Academic Lecture Transcripts - User contributions [en]

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2024-10-18T05:43:03Z

DavidKitFriedman: I don't log in to Wikipedia with any kind of specific frequency, but I've been editing here and there from time to time.

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently editable, but if there was any issue people could try to contact me via my [[w:User_talk:Jjjjjjjjjj|Wikipedia talk page]].

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 05:40, 18 October 2024 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a [https://wikiedu.org/consult-our-expertise/ consulting meeting] with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct, or other errors, and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed as [[wikipedia:Romanization of Russian|romanizations]] of that particular Russian and Bulgarian first name in the Wikipedia article with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2024-10-18T05:40:12Z

DavidKitFriedman: If there's any issue people could seek to contact me via my Wikipedia talk page (there haven't been any issues so far).

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently editable, but if there was any issue people could contact me via my [[w:User_talk:Jjjjjjjjjj|Wikipedia talk page]].

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 05:40, 18 October 2024 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a [https://wikiedu.org/consult-our-expertise/ consulting meeting] with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct, or other errors, and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed as [[wikipedia:Romanization of Russian|romanizations]] of that particular Russian and Bulgarian first name in the Wikipedia article with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s

2024-01-28T00:13:35Z

DavidKitFriedman: Adding link to fuller clip of the scene from the film Network.

== Lecture Overview: Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, today we're going to be talking about globalization in the 1970s. We'll be covering some historical terrain which we've already traversed. But we'll be doing so with a view to a quite different set of historical themes. The big problem that I'm going to be concerned with today is the emergence of what I would characterize as a distinctive new era of globalization in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:24 ]]
<nowiki>[00:24]</nowiki>

You know insofar as I'm going to be dealing with technical topics please you know do feel free to raise your hands and ask if you have questions or would like any clarification. I'm going to try to make this as nontechnical as possible but if you know we end up dealing with technical terms that are perplexing then let me know and I will pause to [[wikt:elucidate|elucidate]] them.

== The Meaning of the Term Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:44 ]]
<nowiki>[00:44]</nowiki>

But I'd like to start with a term that is one of the most confounding terms that we're going to encounter today, and this of course is the term globalization itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:53 ]]
<nowiki>[00:53]</nowiki>

What is globalization? Is it just a phenomenon of the past you know two or three decades or does globalization have a longer history than that? Perhaps a much longer history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:05 ]]
<nowiki>[01:05]</nowiki>

This is a contentious issue. You know historians and political scientists and economists will disagree as to what globalization is and when it begins. It's not my purpose today to try to reconcile those competing definitions. That would be too difficult a task, but rather I should just try to lay out for you how I understand the term globalization. I think my sense of what globalization is probably in line with what most historians who've thought about globalization as a problem would understand that term to mean.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:37 ]]
<nowiki>[01:37]</nowiki>

And this is globalization as a long historical process of social and economic integration. Globalization is the long term sort of integration of societies, nation-states in the modern era, across space. It obviously has a technological aspect. Technology underpins the shrinkage of time and space that is a crucial aspect of globalization's advance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[02:05]</nowiki>

Over time globalization which involves the long term sort of expansion in the scale of social processes from a very local scale to a you know regional even global scale can produce what we might characterize as a increasing interdependence of societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:23 ]]
<nowiki>[02:23]</nowiki>

Interdependence is a term that is distinct from globalization but interdependence can be a state of affairs that globalization produces. As you know the scale of social processes expands as societies become meshed in ever thickening relationships of trade, financial transactions, social and cultural exchange, and so on then these societies can become more interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:48 ]]
<nowiki>[02:48]</nowiki>

And that is to say that developments in one society can have a determining impact on developments elsewhere. Interdependence involves a sort of meshing in the fates of social units.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:01 ]]
<nowiki>[03:01]</nowiki>

Of course when we talk about the modern era nation-states are the principle social units that we're talking about when we discuss globalization at the international scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:11 ]]
<nowiki>[03:11]</nowiki>

It's important when we talk about the history of globalization, even if it is a history that goes back a long way, to acknowledge that the term itself is of relatively recent coinage. It's not until the 1980s, really into the 1990s, that globalization becomes a subject of common discussion in the English language.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[03:32]</nowiki>

What I've have for you here on the slide show is a {{WPExtract|Google Ngram Viewer|Google Ngram}}. Do most of you know what the Google Ngram is?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[03:40]</nowiki>

Okay, the Google Ngram is a really cool tool.<ref>One could also take a look at some [[wikipedia:N-gram#Examples|examples of ''n''-grams in the Wikipedia ''n''-gram article.]]</ref> What it does is it allows you to plot on a time series chart the sort of frequency with which particular words are used in the entire canon of published English language books. As you know Google has been scanning you know sort of the corpus of English language literature held by major university libraries over a period of about ten years now.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:07 ]]
<nowiki>[04:07]</nowiki>

Most of this text has been digitized. And this allows us to see how the usage of particular terms has evolved over time. And this you know is a really good sort of tool for analyzing the evolution of discourse. How does the sort of frequency with which particular used words -- words are used evolve over time?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:27 ]]
<nowiki>[04:27]</nowiki>

And if you look at globalization you can see that globalization is really not used at all in the English language until the 1990s. This is 1990 on the chart. And the frequency with which the word globalization is used increases very dramatically from the early 1990s. So globalization is a term of very recent coinage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50 ]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

Interdependence, which is indicated in the blue line, goes back a lot longer in terms of the sort of frequency with which social scientists and historians and journalists you know really have used the term. Of course interdependence can mean a whole lot of things outside of the context of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:10 ]]
<nowiki>[05:10]</nowiki>

Interdependence when it appears in print can mean you know any number of things. It can be used in any number of contexts. The word globalization has a particular meaning that has to do with international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:22 ]]
<nowiki>[05:22]</nowiki>

So that's a you know quick footnote on the language. I don't know want to belabor that point but just remember that globalization is a relatively new term even if we use it to describe developments that go a long way back.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:34 ]]
<nowiki>[05:34]</nowiki>

In fact just to give you a second footnote on this point the first usage of the term globalization in the English language in print comes in the mid-1980s. It's used in an article in the ''Harvard Business Review''.<ref>The [https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets full text of "The Globalization of Markets" from May 1983] is available on the Harvard Business Review website.</ref>

== Globalization Over the Course of Time ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:48 ]]
<nowiki>[05:48]</nowiki>

But if we think about globalization not just as a phenomenon of recent years but rather as a very long term historical process we can date its origins much, much earlier. If globalization involves simply the expansion in the scale of social and economic processes from the local level to the world scale then globalization could be seen to have begun...as early as the earliest human civilizations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[06:18]</nowiki>

After all processes of sort of interregional trade are familiar to historians of the ancient world. You know one of the accomplishments that the Roman Empire achieves for example is to create a sort of integrated trading arena within the Mediterranean. Roman imperial power will make possible the linkage of North Africa to Europe via you know permanent trade routes. At least trade routes that endure as long as the empire does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:45 ]]
<nowiki>[06:45]</nowiki>

So globalization could be said to have a very old history. It has a history that dates back perhaps as far as the {{WPExtract|Silk Road}} -- at least so far as trade is concerned. If we expand our definition of globalization to include the movement of peoples as well as goods then we might think of the recurrent movements of people from the {{WPExtract|Eurasian Steppe}} into Western Europe and the Middle East as sort of demographic aspects of globalization's long history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:12 ]]
<nowiki>[07:12]</nowiki>

If we think about the diffusion of ideas and ideologies as part of globalization's history then there may be cause to consider the rise of Christianity from about two thousand years ago or the rise of Islam a little more recently than that as globalizing developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:24 ]]
<nowiki>[07:24]</nowiki>

As developments that produce a sort of convergence in belief systems across vast expanses of space. So globalization has a potentially very long history; it has a host of sort of ancient precursors depending of course on how we define it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:44]]
<nowiki>[07:44]</nowiki>

In the modern era globalization accelerates and expands in scope. 1492 is a really important year in the history of globalization. Because we talk about globalizing processes before 1492 we're really talking about developments within the Eurasian world. 1492 is a crucial date because with Columbus's discovery of the New World Eurasia and the America's effect, in effect, become sort of integrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:13]]
<nowiki>[08:13]</nowiki>

At least the moment of departure for a process of global reintegration occurs with the passage of the Columbine threshold. You can think for example about the reintegration of disease across the hemispheres as an example of that with the you know sort of transmission of smallpox to the Americas from Eurasia -- Americans -- which is to say -- indigenous Americans -- become sort of the subjects of an integrated global...environment for disease, and its transmission.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:50 ]]
<nowiki>[08:50]</nowiki>

So the Columbine threshold is important because it brings the Old World and the New together. It creates the possibility for the first time of an integrated global sort of arena on the world scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:04 ]]
<nowiki>[09:04]</nowiki>

Empire in the modern era is a crucial force that pushes forward the advance of globalization. Colonial empires build linkages between continents and between regions. The European trading companies: the {{WPExtract|East India Company|British East India Company}}, the {{WPExtract|Hudson's Bay Company|Hudson Bay Company}}, {{WPExtract|Dutch East India Company|the Dutch VOC, the Dutch East India Company}}, these are all you know sort of crucial builders of globalization. Empires build ships, they build railroads, they build the infrastructure that pulls the world together into a more convergent future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

Of course industrial technology is a crucial underpinning of this imperial era of globalization. As the you know sort of sailing ship is replaced in the 19th century by the steamship the pace of integration can quicken, the pace of global transportation increases, accelerates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:55 ]]
<nowiki>[09:55]</nowiki>

From approximately the 1860s forwards processes of globalization will produce conditions of accelerating and increasing interdependence among nation-states. Especially amongst the nation-states of the North Atlantic world. Globalization in the last decades of the 19th century is most pronounced within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:17 ]]
<nowiki>[10:17]</nowiki>

North America is the principle destination in the late 19th century for British foreign investment overseas. North America is the primary destination for European migrants. Migrants from Europe go elsewhere. They go to Latin America, they go to Australia, they go to New Zealand, but North America is the primary destination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36 ]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

And within the North American world thickening ties of capital mobility, of international trade, and of...demographic movement, the movement of peoples produce something resembling a sort of convergence of economic fortunes. And we can chart this by looking at the convergence of factor prices within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:00 ]]
<nowiki>[11:00]</nowiki>

In 1860 you know wage differentials between North America and Western Europe are very great. North Americans typically earn much, much higher wages then do North, then do West Europeans in 1860.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:13 ]]
<nowiki>[11:13]</nowiki>

By 1900 those differentials have begun to close somewhat. And the reason that they close of course is that Europeans migrate in you know millions and millions annually from Western Europe to North America. And this has an effect of tightening labor markets in North America and loosening labor markets in Western Europe such that the wage differentials you know sort of tend to diminish over time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:40 ]]
<nowiki>[11:40]</nowiki>

Through this era of late 19th century globalization the classical gold standard provides a sort of basic infrastructure as we've discussed for maintaining price stability amongst national currencies. This you know framework is something which makes possible and facilitates the advent of sort of integrative globalizing economic processes. The monetary, the gold standard, for example, reassures investors that the sort of value of investments is not likely to change over time as a consequence of currency price fluctuations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:17 ]]
<nowiki>[12:17]</nowiki>

So the classical gold standard provides a certain sort of institutional stability within which late 19th century globalization can proceed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[12:27]</nowiki>

In the 20th century however really interesting things happen. Globalization does not continue to accelerate. On the contrary globalization is reversed. The First World War is a big [[wikt:exogenous|exogenous]] shock.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:40 ]]
<nowiki>[12:40]</nowiki>

It -- doesn't have much to do with globalization in terms of its origins, the origins of the First World War have to do with the alliance system and Germany's bid for European mastery, but the First World War is nonetheless a sort of catastrophic moment of disrupture for the globalizing world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55 ]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

During the First World War the European belligerent powers throw up you know trade barriers, they throw up {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}}, they take their currencies off the gold standard. And they do all of these things in order to be able to manage their own economies so as to produce the maximal amount possible of war [[wikt:materiel|materiel]].

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:12 ]]
<nowiki>[13:12]</nowiki>

But the effect for the world economy is...a moment of deglobalization. The world economy ceases to integrate. Of course globalizing processes continue during the war and to some extent change direction. New opportunities for example for Latin American food producers arrive as a consequence of Europe's...catastrophic war, but the basic pattern is one of disruption in the second decade of the twentieth century as a consequence of the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:46 ]]
<nowiki>[13:46]</nowiki>

During the 1920s globalization is to some extent restored. This is something that you know we've discussed. There's a restoration of the classical gold standard. Trade begins to pick up from the mid-1920s onwards. But this will be a very fleeting resurgence. The Great Depression really puts an end to a class -- the era of classical globalization. And makes deglobalization permanent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:10 ]]
<nowiki>[14:10]</nowiki>

In the early 1930s countries throw up very substantial barriers to international trade. The {{WPExtract|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act|Smoot–Hawley Tariff}} in the United States is one example of that but it has parallels elsewhere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:21 ]]
<nowiki>[14:21]</nowiki>

International trade grinds to a halt. Governments take their countries off the gold standard and manipulate sort of national currencies with little regard to the international consequences thereof.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:33 ]]
<nowiki>[14:33]</nowiki>

Whether the gold -- world economy can ever be put back together again does not appear entirely obvious at the end of the 1930s. The world has substantially deglobalized. Nation-states have turned in upon themselves. They've become economically more autonomous than ever before.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:50 ]]
<nowiki>[14:50]</nowiki>

It's in this context, as we've discussed, that the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}} tries to orchestrate a qualified reglobalization of the world economy. It was certainly the objective of British and American policy planners at Bretton Woods to establish a framework in which international trade could resume.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:10 ]]
<nowiki>[15:10]</nowiki>

It's one of the reasons that the policy planners who create the Bretton Woods system are so anxious to restore a modicum of international currency stability. Because currency stability is widely believed to be a prerequisite for international trade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:23 ]]
<nowiki>[15:23]</nowiki>

But the Bretton Woods reestablishment of globalization is sharply qualified by a commitment to maintain the macroeconomic autonomy of nation-states. And this is where Keynes's influence on the postwar settlement is pronounced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[15:40]</nowiki>

Keynes argues of course that in order for governments to manage their own economies so as to sustain full employment governments need to be able to work the levers of economic policy -- those levers being fiscal policy and monetary policy. An effective manipulation of fiscal and monetary policy depends upon a certain degree of separation between the national economy and the world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:01 ]]
<nowiki>[16:01]</nowiki>

If your domestic economy is entirely open to international movements of capital for example then it's very, very difficult to regulate a national monetary policy. Because the monetary policy determines the supply of money in the economy and if your borders are open to you know foreign funds washing in and out of your economy then you really can't control your monetary policy on your own terms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:25 ]]
<nowiki>[16:25]</nowiki>

You may have some influence over the sort of direction in which international funds flow whether they flow into or out of your economy but your sort of magnitude of control will be much less in an open market economy than it is in a closed market economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:41 ]]
<nowiki>[16:41]</nowiki>

And Bretton Woods tries to strike a compromise between sort of reglobalization on the one hand and national economic autonomy on the other. And this is really crucial. It's sort of the basis of the postwar economic settlement -- a settlement which tries to combine aspects of market economics with aspects of planned economics in the capitalist West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:04 ]]
<nowiki>[17:04]</nowiki>

This is the mixed economy. This is the economy which we've been talking about. We've talked about the mixed economy sort of within a comparative framework by looking at the experience of different West European economies and comparing them to the United States, but the Bretton Woods framework as I've explained is the international framework within which the mixed economy can flourish. And it's a framework that begins with a compromise between globalization and national policy autonomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:34 ]]
<nowiki>[17:34]</nowiki>

The 1970s are a decade of crucial disjuncture for this postwar compromise. It's in the 1970s that this compromise between the mixed -- this compromise between sort of capitalism and planning, the so-called mixed economy begins to come apart.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:51 ]]
<nowiki>[17:51]</nowiki>

And this process of, you know, deconstruction occurs both within nation-states as the mixed economy compromise breaks down, and at the international level as the Bretton Woods framework breaks down and is replaced by something you know sort of altogether new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:10 ]]
<nowiki>[18:10]</nowiki>

This you know passage from an era of planned capitalist economics to an era of relatively sort of free market economics that occurs during the 1970s is a critical disjuncture for the capitalist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:25 ]]
<nowiki>[18:25]</nowiki>

And it you know can be traced both at the international scale and at the scale of particular national experience. But situated within a larger historical context this disjuncture looks like a really important moment in the larger history of globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:41 ]]
<nowiki>[18:41]</nowiki>

If the mid-20th century from the 1930s through to the 1960s was an era in which globalization was held at bay, held at bay by controls, held at bay by restrictions on the movement of capital and goods, then the 1970s are a period in which globalization accelerates once again. In which the world begins to reglobalize after a long mid-20th century phase in which globalization is held by you know the consensus of governments at bay.

== Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:13 ]]
<nowiki>[19:13]</nowiki>

What are the basic dynamics of globalization in the 1970s? What was globalization in the 1970s? Well globalization in the 1970s is much the same as it had been in the late 19th century. It's a set of processes that tends over time to integrate societies and their economies. Globalization involves in the 1970s, as it had done in the late 19th century, a growing awareness of the basic interdependence of nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:42 ]]
<nowiki>[19:42]</nowiki>

The dynamics of this globalization include the rise of international trade and financial flows. These economic vectors are crucial to the production of a more sort of globalized international economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:57 ]]
<nowiki>[19:57]</nowiki>

But they're not the only signs that a new era of globalization might be taking shape. Economic vectors are very important to the production of economic interdependence. But there's much more to the globalizing shift of the 1970s than that. We might think about sort of the rise of global concerns. Human rights, an issue that we've talked about, is in some aspects a global issue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:21 ]]
<nowiki>[20:21]</nowiki>

Right, the proponents of international human rights proclaim that rights are not a subject for nation-states anymore, that rights are an issue for the international community, that your rights are the same whether you happen to live in Syria or in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:36 ]]
<nowiki>[20:36]</nowiki>

And this is a globalizing shift. It's a globalizing shift in sort of legal discourse. It's a globalizing shift in the scope of rights claims. For most of the modern era the idea of rights had been utterly entwined with the nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[20:52]</nowiki>

It was nation-states that bestowed rights and defended them. Well, the {{WPExtract|Universal Declaration of Human Rights|Universal Declaration in 1948}} signals a sort of move to the global scale but it's in the 1970s that a political, and even a social movement to affirm and uphold that shift in the scale of human rights from the nation-state to the world as a whole really occurs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:12 ]]
<nowiki>[21:12]</nowiki>

So human rights are a global concern that sort of hinge on the 1970s. But there are other global issues too. It's in the 1970s that global environmentalism really takes off as a political movement. Awareness of the basic unity of the planet's biosphere is one factor as we'll discuss that helps to inform a new age of environmental activism and consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:35 ]]
<nowiki>[21:35]</nowiki>

There is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> a glowing awareness that the world, in the, there is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> in the 1970s a growing awareness, that the world constitutes an integrated whole, that the world is not just a patchwork of nation-states. each of which is basically independent and autonomous, that the world constitutes something like an integrated and cohesive system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:57]]
<nowiki>[21:57]</nowiki>

Now this awareness is more pronounced in some spheres of human activity than in others. It's easier to make a you know case for the cohesiveness of the planet's ecology perhaps than it is to make a case for the integration of the world economy, which is you know less tangible. But this basic awareness that the world is integrating, that its fate is you know somehow entwined, is a sort of critical marker of globalization's ascent during the 1970s. Consciousness is very important to the history of globalization.

== The Earthrise Moment ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:32 ]]
<nowiki>[22:32]</nowiki>

Here no single moment is more you know evocative perhaps than you know what I would call the {{WPExtract|Earthrise|Earthrise Moment}}, the moment in December 1968 when Apollo 8 circumnavigates the moon, and takes a picture of the earth from space. And this is the picture that forms the backdrop to this slide.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52 ]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

[[File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24 1022x1024.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Photograph of Planet Earth taken on December 24, 1968 by NASA astronaut William Anders during the Apollo 8 mission (downloaded from [[commons:Main_Page|Wikimedia Commons]]).]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:54 ]]
<nowiki>[22:54]</nowiki>

The ''Earthrise'' image as this becomes known, the photograph is called ''Earthrise'', is not the first image of the world to be taken from space. You know satellites in the 1960s take photographs and return them to earth. But what you get from going to the moon is not only soil samples you also get a unique vantage point on life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:13 ]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

And this is what ''Earthrise'' presents -- a view of the earth as seen from another celestial body -- from the moon.

{{#ev:youtube|https://youtu.be/dE-vOscpiNc||center|Video from NASA reenacting the taking of the ''Earthrise'' photograph (1m 38s excerpt)||start=213&end=321}}

<br />
<br />

And this image becomes very quickly one of the twentieth centuries most iconic images. Lyndon Johnson who's President of the United States at the time of the Apollo 8 expedition sends a copy to every head of state in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:34 ]]
<nowiki>[23:34]</nowiki>

The image adorns a postage stamp in 1969 -- the next year. And the image has profound political implications. What does the image signify? What does it reveal? What does it not reveal?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:48 ]]
<nowiki>[23:48]</nowiki>

The image does not reveal political borders. When you look at the earth from space you don't see nation-states. You don't even see...you know, well, I guess you do see continents, but you don't see...(laughs) (laughter from the class), you don't, but you don't see, a, you don't see the difference between Europe and Asia. You can't really see that when you look at the world from space.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:10 ]]
<nowiki>[24:10]</nowiki>

You see only...you know land and sea and clouds. You see...an integrated ecological unit. You don't see a world divided into sort of politics of nation-states. You don't see an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. You don't see a Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:30 ]]
<nowiki>[24:30]</nowiki>

All you see is an integrated biosphere floating in vast empty space. Of course I know space isn't really empty but this isn't a physics class...so...(laughter from the class).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:40 ]]
<nowiki>[24:40]</nowiki>

And this political, you know, these political implications, are you know very powerful ones, and they help to animate in the 1970s a sense that the world is becoming a singular entity, perhaps that it is a singular entity and needs to be governed and led as such.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:00 ]]
<nowiki>[25:00]</nowiki>

This image -- ''Earthrise'' -- becomes the sort of visual counterpart to a set of discursive claims that you know futurists and visionaries make for the unity of Planet Earth. And this is a theme which you know predates the taking of the photograph itself.

== Futurists and Visionaries on the Unity of Planet Earth ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:17 ]]
<nowiki>[25:17]</nowiki>

During, in 1964, {{WPExtract|Marshall McLuhan}}, sort of media studies scholar, an iconic scholar in the intellectual history of the postwar world, calls the world a {{WPExtract|Global village|global village}}. It's a you know notion that is intended to capture a basic you know sort of interdependence in the affairs of the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:37 ]]
<nowiki>[25:37]</nowiki>

McLuhan argues that the world is you know shrinking as a consequence of you know globalizing processes, the shrinkage of time and space as a consequence of technological innovation, and as a consequence the entire world is coming to resemble a village -- a village in which social life is integrated and interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:54 ]]
<nowiki>[25:54]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Buckminster Fuller}}, an architect and futurist, describes the planet as {{WPExtract|Spaceship Earth}} in 1967. This has a somewhat different set of implications. What Fuller is trying to communicate when he describes the world as Spaceship Earth is the idea that the world...exists kind of alone in space as a finite unit, as a unit with finite resources. Fuller argues that you know political leaders need to be much more aware than they are of the basic limits to the expansion of you know sort of material life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:29 ]]
<nowiki>[26:29]</nowiki>

He says that the world is like a spaceship that is traveling through space and contains only limited supplies. How are those supplies to be conserved and marshaled over time? This is one of the you know sort of conservationist implications that McLuhan pulls -- sorry -- that Buckminster Fuller takes out of the idea that the Earth is a sort of solitary spaceship traveling through the universe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:51 ]]
<nowiki>[26:51]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Lester R. Brown|Lester Brown}}, a Canadian ecologist and diplomat, publishes a book in 1972 titled ''World Without Borders''. Brown is probably more of a pragmatist than either McLuhan or Fuller were but he is no less attentive to a sort of new category of public policy issues that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:11 ]]
<nowiki>[27:11]</nowiki>

Issues that transcend and transgress the borders of nation-states. Issues like you know sort of the global food supply, global population growth, global pollution and so on. I mean these are issues which are becoming increasingly urgent topics of concern in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:27]]
<nowiki>[27:27]</nowiki>

And this photograph really captures how...an evolving consciousness of planetary interdependence might have sort of you know led contemporaries in the 1970s to conclude that global integration demanded new kinds of solutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:49 ]]
<nowiki>[27:49]</nowiki>

So globalization in the 1970s is an intellectual and a perceptual phenomenon as well as an economic one. It's a very complex phenomenon that involves you know sort of processes of integration and accelerating interdependence.

== Questions On Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03 ]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Why did this globalization occur? Was it a consequence of specific choices? Could we see political leaders perhaps as having chosen globalization? Did business leaders push them in this direction?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:19 ]]
<nowiki>[28:19]</nowiki>

Or was globalization something that occurred more as a process of structural change beyond the capacity of sovereign power to orchestrate or promote? This is a very basic question and it's a question which remains very divisive amongst social scientists who study globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:36 ]]
<nowiki>[28:36]</nowiki>

To put it very crudely I would suggest that sort of liberals, people who, accept that the world as it is, you know, presently constituted is more or less the sort of optimal state in which it can be constituted see globalization as a natural or inevitable process, a process that is brought about by structural changes outside of the control of, you know, individual nations or you know sovereign powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:05 ]]
<nowiki>[29:05]</nowiki>

Political radicals on the other hand are probably more inclined to see globalization as the achievement of specific policy choices. You know insofar as the...radical left is critical of globalization the proposition that globalization represents the accomplishment of specific policy choices is an appealing one because it carries with it the implication that different choices could produce a different ordering of global political and economic affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:32 ]]
<nowiki>[29:32]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of political aspect to this question of whether globalization is a choice or not. I don't want to get too caught up in the politics of it today but I wanted just to sort of draw your attention to that point as we consider this very fundamental question. You know to what extent is globalization chosen or to what extent is it produced by structural forces outside of the power of nations and political and economic leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:57 ]]
<nowiki>[29:57]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with {{WPExtract|Neoliberalism|neoliberalism}}? Well, here's a loaded question. What is neoliberalism? Well, we could think of neoliberalism as a set of economic policies that emphasize market determination over determination by government -- as a sort of -- as the optimal means to produce economic outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:18 ]]
<nowiki>[30:18]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with neoliberalism? We'll come back to this question but it's a question that you should bear in mind as we proceed forwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:27 ]]
<nowiki>[30:27]</nowiki>

Finally, what was the scope of globalization in the 1970s? Where did globalization occur? This is a point that is worth thinking about carefully. Insofar as we defined globalization as a process that involves rising interdependence, the acceleration and expansion of transnational movements of goods and ideas and money, it doesn't necessarily follow that globalization affects the entire planet at an even rate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:58 ]]
<nowiki>[30:58]</nowiki>

We should be open to the possibility that globalization was more pronounced among certain countries or within certain regions than it was among others. And my argument about the 1970s would be that globalization in the 1970s was really a phenomenon that occurred among the advanced industrial economies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:18]]
<nowiki>[31:18]</nowiki>

That it is to say within the {{WPExtract|OECD}} world. The OECD is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It encompasses Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:30 ]]
<nowiki>[31:30]</nowiki>

So when we talk about the OECD world we're really talking about sort of the advanced industrial West -- if you want to call it that. And globalization in the '70s was most pronounced among these countries. Later on from the 1980s and subsequently...the rest of the world will come to participate in globalization, but in this initial sort of break through phase it's most pronounced within the OECD universe.

== Questions Overview: Global Dilemmas, Economic Interdependence, Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58 ]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

Okay, well, we're going to try to do today then is...go through the history of this globalizing shift. And I'm going to basically...take you through three aspects of this you know sort of big development that we call globalization. I don't think this this can be a comprehensive history but hopefully I can give you a sense of some of the different aspects to globalization as it proceeds during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:26 ]]
<nowiki>[32:26]</nowiki>

We have about 15 minutes for each theme so we'll try to keep this succinct. First, I want to talk about the emerging awareness in the 1970s of global issues -- that is to say policy dilemmas that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:40 ]]
<nowiki>[32:40]</nowiki>

This is a development that we might call the Shock of the Global. It's a title of a book that I had some involvement with: [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674061866 ''The Shock of the Global''] -- developments that pertain to the world as a whole -- global phenomena, global problems, global issues. How do they strike or shock the policy arena? The world of nation-states in the 1970s? That's our first question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:01 ]]
<nowiki>[33:01]</nowiki>

Second question has to do with the emergence and development of economic interdependence among the advanced capitalist countries, among the countries of the OECD world, how did it happen? What were its you know most important phenomena or symptoms?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:17 ]]
<nowiki>[33:17]</nowiki>

Finally, we're going to talk about the transformation of capitalism in the 1970s. Or the transformation of capitalist economies from the mixed economy synthesis that still is very successful, or appears very successful, at the beginning of the 1970s to the more market oriented policy formulae that nation-states are beginning to embrace at the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:40 ]]
<nowiki>[33:40]</nowiki>

How do we get from the sort of Keynesian world of the 1970s to the world in the 1980s in which sort of so-called neoliberal solutions, more market oriented solutions, are displacing the old Keynesian mixed economy consensus?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:56 ]]
<nowiki>[33:56]</nowiki>

That's our third theme -- the transformation of capitalism. As we work through this I want you to you know reflect upon a number of big questions. How was the world changing? You know what are the big contours of global change during the 1970s? What are the consequences of global integration, of globalization even, for international relations? What does this mean for the basic configuration of international order? What does it mean for the configuration of the international economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:23 ]]
<nowiki>[34:23]</nowiki>

And what are the consequences for individual nation-states? How different does globalization look if we view if from the perspective of a particular nation as opposed from looking at it at the world scale?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:35 ]]
<nowiki>[34:35]</nowiki>

There are other urgent questions too. How did globalization spread beyond the OECD economies to encompass the developing world? A theme of the 1980s and 1990s. What have been globalization's consequences?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:49 ]]
<nowiki>[34:49]</nowiki>

Has globalization made the world happier and more affluent or has it produced unequal, you know, sort of distributions of wealth and you know economic responsibilities? These are questions which will have to wait for our next lecture on globalization on I think April 22nd. It's going to be the lecture titled Contesting Globalization. Today we're going to focus on the sort of early phase of globalization's acceleration during the 1970s.

== Global Dilemmas ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:18 ]]
<nowiki>[35:18]</nowiki>

Okay, global dilemmas. What are global problems? What was the Shock of the Global in the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

You know global problems, global dilemmas, could be construed very simply as the set of problems that escape the managerial regulatory capacities of individual nation-states. They are problems that affect the world as a whole. They might also be construed as problems that attract the attention of the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:47 ]]
<nowiki>[35:47]</nowiki>

You know this is more contestable but there's an argument to be made that issues that unfold within a local or national context but which attract you know sort of global attention and perhaps demand a global response, a famine in sub-Saharan Africa for example, are global issues of a different kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:06 ]]
<nowiki>[36:06]</nowiki>

But what kinds of issue are we talking about when we talk about issues that affect the world as a whole?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:12 ]]
<nowiki>[36:12]</nowiki>

Are there issues that, you know, besides climate change or you know sort of global ecological catastrophe that would seem to you to be global issues of a sort that affect you know multiple nations or perhaps the entire world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:26 ]]
<nowiki>[36:26]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:27 ]]
<nowiki>[36:27]</nowiki>

Yeah, nuclear weapons is a really good one. The possibility of nuclear war is obviously a very global problem.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:36 ]]
<nowiki>[36:36]</nowiki>

Disease is also terrific, you know global public health, because disease respects no barriers of sovereignty, no distinctions between one nation-state and another. Disease that was you know prominent amongst the concerns with which you know sort of policymakers had to grapple, have had to grapple, as the world has become more integrated.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:57 ]]
<nowiki>[36:57]</nowiki>

Energy is also a terrific global issue insofar as the world's energy resources are distributed unequally across space, as is the world's demand for energy, the...process of bringing sort of energy resources to market is an implicitly global dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:18 ]]
<nowiki>[37:18]</nowiki>

We might about other issues that don't necessarily affect the ecological fortune of the planet, but which lie beyond the capacities of sovereign nation-states as being global issues of sorts. You know the illegal drug trade is one good example of an issue that really lies outside of the competence of any nation-state to regulate and manage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:36 ]]
<nowiki>[37:36]</nowiki>

Terrorism is an issue that, you know, sort of lies outside of the capacity of singular nation-states. It requires cooperation amongst nations if it to be effectively engaged and redressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:48 ]]
<nowiki>[37:48]</nowiki>

Why did these kinds of issues attract rising attention in the the 1970s? There are a variety of possible explanations. It could be because they were becoming more urgent. Perhaps the global environment attracted more attention in the 1970s because the rate of its degradation was accelerating.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:04]]
<nowiki>[38:04]</nowiki>

But it's also possible that global issues attracted rising attention in 1970s because of the emerging global consciousness that the ''Earthrise'' photograph signified -- that people like Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan were working hard to cultivate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:21 ]]
<nowiki>[38:21]</nowiki>

So global consciousness can sort of feed engagement with global issues. It's also possible that the diminution of Cold War tensions during the 1970s played a role in creating space in the policy arena for global issues to stake their claim.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:38 ]]
<nowiki>[38:38]</nowiki>

As the urgency of Cold War containment, for example, lessened in the United States, there was more and more time available for policymakers both in the Executive Branch and in the Legislature to pay attention to so-called sort of global issues.

=== The Rise of Global Environmentalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:54 ]]
<nowiki>[38:54]</nowiki>

So the reasons for this are complicated. Let's talk about some specific issues. I'm going to talk first of all about the rise of global environmentalism. We could at the outset draw a distinction between two different kinds of ecological globalization. We might think about the ways in which sort of local environmental catastrophes attract global or transnational opinion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:20 ]]
<nowiki>[39:20]</nowiki>

And indeed oil spills in the 1970s, in particular places, in places like California, in Cornwall off the west coast of England attract global attention. They become sort of, at least for a brief moment, global issues on which international attention fixates. This is significant.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:39 ]]
<nowiki>[39:39]</nowiki>

The fact that you know international audiences are paying more attention during the 1970s to you know for example the deforestation of the Amazon is illustrative of a sort of developing global ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52]</nowiki>

The deforestation of the Amazon may have you know sort of consequences for the global environment as a whole. But it's really a sort of local issue at least in its locus. It affects you know northeastern Brazil primarily. That it is becoming, you know, sort of an increasingly global issue during the 1970s reflects one sort of globalization, a rising sort of international attentiveness, to particular environmental issues or catastrophes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:23 ]]
<nowiki>[40:23]</nowiki>

But there's a second kind of ecological globalization going on during the 1970s and this will involve the rise of concern, or growing concern, with issues affecting the international...ecology as a whole. For example the rise of concern with chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs, in the world's atmosphere is a very global dilemma. CFCs affect not individual nation-states but the entire planet earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:53 ]]
<nowiki>[40:53]</nowiki>

Population growth will be another sort of ecological issue that in the eyes of contemporaries during the 1970s affects the world as a whole and demands global policy responses.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07]</nowiki>

Why was ecological consciousness rising in the 1970s? Why did it rise in the West? Why did in the rise in the United States in particular?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:18 ]]
<nowiki>[41:18]</nowiki>

To some extent the growth of sort of ecological consciousness during the 1970s is a legacy of the 1960s -- of the political and social mobilizations associated with that decade. It might be a legacy even of the counterculture that developed during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:33 ]]
<nowiki>[41:33]</nowiki>

Probably no single published book is more influential upon the rise of an organized environment movement in the United States at least than {{WPExtract|Rachel Carson|Rachel Carson's}} {{WPExtract|Silent Spring|Silent Spring}} -- a book that documented the adverse effects of pollution upon the American ecosystem.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:50 ]]
<nowiki>[41:50]</nowiki>

Whether as a consequence of sort of activism or simply awareness the 1970s bring a rise in sort of organized political mobilizations on behalf of the global environment. New organizations are created. {{WPExtract|Greenpeace}} for example is founded in 1971 with its mission being to protect the Earth's ecology against the encroachment of human activity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:19]]
<nowiki>[42:19]</nowiki>

Environmentalism becomes a popular political cause during the 1970s. The first {{WPExtract|Earth Day}} is held in 1970, and it attracts massive participation. Some 20 million Americans participate in the first Earth Day, so this is one marker of sort of rising ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:38]]
<nowiki>[42:38]</nowiki>

In 1972 the United Nations holds its first international conference on environmental problems which is a marker of how sort of environmentalism is becoming a prominent issue on the global stage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:52 ]]
<nowiki>[42:52]</nowiki>

Where does this awareness come from? Is it just driven by politics? Is it just driven by sort of consciousness? Perhaps. Technology I would suggest also plays an important role in shaping public and political awareness of environmental issues. Space photography as we've already discussed affords a new perspective on Planet Earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:12 ]]
<nowiki>[43:12]</nowiki>

Computers allow scientists to model climate change. So this is an important development. Before computers become cheap enough to be situated in university laboratories it's really difficult for climatologists to develop plausible models of global climate change.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:28 ]]
<nowiki>[43:28]</nowiki>

Once that technology is more readily available then the range of you know sort of opportunities for climate scientists expands.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37]</nowiki>

Satellite imagery also affords sort of kind of a useful research tool. It allows scientists to map deforestation over time because you can take photographs of say the Brazilian rainforest and see how the scope of the forest is retreating in the face of tract farming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:55 ]]
<nowiki>[43:55]</nowiki>

So there are a number of you know sort of developments that go into the production of a ecological environmental moment in the 1970s -- a moment in which rising attention is being paid to the earth's environment and to humankind's fraught relationship with it.

==== Limits to Growth Debate ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:12 ]]
<nowiki>[44:12]</nowiki>

One of the most prominent sort of themes in this global environmental moment of the 1970s will be the limits to growth debate that hinges on the early decades of the 1970s. The limits to growth debate is particularly concerned with population growth though it also emcompasses other forms of economic growth too -- the expansion of industrial production and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:39 ]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

As we think about the sort of discourse on growth and it limits in the 1970s it's important to begin by reminding ourself that population growth and economic growth are from the global perspective overriding themes of the postwar experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:54 ]]
<nowiki>[44:54]</nowiki>

The world's population grows very, very quickly from what, under 3 billion in 1950 to...close to over 4 billion by 1970. Economic growth you know sort of proceeds more or less in tandem with population growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:15 ]]
<nowiki>[45:15]</nowiki>

The world's GDP increases too. And all of this growth creates sort of widespread concern as to...how sustainable growth is. Can the world's population continue to grow at these impressive rates or will growth at some point hit inexorable and inevitable limits, and what then will be the consequences? Will the world's food supply, for example, sustain its rising population or will a growing population at some point face an inevitable famine produced by you know a population increase that expands beyond the capacity of the world to feed it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:53 ]]
<nowiki>[45:53]</nowiki>

These are the issues that the {{WPExtract|Club of Rome}} grapples with in its 1972 report {{WPExtract|The Limits to Growth|''The Limit to Growth''}}<ref>Note that the title is actually ''The Limits to Growth''.</ref>. The Club of Rome is an informal assemblage of demographers and environmentalists, scientists, that convenes in the early 1970s and produces a report that attracts widespread international attention.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:13 ]]
<nowiki>[46:13]</nowiki>

''The Limits to Growth'' argues that the world's population and economic growth rates are unsustainable and it predicts catastrophe if these basic rates of growth are not slowed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:23 ]]
<nowiki>[46:23]</nowiki>

It argues that policymakers need to strive to achieve a so-called stable equilibrium, a situation in which the world's population will not grow, in which there will be zero growth. To achieve this the Club of Rome proposes global management of the world's demographic growth. It's a basic assumption of the Club of Rome that international growth cannot be managed at the national level.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:48 ]]
<nowiki>[46:48]</nowiki>

That global dilemmas demand global solutions. So there's a political implication to this. And it is that nation-states are unable of responding adequately to new global dilemmas.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:00 ]]
<nowiki>[47:00]</nowiki>

Is population growth a security threat? What are its implications for matters of war and peace? This is a question that the United States government actually grapples with. In 1974 the national security council of the United States produces a very lengthy report on population growth as a national security dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:17]]
<nowiki>[47:17]</nowiki>

And the US government concludes that population growth will lead to rising food shortages in the developing world, that these will produce political instability, and that the consequences will be upheaval, that you know could be disadvantageous to the national interests of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:34 ]]
<nowiki>[47:34]</nowiki>

So much as national security specialists in recent years have begin to engage with global climate change as a national security threat so too did national security specialists in the 1970s address population growth as a sort of national security challenge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:51 ]]
<nowiki>[47:51]</nowiki>

If this is the threat what is to be done about it? How can the world's population be controlled or managed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:59 ]]
<nowiki>[47:59]</nowiki>

The developing countries, you know, emphasize contraception and family planning as the means to control a accelerating or expanding global population. They promote these policies with particular regard to the developing world. Here of course reactions will be somewhat mixed. China is an interesting case because China decides of its own volition to support you know policies to control and limit the growth of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:29 ]]
<nowiki>[48:29]</nowiki>

In 1978 China implements a {{WPExtract|One-child policy|one-child policy}}. This is a policy that repudiates Mao Zedong's conviction that there could never be too many Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong saw population growth as a source of national strength. But in 1978 the post-Maoist regime rebukes, you know, this view very powerfully.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:51]]
<nowiki>[48:51]</nowiki>

It introduces a one-child policy, a policy that is often brutal in its implementation and in its consequences, but which does succeed in ending China's long history of recurrent food catastrophe. Famines were until 1978 a recurrent aspect of China's historical experience. After 1978, or since 1978, China has not experienced a famine. And China has been better able to feed itself since making a sort of self-conscious decision to limit the expansion of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:23 ]]
<nowiki>[49:23]</nowiki>

But other developing countries are much less enthusiastic than China is to limit their growth in the name of global stability. Developing countries ask, quite reasonably, why should we impose limits on our growth, when the West has grown over a period of centuries within any limits to its growth? The population of Britain expands for example from about 5 to 6 million at the beginning of the 19th century to 30 million by the end of the 19th century. That's a six fold increase over a period of a hundred years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:57]]
<nowiki>[49:57]</nowiki>

Why should developing countries not have the opportunity to expand like Britain has done? To industrialize like Britain has done? From their perspective, which are national perspectives, the imperatives of national growth take precedence over the regulation of the world's population as a whole.

===== The Green Revolution =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16]</nowiki>

Of course the catastrophe that is predicted by the Club of Rome does not come to pass -- at least not yet. It doesn't come to pass in the 1970s. The limits to growth are avoided, or at least the limits are moved.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:29]]
<nowiki>[50:29]</nowiki>

To explain this we need to think about how global agricultural production develops during the 1970s. One of the critical innovations of this decade is a set of associated transformations in agricultural practices in the developing world that are collectively known as the {{WPExtract|Green Revolution}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:49 ]]
<nowiki>[50:49]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution involves high yield varieties of grain, the pioneer of which, probably the most important pioneer of which, is the agronomist {{WPExtract|Norman Borlaug}} pictured in the slide. Perhaps the most important you know figure in the history of the twentieth century whom you've never heard of.

[[File:Norman Borlaug, 2004 (cropped).jpg|thumb|250px|center|Norman Borlaug in 2004]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:05 ]]
<nowiki>[51:05]</nowiki>

How many of you had heard of Norman Borlaug before? Okay, one or two. I mean this is a man whose sort of consequence for world history I mean far, far outweighs the reach of his reputation. The high yield grain varieties which he pioneers at the University of Iowa -- I mean are...above all what enables the developing world to escape the {{WPExtract|Malthusianism|Malthusian}} trap that the Club of Rome prophesies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:30 ]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

But high yield grain varieties are not all that the Green Revolution depends upon. Fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and the mechanization of agriculture all help to expand grain yields.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:42 ]]
<nowiki>[51:42]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution has transformative consequences for global food production. It enables the increase of agricultural production by a factor of about two or three. So production of food per hectare of land can double or even triple thanks to the application of these advanced farming techniques.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:02 ]]
<nowiki>[52:02]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution on a global scale represents the ecological equivalent of discovering an entirely new North America. It's as if you could create another, you know, continent the size of North America, stick it in the Pacific Ocean and use it to grow food on. That's what the green revolution accomplishes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:19 ]]
<nowiki>[52:19]</nowiki>

So the Green Revolution will allow a growing world to feed itself. Of course the Green Revolution is a one-time fix. You can't continue to expand grain yields beyond the levels that are attained or, you know, in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:35]]
<nowiki>[52:35]</nowiki>

So whether the dire warnings that the club of Rome offered in the early 1970s are you know still relevant just to a different generation, perhaps our generation, as opposed to the generation of our parents, is an interesting question. It's a discomforting question too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:53 ]]
<nowiki>[52:53]</nowiki>

Because the quick fix that the Green Revolution offered will not necessarily be so easy to achieve as global population once again approaches the limits of global food production. Still the Green Revolution in its own time represents a important, you know, vitally important, accomplishment. It's benefits are particularly pronounced for the developing world.

=== The Economic Divergence Between the West and the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:19 ]]
<nowiki>[53:19]</nowiki>

Of course in larger terms the developing world continues to lag behind the advanced industrial West. What this chart shows you is GDP per capita organized on a regional basis over the entire second half of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:37]]
<nowiki>[53:37]</nowiki>

And what the data shows is that during the 1970s the developing world continues to lag behind the countries of Western Europe, and you know what I've identified here as the Western offshoots -- North America, Australia, and New Zealand -- the settler societies populated primarily by Europeans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:59 ]]
<nowiki>[53:59]</nowiki>

These Western countries continue to proceed far ahead of the developing world. And this divergence in human realities at a time of rising awareness of planetary integration is an awkward thing, it's an uncomfortable thing, and it's a challenge that leaders of developing world countries strive to overcome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:23 ]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

At a time when developing countries are becoming more modern, when literacy is spreading, when inhabitants of developing societies are beginning to have you know expanded access to television, television that affords a window on Western lifestyles, human aspirations in the 1970s are beginning to converge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:43 ]]
<nowiki>[54:43]</nowiki>

And this is a really important theme which attracts you know quite widespread attention in the sort of international relations scholarship of the era: convergent human aspirations in a time of widespread modernization. But the disjoint between the convergence of human aspirations and the ongoing divergence of human realities is striking. Even as the world is becoming one the West continues to have a whole lot more than the developing world does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:14 ]]
<nowiki>[55:14]</nowiki>

Westernerns continue to have more than their counterparts in the developing world. How are these basic inequalities to be overcome? The experience of the 1970s offers few answers. Developing economies continue to adhere to the ISI led growth strategies which had been so popular for the generation of, for the first generation of post colonial leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:36]]
<nowiki>[55:36]</nowiki>

There's some experimentation with alternative growth models, growth models more oriented towards exports in a few places, places like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, will experiment will export led growth models that sort of connect developing economies to the expanding global economy. But for the most developing countries remain in the 1970s beholden to nationalistic growth strategies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:03 ]]
<nowiki>[56:03]</nowiki>

Yet all is not well in the developing world during the 1970s. ISI led growth is, by the 1970s, failing to deliver the returns that it had promised to achieve. The oil shocks are a big exogenous crisis for most developing economies. For all developing world economies that don't produce their own oil a four fold increase in the rise in the price of energy inputs is catastrophic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:27]]
<nowiki>[56:27]</nowiki>

It produces price inflation. Price inflation in turn produces political instability. If you want to explain why India, the developing world's exemplary postcolonial democracy, experienced a brief period in which ordinary democratic rules were suspended, the so-called {{WPExtract|The Emergency (India)|Emergency of 1975 to 1977}}, you should pay some reference to the influence of the oil crisis on India's economics and its politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:53 ]]
<nowiki>[56:53]</nowiki>

At a time of rampant inflation, of rising political instability, {{WPExtract|Indira Gandhi}} in 1975 declares a brief emergency during which the rule of law is suspended. So the developing world struggles in an era of accelerating interdependence and this becomes a concern even for the leaders of the rich industrial world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:12 ]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What are to be the solutions to the divergence between the developing world's aspirations and its enduring poverty? Developing world leaders in the 1970s propose a radical reform of the international economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:27 ]]
<nowiki>[57:27]</nowiki>

A new bloc emerges at the United Nations, the so-called {{WPExtract|Group of 77|G77}} Bloc -- a self-conscious counterpart to the {{WPExtract|Group of Seven|G7}} -- the advanced industrial club. The G77 argues for a radical transformation in the international terms of trade. It argues for a set of international cartel agreements that will raise the price for the developing world's agricultural output. You know cartels on the model of OPEC for the producers of other primary commodities like coffee and rubber and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:56 ]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

Developing world political leaders talk about a new international economic order -- an economic order that will be oriented towards the achievement of international distributive justice. These initiatives ultimately come to nothing. What happens instead will be that the developing world comes from the 1980, from the 1980s onwards, to participate increasingly in the globalizing international economic system that takes shape in the West during the 1970s.

== Economic Interdependence ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:25 ]]
<nowiki>[58:25]</nowiki>

And it's to this Western system that we should now turn. I'll try to be brief and succinct.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32]]
<nowiki>[58:32]</nowiki>

Let's start just by reminding ourselves that the West at the end of the 1960s is still very much in the throes of the economic controls that are established during the 1930s and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:50]]
<nowiki>[58:50]</nowiki>

At the end of the 1960s {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}} continue to restrict the international movement of money. Trade barriers have been liberalized somewhat. But international trade is still sort of relatively small-scale in relation to the size of Western capitalist economies. This is a point which we can perhaps illustrate most succinctly by looking at the data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:13 ]]
<nowiki>[59:13]</nowiki>

I'm just going to show you data from one nation-state here. Because it's in some ways easiest to look at this phenomenon from a particular national perspective. The chart on the right of the slide shows the interdependence of the United States with the larger world economy in the financial sector and in the trade sector.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:34 ]]
<nowiki>[59:34]</nowiki>

And what you can see is that in 1950 US sort of interdependence, financially and in terms of trading goods, is much lower than it will become by the sort of 1980s and 1990s. The value of annual trade flows both exports and imports as a fraction of US GDP increases very rapidly particularly from the 1970s. The US becomes increasingly enmeshed with the larger global economy from the 1970s forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:03]</nowiki>

Similarly US stocks of you know, stocks of foreign investment in the United States plus US owned stocks of foreign investment elsewhere, sort of financial interdependence, increases dramatically particularly from the 1980s onwards. The US becomes from the 1970s and 1980s much more enmeshed with the larger global economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:29]</nowiki>

How does this happen? Technology plays a role. We should think if we want to explain processes of financial and trade globalization about the role of technological innovations. Communication satellites which become available from the late 1960s onwords accelerate the velocity with which information can be transmitted around the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:51]</nowiki>

New transatlantic cables, fiber optic cables from the 1980s, reduce the costs of transmitting information and this is really crucial. It facilitates other changes, like the growth of multinational corporations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:04]</nowiki>

There are changes that are more you know prosaic than the advent of high technology communications -- simple changes in techniques. The containerization of shipping: a development that begins in the late 1960s. I don't know did any of you see today's ''San Francisco Chronicle''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:19]</nowiki>

I needn't have asked; nobody reads the ''San Francisco Chronicle''. (laughter from the class). But...there's an interesting story...interesting in its relation to today's lecture. Apparently today or yesterday the biggest ship ever to enter the San Francisco Bay entered the San Francisco Bay.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:36]</nowiki>

And this is a container ship. It's a container ship that holds a third more containers than the previous biggest container ship to enter the San Francisco Bay. I don't remember how much but you can look it up in the Chronicle. But the containerization of shipping is a development that has huge implications for international trade. Substantially reduces transportation costs over the you know sort of medium to long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:58]</nowiki>

Computers are also very important to the story of globalization. They facilitate the outsourcing of production -- the movement of goods. It's very difficult to have containerization without computers because who knows where all the goods are on the boat if you don't have a computer, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:14]</nowiki>

It's very important to have a sort of computer card index that explains what...which containers contain which goods and where they need to go. So the advent of sort of high-tech computer based systems for managing the shipment of goods is an important aspect. These are sort of to a great extent interlinked developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:32]</nowiki>

And they produce substantial changes in the structure of the global economy. Consider the rise of the multinational corporation. This is one of the signal developments of the 1970s. One of the really important, really powerful symptoms, that suggest that big things are changing in the structure of the international economy.

=== Multinational Corporations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:51]]
<nowiki>[1:02:51]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations are crucial -- are crucial motors of globalization. Up to a third of all international trade is [https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7262 intra-firm] trade -- which is to say it occurs within corporations

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:04.]]
<nowiki>[1:03:04.]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations don't only move goods they also move knowledge and techniques -- techniques for manufacturing you know particular commodities, and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17]</nowiki>

The history of multinational corporations of course goes back a long way. I referred earlier in the lecture to the European trading companies of the 18th century: the British East India Company, the Dutch VOC -- these could be seen as precursors to the modern multinational corporation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:32]</nowiki>

But there are crucial distinctions to be made. The modern multinational corporation is different in key respects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:40]</nowiki>

Whereas foreign direct investment in the age of British imperialism had tended to take the form of standalone investments, you know, the creation of a you know sort of British financed railroad in North America for example. Foreign direct investment, after the Second World War involves the creation of vast networks of corporate subsidiaries and affiliates. IBM for example will invest aggressively in the creation of research and production facilities in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:12]</nowiki>

It's not creating standalone investments that manage themselves. Rather it's creating subsidiary branches of the IBM corporation linked within some vast transnational corporate structure.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:24 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:24]</nowiki>

One of the key developments which really distinguishes the modern multinational corporation from its historical predecessors is the transnationalization of production. The breakdown in effect of the old factory conveyor belt into...a set of separate processes that can be parceled out internationally so as to take advantage of the comparative advantages that particular nations offer as sites for particular phases of the productive process.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:53]</nowiki>

So Apple for example can design a computer here in you know Cupertino, California where you know skilled knowledge workers are readily available. And then outsource the manufacturing of that computer to China where you know cheap skilled labor is available to assemble the whole thing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:09]</nowiki>

And of course the you know process is much more complicated than that. Because the computer that is assembled in China is not manufactured entirely in China. You know the aluminum that goes into it will be mined somewhere else based upon the comparative availability of aluminum and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:23 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:23]</nowiki>

The transnationalization of production is a distinctive and novel characteristic of the modern multinational. And it depends upon the modularization of production -- upon the breaking down of productive processes into distinct steps that can be outsourced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:40]</nowiki>

The idea that you know...article like a computer would be manufactured in the same factory complex in which it's designed -- you know that's a 19th century model of capitalism or maybe an early 20th century model of capitalism. It is not how the transnational corporation works. The transnational corporation will disaggregate production so as to be able to take advantages of the comparative -- so as to be able to benefit from the comparative advantages that an integrating global economy offers.

=== Foreign Direct Investment Within the Capitalist West ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:08 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:08]</nowiki>

Where does this mostly happen? I mean what is the scope of the multinationalization of business during the 1970s? Here the answer may be surprising.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:18]</nowiki>

If we look at where the money goes, where foreign direct investment takes place, then what we see is that during the 1970s most foreign direct investment occurs within the OECD economies, among Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:35]</nowiki>

Western corporations are investing in Western countries for the most part. The developing world receives much less FDI from the United States than Western Europe does. Indeed Western Europe is the principle, you know sort of site of development, for the modern you know multinational business. American car corporations, American computer corporations and so on, create affiliates in Western Europe -- not in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:00]</nowiki>

The United States itself is a recipient of substantial FDI. German car manufacturers for example will invest heavily in the southern states of the United States in production facilities. Why do they do this? Why do Western businesses invest in other Western countries?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:20]</nowiki>

Well, there are advantages in this multinationalization of production. It enables corporations to surmount tariff barriers. Mercedes doesn't have to pay American import duties on a car that it manufactures in the United States. So it makes their products more competitive in US markets. It also locates the production of the products closer to the markets in which they can be sold.

=== The Implications of Economic Interdependence in the Larger World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:43 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:43]</nowiki>

So it reduces you know transportation costs. What are the consequences of this for international relations? What does the rise of the multinational signify about the changing state of world affairs?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:54]]
<nowiki>[1:07:54]</nowiki>

Here one of the most sort of articulate spokespeople for the transformative impact of multinationalization is {{WPExtract|Jacques Maisonrouge}} -- a man who was himself an exemplary sort of multinational businessman. Maisonrouge was a French engineer who became a high level vice president at IBM. He was IBM's vice president for international operations in the late '60s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:18]</nowiki>

Maisonrouge also became a sort of notoriously effective spokesperson for the transformation that multinational business was producing. And here's an example. The world's political structures are completely obsolete Maisonrouge declared in a public speech. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the global optimization of resources and the independence of nation-states.<ref>As quoted in [https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/23/archives/planet-earth-a-whollyowned-subsidiary.html ''The New York Times'' from January 23, 1975], Maisonrouge said, "The world's political structures are completely obsolete. They have not changed in at least a hundred years and are woefully out of tune with technological progress. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the search for global optimization of resources and the independence of nation‐states."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:40]</nowiki>

So for Maisonrouge national sovereignty, political sovereignty, isn't anachronism. It's just an impediment to the the most efficient possible allocation of resources -- something that multinational corporations are much better positioned than nation-states to accomplish.

== The Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:58]</nowiki>

Let's talk next about finance. Talked about production -- what about finance? The story of financial globalization begins in the 1960s. Here the signal development is the rise of the Euromarket? What is the Euromarket?<ref>Along with [[wikt:Euromarket|Wiktionary]], [https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/euromarket.asp Investopedia] and the [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/euromarket Cambridge English Dictionary] have definitions for the term. Some sources are capitalizing while others are not. In [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-superpower-transformed-9780195395471?cc=us&lang=en& ''A Superpower Transformed''] by Daniel Sargent the word is capitalized.</ref> The Euromarket is an offshore market for dollars -- held mostly in London.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:21]</nowiki>

It grows quickly during the 1960s and plays a role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The end of Bretton Woods delivers a further impetus to the globalization of finance. It creates opportunities for bankers to you know profit from [[wikt:arbitrage|arbitrage]] based upon fluctuating currency values. The petrodollar crisis as I've already discussed further bolsters the development of a globalizing financial system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:47]</nowiki>

Banks can profit through the recycling of petrodollar earnings, earnings that accrue to the exporting states, by lending those monies to oil importers so as to finance the balance of payments deficits that the oil crisis produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:04]</nowiki>

So the history of financial globalization really hinges on a series of key developments in the late '60s and early '70s. The rise of the Euromarkets, an offshore market for dollars based in London, the end of the Bretton Woods system and the opportunities that that creates for sort of further financial globalization. And the oil crisis which delivers a big shot in the arm to financial market integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:29]</nowiki>

What are the underlying causes? Technology is important, the reduction in the costs of communications technology facilitates the rise of international banking.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:41]</nowiki>

Business innovation is important. You know bankers are adept at devising ways to avoid the capital controls that nation-states try to implement to restrict the international movement of funds.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:52]</nowiki>

Policy choices are also important. Governments decide to reduce controls on international capital mobility. The United States in 1974 removes all of the capital controls which had been you know...used during the Bretton Woods era to defend the fixed exchange rate of the dollar. Great Britain in 1979 follows suit and removes all of its capital controls.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:17]</nowiki>

West European countries, other West European countries, will follow in the 1980s. So there are policy choices that are made to...accept if not to advance the cause of financial globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:30]</nowiki>

Financial globalization has important political consequences. It renders national macroeconomies more interdependent -- far more interdependent than they had been in the heyday of the Bretton Woods era. It also raises the you know prospect that national economic sovereignty is being you know sort of penetrated by, qualified by, free floating movements of global financial capital.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:55]]
<nowiki>[1:11:55]</nowiki>

This is remarked upon at the time, I'm going to show you a video clip even though I don't have time really that comes from a terrific 1976 movie {{WPExtract|Network (1976 film)|''Network''}} in which one of the characters, Ned Beatty, played by {{WPExtract|Ned Beatty}}<ref>Speaker was clarifying that he was saying the name of the actor and not the name of the character -- the name of the character being Arthur Jensen.</ref>, delivers a sort of [[wikt:homily|homily]] on the globalization of finance and it's implications for international politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:15]</nowiki>

<span id="network_clip"></span>''Arthur Jensen: You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians. There are no Arabs. There are no Third Worlds. There is no West. There is only one holistic system of systems. One vast and [[wikt:immane|immane]], interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of dollars: petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars, reichmarks, rins, rubles, pounds, and shekels.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:52]]
<nowiki>[1:12:52]</nowiki>

''Arthur Jensen: It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet.''<ref>A fuller clip of the scene can be found on the website ''American Rhetoric'': [https://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechnetwork4.html Arthur Jensen Pitches Economic Determinism's New World Order to Howard Beale. (4 min. 30 sec.)]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:02]</nowiki>

This is a great movie. One of my favorite '70s movies, so I really recommend it if you haven't seen it. But...it gives you a sense of the...discourse of the time, a discourse that is really not so different from the discourse of our own times when it comes to the relationship between global finance and nationality constituted political authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:22]</nowiki>

Indeed the acceleration of financial interdependence, the rise of the multinational corporation during the '70s, create a set of questions as to the future of political management of economic affairs. Is public policy up to the task or does globalization render national regulation irrelevant or ultimately futile?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:44]</nowiki>

Perhaps there is is a dynamic in play whereby globalization, a process that enables business actors and financial actors to escape the bounds of national regulation implies an implicit process of deregulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:59]</nowiki>

That would be you know kind of logical enough to infer. Insofar at capital becomes in a globalizing world less subject to the jurisdiction of national political authorities what restrictions, what regulations, are to bind business actors? These are questions that globalization conjures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:19]</nowiki>

One alternative would be the reconstitution of regulation on a transnational or even global scale. Can nation-states cooperate to achieve the kinds of sort of regulatory function collectively that individual nation-states used to be able to exercise within their own sort of territorial domains? This is one possibility. International organizations like the International Monetary Fund try during the 1970s to reconstitute stable sort of institutional regulatory arrangements on a transnational scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:52]</nowiki>

The IMF tries to devise sort of new rules for international monetary order to replace the Bretton Woods rules that collapsed in 1971 to 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:02]</nowiki>

Compromise on sort of the constitution of a recast international regulatory order proves very difficult to accomplish however. In part this is because the interests of nation-states are enduringly national and there not always convergence. Instead market determination, at least of currency values, ends up being the de facto solution to the management of international monetary relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:25]</nowiki>

It's too difficult to get nations to agree on a sort of consensual multilateral framework for managing currency values in a post Bretton Woods world. So the de facto alternative is to let markets determine the value of currencies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:38]</nowiki>

Still governments will come together to manage at least the most disruptive aspects of economic globalization. This is something that the {{WPExtract|Trilateral Commission}} proposes. We've talked a little about the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral Commission in essence comes into being as a sort of answer to the question of what are globalization's implications for governance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:03]</nowiki>

The trilateral concept is that an informal dialog amongst business leaders, policymakers and academics within the OECD countries will be able to devise sort of consensual solutions that countries will follow of their own volition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:17]</nowiki>

By consequence we see the rise of new relationships of policy coordination during the 1970s. The most sort of important symbol of which is the G7 summits -- summits that begin in the mid-1970s and continue through to the present day.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:31]</nowiki>

But still the question of whether globalization necessarily limits the scope of government endures. Will it ever be possible for governments acting collectively and multilaterally to regulate and to govern economies so effectively as nation-states had once been able to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:49]</nowiki>

Here we have to you know sort of ask the question of whether governments in the 1970s are becoming less willing, less eager, to attempt the tasks of economic regulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:00]</nowiki>

The Keynesian consensus after all experiences a crisis during the 1970s. Interdependence makes it harder for governments to exercise the regulatory managerial responsibilities that Keynes argued that they should exercise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:15]</nowiki>

The great inflation disrupts the credibility of Keynesian solutions as a sort of plausible framework for managing national macroeconomies. Instead classical liberalism, liberalism that emphasizes the utility of markets as mechanisms for determining the allocation of scarce resources, reasserts itself. After Keynes, {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek}} the exemplary sort of liberal economist of the twentieth century, experiences a heyday.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:44]</nowiki>

Hayek's writings become widely circulated and widely discussed in the 1970s. Hayek will -- wins the Nobel Prize for economics in 1974 -- which is illustrative of the ways in which the priorities of professional economists are shifting.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:59]</nowiki>

But the most influential economist of the decade is not Hayek who by this point is a very old man but {{WPExtract|Milton Friedman}}. A liberal economist who insists upon the preferability of market-based solutions over regulatory solutions. Friedman argues that government has gotten too big in the age of Keynes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:19]]
<nowiki>[1:18:19]</nowiki>

That big government is part of the problem. That government is responsible for the inflationary crisis of the 1970s -- for the failure of sort of growth to reassert itself. Friedman offers a set of radical solutions: spending cuts, tight money policies, reduction in sort of interest, increase in interest rates that will he argues quench the great inflation of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:42]</nowiki>

But the basic concept is one that advocates markets as the solution to the ills that ail the West. The rediscovery of markets is a overriding theme in the sort of economic thought, professional economics thought, of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:58]</nowiki>

But how and when is it translated into policy practice? Great Britain here is in the vanguard of the neoliberal shift. Intellectuals within the {{WPExtract|Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party}}, in particular {{WPExtract|Keith Joseph}}, who'll you have the opportunity to read about in this week's reading package, offer a set of neoliberal policy solutions as a prescription for the dilemmas of the Keynesian welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:20]</nowiki>

In Britain it's Margaret Thatcher who puts this neoliberal synthesis into action as Prime Minister -- a role that she assumes in 1979 when she leads the Conservative Party to election victory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:31]</nowiki>

Thatcher privatizes some of the state industries that had been nationalized after the Second World War. She privatizes coal and steel. She privatizes electricity. She privatizes telecommunications. She implements a broader set of market oriented reforms. She enables sort of individuals who live in public housing for example to purchase the public housing units that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:51]</nowiki>

She argues that this will create a stakeholder society in which individuals have a sort of direct investment in the housing that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:02]</nowiki>

How crucial was Thatcher? Well, this is a question that we can sort of discuss when we return to the neoliberal shift. But let's, by way of conclusion, think about the ways in which similar changes proceed elsewhere including in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

In the United States it was not a Republican administration, an administration of the right, but a Democratic administration that made the first really key moves. Jimmy Carter as President is unfortunate enough to inherit a stagnant economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:30]</nowiki>

He's caught in a very difficult bind. Inflation is a huge dilemma for the Carter administration. How to slay inflation? That's one big policy dilemma. On the other hand unemployment is a big problem for the Carter administration in the second half of the 1970s. How to expand employment? How to reduce unemployment? These are the two dilemmas that Carter has to, has to address.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:52]</nowiki>

At the same time Carter is eager to deregulate the economy. He has a small business background. He believes that excessive regulation is stifling to business and innovation. So the Carter administration makes moves to deregulate trucking and aviation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:07]</nowiki>

Around the same time a Supreme Court decision results in the effective deregulation of some personal financial services. The details are not important. What's important is the ways in which these shifts adhere to a common logic, a logic of deregulation, a logic of market determination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:25]</nowiki>

Carter initially prioritizes the fight over inflation. He pursues a stimulus package to expand the economy, to put Americans back to work, but in 1979 he makes a key shift to prioritize the fight against inflation over the fight against unemployment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:39]</nowiki>

This is a shift that is...sort of a key pivot in the transition from Keynesian welfare economics to what we would -- might characterize instead as neoliberal economics. Economics more oriented with market solutions, with allowing markets to determine their own sort of trajectories.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:00]</nowiki>

The Reagan administration essentially accepts the policy synthesis that Carter produces. Reagan will cut tax rates and continue deregulation. But Reagan does not orchestrate much sort of radical reform beyond that which has already been set in motion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:15]</nowiki>

On the contrary he will govern as a pragmatic President who has to rule with a Democratic legislature. So the United States experiences a sort of shift towards the market at around the same time that Great Britain does. But it's a shift that occurs under a different kind of administration, a Democratic center-left administration, rather than a Conservative center-right administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:35]</nowiki>

And this ought to provocative as we think about the role that politics play in determining the sort of market oriented shifts of the 1970s. You know these are issues that we'll return to and they're issues that you'll engage in your readings and your section discussions. But what's clear is that by the end of the 1970s the capitalist world is headed in a very different direction from that which it appeared to be following at the beginning of the decade.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s

2024-01-28T00:01:21Z

DavidKitFriedman: Seeking to make it so that it's possible to link to the excerpt from the film Network

== Lecture Overview: Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, today we're going to be talking about globalization in the 1970s. We'll be covering some historical terrain which we've already traversed. But we'll be doing so with a view to a quite different set of historical themes. The big problem that I'm going to be concerned with today is the emergence of what I would characterize as a distinctive new era of globalization in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:24 ]]
<nowiki>[00:24]</nowiki>

You know insofar as I'm going to be dealing with technical topics please you know do feel free to raise your hands and ask if you have questions or would like any clarification. I'm going to try to make this as nontechnical as possible but if you know we end up dealing with technical terms that are perplexing then let me know and I will pause to [[wikt:elucidate|elucidate]] them.

== The Meaning of the Term Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:44 ]]
<nowiki>[00:44]</nowiki>

But I'd like to start with a term that is one of the most confounding terms that we're going to encounter today, and this of course is the term globalization itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:53 ]]
<nowiki>[00:53]</nowiki>

What is globalization? Is it just a phenomenon of the past you know two or three decades or does globalization have a longer history than that? Perhaps a much longer history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:05 ]]
<nowiki>[01:05]</nowiki>

This is a contentious issue. You know historians and political scientists and economists will disagree as to what globalization is and when it begins. It's not my purpose today to try to reconcile those competing definitions. That would be too difficult a task, but rather I should just try to lay out for you how I understand the term globalization. I think my sense of what globalization is probably in line with what most historians who've thought about globalization as a problem would understand that term to mean.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:37 ]]
<nowiki>[01:37]</nowiki>

And this is globalization as a long historical process of social and economic integration. Globalization is the long term sort of integration of societies, nation-states in the modern era, across space. It obviously has a technological aspect. Technology underpins the shrinkage of time and space that is a crucial aspect of globalization's advance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[02:05]</nowiki>

Over time globalization which involves the long term sort of expansion in the scale of social processes from a very local scale to a you know regional even global scale can produce what we might characterize as a increasing interdependence of societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:23 ]]
<nowiki>[02:23]</nowiki>

Interdependence is a term that is distinct from globalization but interdependence can be a state of affairs that globalization produces. As you know the scale of social processes expands as societies become meshed in ever thickening relationships of trade, financial transactions, social and cultural exchange, and so on then these societies can become more interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:48 ]]
<nowiki>[02:48]</nowiki>

And that is to say that developments in one society can have a determining impact on developments elsewhere. Interdependence involves a sort of meshing in the fates of social units.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:01 ]]
<nowiki>[03:01]</nowiki>

Of course when we talk about the modern era nation-states are the principle social units that we're talking about when we discuss globalization at the international scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:11 ]]
<nowiki>[03:11]</nowiki>

It's important when we talk about the history of globalization, even if it is a history that goes back a long way, to acknowledge that the term itself is of relatively recent coinage. It's not until the 1980s, really into the 1990s, that globalization becomes a subject of common discussion in the English language.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[03:32]</nowiki>

What I've have for you here on the slide show is a {{WPExtract|Google Ngram Viewer|Google Ngram}}. Do most of you know what the Google Ngram is?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[03:40]</nowiki>

Okay, the Google Ngram is a really cool tool.<ref>One could also take a look at some [[wikipedia:N-gram#Examples|examples of ''n''-grams in the Wikipedia ''n''-gram article.]]</ref> What it does is it allows you to plot on a time series chart the sort of frequency with which particular words are used in the entire canon of published English language books. As you know Google has been scanning you know sort of the corpus of English language literature held by major university libraries over a period of about ten years now.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:07 ]]
<nowiki>[04:07]</nowiki>

Most of this text has been digitized. And this allows us to see how the usage of particular terms has evolved over time. And this you know is a really good sort of tool for analyzing the evolution of discourse. How does the sort of frequency with which particular used words -- words are used evolve over time?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:27 ]]
<nowiki>[04:27]</nowiki>

And if you look at globalization you can see that globalization is really not used at all in the English language until the 1990s. This is 1990 on the chart. And the frequency with which the word globalization is used increases very dramatically from the early 1990s. So globalization is a term of very recent coinage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50 ]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

Interdependence, which is indicated in the blue line, goes back a lot longer in terms of the sort of frequency with which social scientists and historians and journalists you know really have used the term. Of course interdependence can mean a whole lot of things outside of the context of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:10 ]]
<nowiki>[05:10]</nowiki>

Interdependence when it appears in print can mean you know any number of things. It can be used in any number of contexts. The word globalization has a particular meaning that has to do with international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:22 ]]
<nowiki>[05:22]</nowiki>

So that's a you know quick footnote on the language. I don't know want to belabor that point but just remember that globalization is a relatively new term even if we use it to describe developments that go a long way back.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:34 ]]
<nowiki>[05:34]</nowiki>

In fact just to give you a second footnote on this point the first usage of the term globalization in the English language in print comes in the mid-1980s. It's used in an article in the ''Harvard Business Review''.<ref>The [https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets full text of "The Globalization of Markets" from May 1983] is available on the Harvard Business Review website.</ref>

== Globalization Over the Course of Time ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:48 ]]
<nowiki>[05:48]</nowiki>

But if we think about globalization not just as a phenomenon of recent years but rather as a very long term historical process we can date its origins much, much earlier. If globalization involves simply the expansion in the scale of social and economic processes from the local level to the world scale then globalization could be seen to have begun...as early as the earliest human civilizations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[06:18]</nowiki>

After all processes of sort of interregional trade are familiar to historians of the ancient world. You know one of the accomplishments that the Roman Empire achieves for example is to create a sort of integrated trading arena within the Mediterranean. Roman imperial power will make possible the linkage of North Africa to Europe via you know permanent trade routes. At least trade routes that endure as long as the empire does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:45 ]]
<nowiki>[06:45]</nowiki>

So globalization could be said to have a very old history. It has a history that dates back perhaps as far as the {{WPExtract|Silk Road}} -- at least so far as trade is concerned. If we expand our definition of globalization to include the movement of peoples as well as goods then we might think of the recurrent movements of people from the {{WPExtract|Eurasian Steppe}} into Western Europe and the Middle East as sort of demographic aspects of globalization's long history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:12 ]]
<nowiki>[07:12]</nowiki>

If we think about the diffusion of ideas and ideologies as part of globalization's history then there may be cause to consider the rise of Christianity from about two thousand years ago or the rise of Islam a little more recently than that as globalizing developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:24 ]]
<nowiki>[07:24]</nowiki>

As developments that produce a sort of convergence in belief systems across vast expanses of space. So globalization has a potentially very long history; it has a host of sort of ancient precursors depending of course on how we define it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:44]]
<nowiki>[07:44]</nowiki>

In the modern era globalization accelerates and expands in scope. 1492 is a really important year in the history of globalization. Because we talk about globalizing processes before 1492 we're really talking about developments within the Eurasian world. 1492 is a crucial date because with Columbus's discovery of the New World Eurasia and the America's effect, in effect, become sort of integrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:13]]
<nowiki>[08:13]</nowiki>

At least the moment of departure for a process of global reintegration occurs with the passage of the Columbine threshold. You can think for example about the reintegration of disease across the hemispheres as an example of that with the you know sort of transmission of smallpox to the Americas from Eurasia -- Americans -- which is to say -- indigenous Americans -- become sort of the subjects of an integrated global...environment for disease, and its transmission.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:50 ]]
<nowiki>[08:50]</nowiki>

So the Columbine threshold is important because it brings the Old World and the New together. It creates the possibility for the first time of an integrated global sort of arena on the world scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:04 ]]
<nowiki>[09:04]</nowiki>

Empire in the modern era is a crucial force that pushes forward the advance of globalization. Colonial empires build linkages between continents and between regions. The European trading companies: the {{WPExtract|East India Company|British East India Company}}, the {{WPExtract|Hudson's Bay Company|Hudson Bay Company}}, {{WPExtract|Dutch East India Company|the Dutch VOC, the Dutch East India Company}}, these are all you know sort of crucial builders of globalization. Empires build ships, they build railroads, they build the infrastructure that pulls the world together into a more convergent future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

Of course industrial technology is a crucial underpinning of this imperial era of globalization. As the you know sort of sailing ship is replaced in the 19th century by the steamship the pace of integration can quicken, the pace of global transportation increases, accelerates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:55 ]]
<nowiki>[09:55]</nowiki>

From approximately the 1860s forwards processes of globalization will produce conditions of accelerating and increasing interdependence among nation-states. Especially amongst the nation-states of the North Atlantic world. Globalization in the last decades of the 19th century is most pronounced within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:17 ]]
<nowiki>[10:17]</nowiki>

North America is the principle destination in the late 19th century for British foreign investment overseas. North America is the primary destination for European migrants. Migrants from Europe go elsewhere. They go to Latin America, they go to Australia, they go to New Zealand, but North America is the primary destination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36 ]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

And within the North American world thickening ties of capital mobility, of international trade, and of...demographic movement, the movement of peoples produce something resembling a sort of convergence of economic fortunes. And we can chart this by looking at the convergence of factor prices within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:00 ]]
<nowiki>[11:00]</nowiki>

In 1860 you know wage differentials between North America and Western Europe are very great. North Americans typically earn much, much higher wages then do North, then do West Europeans in 1860.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:13 ]]
<nowiki>[11:13]</nowiki>

By 1900 those differentials have begun to close somewhat. And the reason that they close of course is that Europeans migrate in you know millions and millions annually from Western Europe to North America. And this has an effect of tightening labor markets in North America and loosening labor markets in Western Europe such that the wage differentials you know sort of tend to diminish over time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:40 ]]
<nowiki>[11:40]</nowiki>

Through this era of late 19th century globalization the classical gold standard provides a sort of basic infrastructure as we've discussed for maintaining price stability amongst national currencies. This you know framework is something which makes possible and facilitates the advent of sort of integrative globalizing economic processes. The monetary, the gold standard, for example, reassures investors that the sort of value of investments is not likely to change over time as a consequence of currency price fluctuations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:17 ]]
<nowiki>[12:17]</nowiki>

So the classical gold standard provides a certain sort of institutional stability within which late 19th century globalization can proceed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[12:27]</nowiki>

In the 20th century however really interesting things happen. Globalization does not continue to accelerate. On the contrary globalization is reversed. The First World War is a big [[wikt:exogenous|exogenous]] shock.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:40 ]]
<nowiki>[12:40]</nowiki>

It -- doesn't have much to do with globalization in terms of its origins, the origins of the First World War have to do with the alliance system and Germany's bid for European mastery, but the First World War is nonetheless a sort of catastrophic moment of disrupture for the globalizing world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55 ]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

During the First World War the European belligerent powers throw up you know trade barriers, they throw up {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}}, they take their currencies off the gold standard. And they do all of these things in order to be able to manage their own economies so as to produce the maximal amount possible of war [[wikt:materiel|materiel]].

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:12 ]]
<nowiki>[13:12]</nowiki>

But the effect for the world economy is...a moment of deglobalization. The world economy ceases to integrate. Of course globalizing processes continue during the war and to some extent change direction. New opportunities for example for Latin American food producers arrive as a consequence of Europe's...catastrophic war, but the basic pattern is one of disruption in the second decade of the twentieth century as a consequence of the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:46 ]]
<nowiki>[13:46]</nowiki>

During the 1920s globalization is to some extent restored. This is something that you know we've discussed. There's a restoration of the classical gold standard. Trade begins to pick up from the mid-1920s onwards. But this will be a very fleeting resurgence. The Great Depression really puts an end to a class -- the era of classical globalization. And makes deglobalization permanent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:10 ]]
<nowiki>[14:10]</nowiki>

In the early 1930s countries throw up very substantial barriers to international trade. The {{WPExtract|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act|Smoot–Hawley Tariff}} in the United States is one example of that but it has parallels elsewhere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:21 ]]
<nowiki>[14:21]</nowiki>

International trade grinds to a halt. Governments take their countries off the gold standard and manipulate sort of national currencies with little regard to the international consequences thereof.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:33 ]]
<nowiki>[14:33]</nowiki>

Whether the gold -- world economy can ever be put back together again does not appear entirely obvious at the end of the 1930s. The world has substantially deglobalized. Nation-states have turned in upon themselves. They've become economically more autonomous than ever before.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:50 ]]
<nowiki>[14:50]</nowiki>

It's in this context, as we've discussed, that the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}} tries to orchestrate a qualified reglobalization of the world economy. It was certainly the objective of British and American policy planners at Bretton Woods to establish a framework in which international trade could resume.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:10 ]]
<nowiki>[15:10]</nowiki>

It's one of the reasons that the policy planners who create the Bretton Woods system are so anxious to restore a modicum of international currency stability. Because currency stability is widely believed to be a prerequisite for international trade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:23 ]]
<nowiki>[15:23]</nowiki>

But the Bretton Woods reestablishment of globalization is sharply qualified by a commitment to maintain the macroeconomic autonomy of nation-states. And this is where Keynes's influence on the postwar settlement is pronounced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[15:40]</nowiki>

Keynes argues of course that in order for governments to manage their own economies so as to sustain full employment governments need to be able to work the levers of economic policy -- those levers being fiscal policy and monetary policy. An effective manipulation of fiscal and monetary policy depends upon a certain degree of separation between the national economy and the world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:01 ]]
<nowiki>[16:01]</nowiki>

If your domestic economy is entirely open to international movements of capital for example then it's very, very difficult to regulate a national monetary policy. Because the monetary policy determines the supply of money in the economy and if your borders are open to you know foreign funds washing in and out of your economy then you really can't control your monetary policy on your own terms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:25 ]]
<nowiki>[16:25]</nowiki>

You may have some influence over the sort of direction in which international funds flow whether they flow into or out of your economy but your sort of magnitude of control will be much less in an open market economy than it is in a closed market economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:41 ]]
<nowiki>[16:41]</nowiki>

And Bretton Woods tries to strike a compromise between sort of reglobalization on the one hand and national economic autonomy on the other. And this is really crucial. It's sort of the basis of the postwar economic settlement -- a settlement which tries to combine aspects of market economics with aspects of planned economics in the capitalist West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:04 ]]
<nowiki>[17:04]</nowiki>

This is the mixed economy. This is the economy which we've been talking about. We've talked about the mixed economy sort of within a comparative framework by looking at the experience of different West European economies and comparing them to the United States, but the Bretton Woods framework as I've explained is the international framework within which the mixed economy can flourish. And it's a framework that begins with a compromise between globalization and national policy autonomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:34 ]]
<nowiki>[17:34]</nowiki>

The 1970s are a decade of crucial disjuncture for this postwar compromise. It's in the 1970s that this compromise between the mixed -- this compromise between sort of capitalism and planning, the so-called mixed economy begins to come apart.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:51 ]]
<nowiki>[17:51]</nowiki>

And this process of, you know, deconstruction occurs both within nation-states as the mixed economy compromise breaks down, and at the international level as the Bretton Woods framework breaks down and is replaced by something you know sort of altogether new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:10 ]]
<nowiki>[18:10]</nowiki>

This you know passage from an era of planned capitalist economics to an era of relatively sort of free market economics that occurs during the 1970s is a critical disjuncture for the capitalist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:25 ]]
<nowiki>[18:25]</nowiki>

And it you know can be traced both at the international scale and at the scale of particular national experience. But situated within a larger historical context this disjuncture looks like a really important moment in the larger history of globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:41 ]]
<nowiki>[18:41]</nowiki>

If the mid-20th century from the 1930s through to the 1960s was an era in which globalization was held at bay, held at bay by controls, held at bay by restrictions on the movement of capital and goods, then the 1970s are a period in which globalization accelerates once again. In which the world begins to reglobalize after a long mid-20th century phase in which globalization is held by you know the consensus of governments at bay.

== Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:13 ]]
<nowiki>[19:13]</nowiki>

What are the basic dynamics of globalization in the 1970s? What was globalization in the 1970s? Well globalization in the 1970s is much the same as it had been in the late 19th century. It's a set of processes that tends over time to integrate societies and their economies. Globalization involves in the 1970s, as it had done in the late 19th century, a growing awareness of the basic interdependence of nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:42 ]]
<nowiki>[19:42]</nowiki>

The dynamics of this globalization include the rise of international trade and financial flows. These economic vectors are crucial to the production of a more sort of globalized international economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:57 ]]
<nowiki>[19:57]</nowiki>

But they're not the only signs that a new era of globalization might be taking shape. Economic vectors are very important to the production of economic interdependence. But there's much more to the globalizing shift of the 1970s than that. We might think about sort of the rise of global concerns. Human rights, an issue that we've talked about, is in some aspects a global issue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:21 ]]
<nowiki>[20:21]</nowiki>

Right, the proponents of international human rights proclaim that rights are not a subject for nation-states anymore, that rights are an issue for the international community, that your rights are the same whether you happen to live in Syria or in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:36 ]]
<nowiki>[20:36]</nowiki>

And this is a globalizing shift. It's a globalizing shift in sort of legal discourse. It's a globalizing shift in the scope of rights claims. For most of the modern era the idea of rights had been utterly entwined with the nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[20:52]</nowiki>

It was nation-states that bestowed rights and defended them. Well, the {{WPExtract|Universal Declaration of Human Rights|Universal Declaration in 1948}} signals a sort of move to the global scale but it's in the 1970s that a political, and even a social movement to affirm and uphold that shift in the scale of human rights from the nation-state to the world as a whole really occurs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:12 ]]
<nowiki>[21:12]</nowiki>

So human rights are a global concern that sort of hinge on the 1970s. But there are other global issues too. It's in the 1970s that global environmentalism really takes off as a political movement. Awareness of the basic unity of the planet's biosphere is one factor as we'll discuss that helps to inform a new age of environmental activism and consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:35 ]]
<nowiki>[21:35]</nowiki>

There is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> a glowing awareness that the world, in the, there is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> in the 1970s a growing awareness, that the world constitutes an integrated whole, that the world is not just a patchwork of nation-states. each of which is basically independent and autonomous, that the world constitutes something like an integrated and cohesive system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:57]]
<nowiki>[21:57]</nowiki>

Now this awareness is more pronounced in some spheres of human activity than in others. It's easier to make a you know case for the cohesiveness of the planet's ecology perhaps than it is to make a case for the integration of the world economy, which is you know less tangible. But this basic awareness that the world is integrating, that its fate is you know somehow entwined, is a sort of critical marker of globalization's ascent during the 1970s. Consciousness is very important to the history of globalization.

== The Earthrise Moment ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:32 ]]
<nowiki>[22:32]</nowiki>

Here no single moment is more you know evocative perhaps than you know what I would call the {{WPExtract|Earthrise|Earthrise Moment}}, the moment in December 1968 when Apollo 8 circumnavigates the moon, and takes a picture of the earth from space. And this is the picture that forms the backdrop to this slide.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52 ]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

[[File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24 1022x1024.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Photograph of Planet Earth taken on December 24, 1968 by NASA astronaut William Anders during the Apollo 8 mission (downloaded from [[commons:Main_Page|Wikimedia Commons]]).]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:54 ]]
<nowiki>[22:54]</nowiki>

The ''Earthrise'' image as this becomes known, the photograph is called ''Earthrise'', is not the first image of the world to be taken from space. You know satellites in the 1960s take photographs and return them to earth. But what you get from going to the moon is not only soil samples you also get a unique vantage point on life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:13 ]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

And this is what ''Earthrise'' presents -- a view of the earth as seen from another celestial body -- from the moon.

{{#ev:youtube|https://youtu.be/dE-vOscpiNc||center|Video from NASA reenacting the taking of the ''Earthrise'' photograph (1m 38s excerpt)||start=213&end=321}}

<br />
<br />

And this image becomes very quickly one of the twentieth centuries most iconic images. Lyndon Johnson who's President of the United States at the time of the Apollo 8 expedition sends a copy to every head of state in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:34 ]]
<nowiki>[23:34]</nowiki>

The image adorns a postage stamp in 1969 -- the next year. And the image has profound political implications. What does the image signify? What does it reveal? What does it not reveal?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:48 ]]
<nowiki>[23:48]</nowiki>

The image does not reveal political borders. When you look at the earth from space you don't see nation-states. You don't even see...you know, well, I guess you do see continents, but you don't see...(laughs) (laughter from the class), you don't, but you don't see, a, you don't see the difference between Europe and Asia. You can't really see that when you look at the world from space.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:10 ]]
<nowiki>[24:10]</nowiki>

You see only...you know land and sea and clouds. You see...an integrated ecological unit. You don't see a world divided into sort of politics of nation-states. You don't see an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. You don't see a Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:30 ]]
<nowiki>[24:30]</nowiki>

All you see is an integrated biosphere floating in vast empty space. Of course I know space isn't really empty but this isn't a physics class...so...(laughter from the class).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:40 ]]
<nowiki>[24:40]</nowiki>

And this political, you know, these political implications, are you know very powerful ones, and they help to animate in the 1970s a sense that the world is becoming a singular entity, perhaps that it is a singular entity and needs to be governed and led as such.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:00 ]]
<nowiki>[25:00]</nowiki>

This image -- ''Earthrise'' -- becomes the sort of visual counterpart to a set of discursive claims that you know futurists and visionaries make for the unity of Planet Earth. And this is a theme which you know predates the taking of the photograph itself.

== Futurists and Visionaries on the Unity of Planet Earth ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:17 ]]
<nowiki>[25:17]</nowiki>

During, in 1964, {{WPExtract|Marshall McLuhan}}, sort of media studies scholar, an iconic scholar in the intellectual history of the postwar world, calls the world a {{WPExtract|Global village|global village}}. It's a you know notion that is intended to capture a basic you know sort of interdependence in the affairs of the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:37 ]]
<nowiki>[25:37]</nowiki>

McLuhan argues that the world is you know shrinking as a consequence of you know globalizing processes, the shrinkage of time and space as a consequence of technological innovation, and as a consequence the entire world is coming to resemble a village -- a village in which social life is integrated and interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:54 ]]
<nowiki>[25:54]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Buckminster Fuller}}, an architect and futurist, describes the planet as {{WPExtract|Spaceship Earth}} in 1967. This has a somewhat different set of implications. What Fuller is trying to communicate when he describes the world as Spaceship Earth is the idea that the world...exists kind of alone in space as a finite unit, as a unit with finite resources. Fuller argues that you know political leaders need to be much more aware than they are of the basic limits to the expansion of you know sort of material life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:29 ]]
<nowiki>[26:29]</nowiki>

He says that the world is like a spaceship that is traveling through space and contains only limited supplies. How are those supplies to be conserved and marshaled over time? This is one of the you know sort of conservationist implications that McLuhan pulls -- sorry -- that Buckminster Fuller takes out of the idea that the Earth is a sort of solitary spaceship traveling through the universe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:51 ]]
<nowiki>[26:51]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Lester R. Brown|Lester Brown}}, a Canadian ecologist and diplomat, publishes a book in 1972 titled ''World Without Borders''. Brown is probably more of a pragmatist than either McLuhan or Fuller were but he is no less attentive to a sort of new category of public policy issues that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:11 ]]
<nowiki>[27:11]</nowiki>

Issues that transcend and transgress the borders of nation-states. Issues like you know sort of the global food supply, global population growth, global pollution and so on. I mean these are issues which are becoming increasingly urgent topics of concern in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:27]]
<nowiki>[27:27]</nowiki>

And this photograph really captures how...an evolving consciousness of planetary interdependence might have sort of you know led contemporaries in the 1970s to conclude that global integration demanded new kinds of solutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:49 ]]
<nowiki>[27:49]</nowiki>

So globalization in the 1970s is an intellectual and a perceptual phenomenon as well as an economic one. It's a very complex phenomenon that involves you know sort of processes of integration and accelerating interdependence.

== Questions On Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03 ]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Why did this globalization occur? Was it a consequence of specific choices? Could we see political leaders perhaps as having chosen globalization? Did business leaders push them in this direction?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:19 ]]
<nowiki>[28:19]</nowiki>

Or was globalization something that occurred more as a process of structural change beyond the capacity of sovereign power to orchestrate or promote? This is a very basic question and it's a question which remains very divisive amongst social scientists who study globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:36 ]]
<nowiki>[28:36]</nowiki>

To put it very crudely I would suggest that sort of liberals, people who, accept that the world as it is, you know, presently constituted is more or less the sort of optimal state in which it can be constituted see globalization as a natural or inevitable process, a process that is brought about by structural changes outside of the control of, you know, individual nations or you know sovereign powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:05 ]]
<nowiki>[29:05]</nowiki>

Political radicals on the other hand are probably more inclined to see globalization as the achievement of specific policy choices. You know insofar as the...radical left is critical of globalization the proposition that globalization represents the accomplishment of specific policy choices is an appealing one because it carries with it the implication that different choices could produce a different ordering of global political and economic affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:32 ]]
<nowiki>[29:32]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of political aspect to this question of whether globalization is a choice or not. I don't want to get too caught up in the politics of it today but I wanted just to sort of draw your attention to that point as we consider this very fundamental question. You know to what extent is globalization chosen or to what extent is it produced by structural forces outside of the power of nations and political and economic leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:57 ]]
<nowiki>[29:57]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with {{WPExtract|Neoliberalism|neoliberalism}}? Well, here's a loaded question. What is neoliberalism? Well, we could think of neoliberalism as a set of economic policies that emphasize market determination over determination by government -- as a sort of -- as the optimal means to produce economic outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:18 ]]
<nowiki>[30:18]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with neoliberalism? We'll come back to this question but it's a question that you should bear in mind as we proceed forwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:27 ]]
<nowiki>[30:27]</nowiki>

Finally, what was the scope of globalization in the 1970s? Where did globalization occur? This is a point that is worth thinking about carefully. Insofar as we defined globalization as a process that involves rising interdependence, the acceleration and expansion of transnational movements of goods and ideas and money, it doesn't necessarily follow that globalization affects the entire planet at an even rate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:58 ]]
<nowiki>[30:58]</nowiki>

We should be open to the possibility that globalization was more pronounced among certain countries or within certain regions than it was among others. And my argument about the 1970s would be that globalization in the 1970s was really a phenomenon that occurred among the advanced industrial economies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:18]]
<nowiki>[31:18]</nowiki>

That it is to say within the {{WPExtract|OECD}} world. The OECD is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It encompasses Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:30 ]]
<nowiki>[31:30]</nowiki>

So when we talk about the OECD world we're really talking about sort of the advanced industrial West -- if you want to call it that. And globalization in the '70s was most pronounced among these countries. Later on from the 1980s and subsequently...the rest of the world will come to participate in globalization, but in this initial sort of break through phase it's most pronounced within the OECD universe.

== Questions Overview: Global Dilemmas, Economic Interdependence, Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58 ]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

Okay, well, we're going to try to do today then is...go through the history of this globalizing shift. And I'm going to basically...take you through three aspects of this you know sort of big development that we call globalization. I don't think this this can be a comprehensive history but hopefully I can give you a sense of some of the different aspects to globalization as it proceeds during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:26 ]]
<nowiki>[32:26]</nowiki>

We have about 15 minutes for each theme so we'll try to keep this succinct. First, I want to talk about the emerging awareness in the 1970s of global issues -- that is to say policy dilemmas that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:40 ]]
<nowiki>[32:40]</nowiki>

This is a development that we might call the Shock of the Global. It's a title of a book that I had some involvement with: [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674061866 ''The Shock of the Global''] -- developments that pertain to the world as a whole -- global phenomena, global problems, global issues. How do they strike or shock the policy arena? The world of nation-states in the 1970s? That's our first question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:01 ]]
<nowiki>[33:01]</nowiki>

Second question has to do with the emergence and development of economic interdependence among the advanced capitalist countries, among the countries of the OECD world, how did it happen? What were its you know most important phenomena or symptoms?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:17 ]]
<nowiki>[33:17]</nowiki>

Finally, we're going to talk about the transformation of capitalism in the 1970s. Or the transformation of capitalist economies from the mixed economy synthesis that still is very successful, or appears very successful, at the beginning of the 1970s to the more market oriented policy formulae that nation-states are beginning to embrace at the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:40 ]]
<nowiki>[33:40]</nowiki>

How do we get from the sort of Keynesian world of the 1970s to the world in the 1980s in which sort of so-called neoliberal solutions, more market oriented solutions, are displacing the old Keynesian mixed economy consensus?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:56 ]]
<nowiki>[33:56]</nowiki>

That's our third theme -- the transformation of capitalism. As we work through this I want you to you know reflect upon a number of big questions. How was the world changing? You know what are the big contours of global change during the 1970s? What are the consequences of global integration, of globalization even, for international relations? What does this mean for the basic configuration of international order? What does it mean for the configuration of the international economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:23 ]]
<nowiki>[34:23]</nowiki>

And what are the consequences for individual nation-states? How different does globalization look if we view if from the perspective of a particular nation as opposed from looking at it at the world scale?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:35 ]]
<nowiki>[34:35]</nowiki>

There are other urgent questions too. How did globalization spread beyond the OECD economies to encompass the developing world? A theme of the 1980s and 1990s. What have been globalization's consequences?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:49 ]]
<nowiki>[34:49]</nowiki>

Has globalization made the world happier and more affluent or has it produced unequal, you know, sort of distributions of wealth and you know economic responsibilities? These are questions which will have to wait for our next lecture on globalization on I think April 22nd. It's going to be the lecture titled Contesting Globalization. Today we're going to focus on the sort of early phase of globalization's acceleration during the 1970s.

== Global Dilemmas ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:18 ]]
<nowiki>[35:18]</nowiki>

Okay, global dilemmas. What are global problems? What was the Shock of the Global in the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

You know global problems, global dilemmas, could be construed very simply as the set of problems that escape the managerial regulatory capacities of individual nation-states. They are problems that affect the world as a whole. They might also be construed as problems that attract the attention of the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:47 ]]
<nowiki>[35:47]</nowiki>

You know this is more contestable but there's an argument to be made that issues that unfold within a local or national context but which attract you know sort of global attention and perhaps demand a global response, a famine in sub-Saharan Africa for example, are global issues of a different kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:06 ]]
<nowiki>[36:06]</nowiki>

But what kinds of issue are we talking about when we talk about issues that affect the world as a whole?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:12 ]]
<nowiki>[36:12]</nowiki>

Are there issues that, you know, besides climate change or you know sort of global ecological catastrophe that would seem to you to be global issues of a sort that affect you know multiple nations or perhaps the entire world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:26 ]]
<nowiki>[36:26]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:27 ]]
<nowiki>[36:27]</nowiki>

Yeah, nuclear weapons is a really good one. The possibility of nuclear war is obviously a very global problem.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:36 ]]
<nowiki>[36:36]</nowiki>

Disease is also terrific, you know global public health, because disease respects no barriers of sovereignty, no distinctions between one nation-state and another. Disease that was you know prominent amongst the concerns with which you know sort of policymakers had to grapple, have had to grapple, as the world has become more integrated.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:57 ]]
<nowiki>[36:57]</nowiki>

Energy is also a terrific global issue insofar as the world's energy resources are distributed unequally across space, as is the world's demand for energy, the...process of bringing sort of energy resources to market is an implicitly global dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:18 ]]
<nowiki>[37:18]</nowiki>

We might about other issues that don't necessarily affect the ecological fortune of the planet, but which lie beyond the capacities of sovereign nation-states as being global issues of sorts. You know the illegal drug trade is one good example of an issue that really lies outside of the competence of any nation-state to regulate and manage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:36 ]]
<nowiki>[37:36]</nowiki>

Terrorism is an issue that, you know, sort of lies outside of the capacity of singular nation-states. It requires cooperation amongst nations if it to be effectively engaged and redressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:48 ]]
<nowiki>[37:48]</nowiki>

Why did these kinds of issues attract rising attention in the the 1970s? There are a variety of possible explanations. It could be because they were becoming more urgent. Perhaps the global environment attracted more attention in the 1970s because the rate of its degradation was accelerating.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:04]]
<nowiki>[38:04]</nowiki>

But it's also possible that global issues attracted rising attention in 1970s because of the emerging global consciousness that the ''Earthrise'' photograph signified -- that people like Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan were working hard to cultivate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:21 ]]
<nowiki>[38:21]</nowiki>

So global consciousness can sort of feed engagement with global issues. It's also possible that the diminution of Cold War tensions during the 1970s played a role in creating space in the policy arena for global issues to stake their claim.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:38 ]]
<nowiki>[38:38]</nowiki>

As the urgency of Cold War containment, for example, lessened in the United States, there was more and more time available for policymakers both in the Executive Branch and in the Legislature to pay attention to so-called sort of global issues.

=== The Rise of Global Environmentalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:54 ]]
<nowiki>[38:54]</nowiki>

So the reasons for this are complicated. Let's talk about some specific issues. I'm going to talk first of all about the rise of global environmentalism. We could at the outset draw a distinction between two different kinds of ecological globalization. We might think about the ways in which sort of local environmental catastrophes attract global or transnational opinion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:20 ]]
<nowiki>[39:20]</nowiki>

And indeed oil spills in the 1970s, in particular places, in places like California, in Cornwall off the west coast of England attract global attention. They become sort of, at least for a brief moment, global issues on which international attention fixates. This is significant.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:39 ]]
<nowiki>[39:39]</nowiki>

The fact that you know international audiences are paying more attention during the 1970s to you know for example the deforestation of the Amazon is illustrative of a sort of developing global ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52]</nowiki>

The deforestation of the Amazon may have you know sort of consequences for the global environment as a whole. But it's really a sort of local issue at least in its locus. It affects you know northeastern Brazil primarily. That it is becoming, you know, sort of an increasingly global issue during the 1970s reflects one sort of globalization, a rising sort of international attentiveness, to particular environmental issues or catastrophes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:23 ]]
<nowiki>[40:23]</nowiki>

But there's a second kind of ecological globalization going on during the 1970s and this will involve the rise of concern, or growing concern, with issues affecting the international...ecology as a whole. For example the rise of concern with chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs, in the world's atmosphere is a very global dilemma. CFCs affect not individual nation-states but the entire planet earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:53 ]]
<nowiki>[40:53]</nowiki>

Population growth will be another sort of ecological issue that in the eyes of contemporaries during the 1970s affects the world as a whole and demands global policy responses.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07]</nowiki>

Why was ecological consciousness rising in the 1970s? Why did it rise in the West? Why did in the rise in the United States in particular?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:18 ]]
<nowiki>[41:18]</nowiki>

To some extent the growth of sort of ecological consciousness during the 1970s is a legacy of the 1960s -- of the political and social mobilizations associated with that decade. It might be a legacy even of the counterculture that developed during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:33 ]]
<nowiki>[41:33]</nowiki>

Probably no single published book is more influential upon the rise of an organized environment movement in the United States at least than {{WPExtract|Rachel Carson|Rachel Carson's}} {{WPExtract|Silent Spring|Silent Spring}} -- a book that documented the adverse effects of pollution upon the American ecosystem.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:50 ]]
<nowiki>[41:50]</nowiki>

Whether as a consequence of sort of activism or simply awareness the 1970s bring a rise in sort of organized political mobilizations on behalf of the global environment. New organizations are created. {{WPExtract|Greenpeace}} for example is founded in 1971 with its mission being to protect the Earth's ecology against the encroachment of human activity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:19]]
<nowiki>[42:19]</nowiki>

Environmentalism becomes a popular political cause during the 1970s. The first {{WPExtract|Earth Day}} is held in 1970, and it attracts massive participation. Some 20 million Americans participate in the first Earth Day, so this is one marker of sort of rising ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:38]]
<nowiki>[42:38]</nowiki>

In 1972 the United Nations holds its first international conference on environmental problems which is a marker of how sort of environmentalism is becoming a prominent issue on the global stage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:52 ]]
<nowiki>[42:52]</nowiki>

Where does this awareness come from? Is it just driven by politics? Is it just driven by sort of consciousness? Perhaps. Technology I would suggest also plays an important role in shaping public and political awareness of environmental issues. Space photography as we've already discussed affords a new perspective on Planet Earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:12 ]]
<nowiki>[43:12]</nowiki>

Computers allow scientists to model climate change. So this is an important development. Before computers become cheap enough to be situated in university laboratories it's really difficult for climatologists to develop plausible models of global climate change.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:28 ]]
<nowiki>[43:28]</nowiki>

Once that technology is more readily available then the range of you know sort of opportunities for climate scientists expands.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37]</nowiki>

Satellite imagery also affords sort of kind of a useful research tool. It allows scientists to map deforestation over time because you can take photographs of say the Brazilian rainforest and see how the scope of the forest is retreating in the face of tract farming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:55 ]]
<nowiki>[43:55]</nowiki>

So there are a number of you know sort of developments that go into the production of a ecological environmental moment in the 1970s -- a moment in which rising attention is being paid to the earth's environment and to humankind's fraught relationship with it.

==== Limits to Growth Debate ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:12 ]]
<nowiki>[44:12]</nowiki>

One of the most prominent sort of themes in this global environmental moment of the 1970s will be the limits to growth debate that hinges on the early decades of the 1970s. The limits to growth debate is particularly concerned with population growth though it also emcompasses other forms of economic growth too -- the expansion of industrial production and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:39 ]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

As we think about the sort of discourse on growth and it limits in the 1970s it's important to begin by reminding ourself that population growth and economic growth are from the global perspective overriding themes of the postwar experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:54 ]]
<nowiki>[44:54]</nowiki>

The world's population grows very, very quickly from what, under 3 billion in 1950 to...close to over 4 billion by 1970. Economic growth you know sort of proceeds more or less in tandem with population growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:15 ]]
<nowiki>[45:15]</nowiki>

The world's GDP increases too. And all of this growth creates sort of widespread concern as to...how sustainable growth is. Can the world's population continue to grow at these impressive rates or will growth at some point hit inexorable and inevitable limits, and what then will be the consequences? Will the world's food supply, for example, sustain its rising population or will a growing population at some point face an inevitable famine produced by you know a population increase that expands beyond the capacity of the world to feed it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:53 ]]
<nowiki>[45:53]</nowiki>

These are the issues that the {{WPExtract|Club of Rome}} grapples with in its 1972 report {{WPExtract|The Limits to Growth|''The Limit to Growth''}}<ref>Note that the title is actually ''The Limits to Growth''.</ref>. The Club of Rome is an informal assemblage of demographers and environmentalists, scientists, that convenes in the early 1970s and produces a report that attracts widespread international attention.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:13 ]]
<nowiki>[46:13]</nowiki>

''The Limits to Growth'' argues that the world's population and economic growth rates are unsustainable and it predicts catastrophe if these basic rates of growth are not slowed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:23 ]]
<nowiki>[46:23]</nowiki>

It argues that policymakers need to strive to achieve a so-called stable equilibrium, a situation in which the world's population will not grow, in which there will be zero growth. To achieve this the Club of Rome proposes global management of the world's demographic growth. It's a basic assumption of the Club of Rome that international growth cannot be managed at the national level.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:48 ]]
<nowiki>[46:48]</nowiki>

That global dilemmas demand global solutions. So there's a political implication to this. And it is that nation-states are unable of responding adequately to new global dilemmas.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:00 ]]
<nowiki>[47:00]</nowiki>

Is population growth a security threat? What are its implications for matters of war and peace? This is a question that the United States government actually grapples with. In 1974 the national security council of the United States produces a very lengthy report on population growth as a national security dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:17]]
<nowiki>[47:17]</nowiki>

And the US government concludes that population growth will lead to rising food shortages in the developing world, that these will produce political instability, and that the consequences will be upheaval, that you know could be disadvantageous to the national interests of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:34 ]]
<nowiki>[47:34]</nowiki>

So much as national security specialists in recent years have begin to engage with global climate change as a national security threat so too did national security specialists in the 1970s address population growth as a sort of national security challenge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:51 ]]
<nowiki>[47:51]</nowiki>

If this is the threat what is to be done about it? How can the world's population be controlled or managed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:59 ]]
<nowiki>[47:59]</nowiki>

The developing countries, you know, emphasize contraception and family planning as the means to control a accelerating or expanding global population. They promote these policies with particular regard to the developing world. Here of course reactions will be somewhat mixed. China is an interesting case because China decides of its own volition to support you know policies to control and limit the growth of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:29 ]]
<nowiki>[48:29]</nowiki>

In 1978 China implements a {{WPExtract|One-child policy|one-child policy}}. This is a policy that repudiates Mao Zedong's conviction that there could never be too many Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong saw population growth as a source of national strength. But in 1978 the post-Maoist regime rebukes, you know, this view very powerfully.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:51]]
<nowiki>[48:51]</nowiki>

It introduces a one-child policy, a policy that is often brutal in its implementation and in its consequences, but which does succeed in ending China's long history of recurrent food catastrophe. Famines were until 1978 a recurrent aspect of China's historical experience. After 1978, or since 1978, China has not experienced a famine. And China has been better able to feed itself since making a sort of self-conscious decision to limit the expansion of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:23 ]]
<nowiki>[49:23]</nowiki>

But other developing countries are much less enthusiastic than China is to limit their growth in the name of global stability. Developing countries ask, quite reasonably, why should we impose limits on our growth, when the West has grown over a period of centuries within any limits to its growth? The population of Britain expands for example from about 5 to 6 million at the beginning of the 19th century to 30 million by the end of the 19th century. That's a six fold increase over a period of a hundred years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:57]]
<nowiki>[49:57]</nowiki>

Why should developing countries not have the opportunity to expand like Britain has done? To industrialize like Britain has done? From their perspective, which are national perspectives, the imperatives of national growth take precedence over the regulation of the world's population as a whole.

===== The Green Revolution =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16]</nowiki>

Of course the catastrophe that is predicted by the Club of Rome does not come to pass -- at least not yet. It doesn't come to pass in the 1970s. The limits to growth are avoided, or at least the limits are moved.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:29]]
<nowiki>[50:29]</nowiki>

To explain this we need to think about how global agricultural production develops during the 1970s. One of the critical innovations of this decade is a set of associated transformations in agricultural practices in the developing world that are collectively known as the {{WPExtract|Green Revolution}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:49 ]]
<nowiki>[50:49]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution involves high yield varieties of grain, the pioneer of which, probably the most important pioneer of which, is the agronomist {{WPExtract|Norman Borlaug}} pictured in the slide. Perhaps the most important you know figure in the history of the twentieth century whom you've never heard of.

[[File:Norman Borlaug, 2004 (cropped).jpg|thumb|250px|center|Norman Borlaug in 2004]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:05 ]]
<nowiki>[51:05]</nowiki>

How many of you had heard of Norman Borlaug before? Okay, one or two. I mean this is a man whose sort of consequence for world history I mean far, far outweighs the reach of his reputation. The high yield grain varieties which he pioneers at the University of Iowa -- I mean are...above all what enables the developing world to escape the {{WPExtract|Malthusianism|Malthusian}} trap that the Club of Rome prophesies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:30 ]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

But high yield grain varieties are not all that the Green Revolution depends upon. Fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and the mechanization of agriculture all help to expand grain yields.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:42 ]]
<nowiki>[51:42]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution has transformative consequences for global food production. It enables the increase of agricultural production by a factor of about two or three. So production of food per hectare of land can double or even triple thanks to the application of these advanced farming techniques.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:02 ]]
<nowiki>[52:02]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution on a global scale represents the ecological equivalent of discovering an entirely new North America. It's as if you could create another, you know, continent the size of North America, stick it in the Pacific Ocean and use it to grow food on. That's what the green revolution accomplishes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:19 ]]
<nowiki>[52:19]</nowiki>

So the Green Revolution will allow a growing world to feed itself. Of course the Green Revolution is a one-time fix. You can't continue to expand grain yields beyond the levels that are attained or, you know, in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:35]]
<nowiki>[52:35]</nowiki>

So whether the dire warnings that the club of Rome offered in the early 1970s are you know still relevant just to a different generation, perhaps our generation, as opposed to the generation of our parents, is an interesting question. It's a discomforting question too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:53 ]]
<nowiki>[52:53]</nowiki>

Because the quick fix that the Green Revolution offered will not necessarily be so easy to achieve as global population once again approaches the limits of global food production. Still the Green Revolution in its own time represents a important, you know, vitally important, accomplishment. It's benefits are particularly pronounced for the developing world.

=== The Economic Divergence Between the West and the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:19 ]]
<nowiki>[53:19]</nowiki>

Of course in larger terms the developing world continues to lag behind the advanced industrial West. What this chart shows you is GDP per capita organized on a regional basis over the entire second half of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:37]]
<nowiki>[53:37]</nowiki>

And what the data shows is that during the 1970s the developing world continues to lag behind the countries of Western Europe, and you know what I've identified here as the Western offshoots -- North America, Australia, and New Zealand -- the settler societies populated primarily by Europeans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:59 ]]
<nowiki>[53:59]</nowiki>

These Western countries continue to proceed far ahead of the developing world. And this divergence in human realities at a time of rising awareness of planetary integration is an awkward thing, it's an uncomfortable thing, and it's a challenge that leaders of developing world countries strive to overcome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:23 ]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

At a time when developing countries are becoming more modern, when literacy is spreading, when inhabitants of developing societies are beginning to have you know expanded access to television, television that affords a window on Western lifestyles, human aspirations in the 1970s are beginning to converge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:43 ]]
<nowiki>[54:43]</nowiki>

And this is a really important theme which attracts you know quite widespread attention in the sort of international relations scholarship of the era: convergent human aspirations in a time of widespread modernization. But the disjoint between the convergence of human aspirations and the ongoing divergence of human realities is striking. Even as the world is becoming one the West continues to have a whole lot more than the developing world does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:14 ]]
<nowiki>[55:14]</nowiki>

Westernerns continue to have more than their counterparts in the developing world. How are these basic inequalities to be overcome? The experience of the 1970s offers few answers. Developing economies continue to adhere to the ISI led growth strategies which had been so popular for the generation of, for the first generation of post colonial leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:36]]
<nowiki>[55:36]</nowiki>

There's some experimentation with alternative growth models, growth models more oriented towards exports in a few places, places like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, will experiment will export led growth models that sort of connect developing economies to the expanding global economy. But for the most developing countries remain in the 1970s beholden to nationalistic growth strategies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:03 ]]
<nowiki>[56:03]</nowiki>

Yet all is not well in the developing world during the 1970s. ISI led growth is, by the 1970s, failing to deliver the returns that it had promised to achieve. The oil shocks are a big exogenous crisis for most developing economies. For all developing world economies that don't produce their own oil a four fold increase in the rise in the price of energy inputs is catastrophic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:27]]
<nowiki>[56:27]</nowiki>

It produces price inflation. Price inflation in turn produces political instability. If you want to explain why India, the developing world's exemplary postcolonial democracy, experienced a brief period in which ordinary democratic rules were suspended, the so-called {{WPExtract|The Emergency (India)|Emergency of 1975 to 1977}}, you should pay some reference to the influence of the oil crisis on India's economics and its politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:53 ]]
<nowiki>[56:53]</nowiki>

At a time of rampant inflation, of rising political instability, {{WPExtract|Indira Gandhi}} in 1975 declares a brief emergency during which the rule of law is suspended. So the developing world struggles in an era of accelerating interdependence and this becomes a concern even for the leaders of the rich industrial world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:12 ]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What are to be the solutions to the divergence between the developing world's aspirations and its enduring poverty? Developing world leaders in the 1970s propose a radical reform of the international economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:27 ]]
<nowiki>[57:27]</nowiki>

A new bloc emerges at the United Nations, the so-called {{WPExtract|Group of 77|G77}} Bloc -- a self-conscious counterpart to the {{WPExtract|Group of Seven|G7}} -- the advanced industrial club. The G77 argues for a radical transformation in the international terms of trade. It argues for a set of international cartel agreements that will raise the price for the developing world's agricultural output. You know cartels on the model of OPEC for the producers of other primary commodities like coffee and rubber and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:56 ]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

Developing world political leaders talk about a new international economic order -- an economic order that will be oriented towards the achievement of international distributive justice. These initiatives ultimately come to nothing. What happens instead will be that the developing world comes from the 1980, from the 1980s onwards, to participate increasingly in the globalizing international economic system that takes shape in the West during the 1970s.

== Economic Interdependence ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:25 ]]
<nowiki>[58:25]</nowiki>

And it's to this Western system that we should now turn. I'll try to be brief and succinct.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32]]
<nowiki>[58:32]</nowiki>

Let's start just by reminding ourselves that the West at the end of the 1960s is still very much in the throes of the economic controls that are established during the 1930s and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:50]]
<nowiki>[58:50]</nowiki>

At the end of the 1960s {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}} continue to restrict the international movement of money. Trade barriers have been liberalized somewhat. But international trade is still sort of relatively small-scale in relation to the size of Western capitalist economies. This is a point which we can perhaps illustrate most succinctly by looking at the data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:13 ]]
<nowiki>[59:13]</nowiki>

I'm just going to show you data from one nation-state here. Because it's in some ways easiest to look at this phenomenon from a particular national perspective. The chart on the right of the slide shows the interdependence of the United States with the larger world economy in the financial sector and in the trade sector.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:34 ]]
<nowiki>[59:34]</nowiki>

And what you can see is that in 1950 US sort of interdependence, financially and in terms of trading goods, is much lower than it will become by the sort of 1980s and 1990s. The value of annual trade flows both exports and imports as a fraction of US GDP increases very rapidly particularly from the 1970s. The US becomes increasingly enmeshed with the larger global economy from the 1970s forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:03]</nowiki>

Similarly US stocks of you know, stocks of foreign investment in the United States plus US owned stocks of foreign investment elsewhere, sort of financial interdependence, increases dramatically particularly from the 1980s onwards. The US becomes from the 1970s and 1980s much more enmeshed with the larger global economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:29]</nowiki>

How does this happen? Technology plays a role. We should think if we want to explain processes of financial and trade globalization about the role of technological innovations. Communication satellites which become available from the late 1960s onwords accelerate the velocity with which information can be transmitted around the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:51]</nowiki>

New transatlantic cables, fiber optic cables from the 1980s, reduce the costs of transmitting information and this is really crucial. It facilitates other changes, like the growth of multinational corporations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:04]</nowiki>

There are changes that are more you know prosaic than the advent of high technology communications -- simple changes in techniques. The containerization of shipping: a development that begins in the late 1960s. I don't know did any of you see today's ''San Francisco Chronicle''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:19]</nowiki>

I needn't have asked; nobody reads the ''San Francisco Chronicle''. (laughter from the class). But...there's an interesting story...interesting in its relation to today's lecture. Apparently today or yesterday the biggest ship ever to enter the San Francisco Bay entered the San Francisco Bay.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:36]</nowiki>

And this is a container ship. It's a container ship that holds a third more containers than the previous biggest container ship to enter the San Francisco Bay. I don't remember how much but you can look it up in the Chronicle. But the containerization of shipping is a development that has huge implications for international trade. Substantially reduces transportation costs over the you know sort of medium to long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:58]</nowiki>

Computers are also very important to the story of globalization. They facilitate the outsourcing of production -- the movement of goods. It's very difficult to have containerization without computers because who knows where all the goods are on the boat if you don't have a computer, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:14]</nowiki>

It's very important to have a sort of computer card index that explains what...which containers contain which goods and where they need to go. So the advent of sort of high-tech computer based systems for managing the shipment of goods is an important aspect. These are sort of to a great extent interlinked developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:32]</nowiki>

And they produce substantial changes in the structure of the global economy. Consider the rise of the multinational corporation. This is one of the signal developments of the 1970s. One of the really important, really powerful symptoms, that suggest that big things are changing in the structure of the international economy.

=== Multinational Corporations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:51]]
<nowiki>[1:02:51]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations are crucial -- are crucial motors of globalization. Up to a third of all international trade is [https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7262 intra-firm] trade -- which is to say it occurs within corporations

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:04.]]
<nowiki>[1:03:04.]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations don't only move goods they also move knowledge and techniques -- techniques for manufacturing you know particular commodities, and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17]</nowiki>

The history of multinational corporations of course goes back a long way. I referred earlier in the lecture to the European trading companies of the 18th century: the British East India Company, the Dutch VOC -- these could be seen as precursors to the modern multinational corporation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:32]</nowiki>

But there are crucial distinctions to be made. The modern multinational corporation is different in key respects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:40]</nowiki>

Whereas foreign direct investment in the age of British imperialism had tended to take the form of standalone investments, you know, the creation of a you know sort of British financed railroad in North America for example. Foreign direct investment, after the Second World War involves the creation of vast networks of corporate subsidiaries and affiliates. IBM for example will invest aggressively in the creation of research and production facilities in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:12]</nowiki>

It's not creating standalone investments that manage themselves. Rather it's creating subsidiary branches of the IBM corporation linked within some vast transnational corporate structure.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:24 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:24]</nowiki>

One of the key developments which really distinguishes the modern multinational corporation from its historical predecessors is the transnationalization of production. The breakdown in effect of the old factory conveyor belt into...a set of separate processes that can be parceled out internationally so as to take advantage of the comparative advantages that particular nations offer as sites for particular phases of the productive process.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:53]</nowiki>

So Apple for example can design a computer here in you know Cupertino, California where you know skilled knowledge workers are readily available. And then outsource the manufacturing of that computer to China where you know cheap skilled labor is available to assemble the whole thing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:09]</nowiki>

And of course the you know process is much more complicated than that. Because the computer that is assembled in China is not manufactured entirely in China. You know the aluminum that goes into it will be mined somewhere else based upon the comparative availability of aluminum and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:23 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:23]</nowiki>

The transnationalization of production is a distinctive and novel characteristic of the modern multinational. And it depends upon the modularization of production -- upon the breaking down of productive processes into distinct steps that can be outsourced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:40]</nowiki>

The idea that you know...article like a computer would be manufactured in the same factory complex in which it's designed -- you know that's a 19th century model of capitalism or maybe an early 20th century model of capitalism. It is not how the transnational corporation works. The transnational corporation will disaggregate production so as to be able to take advantages of the comparative -- so as to be able to benefit from the comparative advantages that an integrating global economy offers.

=== Foreign Direct Investment Within the Capitalist West ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:08 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:08]</nowiki>

Where does this mostly happen? I mean what is the scope of the multinationalization of business during the 1970s? Here the answer may be surprising.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:18]</nowiki>

If we look at where the money goes, where foreign direct investment takes place, then what we see is that during the 1970s most foreign direct investment occurs within the OECD economies, among Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:35]</nowiki>

Western corporations are investing in Western countries for the most part. The developing world receives much less FDI from the United States than Western Europe does. Indeed Western Europe is the principle, you know sort of site of development, for the modern you know multinational business. American car corporations, American computer corporations and so on, create affiliates in Western Europe -- not in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:00]</nowiki>

The United States itself is a recipient of substantial FDI. German car manufacturers for example will invest heavily in the southern states of the United States in production facilities. Why do they do this? Why do Western businesses invest in other Western countries?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:20]</nowiki>

Well, there are advantages in this multinationalization of production. It enables corporations to surmount tariff barriers. Mercedes doesn't have to pay American import duties on a car that it manufactures in the United States. So it makes their products more competitive in US markets. It also locates the production of the products closer to the markets in which they can be sold.

=== The Implications of Economic Interdependence in the Larger World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:43 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:43]</nowiki>

So it reduces you know transportation costs. What are the consequences of this for international relations? What does the rise of the multinational signify about the changing state of world affairs?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:54]]
<nowiki>[1:07:54]</nowiki>

Here one of the most sort of articulate spokespeople for the transformative impact of multinationalization is {{WPExtract|Jacques Maisonrouge}} -- a man who was himself an exemplary sort of multinational businessman. Maisonrouge was a French engineer who became a high level vice president at IBM. He was IBM's vice president for international operations in the late '60s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:18]</nowiki>

Maisonrouge also became a sort of notoriously effective spokesperson for the transformation that multinational business was producing. And here's an example. The world's political structures are completely obsolete Maisonrouge declared in a public speech. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the global optimization of resources and the independence of nation-states.<ref>As quoted in [https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/23/archives/planet-earth-a-whollyowned-subsidiary.html ''The New York Times'' from January 23, 1975], Maisonrouge said, "The world's political structures are completely obsolete. They have not changed in at least a hundred years and are woefully out of tune with technological progress. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the search for global optimization of resources and the independence of nation‐states."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:40]</nowiki>

So for Maisonrouge national sovereignty, political sovereignty, isn't anachronism. It's just an impediment to the the most efficient possible allocation of resources -- something that multinational corporations are much better positioned than nation-states to accomplish.

== The Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:58]</nowiki>

Let's talk next about finance. Talked about production -- what about finance? The story of financial globalization begins in the 1960s. Here the signal development is the rise of the Euromarket? What is the Euromarket?<ref>Along with [[wikt:Euromarket|Wiktionary]], [https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/euromarket.asp Investopedia] and the [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/euromarket Cambridge English Dictionary] have definitions for the term. Some sources are capitalizing while others are not. In [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-superpower-transformed-9780195395471?cc=us&lang=en& ''A Superpower Transformed''] by Daniel Sargent the word is capitalized.</ref> The Euromarket is an offshore market for dollars -- held mostly in London.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:21]</nowiki>

It grows quickly during the 1960s and plays a role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The end of Bretton Woods delivers a further impetus to the globalization of finance. It creates opportunities for bankers to you know profit from [[wikt:arbitrage|arbitrage]] based upon fluctuating currency values. The petrodollar crisis as I've already discussed further bolsters the development of a globalizing financial system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:47]</nowiki>

Banks can profit through the recycling of petrodollar earnings, earnings that accrue to the exporting states, by lending those monies to oil importers so as to finance the balance of payments deficits that the oil crisis produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:04]</nowiki>

So the history of financial globalization really hinges on a series of key developments in the late '60s and early '70s. The rise of the Euromarkets, an offshore market for dollars based in London, the end of the Bretton Woods system and the opportunities that that creates for sort of further financial globalization. And the oil crisis which delivers a big shot in the arm to financial market integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:29]</nowiki>

What are the underlying causes? Technology is important, the reduction in the costs of communications technology facilitates the rise of international banking.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:41]</nowiki>

Business innovation is important. You know bankers are adept at devising ways to avoid the capital controls that nation-states try to implement to restrict the international movement of funds.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:52]</nowiki>

Policy choices are also important. Governments decide to reduce controls on international capital mobility. The United States in 1974 removes all of the capital controls which had been you know...used during the Bretton Woods era to defend the fixed exchange rate of the dollar. Great Britain in 1979 follows suit and removes all of its capital controls.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:17]</nowiki>

West European countries, other West European countries, will follow in the 1980s. So there are policy choices that are made to...accept if not to advance the cause of financial globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:30]</nowiki>

Financial globalization has important political consequences. It renders national macroeconomies more interdependent -- far more interdependent than they had been in the heyday of the Bretton Woods era. It also raises the you know prospect that national economic sovereignty is being you know sort of penetrated by, qualified by, free floating movements of global financial capital.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:55]]
<nowiki>[1:11:55]</nowiki>

This is remarked upon at the time, I'm going to show you a video clip even though I don't have time really that comes from a terrific 1976 movie {{WPExtract|Network (1976 film)|''Network''}} in which one of the characters, Ned Beatty, played by {{WPExtract|Ned Beatty}}<ref>Speaker was clarifying that he was saying the name of the actor and not the name of the character -- the name of the character being Arthur Jensen.</ref>, delivers a sort of [[wikt:homily|homily]] on the globalization of finance and it's implications for international politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:15]</nowiki>

<span id="network_clip"></span>''Arthur Jensen: You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians. There are no Arabs. There are no Third Worlds. There is no West. There is only one holistic system of systems. One vast and [[wikt:immane|immane]], interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of dollars: petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars, reichmarks, rins, rubles, pounds, and shekels.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:52]]
<nowiki>[1:12:52]</nowiki>

''Arthur Jensen: It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:02]</nowiki>

This is a great movie. One of my favorite '70s movies, so I really recommend it if you haven't seen it. But...it gives you a sense of the...discourse of the time, a discourse that is really not so different from the discourse of our own times when it comes to the relationship between global finance and nationality constituted political authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:22]</nowiki>

Indeed the acceleration of financial interdependence, the rise of the multinational corporation during the '70s, create a set of questions as to the future of political management of economic affairs. Is public policy up to the task or does globalization render national regulation irrelevant or ultimately futile?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:44]</nowiki>

Perhaps there is is a dynamic in play whereby globalization, a process that enables business actors and financial actors to escape the bounds of national regulation implies an implicit process of deregulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:59]</nowiki>

That would be you know kind of logical enough to infer. Insofar at capital becomes in a globalizing world less subject to the jurisdiction of national political authorities what restrictions, what regulations, are to bind business actors? These are questions that globalization conjures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:19]</nowiki>

One alternative would be the reconstitution of regulation on a transnational or even global scale. Can nation-states cooperate to achieve the kinds of sort of regulatory function collectively that individual nation-states used to be able to exercise within their own sort of territorial domains? This is one possibility. International organizations like the International Monetary Fund try during the 1970s to reconstitute stable sort of institutional regulatory arrangements on a transnational scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:52]</nowiki>

The IMF tries to devise sort of new rules for international monetary order to replace the Bretton Woods rules that collapsed in 1971 to 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:02]</nowiki>

Compromise on sort of the constitution of a recast international regulatory order proves very difficult to accomplish however. In part this is because the interests of nation-states are enduringly national and there not always convergence. Instead market determination, at least of currency values, ends up being the de facto solution to the management of international monetary relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:25]</nowiki>

It's too difficult to get nations to agree on a sort of consensual multilateral framework for managing currency values in a post Bretton Woods world. So the de facto alternative is to let markets determine the value of currencies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:38]</nowiki>

Still governments will come together to manage at least the most disruptive aspects of economic globalization. This is something that the {{WPExtract|Trilateral Commission}} proposes. We've talked a little about the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral Commission in essence comes into being as a sort of answer to the question of what are globalization's implications for governance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:03]</nowiki>

The trilateral concept is that an informal dialog amongst business leaders, policymakers and academics within the OECD countries will be able to devise sort of consensual solutions that countries will follow of their own volition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:17]</nowiki>

By consequence we see the rise of new relationships of policy coordination during the 1970s. The most sort of important symbol of which is the G7 summits -- summits that begin in the mid-1970s and continue through to the present day.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:31]</nowiki>

But still the question of whether globalization necessarily limits the scope of government endures. Will it ever be possible for governments acting collectively and multilaterally to regulate and to govern economies so effectively as nation-states had once been able to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:49]</nowiki>

Here we have to you know sort of ask the question of whether governments in the 1970s are becoming less willing, less eager, to attempt the tasks of economic regulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:00]</nowiki>

The Keynesian consensus after all experiences a crisis during the 1970s. Interdependence makes it harder for governments to exercise the regulatory managerial responsibilities that Keynes argued that they should exercise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:15]</nowiki>

The great inflation disrupts the credibility of Keynesian solutions as a sort of plausible framework for managing national macroeconomies. Instead classical liberalism, liberalism that emphasizes the utility of markets as mechanisms for determining the allocation of scarce resources, reasserts itself. After Keynes, {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek}} the exemplary sort of liberal economist of the twentieth century, experiences a heyday.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:44]</nowiki>

Hayek's writings become widely circulated and widely discussed in the 1970s. Hayek will -- wins the Nobel Prize for economics in 1974 -- which is illustrative of the ways in which the priorities of professional economists are shifting.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:59]</nowiki>

But the most influential economist of the decade is not Hayek who by this point is a very old man but {{WPExtract|Milton Friedman}}. A liberal economist who insists upon the preferability of market-based solutions over regulatory solutions. Friedman argues that government has gotten too big in the age of Keynes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:19]]
<nowiki>[1:18:19]</nowiki>

That big government is part of the problem. That government is responsible for the inflationary crisis of the 1970s -- for the failure of sort of growth to reassert itself. Friedman offers a set of radical solutions: spending cuts, tight money policies, reduction in sort of interest, increase in interest rates that will he argues quench the great inflation of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:42]</nowiki>

But the basic concept is one that advocates markets as the solution to the ills that ail the West. The rediscovery of markets is a overriding theme in the sort of economic thought, professional economics thought, of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:58]</nowiki>

But how and when is it translated into policy practice? Great Britain here is in the vanguard of the neoliberal shift. Intellectuals within the {{WPExtract|Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party}}, in particular {{WPExtract|Keith Joseph}}, who'll you have the opportunity to read about in this week's reading package, offer a set of neoliberal policy solutions as a prescription for the dilemmas of the Keynesian welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:20]</nowiki>

In Britain it's Margaret Thatcher who puts this neoliberal synthesis into action as Prime Minister -- a role that she assumes in 1979 when she leads the Conservative Party to election victory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:31]</nowiki>

Thatcher privatizes some of the state industries that had been nationalized after the Second World War. She privatizes coal and steel. She privatizes electricity. She privatizes telecommunications. She implements a broader set of market oriented reforms. She enables sort of individuals who live in public housing for example to purchase the public housing units that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:51]</nowiki>

She argues that this will create a stakeholder society in which individuals have a sort of direct investment in the housing that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:02]</nowiki>

How crucial was Thatcher? Well, this is a question that we can sort of discuss when we return to the neoliberal shift. But let's, by way of conclusion, think about the ways in which similar changes proceed elsewhere including in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

In the United States it was not a Republican administration, an administration of the right, but a Democratic administration that made the first really key moves. Jimmy Carter as President is unfortunate enough to inherit a stagnant economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:30]</nowiki>

He's caught in a very difficult bind. Inflation is a huge dilemma for the Carter administration. How to slay inflation? That's one big policy dilemma. On the other hand unemployment is a big problem for the Carter administration in the second half of the 1970s. How to expand employment? How to reduce unemployment? These are the two dilemmas that Carter has to, has to address.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:52]</nowiki>

At the same time Carter is eager to deregulate the economy. He has a small business background. He believes that excessive regulation is stifling to business and innovation. So the Carter administration makes moves to deregulate trucking and aviation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:07]</nowiki>

Around the same time a Supreme Court decision results in the effective deregulation of some personal financial services. The details are not important. What's important is the ways in which these shifts adhere to a common logic, a logic of deregulation, a logic of market determination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:25]</nowiki>

Carter initially prioritizes the fight over inflation. He pursues a stimulus package to expand the economy, to put Americans back to work, but in 1979 he makes a key shift to prioritize the fight against inflation over the fight against unemployment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:39]</nowiki>

This is a shift that is...sort of a key pivot in the transition from Keynesian welfare economics to what we would -- might characterize instead as neoliberal economics. Economics more oriented with market solutions, with allowing markets to determine their own sort of trajectories.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:00]</nowiki>

The Reagan administration essentially accepts the policy synthesis that Carter produces. Reagan will cut tax rates and continue deregulation. But Reagan does not orchestrate much sort of radical reform beyond that which has already been set in motion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:15]</nowiki>

On the contrary he will govern as a pragmatic President who has to rule with a Democratic legislature. So the United States experiences a sort of shift towards the market at around the same time that Great Britain does. But it's a shift that occurs under a different kind of administration, a Democratic center-left administration, rather than a Conservative center-right administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:35]</nowiki>

And this ought to provocative as we think about the role that politics play in determining the sort of market oriented shifts of the 1970s. You know these are issues that we'll return to and they're issues that you'll engage in your readings and your section discussions. But what's clear is that by the end of the 1970s the capitalist world is headed in a very different direction from that which it appeared to be following at the beginning of the decade.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-04-10T22:43:13Z

DavidKitFriedman: This could be a bit clearer than "world editable" which might not be understood.

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently editable by readers like is the case on [[w:Main Page|Wikipedia]] for [[w:Help:Editing|most articles]], but people can still send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a good edit to make to a Wikipedia article or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a [https://wikiedu.org/consult-our-expertise/ consulting meeting] with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct, or other errors, and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed as [[wikipedia:Romanization of Russian|romanizations]] of that particular Russian and Bulgarian first name in the Wikipedia article with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-04-10T22:27:58Z

DavidKitFriedman: Adding link to "Consult our expertise" Wiki Education page

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a good edit to make to a Wikipedia article or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a [https://wikiedu.org/consult-our-expertise/ consulting meeting] with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct, or other errors, and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed as [[wikipedia:Romanization of Russian|romanizations]] of that particular Russian and Bulgarian first name in the Wikipedia article with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-04-05T23:35:02Z

DavidKitFriedman: Both "Alexey" and "Alexei" are listed as romanizations of that particular first name.

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a good edit to make to a Wikipedia article or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a consulting meeting with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct, or other errors, and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed as [[wikipedia:Romanization of Russian|romanizations]] of that particular Russian and Bulgarian first name in the Wikipedia article with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-04-05T23:30:56Z

DavidKitFriedman: In some instances it was the case that Otter.ai got it right, but in other instances it was just an error that was noticed when reviewing the transcript.

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a good edit to make to a Wikipedia article or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a consulting meeting with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct, or other errors, and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed in the Wikipedia article on the name with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-04-05T23:28:12Z

DavidKitFriedman: Adding review of Otter.ai automated transcription service.

This is a volunteer experimental project transcribing academic lectures and putting the transcripts within a [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/MediaWiki MediaWiki] website. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a good edit to make to a Wikipedia article or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

'''''2022-04-05: Report on Trying Out Otter.ai automated transcription service'''''

<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed" data-expandtext=" Read full review " data-collapsetext=" Hide ">
In the course of preparing for a consulting meeting with [[w:Wiki Education|Wiki Education]][https://wikiedu.org/ ↗]. I recently did a Google search for "audio transcription", and received an ad for [[w:Otter.ai|Otter.ai]][https://otter.ai/home ↗] automated transcription service...

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">I had seen automated transcription on YouTube and also with Skype, and it looked to be a good bit better than some of my earlier experiences with automated audio transcription some years ago.

With a free basic plan and a $12.99 per month pro plan I decided to try Otter.ai using the free basic plan.

The free basic plan offers 600 minutes per month of automated audio transcription done while logged onto the website and with the pro plan one gets 6000 minutes per month.

Unlimited import of audio files is available with the pro plan, but with the free plan one gets a trial of three audio imports with a limit of 30 minutes for each file. Note that these three audio imports is ''per account'' and not ''per month''.

I tried it out on [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges]] and the resulting transcript for the first 30 minutes can be found [[:File:UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s_otter_ai.txt|here]] as a plain text file, and also as [[Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s|a wiki page]].

I compared my transcript with the Otter.ai transcript for the first 10 minutes of the recording. In the course of this comparison I found some errors in my transcript which Otter.ai got correct and one can see these instances in the [[Special:Contributions/DavidKitFriedman|list of contributions]] starting at 15 March 2022 where I started the edit summary with, "Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai."

The Otter.ai transcription has most of the words correct within lengthy paragraphs, but there can be occasional errors. For example, at the beginning it got "I hear..." instead of "I fear...".

Otter.ai was successfully able to get a variety of proper nouns including {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}}, {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}}, {{WPExtract|ZiL|ZiL limousine}}, {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}}, {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin}}. In the case of Kosygin, for the first name, the spelling "Alexei Kosygin" looks to be more standard in results from ProQuest than "Alexey Kosygin" which is what Otter.ai got though both are listed in the Wikipedia article on the name with the title [[wikipedia:Alexey|Alexey]].

On the other hand it was not able to get {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}}, or {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}}. For {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}} it got John Paul Sartre. Sometimes it got détente and sometimes it didn't, and similarly sometimes it got Lévy in the case of the name {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy}} and sometimes it didn't.

Sometimes the sentence construction could be awkward such as with:

:Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership.

Which could be changed to:

:Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

:The Brezhnev years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khrushchev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

Otter.ai offers the capability to edit the produced transcript via the website, and one can play, pause, rewind five seconds, slow down, speed up, using hotkeys as mentioned in [https://help.otter.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360047731754-Edit-a-conversation this article]. Also mentioned there is how the machine learning can learn over time to produce better transcripts. Also available is [https://otter.ai/education Otter.ai for Education] which I haven't investigated.

When I was doing the transcripts available on this website, as I mentioned at the top of this page, I used stenography, and I also used a website called [https://otranscribe.com/ oTranscribe] which similar to Otter.ai has hotkeys for play, rewind, slow down, etc. Using stenography along with oTranscribe I was able to set it up so that when a proper noun was heard that I realized wasn't in the steno dictionary (or perhaps which I didn't remember how to do, or perhaps which I couldn't do quickly enough) I could instead just press a key combination (called a chord in stenography) that inserted "[PNOUN <timestamp>]" where <timestamp> was the timestamp for that proper noun (e.g. (05:25) for 5 minutes and 25 second into the audio file).

It was then possible to do another pass through the transcript, and fill in the proper nouns. Using oTranscribe it was possible to hear the audio at that timestamp by just clicking on the produced link.

I could then also optionally easily insert a link to a Wikipedia article for that proper noun by using a template that I made called [[:Template:WPExtract|<nowiki>{{WPExtract}}</nowiki>]].

One could then add that word to the steno dictionary so that the next time it is spoken it could be done without needing to use PNOUN.

I haven't tried out Otter.ai more fully in terms of say for example doing time, accuracy, quality measurements, etc. between a variety of different techniques, but that's something that one could think about.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 23:28, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
</div>
</div>

----
{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Test Otter.ai transcript on UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-04-05T23:05:54Z

DavidKitFriedman: Otter.ai transcript of UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

Daniel Sargent 0:00
Okay, it's 9:40. So it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room, I hear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be your reason for not coming to lecture and staying home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion. At least I hope that was the case. And that you didn't think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reached that conclusion, it would be those who aren't here. But anyway, it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain, which is actually less rain than we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow, I think. So it's good if you like skiing the precipitation. But that's not what we're gonna be talking about today. This is not a class and we're in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s. So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War, on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today, we take the story to the socialist world of the Soviet Union and China, and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and 20 minutes, with the sort of resurgence of East West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s. And if we can do this, this will situate as well, to transition to the 1980s in the story of globalization next week. Okay, first, the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet style socialism during the 1970s, the Brezhnev years in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev era, because Khrushchev fall he was ousted in 1964. It's followed by a period of collective leadership. It's not Leonid Brezhnev, but Alexey Kosygin, the premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with Nikita Khrushchev in 1967. By the end of the 1960s, the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet states. The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union. Of course, affluence was more or less synonymous with political power. So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union, in the 1970s, had access to quite a lot of it. And this Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, more urban cities in the USSR. And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years, as Soviet citizens experienced them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes, okay. So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin around all of his sort of official apartments and limousines he shows his suite in the Kremlin. He shows his Dhaka in the countryside, he takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows his villa, his big Soviet limousine, Zil limousine. And what is brashness brash maths mother say, just, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the Bolsheviks come back? And this is a real joke that was told. Sort of in Moscow, dining rooms, Moscow apartments during the 1970s You know, the Brezhnev years, were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical got another little anecdote this attributed to Brezhnev himself. the veracity of this I can't confirm, but it certainly attribute it to Brezhnev and a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism as a tall tale for popular consumption. After all, we can't leave the people with no faith, the church was taken away, the Tsar was shot and something had to be substituted. So let the people build communism.

Whether those words are, you know, wherever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him plausibly isn't itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology he didn't stand for, you know, crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability, and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy. The Brezhnev years were a time of stasis, but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society. That were, however, some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future during the 1970s members of the Communist Party including fairly high ranking members, such as Mikhail Gorbachev, become disillusioned with communism, at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR. Despite the veneer of stability, there's a widespread circulation within Soviet society. among the ranks of the intelligentsia of dissident literature of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time. A solid start literally means self published literature, literature critical of the Soviet party state.

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material, Soviet citizens during the 1970s Enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world to information about the West, the Voice of America, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world. To some extent, the politics of detente helped to keep this sort of window onto the world open, the Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions. As a consequence if they taunt so they Tom sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era, for example, outside of the Soviet Union, communism experience is something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall but in the 50s, and well into the 1960s, Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left had been very loath to comment to criticize communism, even communism as practiced in the USSR. Probably the leading postwar French left wing intellectual John Paul Sartre remains to the very end of his life and apologist for Soviet style communism and apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR. Why was this? Well, in part, the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s. And here no single event is more consequential than the 1973 publication in the west of Alexandria social needs since book the Gulag Archipelago, have any of you had the opportunity to read the Gulag Archipelago. Okay, few of you. And this is a book that's really a couched as a history of the Gulag system. The GULAG being the immense system of political concentration camps, which Stalin constructed building upon a Leninist system of internal concentration camps, to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the communist regime. So the Gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet state has perpetrated against its own system against its own citizens. And Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when the Gulag Archipelago is published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression, and the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR. At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights. This Stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world. And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for, I think, this week, it could have been last week, Bernard, Henri Levy's book us barbarism with a human face is one of the texts that sort of powerfully reveals this shift in western attitudes towards the USSR. Lavie is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left wing intellectual tradition that has historically been indulgent towards even sympathetic to Soviet style communism. But Levee Breaks absolutely with its long sort of left wing progressive history of, you know, sympathy and indulgence, and offers a very harsh critique of Soviet style communism. The key move that lovey makes which you'll gather if you've read the piece is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism. authoritarianism, with the left with authoritarianism of the right he subsumes them both under a common category, the category of totalitarianism and philosophy there's very little difference between, you know, left wing shades of totalitarianism and right wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms. So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability, the crisis of You know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet style, socialism is proceeding a pace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects. Within the Soviet Union, ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live in the larger world, any claim that communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future, a bright, you know, future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of tawdry nature of the Soviet system itself. So those are the Brezhnev years, characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the in the larger world. Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but there'll be on the beat space website.

In other respects, however, the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this, we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s, the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973. The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about, it has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the 1973 Arab Israeli war. But the consequence as of the oil crisis, and not restricted to the Middle East and the West, the Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s, a major exporter of energy to global markets, the Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid 1950s. By the turn of the 1970s Energy is the Soviet Union's largest export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal. It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports, as Arab and oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more Petrodollar revenue, they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment, so indirectly as well as directly the soviet union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed, Russia, the primary successive state of the Soviet Union continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran? might it have something to do with the fact that the rising energy prices this is a that as a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia? That may be too cynical, but it should illustrate the basic point, which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises increases in the global price of oil?

What are the consequences of the petro dollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself? Obviously, a rise in oil prices fourfold rising oil prices in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what is this increase in export burning earnings, this petro dollar bouncy mean for the Soviet economy. It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s. to prop up a failing economic system, the Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology. If you can finance imports of Western technology, then the imperative to develop high technology yourself is diminished. The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West, insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture. Oil Helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive, the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce grain from the west instead, cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency, when it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make them cheap and abundant energy makes it you know, less advantageous for the managers of state owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs. Right in a world in which energy is scarce. You have to figure out how to be more ficient in your utilization of energy, this is something that we've sort of begun to do in the, you know, West since the oil crisis, we've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy. But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence, abundant cheap energy for Stolz sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform. Let's pose a counterfactual question, how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way, in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say, but what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform. Alexey Kosygin, who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev, aligns himself with a with an economic reform agenda, because Seguin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives. Even Brezhnev is a conservative, he repudiates conseguenze reform agenda and says, Well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them. Oil makes it possible to do that, or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here, I'm going to draw an example, or draw make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s. Japan's economy after the Second World War is not a centrally planned economy. But it's an economy in which the government exerts a substantial direction over sort of capitalist free market economic development. Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade Mitty is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And Mitty responds to the oil crisis in a US a proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has Japan produces no oil and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence, Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan. But Mitzi the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda, the structural economic reform, what Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies, particularly in energy in to invest particularly in industrial

processes that produce consumer goods. Consumer Electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices, Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production and special in specializing in producing, you know, Sony Walkman, for example, in producing less fuel, thirsty automobiles. So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis. Because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be, and take appropriate action in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the petro dollar bouncy, forestalls the prospect of structural reform, and this will be consequential for the long term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s. The predicament for a Soviet economy which has come which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide will be very serious indeed. Let's talk now about Eastern Europe talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and its relationship with the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s. We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968 Poland scene sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe, the legitimacy of communist systems is always fragile. These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy. The fundamental dilemma for East Europe the Eastern Europe's communist governments is always this how to rule how to maintain control over populations that do not accept For the most part, the legitimacy of communists domination. And there are basically two strategies that East European communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this, in the experiences of Romania and Albania. These are two repressive, sometimes violent regimes regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon, you know, consensus to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose. But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes communist leaders disdain repression, on the basis you know, only of principle, it's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order. So application becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does application involve? Essentially, it involves buying off populations, providing sufficient increases in material well being sufficient supplies of consumer goods. In order to maintain the basic, you know, satisfaction of poppy or of ordinary people, you provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system. This is what a hungry does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest, Hungary is so called reformed communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political acquiescence on the part of the population. This formula becomes known and hungry as goulash communism, you provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy it to eat reasonably well and hungry will remain relatively stable within the communist paradigm.

This is a strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept, so to do East Germany's communist leaders. The East Germany, in some ways is a particular case. Because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and applicators strategies at the same time, East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries elsewhere. These two things repression implication exist in a sort of an inverse correlation. Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet bloc. But they're also among the richest Romania and Albania, though Albania is not really in the communist bloc. So it's a particular case in and of itself, let's just talk about Romania. Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression implication of the two strategies AMS, you know, to some extent, they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both. But in order to placate your populations, through the provision of material abundance, you need to be able to finance your consumer production. And this is costly for communist regimes. Of course, if you're financing consumption, the money you're not financing, what's the trade off if you're consuming? That's right development investment. If you're consuming stuff, then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a trade off to be made between consumption and investment. And this is a difficult trade off for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long term agenda of communist development. It's also the case, you know, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe subject populations are coming to demand. East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy and by comparison with Western automobiles are inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to duplicate subject populations, East European communist governments end up during the 1970s, turning more and more to the west to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends. foreign imports are really, really important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s. The sort of opportunities for East West opening that detente and Astra politic and the Helsinki settlement provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the south. Students have communist led political systems in Eastern Europe, by opening up opportunities for trade of economic exchange, detente, helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of communist governments. And this is one of the reasons that some conservatives in the United States a critical of detente at the time, they argue that the West Western Europe and the United States are helping us sort of communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide western goods for their citizens. But it's important, you know, to think about the role of western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s. And after, not simply in terms of consumption, and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions, how are Easton? How are western goods to be paid for?

How is trade usually financed? That Well, in this case, the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the west. If Eastern European economies were producing, you know, the kinds of things that the West wanted, then they might be able to sustain balanced trade relations with the West. But in the absence of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the west is by borrowing money. So the east Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even a aspect of the story that ties back into the oil crisis. And I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is. One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short term capital circulating in the global economy. And part of this has to do with the petro dollar bouncy, that the oil exporting States enjoy your Saudi Arabia, for example, and you experience over a period of about six months, a four fold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money? It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran, because Iran is a big populous country. Its leadership under Shah Pahlavi has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran, it's easy to spend the money you just spend it on domestic infrastructural development, you build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does. But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

Unknown Speaker 27:54
That's in Japan?

Daniel Sargent 27:56
That's right, you bank it, but not necessarily in Japan? Because Japan by this point, is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital, you bank it. If you're Saudi Arabia, what kind of investor Are you? Are you an aggressive investor? Are you a conservative investor? That's right, you're conservative investors. So you don't do direct investments. You instead you put it with banks, you place it for the most part with you place your money with Western banks. And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers, including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe. This is a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America, which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe, the petro dollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy. But ultimately, this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preventing of staving off political unrest, communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas and probably not is more consequential during the 1970s. Then the issue of inflation. Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high sort of rates of investment over the long term. If you set prices to too low, then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of long term investment. So controlling prices is a really delicate act for central planners to perform. Because if you set prices too high, then you're going to incentivize political unrest, populations will recoil from hybrid prices, they might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult. But setting prices too low, encourages more consumption, then your economy will likely be able to sustain it will probably produce, you know, disruptions in supply, as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is basic market economics. And the rules are not all that different, even in the context of a socialist society. Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right? Socialist societies plan production, but they can't plan for consumption, the only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase. So it's always a very delicate sort of act, that that has to be performed. And the case of Poland is illustrative of some of the, you know, difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it, you in particular, I'm going to sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland, not with respect to the communist system writ large. In the late 1970s 1978 1979, the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap use of prices for food and consumer goods, which have been sustained through most of the 70s. In order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable. This is really important. Price increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis, born of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods, other factors to stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s. In 1978, a Polish national is elected Pope becomes Pope John Paul the Second, and this stimulates a sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti Soviet ism, even Polish anticommunism admits this is a

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File:UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s otter ai.txt

2022-04-01T18:26:59Z

DavidKitFriedman: Automated transcription done by Otter.ai created in the course of trying out Otter.ai.

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Automated transcription done by Otter.ai created in the course of trying out Otter.ai.
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UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-03-15T03:42:24Z

DavidKitFriedman: Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai. Changing "Levi" to "Lévy".

== Preliminaries ==

Okay, it's 9:40 so it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room I fear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be a you know reason for not coming to lecture and staying at home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

At least I hope that was the case in that you didn't all think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reach that conclusion it would be those who aren't here. But anyway it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain which is actually less rain then we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow I think. So, it's good if you like skiing -- the precipitation.

== Lecture Overivew ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:40]]
<nowiki>[00:40]</nowiki>

But that's not what we're going to be talking about today. This is not a class in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:58]]
<nowiki>[00:58]</nowiki>

So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today we take the story to the socialist world, the Soviet Union, and China and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and twenty minutes with the sort of resurgence of East-West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s, and if we can do this -- this will situate us well to transition to the 1980s and the story of globalization next week.

== Transformation and Tumult in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:30]]
<nowiki>[01:30]</nowiki>

=== Tumult in The Soviet Union During the 1970s: The Brezhnev Years ===

Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:40]]
<nowiki>[01:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}} years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khruschev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:01]]
<nowiki>[02:01]</nowiki>

It's not Leonid Brezhnev but {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin}}, the Premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in 1967.<ref>Speaker here is likely referring to the {{WPExtract|Glassboro Summit Conference}} where Alexei Kosygin met with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in the summer of 1967.</ref> By the end of the 1960s the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev, has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:22]]
<nowiki>[02:22]</nowiki>

The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union of course affluence was more or less synonymous with political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:38]]
<nowiki>[02:38]</nowiki>

So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union in the 1970s had access to quite a lot of it. And this...Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, and more urbane cities in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[03:00 ]</nowiki>

And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years as Soviet citizens experience them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10 ]</nowiki>

Okay.

(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:12]]
<nowiki>[03:12]</nowiki>

So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin, around all of his you know sort of official apartments, and limousines. He shows her his suite in the Kremlin. He shows her his [[wikt:dacha|dacha]] in the countryside. He takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows her his villa -- his big Soviet limousine -- {{WPExtract|ZiL}} limousine.<ref>As the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Zil}} mentions ZiL limousines were used by powerful people in the Soviet Union, "The ZiL limousines were the official car that carried the Soviet heads of state, and many Soviet Union allied leaders, to summits or in parades."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:30]]
<nowiki>[03:30]</nowiki>

And what does Brezhnev's mother say? She says, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}} come back?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:38]]
<nowiki>[03:38]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

And this is a real joke that was told...sort of in...Moscow dining rooms, Moscow apartments, during the 1970s. And you know the Brezhnev years were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical. I've got another little anecdote. This attributed to Brezhnev himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:58]]
<nowiki>[03:58]</nowiki>

The veracity of this I can't confirm, but it's certainly attributed to Brezhnev in a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the Czar was shot, and something had to be substituted. So let the people build Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:20]]
<nowiki>[04:20]</nowiki>

Whether those words are, you know, were ever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him, plausibly, is in itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology. He didn't stand for you know crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:42]]
<nowiki>[04:42]</nowiki>

The Brezhnev years were a time of [[wikt:stasis|stasis]] but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

There were however some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future. During the 1970s members of the Communist Party, including fairly high ranking members, such as {{WPExtract|Mikhail Gorbachev}} become disillusioned with Communism at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

Despite the veneer of stability there is a widespread circulation within Soviet society among the ranks of the [[wikt:intelligentsia|intelligentsia]] of dissident literature, of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time as {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, it literally means self-published literature -- literature critical of the Soviet party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material Soviet citizens during the 1970s enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world -- to information about the West. The {{WPExtract|Voice of America}}, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:52]]
<nowiki>[05:52]</nowiki>

To some extent the politics of détente help to keep this sort of window onto the world open. The Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions as a consequence of détente. So détente sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West, a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:19]]
<nowiki>[06:19]</nowiki>

Outside of the Soviet Union Communism experiences something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall but in the '50s and well into the 1960s Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left, had been very loath to criticize communism, even Communism as practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:40]]
<nowiki>[06:40]</nowiki>

Probably the leading postwar French left-wing intellectual, {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}}, remained to the very end of his life an apologist for Soviet-style Communism -- an apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:58]]
<nowiki>[06:58]</nowiki>

Why was this? Well, in part the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights -- of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

And here no single event is more consequential then the 1973 publication in the West of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's}} book {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}}. Have any of you had the opportunity to read the ''The Gulag Archipelago''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:31]]
<nowiki>[07:31]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. And this is a book that's really couched as a history of the {{WPExtract|Gulag|gulag}} system, the gulag being the immense system of political concentration camps which Stalin constructed, building upon a Leninist system of sort of internal concentration camps to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the Communist regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:55]]
<nowiki>[07:55]</nowiki>

So the gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet-state has perpetrated against its own system, against its own citizens, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when ''The Gulag Archipelago'' goes published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression. And the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:17]]
<nowiki>[08:17]</nowiki>

At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights this stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:38]]
<nowiki>[08:38]</nowiki>

And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for...I think this week -- it could have been last week -- {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy|Bernard-Henri Lévy's}} book, ''Barbarism with a Human Face'', is one of the texts that you know sort of powerfully reveals this shift in Western attitudes towards the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:56]]
<nowiki>[08:56]</nowiki>

Lévy is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left-wing intellectual tradition, that has historically been indulgent towards, even sympathetic to Soviet-style communism. But Lévy breaks absolutely with this long sort of left-wing progressive history of you know sympathy and indulgence and offers a you know very harsh critique of Soviet-style communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:21]]
<nowiki>[09:21]</nowiki>

The key move that Lévy makes, which you'll have gather, if you've read the piece, is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism, authoritarianism of the left, with authoritarianism of the right. He subsumes them both under a common category -- the category of totalitarianism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

And for Lévy there's very little difference between, you know, left-wing shades of totalitarianism and right-wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:51]]
<nowiki>[09:51]</nowiki>

So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability the crisis of, you know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet-style socialism is proceeding apace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

Within the Soviet Union ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live. In the larger world any claim that Communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future -- a bright you know future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of [[wikt:tawdry|tawdry]] nature of the Soviet system itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

So those are the Brezhnev years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:37]]
<nowiki>[10:37]</nowiki>

Characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:50]]
<nowiki>[10:50]</nowiki>

Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but they'll be on the bSpace website.

=== Soviet Economic Gain from the Oil Crisis ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:54]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

In other respects however the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s -- the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about. It has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the {{WPExtract|Yom Kippur War|1973 Arab-Israeli War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:28]]
<nowiki>[11:28]</nowiki>

But the consequences of the oil crisis are not restricted to the Middle East and the West. The Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s a major exporter of energy to global markets.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:51]]
<nowiki>[11:51]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid-1950s. By the turn of the 1970s energy is the Soviet Union's largest sort of export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:10]]
<nowiki>[12:10]</nowiki>

It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. Military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports. As Arab and...oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more petrodollar revenue they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

So indirectly as well as directly the Soviet Union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

Might it have something to do with the fact that the rise in energy prices that is a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:07]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

That may be too cynical, but...it should illustrate the basic point which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises, increases, in the global price of oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:19]]
<nowiki>[13:19]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of the petrodollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

Obviously, a rise in oil prices, fourfold rise in oil prices, in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what does this increase in export earnings, this petrodollar bounty, mean for the Soviet economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:49]]
<nowiki>[13:49]</nowiki>

It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s to prop up a failing economic system. The Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:05 ]]
<nowiki>[14:05 ]</nowiki>

If you can finance imports of Western technology then the imperative to develop high-tech technology yourself is diminished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West. Insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture oil helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce, grain, from the West instead.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency. When it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make then cheap and abundant energy makes it...you know...sort of less advantageous for the managers of state-owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

Right, in a world in which energy is scarce, you have to figure out how to be more efficient in your utilization of energy. This is something that we've, you know, sort of begun to do in the, you know, West, since the oil crises. We've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to...to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:17]]
<nowiki>[15:17]</nowiki>

But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence abundant cheap energy forestalls you know sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

Let's pose a counterfactual question: how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say. But what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:51]]
<nowiki>[15:51]</nowiki>

Alexei Kosygin who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev aligns himself with an economic reform agenda. Kosygin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West, that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives even.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:11]]
<nowiki>[16:11]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is a conservative. He repudiates Kosygin's reform agenda. And says, well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them.

==== Contrast with Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

Oil makes it possible to do that. Or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here I'm going to draw an example, or sort of, make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

Japan's economy after the Second World War is not essentially planned economy but it's an economy in which the government exerts substantial direction over you know sort of capitalist free market economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:50]]
<nowiki>[16:50]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry|Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade, METI}}, is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And METI responds to the oil crisis in a you know sort of proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has. Japan produces no oil, and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:19]]
<nowiki>[17:19]</nowiki>

But METI, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda for structural economic reform. What Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies -- particularly in energy...in...to invest particularly in industrial...processes that produce consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

Consumer electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production, in specializing in producing you know {{WPExtract|Walkman|Sony Walkman}}, for example, in producing less fuel thirsty automobiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be and take appropriate action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union on the other hand the petrodollar bounty forestalls the prospect of structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:39]]
<nowiki>[18:39]</nowiki>

And this will be consequential for the long-term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s the predicament for a Soviet economy which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide, will be very serious indeed.

=== Eastern Europe During the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:02]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Let's talk now about Eastern Europe. I've talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and it's relationship to the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership -- against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968. Poland sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of Communist systems is always fragile.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions -- that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

The fundamental dilemma for Eastern Europe's Communist governments is always this: how to rule, how to maintain control over populations that do not accept...for the most part -- the legitimacy of Communist domination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:04]]
<nowiki>[20:04]</nowiki>

And there are basically two strategies that East European Communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this in the experiences of Romania and Albania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:20]]
<nowiki>[20:20]</nowiki>

These are two repressive, sometimes violent, regimes. Regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon...you know, consensus, to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes Communist leaders disdain repression on the basis only of principle. It's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53]]
<nowiki>[20:53]</nowiki>

So placation becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does placation involve? Essentially it involves buying off populations. Providing sufficient increases in material well-being, sufficient supplies of consumer goods, in order to maintain the basic you know satisfaction of pop...or of ordinary people. You provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

This is what Hungary does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest. Hungary's so-called reform Communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political quiescence on the part of the population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

This formula becomes know in Hungary as {{WPExtract|Goulash Communism}}. You provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy to eat reasonably well, and Hungary will remain relatively stable within the Communist paradigm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

This, you know sort of, strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept. So too do East Germany's Communist leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:10]]
<nowiki>[22:10]</nowiki>

Though East Germany in some ways is a particular case because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and...placatory strategies at the same time. East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries. Elsewhere these two things, repression and placation, exist in a sort of inverse correlation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki>

Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc, but there are also among the richest. Romania and Albania, though Albania's not really in the Communist Bloc<ref>Albania allied itself with China and distanced itself from the Soviet Union. See the [[wikipedia:Albania#Communism|Communism section of the Wikipedia article on Albania]] and this is also talked about in lecture 10, "[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s#|So Hoxha becomes this very unusual thing: a European Maoist.]]."</ref> so it's a sort of particular case in and of itself. Let's just talk about Romania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:51]]
<nowiki>[22:51]</nowiki>

Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression and placation are the two strategies and you know to some extent they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:06]]
<nowiki>[23:06]</nowiki>

But in order to placate your populations through the provision of material abundance you need to be able to finance you know consumer production. And this is costly for Communist regimes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

Of course if you're financing consumption then what are you not financing? What's the tradeoff if you're...consuming?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:30]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. Development. Investment. If you're consuming stuff then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a tradeoff to be made between consumption and investment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:43]]
<nowiki>[23:43]</nowiki>

And this is a difficult tradeoff for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long-term agenda of Communist development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

It's also the case, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that Communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe's subject populations are coming to demand.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:06]]
<nowiki>[24:06]</nowiki>

East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy, and by comparison with Western automobiles inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to placate subject populations East European Communist governments end up during the 1970s turning more and more to the West -- to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:35]]
<nowiki>[24:35]</nowiki>

Foreign imports are really, really, important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:47]]
<nowiki>[24:47]</nowiki>

The sort of opportunities for East-West opening that détente and {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}} and the {{WPExtract|Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Settlement}} provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the sustenance of Communist led political systems in Eastern Europe. By opening up opportunities for trade and for economic exchange détente helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of Communist governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

And this is one of the reasons that some you know sort of conservatives in the United States are critical of détente at the time. They argue that the West, Western Europe and the United States, are helping sort of Communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide Western goods for their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

But it's important you know to think about the role of Western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s and after not simply in terms of consumption and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

How are Eastern, how are Western goods to be paid for?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:56]]
<nowiki>[25:56]</nowiki>

How is trade usually financed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

(student response)

Debt. Well, in this case the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the West. If Eastern European economies were producing you know the kinds of things that the West wanted then they might be able to...sustain balanced trade relations with the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:26]]
<nowiki>[26:26]</nowiki>

But in the absence of you know sort of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the West is by borrowing money.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So the East Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even an aspect to the story that ties back into the oil crisis, and I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is.

==== The Increase in Short-Term Capital Because of Oil Demand ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:57]]
<nowiki>[26:57]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short-term capital circulating in the global economy. In part this has to do with the petrodollar bounty that the oil exporting states enjoy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:13]]
<nowiki>[27:13]</nowiki>

You're Saudi Arabia for example. And you experience over a period of about six months a fourfold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:24]]
<nowiki>[27:24]</nowiki>

It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran. Because Iran is a big populous country. It's leadership under {{WPExtract|Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah Pahlavi}} has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran it's easy to spend the money. You just spend it on domestic infrastructural development. You build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:43]]
<nowiki>[27:43]</nowiki>

But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:53]]
<nowiki>[27:53]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You bank it. But not necessarily in Japan. Because Japan by this point is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital. You bank it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:06]]
<nowiki>[28:06]</nowiki>

If you're Saudi Arabia what kind of investor are you? Are you an aggressive investor or are you a conservative investor?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:13]]
<nowiki>[28:13]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You're a conservative investor. So you don't do direct investment. Instead you put it with banks. You place it for the most part with -- you place your money with Western banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers -- including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

There's a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe the petrodollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:07]]
<nowiki>[29:07]</nowiki>

But ultimately this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preve-- of staving off political unrest. Communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas.

==== Inflation in the East Bloc During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

And probably none is more consequential during the 1970s then the issue of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:35]]
<nowiki>[29:35]</nowiki>

Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet Bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high, you know, sort of rates of investment over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:49]]
<nowiki>[29:49]</nowiki>

If you set prices too low then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of sort of long-term investment. So controlling prices is a, you know, sort of really delicate act for central planners to perform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:04]]
<nowiki>[30:04]</nowiki>

Because if you set prices too high then you're going to incentivize political unrest. Populations will recoil from high bread prices. They might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult, but setting prices too low encourages more consumption than your economy will likely be able to sustain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:26 ]]
<nowiki>[30:26 ]</nowiki>

It will probably produce you know disruptions in supply as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is a sort of basic market economics and the rules are not all that different even in the context of a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:40 ]]
<nowiki>[30:40 ]</nowiki>

Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right. Socialist societies plan production but they can't plan consumption. The only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55 ]]
<nowiki>[30:55 ]</nowiki>

So it's always a very delicate you know sort of act that has to be performed.

==== Upheaval in Poland During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:01 ]]
<nowiki>[31:01 ]</nowiki>

And...the case of Poland is you know sort of illustrative of some of the you know difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it you know...in particular. I'm going to...you know sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland -- not with respect to the Communist system writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:25 ]]
<nowiki>[31:25 ]</nowiki>

In the late 1970s...1978, 1979 the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap you know sort of prices for food and consumer goods which have been sustained through most of the 1970s in order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51 ]]
<nowiki>[31:51 ]</nowiki>

This is really important. Prices increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis borne of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods. Other factors too stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:13 ]]
<nowiki>[32:13 ]</nowiki>

In 1978 a Polish national is elected Pope -- becomes {{WPExtract|Pope John Paul II}}. And this stimulates sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti-Sovietism, even Polish anti-Communism. Amidst this you know sort of combination of economic instability borne of an officially mandated price increase and political nationalism stirred by Pope John Paul II's election Poland at the end of the 1970s experiences a major round of political upheaval -- a major sort of political crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49 ]</nowiki>

This crisis is you know usually known as the episode of the {{WPExtract|Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity Movement}}. What is Solidarity? Why does it pose such a political challenge to the Polish Communist regime? Solidarity is an independent trades union movement that emerges in 1980.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:09 ]]
<nowiki>[33:09 ]</nowiki>

The fact of Solidarity's being a labor union, an independent trades union, is in itself consequential. Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:28 ]]
<nowiki>[33:28 ]</nowiki>

That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism. So the emergence of an independent trades union movement in Poland is ideologically disruptive and contentious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:47 ]]
<nowiki>[33:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's also in the summer of 1980 a major political phenomenon. {{WPExtract|Lech Wałęsa}} emerges as the leader of Solidarity, this independent trades union movement. He's a shipworker in Gdańsk with a sort of long history of political activism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:07 ]]
<nowiki>[34:07 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1970 Solidarity numbers over 700,000 workers as members. This is a very big political mobilization. The Polish government initially tries to appease Solidarity by recognizing it as a legitimate sort of representative organ of Polish workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:27 ]]
<nowiki>[34:27 ]</nowiki>

As a consequence of this initial act of recognition Solidarity's membership increases very, very quickly. By the summer, by the end of 1980, there are about 8 million Poles who count themselves as members of Solidarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:39 ]]
<nowiki>[34:39 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1981 one in four Polish people is a member of the Solidarity Movement. So Solidarity sort of explodes onto the Polish scene as an independent political force -- as a political force autonomous from the party-state, headed by a non-Communist membership, sorry, headed, led by a non-Communist leadership -- the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. And this poses a you know sort of serious, even existential threat, to the legitimacy, even the survival of the Polish Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13 ]</nowiki>

How is a party-state that derives its legitimacy from its claim to represent the workers and the interests of the workers going to deal with the emergence of a independent labor union that presents itself as a political rival to the Communist Party?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:30 ]]
<nowiki>[35:30 ]</nowiki>

In a sense what Solidarity means is that plural politics have arrived within the context of the party-state. This is very, very disruptive. So what does the Polish Communist state decide to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:43 ]]
<nowiki>[35:43 ]</nowiki>

It does essentially the only thing that it can do if it wants to remain a party-state -- and that is the government at the end of 1981 turns the tanks on Solidarity. Martial law is declared. Solidarity is declared illegal and popular street demonstrations are violently and viciously repressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04 ]</nowiki>

So the Polish state ultimately embraces repression because it's unable to control the political consequences of this mass mobilization that a combination of you know economic instability borne of rising consumer prices and political nationalism produce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:24 ]]
<nowiki>[36:24 ]</nowiki>

Solidarity in effect demonstrates, or the Solidarity Crisis in effect demonstrates, that there are severe limits to what political reform can accomplish within the context of the party-state. There might be you know an opportunity within the party-state to satisfy some of the you know consumer aspirations that subject populations have but the party-state will not be able tolerate plural politics. That is sort you know persuasively demonstrated.

==== The Economic Lag Between Eastern Europe and the West ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53 ]]
<nowiki>[36:53 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's economies continue to lag further and further behind the capitalist West. This is really, really important. Though the West experiences a slowdown in growth rates during the 1970s the gap between East and West just continues to get bigger and bigger.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:15 ]]
<nowiki>[37:15 ]</nowiki>

Let's took not at overall GDP but at per capita GDP which is what this chart displays. Per capita GDP is a pretty good index of basic economic well-being, of ordinary people. And what you can see is that from sort of the early 1970s in particular the rates of growth in per capita GDP in the East Bloc slow. During the 1980s the story will essentially be one of stasis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:43 ]]
<nowiki>[37:43 ]</nowiki>

In relative terms however the East Bloc is going backwards. As the West continues to get richer and richer in per capita terms the failures of the socialist system to match the affluence that Western capitalism is capable of producing for it citizens become more and more glaring.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:03 ]]
<nowiki>[38:03 ]</nowiki>

So the slowdown is a relative slowdown. There's still a very you know sort of incremental improvement in per capita GDP in the...in say Eastern Europe between you know 1970 and 1980. So relative to sort of...its own experience Eastern Europe's position does improve very, very sluggishly. But relative to the West Eastern Europe is falling behind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:29 ]]
<nowiki>[38:29 ]</nowiki>

And this is really, really important. Because the example of the West will be absolutely crucial to the legitimacy crisis of state Communism in the 1980s. The example of the West exposes the basic dishonesty of Communist propaganda. Insofar as Communist leaders proclaim themselves to be building a future that is even brighter than the future that capitalism could deliver the actual you know historical accomplishments of Communism debunk the myth that Communism is a more advanced economic system -- that the command economy is somehow more productive than the capitalist economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:08 ]]
<nowiki>[39:08 ]</nowiki>

This...disjoint between the theory and the reality of Communism is profoundly consequential. It is in a sense what causes the basic legitimacy crisis of the system. The fact that Communist governments end up depending upon violence and repression to control political unrest only you know sort of exacerbates the basic legitimacy problem. These regimes are brutal and violent sometimes but even more consequential I would argue is the fact that their in...is that they prove unable to deliver the material bounty which they promise to provide for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:45 ]]
<nowiki>[39:45 ]</nowiki>

Communism...sorry...

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52 ]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

No, that's, that's a really good question. Well, that would be you know sort harder to do because the data on which this chart is produced is just population data and GDP data. So the mean average is the one that you know can be easily produced based upon you know the best available data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:19]]
<nowiki>[40:19]</nowiki>

Estimating, this is sort of a subsidiary point, statistics from the East Bloc are notoriously difficult to work with because you know they're frequently manufactured are bare little relation to reality. But it's a very good question. I mean to what extent does this you know sort of tail off in GDP per capita growth in the East Bloc veil sort of important differences between East and West that have to do with the distribution of well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48 ]</nowiki>

Because there's a plausible you know sort of alternative viewpoint here -- which is that Western societies produce more in the aggregate but that wealth in the West is so...unevenly distributed that most of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few very wealthy people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07 ]</nowiki>

Meaning that ordinary Westerns are not necessarily any better off than are ordinary East Bloc citizens. In that circumstance the East Bloc would not have experienced its legitimacy crisis because leaders of East European countries could have said that for, so far as ordinary people were concerned, they were really much better off under Communism than they would be under capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:27 ]]
<nowiki>[41:27 ]</nowiki>

I wish that I had that chart to show you. Unfortunately, I don't have it in the slide show. So you just have to take this on faith, that...the relative decline in sort of....in aggregate economic well-being is experienced by ordinary people in the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:47 ]]
<nowiki>[41:47 ]</nowiki>

Sure, the Western countries even, the countries of Western Europe, which are less unequal than the United States is, remain relatively less equal than the economies of Eastern Europe do but the difference isn't all that much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:01 ]]
<nowiki>[42:01 ]</nowiki>

And this actually gives me an opportunity to talk about a really important point which was a point that we should think about when we're thinking about sort of economics and equality in Communist societies and capitalist societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:15 ]]
<nowiki>[42:15 ]</nowiki>

One of the key you know distinguishing characteristics of a Communist society is that economic wealth ends up being sort of synonymous with political wealth. Economic power ends up being synonymous with political power. Those who control the state, those who control the political apparatus are also those who enjoy the greatest material abundance -- hence, Brezhnev and the fur coat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:41 ]]
<nowiki>[42:41 ]</nowiki>

If you want to make it in the Soviet Union your best opportunity for making it comes through advancing yourself through the party bureaucracy -- through the party hierarchy. It's political power that can deliver you know the things upon which the good life depends: a nice dacha in the countryside, a well appointed well-furnished apartment in Moscow. Well, these things go to the people who wield political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:06 ]]
<nowiki>[43:06 ]</nowiki>

In the West by contrast there's a disjoint between political power and economic power. At least there ought to be in principle, right -- is the case that political power exists apart from economic power. Money can influence elections but it doesn't necessarily determine them. You know of course in the present moment you know I think we're experiencing something of a national conversation as to what the relationship between economic power is...and...but as to what the relationship between economic and political power is and what it should be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37 ]</nowiki>

Whether economic power is excessively influential upon political power is a question that we're debating and there are you know different perspectives that we could bring to that conversation and it's not really my intention to discuss that today because it takes us away from where we need to be going.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:53 ]]
<nowiki>[43:53 ]</nowiki>

But the...point which is crucial to remember about Communist societies is that economic power and political power are in essence synonymous. And as a consequence of that people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who wield power enjoy you know relatively greater abundance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13 ]</nowiki>

They shop in special shops. They're special shops for high ranking party members that provide access to you know much better Western consumer goods than those that are available to ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:23 ]]
<nowiki>[44:23 ]</nowiki>

And this basic you know sort of...the fact that inequality is so implicated with political power further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis of the system. You know ordinary Eastern Europeans who don't enjoy the special prerogatives that party members enjoy will call out party members for you know self-serving hypocrisy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:46 ]]
<nowiki>[44:46 ]</nowiki>

So far as the comparison with the West goes. I'm just going to make one last point on this issue. It's important, and we'll talk more about this, but it's important to think about the role in which you know sort of the media plays in giving East Europeans a sense of what ordinary life is like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:04 ]]
<nowiki>[45:04 ]</nowiki>

American television shows, like {{WPExtract|Dallas (1978 TV series)|''Dallas''}} and {{WPExtract|Dynasty (1981 TV series)|''Dynasty''}}, which probably none of you remember, are...screened on West European television. You know Germany for example you know screens American soap operas constantly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:19]]
<nowiki>[45:19]</nowiki>

These transmissions can be you know easily viewed, you know picked up, by antennae, and viewed in Eastern Europe. And this you know sort of window on Western abundance that television you know drama -- well, drama is probably too good a word to use, that television you know series like ''Dallas'' provide, gives you know sort of East Europeans, a, you know sense, perhaps an exaggerated sense, of what life looks like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:47 ]]
<nowiki>[45:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's not altogether misrepresentive. Right, by the turn of the 1980s what kinds of lives are middle class Americans enjoying? Well, they you know usually inhabit single family homes in suburbs. They'll drive probably two automobiles in a household. Putting food on the table is not a concern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:08 ]]
<nowiki>[46:08 ]</nowiki>

This is a standard of material abundance that the East has entirely failed to match. So the more that Easterners know about how people live in the West, and about the kinds of expectations that Westerners have, the less credible becomes the proclamations of you know Communist leaders to be giving their people better lives than the lives that Westerners live.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29 ]]
<nowiki>[46:29 ]</nowiki>

But we'll talk more about sort of these contrasts in the 1980s and how they [[wikt:inflect|inflect]] the end of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:35 ]]
<nowiki>[46:35 ]</nowiki>

Okay, but the...point I think that the data conveys really powerfully which is a point that you want to bare in mind carefully is that the example of the West is a very subversive one from a Eastern standpoint in the 1970s and the 1980s. The West is growing faster than the East even as the West experiences difficult political and economic transformations of its own.

== Political Tumult in China in the Late 1960s and 1970s ==

=== The Cultural Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:58 ]]
<nowiki>[46:58 ]</nowiki>

Let's move on now to talk about China. Another country that experiences some consequential transformation in its relations with the West during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10 ]</nowiki>

I'm going to take the Chinese story back to the {{WPExtract|Cultural Revolution}} because I don't think that we've yet had the chance to sort of go through the Cultural Revolution in a systemic way and getting the history of the Cultural Revolution right is really important for understanding what comes next.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:25 ]]
<nowiki>[47:25 ]</nowiki>

It's what comes next that should interest us today but to understand that we'll take the history back to the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:33 ]]
<nowiki>[47:33 ]</nowiki>

What was the Cultural Revolution? How did it come to pass? Just to give me a quick sense of the room how many of you had already studied the history of the Cultural Revolution in some other context? In some other class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:46 ]]
<nowiki>[47:46 ]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. So you're just have to bare with you because I'm not probably going to take this into the kind of detail that you've encountered elsewhere but for those who haven't studied the Cultural Revolution it's important just to get a handle on this. Because this a really big, really consequential event, set of events in the making of contemporary China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:05 ]]
<nowiki>[48:05 ]</nowiki>

The Cultural Revolution emerges out of the catastrophic aftermath of China's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}. The Great Leap Forward of course was the developmental plan introduced in 1956 that aimed to construct an indigenous Chinese path to socialist modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:21 ]]
<nowiki>[48:21 ]</nowiki>

It was a path that would involve the promotion of you know all kinds of ambitious things like rural industrialization. Backyard steel furnaces as we've discussed are one of the you know preeminent symbols of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:35 ]]
<nowiki>[48:35 ]</nowiki>

Yet the Great Leap Forward for all of its overwhelming ambition is in practice a horrible catastrophe. Tens of millions of people starve to death as a consequence of the havoc that the Great Leap Forward produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:48 ]]
<nowiki>[48:48 ]</nowiki>

The Great Leap Forward does not accomplish what {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Mao}} wanted to accomplish which is nominally as least to make China prosperous and strong. Instead the Great Leap Forward brings Chinese society to its knees.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:00 ]]
<nowiki>[49:00 ]</nowiki>

There's a massive famine. Tens of millions of people die. It's really, really horrible. This disaster brings not just the legitimacy of you know Communist rule, but Mao Zedong's legitimacy as a wise and farseeing leader into question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:16 ]]
<nowiki>[49:16 ]</nowiki>

Indeed Mao recognizes by you know the turn of the 1960s that he has overreached himself. That he has set something in motion which has been catastrophic in it consequences. And Mao retreats from the sort of front lines of political leadership in China. He goes back home and retreats to his study and undertakes a long phase of you know sort of reading and contemplation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:41 ]]
<nowiki>[49:41 ]</nowiki>

As Mao retreats from the forefront of Chinese politics new leaders emerge and they pursue different kinds of policies. The two most important leaders are {{WPExtract|Liu Shaoqi}}, pictured on the bottom of the slide, and {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}}. And these are the two men who come to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:02 ]]
<nowiki>[50:02 ]</nowiki>

And they pursue policies that are aimed at moderating the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restoring a more normal and a more sustainable path towards modernization and development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16 ]</nowiki>

Both men and fairly pragmatic. Deng Xiaoping is well known for sort of citing an old Sichuan<ref>{{WPExtract|Sichuan|The Wikipedia article on Sichuan}} lists other romanizations of the name of the province to be Szechuan and Szechwan.</ref> saying which is: it doesn't matter if it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it catches mice.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:30 ]]
<nowiki>[50:30 ]</nowiki>

And this is a statement that well captures you know Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism. He's less concerned with ideology as Mao was than with achieving tangible results. So for a period in the first half of the 1960s China experiences a sort of moderate turn in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are temporarily at least preeminent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:53 ]]
<nowiki>[50:53 ]</nowiki>

And they try to restore a stability, sort of normalcy to use {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge|Calvin Coolidge's}} language<ref>The slogan "Return to Normalcy" was used in the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The Harding-Coolidge ticket won the election and after Harding passed away Coolidge was inaugurated as President. See Wikipedia articles: {{WPExtract|Return to normalcy}}, {{WPExtract|1920 United States presidential election}}, {{WPExtract|Warren G. Harding}}, and {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge}}.</ref> to the Chinese socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:02 ]]
<nowiki>[51:02 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao Zedong, sort of sitting, festering in retirement, is plotting a return to the political fore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:11 ]]
<nowiki>[51:11 ]</nowiki>

As Mao contemplates a sort of return to the front line of Chinese politics he is spurred by his wife {{WPExtract|Jiang Qing}} who is a very hard line radical. I mean a real...sort of [[wikt:doctrinaire|doctrinaire]] [[wikt:ideologue|ideologue]]. And she argues that China has taken a sort of bourgeois turn under Liu and Deng -- that it is time to reradicalize the revolution, to reenergize the revolution, perhaps even to launch a new revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeois stability that has set in under Deng and Liu and to sort of restore the revolutionary project to its maximum fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:52 ]]
<nowiki>[51:52 ]</nowiki>

Jiang is particularly resentful of China's cultural establishment. This may have something to do with the fact that she was a actress by trade before she became a political leader. She sees Chinese culture as a bastion of sort of bourgeois tradition. And she is absolutely adamant that if a new revolution is to be launched that it needs to be a Cultural Revolution in its thrust.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:16 ]</nowiki>

That it needs to focus not just upon a transformation of economic and political structures but on transforming Chinese culture and Chinese values -- to create a truly radical, a truly revolutionary society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:29 ]]
<nowiki>[52:29 ]</nowiki>

Spurred by Jing Qing Mao returns to the front line of Chinese politics in 1966. He convenes a special [[wikt:plenum|plenum]] of the Chinese Communist Party that August and it sets in motion the train of events that will become known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:48 ]]
<nowiki>[52:48 ]</nowiki>

And this is how Mao proclaims it. You know China is now going to have a great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This involves the demotion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. These two men are sort of pushed aside. And Mao appoints a radical {{WPExtract|Lin Biao}} as his anointed heir.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:07 ]]
<nowiki>[53:07 ]</nowiki>

Lin Biao is a devoted Maoist. He was responsible a couple of years earlier during Mao's period of exile for collecting a host of Mao's, you know, political sayings into a you know single volume -- a book, that became known as the {{WPExtract|Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book''}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:22 ]]
<nowiki>[53:22 ]</nowiki>

So Lin Biao is sort of more responsible than anybody else for developing what would become in the context of the Cultural Revolution a cult of Maoism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:34 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34 ]</nowiki>

So the Cultural Revolution is launched in 1966 with the purpose of transforming China -- of revolutionizing China's revolution. In a sense the Cultural Revolution represents an effort by Mao to launch a bottom-up revolution against the Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53 ]]
<nowiki>[53:53 ]</nowiki>

So this a really you know sort of peculiar thing. After the 1949 revolution the Communist Party sort of assumes the responsibilities of governance. It assimilates itself to the state and it becomes a well-defined, well-established power structure. This is the power structure that Deng and Liu come responsible for in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward -- the Chinese party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:16 ]]
<nowiki>[54:16 ]</nowiki>

But outside of power, Mao, who is still the nominal leader of this party-state becomes convinced, prodded in part by his wife, that the party-state has become conservative, that it's become bourgeois, that it's become reactionary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:29 ]]
<nowiki>[54:29 ]</nowiki>

So the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents an effort to revolutionize the state that the 1949 Communist Revolution created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40 ]]
<nowiki>[54:40 ]</nowiki>

And in order to accomplish this Mao turns to the masses. He turns to the Chinese masses to launch a revolution against the party-state that the Communist Party has created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:51 ]]
<nowiki>[54:51 ]</nowiki>

Mao in 1966 proclaims a campaign against what he describes as the Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. This is to be a revolution against the old -- out with the old, in with the new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:06 ]]
<nowiki>[55:06 ]</nowiki>

Nowhere is this revolution fiercer than on Chinese university campuses. There is a sort of demographic aspect to the Cultural Revolution that is really important to think about. China, like the United States, like Western Europe, experiences a sort of youth bubble, a baby boom after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:25 ]]
<nowiki>[55:25 ]</nowiki>

By the mid-1960s children born in the aftermath of the Second World War are becoming teenagers. They're becoming seventeen, eighteen, nineteen-year-olds who are becoming you know sort of politically conscious and who are susceptible to...how do I put this politely?...far-fetched ideological doctrines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43 ]]
<nowiki>[55:43 ]</nowiki>

Not that you ever see any evidence of that on Berkeley's campus because this is a, you know, sober, responsible place. But in China it's an altogether different story, and young people are you know susceptible to a kind of radicalization that serves the purposes that Mao now wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:01 ]]
<nowiki>[56:01 ]</nowiki>

So Chinese campuses become a recruiting ground for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao radical Chinese students form units called {{WPExtract|Red Guards}}. These are sort of paramilitary units that establish themselves to advance the revolution, to impose Maoist orthodoxy, and to sort of challenge so-called right-wing deviationists -- rightists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:30 ]]
<nowiki>[56:30 ]</nowiki>

Students form Red Guard units. They carry Mao's ''Little Red Book'' which becomes in the late 1960s you know absolutely ubiquitous as an ideological and political symbol. Carrying the ''Little Red Book'' implies a sort of devotion or signals a devotion to the cult of Maoist Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48 ]]
<nowiki>[56:48 ]</nowiki>

Politically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sort of...targets...you know the bureaucracy. It targets people like Deng Xiaoping who is persecuted in the context of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:08 ]]
<nowiki>[57:08 ]</nowiki>

The denouncication of rightists becomes sort of the overriding theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And this has catastrophic consequences for the state. Important leaders Deng and Liu Shaoqi are purged. They become the targets of particular opprobrium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26 ]]
<nowiki>[57:26 ]</nowiki>

But it's not just you know leaders at the top who are purged. Around two-thirds of all Communist Party officials are removed from their posts in the context of the Great Proletarian Revolution. Red Guards in a sense overthrow the basic institutions of political order that have developed in Communist China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:46 ]]
<nowiki>[57:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is a drama that is played out at many different levels. It's not just at the top leadership level of the party. But at the level of you know sort of social institutions like schools and universities. Red Guards seek out reactionaries and purge them. Bourgeois teachers are purged in schools, bourgeois reactionary professors are purged in universities, which would be a really bad idea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:07 ]]
<nowiki>[58:07 ]</nowiki>

Intellectuals are the target of special assault. Rightists are singled out for public humiliation and are forced to confess their so-called sins against the Maoist Revolution. This is a catastrophic tumultous phase in Chinese life. It's a period in which a revolution from below sort of overthrows you know much of what the Communist Party has built since 1969 -- since 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32 ]]
<nowiki>[58:32 ]</nowiki>

What are the human consequences of this? I mean there are some mass killing. Around half a million deaths, up to half a million deaths, are attributable to the chaos that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45 ]]
<nowiki>[58:45 ]</nowiki>

To situate this in context it's substantially less people than died during the Great Leap Forward. But it's still you know a weighty toll, and a toll that we should contemplate particularly when we consider that the death toll that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused was entirely ideologically motivated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:07]]
<nowiki>[59:07]</nowiki>

Unlike the Great Leap Forward which represented an ambitious effort to industrialize, to modernize China, and in which the catastrophic famines were in a sense an indirect consequence of a modernizing project, virtually all of the people who died during the Cultural Revolution were singled out for political murder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:27 ]]
<nowiki>[59:27 ]</nowiki>

So this is a you know weighty topic with which to grapple. But the political consequences, more than the sort of ethical or moral consequences, are those that shape what comes next. Authority, central political authority, effectively collapses as Red Guards remove Communist bureaucrats from their post.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:48 ]]
<nowiki>[59:48 ]</nowiki>

The central planning system breaks down. The Great Leap Forward had presented an alternative model to Soviet-style central planning. The Cultural Revolution obliterates the mechanics of central planning virtually entirely. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the opportunities for implementing Soviet-style economic planning will be very limited because the planning structures have been dismantled. The bureaucracies have been depopulated and dismantled.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:17 ]</nowiki>

Virtually the only you know political leader in China who is able to hold the whole thing together, which is to say to hold the state together, during the period of the Cultural Revolution is {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai}} -- the Premier of the Chinese state. And a man who while a, you know, sort of very close lieutenant of Mao Zedong throughout Mao's life doesn't share Mao's ideological radicalism or ideological fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:46 ]</nowiki>

It's not to say that Zhou Enlai was a closet liberal. It would be wrong to see him in those terms. But he recognizes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and struggles against you know very difficult odds to preserve the basic stability of the Chinese state -- to protect the institutions of central power and central authority against the rampages of the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:07 ]</nowiki>

And in those Zhou Enlai is more or less successful. He manages to sustain a semblance of a political center through the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:18 ]</nowiki>

Ultimately though it's Mao Zedong who brings the whole production to an end. Mao realizes by the end of 1968, early 1969, that things are going far too far. That if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is permitted to continue that it will result in the effective you know destruction of China as a nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39 ]</nowiki>

That the Chinese [[wikt:polity|polity]] will fall apart as a consequence of this revolution from below. So having launched a popular revolution against the state Mao now very abruptly shifts course and moves to implement a state clamp down on the popular revolution. Mao turns to the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, to purge the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:05 ]</nowiki>

Having previously instructed the Red Guards to purge bourgeois rightist elements in the People's Liberation Army and other you know Communist Party bureaucracies Mao now turns to the army in order to restore order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:18 ]</nowiki>

This attempt to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to an end inaugurates a very sort of peculiar phase in the history of the People's Republic -- a late Maoist phase in which Mao remains the singular preeminent leader of China but in which Mao...does not pursue the sort of revolutionary political and social transformation that characterized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:49 ]</nowiki>

So you might think of the era of late Maoism as an era in which China is delicately poised between revolutionary politics on the one hand, because the forces that have produced the cultural revolution are still present, and Mao is still in many respects sympathetic to them, and the forces of stabilization on the other. It's a very interesting and very delicate phase in China's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:13 ]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17 ]</nowiki>

Because Mao was a brilliant political leader. I mean Mao was extremely adept at balancing political factions and playing off personalities and interests against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:28 ]</nowiki>

I mean Mao may...you know have made a number of catastrophic decisions as regards China's economic development. But when it came to politics -- both domestic politics and international politics. I mean Mao was one of the most gifted political tacticians of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:46 ]</nowiki>

And what Mao does through the era of the Cultural Revolution and into the late Maoist Era that sort of follows the heights of the Cultural Revolution is to balance the centrists, people like Deng Xiaoping, against the radical left, people like his wife Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:03 ]</nowiki>

And ultimately he's successful in performing that delicate balancing act through to the very end of his life. It's sort of remarkable when you think about the tumult that China experiences in the second half of the twentieth century that Mao Zedong dies a peaceful death in his sleep. The fact that he does so is testimony I think to the brilliance of Mao's political skills.

=== Maoist Rule in the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25 ]</nowiki>

So Mao, you know, as I've sort of explained, performs this delicate balancing act in the first half of the 1970s. He works to balance the left against the center.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:40 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao orchestrates, as we've already discussed, a major shift in China's international relations. In 1972 he welcomes Richard Nixon to Beijing. This does not necessarily signify a shift in China's international goals. Mao will continue to talk about global revolution as an objective for China but the realignment with the United States serves a very clear tactical purpose. It serves the purpose of gaining China a tacit ally against the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:12 ]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union by 1972 is a major concern for China. 1969 brings actual fighting between Chinese and Soviet forces over the Ussuri River. That year China experiences a major war scare. Indeed this war scare one of the factors that prompts Mao to wind down the Cultural Revolution. Because Mao recognizes that amidst the upheaval that the Cultural Revolution is performing China is essentially open so far as foreign aggression is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:39 ]</nowiki>

So Mao implements a sort of major tactical shift in the Cold War. He tries to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union, but this does not signify necessarily a strategic reorientation towards the West. There's a big difference between a tactical opening and a strategic opening and what Mao pursues in 1972 is a tactical opening. Mao's overarching goals remain consistent: to make China strong and prosperous and to promote and pursue global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10 ]</nowiki>

But there are significant changes in Mao's you know sort of political discourse during this era of you know late Maoist rule that will help to prefigure what comes next. Probably the single most important sort of revision of Maoist doctrine that Mao orchestrates in this period is the so-called {{WPExtract|Three Worlds Theory}} which Mao first develops in 1973 and which is publicly presented in a speech that Deng Xiaoping gives at the United Nations in 1974.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:42 ]</nowiki>

In this speech Mao, which Mao writes, the world is divided into three parts: the world of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the rich capitalist world, countries like West Germany, and Canada and Australia and so on, and then the Third World -- the rest of the world, the poor world, the world of which China is a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:06 ]</nowiki>

There are really important implications to the way in which this Three Worlds Concept is presented. Whereas Mao had previously described the world in terms of class struggle, the workers versus the bourgeoisie, the Three Worlds Concept implies a more developmental...framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:25]]
<nowiki>[1:07:25]</nowiki>

It suggests, or in some ways it sort of echoes the Three Worlds Concepts that Latin American developmental economists offer, you know, during the 1950s and 1960s. And this is really consequential. Mao talks about the need to develop and build the developing world: China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:46 ]</nowiki>

This is not so different from what developing economics proposes. Though Mao continues to talk about revolution as a goal for China in the world his political rhetoric in the last years of his life is increasingly inflected by a discourse of development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:03]]
<nowiki>[1:08:03]</nowiki>

This doesn't necessarily mean that Mao personally wanted to orchestrate a new course but Mao says things that Mao's successors will be able to hold onto as a way of relating their priorities to sort of Maoist doctrine. Because this is really important. Look Mao remains, continues to be venerated in China, through to the present day. Even as China for the past thirty years has pursued policies at home and in the world that are almost diametrically at odds with most of what Mao said.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:35 ]</nowiki>

So how to relate policies that repudiate the substance of Mao while paying fealty to the dogma? Well, to do that you seize upon things that Mao said that might rationalize the things that you want to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is what Mao's successors will do. They will invoke Mao's Three Worlds Concept and the developmental implications of it in order to legitimate and defend policies that serve quite different purposes to those that Mao wanted to achieve, policies from the late 1970s onwards, that will serve the purposes of development rather than the purposes of global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:11]]
<nowiki>[1:09:11]</nowiki>

There are other key developments during the Mao Era -- none more consequential than the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was purged in 1969, stripped of his official office, sent to work in a tractor factory in Xinjian Province.<ref>In the [[wikipedia:Deng Xiaoping#Cultural Revolution|Cultural Revolution section of the Wikipedia article on Deng Xiaoping]] there is, "In October 1969 Deng Xiaoping was sent to the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi province to work as a regular worker." The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Xinjian District}} says that it is a suburb of {{WPExtract|Nanchang}} which is the capital of {{WPExtract|Jiangxi}} Province.</ref> But in 1974, Deng Xiaoping reforms, sorry, he returns, he doesn't necessarily reform -- that's key. Deng returns -- unreformed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36 ]</nowiki>

Deng returns in part because Zhou Enlai promotes him. Zhou Enlai is really Deng Xiaoping's primary sponsor in the power structure in the late phase of the Cultural Revolution. And Zhou Enlai promotes Deng to become First Vice Premier of the Chinese state with particular responsibility for economic reform. This is a major return because Deng will of course become China's preeminent leader in a post Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:06 ]</nowiki>

The 1969 purge is not the last purge of Deng Xiaoping however. Deng is purged again in 1975. And that's really important. Because it tells us something about how fractious Chinese politics remain through to the end of the Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:21 ]</nowiki>

At the instigation of rightists, sorry of left-wingers, of the radicals around Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Deng is forced to sort of incriminate himself, to draw up a list of self-criticisms, to renounce his so-called ideological deviations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:39 ]</nowiki>

So up to the end of very Mao's life the conflict between the radicals around Mao's wife and the political moderates around Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping remains very fierce. And the second purge of Deng Xiaoping in 1975 is excellent sort of illustration of this point.

=== The Death of Mao Zedong and the Question of Succession ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:57 ]</nowiki>

Mao Zedong of course dies in September 1976. This is a really big, really, really big shift. Even more tumultuous perhaps than Stalin's death in 1953 had been. The Chinese revolution after all has been singularly associated since the 1920s with the personality and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao's death after fifty years...after twenty-five years of head of state, twenty-fives as a revolutionary leader, is a...dramatic and profound disjuncture in the history of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:33 ]</nowiki>

Who will succeed Mao Zedong? This is the big question. There are...a number of factions struggling for influence. Probably the most coherent is the radical faction, the {{WPExtract|Gang of Four}}, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:52 ]</nowiki>

At the same time there are anointed successors. The key anointed successor is {{WPExtract|Hua Guofeng}} -- who's the person who Mao designates as his heir as China's political leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:05 ]</nowiki>

Other however have claims to make besides. Deng Xiaoping, though he has recently been sort of exiled and purged can make a strong claim to being one of China's most effective and proven administrators. Deng has a record of proven accomplishment which will be you know very much to his advantage as China's political future is determined.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:27 ]</nowiki>

The succession is complex but let's try to trace out some of the you know key steps. Hua Guofeng, the anointed successor, moves initially against the radical left. And this is really key. Hua moves to purge the Gang of Four in late 1976. Just months after Mao dies the radicals are purged.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:50 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:50 ]</nowiki>

They're arrested. And a sort of campaign against the extreme left is set in motion. This is really consequential for Deng Xiaoping. Insofar as the radical left, the Gang of Four, had been sort of Deng's primary antagonistic, antagonist, their removal from the political scene creates opportunities for Deng to reassert himself. And this is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15 ]</nowiki>

The power struggle ceases to be three-way or power struggle between Hua, Deng, and the Gang of Four, and it becomes a sort of two-way conflict between Deng and Hua after the removal of the Gang of Four.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:29 ]</nowiki>

And here the you know conflict assumes a sort of ideological aspect. Hua Guofeng aligns himself very closely after the purge of the Gang of Four with Mao Zedong's legacy. Hua proclaims himself loyal to what he characterizes as the two whatevers. He says, and here I quote, whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon we shall resolutely defend, whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed we shall resolutely oppose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:56 ]</nowiki>

So Hua, after Mao's death, presents himself as the heir not only of Mao's political role but also of Mao's ideological commitments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:08]]
<nowiki>[1:14:08]</nowiki>

Deng by contrast is much more pragmatic. Deng argues that policies should be grounded not in Maoist doctrine but in empirical evidence. That China needs to allow its you know policies to be determined by practice, what works and what doesn't, rather than by revolutionary ideology. Deng's cat theory: it doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it captures, catches mice, is you know sort of illustrative of Deng's pragmatism.

=== China Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:37 ]</nowiki>

Deng Xiaoping establishes control fairly quickly. The key event here is the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which takes place in December 1978. This is the moment at which Deng and his allies sort of outflank and overwhelm Hua Guofeng and his allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:57 ]</nowiki>

The Eleventh Central Committee is the sort of key turning point in China's history. At this meeting the Chinese Communist Party renounces basic Maoist revolutionary concepts. The concept of class struggle as the sort of key to history is quitetly discarded. The concept of continual revolution, the idea that the Communist Party needs to be waging a continual revolution, is also discarded -- instead pragmatic policies are embraced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:29 ]</nowiki>

It's as if the Communist Party decides that the revolution has been accomplished with the attainment of its own political power and that the task ahead is now to develop China, to make China strong and prosperous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:40 ]</nowiki>

These pragmatic policies will include economic deregulation and soon enough market oriented reforms. Equally consequential Deng Xiaoping visits the United States. The visit to the United States comes after a formal normalization of diplomatic relations which occurs at the beginning of January. It's negotiated in December 1978, but on the first of January 1979 the United States of America and China normalize diplomatic relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:09 ]</nowiki>

This is a major turning point. It signals a new sort of opening towards the United States a new kind of relationship between the people's republic and the United States.

=== Deng Xiaoping's Policy Towards the US Contrasted with Mao Zedong's Policy Towards the US ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:20 ]</nowiki>

It might be useful to compare and contrast Deng Xiaoping's US policy with Mao Zedong's US policy. What did the two leaders want to accomplish? Well, what Mao Zedong wanted to accomplish, in the context of a war scare with the Soviet Union, was a tactical alignment that would use the United States as a sort of counterweight to the Soviet Union to the advantage of Chinese diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:51 ]</nowiki>

What Deng contemplates is something entirely different. For Deng the opening to the United States is to be strategic rather than political. It's not just an alliance of convenience against the Soviet Union that Deng wants -- though we may note that Deng Xiaoping is fiercely anti-Soviet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:07]]
<nowiki>[1:17:07]</nowiki>

But what Deng wants is something more, far more far reaching than that. He wants to open not only China's sort of political alignments towards the United States but also China's economy, and ultimately China's society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:21 ]</nowiki>

When Deng travels to the United States, which he does in February 1979, he's extremely interested in American industry. He wants to visit factories, car factories, he pays a visit to the space program I think in Texas, and is you know immensely impressed with American high technology -- with American space technology as well as with technology aimed at ordinary consumers. And he seeks to realize for China a future based upon this American high technology model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:55 ]</nowiki>

In order to accomplish that Deng recognizes he will have to open China towards the United States, towards the West, towards the capitalist world. To do this he implements major structural reforms. Foreign investment will be solicited and encouraged. Market incentives will be opened. China in a sense will transition from having been...will transition from the status of a sort of autarkic communistic economy which is what China was, for, through the Maoist Era, to a relationship in which China will begin to reintegrate with the capitalist liberal open world economy that the United States tried to build after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:38 ]</nowiki>

An economy that was built in the West but which was of course divided by the advent of the Second World War. So this is a profound strategic realignment.

=== The Enabling of Market Reforms Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:47 ]</nowiki>

How are we to explain it looking back? Let's conclude with some quick reflections. Why did Deng try to do what he did and why was he able to accomplish so much? We'll talk much more about reforms after 1980 in due course but at this stage let's just reflect on four points.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:05 ]</nowiki>

First socialization in China was always less advanced that it became in the Soviet Union. The socialist project by the mid-1970s was only twenty-five years old. The Great Leap Forward did not achieve everything that it wanted to achieve. The Communist Party found, when it looked carefully at the countryside, that the reach of socialization was very limited. That ordinary Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants, continued to display sort of entrepreneurial impulses, entrepreneurial habits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

In the 1960s this seemed disturbing to the leadership of the Communist Party. It was one of the reasons that the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was launched. But the limits of socialization will in due course facilitate a market oriented transformation of China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:56 ]</nowiki>

The disruption that the Cultural Revolution causes is also crucial. The Cultural Revolution does much of what Mao accomplish, wants is to accomplish, which is to sweep out the olds. Having swept out the olds the opportunity for new thinking, for new approaches is rather more open than it will be by contrast in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

The international reorientations are also crucial. Mao pursues an opening towards the United States for realistic even cynical purposes. Mao wants to bring the United States on board as a tactical asset against the Soviet Union.
But Mao's 1972 tactical opening towards the United States makes it possible for Deng Xiaoping to pursue a far more far reaching strategic opening towards the United States in 1979.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:47 ]</nowiki>

Finally we should be attentive to the subtle shift in Maoist discourse during the last phase of Mao's political career. The fact that Mao will be begin to emphasize development as well as revolution as a goal for China at home and in the world makes it possible for Mao's successors, preeminently for Deng Xiaoping, to orchestrate a transition from revolution to development and modernization as the overarching purpose of Chinese statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:15 ]</nowiki>

The consequences of this in the 1980s and beyond we'll come to in due course.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-03-15T03:40:07Z

DavidKitFriedman: Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai. Adjective "loath" instead of verb "loathe".

== Preliminaries ==

Okay, it's 9:40 so it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room I fear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be a you know reason for not coming to lecture and staying at home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

At least I hope that was the case in that you didn't all think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reach that conclusion it would be those who aren't here. But anyway it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain which is actually less rain then we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow I think. So, it's good if you like skiing -- the precipitation.

== Lecture Overivew ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:40]]
<nowiki>[00:40]</nowiki>

But that's not what we're going to be talking about today. This is not a class in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:58]]
<nowiki>[00:58]</nowiki>

So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today we take the story to the socialist world, the Soviet Union, and China and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and twenty minutes with the sort of resurgence of East-West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s, and if we can do this -- this will situate us well to transition to the 1980s and the story of globalization next week.

== Transformation and Tumult in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:30]]
<nowiki>[01:30]</nowiki>

=== Tumult in The Soviet Union During the 1970s: The Brezhnev Years ===

Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:40]]
<nowiki>[01:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}} years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khruschev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:01]]
<nowiki>[02:01]</nowiki>

It's not Leonid Brezhnev but {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin}}, the Premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in 1967.<ref>Speaker here is likely referring to the {{WPExtract|Glassboro Summit Conference}} where Alexei Kosygin met with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in the summer of 1967.</ref> By the end of the 1960s the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev, has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:22]]
<nowiki>[02:22]</nowiki>

The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union of course affluence was more or less synonymous with political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:38]]
<nowiki>[02:38]</nowiki>

So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union in the 1970s had access to quite a lot of it. And this...Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, and more urbane cities in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[03:00 ]</nowiki>

And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years as Soviet citizens experience them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10 ]</nowiki>

Okay.

(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:12]]
<nowiki>[03:12]</nowiki>

So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin, around all of his you know sort of official apartments, and limousines. He shows her his suite in the Kremlin. He shows her his [[wikt:dacha|dacha]] in the countryside. He takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows her his villa -- his big Soviet limousine -- {{WPExtract|ZiL}} limousine.<ref>As the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Zil}} mentions ZiL limousines were used by powerful people in the Soviet Union, "The ZiL limousines were the official car that carried the Soviet heads of state, and many Soviet Union allied leaders, to summits or in parades."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:30]]
<nowiki>[03:30]</nowiki>

And what does Brezhnev's mother say? She says, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}} come back?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:38]]
<nowiki>[03:38]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

And this is a real joke that was told...sort of in...Moscow dining rooms, Moscow apartments, during the 1970s. And you know the Brezhnev years were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical. I've got another little anecdote. This attributed to Brezhnev himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:58]]
<nowiki>[03:58]</nowiki>

The veracity of this I can't confirm, but it's certainly attributed to Brezhnev in a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the Czar was shot, and something had to be substituted. So let the people build Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:20]]
<nowiki>[04:20]</nowiki>

Whether those words are, you know, were ever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him, plausibly, is in itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology. He didn't stand for you know crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:42]]
<nowiki>[04:42]</nowiki>

The Brezhnev years were a time of [[wikt:stasis|stasis]] but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

There were however some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future. During the 1970s members of the Communist Party, including fairly high ranking members, such as {{WPExtract|Mikhail Gorbachev}} become disillusioned with Communism at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

Despite the veneer of stability there is a widespread circulation within Soviet society among the ranks of the [[wikt:intelligentsia|intelligentsia]] of dissident literature, of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time as {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, it literally means self-published literature -- literature critical of the Soviet party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material Soviet citizens during the 1970s enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world -- to information about the West. The {{WPExtract|Voice of America}}, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:52]]
<nowiki>[05:52]</nowiki>

To some extent the politics of détente help to keep this sort of window onto the world open. The Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions as a consequence of détente. So détente sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West, a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:19]]
<nowiki>[06:19]</nowiki>

Outside of the Soviet Union Communism experiences something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall but in the '50s and well into the 1960s Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left, had been very loath to criticize communism, even Communism as practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:40]]
<nowiki>[06:40]</nowiki>

Probably the leading postwar French left-wing intellectual, {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}}, remained to the very end of his life an apologist for Soviet-style Communism -- an apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:58]]
<nowiki>[06:58]</nowiki>

Why was this? Well, in part the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights -- of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

And here no single event is more consequential then the 1973 publication in the West of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's}} book {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}}. Have any of you had the opportunity to read the ''The Gulag Archipelago''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:31]]
<nowiki>[07:31]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. And this is a book that's really couched as a history of the {{WPExtract|Gulag|gulag}} system, the gulag being the immense system of political concentration camps which Stalin constructed, building upon a Leninist system of sort of internal concentration camps to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the Communist regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:55]]
<nowiki>[07:55]</nowiki>

So the gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet-state has perpetrated against its own system, against its own citizens, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when ''The Gulag Archipelago'' goes published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression. And the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:17]]
<nowiki>[08:17]</nowiki>

At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights this stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:38]]
<nowiki>[08:38]</nowiki>

And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for...I think this week -- it could have been last week -- {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy|Bernard-Henri Lévy's}} book, ''Barbarism with a Human Face'', is one of the texts that you know sort of powerfully reveals this shift in Western attitudes towards the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:56]]
<nowiki>[08:56]</nowiki>

Lévy is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left-wing intellectual tradition, that has historically been indulgent towards, even sympathetic to Soviet-style communism. But Levi breaks absolutely with this long sort of left-wing progressive history of you know sympathy and indulgence and offers a you know very harsh critique of Soviet-style communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:21]]
<nowiki>[09:21]</nowiki>

The key move that Lévy makes, which you'll have gather, if you've read the piece, is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism, authoritarianism of the left, with authoritarianism of the right. He subsumes them both under a common category -- the category of totalitarianism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

And for Lévy there's very little difference between, you know, left-wing shades of totalitarianism and right-wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:51]]
<nowiki>[09:51]</nowiki>

So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability the crisis of, you know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet-style socialism is proceeding apace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

Within the Soviet Union ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live. In the larger world any claim that Communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future -- a bright you know future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of [[wikt:tawdry|tawdry]] nature of the Soviet system itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

So those are the Brezhnev years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:37]]
<nowiki>[10:37]</nowiki>

Characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:50]]
<nowiki>[10:50]</nowiki>

Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but they'll be on the bSpace website.

=== Soviet Economic Gain from the Oil Crisis ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:54]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

In other respects however the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s -- the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about. It has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the {{WPExtract|Yom Kippur War|1973 Arab-Israeli War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:28]]
<nowiki>[11:28]</nowiki>

But the consequences of the oil crisis are not restricted to the Middle East and the West. The Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s a major exporter of energy to global markets.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:51]]
<nowiki>[11:51]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid-1950s. By the turn of the 1970s energy is the Soviet Union's largest sort of export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:10]]
<nowiki>[12:10]</nowiki>

It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. Military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports. As Arab and...oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more petrodollar revenue they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

So indirectly as well as directly the Soviet Union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

Might it have something to do with the fact that the rise in energy prices that is a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:07]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

That may be too cynical, but...it should illustrate the basic point which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises, increases, in the global price of oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:19]]
<nowiki>[13:19]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of the petrodollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

Obviously, a rise in oil prices, fourfold rise in oil prices, in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what does this increase in export earnings, this petrodollar bounty, mean for the Soviet economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:49]]
<nowiki>[13:49]</nowiki>

It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s to prop up a failing economic system. The Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:05 ]]
<nowiki>[14:05 ]</nowiki>

If you can finance imports of Western technology then the imperative to develop high-tech technology yourself is diminished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West. Insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture oil helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce, grain, from the West instead.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency. When it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make then cheap and abundant energy makes it...you know...sort of less advantageous for the managers of state-owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

Right, in a world in which energy is scarce, you have to figure out how to be more efficient in your utilization of energy. This is something that we've, you know, sort of begun to do in the, you know, West, since the oil crises. We've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to...to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:17]]
<nowiki>[15:17]</nowiki>

But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence abundant cheap energy forestalls you know sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

Let's pose a counterfactual question: how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say. But what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:51]]
<nowiki>[15:51]</nowiki>

Alexei Kosygin who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev aligns himself with an economic reform agenda. Kosygin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West, that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives even.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:11]]
<nowiki>[16:11]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is a conservative. He repudiates Kosygin's reform agenda. And says, well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them.

==== Contrast with Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

Oil makes it possible to do that. Or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here I'm going to draw an example, or sort of, make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

Japan's economy after the Second World War is not essentially planned economy but it's an economy in which the government exerts substantial direction over you know sort of capitalist free market economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:50]]
<nowiki>[16:50]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry|Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade, METI}}, is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And METI responds to the oil crisis in a you know sort of proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has. Japan produces no oil, and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:19]]
<nowiki>[17:19]</nowiki>

But METI, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda for structural economic reform. What Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies -- particularly in energy...in...to invest particularly in industrial...processes that produce consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

Consumer electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production, in specializing in producing you know {{WPExtract|Walkman|Sony Walkman}}, for example, in producing less fuel thirsty automobiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be and take appropriate action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union on the other hand the petrodollar bounty forestalls the prospect of structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:39]]
<nowiki>[18:39]</nowiki>

And this will be consequential for the long-term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s the predicament for a Soviet economy which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide, will be very serious indeed.

=== Eastern Europe During the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:02]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Let's talk now about Eastern Europe. I've talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and it's relationship to the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership -- against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968. Poland sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of Communist systems is always fragile.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions -- that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

The fundamental dilemma for Eastern Europe's Communist governments is always this: how to rule, how to maintain control over populations that do not accept...for the most part -- the legitimacy of Communist domination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:04]]
<nowiki>[20:04]</nowiki>

And there are basically two strategies that East European Communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this in the experiences of Romania and Albania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:20]]
<nowiki>[20:20]</nowiki>

These are two repressive, sometimes violent, regimes. Regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon...you know, consensus, to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes Communist leaders disdain repression on the basis only of principle. It's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53]]
<nowiki>[20:53]</nowiki>

So placation becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does placation involve? Essentially it involves buying off populations. Providing sufficient increases in material well-being, sufficient supplies of consumer goods, in order to maintain the basic you know satisfaction of pop...or of ordinary people. You provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

This is what Hungary does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest. Hungary's so-called reform Communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political quiescence on the part of the population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

This formula becomes know in Hungary as {{WPExtract|Goulash Communism}}. You provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy to eat reasonably well, and Hungary will remain relatively stable within the Communist paradigm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

This, you know sort of, strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept. So too do East Germany's Communist leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:10]]
<nowiki>[22:10]</nowiki>

Though East Germany in some ways is a particular case because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and...placatory strategies at the same time. East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries. Elsewhere these two things, repression and placation, exist in a sort of inverse correlation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki>

Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc, but there are also among the richest. Romania and Albania, though Albania's not really in the Communist Bloc<ref>Albania allied itself with China and distanced itself from the Soviet Union. See the [[wikipedia:Albania#Communism|Communism section of the Wikipedia article on Albania]] and this is also talked about in lecture 10, "[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s#|So Hoxha becomes this very unusual thing: a European Maoist.]]."</ref> so it's a sort of particular case in and of itself. Let's just talk about Romania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:51]]
<nowiki>[22:51]</nowiki>

Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression and placation are the two strategies and you know to some extent they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:06]]
<nowiki>[23:06]</nowiki>

But in order to placate your populations through the provision of material abundance you need to be able to finance you know consumer production. And this is costly for Communist regimes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

Of course if you're financing consumption then what are you not financing? What's the tradeoff if you're...consuming?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:30]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. Development. Investment. If you're consuming stuff then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a tradeoff to be made between consumption and investment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:43]]
<nowiki>[23:43]</nowiki>

And this is a difficult tradeoff for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long-term agenda of Communist development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

It's also the case, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that Communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe's subject populations are coming to demand.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:06]]
<nowiki>[24:06]</nowiki>

East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy, and by comparison with Western automobiles inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to placate subject populations East European Communist governments end up during the 1970s turning more and more to the West -- to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:35]]
<nowiki>[24:35]</nowiki>

Foreign imports are really, really, important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:47]]
<nowiki>[24:47]</nowiki>

The sort of opportunities for East-West opening that détente and {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}} and the {{WPExtract|Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Settlement}} provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the sustenance of Communist led political systems in Eastern Europe. By opening up opportunities for trade and for economic exchange détente helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of Communist governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

And this is one of the reasons that some you know sort of conservatives in the United States are critical of détente at the time. They argue that the West, Western Europe and the United States, are helping sort of Communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide Western goods for their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

But it's important you know to think about the role of Western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s and after not simply in terms of consumption and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

How are Eastern, how are Western goods to be paid for?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:56]]
<nowiki>[25:56]</nowiki>

How is trade usually financed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

(student response)

Debt. Well, in this case the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the West. If Eastern European economies were producing you know the kinds of things that the West wanted then they might be able to...sustain balanced trade relations with the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:26]]
<nowiki>[26:26]</nowiki>

But in the absence of you know sort of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the West is by borrowing money.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So the East Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even an aspect to the story that ties back into the oil crisis, and I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is.

==== The Increase in Short-Term Capital Because of Oil Demand ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:57]]
<nowiki>[26:57]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short-term capital circulating in the global economy. In part this has to do with the petrodollar bounty that the oil exporting states enjoy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:13]]
<nowiki>[27:13]</nowiki>

You're Saudi Arabia for example. And you experience over a period of about six months a fourfold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:24]]
<nowiki>[27:24]</nowiki>

It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran. Because Iran is a big populous country. It's leadership under {{WPExtract|Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah Pahlavi}} has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran it's easy to spend the money. You just spend it on domestic infrastructural development. You build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:43]]
<nowiki>[27:43]</nowiki>

But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:53]]
<nowiki>[27:53]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You bank it. But not necessarily in Japan. Because Japan by this point is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital. You bank it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:06]]
<nowiki>[28:06]</nowiki>

If you're Saudi Arabia what kind of investor are you? Are you an aggressive investor or are you a conservative investor?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:13]]
<nowiki>[28:13]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You're a conservative investor. So you don't do direct investment. Instead you put it with banks. You place it for the most part with -- you place your money with Western banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers -- including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

There's a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe the petrodollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:07]]
<nowiki>[29:07]</nowiki>

But ultimately this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preve-- of staving off political unrest. Communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas.

==== Inflation in the East Bloc During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

And probably none is more consequential during the 1970s then the issue of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:35]]
<nowiki>[29:35]</nowiki>

Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet Bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high, you know, sort of rates of investment over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:49]]
<nowiki>[29:49]</nowiki>

If you set prices too low then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of sort of long-term investment. So controlling prices is a, you know, sort of really delicate act for central planners to perform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:04]]
<nowiki>[30:04]</nowiki>

Because if you set prices too high then you're going to incentivize political unrest. Populations will recoil from high bread prices. They might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult, but setting prices too low encourages more consumption than your economy will likely be able to sustain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:26 ]]
<nowiki>[30:26 ]</nowiki>

It will probably produce you know disruptions in supply as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is a sort of basic market economics and the rules are not all that different even in the context of a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:40 ]]
<nowiki>[30:40 ]</nowiki>

Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right. Socialist societies plan production but they can't plan consumption. The only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55 ]]
<nowiki>[30:55 ]</nowiki>

So it's always a very delicate you know sort of act that has to be performed.

==== Upheaval in Poland During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:01 ]]
<nowiki>[31:01 ]</nowiki>

And...the case of Poland is you know sort of illustrative of some of the you know difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it you know...in particular. I'm going to...you know sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland -- not with respect to the Communist system writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:25 ]]
<nowiki>[31:25 ]</nowiki>

In the late 1970s...1978, 1979 the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap you know sort of prices for food and consumer goods which have been sustained through most of the 1970s in order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51 ]]
<nowiki>[31:51 ]</nowiki>

This is really important. Prices increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis borne of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods. Other factors too stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:13 ]]
<nowiki>[32:13 ]</nowiki>

In 1978 a Polish national is elected Pope -- becomes {{WPExtract|Pope John Paul II}}. And this stimulates sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti-Sovietism, even Polish anti-Communism. Amidst this you know sort of combination of economic instability borne of an officially mandated price increase and political nationalism stirred by Pope John Paul II's election Poland at the end of the 1970s experiences a major round of political upheaval -- a major sort of political crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49 ]</nowiki>

This crisis is you know usually known as the episode of the {{WPExtract|Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity Movement}}. What is Solidarity? Why does it pose such a political challenge to the Polish Communist regime? Solidarity is an independent trades union movement that emerges in 1980.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:09 ]]
<nowiki>[33:09 ]</nowiki>

The fact of Solidarity's being a labor union, an independent trades union, is in itself consequential. Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:28 ]]
<nowiki>[33:28 ]</nowiki>

That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism. So the emergence of an independent trades union movement in Poland is ideologically disruptive and contentious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:47 ]]
<nowiki>[33:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's also in the summer of 1980 a major political phenomenon. {{WPExtract|Lech Wałęsa}} emerges as the leader of Solidarity, this independent trades union movement. He's a shipworker in Gdańsk with a sort of long history of political activism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:07 ]]
<nowiki>[34:07 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1970 Solidarity numbers over 700,000 workers as members. This is a very big political mobilization. The Polish government initially tries to appease Solidarity by recognizing it as a legitimate sort of representative organ of Polish workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:27 ]]
<nowiki>[34:27 ]</nowiki>

As a consequence of this initial act of recognition Solidarity's membership increases very, very quickly. By the summer, by the end of 1980, there are about 8 million Poles who count themselves as members of Solidarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:39 ]]
<nowiki>[34:39 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1981 one in four Polish people is a member of the Solidarity Movement. So Solidarity sort of explodes onto the Polish scene as an independent political force -- as a political force autonomous from the party-state, headed by a non-Communist membership, sorry, headed, led by a non-Communist leadership -- the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. And this poses a you know sort of serious, even existential threat, to the legitimacy, even the survival of the Polish Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13 ]</nowiki>

How is a party-state that derives its legitimacy from its claim to represent the workers and the interests of the workers going to deal with the emergence of a independent labor union that presents itself as a political rival to the Communist Party?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:30 ]]
<nowiki>[35:30 ]</nowiki>

In a sense what Solidarity means is that plural politics have arrived within the context of the party-state. This is very, very disruptive. So what does the Polish Communist state decide to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:43 ]]
<nowiki>[35:43 ]</nowiki>

It does essentially the only thing that it can do if it wants to remain a party-state -- and that is the government at the end of 1981 turns the tanks on Solidarity. Martial law is declared. Solidarity is declared illegal and popular street demonstrations are violently and viciously repressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04 ]</nowiki>

So the Polish state ultimately embraces repression because it's unable to control the political consequences of this mass mobilization that a combination of you know economic instability borne of rising consumer prices and political nationalism produce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:24 ]]
<nowiki>[36:24 ]</nowiki>

Solidarity in effect demonstrates, or the Solidarity Crisis in effect demonstrates, that there are severe limits to what political reform can accomplish within the context of the party-state. There might be you know an opportunity within the party-state to satisfy some of the you know consumer aspirations that subject populations have but the party-state will not be able tolerate plural politics. That is sort you know persuasively demonstrated.

==== The Economic Lag Between Eastern Europe and the West ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53 ]]
<nowiki>[36:53 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's economies continue to lag further and further behind the capitalist West. This is really, really important. Though the West experiences a slowdown in growth rates during the 1970s the gap between East and West just continues to get bigger and bigger.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:15 ]]
<nowiki>[37:15 ]</nowiki>

Let's took not at overall GDP but at per capita GDP which is what this chart displays. Per capita GDP is a pretty good index of basic economic well-being, of ordinary people. And what you can see is that from sort of the early 1970s in particular the rates of growth in per capita GDP in the East Bloc slow. During the 1980s the story will essentially be one of stasis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:43 ]]
<nowiki>[37:43 ]</nowiki>

In relative terms however the East Bloc is going backwards. As the West continues to get richer and richer in per capita terms the failures of the socialist system to match the affluence that Western capitalism is capable of producing for it citizens become more and more glaring.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:03 ]]
<nowiki>[38:03 ]</nowiki>

So the slowdown is a relative slowdown. There's still a very you know sort of incremental improvement in per capita GDP in the...in say Eastern Europe between you know 1970 and 1980. So relative to sort of...its own experience Eastern Europe's position does improve very, very sluggishly. But relative to the West Eastern Europe is falling behind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:29 ]]
<nowiki>[38:29 ]</nowiki>

And this is really, really important. Because the example of the West will be absolutely crucial to the legitimacy crisis of state Communism in the 1980s. The example of the West exposes the basic dishonesty of Communist propaganda. Insofar as Communist leaders proclaim themselves to be building a future that is even brighter than the future that capitalism could deliver the actual you know historical accomplishments of Communism debunk the myth that Communism is a more advanced economic system -- that the command economy is somehow more productive than the capitalist economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:08 ]]
<nowiki>[39:08 ]</nowiki>

This...disjoint between the theory and the reality of Communism is profoundly consequential. It is in a sense what causes the basic legitimacy crisis of the system. The fact that Communist governments end up depending upon violence and repression to control political unrest only you know sort of exacerbates the basic legitimacy problem. These regimes are brutal and violent sometimes but even more consequential I would argue is the fact that their in...is that they prove unable to deliver the material bounty which they promise to provide for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:45 ]]
<nowiki>[39:45 ]</nowiki>

Communism...sorry...

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52 ]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

No, that's, that's a really good question. Well, that would be you know sort harder to do because the data on which this chart is produced is just population data and GDP data. So the mean average is the one that you know can be easily produced based upon you know the best available data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:19]]
<nowiki>[40:19]</nowiki>

Estimating, this is sort of a subsidiary point, statistics from the East Bloc are notoriously difficult to work with because you know they're frequently manufactured are bare little relation to reality. But it's a very good question. I mean to what extent does this you know sort of tail off in GDP per capita growth in the East Bloc veil sort of important differences between East and West that have to do with the distribution of well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48 ]</nowiki>

Because there's a plausible you know sort of alternative viewpoint here -- which is that Western societies produce more in the aggregate but that wealth in the West is so...unevenly distributed that most of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few very wealthy people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07 ]</nowiki>

Meaning that ordinary Westerns are not necessarily any better off than are ordinary East Bloc citizens. In that circumstance the East Bloc would not have experienced its legitimacy crisis because leaders of East European countries could have said that for, so far as ordinary people were concerned, they were really much better off under Communism than they would be under capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:27 ]]
<nowiki>[41:27 ]</nowiki>

I wish that I had that chart to show you. Unfortunately, I don't have it in the slide show. So you just have to take this on faith, that...the relative decline in sort of....in aggregate economic well-being is experienced by ordinary people in the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:47 ]]
<nowiki>[41:47 ]</nowiki>

Sure, the Western countries even, the countries of Western Europe, which are less unequal than the United States is, remain relatively less equal than the economies of Eastern Europe do but the difference isn't all that much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:01 ]]
<nowiki>[42:01 ]</nowiki>

And this actually gives me an opportunity to talk about a really important point which was a point that we should think about when we're thinking about sort of economics and equality in Communist societies and capitalist societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:15 ]]
<nowiki>[42:15 ]</nowiki>

One of the key you know distinguishing characteristics of a Communist society is that economic wealth ends up being sort of synonymous with political wealth. Economic power ends up being synonymous with political power. Those who control the state, those who control the political apparatus are also those who enjoy the greatest material abundance -- hence, Brezhnev and the fur coat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:41 ]]
<nowiki>[42:41 ]</nowiki>

If you want to make it in the Soviet Union your best opportunity for making it comes through advancing yourself through the party bureaucracy -- through the party hierarchy. It's political power that can deliver you know the things upon which the good life depends: a nice dacha in the countryside, a well appointed well-furnished apartment in Moscow. Well, these things go to the people who wield political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:06 ]]
<nowiki>[43:06 ]</nowiki>

In the West by contrast there's a disjoint between political power and economic power. At least there ought to be in principle, right -- is the case that political power exists apart from economic power. Money can influence elections but it doesn't necessarily determine them. You know of course in the present moment you know I think we're experiencing something of a national conversation as to what the relationship between economic power is...and...but as to what the relationship between economic and political power is and what it should be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37 ]</nowiki>

Whether economic power is excessively influential upon political power is a question that we're debating and there are you know different perspectives that we could bring to that conversation and it's not really my intention to discuss that today because it takes us away from where we need to be going.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:53 ]]
<nowiki>[43:53 ]</nowiki>

But the...point which is crucial to remember about Communist societies is that economic power and political power are in essence synonymous. And as a consequence of that people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who wield power enjoy you know relatively greater abundance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13 ]</nowiki>

They shop in special shops. They're special shops for high ranking party members that provide access to you know much better Western consumer goods than those that are available to ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:23 ]]
<nowiki>[44:23 ]</nowiki>

And this basic you know sort of...the fact that inequality is so implicated with political power further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis of the system. You know ordinary Eastern Europeans who don't enjoy the special prerogatives that party members enjoy will call out party members for you know self-serving hypocrisy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:46 ]]
<nowiki>[44:46 ]</nowiki>

So far as the comparison with the West goes. I'm just going to make one last point on this issue. It's important, and we'll talk more about this, but it's important to think about the role in which you know sort of the media plays in giving East Europeans a sense of what ordinary life is like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:04 ]]
<nowiki>[45:04 ]</nowiki>

American television shows, like {{WPExtract|Dallas (1978 TV series)|''Dallas''}} and {{WPExtract|Dynasty (1981 TV series)|''Dynasty''}}, which probably none of you remember, are...screened on West European television. You know Germany for example you know screens American soap operas constantly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:19]]
<nowiki>[45:19]</nowiki>

These transmissions can be you know easily viewed, you know picked up, by antennae, and viewed in Eastern Europe. And this you know sort of window on Western abundance that television you know drama -- well, drama is probably too good a word to use, that television you know series like ''Dallas'' provide, gives you know sort of East Europeans, a, you know sense, perhaps an exaggerated sense, of what life looks like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:47 ]]
<nowiki>[45:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's not altogether misrepresentive. Right, by the turn of the 1980s what kinds of lives are middle class Americans enjoying? Well, they you know usually inhabit single family homes in suburbs. They'll drive probably two automobiles in a household. Putting food on the table is not a concern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:08 ]]
<nowiki>[46:08 ]</nowiki>

This is a standard of material abundance that the East has entirely failed to match. So the more that Easterners know about how people live in the West, and about the kinds of expectations that Westerners have, the less credible becomes the proclamations of you know Communist leaders to be giving their people better lives than the lives that Westerners live.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29 ]]
<nowiki>[46:29 ]</nowiki>

But we'll talk more about sort of these contrasts in the 1980s and how they [[wikt:inflect|inflect]] the end of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:35 ]]
<nowiki>[46:35 ]</nowiki>

Okay, but the...point I think that the data conveys really powerfully which is a point that you want to bare in mind carefully is that the example of the West is a very subversive one from a Eastern standpoint in the 1970s and the 1980s. The West is growing faster than the East even as the West experiences difficult political and economic transformations of its own.

== Political Tumult in China in the Late 1960s and 1970s ==

=== The Cultural Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:58 ]]
<nowiki>[46:58 ]</nowiki>

Let's move on now to talk about China. Another country that experiences some consequential transformation in its relations with the West during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10 ]</nowiki>

I'm going to take the Chinese story back to the {{WPExtract|Cultural Revolution}} because I don't think that we've yet had the chance to sort of go through the Cultural Revolution in a systemic way and getting the history of the Cultural Revolution right is really important for understanding what comes next.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:25 ]]
<nowiki>[47:25 ]</nowiki>

It's what comes next that should interest us today but to understand that we'll take the history back to the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:33 ]]
<nowiki>[47:33 ]</nowiki>

What was the Cultural Revolution? How did it come to pass? Just to give me a quick sense of the room how many of you had already studied the history of the Cultural Revolution in some other context? In some other class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:46 ]]
<nowiki>[47:46 ]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. So you're just have to bare with you because I'm not probably going to take this into the kind of detail that you've encountered elsewhere but for those who haven't studied the Cultural Revolution it's important just to get a handle on this. Because this a really big, really consequential event, set of events in the making of contemporary China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:05 ]]
<nowiki>[48:05 ]</nowiki>

The Cultural Revolution emerges out of the catastrophic aftermath of China's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}. The Great Leap Forward of course was the developmental plan introduced in 1956 that aimed to construct an indigenous Chinese path to socialist modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:21 ]]
<nowiki>[48:21 ]</nowiki>

It was a path that would involve the promotion of you know all kinds of ambitious things like rural industrialization. Backyard steel furnaces as we've discussed are one of the you know preeminent symbols of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:35 ]]
<nowiki>[48:35 ]</nowiki>

Yet the Great Leap Forward for all of its overwhelming ambition is in practice a horrible catastrophe. Tens of millions of people starve to death as a consequence of the havoc that the Great Leap Forward produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:48 ]]
<nowiki>[48:48 ]</nowiki>

The Great Leap Forward does not accomplish what {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Mao}} wanted to accomplish which is nominally as least to make China prosperous and strong. Instead the Great Leap Forward brings Chinese society to its knees.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:00 ]]
<nowiki>[49:00 ]</nowiki>

There's a massive famine. Tens of millions of people die. It's really, really horrible. This disaster brings not just the legitimacy of you know Communist rule, but Mao Zedong's legitimacy as a wise and farseeing leader into question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:16 ]]
<nowiki>[49:16 ]</nowiki>

Indeed Mao recognizes by you know the turn of the 1960s that he has overreached himself. That he has set something in motion which has been catastrophic in it consequences. And Mao retreats from the sort of front lines of political leadership in China. He goes back home and retreats to his study and undertakes a long phase of you know sort of reading and contemplation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:41 ]]
<nowiki>[49:41 ]</nowiki>

As Mao retreats from the forefront of Chinese politics new leaders emerge and they pursue different kinds of policies. The two most important leaders are {{WPExtract|Liu Shaoqi}}, pictured on the bottom of the slide, and {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}}. And these are the two men who come to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:02 ]]
<nowiki>[50:02 ]</nowiki>

And they pursue policies that are aimed at moderating the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restoring a more normal and a more sustainable path towards modernization and development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16 ]</nowiki>

Both men and fairly pragmatic. Deng Xiaoping is well known for sort of citing an old Sichuan<ref>{{WPExtract|Sichuan|The Wikipedia article on Sichuan}} lists other romanizations of the name of the province to be Szechuan and Szechwan.</ref> saying which is: it doesn't matter if it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it catches mice.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:30 ]]
<nowiki>[50:30 ]</nowiki>

And this is a statement that well captures you know Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism. He's less concerned with ideology as Mao was than with achieving tangible results. So for a period in the first half of the 1960s China experiences a sort of moderate turn in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are temporarily at least preeminent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:53 ]]
<nowiki>[50:53 ]</nowiki>

And they try to restore a stability, sort of normalcy to use {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge|Calvin Coolidge's}} language<ref>The slogan "Return to Normalcy" was used in the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The Harding-Coolidge ticket won the election and after Harding passed away Coolidge was inaugurated as President. See Wikipedia articles: {{WPExtract|Return to normalcy}}, {{WPExtract|1920 United States presidential election}}, {{WPExtract|Warren G. Harding}}, and {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge}}.</ref> to the Chinese socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:02 ]]
<nowiki>[51:02 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao Zedong, sort of sitting, festering in retirement, is plotting a return to the political fore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:11 ]]
<nowiki>[51:11 ]</nowiki>

As Mao contemplates a sort of return to the front line of Chinese politics he is spurred by his wife {{WPExtract|Jiang Qing}} who is a very hard line radical. I mean a real...sort of [[wikt:doctrinaire|doctrinaire]] [[wikt:ideologue|ideologue]]. And she argues that China has taken a sort of bourgeois turn under Liu and Deng -- that it is time to reradicalize the revolution, to reenergize the revolution, perhaps even to launch a new revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeois stability that has set in under Deng and Liu and to sort of restore the revolutionary project to its maximum fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:52 ]]
<nowiki>[51:52 ]</nowiki>

Jiang is particularly resentful of China's cultural establishment. This may have something to do with the fact that she was a actress by trade before she became a political leader. She sees Chinese culture as a bastion of sort of bourgeois tradition. And she is absolutely adamant that if a new revolution is to be launched that it needs to be a Cultural Revolution in its thrust.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:16 ]</nowiki>

That it needs to focus not just upon a transformation of economic and political structures but on transforming Chinese culture and Chinese values -- to create a truly radical, a truly revolutionary society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:29 ]]
<nowiki>[52:29 ]</nowiki>

Spurred by Jing Qing Mao returns to the front line of Chinese politics in 1966. He convenes a special [[wikt:plenum|plenum]] of the Chinese Communist Party that August and it sets in motion the train of events that will become known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:48 ]]
<nowiki>[52:48 ]</nowiki>

And this is how Mao proclaims it. You know China is now going to have a great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This involves the demotion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. These two men are sort of pushed aside. And Mao appoints a radical {{WPExtract|Lin Biao}} as his anointed heir.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:07 ]]
<nowiki>[53:07 ]</nowiki>

Lin Biao is a devoted Maoist. He was responsible a couple of years earlier during Mao's period of exile for collecting a host of Mao's, you know, political sayings into a you know single volume -- a book, that became known as the {{WPExtract|Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book''}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:22 ]]
<nowiki>[53:22 ]</nowiki>

So Lin Biao is sort of more responsible than anybody else for developing what would become in the context of the Cultural Revolution a cult of Maoism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:34 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34 ]</nowiki>

So the Cultural Revolution is launched in 1966 with the purpose of transforming China -- of revolutionizing China's revolution. In a sense the Cultural Revolution represents an effort by Mao to launch a bottom-up revolution against the Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53 ]]
<nowiki>[53:53 ]</nowiki>

So this a really you know sort of peculiar thing. After the 1949 revolution the Communist Party sort of assumes the responsibilities of governance. It assimilates itself to the state and it becomes a well-defined, well-established power structure. This is the power structure that Deng and Liu come responsible for in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward -- the Chinese party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:16 ]]
<nowiki>[54:16 ]</nowiki>

But outside of power, Mao, who is still the nominal leader of this party-state becomes convinced, prodded in part by his wife, that the party-state has become conservative, that it's become bourgeois, that it's become reactionary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:29 ]]
<nowiki>[54:29 ]</nowiki>

So the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents an effort to revolutionize the state that the 1949 Communist Revolution created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40 ]]
<nowiki>[54:40 ]</nowiki>

And in order to accomplish this Mao turns to the masses. He turns to the Chinese masses to launch a revolution against the party-state that the Communist Party has created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:51 ]]
<nowiki>[54:51 ]</nowiki>

Mao in 1966 proclaims a campaign against what he describes as the Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. This is to be a revolution against the old -- out with the old, in with the new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:06 ]]
<nowiki>[55:06 ]</nowiki>

Nowhere is this revolution fiercer than on Chinese university campuses. There is a sort of demographic aspect to the Cultural Revolution that is really important to think about. China, like the United States, like Western Europe, experiences a sort of youth bubble, a baby boom after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:25 ]]
<nowiki>[55:25 ]</nowiki>

By the mid-1960s children born in the aftermath of the Second World War are becoming teenagers. They're becoming seventeen, eighteen, nineteen-year-olds who are becoming you know sort of politically conscious and who are susceptible to...how do I put this politely?...far-fetched ideological doctrines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43 ]]
<nowiki>[55:43 ]</nowiki>

Not that you ever see any evidence of that on Berkeley's campus because this is a, you know, sober, responsible place. But in China it's an altogether different story, and young people are you know susceptible to a kind of radicalization that serves the purposes that Mao now wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:01 ]]
<nowiki>[56:01 ]</nowiki>

So Chinese campuses become a recruiting ground for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao radical Chinese students form units called {{WPExtract|Red Guards}}. These are sort of paramilitary units that establish themselves to advance the revolution, to impose Maoist orthodoxy, and to sort of challenge so-called right-wing deviationists -- rightists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:30 ]]
<nowiki>[56:30 ]</nowiki>

Students form Red Guard units. They carry Mao's ''Little Red Book'' which becomes in the late 1960s you know absolutely ubiquitous as an ideological and political symbol. Carrying the ''Little Red Book'' implies a sort of devotion or signals a devotion to the cult of Maoist Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48 ]]
<nowiki>[56:48 ]</nowiki>

Politically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sort of...targets...you know the bureaucracy. It targets people like Deng Xiaoping who is persecuted in the context of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:08 ]]
<nowiki>[57:08 ]</nowiki>

The denouncication of rightists becomes sort of the overriding theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And this has catastrophic consequences for the state. Important leaders Deng and Liu Shaoqi are purged. They become the targets of particular opprobrium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26 ]]
<nowiki>[57:26 ]</nowiki>

But it's not just you know leaders at the top who are purged. Around two-thirds of all Communist Party officials are removed from their posts in the context of the Great Proletarian Revolution. Red Guards in a sense overthrow the basic institutions of political order that have developed in Communist China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:46 ]]
<nowiki>[57:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is a drama that is played out at many different levels. It's not just at the top leadership level of the party. But at the level of you know sort of social institutions like schools and universities. Red Guards seek out reactionaries and purge them. Bourgeois teachers are purged in schools, bourgeois reactionary professors are purged in universities, which would be a really bad idea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:07 ]]
<nowiki>[58:07 ]</nowiki>

Intellectuals are the target of special assault. Rightists are singled out for public humiliation and are forced to confess their so-called sins against the Maoist Revolution. This is a catastrophic tumultous phase in Chinese life. It's a period in which a revolution from below sort of overthrows you know much of what the Communist Party has built since 1969 -- since 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32 ]]
<nowiki>[58:32 ]</nowiki>

What are the human consequences of this? I mean there are some mass killing. Around half a million deaths, up to half a million deaths, are attributable to the chaos that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45 ]]
<nowiki>[58:45 ]</nowiki>

To situate this in context it's substantially less people than died during the Great Leap Forward. But it's still you know a weighty toll, and a toll that we should contemplate particularly when we consider that the death toll that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused was entirely ideologically motivated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:07]]
<nowiki>[59:07]</nowiki>

Unlike the Great Leap Forward which represented an ambitious effort to industrialize, to modernize China, and in which the catastrophic famines were in a sense an indirect consequence of a modernizing project, virtually all of the people who died during the Cultural Revolution were singled out for political murder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:27 ]]
<nowiki>[59:27 ]</nowiki>

So this is a you know weighty topic with which to grapple. But the political consequences, more than the sort of ethical or moral consequences, are those that shape what comes next. Authority, central political authority, effectively collapses as Red Guards remove Communist bureaucrats from their post.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:48 ]]
<nowiki>[59:48 ]</nowiki>

The central planning system breaks down. The Great Leap Forward had presented an alternative model to Soviet-style central planning. The Cultural Revolution obliterates the mechanics of central planning virtually entirely. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the opportunities for implementing Soviet-style economic planning will be very limited because the planning structures have been dismantled. The bureaucracies have been depopulated and dismantled.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:17 ]</nowiki>

Virtually the only you know political leader in China who is able to hold the whole thing together, which is to say to hold the state together, during the period of the Cultural Revolution is {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai}} -- the Premier of the Chinese state. And a man who while a, you know, sort of very close lieutenant of Mao Zedong throughout Mao's life doesn't share Mao's ideological radicalism or ideological fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:46 ]</nowiki>

It's not to say that Zhou Enlai was a closet liberal. It would be wrong to see him in those terms. But he recognizes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and struggles against you know very difficult odds to preserve the basic stability of the Chinese state -- to protect the institutions of central power and central authority against the rampages of the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:07 ]</nowiki>

And in those Zhou Enlai is more or less successful. He manages to sustain a semblance of a political center through the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:18 ]</nowiki>

Ultimately though it's Mao Zedong who brings the whole production to an end. Mao realizes by the end of 1968, early 1969, that things are going far too far. That if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is permitted to continue that it will result in the effective you know destruction of China as a nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39 ]</nowiki>

That the Chinese [[wikt:polity|polity]] will fall apart as a consequence of this revolution from below. So having launched a popular revolution against the state Mao now very abruptly shifts course and moves to implement a state clamp down on the popular revolution. Mao turns to the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, to purge the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:05 ]</nowiki>

Having previously instructed the Red Guards to purge bourgeois rightist elements in the People's Liberation Army and other you know Communist Party bureaucracies Mao now turns to the army in order to restore order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:18 ]</nowiki>

This attempt to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to an end inaugurates a very sort of peculiar phase in the history of the People's Republic -- a late Maoist phase in which Mao remains the singular preeminent leader of China but in which Mao...does not pursue the sort of revolutionary political and social transformation that characterized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:49 ]</nowiki>

So you might think of the era of late Maoism as an era in which China is delicately poised between revolutionary politics on the one hand, because the forces that have produced the cultural revolution are still present, and Mao is still in many respects sympathetic to them, and the forces of stabilization on the other. It's a very interesting and very delicate phase in China's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:13 ]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17 ]</nowiki>

Because Mao was a brilliant political leader. I mean Mao was extremely adept at balancing political factions and playing off personalities and interests against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:28 ]</nowiki>

I mean Mao may...you know have made a number of catastrophic decisions as regards China's economic development. But when it came to politics -- both domestic politics and international politics. I mean Mao was one of the most gifted political tacticians of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:46 ]</nowiki>

And what Mao does through the era of the Cultural Revolution and into the late Maoist Era that sort of follows the heights of the Cultural Revolution is to balance the centrists, people like Deng Xiaoping, against the radical left, people like his wife Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:03 ]</nowiki>

And ultimately he's successful in performing that delicate balancing act through to the very end of his life. It's sort of remarkable when you think about the tumult that China experiences in the second half of the twentieth century that Mao Zedong dies a peaceful death in his sleep. The fact that he does so is testimony I think to the brilliance of Mao's political skills.

=== Maoist Rule in the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25 ]</nowiki>

So Mao, you know, as I've sort of explained, performs this delicate balancing act in the first half of the 1970s. He works to balance the left against the center.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:40 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao orchestrates, as we've already discussed, a major shift in China's international relations. In 1972 he welcomes Richard Nixon to Beijing. This does not necessarily signify a shift in China's international goals. Mao will continue to talk about global revolution as an objective for China but the realignment with the United States serves a very clear tactical purpose. It serves the purpose of gaining China a tacit ally against the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:12 ]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union by 1972 is a major concern for China. 1969 brings actual fighting between Chinese and Soviet forces over the Ussuri River. That year China experiences a major war scare. Indeed this war scare one of the factors that prompts Mao to wind down the Cultural Revolution. Because Mao recognizes that amidst the upheaval that the Cultural Revolution is performing China is essentially open so far as foreign aggression is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:39 ]</nowiki>

So Mao implements a sort of major tactical shift in the Cold War. He tries to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union, but this does not signify necessarily a strategic reorientation towards the West. There's a big difference between a tactical opening and a strategic opening and what Mao pursues in 1972 is a tactical opening. Mao's overarching goals remain consistent: to make China strong and prosperous and to promote and pursue global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10 ]</nowiki>

But there are significant changes in Mao's you know sort of political discourse during this era of you know late Maoist rule that will help to prefigure what comes next. Probably the single most important sort of revision of Maoist doctrine that Mao orchestrates in this period is the so-called {{WPExtract|Three Worlds Theory}} which Mao first develops in 1973 and which is publicly presented in a speech that Deng Xiaoping gives at the United Nations in 1974.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:42 ]</nowiki>

In this speech Mao, which Mao writes, the world is divided into three parts: the world of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the rich capitalist world, countries like West Germany, and Canada and Australia and so on, and then the Third World -- the rest of the world, the poor world, the world of which China is a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:06 ]</nowiki>

There are really important implications to the way in which this Three Worlds Concept is presented. Whereas Mao had previously described the world in terms of class struggle, the workers versus the bourgeoisie, the Three Worlds Concept implies a more developmental...framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:25]]
<nowiki>[1:07:25]</nowiki>

It suggests, or in some ways it sort of echoes the Three Worlds Concepts that Latin American developmental economists offer, you know, during the 1950s and 1960s. And this is really consequential. Mao talks about the need to develop and build the developing world: China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:46 ]</nowiki>

This is not so different from what developing economics proposes. Though Mao continues to talk about revolution as a goal for China in the world his political rhetoric in the last years of his life is increasingly inflected by a discourse of development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:03]]
<nowiki>[1:08:03]</nowiki>

This doesn't necessarily mean that Mao personally wanted to orchestrate a new course but Mao says things that Mao's successors will be able to hold onto as a way of relating their priorities to sort of Maoist doctrine. Because this is really important. Look Mao remains, continues to be venerated in China, through to the present day. Even as China for the past thirty years has pursued policies at home and in the world that are almost diametrically at odds with most of what Mao said.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:35 ]</nowiki>

So how to relate policies that repudiate the substance of Mao while paying fealty to the dogma? Well, to do that you seize upon things that Mao said that might rationalize the things that you want to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is what Mao's successors will do. They will invoke Mao's Three Worlds Concept and the developmental implications of it in order to legitimate and defend policies that serve quite different purposes to those that Mao wanted to achieve, policies from the late 1970s onwards, that will serve the purposes of development rather than the purposes of global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:11]]
<nowiki>[1:09:11]</nowiki>

There are other key developments during the Mao Era -- none more consequential than the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was purged in 1969, stripped of his official office, sent to work in a tractor factory in Xinjian Province.<ref>In the [[wikipedia:Deng Xiaoping#Cultural Revolution|Cultural Revolution section of the Wikipedia article on Deng Xiaoping]] there is, "In October 1969 Deng Xiaoping was sent to the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi province to work as a regular worker." The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Xinjian District}} says that it is a suburb of {{WPExtract|Nanchang}} which is the capital of {{WPExtract|Jiangxi}} Province.</ref> But in 1974, Deng Xiaoping reforms, sorry, he returns, he doesn't necessarily reform -- that's key. Deng returns -- unreformed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36 ]</nowiki>

Deng returns in part because Zhou Enlai promotes him. Zhou Enlai is really Deng Xiaoping's primary sponsor in the power structure in the late phase of the Cultural Revolution. And Zhou Enlai promotes Deng to become First Vice Premier of the Chinese state with particular responsibility for economic reform. This is a major return because Deng will of course become China's preeminent leader in a post Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:06 ]</nowiki>

The 1969 purge is not the last purge of Deng Xiaoping however. Deng is purged again in 1975. And that's really important. Because it tells us something about how fractious Chinese politics remain through to the end of the Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:21 ]</nowiki>

At the instigation of rightists, sorry of left-wingers, of the radicals around Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Deng is forced to sort of incriminate himself, to draw up a list of self-criticisms, to renounce his so-called ideological deviations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:39 ]</nowiki>

So up to the end of very Mao's life the conflict between the radicals around Mao's wife and the political moderates around Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping remains very fierce. And the second purge of Deng Xiaoping in 1975 is excellent sort of illustration of this point.

=== The Death of Mao Zedong and the Question of Succession ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:57 ]</nowiki>

Mao Zedong of course dies in September 1976. This is a really big, really, really big shift. Even more tumultuous perhaps than Stalin's death in 1953 had been. The Chinese revolution after all has been singularly associated since the 1920s with the personality and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao's death after fifty years...after twenty-five years of head of state, twenty-fives as a revolutionary leader, is a...dramatic and profound disjuncture in the history of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:33 ]</nowiki>

Who will succeed Mao Zedong? This is the big question. There are...a number of factions struggling for influence. Probably the most coherent is the radical faction, the {{WPExtract|Gang of Four}}, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:52 ]</nowiki>

At the same time there are anointed successors. The key anointed successor is {{WPExtract|Hua Guofeng}} -- who's the person who Mao designates as his heir as China's political leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:05 ]</nowiki>

Other however have claims to make besides. Deng Xiaoping, though he has recently been sort of exiled and purged can make a strong claim to being one of China's most effective and proven administrators. Deng has a record of proven accomplishment which will be you know very much to his advantage as China's political future is determined.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:27 ]</nowiki>

The succession is complex but let's try to trace out some of the you know key steps. Hua Guofeng, the anointed successor, moves initially against the radical left. And this is really key. Hua moves to purge the Gang of Four in late 1976. Just months after Mao dies the radicals are purged.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:50 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:50 ]</nowiki>

They're arrested. And a sort of campaign against the extreme left is set in motion. This is really consequential for Deng Xiaoping. Insofar as the radical left, the Gang of Four, had been sort of Deng's primary antagonistic, antagonist, their removal from the political scene creates opportunities for Deng to reassert himself. And this is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15 ]</nowiki>

The power struggle ceases to be three-way or power struggle between Hua, Deng, and the Gang of Four, and it becomes a sort of two-way conflict between Deng and Hua after the removal of the Gang of Four.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:29 ]</nowiki>

And here the you know conflict assumes a sort of ideological aspect. Hua Guofeng aligns himself very closely after the purge of the Gang of Four with Mao Zedong's legacy. Hua proclaims himself loyal to what he characterizes as the two whatevers. He says, and here I quote, whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon we shall resolutely defend, whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed we shall resolutely oppose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:56 ]</nowiki>

So Hua, after Mao's death, presents himself as the heir not only of Mao's political role but also of Mao's ideological commitments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:08]]
<nowiki>[1:14:08]</nowiki>

Deng by contrast is much more pragmatic. Deng argues that policies should be grounded not in Maoist doctrine but in empirical evidence. That China needs to allow its you know policies to be determined by practice, what works and what doesn't, rather than by revolutionary ideology. Deng's cat theory: it doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it captures, catches mice, is you know sort of illustrative of Deng's pragmatism.

=== China Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:37 ]</nowiki>

Deng Xiaoping establishes control fairly quickly. The key event here is the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which takes place in December 1978. This is the moment at which Deng and his allies sort of outflank and overwhelm Hua Guofeng and his allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:57 ]</nowiki>

The Eleventh Central Committee is the sort of key turning point in China's history. At this meeting the Chinese Communist Party renounces basic Maoist revolutionary concepts. The concept of class struggle as the sort of key to history is quitetly discarded. The concept of continual revolution, the idea that the Communist Party needs to be waging a continual revolution, is also discarded -- instead pragmatic policies are embraced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:29 ]</nowiki>

It's as if the Communist Party decides that the revolution has been accomplished with the attainment of its own political power and that the task ahead is now to develop China, to make China strong and prosperous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:40 ]</nowiki>

These pragmatic policies will include economic deregulation and soon enough market oriented reforms. Equally consequential Deng Xiaoping visits the United States. The visit to the United States comes after a formal normalization of diplomatic relations which occurs at the beginning of January. It's negotiated in December 1978, but on the first of January 1979 the United States of America and China normalize diplomatic relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:09 ]</nowiki>

This is a major turning point. It signals a new sort of opening towards the United States a new kind of relationship between the people's republic and the United States.

=== Deng Xiaoping's Policy Towards the US Contrasted with Mao Zedong's Policy Towards the US ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:20 ]</nowiki>

It might be useful to compare and contrast Deng Xiaoping's US policy with Mao Zedong's US policy. What did the two leaders want to accomplish? Well, what Mao Zedong wanted to accomplish, in the context of a war scare with the Soviet Union, was a tactical alignment that would use the United States as a sort of counterweight to the Soviet Union to the advantage of Chinese diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:51 ]</nowiki>

What Deng contemplates is something entirely different. For Deng the opening to the United States is to be strategic rather than political. It's not just an alliance of convenience against the Soviet Union that Deng wants -- though we may note that Deng Xiaoping is fiercely anti-Soviet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:07]]
<nowiki>[1:17:07]</nowiki>

But what Deng wants is something more, far more far reaching than that. He wants to open not only China's sort of political alignments towards the United States but also China's economy, and ultimately China's society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:21 ]</nowiki>

When Deng travels to the United States, which he does in February 1979, he's extremely interested in American industry. He wants to visit factories, car factories, he pays a visit to the space program I think in Texas, and is you know immensely impressed with American high technology -- with American space technology as well as with technology aimed at ordinary consumers. And he seeks to realize for China a future based upon this American high technology model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:55 ]</nowiki>

In order to accomplish that Deng recognizes he will have to open China towards the United States, towards the West, towards the capitalist world. To do this he implements major structural reforms. Foreign investment will be solicited and encouraged. Market incentives will be opened. China in a sense will transition from having been...will transition from the status of a sort of autarkic communistic economy which is what China was, for, through the Maoist Era, to a relationship in which China will begin to reintegrate with the capitalist liberal open world economy that the United States tried to build after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:38 ]</nowiki>

An economy that was built in the West but which was of course divided by the advent of the Second World War. So this is a profound strategic realignment.

=== The Enabling of Market Reforms Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:47 ]</nowiki>

How are we to explain it looking back? Let's conclude with some quick reflections. Why did Deng try to do what he did and why was he able to accomplish so much? We'll talk much more about reforms after 1980 in due course but at this stage let's just reflect on four points.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:05 ]</nowiki>

First socialization in China was always less advanced that it became in the Soviet Union. The socialist project by the mid-1970s was only twenty-five years old. The Great Leap Forward did not achieve everything that it wanted to achieve. The Communist Party found, when it looked carefully at the countryside, that the reach of socialization was very limited. That ordinary Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants, continued to display sort of entrepreneurial impulses, entrepreneurial habits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

In the 1960s this seemed disturbing to the leadership of the Communist Party. It was one of the reasons that the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was launched. But the limits of socialization will in due course facilitate a market oriented transformation of China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:56 ]</nowiki>

The disruption that the Cultural Revolution causes is also crucial. The Cultural Revolution does much of what Mao accomplish, wants is to accomplish, which is to sweep out the olds. Having swept out the olds the opportunity for new thinking, for new approaches is rather more open than it will be by contrast in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

The international reorientations are also crucial. Mao pursues an opening towards the United States for realistic even cynical purposes. Mao wants to bring the United States on board as a tactical asset against the Soviet Union.
But Mao's 1972 tactical opening towards the United States makes it possible for Deng Xiaoping to pursue a far more far reaching strategic opening towards the United States in 1979.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:47 ]</nowiki>

Finally we should be attentive to the subtle shift in Maoist discourse during the last phase of Mao's political career. The fact that Mao will be begin to emphasize development as well as revolution as a goal for China at home and in the world makes it possible for Mao's successors, preeminently for Deng Xiaoping, to orchestrate a transition from revolution to development and modernization as the overarching purpose of Chinese statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:15 ]</nowiki>

The consequences of this in the 1980s and beyond we'll come to in due course.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-03-15T03:36:54Z

DavidKitFriedman: Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai. "It's really important to recall that in the '50s.." -> "It's really important to recall but in the '50s..."

== Preliminaries ==

Okay, it's 9:40 so it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room I fear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be a you know reason for not coming to lecture and staying at home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

At least I hope that was the case in that you didn't all think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reach that conclusion it would be those who aren't here. But anyway it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain which is actually less rain then we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow I think. So, it's good if you like skiing -- the precipitation.

== Lecture Overivew ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:40]]
<nowiki>[00:40]</nowiki>

But that's not what we're going to be talking about today. This is not a class in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:58]]
<nowiki>[00:58]</nowiki>

So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today we take the story to the socialist world, the Soviet Union, and China and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and twenty minutes with the sort of resurgence of East-West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s, and if we can do this -- this will situate us well to transition to the 1980s and the story of globalization next week.

== Transformation and Tumult in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:30]]
<nowiki>[01:30]</nowiki>

=== Tumult in The Soviet Union During the 1970s: The Brezhnev Years ===

Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:40]]
<nowiki>[01:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}} years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khruschev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:01]]
<nowiki>[02:01]</nowiki>

It's not Leonid Brezhnev but {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin}}, the Premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in 1967.<ref>Speaker here is likely referring to the {{WPExtract|Glassboro Summit Conference}} where Alexei Kosygin met with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in the summer of 1967.</ref> By the end of the 1960s the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev, has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:22]]
<nowiki>[02:22]</nowiki>

The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union of course affluence was more or less synonymous with political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:38]]
<nowiki>[02:38]</nowiki>

So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union in the 1970s had access to quite a lot of it. And this...Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, and more urbane cities in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[03:00 ]</nowiki>

And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years as Soviet citizens experience them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10 ]</nowiki>

Okay.

(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:12]]
<nowiki>[03:12]</nowiki>

So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin, around all of his you know sort of official apartments, and limousines. He shows her his suite in the Kremlin. He shows her his [[wikt:dacha|dacha]] in the countryside. He takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows her his villa -- his big Soviet limousine -- {{WPExtract|ZiL}} limousine.<ref>As the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Zil}} mentions ZiL limousines were used by powerful people in the Soviet Union, "The ZiL limousines were the official car that carried the Soviet heads of state, and many Soviet Union allied leaders, to summits or in parades."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:30]]
<nowiki>[03:30]</nowiki>

And what does Brezhnev's mother say? She says, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}} come back?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:38]]
<nowiki>[03:38]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

And this is a real joke that was told...sort of in...Moscow dining rooms, Moscow apartments, during the 1970s. And you know the Brezhnev years were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical. I've got another little anecdote. This attributed to Brezhnev himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:58]]
<nowiki>[03:58]</nowiki>

The veracity of this I can't confirm, but it's certainly attributed to Brezhnev in a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the Czar was shot, and something had to be substituted. So let the people build Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:20]]
<nowiki>[04:20]</nowiki>

Whether those words are, you know, were ever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him, plausibly, is in itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology. He didn't stand for you know crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:42]]
<nowiki>[04:42]</nowiki>

The Brezhnev years were a time of [[wikt:stasis|stasis]] but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

There were however some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future. During the 1970s members of the Communist Party, including fairly high ranking members, such as {{WPExtract|Mikhail Gorbachev}} become disillusioned with Communism at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

Despite the veneer of stability there is a widespread circulation within Soviet society among the ranks of the [[wikt:intelligentsia|intelligentsia]] of dissident literature, of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time as {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, it literally means self-published literature -- literature critical of the Soviet party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material Soviet citizens during the 1970s enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world -- to information about the West. The {{WPExtract|Voice of America}}, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:52]]
<nowiki>[05:52]</nowiki>

To some extent the politics of détente help to keep this sort of window onto the world open. The Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions as a consequence of détente. So détente sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West, a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:19]]
<nowiki>[06:19]</nowiki>

Outside of the Soviet Union Communism experiences something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall but in the '50s and well into the 1960s Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left, had been very loathe to criticize communism, even Communism as practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:40]]
<nowiki>[06:40]</nowiki>

Probably the leading postwar French left-wing intellectual, {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}}, remained to the very end of his life an apologist for Soviet-style Communism -- an apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:58]]
<nowiki>[06:58]</nowiki>

Why was this? Well, in part the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights -- of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

And here no single event is more consequential then the 1973 publication in the West of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's}} book {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}}. Have any of you had the opportunity to read the ''The Gulag Archipelago''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:31]]
<nowiki>[07:31]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. And this is a book that's really couched as a history of the {{WPExtract|Gulag|gulag}} system, the gulag being the immense system of political concentration camps which Stalin constructed, building upon a Leninist system of sort of internal concentration camps to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the Communist regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:55]]
<nowiki>[07:55]</nowiki>

So the gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet-state has perpetrated against its own system, against its own citizens, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when ''The Gulag Archipelago'' goes published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression. And the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:17]]
<nowiki>[08:17]</nowiki>

At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights this stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:38]]
<nowiki>[08:38]</nowiki>

And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for...I think this week -- it could have been last week -- {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy|Bernard-Henri Lévy's}} book, ''Barbarism with a Human Face'', is one of the texts that you know sort of powerfully reveals this shift in Western attitudes towards the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:56]]
<nowiki>[08:56]</nowiki>

Lévy is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left-wing intellectual tradition, that has historically been indulgent towards, even sympathetic to Soviet-style communism. But Levi breaks absolutely with this long sort of left-wing progressive history of you know sympathy and indulgence and offers a you know very harsh critique of Soviet-style communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:21]]
<nowiki>[09:21]</nowiki>

The key move that Lévy makes, which you'll have gather, if you've read the piece, is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism, authoritarianism of the left, with authoritarianism of the right. He subsumes them both under a common category -- the category of totalitarianism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

And for Lévy there's very little difference between, you know, left-wing shades of totalitarianism and right-wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:51]]
<nowiki>[09:51]</nowiki>

So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability the crisis of, you know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet-style socialism is proceeding apace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

Within the Soviet Union ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live. In the larger world any claim that Communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future -- a bright you know future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of [[wikt:tawdry|tawdry]] nature of the Soviet system itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

So those are the Brezhnev years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:37]]
<nowiki>[10:37]</nowiki>

Characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:50]]
<nowiki>[10:50]</nowiki>

Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but they'll be on the bSpace website.

=== Soviet Economic Gain from the Oil Crisis ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:54]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

In other respects however the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s -- the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about. It has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the {{WPExtract|Yom Kippur War|1973 Arab-Israeli War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:28]]
<nowiki>[11:28]</nowiki>

But the consequences of the oil crisis are not restricted to the Middle East and the West. The Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s a major exporter of energy to global markets.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:51]]
<nowiki>[11:51]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid-1950s. By the turn of the 1970s energy is the Soviet Union's largest sort of export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:10]]
<nowiki>[12:10]</nowiki>

It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. Military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports. As Arab and...oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more petrodollar revenue they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

So indirectly as well as directly the Soviet Union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

Might it have something to do with the fact that the rise in energy prices that is a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:07]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

That may be too cynical, but...it should illustrate the basic point which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises, increases, in the global price of oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:19]]
<nowiki>[13:19]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of the petrodollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

Obviously, a rise in oil prices, fourfold rise in oil prices, in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what does this increase in export earnings, this petrodollar bounty, mean for the Soviet economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:49]]
<nowiki>[13:49]</nowiki>

It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s to prop up a failing economic system. The Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:05 ]]
<nowiki>[14:05 ]</nowiki>

If you can finance imports of Western technology then the imperative to develop high-tech technology yourself is diminished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West. Insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture oil helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce, grain, from the West instead.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency. When it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make then cheap and abundant energy makes it...you know...sort of less advantageous for the managers of state-owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

Right, in a world in which energy is scarce, you have to figure out how to be more efficient in your utilization of energy. This is something that we've, you know, sort of begun to do in the, you know, West, since the oil crises. We've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to...to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:17]]
<nowiki>[15:17]</nowiki>

But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence abundant cheap energy forestalls you know sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

Let's pose a counterfactual question: how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say. But what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:51]]
<nowiki>[15:51]</nowiki>

Alexei Kosygin who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev aligns himself with an economic reform agenda. Kosygin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West, that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives even.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:11]]
<nowiki>[16:11]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is a conservative. He repudiates Kosygin's reform agenda. And says, well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them.

==== Contrast with Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

Oil makes it possible to do that. Or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here I'm going to draw an example, or sort of, make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

Japan's economy after the Second World War is not essentially planned economy but it's an economy in which the government exerts substantial direction over you know sort of capitalist free market economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:50]]
<nowiki>[16:50]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry|Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade, METI}}, is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And METI responds to the oil crisis in a you know sort of proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has. Japan produces no oil, and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:19]]
<nowiki>[17:19]</nowiki>

But METI, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda for structural economic reform. What Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies -- particularly in energy...in...to invest particularly in industrial...processes that produce consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

Consumer electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production, in specializing in producing you know {{WPExtract|Walkman|Sony Walkman}}, for example, in producing less fuel thirsty automobiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be and take appropriate action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union on the other hand the petrodollar bounty forestalls the prospect of structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:39]]
<nowiki>[18:39]</nowiki>

And this will be consequential for the long-term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s the predicament for a Soviet economy which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide, will be very serious indeed.

=== Eastern Europe During the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:02]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Let's talk now about Eastern Europe. I've talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and it's relationship to the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership -- against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968. Poland sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of Communist systems is always fragile.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions -- that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

The fundamental dilemma for Eastern Europe's Communist governments is always this: how to rule, how to maintain control over populations that do not accept...for the most part -- the legitimacy of Communist domination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:04]]
<nowiki>[20:04]</nowiki>

And there are basically two strategies that East European Communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this in the experiences of Romania and Albania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:20]]
<nowiki>[20:20]</nowiki>

These are two repressive, sometimes violent, regimes. Regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon...you know, consensus, to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes Communist leaders disdain repression on the basis only of principle. It's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53]]
<nowiki>[20:53]</nowiki>

So placation becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does placation involve? Essentially it involves buying off populations. Providing sufficient increases in material well-being, sufficient supplies of consumer goods, in order to maintain the basic you know satisfaction of pop...or of ordinary people. You provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

This is what Hungary does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest. Hungary's so-called reform Communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political quiescence on the part of the population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

This formula becomes know in Hungary as {{WPExtract|Goulash Communism}}. You provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy to eat reasonably well, and Hungary will remain relatively stable within the Communist paradigm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

This, you know sort of, strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept. So too do East Germany's Communist leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:10]]
<nowiki>[22:10]</nowiki>

Though East Germany in some ways is a particular case because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and...placatory strategies at the same time. East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries. Elsewhere these two things, repression and placation, exist in a sort of inverse correlation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki>

Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc, but there are also among the richest. Romania and Albania, though Albania's not really in the Communist Bloc<ref>Albania allied itself with China and distanced itself from the Soviet Union. See the [[wikipedia:Albania#Communism|Communism section of the Wikipedia article on Albania]] and this is also talked about in lecture 10, "[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s#|So Hoxha becomes this very unusual thing: a European Maoist.]]."</ref> so it's a sort of particular case in and of itself. Let's just talk about Romania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:51]]
<nowiki>[22:51]</nowiki>

Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression and placation are the two strategies and you know to some extent they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:06]]
<nowiki>[23:06]</nowiki>

But in order to placate your populations through the provision of material abundance you need to be able to finance you know consumer production. And this is costly for Communist regimes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

Of course if you're financing consumption then what are you not financing? What's the tradeoff if you're...consuming?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:30]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. Development. Investment. If you're consuming stuff then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a tradeoff to be made between consumption and investment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:43]]
<nowiki>[23:43]</nowiki>

And this is a difficult tradeoff for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long-term agenda of Communist development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

It's also the case, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that Communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe's subject populations are coming to demand.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:06]]
<nowiki>[24:06]</nowiki>

East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy, and by comparison with Western automobiles inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to placate subject populations East European Communist governments end up during the 1970s turning more and more to the West -- to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:35]]
<nowiki>[24:35]</nowiki>

Foreign imports are really, really, important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:47]]
<nowiki>[24:47]</nowiki>

The sort of opportunities for East-West opening that détente and {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}} and the {{WPExtract|Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Settlement}} provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the sustenance of Communist led political systems in Eastern Europe. By opening up opportunities for trade and for economic exchange détente helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of Communist governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

And this is one of the reasons that some you know sort of conservatives in the United States are critical of détente at the time. They argue that the West, Western Europe and the United States, are helping sort of Communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide Western goods for their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

But it's important you know to think about the role of Western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s and after not simply in terms of consumption and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

How are Eastern, how are Western goods to be paid for?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:56]]
<nowiki>[25:56]</nowiki>

How is trade usually financed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

(student response)

Debt. Well, in this case the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the West. If Eastern European economies were producing you know the kinds of things that the West wanted then they might be able to...sustain balanced trade relations with the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:26]]
<nowiki>[26:26]</nowiki>

But in the absence of you know sort of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the West is by borrowing money.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So the East Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even an aspect to the story that ties back into the oil crisis, and I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is.

==== The Increase in Short-Term Capital Because of Oil Demand ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:57]]
<nowiki>[26:57]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short-term capital circulating in the global economy. In part this has to do with the petrodollar bounty that the oil exporting states enjoy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:13]]
<nowiki>[27:13]</nowiki>

You're Saudi Arabia for example. And you experience over a period of about six months a fourfold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:24]]
<nowiki>[27:24]</nowiki>

It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran. Because Iran is a big populous country. It's leadership under {{WPExtract|Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah Pahlavi}} has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran it's easy to spend the money. You just spend it on domestic infrastructural development. You build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:43]]
<nowiki>[27:43]</nowiki>

But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:53]]
<nowiki>[27:53]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You bank it. But not necessarily in Japan. Because Japan by this point is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital. You bank it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:06]]
<nowiki>[28:06]</nowiki>

If you're Saudi Arabia what kind of investor are you? Are you an aggressive investor or are you a conservative investor?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:13]]
<nowiki>[28:13]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You're a conservative investor. So you don't do direct investment. Instead you put it with banks. You place it for the most part with -- you place your money with Western banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers -- including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

There's a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe the petrodollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:07]]
<nowiki>[29:07]</nowiki>

But ultimately this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preve-- of staving off political unrest. Communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas.

==== Inflation in the East Bloc During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

And probably none is more consequential during the 1970s then the issue of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:35]]
<nowiki>[29:35]</nowiki>

Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet Bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high, you know, sort of rates of investment over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:49]]
<nowiki>[29:49]</nowiki>

If you set prices too low then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of sort of long-term investment. So controlling prices is a, you know, sort of really delicate act for central planners to perform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:04]]
<nowiki>[30:04]</nowiki>

Because if you set prices too high then you're going to incentivize political unrest. Populations will recoil from high bread prices. They might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult, but setting prices too low encourages more consumption than your economy will likely be able to sustain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:26 ]]
<nowiki>[30:26 ]</nowiki>

It will probably produce you know disruptions in supply as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is a sort of basic market economics and the rules are not all that different even in the context of a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:40 ]]
<nowiki>[30:40 ]</nowiki>

Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right. Socialist societies plan production but they can't plan consumption. The only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55 ]]
<nowiki>[30:55 ]</nowiki>

So it's always a very delicate you know sort of act that has to be performed.

==== Upheaval in Poland During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:01 ]]
<nowiki>[31:01 ]</nowiki>

And...the case of Poland is you know sort of illustrative of some of the you know difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it you know...in particular. I'm going to...you know sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland -- not with respect to the Communist system writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:25 ]]
<nowiki>[31:25 ]</nowiki>

In the late 1970s...1978, 1979 the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap you know sort of prices for food and consumer goods which have been sustained through most of the 1970s in order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51 ]]
<nowiki>[31:51 ]</nowiki>

This is really important. Prices increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis borne of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods. Other factors too stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:13 ]]
<nowiki>[32:13 ]</nowiki>

In 1978 a Polish national is elected Pope -- becomes {{WPExtract|Pope John Paul II}}. And this stimulates sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti-Sovietism, even Polish anti-Communism. Amidst this you know sort of combination of economic instability borne of an officially mandated price increase and political nationalism stirred by Pope John Paul II's election Poland at the end of the 1970s experiences a major round of political upheaval -- a major sort of political crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49 ]</nowiki>

This crisis is you know usually known as the episode of the {{WPExtract|Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity Movement}}. What is Solidarity? Why does it pose such a political challenge to the Polish Communist regime? Solidarity is an independent trades union movement that emerges in 1980.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:09 ]]
<nowiki>[33:09 ]</nowiki>

The fact of Solidarity's being a labor union, an independent trades union, is in itself consequential. Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:28 ]]
<nowiki>[33:28 ]</nowiki>

That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism. So the emergence of an independent trades union movement in Poland is ideologically disruptive and contentious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:47 ]]
<nowiki>[33:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's also in the summer of 1980 a major political phenomenon. {{WPExtract|Lech Wałęsa}} emerges as the leader of Solidarity, this independent trades union movement. He's a shipworker in Gdańsk with a sort of long history of political activism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:07 ]]
<nowiki>[34:07 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1970 Solidarity numbers over 700,000 workers as members. This is a very big political mobilization. The Polish government initially tries to appease Solidarity by recognizing it as a legitimate sort of representative organ of Polish workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:27 ]]
<nowiki>[34:27 ]</nowiki>

As a consequence of this initial act of recognition Solidarity's membership increases very, very quickly. By the summer, by the end of 1980, there are about 8 million Poles who count themselves as members of Solidarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:39 ]]
<nowiki>[34:39 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1981 one in four Polish people is a member of the Solidarity Movement. So Solidarity sort of explodes onto the Polish scene as an independent political force -- as a political force autonomous from the party-state, headed by a non-Communist membership, sorry, headed, led by a non-Communist leadership -- the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. And this poses a you know sort of serious, even existential threat, to the legitimacy, even the survival of the Polish Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13 ]</nowiki>

How is a party-state that derives its legitimacy from its claim to represent the workers and the interests of the workers going to deal with the emergence of a independent labor union that presents itself as a political rival to the Communist Party?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:30 ]]
<nowiki>[35:30 ]</nowiki>

In a sense what Solidarity means is that plural politics have arrived within the context of the party-state. This is very, very disruptive. So what does the Polish Communist state decide to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:43 ]]
<nowiki>[35:43 ]</nowiki>

It does essentially the only thing that it can do if it wants to remain a party-state -- and that is the government at the end of 1981 turns the tanks on Solidarity. Martial law is declared. Solidarity is declared illegal and popular street demonstrations are violently and viciously repressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04 ]</nowiki>

So the Polish state ultimately embraces repression because it's unable to control the political consequences of this mass mobilization that a combination of you know economic instability borne of rising consumer prices and political nationalism produce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:24 ]]
<nowiki>[36:24 ]</nowiki>

Solidarity in effect demonstrates, or the Solidarity Crisis in effect demonstrates, that there are severe limits to what political reform can accomplish within the context of the party-state. There might be you know an opportunity within the party-state to satisfy some of the you know consumer aspirations that subject populations have but the party-state will not be able tolerate plural politics. That is sort you know persuasively demonstrated.

==== The Economic Lag Between Eastern Europe and the West ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53 ]]
<nowiki>[36:53 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's economies continue to lag further and further behind the capitalist West. This is really, really important. Though the West experiences a slowdown in growth rates during the 1970s the gap between East and West just continues to get bigger and bigger.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:15 ]]
<nowiki>[37:15 ]</nowiki>

Let's took not at overall GDP but at per capita GDP which is what this chart displays. Per capita GDP is a pretty good index of basic economic well-being, of ordinary people. And what you can see is that from sort of the early 1970s in particular the rates of growth in per capita GDP in the East Bloc slow. During the 1980s the story will essentially be one of stasis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:43 ]]
<nowiki>[37:43 ]</nowiki>

In relative terms however the East Bloc is going backwards. As the West continues to get richer and richer in per capita terms the failures of the socialist system to match the affluence that Western capitalism is capable of producing for it citizens become more and more glaring.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:03 ]]
<nowiki>[38:03 ]</nowiki>

So the slowdown is a relative slowdown. There's still a very you know sort of incremental improvement in per capita GDP in the...in say Eastern Europe between you know 1970 and 1980. So relative to sort of...its own experience Eastern Europe's position does improve very, very sluggishly. But relative to the West Eastern Europe is falling behind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:29 ]]
<nowiki>[38:29 ]</nowiki>

And this is really, really important. Because the example of the West will be absolutely crucial to the legitimacy crisis of state Communism in the 1980s. The example of the West exposes the basic dishonesty of Communist propaganda. Insofar as Communist leaders proclaim themselves to be building a future that is even brighter than the future that capitalism could deliver the actual you know historical accomplishments of Communism debunk the myth that Communism is a more advanced economic system -- that the command economy is somehow more productive than the capitalist economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:08 ]]
<nowiki>[39:08 ]</nowiki>

This...disjoint between the theory and the reality of Communism is profoundly consequential. It is in a sense what causes the basic legitimacy crisis of the system. The fact that Communist governments end up depending upon violence and repression to control political unrest only you know sort of exacerbates the basic legitimacy problem. These regimes are brutal and violent sometimes but even more consequential I would argue is the fact that their in...is that they prove unable to deliver the material bounty which they promise to provide for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:45 ]]
<nowiki>[39:45 ]</nowiki>

Communism...sorry...

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52 ]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

No, that's, that's a really good question. Well, that would be you know sort harder to do because the data on which this chart is produced is just population data and GDP data. So the mean average is the one that you know can be easily produced based upon you know the best available data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:19]]
<nowiki>[40:19]</nowiki>

Estimating, this is sort of a subsidiary point, statistics from the East Bloc are notoriously difficult to work with because you know they're frequently manufactured are bare little relation to reality. But it's a very good question. I mean to what extent does this you know sort of tail off in GDP per capita growth in the East Bloc veil sort of important differences between East and West that have to do with the distribution of well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48 ]</nowiki>

Because there's a plausible you know sort of alternative viewpoint here -- which is that Western societies produce more in the aggregate but that wealth in the West is so...unevenly distributed that most of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few very wealthy people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07 ]</nowiki>

Meaning that ordinary Westerns are not necessarily any better off than are ordinary East Bloc citizens. In that circumstance the East Bloc would not have experienced its legitimacy crisis because leaders of East European countries could have said that for, so far as ordinary people were concerned, they were really much better off under Communism than they would be under capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:27 ]]
<nowiki>[41:27 ]</nowiki>

I wish that I had that chart to show you. Unfortunately, I don't have it in the slide show. So you just have to take this on faith, that...the relative decline in sort of....in aggregate economic well-being is experienced by ordinary people in the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:47 ]]
<nowiki>[41:47 ]</nowiki>

Sure, the Western countries even, the countries of Western Europe, which are less unequal than the United States is, remain relatively less equal than the economies of Eastern Europe do but the difference isn't all that much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:01 ]]
<nowiki>[42:01 ]</nowiki>

And this actually gives me an opportunity to talk about a really important point which was a point that we should think about when we're thinking about sort of economics and equality in Communist societies and capitalist societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:15 ]]
<nowiki>[42:15 ]</nowiki>

One of the key you know distinguishing characteristics of a Communist society is that economic wealth ends up being sort of synonymous with political wealth. Economic power ends up being synonymous with political power. Those who control the state, those who control the political apparatus are also those who enjoy the greatest material abundance -- hence, Brezhnev and the fur coat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:41 ]]
<nowiki>[42:41 ]</nowiki>

If you want to make it in the Soviet Union your best opportunity for making it comes through advancing yourself through the party bureaucracy -- through the party hierarchy. It's political power that can deliver you know the things upon which the good life depends: a nice dacha in the countryside, a well appointed well-furnished apartment in Moscow. Well, these things go to the people who wield political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:06 ]]
<nowiki>[43:06 ]</nowiki>

In the West by contrast there's a disjoint between political power and economic power. At least there ought to be in principle, right -- is the case that political power exists apart from economic power. Money can influence elections but it doesn't necessarily determine them. You know of course in the present moment you know I think we're experiencing something of a national conversation as to what the relationship between economic power is...and...but as to what the relationship between economic and political power is and what it should be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37 ]</nowiki>

Whether economic power is excessively influential upon political power is a question that we're debating and there are you know different perspectives that we could bring to that conversation and it's not really my intention to discuss that today because it takes us away from where we need to be going.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:53 ]]
<nowiki>[43:53 ]</nowiki>

But the...point which is crucial to remember about Communist societies is that economic power and political power are in essence synonymous. And as a consequence of that people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who wield power enjoy you know relatively greater abundance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13 ]</nowiki>

They shop in special shops. They're special shops for high ranking party members that provide access to you know much better Western consumer goods than those that are available to ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:23 ]]
<nowiki>[44:23 ]</nowiki>

And this basic you know sort of...the fact that inequality is so implicated with political power further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis of the system. You know ordinary Eastern Europeans who don't enjoy the special prerogatives that party members enjoy will call out party members for you know self-serving hypocrisy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:46 ]]
<nowiki>[44:46 ]</nowiki>

So far as the comparison with the West goes. I'm just going to make one last point on this issue. It's important, and we'll talk more about this, but it's important to think about the role in which you know sort of the media plays in giving East Europeans a sense of what ordinary life is like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:04 ]]
<nowiki>[45:04 ]</nowiki>

American television shows, like {{WPExtract|Dallas (1978 TV series)|''Dallas''}} and {{WPExtract|Dynasty (1981 TV series)|''Dynasty''}}, which probably none of you remember, are...screened on West European television. You know Germany for example you know screens American soap operas constantly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:19]]
<nowiki>[45:19]</nowiki>

These transmissions can be you know easily viewed, you know picked up, by antennae, and viewed in Eastern Europe. And this you know sort of window on Western abundance that television you know drama -- well, drama is probably too good a word to use, that television you know series like ''Dallas'' provide, gives you know sort of East Europeans, a, you know sense, perhaps an exaggerated sense, of what life looks like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:47 ]]
<nowiki>[45:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's not altogether misrepresentive. Right, by the turn of the 1980s what kinds of lives are middle class Americans enjoying? Well, they you know usually inhabit single family homes in suburbs. They'll drive probably two automobiles in a household. Putting food on the table is not a concern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:08 ]]
<nowiki>[46:08 ]</nowiki>

This is a standard of material abundance that the East has entirely failed to match. So the more that Easterners know about how people live in the West, and about the kinds of expectations that Westerners have, the less credible becomes the proclamations of you know Communist leaders to be giving their people better lives than the lives that Westerners live.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29 ]]
<nowiki>[46:29 ]</nowiki>

But we'll talk more about sort of these contrasts in the 1980s and how they [[wikt:inflect|inflect]] the end of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:35 ]]
<nowiki>[46:35 ]</nowiki>

Okay, but the...point I think that the data conveys really powerfully which is a point that you want to bare in mind carefully is that the example of the West is a very subversive one from a Eastern standpoint in the 1970s and the 1980s. The West is growing faster than the East even as the West experiences difficult political and economic transformations of its own.

== Political Tumult in China in the Late 1960s and 1970s ==

=== The Cultural Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:58 ]]
<nowiki>[46:58 ]</nowiki>

Let's move on now to talk about China. Another country that experiences some consequential transformation in its relations with the West during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10 ]</nowiki>

I'm going to take the Chinese story back to the {{WPExtract|Cultural Revolution}} because I don't think that we've yet had the chance to sort of go through the Cultural Revolution in a systemic way and getting the history of the Cultural Revolution right is really important for understanding what comes next.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:25 ]]
<nowiki>[47:25 ]</nowiki>

It's what comes next that should interest us today but to understand that we'll take the history back to the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:33 ]]
<nowiki>[47:33 ]</nowiki>

What was the Cultural Revolution? How did it come to pass? Just to give me a quick sense of the room how many of you had already studied the history of the Cultural Revolution in some other context? In some other class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:46 ]]
<nowiki>[47:46 ]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. So you're just have to bare with you because I'm not probably going to take this into the kind of detail that you've encountered elsewhere but for those who haven't studied the Cultural Revolution it's important just to get a handle on this. Because this a really big, really consequential event, set of events in the making of contemporary China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:05 ]]
<nowiki>[48:05 ]</nowiki>

The Cultural Revolution emerges out of the catastrophic aftermath of China's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}. The Great Leap Forward of course was the developmental plan introduced in 1956 that aimed to construct an indigenous Chinese path to socialist modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:21 ]]
<nowiki>[48:21 ]</nowiki>

It was a path that would involve the promotion of you know all kinds of ambitious things like rural industrialization. Backyard steel furnaces as we've discussed are one of the you know preeminent symbols of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:35 ]]
<nowiki>[48:35 ]</nowiki>

Yet the Great Leap Forward for all of its overwhelming ambition is in practice a horrible catastrophe. Tens of millions of people starve to death as a consequence of the havoc that the Great Leap Forward produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:48 ]]
<nowiki>[48:48 ]</nowiki>

The Great Leap Forward does not accomplish what {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Mao}} wanted to accomplish which is nominally as least to make China prosperous and strong. Instead the Great Leap Forward brings Chinese society to its knees.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:00 ]]
<nowiki>[49:00 ]</nowiki>

There's a massive famine. Tens of millions of people die. It's really, really horrible. This disaster brings not just the legitimacy of you know Communist rule, but Mao Zedong's legitimacy as a wise and farseeing leader into question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:16 ]]
<nowiki>[49:16 ]</nowiki>

Indeed Mao recognizes by you know the turn of the 1960s that he has overreached himself. That he has set something in motion which has been catastrophic in it consequences. And Mao retreats from the sort of front lines of political leadership in China. He goes back home and retreats to his study and undertakes a long phase of you know sort of reading and contemplation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:41 ]]
<nowiki>[49:41 ]</nowiki>

As Mao retreats from the forefront of Chinese politics new leaders emerge and they pursue different kinds of policies. The two most important leaders are {{WPExtract|Liu Shaoqi}}, pictured on the bottom of the slide, and {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}}. And these are the two men who come to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:02 ]]
<nowiki>[50:02 ]</nowiki>

And they pursue policies that are aimed at moderating the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restoring a more normal and a more sustainable path towards modernization and development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16 ]</nowiki>

Both men and fairly pragmatic. Deng Xiaoping is well known for sort of citing an old Sichuan<ref>{{WPExtract|Sichuan|The Wikipedia article on Sichuan}} lists other romanizations of the name of the province to be Szechuan and Szechwan.</ref> saying which is: it doesn't matter if it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it catches mice.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:30 ]]
<nowiki>[50:30 ]</nowiki>

And this is a statement that well captures you know Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism. He's less concerned with ideology as Mao was than with achieving tangible results. So for a period in the first half of the 1960s China experiences a sort of moderate turn in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are temporarily at least preeminent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:53 ]]
<nowiki>[50:53 ]</nowiki>

And they try to restore a stability, sort of normalcy to use {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge|Calvin Coolidge's}} language<ref>The slogan "Return to Normalcy" was used in the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The Harding-Coolidge ticket won the election and after Harding passed away Coolidge was inaugurated as President. See Wikipedia articles: {{WPExtract|Return to normalcy}}, {{WPExtract|1920 United States presidential election}}, {{WPExtract|Warren G. Harding}}, and {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge}}.</ref> to the Chinese socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:02 ]]
<nowiki>[51:02 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao Zedong, sort of sitting, festering in retirement, is plotting a return to the political fore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:11 ]]
<nowiki>[51:11 ]</nowiki>

As Mao contemplates a sort of return to the front line of Chinese politics he is spurred by his wife {{WPExtract|Jiang Qing}} who is a very hard line radical. I mean a real...sort of [[wikt:doctrinaire|doctrinaire]] [[wikt:ideologue|ideologue]]. And she argues that China has taken a sort of bourgeois turn under Liu and Deng -- that it is time to reradicalize the revolution, to reenergize the revolution, perhaps even to launch a new revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeois stability that has set in under Deng and Liu and to sort of restore the revolutionary project to its maximum fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:52 ]]
<nowiki>[51:52 ]</nowiki>

Jiang is particularly resentful of China's cultural establishment. This may have something to do with the fact that she was a actress by trade before she became a political leader. She sees Chinese culture as a bastion of sort of bourgeois tradition. And she is absolutely adamant that if a new revolution is to be launched that it needs to be a Cultural Revolution in its thrust.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:16 ]</nowiki>

That it needs to focus not just upon a transformation of economic and political structures but on transforming Chinese culture and Chinese values -- to create a truly radical, a truly revolutionary society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:29 ]]
<nowiki>[52:29 ]</nowiki>

Spurred by Jing Qing Mao returns to the front line of Chinese politics in 1966. He convenes a special [[wikt:plenum|plenum]] of the Chinese Communist Party that August and it sets in motion the train of events that will become known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:48 ]]
<nowiki>[52:48 ]</nowiki>

And this is how Mao proclaims it. You know China is now going to have a great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This involves the demotion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. These two men are sort of pushed aside. And Mao appoints a radical {{WPExtract|Lin Biao}} as his anointed heir.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:07 ]]
<nowiki>[53:07 ]</nowiki>

Lin Biao is a devoted Maoist. He was responsible a couple of years earlier during Mao's period of exile for collecting a host of Mao's, you know, political sayings into a you know single volume -- a book, that became known as the {{WPExtract|Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book''}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:22 ]]
<nowiki>[53:22 ]</nowiki>

So Lin Biao is sort of more responsible than anybody else for developing what would become in the context of the Cultural Revolution a cult of Maoism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:34 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34 ]</nowiki>

So the Cultural Revolution is launched in 1966 with the purpose of transforming China -- of revolutionizing China's revolution. In a sense the Cultural Revolution represents an effort by Mao to launch a bottom-up revolution against the Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53 ]]
<nowiki>[53:53 ]</nowiki>

So this a really you know sort of peculiar thing. After the 1949 revolution the Communist Party sort of assumes the responsibilities of governance. It assimilates itself to the state and it becomes a well-defined, well-established power structure. This is the power structure that Deng and Liu come responsible for in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward -- the Chinese party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:16 ]]
<nowiki>[54:16 ]</nowiki>

But outside of power, Mao, who is still the nominal leader of this party-state becomes convinced, prodded in part by his wife, that the party-state has become conservative, that it's become bourgeois, that it's become reactionary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:29 ]]
<nowiki>[54:29 ]</nowiki>

So the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents an effort to revolutionize the state that the 1949 Communist Revolution created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40 ]]
<nowiki>[54:40 ]</nowiki>

And in order to accomplish this Mao turns to the masses. He turns to the Chinese masses to launch a revolution against the party-state that the Communist Party has created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:51 ]]
<nowiki>[54:51 ]</nowiki>

Mao in 1966 proclaims a campaign against what he describes as the Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. This is to be a revolution against the old -- out with the old, in with the new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:06 ]]
<nowiki>[55:06 ]</nowiki>

Nowhere is this revolution fiercer than on Chinese university campuses. There is a sort of demographic aspect to the Cultural Revolution that is really important to think about. China, like the United States, like Western Europe, experiences a sort of youth bubble, a baby boom after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:25 ]]
<nowiki>[55:25 ]</nowiki>

By the mid-1960s children born in the aftermath of the Second World War are becoming teenagers. They're becoming seventeen, eighteen, nineteen-year-olds who are becoming you know sort of politically conscious and who are susceptible to...how do I put this politely?...far-fetched ideological doctrines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43 ]]
<nowiki>[55:43 ]</nowiki>

Not that you ever see any evidence of that on Berkeley's campus because this is a, you know, sober, responsible place. But in China it's an altogether different story, and young people are you know susceptible to a kind of radicalization that serves the purposes that Mao now wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:01 ]]
<nowiki>[56:01 ]</nowiki>

So Chinese campuses become a recruiting ground for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao radical Chinese students form units called {{WPExtract|Red Guards}}. These are sort of paramilitary units that establish themselves to advance the revolution, to impose Maoist orthodoxy, and to sort of challenge so-called right-wing deviationists -- rightists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:30 ]]
<nowiki>[56:30 ]</nowiki>

Students form Red Guard units. They carry Mao's ''Little Red Book'' which becomes in the late 1960s you know absolutely ubiquitous as an ideological and political symbol. Carrying the ''Little Red Book'' implies a sort of devotion or signals a devotion to the cult of Maoist Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48 ]]
<nowiki>[56:48 ]</nowiki>

Politically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sort of...targets...you know the bureaucracy. It targets people like Deng Xiaoping who is persecuted in the context of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:08 ]]
<nowiki>[57:08 ]</nowiki>

The denouncication of rightists becomes sort of the overriding theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And this has catastrophic consequences for the state. Important leaders Deng and Liu Shaoqi are purged. They become the targets of particular opprobrium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26 ]]
<nowiki>[57:26 ]</nowiki>

But it's not just you know leaders at the top who are purged. Around two-thirds of all Communist Party officials are removed from their posts in the context of the Great Proletarian Revolution. Red Guards in a sense overthrow the basic institutions of political order that have developed in Communist China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:46 ]]
<nowiki>[57:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is a drama that is played out at many different levels. It's not just at the top leadership level of the party. But at the level of you know sort of social institutions like schools and universities. Red Guards seek out reactionaries and purge them. Bourgeois teachers are purged in schools, bourgeois reactionary professors are purged in universities, which would be a really bad idea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:07 ]]
<nowiki>[58:07 ]</nowiki>

Intellectuals are the target of special assault. Rightists are singled out for public humiliation and are forced to confess their so-called sins against the Maoist Revolution. This is a catastrophic tumultous phase in Chinese life. It's a period in which a revolution from below sort of overthrows you know much of what the Communist Party has built since 1969 -- since 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32 ]]
<nowiki>[58:32 ]</nowiki>

What are the human consequences of this? I mean there are some mass killing. Around half a million deaths, up to half a million deaths, are attributable to the chaos that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45 ]]
<nowiki>[58:45 ]</nowiki>

To situate this in context it's substantially less people than died during the Great Leap Forward. But it's still you know a weighty toll, and a toll that we should contemplate particularly when we consider that the death toll that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused was entirely ideologically motivated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:07]]
<nowiki>[59:07]</nowiki>

Unlike the Great Leap Forward which represented an ambitious effort to industrialize, to modernize China, and in which the catastrophic famines were in a sense an indirect consequence of a modernizing project, virtually all of the people who died during the Cultural Revolution were singled out for political murder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:27 ]]
<nowiki>[59:27 ]</nowiki>

So this is a you know weighty topic with which to grapple. But the political consequences, more than the sort of ethical or moral consequences, are those that shape what comes next. Authority, central political authority, effectively collapses as Red Guards remove Communist bureaucrats from their post.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:48 ]]
<nowiki>[59:48 ]</nowiki>

The central planning system breaks down. The Great Leap Forward had presented an alternative model to Soviet-style central planning. The Cultural Revolution obliterates the mechanics of central planning virtually entirely. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the opportunities for implementing Soviet-style economic planning will be very limited because the planning structures have been dismantled. The bureaucracies have been depopulated and dismantled.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:17 ]</nowiki>

Virtually the only you know political leader in China who is able to hold the whole thing together, which is to say to hold the state together, during the period of the Cultural Revolution is {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai}} -- the Premier of the Chinese state. And a man who while a, you know, sort of very close lieutenant of Mao Zedong throughout Mao's life doesn't share Mao's ideological radicalism or ideological fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:46 ]</nowiki>

It's not to say that Zhou Enlai was a closet liberal. It would be wrong to see him in those terms. But he recognizes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and struggles against you know very difficult odds to preserve the basic stability of the Chinese state -- to protect the institutions of central power and central authority against the rampages of the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:07 ]</nowiki>

And in those Zhou Enlai is more or less successful. He manages to sustain a semblance of a political center through the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:18 ]</nowiki>

Ultimately though it's Mao Zedong who brings the whole production to an end. Mao realizes by the end of 1968, early 1969, that things are going far too far. That if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is permitted to continue that it will result in the effective you know destruction of China as a nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39 ]</nowiki>

That the Chinese [[wikt:polity|polity]] will fall apart as a consequence of this revolution from below. So having launched a popular revolution against the state Mao now very abruptly shifts course and moves to implement a state clamp down on the popular revolution. Mao turns to the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, to purge the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:05 ]</nowiki>

Having previously instructed the Red Guards to purge bourgeois rightist elements in the People's Liberation Army and other you know Communist Party bureaucracies Mao now turns to the army in order to restore order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:18 ]</nowiki>

This attempt to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to an end inaugurates a very sort of peculiar phase in the history of the People's Republic -- a late Maoist phase in which Mao remains the singular preeminent leader of China but in which Mao...does not pursue the sort of revolutionary political and social transformation that characterized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:49 ]</nowiki>

So you might think of the era of late Maoism as an era in which China is delicately poised between revolutionary politics on the one hand, because the forces that have produced the cultural revolution are still present, and Mao is still in many respects sympathetic to them, and the forces of stabilization on the other. It's a very interesting and very delicate phase in China's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:13 ]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17 ]</nowiki>

Because Mao was a brilliant political leader. I mean Mao was extremely adept at balancing political factions and playing off personalities and interests against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:28 ]</nowiki>

I mean Mao may...you know have made a number of catastrophic decisions as regards China's economic development. But when it came to politics -- both domestic politics and international politics. I mean Mao was one of the most gifted political tacticians of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:46 ]</nowiki>

And what Mao does through the era of the Cultural Revolution and into the late Maoist Era that sort of follows the heights of the Cultural Revolution is to balance the centrists, people like Deng Xiaoping, against the radical left, people like his wife Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:03 ]</nowiki>

And ultimately he's successful in performing that delicate balancing act through to the very end of his life. It's sort of remarkable when you think about the tumult that China experiences in the second half of the twentieth century that Mao Zedong dies a peaceful death in his sleep. The fact that he does so is testimony I think to the brilliance of Mao's political skills.

=== Maoist Rule in the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25 ]</nowiki>

So Mao, you know, as I've sort of explained, performs this delicate balancing act in the first half of the 1970s. He works to balance the left against the center.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:40 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao orchestrates, as we've already discussed, a major shift in China's international relations. In 1972 he welcomes Richard Nixon to Beijing. This does not necessarily signify a shift in China's international goals. Mao will continue to talk about global revolution as an objective for China but the realignment with the United States serves a very clear tactical purpose. It serves the purpose of gaining China a tacit ally against the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:12 ]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union by 1972 is a major concern for China. 1969 brings actual fighting between Chinese and Soviet forces over the Ussuri River. That year China experiences a major war scare. Indeed this war scare one of the factors that prompts Mao to wind down the Cultural Revolution. Because Mao recognizes that amidst the upheaval that the Cultural Revolution is performing China is essentially open so far as foreign aggression is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:39 ]</nowiki>

So Mao implements a sort of major tactical shift in the Cold War. He tries to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union, but this does not signify necessarily a strategic reorientation towards the West. There's a big difference between a tactical opening and a strategic opening and what Mao pursues in 1972 is a tactical opening. Mao's overarching goals remain consistent: to make China strong and prosperous and to promote and pursue global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10 ]</nowiki>

But there are significant changes in Mao's you know sort of political discourse during this era of you know late Maoist rule that will help to prefigure what comes next. Probably the single most important sort of revision of Maoist doctrine that Mao orchestrates in this period is the so-called {{WPExtract|Three Worlds Theory}} which Mao first develops in 1973 and which is publicly presented in a speech that Deng Xiaoping gives at the United Nations in 1974.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:42 ]</nowiki>

In this speech Mao, which Mao writes, the world is divided into three parts: the world of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the rich capitalist world, countries like West Germany, and Canada and Australia and so on, and then the Third World -- the rest of the world, the poor world, the world of which China is a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:06 ]</nowiki>

There are really important implications to the way in which this Three Worlds Concept is presented. Whereas Mao had previously described the world in terms of class struggle, the workers versus the bourgeoisie, the Three Worlds Concept implies a more developmental...framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:25]]
<nowiki>[1:07:25]</nowiki>

It suggests, or in some ways it sort of echoes the Three Worlds Concepts that Latin American developmental economists offer, you know, during the 1950s and 1960s. And this is really consequential. Mao talks about the need to develop and build the developing world: China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:46 ]</nowiki>

This is not so different from what developing economics proposes. Though Mao continues to talk about revolution as a goal for China in the world his political rhetoric in the last years of his life is increasingly inflected by a discourse of development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:03]]
<nowiki>[1:08:03]</nowiki>

This doesn't necessarily mean that Mao personally wanted to orchestrate a new course but Mao says things that Mao's successors will be able to hold onto as a way of relating their priorities to sort of Maoist doctrine. Because this is really important. Look Mao remains, continues to be venerated in China, through to the present day. Even as China for the past thirty years has pursued policies at home and in the world that are almost diametrically at odds with most of what Mao said.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:35 ]</nowiki>

So how to relate policies that repudiate the substance of Mao while paying fealty to the dogma? Well, to do that you seize upon things that Mao said that might rationalize the things that you want to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is what Mao's successors will do. They will invoke Mao's Three Worlds Concept and the developmental implications of it in order to legitimate and defend policies that serve quite different purposes to those that Mao wanted to achieve, policies from the late 1970s onwards, that will serve the purposes of development rather than the purposes of global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:11]]
<nowiki>[1:09:11]</nowiki>

There are other key developments during the Mao Era -- none more consequential than the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was purged in 1969, stripped of his official office, sent to work in a tractor factory in Xinjian Province.<ref>In the [[wikipedia:Deng Xiaoping#Cultural Revolution|Cultural Revolution section of the Wikipedia article on Deng Xiaoping]] there is, "In October 1969 Deng Xiaoping was sent to the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi province to work as a regular worker." The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Xinjian District}} says that it is a suburb of {{WPExtract|Nanchang}} which is the capital of {{WPExtract|Jiangxi}} Province.</ref> But in 1974, Deng Xiaoping reforms, sorry, he returns, he doesn't necessarily reform -- that's key. Deng returns -- unreformed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36 ]</nowiki>

Deng returns in part because Zhou Enlai promotes him. Zhou Enlai is really Deng Xiaoping's primary sponsor in the power structure in the late phase of the Cultural Revolution. And Zhou Enlai promotes Deng to become First Vice Premier of the Chinese state with particular responsibility for economic reform. This is a major return because Deng will of course become China's preeminent leader in a post Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:06 ]</nowiki>

The 1969 purge is not the last purge of Deng Xiaoping however. Deng is purged again in 1975. And that's really important. Because it tells us something about how fractious Chinese politics remain through to the end of the Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:21 ]</nowiki>

At the instigation of rightists, sorry of left-wingers, of the radicals around Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Deng is forced to sort of incriminate himself, to draw up a list of self-criticisms, to renounce his so-called ideological deviations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:39 ]</nowiki>

So up to the end of very Mao's life the conflict between the radicals around Mao's wife and the political moderates around Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping remains very fierce. And the second purge of Deng Xiaoping in 1975 is excellent sort of illustration of this point.

=== The Death of Mao Zedong and the Question of Succession ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:57 ]</nowiki>

Mao Zedong of course dies in September 1976. This is a really big, really, really big shift. Even more tumultuous perhaps than Stalin's death in 1953 had been. The Chinese revolution after all has been singularly associated since the 1920s with the personality and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao's death after fifty years...after twenty-five years of head of state, twenty-fives as a revolutionary leader, is a...dramatic and profound disjuncture in the history of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:33 ]</nowiki>

Who will succeed Mao Zedong? This is the big question. There are...a number of factions struggling for influence. Probably the most coherent is the radical faction, the {{WPExtract|Gang of Four}}, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:52 ]</nowiki>

At the same time there are anointed successors. The key anointed successor is {{WPExtract|Hua Guofeng}} -- who's the person who Mao designates as his heir as China's political leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:05 ]</nowiki>

Other however have claims to make besides. Deng Xiaoping, though he has recently been sort of exiled and purged can make a strong claim to being one of China's most effective and proven administrators. Deng has a record of proven accomplishment which will be you know very much to his advantage as China's political future is determined.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:27 ]</nowiki>

The succession is complex but let's try to trace out some of the you know key steps. Hua Guofeng, the anointed successor, moves initially against the radical left. And this is really key. Hua moves to purge the Gang of Four in late 1976. Just months after Mao dies the radicals are purged.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:50 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:50 ]</nowiki>

They're arrested. And a sort of campaign against the extreme left is set in motion. This is really consequential for Deng Xiaoping. Insofar as the radical left, the Gang of Four, had been sort of Deng's primary antagonistic, antagonist, their removal from the political scene creates opportunities for Deng to reassert himself. And this is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15 ]</nowiki>

The power struggle ceases to be three-way or power struggle between Hua, Deng, and the Gang of Four, and it becomes a sort of two-way conflict between Deng and Hua after the removal of the Gang of Four.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:29 ]</nowiki>

And here the you know conflict assumes a sort of ideological aspect. Hua Guofeng aligns himself very closely after the purge of the Gang of Four with Mao Zedong's legacy. Hua proclaims himself loyal to what he characterizes as the two whatevers. He says, and here I quote, whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon we shall resolutely defend, whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed we shall resolutely oppose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:56 ]</nowiki>

So Hua, after Mao's death, presents himself as the heir not only of Mao's political role but also of Mao's ideological commitments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:08]]
<nowiki>[1:14:08]</nowiki>

Deng by contrast is much more pragmatic. Deng argues that policies should be grounded not in Maoist doctrine but in empirical evidence. That China needs to allow its you know policies to be determined by practice, what works and what doesn't, rather than by revolutionary ideology. Deng's cat theory: it doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it captures, catches mice, is you know sort of illustrative of Deng's pragmatism.

=== China Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:37 ]</nowiki>

Deng Xiaoping establishes control fairly quickly. The key event here is the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which takes place in December 1978. This is the moment at which Deng and his allies sort of outflank and overwhelm Hua Guofeng and his allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:57 ]</nowiki>

The Eleventh Central Committee is the sort of key turning point in China's history. At this meeting the Chinese Communist Party renounces basic Maoist revolutionary concepts. The concept of class struggle as the sort of key to history is quitetly discarded. The concept of continual revolution, the idea that the Communist Party needs to be waging a continual revolution, is also discarded -- instead pragmatic policies are embraced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:29 ]</nowiki>

It's as if the Communist Party decides that the revolution has been accomplished with the attainment of its own political power and that the task ahead is now to develop China, to make China strong and prosperous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:40 ]</nowiki>

These pragmatic policies will include economic deregulation and soon enough market oriented reforms. Equally consequential Deng Xiaoping visits the United States. The visit to the United States comes after a formal normalization of diplomatic relations which occurs at the beginning of January. It's negotiated in December 1978, but on the first of January 1979 the United States of America and China normalize diplomatic relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:09 ]</nowiki>

This is a major turning point. It signals a new sort of opening towards the United States a new kind of relationship between the people's republic and the United States.

=== Deng Xiaoping's Policy Towards the US Contrasted with Mao Zedong's Policy Towards the US ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:20 ]</nowiki>

It might be useful to compare and contrast Deng Xiaoping's US policy with Mao Zedong's US policy. What did the two leaders want to accomplish? Well, what Mao Zedong wanted to accomplish, in the context of a war scare with the Soviet Union, was a tactical alignment that would use the United States as a sort of counterweight to the Soviet Union to the advantage of Chinese diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:51 ]</nowiki>

What Deng contemplates is something entirely different. For Deng the opening to the United States is to be strategic rather than political. It's not just an alliance of convenience against the Soviet Union that Deng wants -- though we may note that Deng Xiaoping is fiercely anti-Soviet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:07]]
<nowiki>[1:17:07]</nowiki>

But what Deng wants is something more, far more far reaching than that. He wants to open not only China's sort of political alignments towards the United States but also China's economy, and ultimately China's society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:21 ]</nowiki>

When Deng travels to the United States, which he does in February 1979, he's extremely interested in American industry. He wants to visit factories, car factories, he pays a visit to the space program I think in Texas, and is you know immensely impressed with American high technology -- with American space technology as well as with technology aimed at ordinary consumers. And he seeks to realize for China a future based upon this American high technology model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:55 ]</nowiki>

In order to accomplish that Deng recognizes he will have to open China towards the United States, towards the West, towards the capitalist world. To do this he implements major structural reforms. Foreign investment will be solicited and encouraged. Market incentives will be opened. China in a sense will transition from having been...will transition from the status of a sort of autarkic communistic economy which is what China was, for, through the Maoist Era, to a relationship in which China will begin to reintegrate with the capitalist liberal open world economy that the United States tried to build after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:38 ]</nowiki>

An economy that was built in the West but which was of course divided by the advent of the Second World War. So this is a profound strategic realignment.

=== The Enabling of Market Reforms Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:47 ]</nowiki>

How are we to explain it looking back? Let's conclude with some quick reflections. Why did Deng try to do what he did and why was he able to accomplish so much? We'll talk much more about reforms after 1980 in due course but at this stage let's just reflect on four points.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:05 ]</nowiki>

First socialization in China was always less advanced that it became in the Soviet Union. The socialist project by the mid-1970s was only twenty-five years old. The Great Leap Forward did not achieve everything that it wanted to achieve. The Communist Party found, when it looked carefully at the countryside, that the reach of socialization was very limited. That ordinary Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants, continued to display sort of entrepreneurial impulses, entrepreneurial habits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

In the 1960s this seemed disturbing to the leadership of the Communist Party. It was one of the reasons that the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was launched. But the limits of socialization will in due course facilitate a market oriented transformation of China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:56 ]</nowiki>

The disruption that the Cultural Revolution causes is also crucial. The Cultural Revolution does much of what Mao accomplish, wants is to accomplish, which is to sweep out the olds. Having swept out the olds the opportunity for new thinking, for new approaches is rather more open than it will be by contrast in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

The international reorientations are also crucial. Mao pursues an opening towards the United States for realistic even cynical purposes. Mao wants to bring the United States on board as a tactical asset against the Soviet Union.
But Mao's 1972 tactical opening towards the United States makes it possible for Deng Xiaoping to pursue a far more far reaching strategic opening towards the United States in 1979.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:47 ]</nowiki>

Finally we should be attentive to the subtle shift in Maoist discourse during the last phase of Mao's political career. The fact that Mao will be begin to emphasize development as well as revolution as a goal for China at home and in the world makes it possible for Mao's successors, preeminently for Deng Xiaoping, to orchestrate a transition from revolution to development and modernization as the overarching purpose of Chinese statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:15 ]</nowiki>

The consequences of this in the 1980s and beyond we'll come to in due course.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-03-15T03:33:55Z

DavidKitFriedman: Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai. Minor syntax fix.

== Preliminaries ==

Okay, it's 9:40 so it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room I fear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be a you know reason for not coming to lecture and staying at home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

At least I hope that was the case in that you didn't all think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reach that conclusion it would be those who aren't here. But anyway it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain which is actually less rain then we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow I think. So, it's good if you like skiing -- the precipitation.

== Lecture Overivew ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:40]]
<nowiki>[00:40]</nowiki>

But that's not what we're going to be talking about today. This is not a class in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:58]]
<nowiki>[00:58]</nowiki>

So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today we take the story to the socialist world, the Soviet Union, and China and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and twenty minutes with the sort of resurgence of East-West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s, and if we can do this -- this will situate us well to transition to the 1980s and the story of globalization next week.

== Transformation and Tumult in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:30]]
<nowiki>[01:30]</nowiki>

=== Tumult in The Soviet Union During the 1970s: The Brezhnev Years ===

Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:40]]
<nowiki>[01:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}} years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khruschev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:01]]
<nowiki>[02:01]</nowiki>

It's not Leonid Brezhnev but {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin}}, the Premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in 1967.<ref>Speaker here is likely referring to the {{WPExtract|Glassboro Summit Conference}} where Alexei Kosygin met with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in the summer of 1967.</ref> By the end of the 1960s the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev, has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:22]]
<nowiki>[02:22]</nowiki>

The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union of course affluence was more or less synonymous with political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:38]]
<nowiki>[02:38]</nowiki>

So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union in the 1970s had access to quite a lot of it. And this...Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, and more urbane cities in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[03:00 ]</nowiki>

And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years as Soviet citizens experience them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10 ]</nowiki>

Okay.

(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:12]]
<nowiki>[03:12]</nowiki>

So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin, around all of his you know sort of official apartments, and limousines. He shows her his suite in the Kremlin. He shows her his [[wikt:dacha|dacha]] in the countryside. He takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows her his villa -- his big Soviet limousine -- {{WPExtract|ZiL}} limousine.<ref>As the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Zil}} mentions ZiL limousines were used by powerful people in the Soviet Union, "The ZiL limousines were the official car that carried the Soviet heads of state, and many Soviet Union allied leaders, to summits or in parades."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:30]]
<nowiki>[03:30]</nowiki>

And what does Brezhnev's mother say? She says, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}} come back?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:38]]
<nowiki>[03:38]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

And this is a real joke that was told...sort of in...Moscow dining rooms, Moscow apartments, during the 1970s. And you know the Brezhnev years were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical. I've got another little anecdote. This attributed to Brezhnev himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:58]]
<nowiki>[03:58]</nowiki>

The veracity of this I can't confirm, but it's certainly attributed to Brezhnev in a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the Czar was shot, and something had to be substituted. So let the people build Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:20]]
<nowiki>[04:20]</nowiki>

Whether those words are, you know, were ever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him, plausibly, is in itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology. He didn't stand for you know crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:42]]
<nowiki>[04:42]</nowiki>

The Brezhnev years were a time of [[wikt:stasis|stasis]] but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

There were however some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future. During the 1970s members of the Communist Party, including fairly high ranking members, such as {{WPExtract|Mikhail Gorbachev}} become disillusioned with Communism at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

Despite the veneer of stability there is a widespread circulation within Soviet society among the ranks of the [[wikt:intelligentsia|intelligentsia]] of dissident literature, of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time as {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, it literally means self-published literature -- literature critical of the Soviet party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material Soviet citizens during the 1970s enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world -- to information about the West. The {{WPExtract|Voice of America}}, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:52]]
<nowiki>[05:52]</nowiki>

To some extent the politics of détente help to keep this sort of window onto the world open. The Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions as a consequence of détente. So détente sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West, a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:19]]
<nowiki>[06:19]</nowiki>

Outside of the Soviet Union Communism experiences something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall that in the '50s and well into the 1960s Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left, had been very loathe to criticize communism, even Communism as practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:40]]
<nowiki>[06:40]</nowiki>

Probably the leading postwar French left-wing intellectual, {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}}, remained to the very end of his life an apologist for Soviet-style Communism -- an apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:58]]
<nowiki>[06:58]</nowiki>

Why was this? Well, in part the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights -- of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

And here no single event is more consequential then the 1973 publication in the West of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's}} book {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}}. Have any of you had the opportunity to read the ''The Gulag Archipelago''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:31]]
<nowiki>[07:31]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. And this is a book that's really couched as a history of the {{WPExtract|Gulag|gulag}} system, the gulag being the immense system of political concentration camps which Stalin constructed, building upon a Leninist system of sort of internal concentration camps to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the Communist regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:55]]
<nowiki>[07:55]</nowiki>

So the gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet-state has perpetrated against its own system, against its own citizens, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when ''The Gulag Archipelago'' goes published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression. And the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:17]]
<nowiki>[08:17]</nowiki>

At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights this stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:38]]
<nowiki>[08:38]</nowiki>

And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for...I think this week -- it could have been last week -- {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy|Bernard-Henri Lévy's}} book, ''Barbarism with a Human Face'', is one of the texts that you know sort of powerfully reveals this shift in Western attitudes towards the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:56]]
<nowiki>[08:56]</nowiki>

Lévy is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left-wing intellectual tradition, that has historically been indulgent towards, even sympathetic to Soviet-style communism. But Levi breaks absolutely with this long sort of left-wing progressive history of you know sympathy and indulgence and offers a you know very harsh critique of Soviet-style communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:21]]
<nowiki>[09:21]</nowiki>

The key move that Lévy makes, which you'll have gather, if you've read the piece, is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism, authoritarianism of the left, with authoritarianism of the right. He subsumes them both under a common category -- the category of totalitarianism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

And for Lévy there's very little difference between, you know, left-wing shades of totalitarianism and right-wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:51]]
<nowiki>[09:51]</nowiki>

So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability the crisis of, you know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet-style socialism is proceeding apace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

Within the Soviet Union ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live. In the larger world any claim that Communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future -- a bright you know future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of [[wikt:tawdry|tawdry]] nature of the Soviet system itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

So those are the Brezhnev years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:37]]
<nowiki>[10:37]</nowiki>

Characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:50]]
<nowiki>[10:50]</nowiki>

Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but they'll be on the bSpace website.

=== Soviet Economic Gain from the Oil Crisis ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:54]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

In other respects however the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s -- the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about. It has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the {{WPExtract|Yom Kippur War|1973 Arab-Israeli War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:28]]
<nowiki>[11:28]</nowiki>

But the consequences of the oil crisis are not restricted to the Middle East and the West. The Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s a major exporter of energy to global markets.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:51]]
<nowiki>[11:51]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid-1950s. By the turn of the 1970s energy is the Soviet Union's largest sort of export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:10]]
<nowiki>[12:10]</nowiki>

It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. Military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports. As Arab and...oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more petrodollar revenue they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

So indirectly as well as directly the Soviet Union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

Might it have something to do with the fact that the rise in energy prices that is a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:07]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

That may be too cynical, but...it should illustrate the basic point which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises, increases, in the global price of oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:19]]
<nowiki>[13:19]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of the petrodollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

Obviously, a rise in oil prices, fourfold rise in oil prices, in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what does this increase in export earnings, this petrodollar bounty, mean for the Soviet economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:49]]
<nowiki>[13:49]</nowiki>

It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s to prop up a failing economic system. The Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:05 ]]
<nowiki>[14:05 ]</nowiki>

If you can finance imports of Western technology then the imperative to develop high-tech technology yourself is diminished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West. Insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture oil helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce, grain, from the West instead.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency. When it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make then cheap and abundant energy makes it...you know...sort of less advantageous for the managers of state-owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

Right, in a world in which energy is scarce, you have to figure out how to be more efficient in your utilization of energy. This is something that we've, you know, sort of begun to do in the, you know, West, since the oil crises. We've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to...to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:17]]
<nowiki>[15:17]</nowiki>

But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence abundant cheap energy forestalls you know sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

Let's pose a counterfactual question: how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say. But what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:51]]
<nowiki>[15:51]</nowiki>

Alexei Kosygin who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev aligns himself with an economic reform agenda. Kosygin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West, that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives even.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:11]]
<nowiki>[16:11]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is a conservative. He repudiates Kosygin's reform agenda. And says, well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them.

==== Contrast with Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

Oil makes it possible to do that. Or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here I'm going to draw an example, or sort of, make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

Japan's economy after the Second World War is not essentially planned economy but it's an economy in which the government exerts substantial direction over you know sort of capitalist free market economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:50]]
<nowiki>[16:50]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry|Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade, METI}}, is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And METI responds to the oil crisis in a you know sort of proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has. Japan produces no oil, and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:19]]
<nowiki>[17:19]</nowiki>

But METI, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda for structural economic reform. What Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies -- particularly in energy...in...to invest particularly in industrial...processes that produce consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

Consumer electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production, in specializing in producing you know {{WPExtract|Walkman|Sony Walkman}}, for example, in producing less fuel thirsty automobiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be and take appropriate action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union on the other hand the petrodollar bounty forestalls the prospect of structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:39]]
<nowiki>[18:39]</nowiki>

And this will be consequential for the long-term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s the predicament for a Soviet economy which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide, will be very serious indeed.

=== Eastern Europe During the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:02]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Let's talk now about Eastern Europe. I've talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and it's relationship to the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership -- against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968. Poland sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of Communist systems is always fragile.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions -- that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

The fundamental dilemma for Eastern Europe's Communist governments is always this: how to rule, how to maintain control over populations that do not accept...for the most part -- the legitimacy of Communist domination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:04]]
<nowiki>[20:04]</nowiki>

And there are basically two strategies that East European Communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this in the experiences of Romania and Albania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:20]]
<nowiki>[20:20]</nowiki>

These are two repressive, sometimes violent, regimes. Regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon...you know, consensus, to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes Communist leaders disdain repression on the basis only of principle. It's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53]]
<nowiki>[20:53]</nowiki>

So placation becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does placation involve? Essentially it involves buying off populations. Providing sufficient increases in material well-being, sufficient supplies of consumer goods, in order to maintain the basic you know satisfaction of pop...or of ordinary people. You provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

This is what Hungary does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest. Hungary's so-called reform Communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political quiescence on the part of the population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

This formula becomes know in Hungary as {{WPExtract|Goulash Communism}}. You provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy to eat reasonably well, and Hungary will remain relatively stable within the Communist paradigm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

This, you know sort of, strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept. So too do East Germany's Communist leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:10]]
<nowiki>[22:10]</nowiki>

Though East Germany in some ways is a particular case because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and...placatory strategies at the same time. East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries. Elsewhere these two things, repression and placation, exist in a sort of inverse correlation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki>

Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc, but there are also among the richest. Romania and Albania, though Albania's not really in the Communist Bloc<ref>Albania allied itself with China and distanced itself from the Soviet Union. See the [[wikipedia:Albania#Communism|Communism section of the Wikipedia article on Albania]] and this is also talked about in lecture 10, "[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s#|So Hoxha becomes this very unusual thing: a European Maoist.]]."</ref> so it's a sort of particular case in and of itself. Let's just talk about Romania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:51]]
<nowiki>[22:51]</nowiki>

Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression and placation are the two strategies and you know to some extent they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:06]]
<nowiki>[23:06]</nowiki>

But in order to placate your populations through the provision of material abundance you need to be able to finance you know consumer production. And this is costly for Communist regimes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

Of course if you're financing consumption then what are you not financing? What's the tradeoff if you're...consuming?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:30]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. Development. Investment. If you're consuming stuff then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a tradeoff to be made between consumption and investment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:43]]
<nowiki>[23:43]</nowiki>

And this is a difficult tradeoff for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long-term agenda of Communist development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

It's also the case, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that Communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe's subject populations are coming to demand.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:06]]
<nowiki>[24:06]</nowiki>

East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy, and by comparison with Western automobiles inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to placate subject populations East European Communist governments end up during the 1970s turning more and more to the West -- to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:35]]
<nowiki>[24:35]</nowiki>

Foreign imports are really, really, important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:47]]
<nowiki>[24:47]</nowiki>

The sort of opportunities for East-West opening that détente and {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}} and the {{WPExtract|Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Settlement}} provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the sustenance of Communist led political systems in Eastern Europe. By opening up opportunities for trade and for economic exchange détente helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of Communist governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

And this is one of the reasons that some you know sort of conservatives in the United States are critical of détente at the time. They argue that the West, Western Europe and the United States, are helping sort of Communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide Western goods for their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

But it's important you know to think about the role of Western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s and after not simply in terms of consumption and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

How are Eastern, how are Western goods to be paid for?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:56]]
<nowiki>[25:56]</nowiki>

How is trade usually financed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

(student response)

Debt. Well, in this case the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the West. If Eastern European economies were producing you know the kinds of things that the West wanted then they might be able to...sustain balanced trade relations with the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:26]]
<nowiki>[26:26]</nowiki>

But in the absence of you know sort of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the West is by borrowing money.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So the East Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even an aspect to the story that ties back into the oil crisis, and I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is.

==== The Increase in Short-Term Capital Because of Oil Demand ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:57]]
<nowiki>[26:57]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short-term capital circulating in the global economy. In part this has to do with the petrodollar bounty that the oil exporting states enjoy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:13]]
<nowiki>[27:13]</nowiki>

You're Saudi Arabia for example. And you experience over a period of about six months a fourfold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:24]]
<nowiki>[27:24]</nowiki>

It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran. Because Iran is a big populous country. It's leadership under {{WPExtract|Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah Pahlavi}} has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran it's easy to spend the money. You just spend it on domestic infrastructural development. You build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:43]]
<nowiki>[27:43]</nowiki>

But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:53]]
<nowiki>[27:53]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You bank it. But not necessarily in Japan. Because Japan by this point is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital. You bank it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:06]]
<nowiki>[28:06]</nowiki>

If you're Saudi Arabia what kind of investor are you? Are you an aggressive investor or are you a conservative investor?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:13]]
<nowiki>[28:13]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You're a conservative investor. So you don't do direct investment. Instead you put it with banks. You place it for the most part with -- you place your money with Western banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers -- including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

There's a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe the petrodollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:07]]
<nowiki>[29:07]</nowiki>

But ultimately this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preve-- of staving off political unrest. Communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas.

==== Inflation in the East Bloc During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

And probably none is more consequential during the 1970s then the issue of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:35]]
<nowiki>[29:35]</nowiki>

Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet Bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high, you know, sort of rates of investment over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:49]]
<nowiki>[29:49]</nowiki>

If you set prices too low then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of sort of long-term investment. So controlling prices is a, you know, sort of really delicate act for central planners to perform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:04]]
<nowiki>[30:04]</nowiki>

Because if you set prices too high then you're going to incentivize political unrest. Populations will recoil from high bread prices. They might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult, but setting prices too low encourages more consumption than your economy will likely be able to sustain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:26 ]]
<nowiki>[30:26 ]</nowiki>

It will probably produce you know disruptions in supply as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is a sort of basic market economics and the rules are not all that different even in the context of a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:40 ]]
<nowiki>[30:40 ]</nowiki>

Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right. Socialist societies plan production but they can't plan consumption. The only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55 ]]
<nowiki>[30:55 ]</nowiki>

So it's always a very delicate you know sort of act that has to be performed.

==== Upheaval in Poland During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:01 ]]
<nowiki>[31:01 ]</nowiki>

And...the case of Poland is you know sort of illustrative of some of the you know difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it you know...in particular. I'm going to...you know sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland -- not with respect to the Communist system writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:25 ]]
<nowiki>[31:25 ]</nowiki>

In the late 1970s...1978, 1979 the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap you know sort of prices for food and consumer goods which have been sustained through most of the 1970s in order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51 ]]
<nowiki>[31:51 ]</nowiki>

This is really important. Prices increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis borne of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods. Other factors too stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:13 ]]
<nowiki>[32:13 ]</nowiki>

In 1978 a Polish national is elected Pope -- becomes {{WPExtract|Pope John Paul II}}. And this stimulates sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti-Sovietism, even Polish anti-Communism. Amidst this you know sort of combination of economic instability borne of an officially mandated price increase and political nationalism stirred by Pope John Paul II's election Poland at the end of the 1970s experiences a major round of political upheaval -- a major sort of political crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49 ]</nowiki>

This crisis is you know usually known as the episode of the {{WPExtract|Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity Movement}}. What is Solidarity? Why does it pose such a political challenge to the Polish Communist regime? Solidarity is an independent trades union movement that emerges in 1980.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:09 ]]
<nowiki>[33:09 ]</nowiki>

The fact of Solidarity's being a labor union, an independent trades union, is in itself consequential. Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:28 ]]
<nowiki>[33:28 ]</nowiki>

That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism. So the emergence of an independent trades union movement in Poland is ideologically disruptive and contentious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:47 ]]
<nowiki>[33:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's also in the summer of 1980 a major political phenomenon. {{WPExtract|Lech Wałęsa}} emerges as the leader of Solidarity, this independent trades union movement. He's a shipworker in Gdańsk with a sort of long history of political activism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:07 ]]
<nowiki>[34:07 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1970 Solidarity numbers over 700,000 workers as members. This is a very big political mobilization. The Polish government initially tries to appease Solidarity by recognizing it as a legitimate sort of representative organ of Polish workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:27 ]]
<nowiki>[34:27 ]</nowiki>

As a consequence of this initial act of recognition Solidarity's membership increases very, very quickly. By the summer, by the end of 1980, there are about 8 million Poles who count themselves as members of Solidarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:39 ]]
<nowiki>[34:39 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1981 one in four Polish people is a member of the Solidarity Movement. So Solidarity sort of explodes onto the Polish scene as an independent political force -- as a political force autonomous from the party-state, headed by a non-Communist membership, sorry, headed, led by a non-Communist leadership -- the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. And this poses a you know sort of serious, even existential threat, to the legitimacy, even the survival of the Polish Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13 ]</nowiki>

How is a party-state that derives its legitimacy from its claim to represent the workers and the interests of the workers going to deal with the emergence of a independent labor union that presents itself as a political rival to the Communist Party?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:30 ]]
<nowiki>[35:30 ]</nowiki>

In a sense what Solidarity means is that plural politics have arrived within the context of the party-state. This is very, very disruptive. So what does the Polish Communist state decide to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:43 ]]
<nowiki>[35:43 ]</nowiki>

It does essentially the only thing that it can do if it wants to remain a party-state -- and that is the government at the end of 1981 turns the tanks on Solidarity. Martial law is declared. Solidarity is declared illegal and popular street demonstrations are violently and viciously repressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04 ]</nowiki>

So the Polish state ultimately embraces repression because it's unable to control the political consequences of this mass mobilization that a combination of you know economic instability borne of rising consumer prices and political nationalism produce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:24 ]]
<nowiki>[36:24 ]</nowiki>

Solidarity in effect demonstrates, or the Solidarity Crisis in effect demonstrates, that there are severe limits to what political reform can accomplish within the context of the party-state. There might be you know an opportunity within the party-state to satisfy some of the you know consumer aspirations that subject populations have but the party-state will not be able tolerate plural politics. That is sort you know persuasively demonstrated.

==== The Economic Lag Between Eastern Europe and the West ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53 ]]
<nowiki>[36:53 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's economies continue to lag further and further behind the capitalist West. This is really, really important. Though the West experiences a slowdown in growth rates during the 1970s the gap between East and West just continues to get bigger and bigger.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:15 ]]
<nowiki>[37:15 ]</nowiki>

Let's took not at overall GDP but at per capita GDP which is what this chart displays. Per capita GDP is a pretty good index of basic economic well-being, of ordinary people. And what you can see is that from sort of the early 1970s in particular the rates of growth in per capita GDP in the East Bloc slow. During the 1980s the story will essentially be one of stasis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:43 ]]
<nowiki>[37:43 ]</nowiki>

In relative terms however the East Bloc is going backwards. As the West continues to get richer and richer in per capita terms the failures of the socialist system to match the affluence that Western capitalism is capable of producing for it citizens become more and more glaring.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:03 ]]
<nowiki>[38:03 ]</nowiki>

So the slowdown is a relative slowdown. There's still a very you know sort of incremental improvement in per capita GDP in the...in say Eastern Europe between you know 1970 and 1980. So relative to sort of...its own experience Eastern Europe's position does improve very, very sluggishly. But relative to the West Eastern Europe is falling behind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:29 ]]
<nowiki>[38:29 ]</nowiki>

And this is really, really important. Because the example of the West will be absolutely crucial to the legitimacy crisis of state Communism in the 1980s. The example of the West exposes the basic dishonesty of Communist propaganda. Insofar as Communist leaders proclaim themselves to be building a future that is even brighter than the future that capitalism could deliver the actual you know historical accomplishments of Communism debunk the myth that Communism is a more advanced economic system -- that the command economy is somehow more productive than the capitalist economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:08 ]]
<nowiki>[39:08 ]</nowiki>

This...disjoint between the theory and the reality of Communism is profoundly consequential. It is in a sense what causes the basic legitimacy crisis of the system. The fact that Communist governments end up depending upon violence and repression to control political unrest only you know sort of exacerbates the basic legitimacy problem. These regimes are brutal and violent sometimes but even more consequential I would argue is the fact that their in...is that they prove unable to deliver the material bounty which they promise to provide for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:45 ]]
<nowiki>[39:45 ]</nowiki>

Communism...sorry...

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52 ]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

No, that's, that's a really good question. Well, that would be you know sort harder to do because the data on which this chart is produced is just population data and GDP data. So the mean average is the one that you know can be easily produced based upon you know the best available data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:19]]
<nowiki>[40:19]</nowiki>

Estimating, this is sort of a subsidiary point, statistics from the East Bloc are notoriously difficult to work with because you know they're frequently manufactured are bare little relation to reality. But it's a very good question. I mean to what extent does this you know sort of tail off in GDP per capita growth in the East Bloc veil sort of important differences between East and West that have to do with the distribution of well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48 ]</nowiki>

Because there's a plausible you know sort of alternative viewpoint here -- which is that Western societies produce more in the aggregate but that wealth in the West is so...unevenly distributed that most of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few very wealthy people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07 ]</nowiki>

Meaning that ordinary Westerns are not necessarily any better off than are ordinary East Bloc citizens. In that circumstance the East Bloc would not have experienced its legitimacy crisis because leaders of East European countries could have said that for, so far as ordinary people were concerned, they were really much better off under Communism than they would be under capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:27 ]]
<nowiki>[41:27 ]</nowiki>

I wish that I had that chart to show you. Unfortunately, I don't have it in the slide show. So you just have to take this on faith, that...the relative decline in sort of....in aggregate economic well-being is experienced by ordinary people in the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:47 ]]
<nowiki>[41:47 ]</nowiki>

Sure, the Western countries even, the countries of Western Europe, which are less unequal than the United States is, remain relatively less equal than the economies of Eastern Europe do but the difference isn't all that much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:01 ]]
<nowiki>[42:01 ]</nowiki>

And this actually gives me an opportunity to talk about a really important point which was a point that we should think about when we're thinking about sort of economics and equality in Communist societies and capitalist societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:15 ]]
<nowiki>[42:15 ]</nowiki>

One of the key you know distinguishing characteristics of a Communist society is that economic wealth ends up being sort of synonymous with political wealth. Economic power ends up being synonymous with political power. Those who control the state, those who control the political apparatus are also those who enjoy the greatest material abundance -- hence, Brezhnev and the fur coat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:41 ]]
<nowiki>[42:41 ]</nowiki>

If you want to make it in the Soviet Union your best opportunity for making it comes through advancing yourself through the party bureaucracy -- through the party hierarchy. It's political power that can deliver you know the things upon which the good life depends: a nice dacha in the countryside, a well appointed well-furnished apartment in Moscow. Well, these things go to the people who wield political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:06 ]]
<nowiki>[43:06 ]</nowiki>

In the West by contrast there's a disjoint between political power and economic power. At least there ought to be in principle, right -- is the case that political power exists apart from economic power. Money can influence elections but it doesn't necessarily determine them. You know of course in the present moment you know I think we're experiencing something of a national conversation as to what the relationship between economic power is...and...but as to what the relationship between economic and political power is and what it should be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37 ]</nowiki>

Whether economic power is excessively influential upon political power is a question that we're debating and there are you know different perspectives that we could bring to that conversation and it's not really my intention to discuss that today because it takes us away from where we need to be going.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:53 ]]
<nowiki>[43:53 ]</nowiki>

But the...point which is crucial to remember about Communist societies is that economic power and political power are in essence synonymous. And as a consequence of that people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who wield power enjoy you know relatively greater abundance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13 ]</nowiki>

They shop in special shops. They're special shops for high ranking party members that provide access to you know much better Western consumer goods than those that are available to ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:23 ]]
<nowiki>[44:23 ]</nowiki>

And this basic you know sort of...the fact that inequality is so implicated with political power further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis of the system. You know ordinary Eastern Europeans who don't enjoy the special prerogatives that party members enjoy will call out party members for you know self-serving hypocrisy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:46 ]]
<nowiki>[44:46 ]</nowiki>

So far as the comparison with the West goes. I'm just going to make one last point on this issue. It's important, and we'll talk more about this, but it's important to think about the role in which you know sort of the media plays in giving East Europeans a sense of what ordinary life is like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:04 ]]
<nowiki>[45:04 ]</nowiki>

American television shows, like {{WPExtract|Dallas (1978 TV series)|''Dallas''}} and {{WPExtract|Dynasty (1981 TV series)|''Dynasty''}}, which probably none of you remember, are...screened on West European television. You know Germany for example you know screens American soap operas constantly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:19]]
<nowiki>[45:19]</nowiki>

These transmissions can be you know easily viewed, you know picked up, by antennae, and viewed in Eastern Europe. And this you know sort of window on Western abundance that television you know drama -- well, drama is probably too good a word to use, that television you know series like ''Dallas'' provide, gives you know sort of East Europeans, a, you know sense, perhaps an exaggerated sense, of what life looks like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:47 ]]
<nowiki>[45:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's not altogether misrepresentive. Right, by the turn of the 1980s what kinds of lives are middle class Americans enjoying? Well, they you know usually inhabit single family homes in suburbs. They'll drive probably two automobiles in a household. Putting food on the table is not a concern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:08 ]]
<nowiki>[46:08 ]</nowiki>

This is a standard of material abundance that the East has entirely failed to match. So the more that Easterners know about how people live in the West, and about the kinds of expectations that Westerners have, the less credible becomes the proclamations of you know Communist leaders to be giving their people better lives than the lives that Westerners live.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29 ]]
<nowiki>[46:29 ]</nowiki>

But we'll talk more about sort of these contrasts in the 1980s and how they [[wikt:inflect|inflect]] the end of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:35 ]]
<nowiki>[46:35 ]</nowiki>

Okay, but the...point I think that the data conveys really powerfully which is a point that you want to bare in mind carefully is that the example of the West is a very subversive one from a Eastern standpoint in the 1970s and the 1980s. The West is growing faster than the East even as the West experiences difficult political and economic transformations of its own.

== Political Tumult in China in the Late 1960s and 1970s ==

=== The Cultural Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:58 ]]
<nowiki>[46:58 ]</nowiki>

Let's move on now to talk about China. Another country that experiences some consequential transformation in its relations with the West during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10 ]</nowiki>

I'm going to take the Chinese story back to the {{WPExtract|Cultural Revolution}} because I don't think that we've yet had the chance to sort of go through the Cultural Revolution in a systemic way and getting the history of the Cultural Revolution right is really important for understanding what comes next.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:25 ]]
<nowiki>[47:25 ]</nowiki>

It's what comes next that should interest us today but to understand that we'll take the history back to the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:33 ]]
<nowiki>[47:33 ]</nowiki>

What was the Cultural Revolution? How did it come to pass? Just to give me a quick sense of the room how many of you had already studied the history of the Cultural Revolution in some other context? In some other class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:46 ]]
<nowiki>[47:46 ]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. So you're just have to bare with you because I'm not probably going to take this into the kind of detail that you've encountered elsewhere but for those who haven't studied the Cultural Revolution it's important just to get a handle on this. Because this a really big, really consequential event, set of events in the making of contemporary China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:05 ]]
<nowiki>[48:05 ]</nowiki>

The Cultural Revolution emerges out of the catastrophic aftermath of China's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}. The Great Leap Forward of course was the developmental plan introduced in 1956 that aimed to construct an indigenous Chinese path to socialist modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:21 ]]
<nowiki>[48:21 ]</nowiki>

It was a path that would involve the promotion of you know all kinds of ambitious things like rural industrialization. Backyard steel furnaces as we've discussed are one of the you know preeminent symbols of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:35 ]]
<nowiki>[48:35 ]</nowiki>

Yet the Great Leap Forward for all of its overwhelming ambition is in practice a horrible catastrophe. Tens of millions of people starve to death as a consequence of the havoc that the Great Leap Forward produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:48 ]]
<nowiki>[48:48 ]</nowiki>

The Great Leap Forward does not accomplish what {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Mao}} wanted to accomplish which is nominally as least to make China prosperous and strong. Instead the Great Leap Forward brings Chinese society to its knees.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:00 ]]
<nowiki>[49:00 ]</nowiki>

There's a massive famine. Tens of millions of people die. It's really, really horrible. This disaster brings not just the legitimacy of you know Communist rule, but Mao Zedong's legitimacy as a wise and farseeing leader into question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:16 ]]
<nowiki>[49:16 ]</nowiki>

Indeed Mao recognizes by you know the turn of the 1960s that he has overreached himself. That he has set something in motion which has been catastrophic in it consequences. And Mao retreats from the sort of front lines of political leadership in China. He goes back home and retreats to his study and undertakes a long phase of you know sort of reading and contemplation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:41 ]]
<nowiki>[49:41 ]</nowiki>

As Mao retreats from the forefront of Chinese politics new leaders emerge and they pursue different kinds of policies. The two most important leaders are {{WPExtract|Liu Shaoqi}}, pictured on the bottom of the slide, and {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}}. And these are the two men who come to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:02 ]]
<nowiki>[50:02 ]</nowiki>

And they pursue policies that are aimed at moderating the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restoring a more normal and a more sustainable path towards modernization and development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16 ]</nowiki>

Both men and fairly pragmatic. Deng Xiaoping is well known for sort of citing an old Sichuan<ref>{{WPExtract|Sichuan|The Wikipedia article on Sichuan}} lists other romanizations of the name of the province to be Szechuan and Szechwan.</ref> saying which is: it doesn't matter if it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it catches mice.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:30 ]]
<nowiki>[50:30 ]</nowiki>

And this is a statement that well captures you know Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism. He's less concerned with ideology as Mao was than with achieving tangible results. So for a period in the first half of the 1960s China experiences a sort of moderate turn in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are temporarily at least preeminent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:53 ]]
<nowiki>[50:53 ]</nowiki>

And they try to restore a stability, sort of normalcy to use {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge|Calvin Coolidge's}} language<ref>The slogan "Return to Normalcy" was used in the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The Harding-Coolidge ticket won the election and after Harding passed away Coolidge was inaugurated as President. See Wikipedia articles: {{WPExtract|Return to normalcy}}, {{WPExtract|1920 United States presidential election}}, {{WPExtract|Warren G. Harding}}, and {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge}}.</ref> to the Chinese socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:02 ]]
<nowiki>[51:02 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao Zedong, sort of sitting, festering in retirement, is plotting a return to the political fore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:11 ]]
<nowiki>[51:11 ]</nowiki>

As Mao contemplates a sort of return to the front line of Chinese politics he is spurred by his wife {{WPExtract|Jiang Qing}} who is a very hard line radical. I mean a real...sort of [[wikt:doctrinaire|doctrinaire]] [[wikt:ideologue|ideologue]]. And she argues that China has taken a sort of bourgeois turn under Liu and Deng -- that it is time to reradicalize the revolution, to reenergize the revolution, perhaps even to launch a new revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeois stability that has set in under Deng and Liu and to sort of restore the revolutionary project to its maximum fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:52 ]]
<nowiki>[51:52 ]</nowiki>

Jiang is particularly resentful of China's cultural establishment. This may have something to do with the fact that she was a actress by trade before she became a political leader. She sees Chinese culture as a bastion of sort of bourgeois tradition. And she is absolutely adamant that if a new revolution is to be launched that it needs to be a Cultural Revolution in its thrust.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:16 ]</nowiki>

That it needs to focus not just upon a transformation of economic and political structures but on transforming Chinese culture and Chinese values -- to create a truly radical, a truly revolutionary society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:29 ]]
<nowiki>[52:29 ]</nowiki>

Spurred by Jing Qing Mao returns to the front line of Chinese politics in 1966. He convenes a special [[wikt:plenum|plenum]] of the Chinese Communist Party that August and it sets in motion the train of events that will become known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:48 ]]
<nowiki>[52:48 ]</nowiki>

And this is how Mao proclaims it. You know China is now going to have a great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This involves the demotion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. These two men are sort of pushed aside. And Mao appoints a radical {{WPExtract|Lin Biao}} as his anointed heir.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:07 ]]
<nowiki>[53:07 ]</nowiki>

Lin Biao is a devoted Maoist. He was responsible a couple of years earlier during Mao's period of exile for collecting a host of Mao's, you know, political sayings into a you know single volume -- a book, that became known as the {{WPExtract|Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book''}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:22 ]]
<nowiki>[53:22 ]</nowiki>

So Lin Biao is sort of more responsible than anybody else for developing what would become in the context of the Cultural Revolution a cult of Maoism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:34 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34 ]</nowiki>

So the Cultural Revolution is launched in 1966 with the purpose of transforming China -- of revolutionizing China's revolution. In a sense the Cultural Revolution represents an effort by Mao to launch a bottom-up revolution against the Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53 ]]
<nowiki>[53:53 ]</nowiki>

So this a really you know sort of peculiar thing. After the 1949 revolution the Communist Party sort of assumes the responsibilities of governance. It assimilates itself to the state and it becomes a well-defined, well-established power structure. This is the power structure that Deng and Liu come responsible for in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward -- the Chinese party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:16 ]]
<nowiki>[54:16 ]</nowiki>

But outside of power, Mao, who is still the nominal leader of this party-state becomes convinced, prodded in part by his wife, that the party-state has become conservative, that it's become bourgeois, that it's become reactionary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:29 ]]
<nowiki>[54:29 ]</nowiki>

So the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents an effort to revolutionize the state that the 1949 Communist Revolution created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40 ]]
<nowiki>[54:40 ]</nowiki>

And in order to accomplish this Mao turns to the masses. He turns to the Chinese masses to launch a revolution against the party-state that the Communist Party has created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:51 ]]
<nowiki>[54:51 ]</nowiki>

Mao in 1966 proclaims a campaign against what he describes as the Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. This is to be a revolution against the old -- out with the old, in with the new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:06 ]]
<nowiki>[55:06 ]</nowiki>

Nowhere is this revolution fiercer than on Chinese university campuses. There is a sort of demographic aspect to the Cultural Revolution that is really important to think about. China, like the United States, like Western Europe, experiences a sort of youth bubble, a baby boom after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:25 ]]
<nowiki>[55:25 ]</nowiki>

By the mid-1960s children born in the aftermath of the Second World War are becoming teenagers. They're becoming seventeen, eighteen, nineteen-year-olds who are becoming you know sort of politically conscious and who are susceptible to...how do I put this politely?...far-fetched ideological doctrines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43 ]]
<nowiki>[55:43 ]</nowiki>

Not that you ever see any evidence of that on Berkeley's campus because this is a, you know, sober, responsible place. But in China it's an altogether different story, and young people are you know susceptible to a kind of radicalization that serves the purposes that Mao now wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:01 ]]
<nowiki>[56:01 ]</nowiki>

So Chinese campuses become a recruiting ground for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao radical Chinese students form units called {{WPExtract|Red Guards}}. These are sort of paramilitary units that establish themselves to advance the revolution, to impose Maoist orthodoxy, and to sort of challenge so-called right-wing deviationists -- rightists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:30 ]]
<nowiki>[56:30 ]</nowiki>

Students form Red Guard units. They carry Mao's ''Little Red Book'' which becomes in the late 1960s you know absolutely ubiquitous as an ideological and political symbol. Carrying the ''Little Red Book'' implies a sort of devotion or signals a devotion to the cult of Maoist Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48 ]]
<nowiki>[56:48 ]</nowiki>

Politically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sort of...targets...you know the bureaucracy. It targets people like Deng Xiaoping who is persecuted in the context of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:08 ]]
<nowiki>[57:08 ]</nowiki>

The denouncication of rightists becomes sort of the overriding theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And this has catastrophic consequences for the state. Important leaders Deng and Liu Shaoqi are purged. They become the targets of particular opprobrium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26 ]]
<nowiki>[57:26 ]</nowiki>

But it's not just you know leaders at the top who are purged. Around two-thirds of all Communist Party officials are removed from their posts in the context of the Great Proletarian Revolution. Red Guards in a sense overthrow the basic institutions of political order that have developed in Communist China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:46 ]]
<nowiki>[57:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is a drama that is played out at many different levels. It's not just at the top leadership level of the party. But at the level of you know sort of social institutions like schools and universities. Red Guards seek out reactionaries and purge them. Bourgeois teachers are purged in schools, bourgeois reactionary professors are purged in universities, which would be a really bad idea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:07 ]]
<nowiki>[58:07 ]</nowiki>

Intellectuals are the target of special assault. Rightists are singled out for public humiliation and are forced to confess their so-called sins against the Maoist Revolution. This is a catastrophic tumultous phase in Chinese life. It's a period in which a revolution from below sort of overthrows you know much of what the Communist Party has built since 1969 -- since 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32 ]]
<nowiki>[58:32 ]</nowiki>

What are the human consequences of this? I mean there are some mass killing. Around half a million deaths, up to half a million deaths, are attributable to the chaos that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45 ]]
<nowiki>[58:45 ]</nowiki>

To situate this in context it's substantially less people than died during the Great Leap Forward. But it's still you know a weighty toll, and a toll that we should contemplate particularly when we consider that the death toll that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused was entirely ideologically motivated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:07]]
<nowiki>[59:07]</nowiki>

Unlike the Great Leap Forward which represented an ambitious effort to industrialize, to modernize China, and in which the catastrophic famines were in a sense an indirect consequence of a modernizing project, virtually all of the people who died during the Cultural Revolution were singled out for political murder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:27 ]]
<nowiki>[59:27 ]</nowiki>

So this is a you know weighty topic with which to grapple. But the political consequences, more than the sort of ethical or moral consequences, are those that shape what comes next. Authority, central political authority, effectively collapses as Red Guards remove Communist bureaucrats from their post.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:48 ]]
<nowiki>[59:48 ]</nowiki>

The central planning system breaks down. The Great Leap Forward had presented an alternative model to Soviet-style central planning. The Cultural Revolution obliterates the mechanics of central planning virtually entirely. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the opportunities for implementing Soviet-style economic planning will be very limited because the planning structures have been dismantled. The bureaucracies have been depopulated and dismantled.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:17 ]</nowiki>

Virtually the only you know political leader in China who is able to hold the whole thing together, which is to say to hold the state together, during the period of the Cultural Revolution is {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai}} -- the Premier of the Chinese state. And a man who while a, you know, sort of very close lieutenant of Mao Zedong throughout Mao's life doesn't share Mao's ideological radicalism or ideological fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:46 ]</nowiki>

It's not to say that Zhou Enlai was a closet liberal. It would be wrong to see him in those terms. But he recognizes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and struggles against you know very difficult odds to preserve the basic stability of the Chinese state -- to protect the institutions of central power and central authority against the rampages of the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:07 ]</nowiki>

And in those Zhou Enlai is more or less successful. He manages to sustain a semblance of a political center through the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:18 ]</nowiki>

Ultimately though it's Mao Zedong who brings the whole production to an end. Mao realizes by the end of 1968, early 1969, that things are going far too far. That if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is permitted to continue that it will result in the effective you know destruction of China as a nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39 ]</nowiki>

That the Chinese [[wikt:polity|polity]] will fall apart as a consequence of this revolution from below. So having launched a popular revolution against the state Mao now very abruptly shifts course and moves to implement a state clamp down on the popular revolution. Mao turns to the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, to purge the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:05 ]</nowiki>

Having previously instructed the Red Guards to purge bourgeois rightist elements in the People's Liberation Army and other you know Communist Party bureaucracies Mao now turns to the army in order to restore order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:18 ]</nowiki>

This attempt to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to an end inaugurates a very sort of peculiar phase in the history of the People's Republic -- a late Maoist phase in which Mao remains the singular preeminent leader of China but in which Mao...does not pursue the sort of revolutionary political and social transformation that characterized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:49 ]</nowiki>

So you might think of the era of late Maoism as an era in which China is delicately poised between revolutionary politics on the one hand, because the forces that have produced the cultural revolution are still present, and Mao is still in many respects sympathetic to them, and the forces of stabilization on the other. It's a very interesting and very delicate phase in China's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:13 ]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17 ]</nowiki>

Because Mao was a brilliant political leader. I mean Mao was extremely adept at balancing political factions and playing off personalities and interests against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:28 ]</nowiki>

I mean Mao may...you know have made a number of catastrophic decisions as regards China's economic development. But when it came to politics -- both domestic politics and international politics. I mean Mao was one of the most gifted political tacticians of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:46 ]</nowiki>

And what Mao does through the era of the Cultural Revolution and into the late Maoist Era that sort of follows the heights of the Cultural Revolution is to balance the centrists, people like Deng Xiaoping, against the radical left, people like his wife Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:03 ]</nowiki>

And ultimately he's successful in performing that delicate balancing act through to the very end of his life. It's sort of remarkable when you think about the tumult that China experiences in the second half of the twentieth century that Mao Zedong dies a peaceful death in his sleep. The fact that he does so is testimony I think to the brilliance of Mao's political skills.

=== Maoist Rule in the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25 ]</nowiki>

So Mao, you know, as I've sort of explained, performs this delicate balancing act in the first half of the 1970s. He works to balance the left against the center.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:40 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao orchestrates, as we've already discussed, a major shift in China's international relations. In 1972 he welcomes Richard Nixon to Beijing. This does not necessarily signify a shift in China's international goals. Mao will continue to talk about global revolution as an objective for China but the realignment with the United States serves a very clear tactical purpose. It serves the purpose of gaining China a tacit ally against the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:12 ]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union by 1972 is a major concern for China. 1969 brings actual fighting between Chinese and Soviet forces over the Ussuri River. That year China experiences a major war scare. Indeed this war scare one of the factors that prompts Mao to wind down the Cultural Revolution. Because Mao recognizes that amidst the upheaval that the Cultural Revolution is performing China is essentially open so far as foreign aggression is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:39 ]</nowiki>

So Mao implements a sort of major tactical shift in the Cold War. He tries to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union, but this does not signify necessarily a strategic reorientation towards the West. There's a big difference between a tactical opening and a strategic opening and what Mao pursues in 1972 is a tactical opening. Mao's overarching goals remain consistent: to make China strong and prosperous and to promote and pursue global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10 ]</nowiki>

But there are significant changes in Mao's you know sort of political discourse during this era of you know late Maoist rule that will help to prefigure what comes next. Probably the single most important sort of revision of Maoist doctrine that Mao orchestrates in this period is the so-called {{WPExtract|Three Worlds Theory}} which Mao first develops in 1973 and which is publicly presented in a speech that Deng Xiaoping gives at the United Nations in 1974.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:42 ]</nowiki>

In this speech Mao, which Mao writes, the world is divided into three parts: the world of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the rich capitalist world, countries like West Germany, and Canada and Australia and so on, and then the Third World -- the rest of the world, the poor world, the world of which China is a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:06 ]</nowiki>

There are really important implications to the way in which this Three Worlds Concept is presented. Whereas Mao had previously described the world in terms of class struggle, the workers versus the bourgeoisie, the Three Worlds Concept implies a more developmental...framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:25]]
<nowiki>[1:07:25]</nowiki>

It suggests, or in some ways it sort of echoes the Three Worlds Concepts that Latin American developmental economists offer, you know, during the 1950s and 1960s. And this is really consequential. Mao talks about the need to develop and build the developing world: China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:46 ]</nowiki>

This is not so different from what developing economics proposes. Though Mao continues to talk about revolution as a goal for China in the world his political rhetoric in the last years of his life is increasingly inflected by a discourse of development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:03]]
<nowiki>[1:08:03]</nowiki>

This doesn't necessarily mean that Mao personally wanted to orchestrate a new course but Mao says things that Mao's successors will be able to hold onto as a way of relating their priorities to sort of Maoist doctrine. Because this is really important. Look Mao remains, continues to be venerated in China, through to the present day. Even as China for the past thirty years has pursued policies at home and in the world that are almost diametrically at odds with most of what Mao said.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:35 ]</nowiki>

So how to relate policies that repudiate the substance of Mao while paying fealty to the dogma? Well, to do that you seize upon things that Mao said that might rationalize the things that you want to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is what Mao's successors will do. They will invoke Mao's Three Worlds Concept and the developmental implications of it in order to legitimate and defend policies that serve quite different purposes to those that Mao wanted to achieve, policies from the late 1970s onwards, that will serve the purposes of development rather than the purposes of global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:11]]
<nowiki>[1:09:11]</nowiki>

There are other key developments during the Mao Era -- none more consequential than the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was purged in 1969, stripped of his official office, sent to work in a tractor factory in Xinjian Province.<ref>In the [[wikipedia:Deng Xiaoping#Cultural Revolution|Cultural Revolution section of the Wikipedia article on Deng Xiaoping]] there is, "In October 1969 Deng Xiaoping was sent to the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi province to work as a regular worker." The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Xinjian District}} says that it is a suburb of {{WPExtract|Nanchang}} which is the capital of {{WPExtract|Jiangxi}} Province.</ref> But in 1974, Deng Xiaoping reforms, sorry, he returns, he doesn't necessarily reform -- that's key. Deng returns -- unreformed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36 ]</nowiki>

Deng returns in part because Zhou Enlai promotes him. Zhou Enlai is really Deng Xiaoping's primary sponsor in the power structure in the late phase of the Cultural Revolution. And Zhou Enlai promotes Deng to become First Vice Premier of the Chinese state with particular responsibility for economic reform. This is a major return because Deng will of course become China's preeminent leader in a post Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:06 ]</nowiki>

The 1969 purge is not the last purge of Deng Xiaoping however. Deng is purged again in 1975. And that's really important. Because it tells us something about how fractious Chinese politics remain through to the end of the Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:21 ]</nowiki>

At the instigation of rightists, sorry of left-wingers, of the radicals around Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Deng is forced to sort of incriminate himself, to draw up a list of self-criticisms, to renounce his so-called ideological deviations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:39 ]</nowiki>

So up to the end of very Mao's life the conflict between the radicals around Mao's wife and the political moderates around Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping remains very fierce. And the second purge of Deng Xiaoping in 1975 is excellent sort of illustration of this point.

=== The Death of Mao Zedong and the Question of Succession ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:57 ]</nowiki>

Mao Zedong of course dies in September 1976. This is a really big, really, really big shift. Even more tumultuous perhaps than Stalin's death in 1953 had been. The Chinese revolution after all has been singularly associated since the 1920s with the personality and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao's death after fifty years...after twenty-five years of head of state, twenty-fives as a revolutionary leader, is a...dramatic and profound disjuncture in the history of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:33 ]</nowiki>

Who will succeed Mao Zedong? This is the big question. There are...a number of factions struggling for influence. Probably the most coherent is the radical faction, the {{WPExtract|Gang of Four}}, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:52 ]</nowiki>

At the same time there are anointed successors. The key anointed successor is {{WPExtract|Hua Guofeng}} -- who's the person who Mao designates as his heir as China's political leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:05 ]</nowiki>

Other however have claims to make besides. Deng Xiaoping, though he has recently been sort of exiled and purged can make a strong claim to being one of China's most effective and proven administrators. Deng has a record of proven accomplishment which will be you know very much to his advantage as China's political future is determined.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:27 ]</nowiki>

The succession is complex but let's try to trace out some of the you know key steps. Hua Guofeng, the anointed successor, moves initially against the radical left. And this is really key. Hua moves to purge the Gang of Four in late 1976. Just months after Mao dies the radicals are purged.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:50 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:50 ]</nowiki>

They're arrested. And a sort of campaign against the extreme left is set in motion. This is really consequential for Deng Xiaoping. Insofar as the radical left, the Gang of Four, had been sort of Deng's primary antagonistic, antagonist, their removal from the political scene creates opportunities for Deng to reassert himself. And this is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15 ]</nowiki>

The power struggle ceases to be three-way or power struggle between Hua, Deng, and the Gang of Four, and it becomes a sort of two-way conflict between Deng and Hua after the removal of the Gang of Four.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:29 ]</nowiki>

And here the you know conflict assumes a sort of ideological aspect. Hua Guofeng aligns himself very closely after the purge of the Gang of Four with Mao Zedong's legacy. Hua proclaims himself loyal to what he characterizes as the two whatevers. He says, and here I quote, whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon we shall resolutely defend, whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed we shall resolutely oppose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:56 ]</nowiki>

So Hua, after Mao's death, presents himself as the heir not only of Mao's political role but also of Mao's ideological commitments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:08]]
<nowiki>[1:14:08]</nowiki>

Deng by contrast is much more pragmatic. Deng argues that policies should be grounded not in Maoist doctrine but in empirical evidence. That China needs to allow its you know policies to be determined by practice, what works and what doesn't, rather than by revolutionary ideology. Deng's cat theory: it doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it captures, catches mice, is you know sort of illustrative of Deng's pragmatism.

=== China Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:37 ]</nowiki>

Deng Xiaoping establishes control fairly quickly. The key event here is the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which takes place in December 1978. This is the moment at which Deng and his allies sort of outflank and overwhelm Hua Guofeng and his allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:57 ]</nowiki>

The Eleventh Central Committee is the sort of key turning point in China's history. At this meeting the Chinese Communist Party renounces basic Maoist revolutionary concepts. The concept of class struggle as the sort of key to history is quitetly discarded. The concept of continual revolution, the idea that the Communist Party needs to be waging a continual revolution, is also discarded -- instead pragmatic policies are embraced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:29 ]</nowiki>

It's as if the Communist Party decides that the revolution has been accomplished with the attainment of its own political power and that the task ahead is now to develop China, to make China strong and prosperous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:40 ]</nowiki>

These pragmatic policies will include economic deregulation and soon enough market oriented reforms. Equally consequential Deng Xiaoping visits the United States. The visit to the United States comes after a formal normalization of diplomatic relations which occurs at the beginning of January. It's negotiated in December 1978, but on the first of January 1979 the United States of America and China normalize diplomatic relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:09 ]</nowiki>

This is a major turning point. It signals a new sort of opening towards the United States a new kind of relationship between the people's republic and the United States.

=== Deng Xiaoping's Policy Towards the US Contrasted with Mao Zedong's Policy Towards the US ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:20 ]</nowiki>

It might be useful to compare and contrast Deng Xiaoping's US policy with Mao Zedong's US policy. What did the two leaders want to accomplish? Well, what Mao Zedong wanted to accomplish, in the context of a war scare with the Soviet Union, was a tactical alignment that would use the United States as a sort of counterweight to the Soviet Union to the advantage of Chinese diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:51 ]</nowiki>

What Deng contemplates is something entirely different. For Deng the opening to the United States is to be strategic rather than political. It's not just an alliance of convenience against the Soviet Union that Deng wants -- though we may note that Deng Xiaoping is fiercely anti-Soviet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:07]]
<nowiki>[1:17:07]</nowiki>

But what Deng wants is something more, far more far reaching than that. He wants to open not only China's sort of political alignments towards the United States but also China's economy, and ultimately China's society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:21 ]</nowiki>

When Deng travels to the United States, which he does in February 1979, he's extremely interested in American industry. He wants to visit factories, car factories, he pays a visit to the space program I think in Texas, and is you know immensely impressed with American high technology -- with American space technology as well as with technology aimed at ordinary consumers. And he seeks to realize for China a future based upon this American high technology model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:55 ]</nowiki>

In order to accomplish that Deng recognizes he will have to open China towards the United States, towards the West, towards the capitalist world. To do this he implements major structural reforms. Foreign investment will be solicited and encouraged. Market incentives will be opened. China in a sense will transition from having been...will transition from the status of a sort of autarkic communistic economy which is what China was, for, through the Maoist Era, to a relationship in which China will begin to reintegrate with the capitalist liberal open world economy that the United States tried to build after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:38 ]</nowiki>

An economy that was built in the West but which was of course divided by the advent of the Second World War. So this is a profound strategic realignment.

=== The Enabling of Market Reforms Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:47 ]</nowiki>

How are we to explain it looking back? Let's conclude with some quick reflections. Why did Deng try to do what he did and why was he able to accomplish so much? We'll talk much more about reforms after 1980 in due course but at this stage let's just reflect on four points.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:05 ]</nowiki>

First socialization in China was always less advanced that it became in the Soviet Union. The socialist project by the mid-1970s was only twenty-five years old. The Great Leap Forward did not achieve everything that it wanted to achieve. The Communist Party found, when it looked carefully at the countryside, that the reach of socialization was very limited. That ordinary Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants, continued to display sort of entrepreneurial impulses, entrepreneurial habits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

In the 1960s this seemed disturbing to the leadership of the Communist Party. It was one of the reasons that the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was launched. But the limits of socialization will in due course facilitate a market oriented transformation of China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:56 ]</nowiki>

The disruption that the Cultural Revolution causes is also crucial. The Cultural Revolution does much of what Mao accomplish, wants is to accomplish, which is to sweep out the olds. Having swept out the olds the opportunity for new thinking, for new approaches is rather more open than it will be by contrast in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

The international reorientations are also crucial. Mao pursues an opening towards the United States for realistic even cynical purposes. Mao wants to bring the United States on board as a tactical asset against the Soviet Union.
But Mao's 1972 tactical opening towards the United States makes it possible for Deng Xiaoping to pursue a far more far reaching strategic opening towards the United States in 1979.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:47 ]</nowiki>

Finally we should be attentive to the subtle shift in Maoist discourse during the last phase of Mao's political career. The fact that Mao will be begin to emphasize development as well as revolution as a goal for China at home and in the world makes it possible for Mao's successors, preeminently for Deng Xiaoping, to orchestrate a transition from revolution to development and modernization as the overarching purpose of Chinese statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:15 ]</nowiki>

The consequences of this in the 1980s and beyond we'll come to in due course.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-03-15T03:32:56Z

DavidKitFriedman: Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai. Speaker did say it was Alexei Kosygin, and so fixing note.

== Preliminaries ==

Okay, it's 9:40 so it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room I fear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be a you know reason for not coming to lecture and staying at home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

At least I hope that was the case in that you didn't all think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reach that conclusion it would be those who aren't here. But anyway it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain which is actually less rain then we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow I think. So, it's good if you like skiing -- the precipitation.

== Lecture Overivew ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:40]]
<nowiki>[00:40]</nowiki>

But that's not what we're going to be talking about today. This is not a class in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:58]]
<nowiki>[00:58]</nowiki>

So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today we take the story to the socialist world, the Soviet Union, and China and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and twenty minutes with the sort of resurgence of East-West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s, and if we can do this -- this will situate us well to transition to the 1980s and the story of globalization next week.

== Transformation and Tumult in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:30]]
<nowiki>[01:30]</nowiki>

=== Tumult in The Soviet Union During the 1970s: The Brezhnev Years ===

Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:40]]
<nowiki>[01:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}} years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khruschev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:01]]
<nowiki>[02:01]</nowiki>

It's not Leonid Brezhnev but {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin}}, the Premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in 1967.<ref>Speaker here is likely referring to the {{WPExtract|Glassboro Summit Conference}} where Alexei Kosygin met with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in the summer of 1967.</ref> By the end of the 1960s the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev, has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:22]]
<nowiki>[02:22]</nowiki>

The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union of course affluence was more or less synonymous with political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:38]]
<nowiki>[02:38]</nowiki>

So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union in the 1970s had access to quite a lot of it. And this...Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, and more urbane cities in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[03:00 ]</nowiki>

And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years as Soviet citizens experience them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10 ]</nowiki>

Okay.

(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:12]]
<nowiki>[03:12]</nowiki>

So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin, around all of his you know sort of official apartments, and limousines. He shows her his suite in the Kremlin. He shows her his [[wikt:dacha|dacha]] in the countryside. He takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows her his villa -- his big Soviet limousine -- {{WPExtract|ZiL}} limousine.<ref>As the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Zil}} mentions ZiL limousines were used by powerful people in the Soviet Union, "The ZiL limousines were the official car that carried the Soviet heads of state, and many Soviet Union allied leaders, to summits or in parades."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:30]]
<nowiki>[03:30]</nowiki>

And what does Brezhnev's mother say? She says, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}} come back?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:38]]
<nowiki>[03:38]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

And this is a real joke that was told...sort of in...Moscow dining rooms, Moscow apartments, during the 1970s. And you know the Brezhnev years were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical. I've got another little anecdote. This attributed to Brezhnev himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:58]]
<nowiki>[03:58]</nowiki>

The veracity of this I can't confirm, but it's certainly attributed to Brezhnev in a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the Czar was shot, and something had to be substituted. So let the people build Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:20]]
<nowiki>[04:20]</nowiki>

Whether those words are, you know, were ever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him, plausibly, is in itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology. He didn't stand for you know crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:42]]
<nowiki>[04:42]</nowiki>

The Brezhnev years were a time of [[wikt:stasis|stasis]] but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

There were however some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future. During the 1970s members of the Communist Party, including fairly high ranking members, such as {{WPExtract|Mikhail Gorbachev}} become disillusioned with Communism at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

Despite the veneer of stability there is a widespread circulation within Soviet society among the ranks of the [[wikt:intelligentsia|:intelligentsia]] of dissident literature, of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time as {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, it literally means self-published literature -- literature critical of the Soviet party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material Soviet citizens during the 1970s enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world -- to information about the West. The {{WPExtract|Voice of America}}, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:52]]
<nowiki>[05:52]</nowiki>

To some extent the politics of détente help to keep this sort of window onto the world open. The Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions as a consequence of détente. So détente sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West, a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:19]]
<nowiki>[06:19]</nowiki>

Outside of the Soviet Union Communism experiences something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall that in the '50s and well into the 1960s Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left, had been very loathe to criticize communism, even Communism as practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:40]]
<nowiki>[06:40]</nowiki>

Probably the leading postwar French left-wing intellectual, {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}}, remained to the very end of his life an apologist for Soviet-style Communism -- an apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:58]]
<nowiki>[06:58]</nowiki>

Why was this? Well, in part the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights -- of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

And here no single event is more consequential then the 1973 publication in the West of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's}} book {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}}. Have any of you had the opportunity to read the ''The Gulag Archipelago''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:31]]
<nowiki>[07:31]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. And this is a book that's really couched as a history of the {{WPExtract|Gulag|gulag}} system, the gulag being the immense system of political concentration camps which Stalin constructed, building upon a Leninist system of sort of internal concentration camps to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the Communist regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:55]]
<nowiki>[07:55]</nowiki>

So the gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet-state has perpetrated against its own system, against its own citizens, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when ''The Gulag Archipelago'' goes published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression. And the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:17]]
<nowiki>[08:17]</nowiki>

At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights this stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:38]]
<nowiki>[08:38]</nowiki>

And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for...I think this week -- it could have been last week -- {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy|Bernard-Henri Lévy's}} book, ''Barbarism with a Human Face'', is one of the texts that you know sort of powerfully reveals this shift in Western attitudes towards the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:56]]
<nowiki>[08:56]</nowiki>

Lévy is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left-wing intellectual tradition, that has historically been indulgent towards, even sympathetic to Soviet-style communism. But Levi breaks absolutely with this long sort of left-wing progressive history of you know sympathy and indulgence and offers a you know very harsh critique of Soviet-style communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:21]]
<nowiki>[09:21]</nowiki>

The key move that Lévy makes, which you'll have gather, if you've read the piece, is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism, authoritarianism of the left, with authoritarianism of the right. He subsumes them both under a common category -- the category of totalitarianism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

And for Lévy there's very little difference between, you know, left-wing shades of totalitarianism and right-wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:51]]
<nowiki>[09:51]</nowiki>

So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability the crisis of, you know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet-style socialism is proceeding apace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

Within the Soviet Union ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live. In the larger world any claim that Communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future -- a bright you know future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of [[wikt:tawdry|tawdry]] nature of the Soviet system itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

So those are the Brezhnev years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:37]]
<nowiki>[10:37]</nowiki>

Characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:50]]
<nowiki>[10:50]</nowiki>

Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but they'll be on the bSpace website.

=== Soviet Economic Gain from the Oil Crisis ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:54]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

In other respects however the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s -- the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about. It has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the {{WPExtract|Yom Kippur War|1973 Arab-Israeli War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:28]]
<nowiki>[11:28]</nowiki>

But the consequences of the oil crisis are not restricted to the Middle East and the West. The Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s a major exporter of energy to global markets.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:51]]
<nowiki>[11:51]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid-1950s. By the turn of the 1970s energy is the Soviet Union's largest sort of export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:10]]
<nowiki>[12:10]</nowiki>

It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. Military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports. As Arab and...oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more petrodollar revenue they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

So indirectly as well as directly the Soviet Union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

Might it have something to do with the fact that the rise in energy prices that is a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:07]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

That may be too cynical, but...it should illustrate the basic point which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises, increases, in the global price of oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:19]]
<nowiki>[13:19]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of the petrodollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

Obviously, a rise in oil prices, fourfold rise in oil prices, in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what does this increase in export earnings, this petrodollar bounty, mean for the Soviet economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:49]]
<nowiki>[13:49]</nowiki>

It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s to prop up a failing economic system. The Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:05 ]]
<nowiki>[14:05 ]</nowiki>

If you can finance imports of Western technology then the imperative to develop high-tech technology yourself is diminished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West. Insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture oil helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce, grain, from the West instead.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency. When it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make then cheap and abundant energy makes it...you know...sort of less advantageous for the managers of state-owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

Right, in a world in which energy is scarce, you have to figure out how to be more efficient in your utilization of energy. This is something that we've, you know, sort of begun to do in the, you know, West, since the oil crises. We've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to...to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:17]]
<nowiki>[15:17]</nowiki>

But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence abundant cheap energy forestalls you know sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

Let's pose a counterfactual question: how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say. But what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:51]]
<nowiki>[15:51]</nowiki>

Alexei Kosygin who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev aligns himself with an economic reform agenda. Kosygin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West, that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives even.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:11]]
<nowiki>[16:11]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is a conservative. He repudiates Kosygin's reform agenda. And says, well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them.

==== Contrast with Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

Oil makes it possible to do that. Or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here I'm going to draw an example, or sort of, make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

Japan's economy after the Second World War is not essentially planned economy but it's an economy in which the government exerts substantial direction over you know sort of capitalist free market economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:50]]
<nowiki>[16:50]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry|Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade, METI}}, is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And METI responds to the oil crisis in a you know sort of proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has. Japan produces no oil, and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:19]]
<nowiki>[17:19]</nowiki>

But METI, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda for structural economic reform. What Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies -- particularly in energy...in...to invest particularly in industrial...processes that produce consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

Consumer electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production, in specializing in producing you know {{WPExtract|Walkman|Sony Walkman}}, for example, in producing less fuel thirsty automobiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be and take appropriate action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union on the other hand the petrodollar bounty forestalls the prospect of structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:39]]
<nowiki>[18:39]</nowiki>

And this will be consequential for the long-term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s the predicament for a Soviet economy which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide, will be very serious indeed.

=== Eastern Europe During the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:02]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Let's talk now about Eastern Europe. I've talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and it's relationship to the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership -- against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968. Poland sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of Communist systems is always fragile.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions -- that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

The fundamental dilemma for Eastern Europe's Communist governments is always this: how to rule, how to maintain control over populations that do not accept...for the most part -- the legitimacy of Communist domination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:04]]
<nowiki>[20:04]</nowiki>

And there are basically two strategies that East European Communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this in the experiences of Romania and Albania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:20]]
<nowiki>[20:20]</nowiki>

These are two repressive, sometimes violent, regimes. Regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon...you know, consensus, to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes Communist leaders disdain repression on the basis only of principle. It's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53]]
<nowiki>[20:53]</nowiki>

So placation becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does placation involve? Essentially it involves buying off populations. Providing sufficient increases in material well-being, sufficient supplies of consumer goods, in order to maintain the basic you know satisfaction of pop...or of ordinary people. You provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

This is what Hungary does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest. Hungary's so-called reform Communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political quiescence on the part of the population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

This formula becomes know in Hungary as {{WPExtract|Goulash Communism}}. You provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy to eat reasonably well, and Hungary will remain relatively stable within the Communist paradigm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

This, you know sort of, strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept. So too do East Germany's Communist leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:10]]
<nowiki>[22:10]</nowiki>

Though East Germany in some ways is a particular case because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and...placatory strategies at the same time. East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries. Elsewhere these two things, repression and placation, exist in a sort of inverse correlation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki>

Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc, but there are also among the richest. Romania and Albania, though Albania's not really in the Communist Bloc<ref>Albania allied itself with China and distanced itself from the Soviet Union. See the [[wikipedia:Albania#Communism|Communism section of the Wikipedia article on Albania]] and this is also talked about in lecture 10, "[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s#|So Hoxha becomes this very unusual thing: a European Maoist.]]."</ref> so it's a sort of particular case in and of itself. Let's just talk about Romania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:51]]
<nowiki>[22:51]</nowiki>

Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression and placation are the two strategies and you know to some extent they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:06]]
<nowiki>[23:06]</nowiki>

But in order to placate your populations through the provision of material abundance you need to be able to finance you know consumer production. And this is costly for Communist regimes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

Of course if you're financing consumption then what are you not financing? What's the tradeoff if you're...consuming?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:30]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. Development. Investment. If you're consuming stuff then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a tradeoff to be made between consumption and investment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:43]]
<nowiki>[23:43]</nowiki>

And this is a difficult tradeoff for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long-term agenda of Communist development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

It's also the case, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that Communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe's subject populations are coming to demand.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:06]]
<nowiki>[24:06]</nowiki>

East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy, and by comparison with Western automobiles inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to placate subject populations East European Communist governments end up during the 1970s turning more and more to the West -- to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:35]]
<nowiki>[24:35]</nowiki>

Foreign imports are really, really, important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:47]]
<nowiki>[24:47]</nowiki>

The sort of opportunities for East-West opening that détente and {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}} and the {{WPExtract|Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Settlement}} provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the sustenance of Communist led political systems in Eastern Europe. By opening up opportunities for trade and for economic exchange détente helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of Communist governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

And this is one of the reasons that some you know sort of conservatives in the United States are critical of détente at the time. They argue that the West, Western Europe and the United States, are helping sort of Communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide Western goods for their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

But it's important you know to think about the role of Western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s and after not simply in terms of consumption and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

How are Eastern, how are Western goods to be paid for?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:56]]
<nowiki>[25:56]</nowiki>

How is trade usually financed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

(student response)

Debt. Well, in this case the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the West. If Eastern European economies were producing you know the kinds of things that the West wanted then they might be able to...sustain balanced trade relations with the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:26]]
<nowiki>[26:26]</nowiki>

But in the absence of you know sort of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the West is by borrowing money.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So the East Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even an aspect to the story that ties back into the oil crisis, and I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is.

==== The Increase in Short-Term Capital Because of Oil Demand ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:57]]
<nowiki>[26:57]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short-term capital circulating in the global economy. In part this has to do with the petrodollar bounty that the oil exporting states enjoy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:13]]
<nowiki>[27:13]</nowiki>

You're Saudi Arabia for example. And you experience over a period of about six months a fourfold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:24]]
<nowiki>[27:24]</nowiki>

It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran. Because Iran is a big populous country. It's leadership under {{WPExtract|Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah Pahlavi}} has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran it's easy to spend the money. You just spend it on domestic infrastructural development. You build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:43]]
<nowiki>[27:43]</nowiki>

But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:53]]
<nowiki>[27:53]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You bank it. But not necessarily in Japan. Because Japan by this point is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital. You bank it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:06]]
<nowiki>[28:06]</nowiki>

If you're Saudi Arabia what kind of investor are you? Are you an aggressive investor or are you a conservative investor?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:13]]
<nowiki>[28:13]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You're a conservative investor. So you don't do direct investment. Instead you put it with banks. You place it for the most part with -- you place your money with Western banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers -- including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

There's a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe the petrodollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:07]]
<nowiki>[29:07]</nowiki>

But ultimately this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preve-- of staving off political unrest. Communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas.

==== Inflation in the East Bloc During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

And probably none is more consequential during the 1970s then the issue of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:35]]
<nowiki>[29:35]</nowiki>

Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet Bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high, you know, sort of rates of investment over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:49]]
<nowiki>[29:49]</nowiki>

If you set prices too low then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of sort of long-term investment. So controlling prices is a, you know, sort of really delicate act for central planners to perform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:04]]
<nowiki>[30:04]</nowiki>

Because if you set prices too high then you're going to incentivize political unrest. Populations will recoil from high bread prices. They might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult, but setting prices too low encourages more consumption than your economy will likely be able to sustain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:26 ]]
<nowiki>[30:26 ]</nowiki>

It will probably produce you know disruptions in supply as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is a sort of basic market economics and the rules are not all that different even in the context of a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:40 ]]
<nowiki>[30:40 ]</nowiki>

Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right. Socialist societies plan production but they can't plan consumption. The only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55 ]]
<nowiki>[30:55 ]</nowiki>

So it's always a very delicate you know sort of act that has to be performed.

==== Upheaval in Poland During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:01 ]]
<nowiki>[31:01 ]</nowiki>

And...the case of Poland is you know sort of illustrative of some of the you know difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it you know...in particular. I'm going to...you know sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland -- not with respect to the Communist system writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:25 ]]
<nowiki>[31:25 ]</nowiki>

In the late 1970s...1978, 1979 the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap you know sort of prices for food and consumer goods which have been sustained through most of the 1970s in order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51 ]]
<nowiki>[31:51 ]</nowiki>

This is really important. Prices increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis borne of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods. Other factors too stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:13 ]]
<nowiki>[32:13 ]</nowiki>

In 1978 a Polish national is elected Pope -- becomes {{WPExtract|Pope John Paul II}}. And this stimulates sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti-Sovietism, even Polish anti-Communism. Amidst this you know sort of combination of economic instability borne of an officially mandated price increase and political nationalism stirred by Pope John Paul II's election Poland at the end of the 1970s experiences a major round of political upheaval -- a major sort of political crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49 ]</nowiki>

This crisis is you know usually known as the episode of the {{WPExtract|Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity Movement}}. What is Solidarity? Why does it pose such a political challenge to the Polish Communist regime? Solidarity is an independent trades union movement that emerges in 1980.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:09 ]]
<nowiki>[33:09 ]</nowiki>

The fact of Solidarity's being a labor union, an independent trades union, is in itself consequential. Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:28 ]]
<nowiki>[33:28 ]</nowiki>

That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism. So the emergence of an independent trades union movement in Poland is ideologically disruptive and contentious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:47 ]]
<nowiki>[33:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's also in the summer of 1980 a major political phenomenon. {{WPExtract|Lech Wałęsa}} emerges as the leader of Solidarity, this independent trades union movement. He's a shipworker in Gdańsk with a sort of long history of political activism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:07 ]]
<nowiki>[34:07 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1970 Solidarity numbers over 700,000 workers as members. This is a very big political mobilization. The Polish government initially tries to appease Solidarity by recognizing it as a legitimate sort of representative organ of Polish workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:27 ]]
<nowiki>[34:27 ]</nowiki>

As a consequence of this initial act of recognition Solidarity's membership increases very, very quickly. By the summer, by the end of 1980, there are about 8 million Poles who count themselves as members of Solidarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:39 ]]
<nowiki>[34:39 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1981 one in four Polish people is a member of the Solidarity Movement. So Solidarity sort of explodes onto the Polish scene as an independent political force -- as a political force autonomous from the party-state, headed by a non-Communist membership, sorry, headed, led by a non-Communist leadership -- the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. And this poses a you know sort of serious, even existential threat, to the legitimacy, even the survival of the Polish Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13 ]</nowiki>

How is a party-state that derives its legitimacy from its claim to represent the workers and the interests of the workers going to deal with the emergence of a independent labor union that presents itself as a political rival to the Communist Party?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:30 ]]
<nowiki>[35:30 ]</nowiki>

In a sense what Solidarity means is that plural politics have arrived within the context of the party-state. This is very, very disruptive. So what does the Polish Communist state decide to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:43 ]]
<nowiki>[35:43 ]</nowiki>

It does essentially the only thing that it can do if it wants to remain a party-state -- and that is the government at the end of 1981 turns the tanks on Solidarity. Martial law is declared. Solidarity is declared illegal and popular street demonstrations are violently and viciously repressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04 ]</nowiki>

So the Polish state ultimately embraces repression because it's unable to control the political consequences of this mass mobilization that a combination of you know economic instability borne of rising consumer prices and political nationalism produce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:24 ]]
<nowiki>[36:24 ]</nowiki>

Solidarity in effect demonstrates, or the Solidarity Crisis in effect demonstrates, that there are severe limits to what political reform can accomplish within the context of the party-state. There might be you know an opportunity within the party-state to satisfy some of the you know consumer aspirations that subject populations have but the party-state will not be able tolerate plural politics. That is sort you know persuasively demonstrated.

==== The Economic Lag Between Eastern Europe and the West ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53 ]]
<nowiki>[36:53 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's economies continue to lag further and further behind the capitalist West. This is really, really important. Though the West experiences a slowdown in growth rates during the 1970s the gap between East and West just continues to get bigger and bigger.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:15 ]]
<nowiki>[37:15 ]</nowiki>

Let's took not at overall GDP but at per capita GDP which is what this chart displays. Per capita GDP is a pretty good index of basic economic well-being, of ordinary people. And what you can see is that from sort of the early 1970s in particular the rates of growth in per capita GDP in the East Bloc slow. During the 1980s the story will essentially be one of stasis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:43 ]]
<nowiki>[37:43 ]</nowiki>

In relative terms however the East Bloc is going backwards. As the West continues to get richer and richer in per capita terms the failures of the socialist system to match the affluence that Western capitalism is capable of producing for it citizens become more and more glaring.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:03 ]]
<nowiki>[38:03 ]</nowiki>

So the slowdown is a relative slowdown. There's still a very you know sort of incremental improvement in per capita GDP in the...in say Eastern Europe between you know 1970 and 1980. So relative to sort of...its own experience Eastern Europe's position does improve very, very sluggishly. But relative to the West Eastern Europe is falling behind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:29 ]]
<nowiki>[38:29 ]</nowiki>

And this is really, really important. Because the example of the West will be absolutely crucial to the legitimacy crisis of state Communism in the 1980s. The example of the West exposes the basic dishonesty of Communist propaganda. Insofar as Communist leaders proclaim themselves to be building a future that is even brighter than the future that capitalism could deliver the actual you know historical accomplishments of Communism debunk the myth that Communism is a more advanced economic system -- that the command economy is somehow more productive than the capitalist economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:08 ]]
<nowiki>[39:08 ]</nowiki>

This...disjoint between the theory and the reality of Communism is profoundly consequential. It is in a sense what causes the basic legitimacy crisis of the system. The fact that Communist governments end up depending upon violence and repression to control political unrest only you know sort of exacerbates the basic legitimacy problem. These regimes are brutal and violent sometimes but even more consequential I would argue is the fact that their in...is that they prove unable to deliver the material bounty which they promise to provide for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:45 ]]
<nowiki>[39:45 ]</nowiki>

Communism...sorry...

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52 ]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

No, that's, that's a really good question. Well, that would be you know sort harder to do because the data on which this chart is produced is just population data and GDP data. So the mean average is the one that you know can be easily produced based upon you know the best available data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:19]]
<nowiki>[40:19]</nowiki>

Estimating, this is sort of a subsidiary point, statistics from the East Bloc are notoriously difficult to work with because you know they're frequently manufactured are bare little relation to reality. But it's a very good question. I mean to what extent does this you know sort of tail off in GDP per capita growth in the East Bloc veil sort of important differences between East and West that have to do with the distribution of well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48 ]</nowiki>

Because there's a plausible you know sort of alternative viewpoint here -- which is that Western societies produce more in the aggregate but that wealth in the West is so...unevenly distributed that most of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few very wealthy people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07 ]</nowiki>

Meaning that ordinary Westerns are not necessarily any better off than are ordinary East Bloc citizens. In that circumstance the East Bloc would not have experienced its legitimacy crisis because leaders of East European countries could have said that for, so far as ordinary people were concerned, they were really much better off under Communism than they would be under capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:27 ]]
<nowiki>[41:27 ]</nowiki>

I wish that I had that chart to show you. Unfortunately, I don't have it in the slide show. So you just have to take this on faith, that...the relative decline in sort of....in aggregate economic well-being is experienced by ordinary people in the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:47 ]]
<nowiki>[41:47 ]</nowiki>

Sure, the Western countries even, the countries of Western Europe, which are less unequal than the United States is, remain relatively less equal than the economies of Eastern Europe do but the difference isn't all that much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:01 ]]
<nowiki>[42:01 ]</nowiki>

And this actually gives me an opportunity to talk about a really important point which was a point that we should think about when we're thinking about sort of economics and equality in Communist societies and capitalist societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:15 ]]
<nowiki>[42:15 ]</nowiki>

One of the key you know distinguishing characteristics of a Communist society is that economic wealth ends up being sort of synonymous with political wealth. Economic power ends up being synonymous with political power. Those who control the state, those who control the political apparatus are also those who enjoy the greatest material abundance -- hence, Brezhnev and the fur coat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:41 ]]
<nowiki>[42:41 ]</nowiki>

If you want to make it in the Soviet Union your best opportunity for making it comes through advancing yourself through the party bureaucracy -- through the party hierarchy. It's political power that can deliver you know the things upon which the good life depends: a nice dacha in the countryside, a well appointed well-furnished apartment in Moscow. Well, these things go to the people who wield political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:06 ]]
<nowiki>[43:06 ]</nowiki>

In the West by contrast there's a disjoint between political power and economic power. At least there ought to be in principle, right -- is the case that political power exists apart from economic power. Money can influence elections but it doesn't necessarily determine them. You know of course in the present moment you know I think we're experiencing something of a national conversation as to what the relationship between economic power is...and...but as to what the relationship between economic and political power is and what it should be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37 ]</nowiki>

Whether economic power is excessively influential upon political power is a question that we're debating and there are you know different perspectives that we could bring to that conversation and it's not really my intention to discuss that today because it takes us away from where we need to be going.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:53 ]]
<nowiki>[43:53 ]</nowiki>

But the...point which is crucial to remember about Communist societies is that economic power and political power are in essence synonymous. And as a consequence of that people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who wield power enjoy you know relatively greater abundance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13 ]</nowiki>

They shop in special shops. They're special shops for high ranking party members that provide access to you know much better Western consumer goods than those that are available to ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:23 ]]
<nowiki>[44:23 ]</nowiki>

And this basic you know sort of...the fact that inequality is so implicated with political power further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis of the system. You know ordinary Eastern Europeans who don't enjoy the special prerogatives that party members enjoy will call out party members for you know self-serving hypocrisy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:46 ]]
<nowiki>[44:46 ]</nowiki>

So far as the comparison with the West goes. I'm just going to make one last point on this issue. It's important, and we'll talk more about this, but it's important to think about the role in which you know sort of the media plays in giving East Europeans a sense of what ordinary life is like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:04 ]]
<nowiki>[45:04 ]</nowiki>

American television shows, like {{WPExtract|Dallas (1978 TV series)|''Dallas''}} and {{WPExtract|Dynasty (1981 TV series)|''Dynasty''}}, which probably none of you remember, are...screened on West European television. You know Germany for example you know screens American soap operas constantly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:19]]
<nowiki>[45:19]</nowiki>

These transmissions can be you know easily viewed, you know picked up, by antennae, and viewed in Eastern Europe. And this you know sort of window on Western abundance that television you know drama -- well, drama is probably too good a word to use, that television you know series like ''Dallas'' provide, gives you know sort of East Europeans, a, you know sense, perhaps an exaggerated sense, of what life looks like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:47 ]]
<nowiki>[45:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's not altogether misrepresentive. Right, by the turn of the 1980s what kinds of lives are middle class Americans enjoying? Well, they you know usually inhabit single family homes in suburbs. They'll drive probably two automobiles in a household. Putting food on the table is not a concern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:08 ]]
<nowiki>[46:08 ]</nowiki>

This is a standard of material abundance that the East has entirely failed to match. So the more that Easterners know about how people live in the West, and about the kinds of expectations that Westerners have, the less credible becomes the proclamations of you know Communist leaders to be giving their people better lives than the lives that Westerners live.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29 ]]
<nowiki>[46:29 ]</nowiki>

But we'll talk more about sort of these contrasts in the 1980s and how they [[wikt:inflect|inflect]] the end of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:35 ]]
<nowiki>[46:35 ]</nowiki>

Okay, but the...point I think that the data conveys really powerfully which is a point that you want to bare in mind carefully is that the example of the West is a very subversive one from a Eastern standpoint in the 1970s and the 1980s. The West is growing faster than the East even as the West experiences difficult political and economic transformations of its own.

== Political Tumult in China in the Late 1960s and 1970s ==

=== The Cultural Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:58 ]]
<nowiki>[46:58 ]</nowiki>

Let's move on now to talk about China. Another country that experiences some consequential transformation in its relations with the West during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10 ]</nowiki>

I'm going to take the Chinese story back to the {{WPExtract|Cultural Revolution}} because I don't think that we've yet had the chance to sort of go through the Cultural Revolution in a systemic way and getting the history of the Cultural Revolution right is really important for understanding what comes next.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:25 ]]
<nowiki>[47:25 ]</nowiki>

It's what comes next that should interest us today but to understand that we'll take the history back to the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:33 ]]
<nowiki>[47:33 ]</nowiki>

What was the Cultural Revolution? How did it come to pass? Just to give me a quick sense of the room how many of you had already studied the history of the Cultural Revolution in some other context? In some other class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:46 ]]
<nowiki>[47:46 ]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. So you're just have to bare with you because I'm not probably going to take this into the kind of detail that you've encountered elsewhere but for those who haven't studied the Cultural Revolution it's important just to get a handle on this. Because this a really big, really consequential event, set of events in the making of contemporary China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:05 ]]
<nowiki>[48:05 ]</nowiki>

The Cultural Revolution emerges out of the catastrophic aftermath of China's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}. The Great Leap Forward of course was the developmental plan introduced in 1956 that aimed to construct an indigenous Chinese path to socialist modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:21 ]]
<nowiki>[48:21 ]</nowiki>

It was a path that would involve the promotion of you know all kinds of ambitious things like rural industrialization. Backyard steel furnaces as we've discussed are one of the you know preeminent symbols of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:35 ]]
<nowiki>[48:35 ]</nowiki>

Yet the Great Leap Forward for all of its overwhelming ambition is in practice a horrible catastrophe. Tens of millions of people starve to death as a consequence of the havoc that the Great Leap Forward produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:48 ]]
<nowiki>[48:48 ]</nowiki>

The Great Leap Forward does not accomplish what {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Mao}} wanted to accomplish which is nominally as least to make China prosperous and strong. Instead the Great Leap Forward brings Chinese society to its knees.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:00 ]]
<nowiki>[49:00 ]</nowiki>

There's a massive famine. Tens of millions of people die. It's really, really horrible. This disaster brings not just the legitimacy of you know Communist rule, but Mao Zedong's legitimacy as a wise and farseeing leader into question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:16 ]]
<nowiki>[49:16 ]</nowiki>

Indeed Mao recognizes by you know the turn of the 1960s that he has overreached himself. That he has set something in motion which has been catastrophic in it consequences. And Mao retreats from the sort of front lines of political leadership in China. He goes back home and retreats to his study and undertakes a long phase of you know sort of reading and contemplation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:41 ]]
<nowiki>[49:41 ]</nowiki>

As Mao retreats from the forefront of Chinese politics new leaders emerge and they pursue different kinds of policies. The two most important leaders are {{WPExtract|Liu Shaoqi}}, pictured on the bottom of the slide, and {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}}. And these are the two men who come to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:02 ]]
<nowiki>[50:02 ]</nowiki>

And they pursue policies that are aimed at moderating the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restoring a more normal and a more sustainable path towards modernization and development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16 ]</nowiki>

Both men and fairly pragmatic. Deng Xiaoping is well known for sort of citing an old Sichuan<ref>{{WPExtract|Sichuan|The Wikipedia article on Sichuan}} lists other romanizations of the name of the province to be Szechuan and Szechwan.</ref> saying which is: it doesn't matter if it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it catches mice.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:30 ]]
<nowiki>[50:30 ]</nowiki>

And this is a statement that well captures you know Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism. He's less concerned with ideology as Mao was than with achieving tangible results. So for a period in the first half of the 1960s China experiences a sort of moderate turn in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are temporarily at least preeminent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:53 ]]
<nowiki>[50:53 ]</nowiki>

And they try to restore a stability, sort of normalcy to use {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge|Calvin Coolidge's}} language<ref>The slogan "Return to Normalcy" was used in the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The Harding-Coolidge ticket won the election and after Harding passed away Coolidge was inaugurated as President. See Wikipedia articles: {{WPExtract|Return to normalcy}}, {{WPExtract|1920 United States presidential election}}, {{WPExtract|Warren G. Harding}}, and {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge}}.</ref> to the Chinese socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:02 ]]
<nowiki>[51:02 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao Zedong, sort of sitting, festering in retirement, is plotting a return to the political fore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:11 ]]
<nowiki>[51:11 ]</nowiki>

As Mao contemplates a sort of return to the front line of Chinese politics he is spurred by his wife {{WPExtract|Jiang Qing}} who is a very hard line radical. I mean a real...sort of [[wikt:doctrinaire|doctrinaire]] [[wikt:ideologue|ideologue]]. And she argues that China has taken a sort of bourgeois turn under Liu and Deng -- that it is time to reradicalize the revolution, to reenergize the revolution, perhaps even to launch a new revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeois stability that has set in under Deng and Liu and to sort of restore the revolutionary project to its maximum fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:52 ]]
<nowiki>[51:52 ]</nowiki>

Jiang is particularly resentful of China's cultural establishment. This may have something to do with the fact that she was a actress by trade before she became a political leader. She sees Chinese culture as a bastion of sort of bourgeois tradition. And she is absolutely adamant that if a new revolution is to be launched that it needs to be a Cultural Revolution in its thrust.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:16 ]</nowiki>

That it needs to focus not just upon a transformation of economic and political structures but on transforming Chinese culture and Chinese values -- to create a truly radical, a truly revolutionary society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:29 ]]
<nowiki>[52:29 ]</nowiki>

Spurred by Jing Qing Mao returns to the front line of Chinese politics in 1966. He convenes a special [[wikt:plenum|plenum]] of the Chinese Communist Party that August and it sets in motion the train of events that will become known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:48 ]]
<nowiki>[52:48 ]</nowiki>

And this is how Mao proclaims it. You know China is now going to have a great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This involves the demotion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. These two men are sort of pushed aside. And Mao appoints a radical {{WPExtract|Lin Biao}} as his anointed heir.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:07 ]]
<nowiki>[53:07 ]</nowiki>

Lin Biao is a devoted Maoist. He was responsible a couple of years earlier during Mao's period of exile for collecting a host of Mao's, you know, political sayings into a you know single volume -- a book, that became known as the {{WPExtract|Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book''}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:22 ]]
<nowiki>[53:22 ]</nowiki>

So Lin Biao is sort of more responsible than anybody else for developing what would become in the context of the Cultural Revolution a cult of Maoism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:34 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34 ]</nowiki>

So the Cultural Revolution is launched in 1966 with the purpose of transforming China -- of revolutionizing China's revolution. In a sense the Cultural Revolution represents an effort by Mao to launch a bottom-up revolution against the Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53 ]]
<nowiki>[53:53 ]</nowiki>

So this a really you know sort of peculiar thing. After the 1949 revolution the Communist Party sort of assumes the responsibilities of governance. It assimilates itself to the state and it becomes a well-defined, well-established power structure. This is the power structure that Deng and Liu come responsible for in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward -- the Chinese party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:16 ]]
<nowiki>[54:16 ]</nowiki>

But outside of power, Mao, who is still the nominal leader of this party-state becomes convinced, prodded in part by his wife, that the party-state has become conservative, that it's become bourgeois, that it's become reactionary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:29 ]]
<nowiki>[54:29 ]</nowiki>

So the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents an effort to revolutionize the state that the 1949 Communist Revolution created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40 ]]
<nowiki>[54:40 ]</nowiki>

And in order to accomplish this Mao turns to the masses. He turns to the Chinese masses to launch a revolution against the party-state that the Communist Party has created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:51 ]]
<nowiki>[54:51 ]</nowiki>

Mao in 1966 proclaims a campaign against what he describes as the Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. This is to be a revolution against the old -- out with the old, in with the new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:06 ]]
<nowiki>[55:06 ]</nowiki>

Nowhere is this revolution fiercer than on Chinese university campuses. There is a sort of demographic aspect to the Cultural Revolution that is really important to think about. China, like the United States, like Western Europe, experiences a sort of youth bubble, a baby boom after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:25 ]]
<nowiki>[55:25 ]</nowiki>

By the mid-1960s children born in the aftermath of the Second World War are becoming teenagers. They're becoming seventeen, eighteen, nineteen-year-olds who are becoming you know sort of politically conscious and who are susceptible to...how do I put this politely?...far-fetched ideological doctrines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43 ]]
<nowiki>[55:43 ]</nowiki>

Not that you ever see any evidence of that on Berkeley's campus because this is a, you know, sober, responsible place. But in China it's an altogether different story, and young people are you know susceptible to a kind of radicalization that serves the purposes that Mao now wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:01 ]]
<nowiki>[56:01 ]</nowiki>

So Chinese campuses become a recruiting ground for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao radical Chinese students form units called {{WPExtract|Red Guards}}. These are sort of paramilitary units that establish themselves to advance the revolution, to impose Maoist orthodoxy, and to sort of challenge so-called right-wing deviationists -- rightists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:30 ]]
<nowiki>[56:30 ]</nowiki>

Students form Red Guard units. They carry Mao's ''Little Red Book'' which becomes in the late 1960s you know absolutely ubiquitous as an ideological and political symbol. Carrying the ''Little Red Book'' implies a sort of devotion or signals a devotion to the cult of Maoist Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48 ]]
<nowiki>[56:48 ]</nowiki>

Politically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sort of...targets...you know the bureaucracy. It targets people like Deng Xiaoping who is persecuted in the context of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:08 ]]
<nowiki>[57:08 ]</nowiki>

The denouncication of rightists becomes sort of the overriding theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And this has catastrophic consequences for the state. Important leaders Deng and Liu Shaoqi are purged. They become the targets of particular opprobrium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26 ]]
<nowiki>[57:26 ]</nowiki>

But it's not just you know leaders at the top who are purged. Around two-thirds of all Communist Party officials are removed from their posts in the context of the Great Proletarian Revolution. Red Guards in a sense overthrow the basic institutions of political order that have developed in Communist China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:46 ]]
<nowiki>[57:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is a drama that is played out at many different levels. It's not just at the top leadership level of the party. But at the level of you know sort of social institutions like schools and universities. Red Guards seek out reactionaries and purge them. Bourgeois teachers are purged in schools, bourgeois reactionary professors are purged in universities, which would be a really bad idea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:07 ]]
<nowiki>[58:07 ]</nowiki>

Intellectuals are the target of special assault. Rightists are singled out for public humiliation and are forced to confess their so-called sins against the Maoist Revolution. This is a catastrophic tumultous phase in Chinese life. It's a period in which a revolution from below sort of overthrows you know much of what the Communist Party has built since 1969 -- since 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32 ]]
<nowiki>[58:32 ]</nowiki>

What are the human consequences of this? I mean there are some mass killing. Around half a million deaths, up to half a million deaths, are attributable to the chaos that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45 ]]
<nowiki>[58:45 ]</nowiki>

To situate this in context it's substantially less people than died during the Great Leap Forward. But it's still you know a weighty toll, and a toll that we should contemplate particularly when we consider that the death toll that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused was entirely ideologically motivated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:07]]
<nowiki>[59:07]</nowiki>

Unlike the Great Leap Forward which represented an ambitious effort to industrialize, to modernize China, and in which the catastrophic famines were in a sense an indirect consequence of a modernizing project, virtually all of the people who died during the Cultural Revolution were singled out for political murder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:27 ]]
<nowiki>[59:27 ]</nowiki>

So this is a you know weighty topic with which to grapple. But the political consequences, more than the sort of ethical or moral consequences, are those that shape what comes next. Authority, central political authority, effectively collapses as Red Guards remove Communist bureaucrats from their post.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:48 ]]
<nowiki>[59:48 ]</nowiki>

The central planning system breaks down. The Great Leap Forward had presented an alternative model to Soviet-style central planning. The Cultural Revolution obliterates the mechanics of central planning virtually entirely. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the opportunities for implementing Soviet-style economic planning will be very limited because the planning structures have been dismantled. The bureaucracies have been depopulated and dismantled.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:17 ]</nowiki>

Virtually the only you know political leader in China who is able to hold the whole thing together, which is to say to hold the state together, during the period of the Cultural Revolution is {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai}} -- the Premier of the Chinese state. And a man who while a, you know, sort of very close lieutenant of Mao Zedong throughout Mao's life doesn't share Mao's ideological radicalism or ideological fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:46 ]</nowiki>

It's not to say that Zhou Enlai was a closet liberal. It would be wrong to see him in those terms. But he recognizes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and struggles against you know very difficult odds to preserve the basic stability of the Chinese state -- to protect the institutions of central power and central authority against the rampages of the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:07 ]</nowiki>

And in those Zhou Enlai is more or less successful. He manages to sustain a semblance of a political center through the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:18 ]</nowiki>

Ultimately though it's Mao Zedong who brings the whole production to an end. Mao realizes by the end of 1968, early 1969, that things are going far too far. That if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is permitted to continue that it will result in the effective you know destruction of China as a nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39 ]</nowiki>

That the Chinese [[wikt:polity|polity]] will fall apart as a consequence of this revolution from below. So having launched a popular revolution against the state Mao now very abruptly shifts course and moves to implement a state clamp down on the popular revolution. Mao turns to the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, to purge the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:05 ]</nowiki>

Having previously instructed the Red Guards to purge bourgeois rightist elements in the People's Liberation Army and other you know Communist Party bureaucracies Mao now turns to the army in order to restore order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:18 ]</nowiki>

This attempt to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to an end inaugurates a very sort of peculiar phase in the history of the People's Republic -- a late Maoist phase in which Mao remains the singular preeminent leader of China but in which Mao...does not pursue the sort of revolutionary political and social transformation that characterized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:49 ]</nowiki>

So you might think of the era of late Maoism as an era in which China is delicately poised between revolutionary politics on the one hand, because the forces that have produced the cultural revolution are still present, and Mao is still in many respects sympathetic to them, and the forces of stabilization on the other. It's a very interesting and very delicate phase in China's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:13 ]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17 ]</nowiki>

Because Mao was a brilliant political leader. I mean Mao was extremely adept at balancing political factions and playing off personalities and interests against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:28 ]</nowiki>

I mean Mao may...you know have made a number of catastrophic decisions as regards China's economic development. But when it came to politics -- both domestic politics and international politics. I mean Mao was one of the most gifted political tacticians of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:46 ]</nowiki>

And what Mao does through the era of the Cultural Revolution and into the late Maoist Era that sort of follows the heights of the Cultural Revolution is to balance the centrists, people like Deng Xiaoping, against the radical left, people like his wife Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:03 ]</nowiki>

And ultimately he's successful in performing that delicate balancing act through to the very end of his life. It's sort of remarkable when you think about the tumult that China experiences in the second half of the twentieth century that Mao Zedong dies a peaceful death in his sleep. The fact that he does so is testimony I think to the brilliance of Mao's political skills.

=== Maoist Rule in the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25 ]</nowiki>

So Mao, you know, as I've sort of explained, performs this delicate balancing act in the first half of the 1970s. He works to balance the left against the center.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:40 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao orchestrates, as we've already discussed, a major shift in China's international relations. In 1972 he welcomes Richard Nixon to Beijing. This does not necessarily signify a shift in China's international goals. Mao will continue to talk about global revolution as an objective for China but the realignment with the United States serves a very clear tactical purpose. It serves the purpose of gaining China a tacit ally against the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:12 ]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union by 1972 is a major concern for China. 1969 brings actual fighting between Chinese and Soviet forces over the Ussuri River. That year China experiences a major war scare. Indeed this war scare one of the factors that prompts Mao to wind down the Cultural Revolution. Because Mao recognizes that amidst the upheaval that the Cultural Revolution is performing China is essentially open so far as foreign aggression is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:39 ]</nowiki>

So Mao implements a sort of major tactical shift in the Cold War. He tries to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union, but this does not signify necessarily a strategic reorientation towards the West. There's a big difference between a tactical opening and a strategic opening and what Mao pursues in 1972 is a tactical opening. Mao's overarching goals remain consistent: to make China strong and prosperous and to promote and pursue global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10 ]</nowiki>

But there are significant changes in Mao's you know sort of political discourse during this era of you know late Maoist rule that will help to prefigure what comes next. Probably the single most important sort of revision of Maoist doctrine that Mao orchestrates in this period is the so-called {{WPExtract|Three Worlds Theory}} which Mao first develops in 1973 and which is publicly presented in a speech that Deng Xiaoping gives at the United Nations in 1974.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:42 ]</nowiki>

In this speech Mao, which Mao writes, the world is divided into three parts: the world of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the rich capitalist world, countries like West Germany, and Canada and Australia and so on, and then the Third World -- the rest of the world, the poor world, the world of which China is a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:06 ]</nowiki>

There are really important implications to the way in which this Three Worlds Concept is presented. Whereas Mao had previously described the world in terms of class struggle, the workers versus the bourgeoisie, the Three Worlds Concept implies a more developmental...framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:25]]
<nowiki>[1:07:25]</nowiki>

It suggests, or in some ways it sort of echoes the Three Worlds Concepts that Latin American developmental economists offer, you know, during the 1950s and 1960s. And this is really consequential. Mao talks about the need to develop and build the developing world: China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:46 ]</nowiki>

This is not so different from what developing economics proposes. Though Mao continues to talk about revolution as a goal for China in the world his political rhetoric in the last years of his life is increasingly inflected by a discourse of development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:03]]
<nowiki>[1:08:03]</nowiki>

This doesn't necessarily mean that Mao personally wanted to orchestrate a new course but Mao says things that Mao's successors will be able to hold onto as a way of relating their priorities to sort of Maoist doctrine. Because this is really important. Look Mao remains, continues to be venerated in China, through to the present day. Even as China for the past thirty years has pursued policies at home and in the world that are almost diametrically at odds with most of what Mao said.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:35 ]</nowiki>

So how to relate policies that repudiate the substance of Mao while paying fealty to the dogma? Well, to do that you seize upon things that Mao said that might rationalize the things that you want to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is what Mao's successors will do. They will invoke Mao's Three Worlds Concept and the developmental implications of it in order to legitimate and defend policies that serve quite different purposes to those that Mao wanted to achieve, policies from the late 1970s onwards, that will serve the purposes of development rather than the purposes of global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:11]]
<nowiki>[1:09:11]</nowiki>

There are other key developments during the Mao Era -- none more consequential than the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was purged in 1969, stripped of his official office, sent to work in a tractor factory in Xinjian Province.<ref>In the [[wikipedia:Deng Xiaoping#Cultural Revolution|Cultural Revolution section of the Wikipedia article on Deng Xiaoping]] there is, "In October 1969 Deng Xiaoping was sent to the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi province to work as a regular worker." The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Xinjian District}} says that it is a suburb of {{WPExtract|Nanchang}} which is the capital of {{WPExtract|Jiangxi}} Province.</ref> But in 1974, Deng Xiaoping reforms, sorry, he returns, he doesn't necessarily reform -- that's key. Deng returns -- unreformed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36 ]</nowiki>

Deng returns in part because Zhou Enlai promotes him. Zhou Enlai is really Deng Xiaoping's primary sponsor in the power structure in the late phase of the Cultural Revolution. And Zhou Enlai promotes Deng to become First Vice Premier of the Chinese state with particular responsibility for economic reform. This is a major return because Deng will of course become China's preeminent leader in a post Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:06 ]</nowiki>

The 1969 purge is not the last purge of Deng Xiaoping however. Deng is purged again in 1975. And that's really important. Because it tells us something about how fractious Chinese politics remain through to the end of the Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:21 ]</nowiki>

At the instigation of rightists, sorry of left-wingers, of the radicals around Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Deng is forced to sort of incriminate himself, to draw up a list of self-criticisms, to renounce his so-called ideological deviations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:39 ]</nowiki>

So up to the end of very Mao's life the conflict between the radicals around Mao's wife and the political moderates around Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping remains very fierce. And the second purge of Deng Xiaoping in 1975 is excellent sort of illustration of this point.

=== The Death of Mao Zedong and the Question of Succession ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:57 ]</nowiki>

Mao Zedong of course dies in September 1976. This is a really big, really, really big shift. Even more tumultuous perhaps than Stalin's death in 1953 had been. The Chinese revolution after all has been singularly associated since the 1920s with the personality and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao's death after fifty years...after twenty-five years of head of state, twenty-fives as a revolutionary leader, is a...dramatic and profound disjuncture in the history of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:33 ]</nowiki>

Who will succeed Mao Zedong? This is the big question. There are...a number of factions struggling for influence. Probably the most coherent is the radical faction, the {{WPExtract|Gang of Four}}, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:52 ]</nowiki>

At the same time there are anointed successors. The key anointed successor is {{WPExtract|Hua Guofeng}} -- who's the person who Mao designates as his heir as China's political leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:05 ]</nowiki>

Other however have claims to make besides. Deng Xiaoping, though he has recently been sort of exiled and purged can make a strong claim to being one of China's most effective and proven administrators. Deng has a record of proven accomplishment which will be you know very much to his advantage as China's political future is determined.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:27 ]</nowiki>

The succession is complex but let's try to trace out some of the you know key steps. Hua Guofeng, the anointed successor, moves initially against the radical left. And this is really key. Hua moves to purge the Gang of Four in late 1976. Just months after Mao dies the radicals are purged.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:50 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:50 ]</nowiki>

They're arrested. And a sort of campaign against the extreme left is set in motion. This is really consequential for Deng Xiaoping. Insofar as the radical left, the Gang of Four, had been sort of Deng's primary antagonistic, antagonist, their removal from the political scene creates opportunities for Deng to reassert himself. And this is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15 ]</nowiki>

The power struggle ceases to be three-way or power struggle between Hua, Deng, and the Gang of Four, and it becomes a sort of two-way conflict between Deng and Hua after the removal of the Gang of Four.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:29 ]</nowiki>

And here the you know conflict assumes a sort of ideological aspect. Hua Guofeng aligns himself very closely after the purge of the Gang of Four with Mao Zedong's legacy. Hua proclaims himself loyal to what he characterizes as the two whatevers. He says, and here I quote, whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon we shall resolutely defend, whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed we shall resolutely oppose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:56 ]</nowiki>

So Hua, after Mao's death, presents himself as the heir not only of Mao's political role but also of Mao's ideological commitments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:08]]
<nowiki>[1:14:08]</nowiki>

Deng by contrast is much more pragmatic. Deng argues that policies should be grounded not in Maoist doctrine but in empirical evidence. That China needs to allow its you know policies to be determined by practice, what works and what doesn't, rather than by revolutionary ideology. Deng's cat theory: it doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it captures, catches mice, is you know sort of illustrative of Deng's pragmatism.

=== China Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:37 ]</nowiki>

Deng Xiaoping establishes control fairly quickly. The key event here is the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which takes place in December 1978. This is the moment at which Deng and his allies sort of outflank and overwhelm Hua Guofeng and his allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:57 ]</nowiki>

The Eleventh Central Committee is the sort of key turning point in China's history. At this meeting the Chinese Communist Party renounces basic Maoist revolutionary concepts. The concept of class struggle as the sort of key to history is quitetly discarded. The concept of continual revolution, the idea that the Communist Party needs to be waging a continual revolution, is also discarded -- instead pragmatic policies are embraced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:29 ]</nowiki>

It's as if the Communist Party decides that the revolution has been accomplished with the attainment of its own political power and that the task ahead is now to develop China, to make China strong and prosperous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:40 ]</nowiki>

These pragmatic policies will include economic deregulation and soon enough market oriented reforms. Equally consequential Deng Xiaoping visits the United States. The visit to the United States comes after a formal normalization of diplomatic relations which occurs at the beginning of January. It's negotiated in December 1978, but on the first of January 1979 the United States of America and China normalize diplomatic relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:09 ]</nowiki>

This is a major turning point. It signals a new sort of opening towards the United States a new kind of relationship between the people's republic and the United States.

=== Deng Xiaoping's Policy Towards the US Contrasted with Mao Zedong's Policy Towards the US ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:20 ]</nowiki>

It might be useful to compare and contrast Deng Xiaoping's US policy with Mao Zedong's US policy. What did the two leaders want to accomplish? Well, what Mao Zedong wanted to accomplish, in the context of a war scare with the Soviet Union, was a tactical alignment that would use the United States as a sort of counterweight to the Soviet Union to the advantage of Chinese diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:51 ]</nowiki>

What Deng contemplates is something entirely different. For Deng the opening to the United States is to be strategic rather than political. It's not just an alliance of convenience against the Soviet Union that Deng wants -- though we may note that Deng Xiaoping is fiercely anti-Soviet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:07]]
<nowiki>[1:17:07]</nowiki>

But what Deng wants is something more, far more far reaching than that. He wants to open not only China's sort of political alignments towards the United States but also China's economy, and ultimately China's society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:21 ]</nowiki>

When Deng travels to the United States, which he does in February 1979, he's extremely interested in American industry. He wants to visit factories, car factories, he pays a visit to the space program I think in Texas, and is you know immensely impressed with American high technology -- with American space technology as well as with technology aimed at ordinary consumers. And he seeks to realize for China a future based upon this American high technology model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:55 ]</nowiki>

In order to accomplish that Deng recognizes he will have to open China towards the United States, towards the West, towards the capitalist world. To do this he implements major structural reforms. Foreign investment will be solicited and encouraged. Market incentives will be opened. China in a sense will transition from having been...will transition from the status of a sort of autarkic communistic economy which is what China was, for, through the Maoist Era, to a relationship in which China will begin to reintegrate with the capitalist liberal open world economy that the United States tried to build after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:38 ]</nowiki>

An economy that was built in the West but which was of course divided by the advent of the Second World War. So this is a profound strategic realignment.

=== The Enabling of Market Reforms Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:47 ]</nowiki>

How are we to explain it looking back? Let's conclude with some quick reflections. Why did Deng try to do what he did and why was he able to accomplish so much? We'll talk much more about reforms after 1980 in due course but at this stage let's just reflect on four points.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:05 ]</nowiki>

First socialization in China was always less advanced that it became in the Soviet Union. The socialist project by the mid-1970s was only twenty-five years old. The Great Leap Forward did not achieve everything that it wanted to achieve. The Communist Party found, when it looked carefully at the countryside, that the reach of socialization was very limited. That ordinary Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants, continued to display sort of entrepreneurial impulses, entrepreneurial habits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

In the 1960s this seemed disturbing to the leadership of the Communist Party. It was one of the reasons that the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was launched. But the limits of socialization will in due course facilitate a market oriented transformation of China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:56 ]</nowiki>

The disruption that the Cultural Revolution causes is also crucial. The Cultural Revolution does much of what Mao accomplish, wants is to accomplish, which is to sweep out the olds. Having swept out the olds the opportunity for new thinking, for new approaches is rather more open than it will be by contrast in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

The international reorientations are also crucial. Mao pursues an opening towards the United States for realistic even cynical purposes. Mao wants to bring the United States on board as a tactical asset against the Soviet Union.
But Mao's 1972 tactical opening towards the United States makes it possible for Deng Xiaoping to pursue a far more far reaching strategic opening towards the United States in 1979.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:47 ]</nowiki>

Finally we should be attentive to the subtle shift in Maoist discourse during the last phase of Mao's political career. The fact that Mao will be begin to emphasize development as well as revolution as a goal for China at home and in the world makes it possible for Mao's successors, preeminently for Deng Xiaoping, to orchestrate a transition from revolution to development and modernization as the overarching purpose of Chinese statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:15 ]</nowiki>

The consequences of this in the 1980s and beyond we'll come to in due course.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s

2022-03-15T03:28:31Z

DavidKitFriedman: Found while comparing this transcript to an automated one produced by Otter.ai. The second "Okay" is actually not correct.

== Preliminaries ==

Okay, it's 9:40 so it's about time for us to get going. Looking at the room I fear that my observation on Tuesday that the weather might be a you know reason for not coming to lecture and staying at home and listening to it on the podcast may have been taken as a suggestion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

At least I hope that was the case in that you didn't all think that the lecture on Tuesday was so appalling that you weren't going to bother showing up on Thursday. Well, it wouldn't be those of you here who reach that conclusion it would be those who aren't here. But anyway it's nice to see those of you who made it through the rain which is actually less rain then we had on Tuesday, but it's going to be worse tomorrow I think. So, it's good if you like skiing -- the precipitation.

== Lecture Overivew ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:40]]
<nowiki>[00:40]</nowiki>

But that's not what we're going to be talking about today. This is not a class in meteorology. We're going to talk today about the transformations of the socialist world in the 1970s. And I'll try to conclude with some discussion of the sort of larger transformations of Cold War politics in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:58]]
<nowiki>[00:58]</nowiki>

So having focused on sort of the high geopolitics of the Cold War on Tuesday, on the political economic transformations of the West last week, today we take the story to the socialist world, the Soviet Union, and China and hopefully tie this all together within an hour and twenty minutes with the sort of resurgence of East-West rivalries towards the end of the 1970s, and if we can do this -- this will situate us well to transition to the 1980s and the story of globalization next week.

== Transformation and Tumult in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:30]]
<nowiki>[01:30]</nowiki>

=== Tumult in The Soviet Union During the 1970s: The Brezhnev Years ===

Okay, first the Soviet Union. What do we need to know about the travails of Soviet-style socialism during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:40]]
<nowiki>[01:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev}} years, in the history of the Soviet Union, a period that begins, towards the late 1960s. It's difficult to put a specific point on the origins of the Brezhnev Era because Khruschev's fall, he was ousted in 1964, is followed by a period of collective leadership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:01]]
<nowiki>[02:01]</nowiki>

It's not Leonid Brezhnev but {{WPExtract|Alexei Kosygin}}, the Premier of the Soviet Union at the time, who meets with {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in 1967.<ref>Speaker here is likely referring to the {{WPExtract|Glassboro Summit Conference}} and meant that it is actually Alexei Kosygin and not Leonid Brezhnev who meets with President Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro in the summer of 1967.</ref> By the end of the 1960s the man pictured in the slide in the beautiful fur coat, Leonid Brezhnev, has emerged as the singular leader of the Soviet state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:22]]
<nowiki>[02:22]</nowiki>

The reason that I've selected a picture of Brezhnev in a fur coat is not altogether accidental. Brezhnev had a notorious taste for the good life, and for the things that affluence could provide. In the Soviet Union of course affluence was more or less synonymous with political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:38]]
<nowiki>[02:38]</nowiki>

So Brezhnev as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union in the 1970s had access to quite a lot of it. And this...Brezhnev's taste for the good life became the butt of popular jokes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev years were great years for street humor, particularly in Moscow, and more urbane cities in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[03:00 ]</nowiki>

And some of these jokes give us a pretty good flavor of the Brezhnev years as Soviet citizens experience them. So I'm going to try to tell you one of these jokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10 ]</nowiki>

Okay.

(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:12]]
<nowiki>[03:12]</nowiki>

So, Brezhnev is showing his mother around the Kremlin, around all of his you know sort of official apartments, and limousines. He shows her his suite in the Kremlin. He shows her his [[wikt:dacha|dacha]] in the countryside. He takes his mother down to the Black Sea and shows her his villa -- his big Soviet limousine -- {{WPExtract|ZiL}} limousine.<ref>As the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Zil}} mentions ZiL limousines were used by powerful people in the Soviet Union, "The ZiL limousines were the official car that carried the Soviet heads of state, and many Soviet Union allied leaders, to summits or in parades."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:30]]
<nowiki>[03:30]</nowiki>

And what does Brezhnev's mother say? She says, well, dear, this is all very nice, but what are you going to do if the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik|Bolsheviks}} come back?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:38]]
<nowiki>[03:38]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

And this is a real joke that was told...sort of in...Moscow dining rooms, Moscow apartments, during the 1970s. And you know the Brezhnev years were times of cynicism in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was himself cynical. I've got another little anecdote. This attributed to Brezhnev himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:58]]
<nowiki>[03:58]</nowiki>

The veracity of this I can't confirm, but it's certainly attributed to Brezhnev in a number of secondary sources. Brezhnev is reported to have said, all that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the Czar was shot, and something had to be substituted. So let the people build Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:20]]
<nowiki>[04:20]</nowiki>

Whether those words are, you know, were ever spoken by Brezhnev or not is, you know, questionable, but the fact that they could be attributed to him, plausibly, is in itself revelatory. Brezhnev didn't stand for ideology. He didn't stand for you know crusade to build a new and ambitious future. He stood for stability and he stood for the prerogatives of the bureaucracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:42]]
<nowiki>[04:42]</nowiki>

The Brezhnev years were a time of [[wikt:stasis|stasis]] but also a time of stability in Soviet politics and Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

There were however some underlying changes that occurred within the Soviet Union during the 1970s that would have consequences for the future. During the 1970s members of the Communist Party, including fairly high ranking members, such as {{WPExtract|Mikhail Gorbachev}} become disillusioned with Communism at least as it's being presently practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

Despite the veneer of stability there is a widespread circulation within Soviet society among the ranks of the [[wikt:intelligentsia|:intelligentsia]] of dissident literature, of literature that would be known in the vernacular of the time as {{WPExtract|Samizdat}}, it literally means self-published literature -- literature critical of the Soviet party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

Besides the circulation of indigenous dissident material Soviet citizens during the 1970s enjoy growing access to ideas about the external world -- to information about the West. The {{WPExtract|Voice of America}}, for example, which broadcasts into the Soviet Union is one such source of information on the external world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:52]]
<nowiki>[05:52]</nowiki>

To some extent the politics of détente help to keep this sort of window onto the world open. The Soviet Union ceases blocking Western radio transmissions as a consequence of détente. So détente sort of cracks open space for Soviet citizens to learn a little bit more about the West, a little bit more about the world beyond the USSR, certainly more than they had known in the Stalinist era for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:19]]
<nowiki>[06:19]</nowiki>

Outside of the Soviet Union Communism experiences something akin to a general crisis of legitimacy during the 1970s. It's really important to recall that in the '50s and well into the 1960s Western intellectuals, intellectuals of the left, had been very loathe to criticize communism, even Communism as practiced in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:40]]
<nowiki>[06:40]</nowiki>

Probably the leading postwar French left-wing intellectual, {{WPExtract|Jean-Paul Sartre}}, remained to the very end of his life an apologist for Soviet-style Communism -- an apologist even for Stalinism. During the 1970s Western intellectuals cease to be so indulgent of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:58]]
<nowiki>[06:58]</nowiki>

Why was this? Well, in part the answer has to do with a growing consciousness of what we might now call human rights -- of what was in fact at the time called human rights. The grievous human rights violations which have occurred within the history of the Soviet Union begin to attract more attention during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

And here no single event is more consequential then the 1973 publication in the West of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's}} book {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}}. Have any of you had the opportunity to read the ''The Gulag Archipelago''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:31]]
<nowiki>[07:31]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. And this is a book that's really couched as a history of the {{WPExtract|Gulag|gulag}} system, the gulag being the immense system of political concentration camps which Stalin constructed, building upon a Leninist system of sort of internal concentration camps to oppress, imprison and terrify political opponents of the Communist regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:55]]
<nowiki>[07:55]</nowiki>

So the gulag is symbolic of the violence that the Soviet-state has perpetrated against its own system, against its own citizens, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1973, when ''The Gulag Archipelago'' goes published in the West, sort of opens a window onto this world of hidden repression. And the consequences are sort of devastating for the legitimacy of the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:17]]
<nowiki>[08:17]</nowiki>

At a time when Western intellectuals and political leaders and public opinion in general are all becoming more attentive to human rights this stark revelation of the political brutality that the Soviet Union has inflicted upon its own citizens is devastating to the legitimacy and credibility of communism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:38]]
<nowiki>[08:38]</nowiki>

And you get some sense of this from one of the readings which was assigned for...I think this week -- it could have been last week -- {{WPExtract|Bernard-Henri Lévy|Bernard-Henri Lévy's}} book, ''Barbarism with a Human Face'', is one of the texts that you know sort of powerfully reveals this shift in Western attitudes towards the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:56]]
<nowiki>[08:56]</nowiki>

Lévy is coming out of an intellectual tradition, a French left-wing intellectual tradition, that has historically been indulgent towards, even sympathetic to Soviet-style communism. But Levi breaks absolutely with this long sort of left-wing progressive history of you know sympathy and indulgence and offers a you know very harsh critique of Soviet-style communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:21]]
<nowiki>[09:21]</nowiki>

The key move that Lévy makes, which you'll have gather, if you've read the piece, is to conflate Soviet authoritarianism, authoritarianism of the left, with authoritarianism of the right. He subsumes them both under a common category -- the category of totalitarianism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

And for Lévy there's very little difference between, you know, left-wing shades of totalitarianism and right-wing shades of totalitarianism, they are all to be defined by their inability to respect basic human rights, basic human freedoms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:51]]
<nowiki>[09:51]</nowiki>

So even as Brezhnev preserves a sort of superficial political stability the crisis of, you know, the legitimacy crisis of Soviet-style socialism is proceeding apace. And it's a crisis that has both domestic aspects and international aspects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

Within the Soviet Union ordinary Soviet citizens are becoming much more cynical about the government under which they live. In the larger world any claim that Communism had to represent, you know, sort of the wave of the future -- a bright you know future for all of humankind is being exploded by revelations about the repressive and sort of [[wikt:tawdry|tawdry]] nature of the Soviet system itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

So those are the Brezhnev years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:37]]
<nowiki>[10:37]</nowiki>

Characterized by a superficial stability, underlying social and intellectual change within the USSR, and a willingness to interrogate the legitimacy of Marxism in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:50]]
<nowiki>[10:50]</nowiki>

Sorry that the bullet points weren't there while I was talking, but they'll be on the bSpace website.

=== Soviet Economic Gain from the Oil Crisis ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:54]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

In other respects however the 1970s are bountiful years for the Soviet Union. To explain this we need to think about what's going on in the global oil economy during the 1970s. We've already talked at some length about the energy crisis of the 1970s -- the fourfold increase in the price of oil that occurs during the fall of 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

The causes of the oil crisis we've talked about. It has to do with supply and demand and the trigger event that is the {{WPExtract|Yom Kippur War|1973 Arab-Israeli War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:28]]
<nowiki>[11:28]</nowiki>

But the consequences of the oil crisis are not restricted to the Middle East and the West. The Soviet Union is also powerfully implicated by the energy shocks of the 1970s. And this reflects the basic reality that the Soviet Union is in the 1970s a major exporter of energy to global markets.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:51]]
<nowiki>[11:51]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union began shipping oil to the world market in the mid-1950s. By the turn of the 1970s energy is the Soviet Union's largest sort of export item. Indeed, energy exports account for about 80% of Soviet export earnings by the early 1970s. This is a big deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:10]]
<nowiki>[12:10]</nowiki>

It's not only that the Soviet Union benefits directly from the export of energy. There are also indirect benefits to the Soviet Union of rising energy prices. Military hardware is another major item that the Soviet Union exports. As Arab and...oil exporters enjoy sort of more and more petrodollar revenue they have more money to spend on Soviet military equipment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

So indirectly as well as directly the Soviet Union benefits from rising energy prices. Indeed Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to benefit from high energy prices through to the present day. Why do you think that Russia has been so recalcitrant on the issue of Iran?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

Might it have something to do with the fact that the rise in energy prices that is a consequence of this prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Iran's nuclear program has some material benefits for Russia?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:07]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

That may be too cynical, but...it should illustrate the basic point which is that the Soviet Union benefits from rises, increases, in the global price of oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:19]]
<nowiki>[13:19]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of the petrodollar bounty that the Soviet Union experiences during the 1970s for the Soviet economy itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

Obviously, a rise in oil prices, fourfold rise in oil prices, in a space of about six months, means a substantial increase in export earnings for the USSR. That's obvious enough. But what does this increase in export earnings, this petrodollar bounty, mean for the Soviet economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:49]]
<nowiki>[13:49]</nowiki>

It has important consequences insofar as oil revenues work in the 1970s to prop up a failing economic system. The Soviet Union is able to use the money that it earns from exporting oil to the world economy to finance imports of Western technology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:05 ]]
<nowiki>[14:05 ]</nowiki>

If you can finance imports of Western technology then the imperative to develop high-tech technology yourself is diminished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union can also finance grain imports from the West. Insofar as Soviet agriculture is woefully inefficient by comparison with say American agriculture oil helps to disincentivize reform. Rather than making domestic agriculture more productive the Soviets are able simply to import agricultural produce, grain, from the West instead.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Cheap energy incentivizes industrial inefficiency. When it comes to the things that the Soviet Union does make then cheap and abundant energy makes it...you know...sort of less advantageous for the managers of state-owned enterprises to devise ways to manufacture more stuff with less energy inputs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

Right, in a world in which energy is scarce, you have to figure out how to be more efficient in your utilization of energy. This is something that we've, you know, sort of begun to do in the, you know, West, since the oil crises. We've got better at, you know, reducing energy inputs to...to increase the productivity of our industries in relation to energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:17]]
<nowiki>[15:17]</nowiki>

But the Soviets don't have these incentives during the 1970s. As a consequence abundant cheap energy forestalls you know sort of any prospect of undertaking serious structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

Let's pose a counterfactual question: how plausible is it that the Soviet Union might have reformed its economy in a serious way in the absence of rising energy prices? It's really hard to say. But what I can tell you is that there is a serious debate at the beginning of the Brezhnev era as to how ambitious the Soviet Union ought to be in undertaking structural economic reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:51]]
<nowiki>[15:51]</nowiki>

Alexei Kosygin who is the main rival to Leonid Brezhnev aligns himself with an economic reform agenda. Kosygin argues that the Soviet economy is faltering, that it needs to learn from the West, that it needs to become more efficient, perhaps that there needs to be expanded scope in the Soviet system for market incentives even.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:11]]
<nowiki>[16:11]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is a conservative. He repudiates Kosygin's reform agenda. And says, well, we should just carry on doing things the way that we've been doing them.

==== Contrast with Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

Oil makes it possible to do that. Or at least oil makes it easier to carry on doing things the way that we've just been doing them. It forestalls reform. And here I'm going to draw an example, or sort of, make a counterpoint with the experience of Japan in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

Japan's economy after the Second World War is not essentially planned economy but it's an economy in which the government exerts substantial direction over you know sort of capitalist free market economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:50]]
<nowiki>[16:50]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry|Japan's Ministry of Industry and Trade, METI}}, is a very powerful force in Japan's economic life. And METI responds to the oil crisis in a you know sort of proactive dynamic way. Japan has a very different kind of relationship with the global oil economy from that that the Soviet Union has. Japan produces no oil, and imports all of its oil from abroad. As a consequence Japan is very seriously afflicted by the energy crisis. The energy crisis is bad news for Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:19]]
<nowiki>[17:19]</nowiki>

But METI, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, uses the oil crisis as an opportunity to push forward a very ambitious agenda for structural economic reform. What Japan does in the 1970s is to invest in less energy intensive technologies -- particularly in energy...in...to invest particularly in industrial...processes that produce consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

Consumer electronics, for example, become a priority for Japan in the aftermath of the oil crisis. And this reflects the experience of the oil crisis. Japanese economic planners and ministers conclude that in a world of high energy prices Japan has a comparative advantage in specializing in less energy intensive production, in specializing in producing you know {{WPExtract|Walkman|Sony Walkman}}, for example, in producing less fuel thirsty automobiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

So Japan does very well as a consequence of the energy crisis because Japanese industrialists and economics ministers realize what the long term consequences of the oil crisis are likely to be and take appropriate action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union on the other hand the petrodollar bounty forestalls the prospect of structural reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:39]]
<nowiki>[18:39]</nowiki>

And this will be consequential for the long-term history of the Soviet Union. When global energy prices fall in the 1980s the predicament for a Soviet economy which has become dependent on expensive oil, even addicted to the export earnings that expensive oil provide, will be very serious indeed.

=== Eastern Europe During the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:02]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Let's talk now about Eastern Europe. I've talked a little bit about the Soviet Union and it's relationship to the global energy economy. What happens in Eastern Europe during the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

We've already talked about Eastern Europe's history of rebellion against Soviet leadership -- against the strictures of socialist domination. Hungary revolted in 1956. Czechoslovakia revolted in 1968. Poland sees an uprising in 1970. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of Communist systems is always fragile.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

These are not democratically elected systems. These are systems throughout Eastern Europe that are essentially Soviet impositions -- that lack basic sort of popular legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

The fundamental dilemma for Eastern Europe's Communist governments is always this: how to rule, how to maintain control over populations that do not accept...for the most part -- the legitimacy of Communist domination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:04]]
<nowiki>[20:04]</nowiki>

And there are basically two strategies that East European Communist governments can deploy in order to maintain political control. And the first is repression. And you see exemplary models of this in the experiences of Romania and Albania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:20]]
<nowiki>[20:20]</nowiki>

These are two repressive, sometimes violent, regimes. Regimes that depend upon brute force more than upon...you know, consensus, to maintain their basic political integrity and purpose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

But repression is not always a palatable option. Sometimes Communist leaders disdain repression on the basis only of principle. It's not very nice to depend upon repression in order to maintain political order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53]]
<nowiki>[20:53]</nowiki>

So placation becomes an alternative strategy for maintaining control in Eastern Europe. And what does placation involve? Essentially it involves buying off populations. Providing sufficient increases in material well-being, sufficient supplies of consumer goods, in order to maintain the basic you know satisfaction of pop...or of ordinary people. You provide material things in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

This is what Hungary does in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Budapest. Hungary's so-called reform Communist leaders develop a strategy that provides material goods in exchange for political quiescence on the part of the population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

This formula becomes know in Hungary as {{WPExtract|Goulash Communism}}. You provide the people enough stuff that they can enjoy to eat reasonably well, and Hungary will remain relatively stable within the Communist paradigm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

This, you know sort of, strategy for placating unrest through the provision of material abundance works elsewhere. Poland's communist leaders pursue much the same basic concept. So too do East Germany's Communist leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:10]]
<nowiki>[22:10]</nowiki>

Though East Germany in some ways is a particular case because East Germany's leaders pursue a sort of mixture of repressive and...placatory strategies at the same time. East Germany is both the materially richest state in Eastern Europe and one of the more repressive countries. Elsewhere these two things, repression and placation, exist in a sort of inverse correlation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki>

Poland and Hungary are among the less repressive countries in the Soviet Bloc, but there are also among the richest. Romania and Albania, though Albania's not really in the Communist Bloc<ref>Albania allied itself with China and distanced itself from the Soviet Union. See the [[wikipedia:Albania#Communism|Communism section of the Wikipedia article on Albania]] and this is also talked about in lecture 10, "[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s#|So Hoxha becomes this very unusual thing: a European Maoist.]]."</ref> so it's a sort of particular case in and of itself. Let's just talk about Romania.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:51]]
<nowiki>[22:51]</nowiki>

Romania is both poorer and more repressive than Poland and Hungary. So, repression and placation are the two strategies and you know to some extent they can substitute for each other. East Germany deploys a mixture of both.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:06]]
<nowiki>[23:06]</nowiki>

But in order to placate your populations through the provision of material abundance you need to be able to finance you know consumer production. And this is costly for Communist regimes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

Of course if you're financing consumption then what are you not financing? What's the tradeoff if you're...consuming?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:30]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. Development. Investment. If you're consuming stuff then you're not investing in expanding production for the future. So there's always a tradeoff to be made between consumption and investment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:43]]
<nowiki>[23:43]</nowiki>

And this is a difficult tradeoff for regimes that are committed ideologically to a long-term agenda of Communist development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

It's also the case, particularly once we get into the 1970s, that Communist industries are simply not capable of producing the kinds of consumer goods that Eastern Europe's subject populations are coming to demand.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:06]]
<nowiki>[24:06]</nowiki>

East European automobiles, for example, are shoddy, and by comparison with Western automobiles inefficient and expensive to manufacture. In order to sort of continue to placate subject populations East European Communist governments end up during the 1970s turning more and more to the West -- to imports from capitalist Western Europe in order to provide the consumer goods on which the sustenance of political legitimacy depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:35]]
<nowiki>[24:35]</nowiki>

Foreign imports are really, really, important to the political survival of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on by the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:47]]
<nowiki>[24:47]</nowiki>

The sort of opportunities for East-West opening that détente and {{WPExtract|Ostpolitik}} and the {{WPExtract|Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Settlement}} provide are then conducive from a certain point of view to the sustenance of Communist led political systems in Eastern Europe. By opening up opportunities for trade and for economic exchange détente helps to sort of bolster the practical legitimacy of Communist governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

And this is one of the reasons that some you know sort of conservatives in the United States are critical of détente at the time. They argue that the West, Western Europe and the United States, are helping sort of Communist governments to stabilize themselves by enabling them to provide Western goods for their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

But it's important you know to think about the role of Western goods in the East Bloc during the 1970s and after not simply in terms of consumption and its political consequences. We should also think about the financial aspects of these transactions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

How are Eastern, how are Western goods to be paid for?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:56]]
<nowiki>[25:56]</nowiki>

How is trade usually financed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

(student response)

Debt. Well, in this case the trade is to be financed with debt. But that's because the East European countries are not capable of manufacturing or growing the kinds of products that would balance their imports from the West. If Eastern European economies were producing you know the kinds of things that the West wanted then they might be able to...sustain balanced trade relations with the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:26]]
<nowiki>[26:26]</nowiki>

But in the absence of you know sort of desirable East European exports, or East European exports that are desirable in the West, the only way to finance imports from the West is by borrowing money.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So the East Europeans borrow money from the West in order to finance imports of consumer goods on which political legitimacy depends. Now there's even an aspect to the story that ties back into the oil crisis, and I can try to tell that if it doesn't make the whole story even more complicated than it already is.

==== The Increase in Short-Term Capital Because of Oil Demand ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:57]]
<nowiki>[26:57]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the oil crisis is to vastly expand the value of sort of short-term capital circulating in the global economy. In part this has to do with the petrodollar bounty that the oil exporting states enjoy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:13]]
<nowiki>[27:13]</nowiki>

You're Saudi Arabia for example. And you experience over a period of about six months a fourfold increase in your export earnings. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:24]]
<nowiki>[27:24]</nowiki>

It's easier to answer that question if you're Iran. Because Iran is a big populous country. It's leadership under {{WPExtract|Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah Pahlavi}} has big developmental aspirations. So if you're Iran it's easy to spend the money. You just spend it on domestic infrastructural development. You build nuclear power stations and so on, which is what Iran does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:43]]
<nowiki>[27:43]</nowiki>

But if you're Saudi Arabia, or if you're Dubai, if you're one of the little Gulf Emirates, you have a small population, your territory is basically desert. What are you going to do with that money?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:53]]
<nowiki>[27:53]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You bank it. But not necessarily in Japan. Because Japan by this point is a fairly developed economy. It's capable of providing its own investment capital. You bank it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:06]]
<nowiki>[28:06]</nowiki>

If you're Saudi Arabia what kind of investor are you? Are you an aggressive investor or are you a conservative investor?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:13]]
<nowiki>[28:13]</nowiki>

(student response)

That's right. You're a conservative investor. So you don't do direct investment. Instead you put it with banks. You place it for the most part with -- you place your money with Western banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

And this means that Western banks during the 1970s experience sort of a massive influx in deposits. There's a great deal of money in the global financial system during the 1970s. And some of this can be lent to sovereign borrowers -- including the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

There's a similar story that plays itself out in Latin America which we're going to talk about next week. But in Eastern Europe the petrodollar led transformation of the global financial system helps to sustain economic strategies that will use imports from Western capitalist economies in order to preserve political legitimacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:07]]
<nowiki>[29:07]</nowiki>

But ultimately this strategy has serious flaws. It doesn't prove capable of preve-- of staving off political unrest. Communist planners continue to confront, you know, serious economic dilemmas.

==== Inflation in the East Bloc During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

And probably none is more consequential during the 1970s then the issue of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:35]]
<nowiki>[29:35]</nowiki>

Prices are sort of controlled in the Soviet Bloc, but central planners have to set prices at such a level as to be able to sustain relatively high, you know, sort of rates of investment over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:49]]
<nowiki>[29:49]</nowiki>

If you set prices too low then you're incentivizing consumption that will occur at the expense of sort of long-term investment. So controlling prices is a, you know, sort of really delicate act for central planners to perform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:04]]
<nowiki>[30:04]</nowiki>

Because if you set prices too high then you're going to incentivize political unrest. Populations will recoil from high bread prices. They might demonstrate in the streets. So high prices are a recipe for political destabilization and tumult, but setting prices too low encourages more consumption than your economy will likely be able to sustain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:26 ]]
<nowiki>[30:26 ]</nowiki>

It will probably produce you know disruptions in supply as available demand exceeds supply and so on. This is a sort of basic market economics and the rules are not all that different even in the context of a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:40 ]]
<nowiki>[30:40 ]</nowiki>

Because consumption is never something that socialist societies can plan, right. Socialist societies plan production but they can't plan consumption. The only way that they can control consumption is by adjusting the prices of commodities that consumers purchase.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55 ]]
<nowiki>[30:55 ]</nowiki>

So it's always a very delicate you know sort of act that has to be performed.

==== Upheaval in Poland During the 1970s ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:01 ]]
<nowiki>[31:01 ]</nowiki>

And...the case of Poland is you know sort of illustrative of some of the you know difficulties that are inherent in the performance of this act. So we should talk about it you know...in particular. I'm going to...you know sort of couch the next couple of minutes with particular respect to Poland -- not with respect to the Communist system writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:25 ]]
<nowiki>[31:25 ]</nowiki>

In the late 1970s...1978, 1979 the Polish government decides that it has to sort of increase prices because the cheap you know sort of prices for food and consumer goods which have been sustained through most of the 1970s in order to stave off popular unrest following the 1970 uprising are unsustainable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51 ]]
<nowiki>[31:51 ]</nowiki>

This is really important. Prices increases are sort of politically unpopular. The Polish system experiences an economic crisis borne of the basic unsustainability of low prices for consumer goods. Other factors too stimulate dissent and unrest in Poland in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:13 ]]
<nowiki>[32:13 ]</nowiki>

In 1978 a Polish national is elected Pope -- becomes {{WPExtract|Pope John Paul II}}. And this stimulates sort of Polish nationalism, Polish anti-Sovietism, even Polish anti-Communism. Amidst this you know sort of combination of economic instability borne of an officially mandated price increase and political nationalism stirred by Pope John Paul II's election Poland at the end of the 1970s experiences a major round of political upheaval -- a major sort of political crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49 ]</nowiki>

This crisis is you know usually known as the episode of the {{WPExtract|Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity Movement}}. What is Solidarity? Why does it pose such a political challenge to the Polish Communist regime? Solidarity is an independent trades union movement that emerges in 1980.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:09 ]]
<nowiki>[33:09 ]</nowiki>

The fact of Solidarity's being a labor union, an independent trades union, is in itself consequential. Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:28 ]]
<nowiki>[33:28 ]</nowiki>

That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism. So the emergence of an independent trades union movement in Poland is ideologically disruptive and contentious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:47 ]]
<nowiki>[33:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's also in the summer of 1980 a major political phenomenon. {{WPExtract|Lech Wałęsa}} emerges as the leader of Solidarity, this independent trades union movement. He's a shipworker in Gdańsk with a sort of long history of political activism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:07 ]]
<nowiki>[34:07 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1970 Solidarity numbers over 700,000 workers as members. This is a very big political mobilization. The Polish government initially tries to appease Solidarity by recognizing it as a legitimate sort of representative organ of Polish workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:27 ]]
<nowiki>[34:27 ]</nowiki>

As a consequence of this initial act of recognition Solidarity's membership increases very, very quickly. By the summer, by the end of 1980, there are about 8 million Poles who count themselves as members of Solidarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:39 ]]
<nowiki>[34:39 ]</nowiki>

By the summer of 1981 one in four Polish people is a member of the Solidarity Movement. So Solidarity sort of explodes onto the Polish scene as an independent political force -- as a political force autonomous from the party-state, headed by a non-Communist membership, sorry, headed, led by a non-Communist leadership -- the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. And this poses a you know sort of serious, even existential threat, to the legitimacy, even the survival of the Polish Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13 ]</nowiki>

How is a party-state that derives its legitimacy from its claim to represent the workers and the interests of the workers going to deal with the emergence of a independent labor union that presents itself as a political rival to the Communist Party?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:30 ]]
<nowiki>[35:30 ]</nowiki>

In a sense what Solidarity means is that plural politics have arrived within the context of the party-state. This is very, very disruptive. So what does the Polish Communist state decide to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:43 ]]
<nowiki>[35:43 ]</nowiki>

It does essentially the only thing that it can do if it wants to remain a party-state -- and that is the government at the end of 1981 turns the tanks on Solidarity. Martial law is declared. Solidarity is declared illegal and popular street demonstrations are violently and viciously repressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04 ]</nowiki>

So the Polish state ultimately embraces repression because it's unable to control the political consequences of this mass mobilization that a combination of you know economic instability borne of rising consumer prices and political nationalism produce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:24 ]]
<nowiki>[36:24 ]</nowiki>

Solidarity in effect demonstrates, or the Solidarity Crisis in effect demonstrates, that there are severe limits to what political reform can accomplish within the context of the party-state. There might be you know an opportunity within the party-state to satisfy some of the you know consumer aspirations that subject populations have but the party-state will not be able tolerate plural politics. That is sort you know persuasively demonstrated.

==== The Economic Lag Between Eastern Europe and the West ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53 ]]
<nowiki>[36:53 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's economies continue to lag further and further behind the capitalist West. This is really, really important. Though the West experiences a slowdown in growth rates during the 1970s the gap between East and West just continues to get bigger and bigger.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:15 ]]
<nowiki>[37:15 ]</nowiki>

Let's took not at overall GDP but at per capita GDP which is what this chart displays. Per capita GDP is a pretty good index of basic economic well-being, of ordinary people. And what you can see is that from sort of the early 1970s in particular the rates of growth in per capita GDP in the East Bloc slow. During the 1980s the story will essentially be one of stasis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:43 ]]
<nowiki>[37:43 ]</nowiki>

In relative terms however the East Bloc is going backwards. As the West continues to get richer and richer in per capita terms the failures of the socialist system to match the affluence that Western capitalism is capable of producing for it citizens become more and more glaring.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:03 ]]
<nowiki>[38:03 ]</nowiki>

So the slowdown is a relative slowdown. There's still a very you know sort of incremental improvement in per capita GDP in the...in say Eastern Europe between you know 1970 and 1980. So relative to sort of...its own experience Eastern Europe's position does improve very, very sluggishly. But relative to the West Eastern Europe is falling behind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:29 ]]
<nowiki>[38:29 ]</nowiki>

And this is really, really important. Because the example of the West will be absolutely crucial to the legitimacy crisis of state Communism in the 1980s. The example of the West exposes the basic dishonesty of Communist propaganda. Insofar as Communist leaders proclaim themselves to be building a future that is even brighter than the future that capitalism could deliver the actual you know historical accomplishments of Communism debunk the myth that Communism is a more advanced economic system -- that the command economy is somehow more productive than the capitalist economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:08 ]]
<nowiki>[39:08 ]</nowiki>

This...disjoint between the theory and the reality of Communism is profoundly consequential. It is in a sense what causes the basic legitimacy crisis of the system. The fact that Communist governments end up depending upon violence and repression to control political unrest only you know sort of exacerbates the basic legitimacy problem. These regimes are brutal and violent sometimes but even more consequential I would argue is the fact that their in...is that they prove unable to deliver the material bounty which they promise to provide for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:45 ]]
<nowiki>[39:45 ]</nowiki>

Communism...sorry...

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52 ]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

No, that's, that's a really good question. Well, that would be you know sort harder to do because the data on which this chart is produced is just population data and GDP data. So the mean average is the one that you know can be easily produced based upon you know the best available data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:19]]
<nowiki>[40:19]</nowiki>

Estimating, this is sort of a subsidiary point, statistics from the East Bloc are notoriously difficult to work with because you know they're frequently manufactured are bare little relation to reality. But it's a very good question. I mean to what extent does this you know sort of tail off in GDP per capita growth in the East Bloc veil sort of important differences between East and West that have to do with the distribution of well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48 ]</nowiki>

Because there's a plausible you know sort of alternative viewpoint here -- which is that Western societies produce more in the aggregate but that wealth in the West is so...unevenly distributed that most of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few very wealthy people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07 ]</nowiki>

Meaning that ordinary Westerns are not necessarily any better off than are ordinary East Bloc citizens. In that circumstance the East Bloc would not have experienced its legitimacy crisis because leaders of East European countries could have said that for, so far as ordinary people were concerned, they were really much better off under Communism than they would be under capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:27 ]]
<nowiki>[41:27 ]</nowiki>

I wish that I had that chart to show you. Unfortunately, I don't have it in the slide show. So you just have to take this on faith, that...the relative decline in sort of....in aggregate economic well-being is experienced by ordinary people in the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:47 ]]
<nowiki>[41:47 ]</nowiki>

Sure, the Western countries even, the countries of Western Europe, which are less unequal than the United States is, remain relatively less equal than the economies of Eastern Europe do but the difference isn't all that much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:01 ]]
<nowiki>[42:01 ]</nowiki>

And this actually gives me an opportunity to talk about a really important point which was a point that we should think about when we're thinking about sort of economics and equality in Communist societies and capitalist societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:15 ]]
<nowiki>[42:15 ]</nowiki>

One of the key you know distinguishing characteristics of a Communist society is that economic wealth ends up being sort of synonymous with political wealth. Economic power ends up being synonymous with political power. Those who control the state, those who control the political apparatus are also those who enjoy the greatest material abundance -- hence, Brezhnev and the fur coat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:41 ]]
<nowiki>[42:41 ]</nowiki>

If you want to make it in the Soviet Union your best opportunity for making it comes through advancing yourself through the party bureaucracy -- through the party hierarchy. It's political power that can deliver you know the things upon which the good life depends: a nice dacha in the countryside, a well appointed well-furnished apartment in Moscow. Well, these things go to the people who wield political power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:06 ]]
<nowiki>[43:06 ]</nowiki>

In the West by contrast there's a disjoint between political power and economic power. At least there ought to be in principle, right -- is the case that political power exists apart from economic power. Money can influence elections but it doesn't necessarily determine them. You know of course in the present moment you know I think we're experiencing something of a national conversation as to what the relationship between economic power is...and...but as to what the relationship between economic and political power is and what it should be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37 ]</nowiki>

Whether economic power is excessively influential upon political power is a question that we're debating and there are you know different perspectives that we could bring to that conversation and it's not really my intention to discuss that today because it takes us away from where we need to be going.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:53 ]]
<nowiki>[43:53 ]</nowiki>

But the...point which is crucial to remember about Communist societies is that economic power and political power are in essence synonymous. And as a consequence of that people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who wield power enjoy you know relatively greater abundance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13 ]</nowiki>

They shop in special shops. They're special shops for high ranking party members that provide access to you know much better Western consumer goods than those that are available to ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:23 ]]
<nowiki>[44:23 ]</nowiki>

And this basic you know sort of...the fact that inequality is so implicated with political power further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis of the system. You know ordinary Eastern Europeans who don't enjoy the special prerogatives that party members enjoy will call out party members for you know self-serving hypocrisy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:46 ]]
<nowiki>[44:46 ]</nowiki>

So far as the comparison with the West goes. I'm just going to make one last point on this issue. It's important, and we'll talk more about this, but it's important to think about the role in which you know sort of the media plays in giving East Europeans a sense of what ordinary life is like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:04 ]]
<nowiki>[45:04 ]</nowiki>

American television shows, like {{WPExtract|Dallas (1978 TV series)|''Dallas''}} and {{WPExtract|Dynasty (1981 TV series)|''Dynasty''}}, which probably none of you remember, are...screened on West European television. You know Germany for example you know screens American soap operas constantly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:19]]
<nowiki>[45:19]</nowiki>

These transmissions can be you know easily viewed, you know picked up, by antennae, and viewed in Eastern Europe. And this you know sort of window on Western abundance that television you know drama -- well, drama is probably too good a word to use, that television you know series like ''Dallas'' provide, gives you know sort of East Europeans, a, you know sense, perhaps an exaggerated sense, of what life looks like in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:47 ]]
<nowiki>[45:47 ]</nowiki>

But it's not altogether misrepresentive. Right, by the turn of the 1980s what kinds of lives are middle class Americans enjoying? Well, they you know usually inhabit single family homes in suburbs. They'll drive probably two automobiles in a household. Putting food on the table is not a concern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:08 ]]
<nowiki>[46:08 ]</nowiki>

This is a standard of material abundance that the East has entirely failed to match. So the more that Easterners know about how people live in the West, and about the kinds of expectations that Westerners have, the less credible becomes the proclamations of you know Communist leaders to be giving their people better lives than the lives that Westerners live.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29 ]]
<nowiki>[46:29 ]</nowiki>

But we'll talk more about sort of these contrasts in the 1980s and how they [[wikt:inflect|inflect]] the end of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:35 ]]
<nowiki>[46:35 ]</nowiki>

Okay, but the...point I think that the data conveys really powerfully which is a point that you want to bare in mind carefully is that the example of the West is a very subversive one from a Eastern standpoint in the 1970s and the 1980s. The West is growing faster than the East even as the West experiences difficult political and economic transformations of its own.

== Political Tumult in China in the Late 1960s and 1970s ==

=== The Cultural Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:58 ]]
<nowiki>[46:58 ]</nowiki>

Let's move on now to talk about China. Another country that experiences some consequential transformation in its relations with the West during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10 ]</nowiki>

I'm going to take the Chinese story back to the {{WPExtract|Cultural Revolution}} because I don't think that we've yet had the chance to sort of go through the Cultural Revolution in a systemic way and getting the history of the Cultural Revolution right is really important for understanding what comes next.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:25 ]]
<nowiki>[47:25 ]</nowiki>

It's what comes next that should interest us today but to understand that we'll take the history back to the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:33 ]]
<nowiki>[47:33 ]</nowiki>

What was the Cultural Revolution? How did it come to pass? Just to give me a quick sense of the room how many of you had already studied the history of the Cultural Revolution in some other context? In some other class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:46 ]]
<nowiki>[47:46 ]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you. So you're just have to bare with you because I'm not probably going to take this into the kind of detail that you've encountered elsewhere but for those who haven't studied the Cultural Revolution it's important just to get a handle on this. Because this a really big, really consequential event, set of events in the making of contemporary China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:05 ]]
<nowiki>[48:05 ]</nowiki>

The Cultural Revolution emerges out of the catastrophic aftermath of China's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}. The Great Leap Forward of course was the developmental plan introduced in 1956 that aimed to construct an indigenous Chinese path to socialist modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:21 ]]
<nowiki>[48:21 ]</nowiki>

It was a path that would involve the promotion of you know all kinds of ambitious things like rural industrialization. Backyard steel furnaces as we've discussed are one of the you know preeminent symbols of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:35 ]]
<nowiki>[48:35 ]</nowiki>

Yet the Great Leap Forward for all of its overwhelming ambition is in practice a horrible catastrophe. Tens of millions of people starve to death as a consequence of the havoc that the Great Leap Forward produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:48 ]]
<nowiki>[48:48 ]</nowiki>

The Great Leap Forward does not accomplish what {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Mao}} wanted to accomplish which is nominally as least to make China prosperous and strong. Instead the Great Leap Forward brings Chinese society to its knees.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:00 ]]
<nowiki>[49:00 ]</nowiki>

There's a massive famine. Tens of millions of people die. It's really, really horrible. This disaster brings not just the legitimacy of you know Communist rule, but Mao Zedong's legitimacy as a wise and farseeing leader into question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:16 ]]
<nowiki>[49:16 ]</nowiki>

Indeed Mao recognizes by you know the turn of the 1960s that he has overreached himself. That he has set something in motion which has been catastrophic in it consequences. And Mao retreats from the sort of front lines of political leadership in China. He goes back home and retreats to his study and undertakes a long phase of you know sort of reading and contemplation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:41 ]]
<nowiki>[49:41 ]</nowiki>

As Mao retreats from the forefront of Chinese politics new leaders emerge and they pursue different kinds of policies. The two most important leaders are {{WPExtract|Liu Shaoqi}}, pictured on the bottom of the slide, and {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}}. And these are the two men who come to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:02 ]]
<nowiki>[50:02 ]</nowiki>

And they pursue policies that are aimed at moderating the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and restoring a more normal and a more sustainable path towards modernization and development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16 ]</nowiki>

Both men and fairly pragmatic. Deng Xiaoping is well known for sort of citing an old Sichuan<ref>{{WPExtract|Sichuan|The Wikipedia article on Sichuan}} lists other romanizations of the name of the province to be Szechuan and Szechwan.</ref> saying which is: it doesn't matter if it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it catches mice.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:30 ]]
<nowiki>[50:30 ]</nowiki>

And this is a statement that well captures you know Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism. He's less concerned with ideology as Mao was than with achieving tangible results. So for a period in the first half of the 1960s China experiences a sort of moderate turn in which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are temporarily at least preeminent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:53 ]]
<nowiki>[50:53 ]</nowiki>

And they try to restore a stability, sort of normalcy to use {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge|Calvin Coolidge's}} language<ref>The slogan "Return to Normalcy" was used in the 1920 presidential campaign of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The Harding-Coolidge ticket won the election and after Harding passed away Coolidge was inaugurated as President. See Wikipedia articles: {{WPExtract|Return to normalcy}}, {{WPExtract|1920 United States presidential election}}, {{WPExtract|Warren G. Harding}}, and {{WPExtract|Calvin Coolidge}}.</ref> to the Chinese socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:02 ]]
<nowiki>[51:02 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao Zedong, sort of sitting, festering in retirement, is plotting a return to the political fore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:11 ]]
<nowiki>[51:11 ]</nowiki>

As Mao contemplates a sort of return to the front line of Chinese politics he is spurred by his wife {{WPExtract|Jiang Qing}} who is a very hard line radical. I mean a real...sort of [[wikt:doctrinaire|doctrinaire]] [[wikt:ideologue|ideologue]]. And she argues that China has taken a sort of bourgeois turn under Liu and Deng -- that it is time to reradicalize the revolution, to reenergize the revolution, perhaps even to launch a new revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeois stability that has set in under Deng and Liu and to sort of restore the revolutionary project to its maximum fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:52 ]]
<nowiki>[51:52 ]</nowiki>

Jiang is particularly resentful of China's cultural establishment. This may have something to do with the fact that she was a actress by trade before she became a political leader. She sees Chinese culture as a bastion of sort of bourgeois tradition. And she is absolutely adamant that if a new revolution is to be launched that it needs to be a Cultural Revolution in its thrust.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:16 ]</nowiki>

That it needs to focus not just upon a transformation of economic and political structures but on transforming Chinese culture and Chinese values -- to create a truly radical, a truly revolutionary society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:29 ]]
<nowiki>[52:29 ]</nowiki>

Spurred by Jing Qing Mao returns to the front line of Chinese politics in 1966. He convenes a special [[wikt:plenum|plenum]] of the Chinese Communist Party that August and it sets in motion the train of events that will become known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:48 ]]
<nowiki>[52:48 ]</nowiki>

And this is how Mao proclaims it. You know China is now going to have a great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This involves the demotion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. These two men are sort of pushed aside. And Mao appoints a radical {{WPExtract|Lin Biao}} as his anointed heir.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:07 ]]
<nowiki>[53:07 ]</nowiki>

Lin Biao is a devoted Maoist. He was responsible a couple of years earlier during Mao's period of exile for collecting a host of Mao's, you know, political sayings into a you know single volume -- a book, that became known as the {{WPExtract|Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book''}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:22 ]]
<nowiki>[53:22 ]</nowiki>

So Lin Biao is sort of more responsible than anybody else for developing what would become in the context of the Cultural Revolution a cult of Maoism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:34 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34 ]</nowiki>

So the Cultural Revolution is launched in 1966 with the purpose of transforming China -- of revolutionizing China's revolution. In a sense the Cultural Revolution represents an effort by Mao to launch a bottom-up revolution against the Communist party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53 ]]
<nowiki>[53:53 ]</nowiki>

So this a really you know sort of peculiar thing. After the 1949 revolution the Communist Party sort of assumes the responsibilities of governance. It assimilates itself to the state and it becomes a well-defined, well-established power structure. This is the power structure that Deng and Liu come responsible for in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward -- the Chinese party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:16 ]]
<nowiki>[54:16 ]</nowiki>

But outside of power, Mao, who is still the nominal leader of this party-state becomes convinced, prodded in part by his wife, that the party-state has become conservative, that it's become bourgeois, that it's become reactionary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:29 ]]
<nowiki>[54:29 ]</nowiki>

So the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents an effort to revolutionize the state that the 1949 Communist Revolution created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40 ]]
<nowiki>[54:40 ]</nowiki>

And in order to accomplish this Mao turns to the masses. He turns to the Chinese masses to launch a revolution against the party-state that the Communist Party has created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:51 ]]
<nowiki>[54:51 ]</nowiki>

Mao in 1966 proclaims a campaign against what he describes as the Four Olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. This is to be a revolution against the old -- out with the old, in with the new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:06 ]]
<nowiki>[55:06 ]</nowiki>

Nowhere is this revolution fiercer than on Chinese university campuses. There is a sort of demographic aspect to the Cultural Revolution that is really important to think about. China, like the United States, like Western Europe, experiences a sort of youth bubble, a baby boom after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:25 ]]
<nowiki>[55:25 ]</nowiki>

By the mid-1960s children born in the aftermath of the Second World War are becoming teenagers. They're becoming seventeen, eighteen, nineteen-year-olds who are becoming you know sort of politically conscious and who are susceptible to...how do I put this politely?...far-fetched ideological doctrines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43 ]]
<nowiki>[55:43 ]</nowiki>

Not that you ever see any evidence of that on Berkeley's campus because this is a, you know, sober, responsible place. But in China it's an altogether different story, and young people are you know susceptible to a kind of radicalization that serves the purposes that Mao now wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:01 ]]
<nowiki>[56:01 ]</nowiki>

So Chinese campuses become a recruiting ground for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao radical Chinese students form units called {{WPExtract|Red Guards}}. These are sort of paramilitary units that establish themselves to advance the revolution, to impose Maoist orthodoxy, and to sort of challenge so-called right-wing deviationists -- rightists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:30 ]]
<nowiki>[56:30 ]</nowiki>

Students form Red Guard units. They carry Mao's ''Little Red Book'' which becomes in the late 1960s you know absolutely ubiquitous as an ideological and political symbol. Carrying the ''Little Red Book'' implies a sort of devotion or signals a devotion to the cult of Maoist Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48 ]]
<nowiki>[56:48 ]</nowiki>

Politically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sort of...targets...you know the bureaucracy. It targets people like Deng Xiaoping who is persecuted in the context of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:08 ]]
<nowiki>[57:08 ]</nowiki>

The denouncication of rightists becomes sort of the overriding theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And this has catastrophic consequences for the state. Important leaders Deng and Liu Shaoqi are purged. They become the targets of particular opprobrium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26 ]]
<nowiki>[57:26 ]</nowiki>

But it's not just you know leaders at the top who are purged. Around two-thirds of all Communist Party officials are removed from their posts in the context of the Great Proletarian Revolution. Red Guards in a sense overthrow the basic institutions of political order that have developed in Communist China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:46 ]]
<nowiki>[57:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is a drama that is played out at many different levels. It's not just at the top leadership level of the party. But at the level of you know sort of social institutions like schools and universities. Red Guards seek out reactionaries and purge them. Bourgeois teachers are purged in schools, bourgeois reactionary professors are purged in universities, which would be a really bad idea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:07 ]]
<nowiki>[58:07 ]</nowiki>

Intellectuals are the target of special assault. Rightists are singled out for public humiliation and are forced to confess their so-called sins against the Maoist Revolution. This is a catastrophic tumultous phase in Chinese life. It's a period in which a revolution from below sort of overthrows you know much of what the Communist Party has built since 1969 -- since 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32 ]]
<nowiki>[58:32 ]</nowiki>

What are the human consequences of this? I mean there are some mass killing. Around half a million deaths, up to half a million deaths, are attributable to the chaos that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45 ]]
<nowiki>[58:45 ]</nowiki>

To situate this in context it's substantially less people than died during the Great Leap Forward. But it's still you know a weighty toll, and a toll that we should contemplate particularly when we consider that the death toll that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused was entirely ideologically motivated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:07]]
<nowiki>[59:07]</nowiki>

Unlike the Great Leap Forward which represented an ambitious effort to industrialize, to modernize China, and in which the catastrophic famines were in a sense an indirect consequence of a modernizing project, virtually all of the people who died during the Cultural Revolution were singled out for political murder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:27 ]]
<nowiki>[59:27 ]</nowiki>

So this is a you know weighty topic with which to grapple. But the political consequences, more than the sort of ethical or moral consequences, are those that shape what comes next. Authority, central political authority, effectively collapses as Red Guards remove Communist bureaucrats from their post.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:48 ]]
<nowiki>[59:48 ]</nowiki>

The central planning system breaks down. The Great Leap Forward had presented an alternative model to Soviet-style central planning. The Cultural Revolution obliterates the mechanics of central planning virtually entirely. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the opportunities for implementing Soviet-style economic planning will be very limited because the planning structures have been dismantled. The bureaucracies have been depopulated and dismantled.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:17 ]</nowiki>

Virtually the only you know political leader in China who is able to hold the whole thing together, which is to say to hold the state together, during the period of the Cultural Revolution is {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai}} -- the Premier of the Chinese state. And a man who while a, you know, sort of very close lieutenant of Mao Zedong throughout Mao's life doesn't share Mao's ideological radicalism or ideological fervor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:46 ]</nowiki>

It's not to say that Zhou Enlai was a closet liberal. It would be wrong to see him in those terms. But he recognizes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and struggles against you know very difficult odds to preserve the basic stability of the Chinese state -- to protect the institutions of central power and central authority against the rampages of the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:07 ]</nowiki>

And in those Zhou Enlai is more or less successful. He manages to sustain a semblance of a political center through the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:18 ]</nowiki>

Ultimately though it's Mao Zedong who brings the whole production to an end. Mao realizes by the end of 1968, early 1969, that things are going far too far. That if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is permitted to continue that it will result in the effective you know destruction of China as a nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39 ]</nowiki>

That the Chinese [[wikt:polity|polity]] will fall apart as a consequence of this revolution from below. So having launched a popular revolution against the state Mao now very abruptly shifts course and moves to implement a state clamp down on the popular revolution. Mao turns to the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, to purge the Red Guards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:05 ]</nowiki>

Having previously instructed the Red Guards to purge bourgeois rightist elements in the People's Liberation Army and other you know Communist Party bureaucracies Mao now turns to the army in order to restore order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:18 ]</nowiki>

This attempt to bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to an end inaugurates a very sort of peculiar phase in the history of the People's Republic -- a late Maoist phase in which Mao remains the singular preeminent leader of China but in which Mao...does not pursue the sort of revolutionary political and social transformation that characterized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:49 ]</nowiki>

So you might think of the era of late Maoism as an era in which China is delicately poised between revolutionary politics on the one hand, because the forces that have produced the cultural revolution are still present, and Mao is still in many respects sympathetic to them, and the forces of stabilization on the other. It's a very interesting and very delicate phase in China's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:13 ]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17 ]</nowiki>

Because Mao was a brilliant political leader. I mean Mao was extremely adept at balancing political factions and playing off personalities and interests against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:28 ]</nowiki>

I mean Mao may...you know have made a number of catastrophic decisions as regards China's economic development. But when it came to politics -- both domestic politics and international politics. I mean Mao was one of the most gifted political tacticians of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:46 ]</nowiki>

And what Mao does through the era of the Cultural Revolution and into the late Maoist Era that sort of follows the heights of the Cultural Revolution is to balance the centrists, people like Deng Xiaoping, against the radical left, people like his wife Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:03 ]</nowiki>

And ultimately he's successful in performing that delicate balancing act through to the very end of his life. It's sort of remarkable when you think about the tumult that China experiences in the second half of the twentieth century that Mao Zedong dies a peaceful death in his sleep. The fact that he does so is testimony I think to the brilliance of Mao's political skills.

=== Maoist Rule in the 1970s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25 ]</nowiki>

So Mao, you know, as I've sort of explained, performs this delicate balancing act in the first half of the 1970s. He works to balance the left against the center.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:40 ]</nowiki>

Meanwhile Mao orchestrates, as we've already discussed, a major shift in China's international relations. In 1972 he welcomes Richard Nixon to Beijing. This does not necessarily signify a shift in China's international goals. Mao will continue to talk about global revolution as an objective for China but the realignment with the United States serves a very clear tactical purpose. It serves the purpose of gaining China a tacit ally against the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:12 ]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union by 1972 is a major concern for China. 1969 brings actual fighting between Chinese and Soviet forces over the Ussuri River. That year China experiences a major war scare. Indeed this war scare one of the factors that prompts Mao to wind down the Cultural Revolution. Because Mao recognizes that amidst the upheaval that the Cultural Revolution is performing China is essentially open so far as foreign aggression is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:39 ]</nowiki>

So Mao implements a sort of major tactical shift in the Cold War. He tries to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union, but this does not signify necessarily a strategic reorientation towards the West. There's a big difference between a tactical opening and a strategic opening and what Mao pursues in 1972 is a tactical opening. Mao's overarching goals remain consistent: to make China strong and prosperous and to promote and pursue global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10 ]</nowiki>

But there are significant changes in Mao's you know sort of political discourse during this era of you know late Maoist rule that will help to prefigure what comes next. Probably the single most important sort of revision of Maoist doctrine that Mao orchestrates in this period is the so-called {{WPExtract|Three Worlds Theory}} which Mao first develops in 1973 and which is publicly presented in a speech that Deng Xiaoping gives at the United Nations in 1974.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:42 ]</nowiki>

In this speech Mao, which Mao writes, the world is divided into three parts: the world of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the rich capitalist world, countries like West Germany, and Canada and Australia and so on, and then the Third World -- the rest of the world, the poor world, the world of which China is a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:06 ]</nowiki>

There are really important implications to the way in which this Three Worlds Concept is presented. Whereas Mao had previously described the world in terms of class struggle, the workers versus the bourgeoisie, the Three Worlds Concept implies a more developmental...framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:25]]
<nowiki>[1:07:25]</nowiki>

It suggests, or in some ways it sort of echoes the Three Worlds Concepts that Latin American developmental economists offer, you know, during the 1950s and 1960s. And this is really consequential. Mao talks about the need to develop and build the developing world: China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:46 ]</nowiki>

This is not so different from what developing economics proposes. Though Mao continues to talk about revolution as a goal for China in the world his political rhetoric in the last years of his life is increasingly inflected by a discourse of development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:03]]
<nowiki>[1:08:03]</nowiki>

This doesn't necessarily mean that Mao personally wanted to orchestrate a new course but Mao says things that Mao's successors will be able to hold onto as a way of relating their priorities to sort of Maoist doctrine. Because this is really important. Look Mao remains, continues to be venerated in China, through to the present day. Even as China for the past thirty years has pursued policies at home and in the world that are almost diametrically at odds with most of what Mao said.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:35 ]</nowiki>

So how to relate policies that repudiate the substance of Mao while paying fealty to the dogma? Well, to do that you seize upon things that Mao said that might rationalize the things that you want to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:46 ]</nowiki>

And this is what Mao's successors will do. They will invoke Mao's Three Worlds Concept and the developmental implications of it in order to legitimate and defend policies that serve quite different purposes to those that Mao wanted to achieve, policies from the late 1970s onwards, that will serve the purposes of development rather than the purposes of global revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:11]]
<nowiki>[1:09:11]</nowiki>

There are other key developments during the Mao Era -- none more consequential than the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was purged in 1969, stripped of his official office, sent to work in a tractor factory in Xinjian Province.<ref>In the [[wikipedia:Deng Xiaoping#Cultural Revolution|Cultural Revolution section of the Wikipedia article on Deng Xiaoping]] there is, "In October 1969 Deng Xiaoping was sent to the Xinjian County Tractor Factory in rural Jiangxi province to work as a regular worker." The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Xinjian District}} says that it is a suburb of {{WPExtract|Nanchang}} which is the capital of {{WPExtract|Jiangxi}} Province.</ref> But in 1974, Deng Xiaoping reforms, sorry, he returns, he doesn't necessarily reform -- that's key. Deng returns -- unreformed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36 ]</nowiki>

Deng returns in part because Zhou Enlai promotes him. Zhou Enlai is really Deng Xiaoping's primary sponsor in the power structure in the late phase of the Cultural Revolution. And Zhou Enlai promotes Deng to become First Vice Premier of the Chinese state with particular responsibility for economic reform. This is a major return because Deng will of course become China's preeminent leader in a post Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:06 ]</nowiki>

The 1969 purge is not the last purge of Deng Xiaoping however. Deng is purged again in 1975. And that's really important. Because it tells us something about how fractious Chinese politics remain through to the end of the Maoist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:21 ]</nowiki>

At the instigation of rightists, sorry of left-wingers, of the radicals around Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, Deng is forced to sort of incriminate himself, to draw up a list of self-criticisms, to renounce his so-called ideological deviations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:39 ]</nowiki>

So up to the end of very Mao's life the conflict between the radicals around Mao's wife and the political moderates around Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping remains very fierce. And the second purge of Deng Xiaoping in 1975 is excellent sort of illustration of this point.

=== The Death of Mao Zedong and the Question of Succession ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:57 ]</nowiki>

Mao Zedong of course dies in September 1976. This is a really big, really, really big shift. Even more tumultuous perhaps than Stalin's death in 1953 had been. The Chinese revolution after all has been singularly associated since the 1920s with the personality and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao's death after fifty years...after twenty-five years of head of state, twenty-fives as a revolutionary leader, is a...dramatic and profound disjuncture in the history of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:33 ]</nowiki>

Who will succeed Mao Zedong? This is the big question. There are...a number of factions struggling for influence. Probably the most coherent is the radical faction, the {{WPExtract|Gang of Four}}, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:52 ]</nowiki>

At the same time there are anointed successors. The key anointed successor is {{WPExtract|Hua Guofeng}} -- who's the person who Mao designates as his heir as China's political leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:05 ]</nowiki>

Other however have claims to make besides. Deng Xiaoping, though he has recently been sort of exiled and purged can make a strong claim to being one of China's most effective and proven administrators. Deng has a record of proven accomplishment which will be you know very much to his advantage as China's political future is determined.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:27 ]</nowiki>

The succession is complex but let's try to trace out some of the you know key steps. Hua Guofeng, the anointed successor, moves initially against the radical left. And this is really key. Hua moves to purge the Gang of Four in late 1976. Just months after Mao dies the radicals are purged.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:50 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:50 ]</nowiki>

They're arrested. And a sort of campaign against the extreme left is set in motion. This is really consequential for Deng Xiaoping. Insofar as the radical left, the Gang of Four, had been sort of Deng's primary antagonistic, antagonist, their removal from the political scene creates opportunities for Deng to reassert himself. And this is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15 ]</nowiki>

The power struggle ceases to be three-way or power struggle between Hua, Deng, and the Gang of Four, and it becomes a sort of two-way conflict between Deng and Hua after the removal of the Gang of Four.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:29 ]</nowiki>

And here the you know conflict assumes a sort of ideological aspect. Hua Guofeng aligns himself very closely after the purge of the Gang of Four with Mao Zedong's legacy. Hua proclaims himself loyal to what he characterizes as the two whatevers. He says, and here I quote, whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon we shall resolutely defend, whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed we shall resolutely oppose.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:56 ]</nowiki>

So Hua, after Mao's death, presents himself as the heir not only of Mao's political role but also of Mao's ideological commitments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:08]]
<nowiki>[1:14:08]</nowiki>

Deng by contrast is much more pragmatic. Deng argues that policies should be grounded not in Maoist doctrine but in empirical evidence. That China needs to allow its you know policies to be determined by practice, what works and what doesn't, rather than by revolutionary ideology. Deng's cat theory: it doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat so long as it captures, catches mice, is you know sort of illustrative of Deng's pragmatism.

=== China Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:37 ]</nowiki>

Deng Xiaoping establishes control fairly quickly. The key event here is the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which takes place in December 1978. This is the moment at which Deng and his allies sort of outflank and overwhelm Hua Guofeng and his allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:57 ]</nowiki>

The Eleventh Central Committee is the sort of key turning point in China's history. At this meeting the Chinese Communist Party renounces basic Maoist revolutionary concepts. The concept of class struggle as the sort of key to history is quitetly discarded. The concept of continual revolution, the idea that the Communist Party needs to be waging a continual revolution, is also discarded -- instead pragmatic policies are embraced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:29 ]</nowiki>

It's as if the Communist Party decides that the revolution has been accomplished with the attainment of its own political power and that the task ahead is now to develop China, to make China strong and prosperous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:40 ]</nowiki>

These pragmatic policies will include economic deregulation and soon enough market oriented reforms. Equally consequential Deng Xiaoping visits the United States. The visit to the United States comes after a formal normalization of diplomatic relations which occurs at the beginning of January. It's negotiated in December 1978, but on the first of January 1979 the United States of America and China normalize diplomatic relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:09 ]</nowiki>

This is a major turning point. It signals a new sort of opening towards the United States a new kind of relationship between the people's republic and the United States.

=== Deng Xiaoping's Policy Towards the US Contrasted with Mao Zedong's Policy Towards the US ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:20 ]</nowiki>

It might be useful to compare and contrast Deng Xiaoping's US policy with Mao Zedong's US policy. What did the two leaders want to accomplish? Well, what Mao Zedong wanted to accomplish, in the context of a war scare with the Soviet Union, was a tactical alignment that would use the United States as a sort of counterweight to the Soviet Union to the advantage of Chinese diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:51 ]</nowiki>

What Deng contemplates is something entirely different. For Deng the opening to the United States is to be strategic rather than political. It's not just an alliance of convenience against the Soviet Union that Deng wants -- though we may note that Deng Xiaoping is fiercely anti-Soviet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:07]]
<nowiki>[1:17:07]</nowiki>

But what Deng wants is something more, far more far reaching than that. He wants to open not only China's sort of political alignments towards the United States but also China's economy, and ultimately China's society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:21 ]</nowiki>

When Deng travels to the United States, which he does in February 1979, he's extremely interested in American industry. He wants to visit factories, car factories, he pays a visit to the space program I think in Texas, and is you know immensely impressed with American high technology -- with American space technology as well as with technology aimed at ordinary consumers. And he seeks to realize for China a future based upon this American high technology model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:55 ]</nowiki>

In order to accomplish that Deng recognizes he will have to open China towards the United States, towards the West, towards the capitalist world. To do this he implements major structural reforms. Foreign investment will be solicited and encouraged. Market incentives will be opened. China in a sense will transition from having been...will transition from the status of a sort of autarkic communistic economy which is what China was, for, through the Maoist Era, to a relationship in which China will begin to reintegrate with the capitalist liberal open world economy that the United States tried to build after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:38 ]</nowiki>

An economy that was built in the West but which was of course divided by the advent of the Second World War. So this is a profound strategic realignment.

=== The Enabling of Market Reforms Under Deng Xiaoping ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:47 ]</nowiki>

How are we to explain it looking back? Let's conclude with some quick reflections. Why did Deng try to do what he did and why was he able to accomplish so much? We'll talk much more about reforms after 1980 in due course but at this stage let's just reflect on four points.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:05 ]</nowiki>

First socialization in China was always less advanced that it became in the Soviet Union. The socialist project by the mid-1970s was only twenty-five years old. The Great Leap Forward did not achieve everything that it wanted to achieve. The Communist Party found, when it looked carefully at the countryside, that the reach of socialization was very limited. That ordinary Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants, continued to display sort of entrepreneurial impulses, entrepreneurial habits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

In the 1960s this seemed disturbing to the leadership of the Communist Party. It was one of the reasons that the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was launched. But the limits of socialization will in due course facilitate a market oriented transformation of China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:56 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:56 ]</nowiki>

The disruption that the Cultural Revolution causes is also crucial. The Cultural Revolution does much of what Mao accomplish, wants is to accomplish, which is to sweep out the olds. Having swept out the olds the opportunity for new thinking, for new approaches is rather more open than it will be by contrast in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

The international reorientations are also crucial. Mao pursues an opening towards the United States for realistic even cynical purposes. Mao wants to bring the United States on board as a tactical asset against the Soviet Union.
But Mao's 1972 tactical opening towards the United States makes it possible for Deng Xiaoping to pursue a far more far reaching strategic opening towards the United States in 1979.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:47 ]</nowiki>

Finally we should be attentive to the subtle shift in Maoist discourse during the last phase of Mao's political career. The fact that Mao will be begin to emphasize development as well as revolution as a goal for China at home and in the world makes it possible for Mao's successors, preeminently for Deng Xiaoping, to orchestrate a transition from revolution to development and modernization as the overarching purpose of Chinese statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:15 ]</nowiki>

The consequences of this in the 1980s and beyond we'll come to in due course.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-03-15T03:22:54Z

DavidKitFriedman: Minor change to the first sentence. Adding that it's an experimental project, and that the transcripts are within a MediaWiki website.

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s

2022-03-09T08:03:00Z

DavidKitFriedman: "This is only one holistic system..." -> "There is only one holistic system..."

== Lecture Overview: Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, today we're going to be talking about globalization in the 1970s. We'll be covering some historical terrain which we've already traversed. But we'll be doing so with a view to a quite different set of historical themes. The big problem that I'm going to be concerned with today is the emergence of what I would characterize as a distinctive new era of globalization in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:24 ]]
<nowiki>[00:24]</nowiki>

You know insofar as I'm going to be dealing with technical topics please you know do feel free to raise your hands and ask if you have questions or would like any clarification. I'm going to try to make this as nontechnical as possible but if you know we end up dealing with technical terms that are perplexing then let me know and I will pause to [[wikt:elucidate|elucidate]] them.

== The Meaning of the Term Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:44 ]]
<nowiki>[00:44]</nowiki>

But I'd like to start with a term that is one of the most confounding terms that we're going to encounter today, and this of course is the term globalization itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:53 ]]
<nowiki>[00:53]</nowiki>

What is globalization? Is it just a phenomenon of the past you know two or three decades or does globalization have a longer history than that? Perhaps a much longer history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:05 ]]
<nowiki>[01:05]</nowiki>

This is a contentious issue. You know historians and political scientists and economists will disagree as to what globalization is and when it begins. It's not my purpose today to try to reconcile those competing definitions. That would be too difficult a task, but rather I should just try to lay out for you how I understand the term globalization. I think my sense of what globalization is probably in line with what most historians who've thought about globalization as a problem would understand that term to mean.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:37 ]]
<nowiki>[01:37]</nowiki>

And this is globalization as a long historical process of social and economic integration. Globalization is the long term sort of integration of societies, nation-states in the modern era, across space. It obviously has a technological aspect. Technology underpins the shrinkage of time and space that is a crucial aspect of globalization's advance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[02:05]</nowiki>

Over time globalization which involves the long term sort of expansion in the scale of social processes from a very local scale to a you know regional even global scale can produce what we might characterize as a increasing interdependence of societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:23 ]]
<nowiki>[02:23]</nowiki>

Interdependence is a term that is distinct from globalization but interdependence can be a state of affairs that globalization produces. As you know the scale of social processes expands as societies become meshed in ever thickening relationships of trade, financial transactions, social and cultural exchange, and so on then these societies can become more interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:48 ]]
<nowiki>[02:48]</nowiki>

And that is to say that developments in one society can have a determining impact on developments elsewhere. Interdependence involves a sort of meshing in the fates of social units.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:01 ]]
<nowiki>[03:01]</nowiki>

Of course when we talk about the modern era nation-states are the principle social units that we're talking about when we discuss globalization at the international scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:11 ]]
<nowiki>[03:11]</nowiki>

It's important when we talk about the history of globalization, even if it is a history that goes back a long way, to acknowledge that the term itself is of relatively recent coinage. It's not until the 1980s, really into the 1990s, that globalization becomes a subject of common discussion in the English language.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[03:32]</nowiki>

What I've have for you here on the slide show is a {{WPExtract|Google Ngram Viewer|Google Ngram}}. Do most of you know what the Google Ngram is?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[03:40]</nowiki>

Okay, the Google Ngram is a really cool tool.<ref>One could also take a look at some [[wikipedia:N-gram#Examples|examples of ''n''-grams in the Wikipedia ''n''-gram article.]]</ref> What it does is it allows you to plot on a time series chart the sort of frequency with which particular words are used in the entire canon of published English language books. As you know Google has been scanning you know sort of the corpus of English language literature held by major university libraries over a period of about ten years now.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:07 ]]
<nowiki>[04:07]</nowiki>

Most of this text has been digitized. And this allows us to see how the usage of particular terms has evolved over time. And this you know is a really good sort of tool for analyzing the evolution of discourse. How does the sort of frequency with which particular used words -- words are used evolve over time?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:27 ]]
<nowiki>[04:27]</nowiki>

And if you look at globalization you can see that globalization is really not used at all in the English language until the 1990s. This is 1990 on the chart. And the frequency with which the word globalization is used increases very dramatically from the early 1990s. So globalization is a term of very recent coinage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50 ]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

Interdependence, which is indicated in the blue line, goes back a lot longer in terms of the sort of frequency with which social scientists and historians and journalists you know really have used the term. Of course interdependence can mean a whole lot of things outside of the context of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:10 ]]
<nowiki>[05:10]</nowiki>

Interdependence when it appears in print can mean you know any number of things. It can be used in any number of contexts. The word globalization has a particular meaning that has to do with international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:22 ]]
<nowiki>[05:22]</nowiki>

So that's a you know quick footnote on the language. I don't know want to belabor that point but just remember that globalization is a relatively new term even if we use it to describe developments that go a long way back.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:34 ]]
<nowiki>[05:34]</nowiki>

In fact just to give you a second footnote on this point the first usage of the term globalization in the English language in print comes in the mid-1980s. It's used in an article in the ''Harvard Business Review''.<ref>The [https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets full text of "The Globalization of Markets" from May 1983] is available on the Harvard Business Review website.</ref>

== Globalization Over the Course of Time ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:48 ]]
<nowiki>[05:48]</nowiki>

But if we think about globalization not just as a phenomenon of recent years but rather as a very long term historical process we can date its origins much, much earlier. If globalization involves simply the expansion in the scale of social and economic processes from the local level to the world scale then globalization could be seen to have begun...as early as the earliest human civilizations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[06:18]</nowiki>

After all processes of sort of interregional trade are familiar to historians of the ancient world. You know one of the accomplishments that the Roman Empire achieves for example is to create a sort of integrated trading arena within the Mediterranean. Roman imperial power will make possible the linkage of North Africa to Europe via you know permanent trade routes. At least trade routes that endure as long as the empire does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:45 ]]
<nowiki>[06:45]</nowiki>

So globalization could be said to have a very old history. It has a history that dates back perhaps as far as the {{WPExtract|Silk Road}} -- at least so far as trade is concerned. If we expand our definition of globalization to include the movement of peoples as well as goods then we might think of the recurrent movements of people from the {{WPExtract|Eurasian Steppe}} into Western Europe and the Middle East as sort of demographic aspects of globalization's long history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:12 ]]
<nowiki>[07:12]</nowiki>

If we think about the diffusion of ideas and ideologies as part of globalization's history then there may be cause to consider the rise of Christianity from about two thousand years ago or the rise of Islam a little more recently than that as globalizing developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:24 ]]
<nowiki>[07:24]</nowiki>

As developments that produce a sort of convergence in belief systems across vast expanses of space. So globalization has a potentially very long history; it has a host of sort of ancient precursors depending of course on how we define it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:44]]
<nowiki>[07:44]</nowiki>

In the modern era globalization accelerates and expands in scope. 1492 is a really important year in the history of globalization. Because we talk about globalizing processes before 1492 we're really talking about developments within the Eurasian world. 1492 is a crucial date because with Columbus's discovery of the New World Eurasia and the America's effect, in effect, become sort of integrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:13]]
<nowiki>[08:13]</nowiki>

At least the moment of departure for a process of global reintegration occurs with the passage of the Columbine threshold. You can think for example about the reintegration of disease across the hemispheres as an example of that with the you know sort of transmission of smallpox to the Americas from Eurasia -- Americans -- which is to say -- indigenous Americans -- become sort of the subjects of an integrated global...environment for disease, and its transmission.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:50 ]]
<nowiki>[08:50]</nowiki>

So the Columbine threshold is important because it brings the Old World and the New together. It creates the possibility for the first time of an integrated global sort of arena on the world scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:04 ]]
<nowiki>[09:04]</nowiki>

Empire in the modern era is a crucial force that pushes forward the advance of globalization. Colonial empires build linkages between continents and between regions. The European trading companies: the {{WPExtract|East India Company|British East India Company}}, the {{WPExtract|Hudson's Bay Company|Hudson Bay Company}}, {{WPExtract|Dutch East India Company|the Dutch VOC, the Dutch East India Company}}, these are all you know sort of crucial builders of globalization. Empires build ships, they build railroads, they build the infrastructure that pulls the world together into a more convergent future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

Of course industrial technology is a crucial underpinning of this imperial era of globalization. As the you know sort of sailing ship is replaced in the 19th century by the steamship the pace of integration can quicken, the pace of global transportation increases, accelerates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:55 ]]
<nowiki>[09:55]</nowiki>

From approximately the 1860s forwards processes of globalization will produce conditions of accelerating and increasing interdependence among nation-states. Especially amongst the nation-states of the North Atlantic world. Globalization in the last decades of the 19th century is most pronounced within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:17 ]]
<nowiki>[10:17]</nowiki>

North America is the principle destination in the late 19th century for British foreign investment overseas. North America is the primary destination for European migrants. Migrants from Europe go elsewhere. They go to Latin America, they go to Australia, they go to New Zealand, but North America is the primary destination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36 ]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

And within the North American world thickening ties of capital mobility, of international trade, and of...demographic movement, the movement of peoples produce something resembling a sort of convergence of economic fortunes. And we can chart this by looking at the convergence of factor prices within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:00 ]]
<nowiki>[11:00]</nowiki>

In 1860 you know wage differentials between North America and Western Europe are very great. North Americans typically earn much, much higher wages then do North, then do West Europeans in 1860.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:13 ]]
<nowiki>[11:13]</nowiki>

By 1900 those differentials have begun to close somewhat. And the reason that they close of course is that Europeans migrate in you know millions and millions annually from Western Europe to North America. And this has an effect of tightening labor markets in North America and loosening labor markets in Western Europe such that the wage differentials you know sort of tend to diminish over time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:40 ]]
<nowiki>[11:40]</nowiki>

Through this era of late 19th century globalization the classical gold standard provides a sort of basic infrastructure as we've discussed for maintaining price stability amongst national currencies. This you know framework is something which makes possible and facilitates the advent of sort of integrative globalizing economic processes. The monetary, the gold standard, for example, reassures investors that the sort of value of investments is not likely to change over time as a consequence of currency price fluctuations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:17 ]]
<nowiki>[12:17]</nowiki>

So the classical gold standard provides a certain sort of institutional stability within which late 19th century globalization can proceed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[12:27]</nowiki>

In the 20th century however really interesting things happen. Globalization does not continue to accelerate. On the contrary globalization is reversed. The First World War is a big [[wikt:exogenous|exogenous]] shock.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:40 ]]
<nowiki>[12:40]</nowiki>

It -- doesn't have much to do with globalization in terms of its origins, the origins of the First World War have to do with the alliance system and Germany's bid for European mastery, but the First World War is nonetheless a sort of catastrophic moment of disrupture for the globalizing world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55 ]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

During the First World War the European belligerent powers throw up you know trade barriers, they throw up {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}}, they take their currencies off the gold standard. And they do all of these things in order to be able to manage their own economies so as to produce the maximal amount possible of war [[wikt:materiel|materiel]].

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:12 ]]
<nowiki>[13:12]</nowiki>

But the effect for the world economy is...a moment of deglobalization. The world economy ceases to integrate. Of course globalizing processes continue during the war and to some extent change direction. New opportunities for example for Latin American food producers arrive as a consequence of Europe's...catastrophic war, but the basic pattern is one of disruption in the second decade of the twentieth century as a consequence of the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:46 ]]
<nowiki>[13:46]</nowiki>

During the 1920s globalization is to some extent restored. This is something that you know we've discussed. There's a restoration of the classical gold standard. Trade begins to pick up from the mid-1920s onwards. But this will be a very fleeting resurgence. The Great Depression really puts an end to a class -- the era of classical globalization. And makes deglobalization permanent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:10 ]]
<nowiki>[14:10]</nowiki>

In the early 1930s countries throw up very substantial barriers to international trade. The {{WPExtract|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act|Smoot–Hawley Tariff}} in the United States is one example of that but it has parallels elsewhere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:21 ]]
<nowiki>[14:21]</nowiki>

International trade grinds to a halt. Governments take their countries off the gold standard and manipulate sort of national currencies with little regard to the international consequences thereof.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:33 ]]
<nowiki>[14:33]</nowiki>

Whether the gold -- world economy can ever be put back together again does not appear entirely obvious at the end of the 1930s. The world has substantially deglobalized. Nation-states have turned in upon themselves. They've become economically more autonomous than ever before.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:50 ]]
<nowiki>[14:50]</nowiki>

It's in this context, as we've discussed, that the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}} tries to orchestrate a qualified reglobalization of the world economy. It was certainly the objective of British and American policy planners at Bretton Woods to establish a framework in which international trade could resume.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:10 ]]
<nowiki>[15:10]</nowiki>

It's one of the reasons that the policy planners who create the Bretton Woods system are so anxious to restore a modicum of international currency stability. Because currency stability is widely believed to be a prerequisite for international trade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:23 ]]
<nowiki>[15:23]</nowiki>

But the Bretton Woods reestablishment of globalization is sharply qualified by a commitment to maintain the macroeconomic autonomy of nation-states. And this is where Keynes's influence on the postwar settlement is pronounced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[15:40]</nowiki>

Keynes argues of course that in order for governments to manage their own economies so as to sustain full employment governments need to be able to work the levers of economic policy -- those levers being fiscal policy and monetary policy. An effective manipulation of fiscal and monetary policy depends upon a certain degree of separation between the national economy and the world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:01 ]]
<nowiki>[16:01]</nowiki>

If your domestic economy is entirely open to international movements of capital for example then it's very, very difficult to regulate a national monetary policy. Because the monetary policy determines the supply of money in the economy and if your borders are open to you know foreign funds washing in and out of your economy then you really can't control your monetary policy on your own terms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:25 ]]
<nowiki>[16:25]</nowiki>

You may have some influence over the sort of direction in which international funds flow whether they flow into or out of your economy but your sort of magnitude of control will be much less in an open market economy than it is in a closed market economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:41 ]]
<nowiki>[16:41]</nowiki>

And Bretton Woods tries to strike a compromise between sort of reglobalization on the one hand and national economic autonomy on the other. And this is really crucial. It's sort of the basis of the postwar economic settlement -- a settlement which tries to combine aspects of market economics with aspects of planned economics in the capitalist West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:04 ]]
<nowiki>[17:04]</nowiki>

This is the mixed economy. This is the economy which we've been talking about. We've talked about the mixed economy sort of within a comparative framework by looking at the experience of different West European economies and comparing them to the United States, but the Bretton Woods framework as I've explained is the international framework within which the mixed economy can flourish. And it's a framework that begins with a compromise between globalization and national policy autonomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:34 ]]
<nowiki>[17:34]</nowiki>

The 1970s are a decade of crucial disjuncture for this postwar compromise. It's in the 1970s that this compromise between the mixed -- this compromise between sort of capitalism and planning, the so-called mixed economy begins to come apart.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:51 ]]
<nowiki>[17:51]</nowiki>

And this process of, you know, deconstruction occurs both within nation-states as the mixed economy compromise breaks down, and at the international level as the Bretton Woods framework breaks down and is replaced by something you know sort of altogether new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:10 ]]
<nowiki>[18:10]</nowiki>

This you know passage from an era of planned capitalist economics to an era of relatively sort of free market economics that occurs during the 1970s is a critical disjuncture for the capitalist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:25 ]]
<nowiki>[18:25]</nowiki>

And it you know can be traced both at the international scale and at the scale of particular national experience. But situated within a larger historical context this disjuncture looks like a really important moment in the larger history of globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:41 ]]
<nowiki>[18:41]</nowiki>

If the mid-20th century from the 1930s through to the 1960s was an era in which globalization was held at bay, held at bay by controls, held at bay by restrictions on the movement of capital and goods, then the 1970s are a period in which globalization accelerates once again. In which the world begins to reglobalize after a long mid-20th century phase in which globalization is held by you know the consensus of governments at bay.

== Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:13 ]]
<nowiki>[19:13]</nowiki>

What are the basic dynamics of globalization in the 1970s? What was globalization in the 1970s? Well globalization in the 1970s is much the same as it had been in the late 19th century. It's a set of processes that tends over time to integrate societies and their economies. Globalization involves in the 1970s, as it had done in the late 19th century, a growing awareness of the basic interdependence of nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:42 ]]
<nowiki>[19:42]</nowiki>

The dynamics of this globalization include the rise of international trade and financial flows. These economic vectors are crucial to the production of a more sort of globalized international economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:57 ]]
<nowiki>[19:57]</nowiki>

But they're not the only signs that a new era of globalization might be taking shape. Economic vectors are very important to the production of economic interdependence. But there's much more to the globalizing shift of the 1970s than that. We might think about sort of the rise of global concerns. Human rights, an issue that we've talked about, is in some aspects a global issue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:21 ]]
<nowiki>[20:21]</nowiki>

Right, the proponents of international human rights proclaim that rights are not a subject for nation-states anymore, that rights are an issue for the international community, that your rights are the same whether you happen to live in Syria or in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:36 ]]
<nowiki>[20:36]</nowiki>

And this is a globalizing shift. It's a globalizing shift in sort of legal discourse. It's a globalizing shift in the scope of rights claims. For most of the modern era the idea of rights had been utterly entwined with the nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[20:52]</nowiki>

It was nation-states that bestowed rights and defended them. Well, the {{WPExtract|Universal Declaration of Human Rights|Universal Declaration in 1948}} signals a sort of move to the global scale but it's in the 1970s that a political, and even a social movement to affirm and uphold that shift in the scale of human rights from the nation-state to the world as a whole really occurs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:12 ]]
<nowiki>[21:12]</nowiki>

So human rights are a global concern that sort of hinge on the 1970s. But there are other global issues too. It's in the 1970s that global environmentalism really takes off as a political movement. Awareness of the basic unity of the planet's biosphere is one factor as we'll discuss that helps to inform a new age of environmental activism and consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:35 ]]
<nowiki>[21:35]</nowiki>

There is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> a glowing awareness that the world, in the, there is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> in the 1970s a growing awareness, that the world constitutes an integrated whole, that the world is not just a patchwork of nation-states. each of which is basically independent and autonomous, that the world constitutes something like an integrated and cohesive system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:57]]
<nowiki>[21:57]</nowiki>

Now this awareness is more pronounced in some spheres of human activity than in others. It's easier to make a you know case for the cohesiveness of the planet's ecology perhaps than it is to make a case for the integration of the world economy, which is you know less tangible. But this basic awareness that the world is integrating, that its fate is you know somehow entwined, is a sort of critical marker of globalization's ascent during the 1970s. Consciousness is very important to the history of globalization.

== The Earthrise Moment ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:32 ]]
<nowiki>[22:32]</nowiki>

Here no single moment is more you know evocative perhaps than you know what I would call the {{WPExtract|Earthrise|Earthrise Moment}}, the moment in December 1968 when Apollo 8 circumnavigates the moon, and takes a picture of the earth from space. And this is the picture that forms the backdrop to this slide.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52 ]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

[[File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24 1022x1024.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Photograph of Planet Earth taken on December 24, 1968 by NASA astronaut William Anders during the Apollo 8 mission (downloaded from [[commons:Main_Page|Wikimedia Commons]]).]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:54 ]]
<nowiki>[22:54]</nowiki>

The ''Earthrise'' image as this becomes known, the photograph is called ''Earthrise'', is not the first image of the world to be taken from space. You know satellites in the 1960s take photographs and return them to earth. But what you get from going to the moon is not only soil samples you also get a unique vantage point on life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:13 ]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

And this is what ''Earthrise'' presents -- a view of the earth as seen from another celestial body -- from the moon.

{{#ev:youtube|https://youtu.be/dE-vOscpiNc||center|Video from NASA reenacting the taking of the ''Earthrise'' photograph (1m 38s excerpt)||start=213&end=321}}

<br />
<br />

And this image becomes very quickly one of the twentieth centuries most iconic images. Lyndon Johnson who's President of the United States at the time of the Apollo 8 expedition sends a copy to every head of state in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:34 ]]
<nowiki>[23:34]</nowiki>

The image adorns a postage stamp in 1969 -- the next year. And the image has profound political implications. What does the image signify? What does it reveal? What does it not reveal?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:48 ]]
<nowiki>[23:48]</nowiki>

The image does not reveal political borders. When you look at the earth from space you don't see nation-states. You don't even see...you know, well, I guess you do see continents, but you don't see...(laughs) (laughter from the class), you don't, but you don't see, a, you don't see the difference between Europe and Asia. You can't really see that when you look at the world from space.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:10 ]]
<nowiki>[24:10]</nowiki>

You see only...you know land and sea and clouds. You see...an integrated ecological unit. You don't see a world divided into sort of politics of nation-states. You don't see an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. You don't see a Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:30 ]]
<nowiki>[24:30]</nowiki>

All you see is an integrated biosphere floating in vast empty space. Of course I know space isn't really empty but this isn't a physics class...so...(laughter from the class).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:40 ]]
<nowiki>[24:40]</nowiki>

And this political, you know, these political implications, are you know very powerful ones, and they help to animate in the 1970s a sense that the world is becoming a singular entity, perhaps that it is a singular entity and needs to be governed and led as such.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:00 ]]
<nowiki>[25:00]</nowiki>

This image -- ''Earthrise'' -- becomes the sort of visual counterpart to a set of discursive claims that you know futurists and visionaries make for the unity of Planet Earth. And this is a theme which you know predates the taking of the photograph itself.

== Futurists and Visionaries on the Unity of Planet Earth ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:17 ]]
<nowiki>[25:17]</nowiki>

During, in 1964, {{WPExtract|Marshall McLuhan}}, sort of media studies scholar, an iconic scholar in the intellectual history of the postwar world, calls the world a {{WPExtract|Global village|global village}}. It's a you know notion that is intended to capture a basic you know sort of interdependence in the affairs of the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:37 ]]
<nowiki>[25:37]</nowiki>

McLuhan argues that the world is you know shrinking as a consequence of you know globalizing processes, the shrinkage of time and space as a consequence of technological innovation, and as a consequence the entire world is coming to resemble a village -- a village in which social life is integrated and interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:54 ]]
<nowiki>[25:54]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Buckminster Fuller}}, an architect and futurist, describes the planet as {{WPExtract|Spaceship Earth}} in 1967. This has a somewhat different set of implications. What Fuller is trying to communicate when he describes the world as Spaceship Earth is the idea that the world...exists kind of alone in space as a finite unit, as a unit with finite resources. Fuller argues that you know political leaders need to be much more aware than they are of the basic limits to the expansion of you know sort of material life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:29 ]]
<nowiki>[26:29]</nowiki>

He says that the world is like a spaceship that is traveling through space and contains only limited supplies. How are those supplies to be conserved and marshaled over time? This is one of the you know sort of conservationist implications that McLuhan pulls -- sorry -- that Buckminster Fuller takes out of the idea that the Earth is a sort of solitary spaceship traveling through the universe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:51 ]]
<nowiki>[26:51]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Lester R. Brown|Lester Brown}}, a Canadian ecologist and diplomat, publishes a book in 1972 titled ''World Without Borders''. Brown is probably more of a pragmatist than either McLuhan or Fuller were but he is no less attentive to a sort of new category of public policy issues that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:11 ]]
<nowiki>[27:11]</nowiki>

Issues that transcend and transgress the borders of nation-states. Issues like you know sort of the global food supply, global population growth, global pollution and so on. I mean these are issues which are becoming increasingly urgent topics of concern in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:27]]
<nowiki>[27:27]</nowiki>

And this photograph really captures how...an evolving consciousness of planetary interdependence might have sort of you know led contemporaries in the 1970s to conclude that global integration demanded new kinds of solutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:49 ]]
<nowiki>[27:49]</nowiki>

So globalization in the 1970s is an intellectual and a perceptual phenomenon as well as an economic one. It's a very complex phenomenon that involves you know sort of processes of integration and accelerating interdependence.

== Questions On Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03 ]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Why did this globalization occur? Was it a consequence of specific choices? Could we see political leaders perhaps as having chosen globalization? Did business leaders push them in this direction?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:19 ]]
<nowiki>[28:19]</nowiki>

Or was globalization something that occurred more as a process of structural change beyond the capacity of sovereign power to orchestrate or promote? This is a very basic question and it's a question which remains very divisive amongst social scientists who study globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:36 ]]
<nowiki>[28:36]</nowiki>

To put it very crudely I would suggest that sort of liberals, people who, accept that the world as it is, you know, presently constituted is more or less the sort of optimal state in which it can be constituted see globalization as a natural or inevitable process, a process that is brought about by structural changes outside of the control of, you know, individual nations or you know sovereign powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:05 ]]
<nowiki>[29:05]</nowiki>

Political radicals on the other hand are probably more inclined to see globalization as the achievement of specific policy choices. You know insofar as the...radical left is critical of globalization the proposition that globalization represents the accomplishment of specific policy choices is an appealing one because it carries with it the implication that different choices could produce a different ordering of global political and economic affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:32 ]]
<nowiki>[29:32]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of political aspect to this question of whether globalization is a choice or not. I don't want to get too caught up in the politics of it today but I wanted just to sort of draw your attention to that point as we consider this very fundamental question. You know to what extent is globalization chosen or to what extent is it produced by structural forces outside of the power of nations and political and economic leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:57 ]]
<nowiki>[29:57]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with {{WPExtract|Neoliberalism|neoliberalism}}? Well, here's a loaded question. What is neoliberalism? Well, we could think of neoliberalism as a set of economic policies that emphasize market determination over determination by government -- as a sort of -- as the optimal means to produce economic outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:18 ]]
<nowiki>[30:18]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with neoliberalism? We'll come back to this question but it's a question that you should bear in mind as we proceed forwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:27 ]]
<nowiki>[30:27]</nowiki>

Finally, what was the scope of globalization in the 1970s? Where did globalization occur? This is a point that is worth thinking about carefully. Insofar as we defined globalization as a process that involves rising interdependence, the acceleration and expansion of transnational movements of goods and ideas and money, it doesn't necessarily follow that globalization affects the entire planet at an even rate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:58 ]]
<nowiki>[30:58]</nowiki>

We should be open to the possibility that globalization was more pronounced among certain countries or within certain regions than it was among others. And my argument about the 1970s would be that globalization in the 1970s was really a phenomenon that occurred among the advanced industrial economies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:18]]
<nowiki>[31:18]</nowiki>

That it is to say within the {{WPExtract|OECD}} world. The OECD is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It encompasses Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:30 ]]
<nowiki>[31:30]</nowiki>

So when we talk about the OECD world we're really talking about sort of the advanced industrial West -- if you want to call it that. And globalization in the '70s was most pronounced among these countries. Later on from the 1980s and subsequently...the rest of the world will come to participate in globalization, but in this initial sort of break through phase it's most pronounced within the OECD universe.

== Questions Overview: Global Dilemmas, Economic Interdependence, Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58 ]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

Okay, well, we're going to try to do today then is...go through the history of this globalizing shift. And I'm going to basically...take you through three aspects of this you know sort of big development that we call globalization. I don't think this this can be a comprehensive history but hopefully I can give you a sense of some of the different aspects to globalization as it proceeds during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:26 ]]
<nowiki>[32:26]</nowiki>

We have about 15 minutes for each theme so we'll try to keep this succinct. First, I want to talk about the emerging awareness in the 1970s of global issues -- that is to say policy dilemmas that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:40 ]]
<nowiki>[32:40]</nowiki>

This is a development that we might call the Shock of the Global. It's a title of a book that I had some involvement with: [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674061866 ''The Shock of the Global''] -- developments that pertain to the world as a whole -- global phenomena, global problems, global issues. How do they strike or shock the policy arena? The world of nation-states in the 1970s? That's our first question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:01 ]]
<nowiki>[33:01]</nowiki>

Second question has to do with the emergence and development of economic interdependence among the advanced capitalist countries, among the countries of the OECD world, how did it happen? What were its you know most important phenomena or symptoms?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:17 ]]
<nowiki>[33:17]</nowiki>

Finally, we're going to talk about the transformation of capitalism in the 1970s. Or the transformation of capitalist economies from the mixed economy synthesis that still is very successful, or appears very successful, at the beginning of the 1970s to the more market oriented policy formulae that nation-states are beginning to embrace at the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:40 ]]
<nowiki>[33:40]</nowiki>

How do we get from the sort of Keynesian world of the 1970s to the world in the 1980s in which sort of so-called neoliberal solutions, more market oriented solutions, are displacing the old Keynesian mixed economy consensus?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:56 ]]
<nowiki>[33:56]</nowiki>

That's our third theme -- the transformation of capitalism. As we work through this I want you to you know reflect upon a number of big questions. How was the world changing? You know what are the big contours of global change during the 1970s? What are the consequences of global integration, of globalization even, for international relations? What does this mean for the basic configuration of international order? What does it mean for the configuration of the international economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:23 ]]
<nowiki>[34:23]</nowiki>

And what are the consequences for individual nation-states? How different does globalization look if we view if from the perspective of a particular nation as opposed from looking at it at the world scale?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:35 ]]
<nowiki>[34:35]</nowiki>

There are other urgent questions too. How did globalization spread beyond the OECD economies to encompass the developing world? A theme of the 1980s and 1990s. What have been globalization's consequences?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:49 ]]
<nowiki>[34:49]</nowiki>

Has globalization made the world happier and more affluent or has it produced unequal, you know, sort of distributions of wealth and you know economic responsibilities? These are questions which will have to wait for our next lecture on globalization on I think April 22nd. It's going to be the lecture titled Contesting Globalization. Today we're going to focus on the sort of early phase of globalization's acceleration during the 1970s.

== Global Dilemmas ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:18 ]]
<nowiki>[35:18]</nowiki>

Okay, global dilemmas. What are global problems? What was the Shock of the Global in the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

You know global problems, global dilemmas, could be construed very simply as the set of problems that escape the managerial regulatory capacities of individual nation-states. They are problems that affect the world as a whole. They might also be construed as problems that attract the attention of the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:47 ]]
<nowiki>[35:47]</nowiki>

You know this is more contestable but there's an argument to be made that issues that unfold within a local or national context but which attract you know sort of global attention and perhaps demand a global response, a famine in sub-Saharan Africa for example, are global issues of a different kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:06 ]]
<nowiki>[36:06]</nowiki>

But what kinds of issue are we talking about when we talk about issues that affect the world as a whole?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:12 ]]
<nowiki>[36:12]</nowiki>

Are there issues that, you know, besides climate change or you know sort of global ecological catastrophe that would seem to you to be global issues of a sort that affect you know multiple nations or perhaps the entire world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:26 ]]
<nowiki>[36:26]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:27 ]]
<nowiki>[36:27]</nowiki>

Yeah, nuclear weapons is a really good one. The possibility of nuclear war is obviously a very global problem.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:36 ]]
<nowiki>[36:36]</nowiki>

Disease is also terrific, you know global public health, because disease respects no barriers of sovereignty, no distinctions between one nation-state and another. Disease that was you know prominent amongst the concerns with which you know sort of policymakers had to grapple, have had to grapple, as the world has become more integrated.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:57 ]]
<nowiki>[36:57]</nowiki>

Energy is also a terrific global issue insofar as the world's energy resources are distributed unequally across space, as is the world's demand for energy, the...process of bringing sort of energy resources to market is an implicitly global dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:18 ]]
<nowiki>[37:18]</nowiki>

We might about other issues that don't necessarily affect the ecological fortune of the planet, but which lie beyond the capacities of sovereign nation-states as being global issues of sorts. You know the illegal drug trade is one good example of an issue that really lies outside of the competence of any nation-state to regulate and manage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:36 ]]
<nowiki>[37:36]</nowiki>

Terrorism is an issue that, you know, sort of lies outside of the capacity of singular nation-states. It requires cooperation amongst nations if it to be effectively engaged and redressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:48 ]]
<nowiki>[37:48]</nowiki>

Why did these kinds of issues attract rising attention in the the 1970s? There are a variety of possible explanations. It could be because they were becoming more urgent. Perhaps the global environment attracted more attention in the 1970s because the rate of its degradation was accelerating.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:04]]
<nowiki>[38:04]</nowiki>

But it's also possible that global issues attracted rising attention in 1970s because of the emerging global consciousness that the ''Earthrise'' photograph signified -- that people like Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan were working hard to cultivate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:21 ]]
<nowiki>[38:21]</nowiki>

So global consciousness can sort of feed engagement with global issues. It's also possible that the diminution of Cold War tensions during the 1970s played a role in creating space in the policy arena for global issues to stake their claim.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:38 ]]
<nowiki>[38:38]</nowiki>

As the urgency of Cold War containment, for example, lessened in the United States, there was more and more time available for policymakers both in the Executive Branch and in the Legislature to pay attention to so-called sort of global issues.

=== The Rise of Global Environmentalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:54 ]]
<nowiki>[38:54]</nowiki>

So the reasons for this are complicated. Let's talk about some specific issues. I'm going to talk first of all about the rise of global environmentalism. We could at the outset draw a distinction between two different kinds of ecological globalization. We might think about the ways in which sort of local environmental catastrophes attract global or transnational opinion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:20 ]]
<nowiki>[39:20]</nowiki>

And indeed oil spills in the 1970s, in particular places, in places like California, in Cornwall off the west coast of England attract global attention. They become sort of, at least for a brief moment, global issues on which international attention fixates. This is significant.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:39 ]]
<nowiki>[39:39]</nowiki>

The fact that you know international audiences are paying more attention during the 1970s to you know for example the deforestation of the Amazon is illustrative of a sort of developing global ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52]</nowiki>

The deforestation of the Amazon may have you know sort of consequences for the global environment as a whole. But it's really a sort of local issue at least in its locus. It affects you know northeastern Brazil primarily. That it is becoming, you know, sort of an increasingly global issue during the 1970s reflects one sort of globalization, a rising sort of international attentiveness, to particular environmental issues or catastrophes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:23 ]]
<nowiki>[40:23]</nowiki>

But there's a second kind of ecological globalization going on during the 1970s and this will involve the rise of concern, or growing concern, with issues affecting the international...ecology as a whole. For example the rise of concern with chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs, in the world's atmosphere is a very global dilemma. CFCs affect not individual nation-states but the entire planet earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:53 ]]
<nowiki>[40:53]</nowiki>

Population growth will be another sort of ecological issue that in the eyes of contemporaries during the 1970s affects the world as a whole and demands global policy responses.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07]</nowiki>

Why was ecological consciousness rising in the 1970s? Why did it rise in the West? Why did in the rise in the United States in particular?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:18 ]]
<nowiki>[41:18]</nowiki>

To some extent the growth of sort of ecological consciousness during the 1970s is a legacy of the 1960s -- of the political and social mobilizations associated with that decade. It might be a legacy even of the counterculture that developed during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:33 ]]
<nowiki>[41:33]</nowiki>

Probably no single published book is more influential upon the rise of an organized environment movement in the United States at least than {{WPExtract|Rachel Carson|Rachel Carson's}} {{WPExtract|Silent Spring|Silent Spring}} -- a book that documented the adverse effects of pollution upon the American ecosystem.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:50 ]]
<nowiki>[41:50]</nowiki>

Whether as a consequence of sort of activism or simply awareness the 1970s bring a rise in sort of organized political mobilizations on behalf of the global environment. New organizations are created. {{WPExtract|Greenpeace}} for example is founded in 1971 with its mission being to protect the Earth's ecology against the encroachment of human activity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:19]]
<nowiki>[42:19]</nowiki>

Environmentalism becomes a popular political cause during the 1970s. The first {{WPExtract|Earth Day}} is held in 1970, and it attracts massive participation. Some 20 million Americans participate in the first Earth Day, so this is one marker of sort of rising ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:38]]
<nowiki>[42:38]</nowiki>

In 1972 the United Nations holds its first international conference on environmental problems which is a marker of how sort of environmentalism is becoming a prominent issue on the global stage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:52 ]]
<nowiki>[42:52]</nowiki>

Where does this awareness come from? Is it just driven by politics? Is it just driven by sort of consciousness? Perhaps. Technology I would suggest also plays an important role in shaping public and political awareness of environmental issues. Space photography as we've already discussed affords a new perspective on Planet Earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:12 ]]
<nowiki>[43:12]</nowiki>

Computers allow scientists to model climate change. So this is an important development. Before computers become cheap enough to be situated in university laboratories it's really difficult for climatologists to develop plausible models of global climate change.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:28 ]]
<nowiki>[43:28]</nowiki>

Once that technology is more readily available then the range of you know sort of opportunities for climate scientists expands.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37]</nowiki>

Satellite imagery also affords sort of kind of a useful research tool. It allows scientists to map deforestation over time because you can take photographs of say the Brazilian rainforest and see how the scope of the forest is retreating in the face of tract farming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:55 ]]
<nowiki>[43:55]</nowiki>

So there are a number of you know sort of developments that go into the production of a ecological environmental moment in the 1970s -- a moment in which rising attention is being paid to the earth's environment and to humankind's fraught relationship with it.

==== Limits to Growth Debate ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:12 ]]
<nowiki>[44:12]</nowiki>

One of the most prominent sort of themes in this global environmental moment of the 1970s will be the limits to growth debate that hinges on the early decades of the 1970s. The limits to growth debate is particularly concerned with population growth though it also emcompasses other forms of economic growth too -- the expansion of industrial production and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:39 ]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

As we think about the sort of discourse on growth and it limits in the 1970s it's important to begin by reminding ourself that population growth and economic growth are from the global perspective overriding themes of the postwar experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:54 ]]
<nowiki>[44:54]</nowiki>

The world's population grows very, very quickly from what, under 3 billion in 1950 to...close to over 4 billion by 1970. Economic growth you know sort of proceeds more or less in tandem with population growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:15 ]]
<nowiki>[45:15]</nowiki>

The world's GDP increases too. And all of this growth creates sort of widespread concern as to...how sustainable growth is. Can the world's population continue to grow at these impressive rates or will growth at some point hit inexorable and inevitable limits, and what then will be the consequences? Will the world's food supply, for example, sustain its rising population or will a growing population at some point face an inevitable famine produced by you know a population increase that expands beyond the capacity of the world to feed it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:53 ]]
<nowiki>[45:53]</nowiki>

These are the issues that the {{WPExtract|Club of Rome}} grapples with in its 1972 report {{WPExtract|The Limits to Growth|''The Limit to Growth''}}<ref>Note that the title is actually ''The Limits to Growth''.</ref>. The Club of Rome is an informal assemblage of demographers and environmentalists, scientists, that convenes in the early 1970s and produces a report that attracts widespread international attention.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:13 ]]
<nowiki>[46:13]</nowiki>

''The Limits to Growth'' argues that the world's population and economic growth rates are unsustainable and it predicts catastrophe if these basic rates of growth are not slowed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:23 ]]
<nowiki>[46:23]</nowiki>

It argues that policymakers need to strive to achieve a so-called stable equilibrium, a situation in which the world's population will not grow, in which there will be zero growth. To achieve this the Club of Rome proposes global management of the world's demographic growth. It's a basic assumption of the Club of Rome that international growth cannot be managed at the national level.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:48 ]]
<nowiki>[46:48]</nowiki>

That global dilemmas demand global solutions. So there's a political implication to this. And it is that nation-states are unable of responding adequately to new global dilemmas.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:00 ]]
<nowiki>[47:00]</nowiki>

Is population growth a security threat? What are its implications for matters of war and peace? This is a question that the United States government actually grapples with. In 1974 the national security council of the United States produces a very lengthy report on population growth as a national security dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:17]]
<nowiki>[47:17]</nowiki>

And the US government concludes that population growth will lead to rising food shortages in the developing world, that these will produce political instability, and that the consequences will be upheaval, that you know could be disadvantageous to the national interests of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:34 ]]
<nowiki>[47:34]</nowiki>

So much as national security specialists in recent years have begin to engage with global climate change as a national security threat so too did national security specialists in the 1970s address population growth as a sort of national security challenge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:51 ]]
<nowiki>[47:51]</nowiki>

If this is the threat what is to be done about it? How can the world's population be controlled or managed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:59 ]]
<nowiki>[47:59]</nowiki>

The developing countries, you know, emphasize contraception and family planning as the means to control a accelerating or expanding global population. They promote these policies with particular regard to the developing world. Here of course reactions will be somewhat mixed. China is an interesting case because China decides of its own volition to support you know policies to control and limit the growth of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:29 ]]
<nowiki>[48:29]</nowiki>

In 1978 China implements a {{WPExtract|One-child policy|one-child policy}}. This is a policy that repudiates Mao Zedong's conviction that there could never be too many Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong saw population growth as a source of national strength. But in 1978 the post-Maoist regime rebukes, you know, this view very powerfully.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:51]]
<nowiki>[48:51]</nowiki>

It introduces a one-child policy, a policy that is often brutal in its implementation and in its consequences, but which does succeed in ending China's long history of recurrent food catastrophe. Famines were until 1978 a recurrent aspect of China's historical experience. After 1978, or since 1978, China has not experienced a famine. And China has been better able to feed itself since making a sort of self-conscious decision to limit the expansion of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:23 ]]
<nowiki>[49:23]</nowiki>

But other developing countries are much less enthusiastic than China is to limit their growth in the name of global stability. Developing countries ask, quite reasonably, why should we impose limits on our growth, when the West has grown over a period of centuries within any limits to its growth? The population of Britain expands for example from about 5 to 6 million at the beginning of the 19th century to 30 million by the end of the 19th century. That's a six fold increase over a period of a hundred years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:57]]
<nowiki>[49:57]</nowiki>

Why should developing countries not have the opportunity to expand like Britain has done? To industrialize like Britain has done? From their perspective, which are national perspectives, the imperatives of national growth take precedence over the regulation of the world's population as a whole.

===== The Green Revolution =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16]</nowiki>

Of course the catastrophe that is predicted by the Club of Rome does not come to pass -- at least not yet. It doesn't come to pass in the 1970s. The limits to growth are avoided, or at least the limits are moved.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:29]]
<nowiki>[50:29]</nowiki>

To explain this we need to think about how global agricultural production develops during the 1970s. One of the critical innovations of this decade is a set of associated transformations in agricultural practices in the developing world that are collectively known as the {{WPExtract|Green Revolution}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:49 ]]
<nowiki>[50:49]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution involves high yield varieties of grain, the pioneer of which, probably the most important pioneer of which, is the agronomist {{WPExtract|Norman Borlaug}} pictured in the slide. Perhaps the most important you know figure in the history of the twentieth century whom you've never heard of.

[[File:Norman Borlaug, 2004 (cropped).jpg|thumb|250px|center|Norman Borlaug in 2004]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:05 ]]
<nowiki>[51:05]</nowiki>

How many of you had heard of Norman Borlaug before? Okay, one or two. I mean this is a man whose sort of consequence for world history I mean far, far outweighs the reach of his reputation. The high yield grain varieties which he pioneers at the University of Iowa -- I mean are...above all what enables the developing world to escape the {{WPExtract|Malthusianism|Malthusian}} trap that the Club of Rome prophesies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:30 ]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

But high yield grain varieties are not all that the Green Revolution depends upon. Fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and the mechanization of agriculture all help to expand grain yields.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:42 ]]
<nowiki>[51:42]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution has transformative consequences for global food production. It enables the increase of agricultural production by a factor of about two or three. So production of food per hectare of land can double or even triple thanks to the application of these advanced farming techniques.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:02 ]]
<nowiki>[52:02]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution on a global scale represents the ecological equivalent of discovering an entirely new North America. It's as if you could create another, you know, continent the size of North America, stick it in the Pacific Ocean and use it to grow food on. That's what the green revolution accomplishes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:19 ]]
<nowiki>[52:19]</nowiki>

So the Green Revolution will allow a growing world to feed itself. Of course the Green Revolution is a one-time fix. You can't continue to expand grain yields beyond the levels that are attained or, you know, in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:35]]
<nowiki>[52:35]</nowiki>

So whether the dire warnings that the club of Rome offered in the early 1970s are you know still relevant just to a different generation, perhaps our generation, as opposed to the generation of our parents, is an interesting question. It's a discomforting question too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:53 ]]
<nowiki>[52:53]</nowiki>

Because the quick fix that the Green Revolution offered will not necessarily be so easy to achieve as global population once again approaches the limits of global food production. Still the Green Revolution in its own time represents a important, you know, vitally important, accomplishment. It's benefits are particularly pronounced for the developing world.

=== The Economic Divergence Between the West and the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:19 ]]
<nowiki>[53:19]</nowiki>

Of course in larger terms the developing world continues to lag behind the advanced industrial West. What this chart shows you is GDP per capita organized on a regional basis over the entire second half of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:37]]
<nowiki>[53:37]</nowiki>

And what the data shows is that during the 1970s the developing world continues to lag behind the countries of Western Europe, and you know what I've identified here as the Western offshoots -- North America, Australia, and New Zealand -- the settler societies populated primarily by Europeans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:59 ]]
<nowiki>[53:59]</nowiki>

These Western countries continue to proceed far ahead of the developing world. And this divergence in human realities at a time of rising awareness of planetary integration is an awkward thing, it's an uncomfortable thing, and it's a challenge that leaders of developing world countries strive to overcome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:23 ]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

At a time when developing countries are becoming more modern, when literacy is spreading, when inhabitants of developing societies are beginning to have you know expanded access to television, television that affords a window on Western lifestyles, human aspirations in the 1970s are beginning to converge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:43 ]]
<nowiki>[54:43]</nowiki>

And this is a really important theme which attracts you know quite widespread attention in the sort of international relations scholarship of the era: convergent human aspirations in a time of widespread modernization. But the disjoint between the convergence of human aspirations and the ongoing divergence of human realities is striking. Even as the world is becoming one the West continues to have a whole lot more than the developing world does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:14 ]]
<nowiki>[55:14]</nowiki>

Westernerns continue to have more than their counterparts in the developing world. How are these basic inequalities to be overcome? The experience of the 1970s offers few answers. Developing economies continue to adhere to the ISI led growth strategies which had been so popular for the generation of, for the first generation of post colonial leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:36]]
<nowiki>[55:36]</nowiki>

There's some experimentation with alternative growth models, growth models more oriented towards exports in a few places, places like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, will experiment will export led growth models that sort of connect developing economies to the expanding global economy. But for the most developing countries remain in the 1970s beholden to nationalistic growth strategies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:03 ]]
<nowiki>[56:03]</nowiki>

Yet all is not well in the developing world during the 1970s. ISI led growth is, by the 1970s, failing to deliver the returns that it had promised to achieve. The oil shocks are a big exogenous crisis for most developing economies. For all developing world economies that don't produce their own oil a four fold increase in the rise in the price of energy inputs is catastrophic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:27]]
<nowiki>[56:27]</nowiki>

It produces price inflation. Price inflation in turn produces political instability. If you want to explain why India, the developing world's exemplary postcolonial democracy, experienced a brief period in which ordinary democratic rules were suspended, the so-called {{WPExtract|The Emergency (India)|Emergency of 1975 to 1977}}, you should pay some reference to the influence of the oil crisis on India's economics and its politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:53 ]]
<nowiki>[56:53]</nowiki>

At a time of rampant inflation, of rising political instability, {{WPExtract|Indira Gandhi}} in 1975 declares a brief emergency during which the rule of law is suspended. So the developing world struggles in an era of accelerating interdependence and this becomes a concern even for the leaders of the rich industrial world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:12 ]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What are to be the solutions to the divergence between the developing world's aspirations and its enduring poverty? Developing world leaders in the 1970s propose a radical reform of the international economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:27 ]]
<nowiki>[57:27]</nowiki>

A new bloc emerges at the United Nations, the so-called {{WPExtract|Group of 77|G77}} Bloc -- a self-conscious counterpart to the {{WPExtract|Group of Seven|G7}} -- the advanced industrial club. The G77 argues for a radical transformation in the international terms of trade. It argues for a set of international cartel agreements that will raise the price for the developing world's agricultural output. You know cartels on the model of OPEC for the producers of other primary commodities like coffee and rubber and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:56 ]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

Developing world political leaders talk about a new international economic order -- an economic order that will be oriented towards the achievement of international distributive justice. These initiatives ultimately come to nothing. What happens instead will be that the developing world comes from the 1980, from the 1980s onwards, to participate increasingly in the globalizing international economic system that takes shape in the West during the 1970s.

== Economic Interdependence ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:25 ]]
<nowiki>[58:25]</nowiki>

And it's to this Western system that we should now turn. I'll try to be brief and succinct.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32]]
<nowiki>[58:32]</nowiki>

Let's start just by reminding ourselves that the West at the end of the 1960s is still very much in the throes of the economic controls that are established during the 1930s and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:50]]
<nowiki>[58:50]</nowiki>

At the end of the 1960s {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}} continue to restrict the international movement of money. Trade barriers have been liberalized somewhat. But international trade is still sort of relatively small-scale in relation to the size of Western capitalist economies. This is a point which we can perhaps illustrate most succinctly by looking at the data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:13 ]]
<nowiki>[59:13]</nowiki>

I'm just going to show you data from one nation-state here. Because it's in some ways easiest to look at this phenomenon from a particular national perspective. The chart on the right of the slide shows the interdependence of the United States with the larger world economy in the financial sector and in the trade sector.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:34 ]]
<nowiki>[59:34]</nowiki>

And what you can see is that in 1950 US sort of interdependence, financially and in terms of trading goods, is much lower than it will become by the sort of 1980s and 1990s. The value of annual trade flows both exports and imports as a fraction of US GDP increases very rapidly particularly from the 1970s. The US becomes increasingly enmeshed with the larger global economy from the 1970s forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:03]</nowiki>

Similarly US stocks of you know, stocks of foreign investment in the United States plus US owned stocks of foreign investment elsewhere, sort of financial interdependence, increases dramatically particularly from the 1980s onwards. The US becomes from the 1970s and 1980s much more enmeshed with the larger global economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:29]</nowiki>

How does this happen? Technology plays a role. We should think if we want to explain processes of financial and trade globalization about the role of technological innovations. Communication satellites which become available from the late 1960s onwords accelerate the velocity with which information can be transmitted around the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:51]</nowiki>

New transatlantic cables, fiber optic cables from the 1980s, reduce the costs of transmitting information and this is really crucial. It facilitates other changes, like the growth of multinational corporations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:04]</nowiki>

There are changes that are more you know prosaic than the advent of high technology communications -- simple changes in techniques. The containerization of shipping: a development that begins in the late 1960s. I don't know did any of you see today's ''San Francisco Chronicle''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:19]</nowiki>

I needn't have asked; nobody reads the ''San Francisco Chronicle''. (laughter from the class). But...there's an interesting story...interesting in its relation to today's lecture. Apparently today or yesterday the biggest ship ever to enter the San Francisco Bay entered the San Francisco Bay.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:36]</nowiki>

And this is a container ship. It's a container ship that holds a third more containers than the previous biggest container ship to enter the San Francisco Bay. I don't remember how much but you can look it up in the Chronicle. But the containerization of shipping is a development that has huge implications for international trade. Substantially reduces transportation costs over the you know sort of medium to long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:58]</nowiki>

Computers are also very important to the story of globalization. They facilitate the outsourcing of production -- the movement of goods. It's very difficult to have containerization without computers because who knows where all the goods are on the boat if you don't have a computer, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:14]</nowiki>

It's very important to have a sort of computer card index that explains what...which containers contain which goods and where they need to go. So the advent of sort of high-tech computer based systems for managing the shipment of goods is an important aspect. These are sort of to a great extent interlinked developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:32]</nowiki>

And they produce substantial changes in the structure of the global economy. Consider the rise of the multinational corporation. This is one of the signal developments of the 1970s. One of the really important, really powerful symptoms, that suggest that big things are changing in the structure of the international economy.

=== Multinational Corporations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:51]]
<nowiki>[1:02:51]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations are crucial -- are crucial motors of globalization. Up to a third of all international trade is [https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7262 intra-firm] trade -- which is to say it occurs within corporations

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:04.]]
<nowiki>[1:03:04.]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations don't only move goods they also move knowledge and techniques -- techniques for manufacturing you know particular commodities, and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17]</nowiki>

The history of multinational corporations of course goes back a long way. I referred earlier in the lecture to the European trading companies of the 18th century: the British East India Company, the Dutch VOC -- these could be seen as precursors to the modern multinational corporation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:32]</nowiki>

But there are crucial distinctions to be made. The modern multinational corporation is different in key respects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:40]</nowiki>

Whereas foreign direct investment in the age of British imperialism had tended to take the form of standalone investments, you know, the creation of a you know sort of British financed railroad in North America for example. Foreign direct investment, after the Second World War involves the creation of vast networks of corporate subsidiaries and affiliates. IBM for example will invest aggressively in the creation of research and production facilities in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:12]</nowiki>

It's not creating standalone investments that manage themselves. Rather it's creating subsidiary branches of the IBM corporation linked within some vast transnational corporate structure.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:24 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:24]</nowiki>

One of the key developments which really distinguishes the modern multinational corporation from its historical predecessors is the transnationalization of production. The breakdown in effect of the old factory conveyor belt into...a set of separate processes that can be parceled out internationally so as to take advantage of the comparative advantages that particular nations offer as sites for particular phases of the productive process.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:53]</nowiki>

So Apple for example can design a computer here in you know Cupertino, California where you know skilled knowledge workers are readily available. And then outsource the manufacturing of that computer to China where you know cheap skilled labor is available to assemble the whole thing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:09]</nowiki>

And of course the you know process is much more complicated than that. Because the computer that is assembled in China is not manufactured entirely in China. You know the aluminum that goes into it will be mined somewhere else based upon the comparative availability of aluminum and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:23 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:23]</nowiki>

The transnationalization of production is a distinctive and novel characteristic of the modern multinational. And it depends upon the modularization of production -- upon the breaking down of productive processes into distinct steps that can be outsourced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:40]</nowiki>

The idea that you know...article like a computer would be manufactured in the same factory complex in which it's designed -- you know that's a 19th century model of capitalism or maybe an early 20th century model of capitalism. It is not how the transnational corporation works. The transnational corporation will disaggregate production so as to be able to take advantages of the comparative -- so as to be able to benefit from the comparative advantages that an integrating global economy offers.

=== Foreign Direct Investment Within the Capitalist West ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:08 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:08]</nowiki>

Where does this mostly happen? I mean what is the scope of the multinationalization of business during the 1970s? Here the answer may be surprising.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:18]</nowiki>

If we look at where the money goes, where foreign direct investment takes place, then what we see is that during the 1970s most foreign direct investment occurs within the OECD economies, among Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:35]</nowiki>

Western corporations are investing in Western countries for the most part. The developing world receives much less FDI from the United States than Western Europe does. Indeed Western Europe is the principle, you know sort of site of development, for the modern you know multinational business. American car corporations, American computer corporations and so on, create affiliates in Western Europe -- not in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:00]</nowiki>

The United States itself is a recipient of substantial FDI. German car manufacturers for example will invest heavily in the southern states of the United States in production facilities. Why do they do this? Why do Western businesses invest in other Western countries?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:20]</nowiki>

Well, there are advantages in this multinationalization of production. It enables corporations to surmount tariff barriers. Mercedes doesn't have to pay American import duties on a car that it manufactures in the United States. So it makes their products more competitive in US markets. It also locates the production of the products closer to the markets in which they can be sold.

=== The Implications of Economic Interdependence in the Larger World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:43 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:43]</nowiki>

So it reduces you know transportation costs. What are the consequences of this for international relations? What does the rise of the multinational signify about the changing state of world affairs?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:54]]
<nowiki>[1:07:54]</nowiki>

Here one of the most sort of articulate spokespeople for the transformative impact of multinationalization is {{WPExtract|Jacques Maisonrouge}} -- a man who was himself an exemplary sort of multinational businessman. Maisonrouge was a French engineer who became a high level vice president at IBM. He was IBM's vice president for international operations in the late '60s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:18]</nowiki>

Maisonrouge also became a sort of notoriously effective spokesperson for the transformation that multinational business was producing. And here's an example. The world's political structures are completely obsolete Maisonrouge declared in a public speech. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the global optimization of resources and the independence of nation-states.<ref>As quoted in [https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/23/archives/planet-earth-a-whollyowned-subsidiary.html ''The New York Times'' from January 23, 1975], Maisonrouge said, "The world's political structures are completely obsolete. They have not changed in at least a hundred years and are woefully out of tune with technological progress. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the search for global optimization of resources and the independence of nation‐states."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:40]</nowiki>

So for Maisonrouge national sovereignty, political sovereignty, isn't anachronism. It's just an impediment to the the most efficient possible allocation of resources -- something that multinational corporations are much better positioned than nation-states to accomplish.

== The Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:58]</nowiki>

Let's talk next about finance. Talked about production -- what about finance? The story of financial globalization begins in the 1960s. Here the signal development is the rise of the Euromarket? What is the Euromarket?<ref>Along with [[wikt:Euromarket|Wiktionary]], [https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/euromarket.asp Investopedia] and the [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/euromarket Cambridge English Dictionary] have definitions for the term. Some sources are capitalizing while others are not. In [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-superpower-transformed-9780195395471?cc=us&lang=en& ''A Superpower Transformed''] by Daniel Sargent the word is capitalized.</ref> The Euromarket is an offshore market for dollars -- held mostly in London.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:21]</nowiki>

It grows quickly during the 1960s and plays a role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The end of Bretton Woods delivers a further impetus to the globalization of finance. It creates opportunities for bankers to you know profit from [[wikt:arbitrage|arbitrage]] based upon fluctuating currency values. The petrodollar crisis as I've already discussed further bolsters the development of a globalizing financial system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:47]</nowiki>

Banks can profit through the recycling of petrodollar earnings, earnings that accrue to the exporting states, by lending those monies to oil importers so as to finance the balance of payments deficits that the oil crisis produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:04]</nowiki>

So the history of financial globalization really hinges on a series of key developments in the late '60s and early '70s. The rise of the Euromarkets, an offshore market for dollars based in London, the end of the Bretton Woods system and the opportunities that that creates for sort of further financial globalization. And the oil crisis which delivers a big shot in the arm to financial market integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:29]</nowiki>

What are the underlying causes? Technology is important, the reduction in the costs of communications technology facilitates the rise of international banking.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:41]</nowiki>

Business innovation is important. You know bankers are adept at devising ways to avoid the capital controls that nation-states try to implement to restrict the international movement of funds.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:52]</nowiki>

Policy choices are also important. Governments decide to reduce controls on international capital mobility. The United States in 1974 removes all of the capital controls which had been you know...used during the Bretton Woods era to defend the fixed exchange rate of the dollar. Great Britain in 1979 follows suit and removes all of its capital controls.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:17]</nowiki>

West European countries, other West European countries, will follow in the 1980s. So there are policy choices that are made to...accept if not to advance the cause of financial globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:30]</nowiki>

Financial globalization has important political consequences. It renders national macroeconomies more interdependent -- far more interdependent than they had been in the heyday of the Bretton Woods era. It also raises the you know prospect that national economic sovereignty is being you know sort of penetrated by, qualified by, free floating movements of global financial capital.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:55]]
<nowiki>[1:11:55]</nowiki>

This is remarked upon at the time, I'm going to show you a video clip even though I don't have time really that comes from a terrific 1976 movie {{WPExtract|Network (1976 film)|''Network''}} in which one of the characters, Ned Beatty, played by {{WPExtract|Ned Beatty}}<ref>Speaker was clarifying that he was saying the name of the actor and not the name of the character -- the name of the character being Arthur Jensen.</ref>, delivers a sort of [[wikt:homily|homily]] on the globalization of finance and it's implications for international politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:15]</nowiki>

''Arthur Jensen: You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians. There are no Arabs. There are no Third Worlds. There is no West. There is only one holistic system of systems. One vast and [[wikt:immane|immane]], interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of dollars: petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars, reichmarks, rins, rubles, pounds, and shekels.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:52]]
<nowiki>[1:12:52]</nowiki>

''Arthur Jensen: It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:02]</nowiki>

This is a great movie. One of my favorite '70s movies, so I really recommend it if you haven't seen it. But...it gives you a sense of the...discourse of the time, a discourse that is really not so different from the discourse of our own times when it comes to the relationship between global finance and nationality constituted political authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:22]</nowiki>

Indeed the acceleration of financial interdependence, the rise of the multinational corporation during the '70s, create a set of questions as to the future of political management of economic affairs. Is public policy up to the task or does globalization render national regulation irrelevant or ultimately futile?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:44]</nowiki>

Perhaps there is is a dynamic in play whereby globalization, a process that enables business actors and financial actors to escape the bounds of national regulation implies an implicit process of deregulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:59]</nowiki>

That would be you know kind of logical enough to infer. Insofar at capital becomes in a globalizing world less subject to the jurisdiction of national political authorities what restrictions, what regulations, are to bind business actors? These are questions that globalization conjures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:19]</nowiki>

One alternative would be the reconstitution of regulation on a transnational or even global scale. Can nation-states cooperate to achieve the kinds of sort of regulatory function collectively that individual nation-states used to be able to exercise within their own sort of territorial domains? This is one possibility. International organizations like the International Monetary Fund try during the 1970s to reconstitute stable sort of institutional regulatory arrangements on a transnational scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:52]</nowiki>

The IMF tries to devise sort of new rules for international monetary order to replace the Bretton Woods rules that collapsed in 1971 to 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:02]</nowiki>

Compromise on sort of the constitution of a recast international regulatory order proves very difficult to accomplish however. In part this is because the interests of nation-states are enduringly national and there not always convergence. Instead market determination, at least of currency values, ends up being the de facto solution to the management of international monetary relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:25]</nowiki>

It's too difficult to get nations to agree on a sort of consensual multilateral framework for managing currency values in a post Bretton Woods world. So the de facto alternative is to let markets determine the value of currencies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:38]</nowiki>

Still governments will come together to manage at least the most disruptive aspects of economic globalization. This is something that the {{WPExtract|Trilateral Commission}} proposes. We've talked a little about the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral Commission in essence comes into being as a sort of answer to the question of what are globalization's implications for governance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:03]</nowiki>

The trilateral concept is that an informal dialog amongst business leaders, policymakers and academics within the OECD countries will be able to devise sort of consensual solutions that countries will follow of their own volition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:17]</nowiki>

By consequence we see the rise of new relationships of policy coordination during the 1970s. The most sort of important symbol of which is the G7 summits -- summits that begin in the mid-1970s and continue through to the present day.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:31]</nowiki>

But still the question of whether globalization necessarily limits the scope of government endures. Will it ever be possible for governments acting collectively and multilaterally to regulate and to govern economies so effectively as nation-states had once been able to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:49]</nowiki>

Here we have to you know sort of ask the question of whether governments in the 1970s are becoming less willing, less eager, to attempt the tasks of economic regulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:00]</nowiki>

The Keynesian consensus after all experiences a crisis during the 1970s. Interdependence makes it harder for governments to exercise the regulatory managerial responsibilities that Keynes argued that they should exercise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:15]</nowiki>

The great inflation disrupts the credibility of Keynesian solutions as a sort of plausible framework for managing national macroeconomies. Instead classical liberalism, liberalism that emphasizes the utility of markets as mechanisms for determining the allocation of scarce resources, reasserts itself. After Keynes, {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek}} the exemplary sort of liberal economist of the twentieth century, experiences a heyday.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:44]</nowiki>

Hayek's writings become widely circulated and widely discussed in the 1970s. Hayek will -- wins the Nobel Prize for economics in 1974 -- which is illustrative of the ways in which the priorities of professional economists are shifting.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:59]</nowiki>

But the most influential economist of the decade is not Hayek who by this point is a very old man but {{WPExtract|Milton Friedman}}. A liberal economist who insists upon the preferability of market-based solutions over regulatory solutions. Friedman argues that government has gotten too big in the age of Keynes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:19]]
<nowiki>[1:18:19]</nowiki>

That big government is part of the problem. That government is responsible for the inflationary crisis of the 1970s -- for the failure of sort of growth to reassert itself. Friedman offers a set of radical solutions: spending cuts, tight money policies, reduction in sort of interest, increase in interest rates that will he argues quench the great inflation of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:42]</nowiki>

But the basic concept is one that advocates markets as the solution to the ills that ail the West. The rediscovery of markets is a overriding theme in the sort of economic thought, professional economics thought, of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:58]</nowiki>

But how and when is it translated into policy practice? Great Britain here is in the vanguard of the neoliberal shift. Intellectuals within the {{WPExtract|Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party}}, in particular {{WPExtract|Keith Joseph}}, who'll you have the opportunity to read about in this week's reading package, offer a set of neoliberal policy solutions as a prescription for the dilemmas of the Keynesian welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:20]</nowiki>

In Britain it's Margaret Thatcher who puts this neoliberal synthesis into action as Prime Minister -- a role that she assumes in 1979 when she leads the Conservative Party to election victory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:31]</nowiki>

Thatcher privatizes some of the state industries that had been nationalized after the Second World War. She privatizes coal and steel. She privatizes electricity. She privatizes telecommunications. She implements a broader set of market oriented reforms. She enables sort of individuals who live in public housing for example to purchase the public housing units that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:51]</nowiki>

She argues that this will create a stakeholder society in which individuals have a sort of direct investment in the housing that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:02]</nowiki>

How crucial was Thatcher? Well, this is a question that we can sort of discuss when we return to the neoliberal shift. But let's, by way of conclusion, think about the ways in which similar changes proceed elsewhere including in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

In the United States it was not a Republican administration, an administration of the right, but a Democratic administration that made the first really key moves. Jimmy Carter as President is unfortunate enough to inherit a stagnant economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:30]</nowiki>

He's caught in a very difficult bind. Inflation is a huge dilemma for the Carter administration. How to slay inflation? That's one big policy dilemma. On the other hand unemployment is a big problem for the Carter administration in the second half of the 1970s. How to expand employment? How to reduce unemployment? These are the two dilemmas that Carter has to, has to address.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:52]</nowiki>

At the same time Carter is eager to deregulate the economy. He has a small business background. He believes that excessive regulation is stifling to business and innovation. So the Carter administration makes moves to deregulate trucking and aviation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:07]</nowiki>

Around the same time a Supreme Court decision results in the effective deregulation of some personal financial services. The details are not important. What's important is the ways in which these shifts adhere to a common logic, a logic of deregulation, a logic of market determination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:25]</nowiki>

Carter initially prioritizes the fight over inflation. He pursues a stimulus package to expand the economy, to put Americans back to work, but in 1979 he makes a key shift to prioritize the fight against inflation over the fight against unemployment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:39]</nowiki>

This is a shift that is...sort of a key pivot in the transition from Keynesian welfare economics to what we would -- might characterize instead as neoliberal economics. Economics more oriented with market solutions, with allowing markets to determine their own sort of trajectories.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:00]</nowiki>

The Reagan administration essentially accepts the policy synthesis that Carter produces. Reagan will cut tax rates and continue deregulation. But Reagan does not orchestrate much sort of radical reform beyond that which has already been set in motion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:15]</nowiki>

On the contrary he will govern as a pragmatic President who has to rule with a Democratic legislature. So the United States experiences a sort of shift towards the market at around the same time that Great Britain does. But it's a shift that occurs under a different kind of administration, a Democratic center-left administration, rather than a Conservative center-right administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:35]</nowiki>

And this ought to provocative as we think about the role that politics play in determining the sort of market oriented shifts of the 1970s. You know these are issues that we'll return to and they're issues that you'll engage in your readings and your section discussions. But what's clear is that by the end of the 1970s the capitalist world is headed in a very different direction from that which it appeared to be following at the beginning of the decade.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s

2022-03-09T07:59:26Z

DavidKitFriedman: Adding the time at which that particular statement occurs in the speech, and making the width of the audio widget the same as the others.

== Problem of Beginnings ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Alright, it's just about time to begin and I would like to begin by talking about the problem of beginnings. When specifically should we begin, when should a historian begin a history of the postwar world. The problem of origins is a consuming problem for historians. We grapple constantly with the question of when we should begin our histories.

It can be difficult even to locate the beginnings of events that we think are familiar. When did the Second World War begin, for example? Do any of you have a quick answer to that question?
(Student Response)

1937. That's a pretty good answer. But it's not the conventional one, right? When would we conventionally locate the origins of the Second World War?

(Student Response)

That's right September 1939. I would argue that you are every bit as correct to identify 1937 as the point of beginning for the Second World War. It's when the {{WPExtract|Second Sino-Japanese War}} begins. It's a huge part of the Second World War -- the conflict between Japan and China.

But by dating the origins of the Second World War in 1939 we privilege the European theater of the War, right? We say that what really mattered was when Hitler invaded Poland. But a different perspective on the Second World War, one that was as sensitive to the war in East Asia as to the war in Europe, might locate the origins of the world war in 1937.

We might equally well say that the Second World War began in 1941 when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because it's really only at that point that the two theaters of the world, the European and the East Asian, adjoined and the two conflicts become a single world war.
So the point is not that there's a correct answer. There really is no correct answer to the question. It's sort of contestable. The point is simply that origins can be a confounding thing to define.

== Problem of Periodization ==
[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:00]]
<nowiki>[2:00]</nowiki>

Sort of related to the problem of origins for historians is the problem of periodization. Historians are prone to divide history into convenient chunks which we label.

Think for example about American political history. How many of you have had the chance to take courses in American political history here at Berkeley? Okay, some of you. So you're familiar that political historians are prone to demarcate swathes of history and to pin labels on them.
We might talk for example about the 1830s and 1840s as the Age of {{WPExtract|Andrew Jackson|Jackson}}. The 1930s and the 1940s as the Age of {{WPExtract|Franklin D. Roosevelt|Roosevelt}}. Maybe the 1980s and beyond as the Age of {{WPExtract|Ronald Reagan|Reagan}}. This is contestable.

Labeling history like this is really useful for historians. It helps us to impose sort of organizing metanarratives on the past. The label tells us something about the key themes and problems of a particular period in history. So there's a purpose to this. But there's also a danger, right. The danger is that labeling a particular period of history as being dominated by a singular theme or problem is to privilege a particular perspective on the past.

If we call the 1980s the Age of Reagan for example then we're sort of implying that what really mattered about the 1980s was the rise of the political right in the United States -- the sort of conservative backlash against a long period of progressive liberal dominance -- the Age of Roosevelt.

But to privilege the political narrative, the rise of the right, is necessarily to sort of downgrade, at least in relative terms, other perspectives on the history of the 1980s.

Why call the 1980s the Age of Reagan and not the age of Silicon Valley? There's an alternative perspective which emphasizes technological and economic changes as being ultimately more important than political ones.

So metanarratives which we use to compartmentalize and to demarcate history they help us to navigate the past but they can also mislead us. It's important to remember that human history doesn't move to a single beat. There are multiple perspectives on the past and it all depends upon where we want to look.

And this is really important to remember when we think about the question of where to begin a history of the postwar world. It may vary depending upon the vantage point from which we approach it.

== When Did the Postwar World Begin? ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:36]]
<nowiki>[4:36]</nowiki>

Let's consider some plausible points of departure.

=== 1945: The End of the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:39]]
<nowiki>[4:39]</nowiki>

Well, 1945 is the most obvious point of departure. It is indeed the point of departure that is identified in the course catalog. More than that it's the classic moment at which postwar history begins.

Why is 1945 a useful point of departure? Well, the answer is sort of obvious. It marks the end of the Second World War. The destruction of Germany and the greater German empire which {{WPExtract|Adolf Hitler|Hilter}} built in Europe. It marks the destruction of Japan's imperial project and the transformation of East Asian {{WPExtract|geopolitics}}. It also sees the creation of new international institutions. The United Nations is born in 1945.

It's also the point, and this is to look forward not backwards, that marks the beginnings of the unraveling of the Soviet American alliance which had fought and won the Second World War.

So 1945 is a key turning point for a variety of very important reasons.

But there are also problems with taking 1945 as a point of departure for the history of the postwar era.

The Second World War, after all, was a war that was played out primarily within the Northern Hemisphere. It does ... The war's violence does of course penetrate the Southern Hemisphere in Southeast Asia, just about, but it's a war that is fought primarily amongst the advanced industrial states: the Soviet Union, the United States, and Nazi Germany.

It's not a war that has so much relevance for the lives of people in the colonized world as it does for human beings in the sort of {{WPExtract|North-South divide|advanced industrial North}}.

=== 1947: Indian Independence ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:25]]
<nowiki>[6:25]</nowiki>

If you're looking at the world from a sort of colonial or postcolonial perspective then you might argue that 1947, the year that marks the advent of {{WPExtract|Indian independence movement|Indian independence}}, is as plausible, perhaps even a preferable point of departure for postwar history.

If we privilege the history of decolonization as the most important, the most interesting sort of metanarrative of postwar history, then 1945 is not so obviously the point at which we ought to begin it.

Of course there are problems with taking 1947 as the point of departure too, right? That's the year that India and Pakistan became independent -- doesn't have so much resonance for the history of Africa as it does for the history of South Asia. So the appropriate point departure is always a question of one's vantage point.

== Economic Vantage Point ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:14]]
<nowiki>[7:14]</nowiki>

Virtually all the themes that I've just been discussing over the past couple of minutes have to do with high politics, with international relations, with statecraft, with the rise and fall of imperial projects.
But this represents a sort of thematic bias -- a bias towards the political and the strategic at the expense perhaps of the economic and the social. Was 1945 such an important turning point in the economic history of the world?

Arguably it was less important than the turning point that the 1930s represent. After all the 1930s, the decade of the {{WPExtract|Great Depression}}, casts a long shadow.

The echoes of the 1930s are heard all the way through the history of the postwar era. The 1930s marked the end of one sort of international economic system or era and the advent of a distinct new era in international economic history.

We're going to talk much more about the consequences of this in today's lecture so I won't belabor the point. I want simply to suggest that if you are privileging the political economic organization of societies, even of the international system as your major theme, then you might argue that the 1930s marked a much more decisive sort of historical juncture than even does the Second World War.

== Historical Prologue ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:39]]
<nowiki>[8:39]</nowiki>

So having reminded ourselves that points of departure are in a sense always arbitrary, that they depend upon the themes that we prefer to privilege, let's begin the lecture course with the historical substance. But I'm going to present this not as a sort of history of origins so much as a historical prologue. With a mind to what is coming next I want today to cover some of the history that will help you to better understand the history of the postwar world. So let's think about this not as the beginning of any historical narrative in particular so much as a discussion of some key historical background which will help you to better situate the history of the postwar era.

== Three Major Themes ==

=== Political and Economic Ramifications of the Great Depression ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:38]]
<nowiki>[9:38]</nowiki>

We're going to deal with three major themes today. I want to start by talking about political economy. What were the consequences of the Great Depression both for the internal, political economic organization of societies and for the larger international economic system?

Answering this question is really really important for understanding the international economic history of the twentieth century. The Great Depression was the defining event of twentieth century economic history and we need to pay some attention to it in order to fully grasp what comes next. The history of this era, the era of the Great Depression and beyond could be characterized I would argue as the history of a revolt against {{WPExtract|globalization}}. That's the phrase that I use to identify this particular strand of historical interpretation, and it's a strand which we'll be dealing with in just a moment or two.

=== The Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

Next we're going to talk about the Second World War. The Second World War is obviously very, very important. It's a deeply and profoundly traumatic experience for the people who lived through it. And the searing experience of war will be constitutive in important ways of the postwar era that follows. So we at least have to pay some attention to the Second World War, the war of the world as we might consider it, as a theme that is in crucial respects determinative of postwar outcomes and experiences.

=== Postwar Settlement ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:12]]
<nowiki>[11:12]</nowiki>

And finally we're going to talk a little bit about the institutional aspects of the postwar settlement -- the foundations of peace.

Insofar as the postwar era begins with the self-conscious effort on the part of powerful states to reconstruct the international system, to build new international institutions, the United Nations and the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods economic institutions}}.<ref>See also {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods Conference}}</ref> We need to pay attention to this history of self-conscious recasting. What kind of international order did the leaders of powerful states try to build? What were its basic institutional characteristics? And what would be the legacies for the history of the post '45 world.

To think about the foundations of peace will be the last of the three themes that we deal with today.

=== What About the Cold War? ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:01]]
<nowiki>[12:01]</nowiki>

What's missing from this thematic framework that I've just sketched out for today's lecture? You might be struck, maybe not, but you might be struck by the fact, that I haven't made any mention of the Cold War as a theme that we're going to deal with today. And we're not really going to talk about the Cold War today. Why not?

I don't want to suggest that there were no major tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. There certainly were. And the history of the Soviet American antagonism dates all the way back to the {{WPExtract|October Revolution|Bolshevik Revolution}} in 1917.

But the point is that the Cold War was not a predominant theme or problem for the men and women who lived through and fought the Second World War.

They were much more concerned with the legacies of the Great Depression and with the fight against fascism in Europe and East Asia.

To search for the origins of the Cold War in the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s would be to run the risk of historical anachronism.

==== Danger of Assuming Knowledge of the Future to Historical Actors ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:02]]
<nowiki>[13:02]</nowiki>

It would be to venture into that history knowing what we already know about what was subsequently to come. And it's really important as historians to avoid that temptation. When we deal with history we have to remind ourselves that the men and women whom we encounter in the past don't know what we know about what was to happen next.

They were ignorant about the future. Of course we're all ignorant about the future. We don't know what's going to happen tomorrow. But as historians when we encounter historical actors we do so with a very dangerous knowledge and that is the knowledge about what actually did happen next. And we ought to be really conscious when we think about history of the reality that the people who made history, the people whom we encounter in our studies, were open to a range of possible futures. The alternatives were multiple so far as they perceived them.

They, like us, looked backwards for their points of reference, not forwards and that's really, really important to remember.

History is made moving forwards but the reference points with which men and women navigate history are always retrospective ones. We understand our own relationships to our own times not in terms of what is to happen but in terms of what has happened.

And when we encounter historical actors and seek to situate and understand them it's very important to remember that they too look backwards. They could hardly anticipate what we now know was to come.

== The Great Depression: The Revolt Against Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:40]]
<nowiki>[14:40]</nowiki>

So with that caution, let's think a little bit about the history of the Great Depression, the revolt against globalization as I characterize it.

To understand the significance of the Great Depression I want to take you back in time. I want to take a really long way back in time. Let's think about the economic history of the world since ... over the past two thousand years.

What is the basic story of global economic history not over years or decades but over millennia? Crudely the economic history of the world before about 1800 is this.

=== Human Economic History Pre-1800 ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:24]]
<nowiki>[15:24]</nowiki>

There are minimal gains in economic productivity. People become slightly more efficient at farming, at making things. But whatever gains there are -- are offset by the growth of the world's population with the consequence that the quality of life for ordinary men and women really does not improve between the times of Jesus Christ and the time, the beginnings of the 19th century.

For most ordinary men and women the condition of material life remains more or less stable over a period of about two millennia.
You could even take the history back further than this.

We could go back to the earliest origins of human civilization and posit a basic continuity in the material condition of humankind. Human life is lived within stringent limits for most of human history.

Of course some people do become very wealthy and very affluent. High culture flourishes of course in the Renaissance. But to focus on the sort of [[wikt:efflorescence|efflorescence]] of high culture is to disregard the reality that the overwhelming majority of human beings exist in state of misery and [[wikt:penury|penury]].

=== The Industrial Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:41]]
<nowiki>[16:41]</nowiki>

And this is essentially the human condition until the {{WPExtract|Industrial Revolution}}. The Industrial Revolution is really really important as you can see in the chart here.

It begins to transform the economic prospects of humankind. The average income of each human being in the world if you look at the world's total productivity and average it out across the world's total population begins to increase really really dramatically in the 19th century.
This stunning increase in global productivity and in global wealth is of course a consequence of industrialization, the application of machine power to the tasks of economic production.

The Industrial Revolution produces an increase of about 20 fold in the average well-being of each man, woman and child on this planet between 1800 and 2000. This is a stunning increase in global aggregate well-being the likes of which our species had never previously seen.

But of course as you all know very well the economic benefits of the Industrial Revolution are not evenly distributed. At least not initially.
=== Distribution of Economic Growth from the Industrial Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:59]]
<nowiki>[17:59]</nowiki>

Well, let's look at the distribution of global economic output before the Industrial Revolution.

If you look at the world around 1500 then you see really three major centers of economic activity and power. China, South Asia, and Europe, and the balance between the three is fairly equal.

The reason that Africa looks in this map -- the map is scaled according to the GDP or particular regions -- the reason that Africa looks less affluent than Europe, Asia and ... Europe, South Asia, and China is simply that there are fewer people in Africa. The continent is not particularly populous.

But if you look at the world in 1500 and then compare it with the world of 1900 then you can see that the global distribution of well-being has changed pretty dramatically. Europe now far eclipses South Asia and China. And the United States, an offshoot of European civilization, has become a major economic power.

The history of the Industrial Revolution is closely associated with the rise of Western ascendancy in the world's economic affairs. You can chart this is different ways.

What this chart here does is to show you Western Europe's share of the world's total GDP. And you can see that this increases pretty dramatically from the early modern period when Europe's share of global GDP is around 40% to the turn of the twentieth century when Europe's share of world GDP approaches 65 or 70%. The rise of Europe, the rise of European power, and wealth, is one of the crucial stories of modernity.

=== Inequality: Europe Industrialized First ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:54]]
<nowiki>[19:54]</nowiki>

So industrialization makes the world richer but its wealth will be unevenly distributed. How do we explain this increase in inequality between societies?

Well, the easiest explanation is simply this. The Europeans industrialized first so they enjoyed the benefits of industrialization before anybody else did. And that's the explanation which in my view is the most correct one.

At the same time we should not be insensitive to the ways in which economic developments in the 18th and 19th century transform actual relationships between the Europeans and the peoples of the non-European world.

==== Change in Relations Between Industrialized North and Global South ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:40]]
<nowiki>[20:40]</nowiki>

And so here we encounter the theme of globalization. Globalization has a long history. It's arguably a history that traces back centuries if not millennia. That's a theme for a different class. For our purposes it's essential to remind ourselves that globalization, which is to say, the integration of economic areas of nation-states and of regions increases rapidly from the 1860s. It brings, it establishes relationships of economic dependency between the peoples of the non-industrial world, the {{WPExtract|Global South}}, and those of the industrialized North.

The North becomes dependent upon the South for certain raw materials. The South becomes dependent upon the North for manufactured goods. Globalization transforms economic relationships among societies in ways that render them interdependent.

=== Technology Spurs Globalization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:39]]
<nowiki>[21:39]</nowiki>

Why does globalization occur? Why is it that the world in the 19th century becomes economically integrated?

The most succinct answer is technology. The application of mechanical power to the purposes of transportation through the steamship and the railroad contract spaces and shrinks time. It reduces transportation costs in the economist's parlance and makes it cheaper and cheaper to shift goods and money from one place to another.

So technology plays a really really powerful essential role in the promotion of globalization.

=== Enforcement of the Rules of Globalization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:18]]
<nowiki>[22:18]</nowiki>

It's also important to remember that there is a political or military aspect to the history of globalization too.
Insofar as globalization depends on rules, rules that are enforced by social institutions, the history of imperial power, specifically the history of British imperial power is part of the history of globalization.

A long distance transaction, perhaps to ship a hundred bushels of grain from North America to market in London, doesn't do you much good unless you can be reasonably assured that the contract that you sign to transport that grain will be honored by payment in the amount specified at the moment of transaction. The enforcement of contracts over great distances is essential to the flourishing of a globalizing world economy.

And of course the enforcement of contracts depends upon an ultimate recourse to power. Even to coercive violence. So the history of economic integration has a power political aspect. Once again I don't want to belabor the point. It's simply important to remind ourselves that the history of imperialism, and the history of globalization are not wholly apart.

=== Consequences of Globalization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:37]]
<nowiki>[23:37]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of globalization from the late 19th century? Well it produces a certain integration of the world economy. Economies become drawn into webs of tighter and more complex interdependence. Globalization also tends to produce a certain differentiation between different regions of the world economy.

This is your theory of comparative advantage. The industrial North begins to specialize in manufactured production. The South will specialize in the production of basic primary commodities.

Globalization confirms and accelerates a differentiation between core and periphery that sociologists of the world economy following {{WPExtract|Immanuel Wallerstein}} have written about quite extensively. Again it's not the central focus of today's conversation.

What are the consequences of globalization for the economic well-being of ordinary men and women? This is a really interesting question. It's a really important question and it's a question with a great deal of contemporary relevance. Does globalization tend to produce a convergence in material conditions or does it produce a divergence that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. This is a contentious question and you're going to find different answers to it depending upon who you ask.

I'm a historian so I'm not going to offer any absolute answers to that question. I would say it depends. It depends upon the particular terms of ... Or the particular terms on which any given system of globalization operates. And here the experience of the late 19th century is sort of suggestive.

=== Globalization Decreases Economic Inequality Between North America and Europe In the Late 19th Century ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:23]]
<nowiki>[25:23]</nowiki>

Within the North Atlantic world, which is to say within the world of the United States and Canada and Western Europe the economic inequalities of nations tend to diminish between the 1860s and 1914. Globalization in other words produces a certain convergence in the material well-being of nations.

At the beginning of this period, in 1860, North Americans are much much better off in the average than are Europeans. The reason for that is fairly simple. There are fewer North Americas in relation to the economic resources they possess than there are Europeans. Europe is a much more densely populated place than is North America so there is less wealth to spread around.

As a consequence of the sort of migration of peoples from Western Europe to North America in the last third of the 19th century, a theme from which you're all sort of vaguely familiar, at least many of you will be intimately familiar with that history. Average incomes in Europe and North America do begin to converge. The convergence of labor markets produces a gradual trend toward convergence in ordinary human well-being.

Globalization does seem at least for a time to narrow inequalities between nation-states.

==== Economic Inequalities Within Nation States ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:52]]
<nowiki>[26:52]</nowiki>

The consequences for economic inequalities within nation-states are ... That's a different question. If you think about the contemporary world, just for a moment we'll come back to the world of the 1990s and beyond, what have been the effects of globalization on income inequality?

I mean very, very crudely, and we'll get into this much more as we move towards the end of the semester, the effects of globalization have been to diminish international inequalities, which is to say to diminish inequalities between nation-states while increasing economic inequalities within nation-states.

Does that make sense? Okay.

=== Globalization in the Last Third of the 19th Century ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:34]]
<nowiki>[27:34]</nowiki>

In the last third of the 19th century the experiences is not so different. Globalization also tends to produce a convergence trend in the well-being of nation-states. In some respects the globalization system of the late 19th century looks to be kind of benign, even harmonious.

The last decades of the 19th century are a time of remarkable international peace, even remarkable international stability. There are time at least within the North Atlantic world when goods, ideas and culture can transmit freely from societies, to society, from nation to nation. Globalization looks to be in this era a force that is propelling the world towards a convergent modernity. Things look to be pretty rosy so far as the future goes.

=== Globalization and the First World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:32]]
<nowiki>[28:32]</nowiki>

And then of course it all comes to a shuddering halt in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War. The First World War was a catastrophic event for the world economy for the international system of the late 19th century. A system that looked to be stable and harmonious operating according to the rules of rational self-interest within the context of a fairly integrated global market.

The experience of the First World War ought to be cautionary for us today insofar as it reminds us that exogenous political shocks can wreck catastrophic damage upon systems of relatively integrated international exchange. The experience of the First World War is sort of troubling.

=== Globalization in the Post First World War Era ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:24]]
<nowiki>[29:24]</nowiki>

After the First World War the relatively globalized international economy that had flourished in the last decades of the 19th century is briefly restored. Men and women once again presume themselves to be converging towards a relatively coherent vision of modernity, at least in the North Atlantic world.

North American social reformists for example look to West European social reformist for inspiration. Americans travel frequently to Europe, Europeans travel frequently to the United States. It seems in the 1920s as if the world has resumed the basic trajectory of integration and interdependence that it was on before the First World War.

It looks as if we're, have resumed the march, towards a technotopia as represented in {{WPExtract|Fritz Lang}}'s great, great, movie, {{WPExtract|Metropolis (1927 film)|Metropolis}}.
==== Differences Between Global Economic Systems Between the 1920s and Late 19th Century ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:28]]
<nowiki>[30:28]</nowiki>

There are key differences between the sort of restored global economic system of the 1920s and the late 19th century system.

Great Britain had been a sort of dominant political influence on the late 19th century system by the 1920s the United States has emerged as the dominant center of the global economy.

We don't need to belabor the differences. Once again that's a topic for a different class.

==== Restoration of the Global System ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55]]
<nowiki>[30:55]</nowiki>

But the key point is that the 1920s witnesses a sort of restoration of liberal economic integration within the international economy with really important implications for the larger sort of international political system.

Things look to be back on course. The world economy is rolling towards convergence once again. And then of course the Great Depression happens in 1929.

=== The Crash of 1929 and the Beginning of the Great Depression ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:26]]
<nowiki>[31:26]</nowiki>

The tremors of the Great Depression of course predate the {{WPExtract|Wall Street Crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of October '29}}. But the Wall Street crash is what causes men and women throughout the industrialized world to sit up and take stock of the fact that something really big has happened.

This is a second great shock to the system of 19th century globalization. And in most respects it's even more catastrophic than the First World War had been.

The First World War had been an essentially exogenous shock. That's to say that the origins of the First World War did not have a lot to do with globalization. The Wall Street crash has everything to do with globalization. It's a crisis which is endogenous to the global economic system as it has developed through the last decades of the 19th century and into the 1920s.

=== What caused the Great Depression ? ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:23]]
<nowiki>[32:23]</nowiki>

What caused the Great Depression? It's a big question we could spend all lecture trying to answer it but we won't do that.

The very succinct answer is that the Great Depression had to do with a convergence of cyclical downturns exacerbated by bad policy choices. Confronted by a serious recession governments implemented austerity plans and made the situation much worse.

There are economists who would dispute that reading of events. This is a politicized interpretation of history. So let me just acknowledge that, but the mainstream interpretation amongst economic historians is that a combination of cyclical recession plus catastrophic policy choice in both fiscal and monetary policy is what caused the Great Depression.

=== Consequences of the Great Depression ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:16]]
<nowiki>[33:16]</nowiki>

What were the consequences? Falling prices for goods and labor. Mass unemployment throughout the industrial world and widespread human immiseration. The Great Depression seemed to interrupt and then reverse the remarkable trajectory of economic progress that the industrial world had been on since the beginning of the 19th century.

There are other setbacks. There's a long recession in the 1890s which also sort of interrupts the march of progress so the Great Depression is not wholly unprecedented. It's just much, much worse than any previous recession of the industrial era.

==== Economic Catastrophe and Mass Democracy ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:04]]
<nowiki>[34:04]</nowiki>

It produces widespread immiseration and one of the key differences in the 1930s when you compare the experience of the 1930s with the experience of 19th century recession is that it occurs in a world in which a growing number of workers, probably a majority of them, have the vote. It occurs in a world that is democratic rather than a world that is still dominated, as 19th century Britain was, by aristocratic elites.

Immiserated and discontented men and women have a choice in the 1930s. They can choose to vote for political projects that promise solutions to their economic misery. They can vote for {{WPExtract|communism|communist}} parties that promise to spread the wealth much more evenly that the {{WPExtract|capitalism|capitalist}} system does. They can vote for {{WPExtract|fascism|fascist}} parties which promise to sort of kick out the foreigners or which point the finger at bankers and blame them for the economic catastrophe of the era.

The point is that the 1930s are a particularly traumatic decade because of the combination of economic catastrophe and mass democracy.

==== Nation States Respond to the Great Depression with Protectionism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:23]]
<nowiki>[35:23]</nowiki>

Even the states that do not end up opting for radical political alternatives whether of the left or the right end up implementing major policy changes.

Great Britain which had for about a century been committed to a {{WPExtract|free trade}} policy throws up {{WPExtract|trade barrier|trade barriers}}.

The United States implements trade barriers, trade barriers of an unprecedented severity.

The Congress of the United States at the beginning of the 1930s passes a tariff, the {{WPExtract|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act| Smoot–Hawley Tariff}}, which raises tariff barriers with the effect that it tries to shut out foreign goods, to shut out foreign competition, to throw up a big wall between the United States and the larger global economy.

This experience is replicated almost everywhere. Countries try to protect themselves against the recession by erecting barriers, by shutting out globalization, by circumscribing the national economy from the larger global economy of which previously it had been part. By consequence the 1930s witness a radical and unprecedented move towards deglobalization. Countries try desperately to disengage from the international economy by throwing up trade barriers and sometimes by making their currencies {{WPExtract|Convertibility|nonconvertible}}.

They do this in order to try to gain some leverage over the economic situation at home. So you see a series of choices that are made by nation-states to prioritize domestic economic policy over global economic integration. The price that has to be paid for regaining control over your economy at home is circumscribing your interactions with the larger world economy.

There are good technical reasons for all of this. We might get into some of them as the course progresses. The purpose of today's lecture is just to provide a sort of panoramic overview.

=== Relationship Between the State and the Market ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:18]]
<nowiki>[37:18]</nowiki>

So the 1930s brings really big transformations or shifts in the relationships between nation-states and the larger global economy.

How do we understand this? The relationship between the state and the market is a huge, huge topic. We're not going to plummet in any great depth today. Let me just point to a couple of theorists, economic theorists, who might help us to think about the ways in which relations between states and markets are changing in the era of the Great Depression.

==== Karl Polanyi ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:59]]
<nowiki>[37:59]</nowiki>

The first theorist who I want to talk about for a minute or so is {{WPExtract|Karl Polanyi}}. Have any of you heard of Karl Polanyi?

It's good. I'm glad some of you have and the rest should have done.

Polanyi is a really, really important thinker in the history of twentieth century economics. He probably better than anybody else analyzes incisively the relationship between the state, the democratic state, and the market.

Polanyi's crucial insight, really his foundational insight, is that markets are not natural, that they are embedded within larger political and social institutions and frameworks. Polanyi insists that you can't have a market without the rule of law, you can't have a rule of law without power. Markets ultimately depend upon a framework of political authority in order to function. In 1944 Polanyi publishes a book which is titled {{WPExtract| The Great Transformation (book)|''The Great Transformation''}}.

The book offers a really important historical interpretation of the rise of market society. Polanyi systemically tries to demonstrate the ways in which the emergence of the market depended upon political structures of power that sort of contained and embedded the market.

But the book also offers a really important interpretation of recent history.

Polanyi argues that the rise of market society carries with it catastrophic human and social costs insofar as markets provide an efficient framework for the exchange of goods, services and money. Markets, at least markets that are not subordinate to some social control, can produce gross inequalities of outcome. They can make some people very rich and other people very poor.

By consequence untrammeled markets, Polanyi argues, come with serious social costs.

Polanyi having situated the state intention with the market sees the 1930s as the moment when society via the democratic state began to fight back against the free market.

Polanyi sees the relationship between the state and the market as this relationship of profound tension and argues that after a long period in which markets gained greater and greater autonomy from political power the 1930s marked the moment at which nation-states, which is to say political authority, tried to subjugate the market to some expanded political direction.

And this is what Polanyi characterizes as The Great Transformation of his times.

And what did this mean in terms of substantial policy choices. Well it involved some of those choices which I just told you about. The imposition of tariff barriers for example represents an effort by political power to interject itself in market behavior.

To prevent market transactions, which is to say the free movement of goods from one country to another, in order to serve some social purpose, presumably the protection of domestic industry against foreign competition.

The establishment of a social security system which the United States does in 1935 is a reassertion by political power of its prerogatives against the market.

In a society that was governed according to the strict dictates of the market we wouldn't have social security. Social security disincentives its beneficiaries from working as such it interferes with the natural play of the market mechanism. The establishment of a system of social security is an attempt by political power to subject the market to certain social norms, to make markets serve a social purpose rather than the reverse.

And this is one of the key stories of the 1930s. It's the backlash of society and politics against the market. And of course it happens because of the Great Depression. A depression that exhibits the sort of inability of markets to quickly correct themselves in the event of a systemic crisis which the Great Depression was.

So that's one key aspect of the economic history of the 1930s. The Great Transformation and the relationship between states and markets.

==== John Maynard Keynes ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:53]]
<nowiki>[42:53]</nowiki>

There are also major changes that occur in economic thought, and here the key theorist is {{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes}}. Presumably most of you have heard of Keynes, right?

Have you studied Keynes in economics classes? Okay, to some extent. That's good.

Keynes, we could have a whole semester talking about Keynes, but we're not going to do that. Keynes is the crucial economist of the depression era. Keynes, perhaps better than anybody else, offers an explanation for why markets do not quickly correct themselves following the crisis of 1929.

After all {{WPExtract|Classical economics|classical economic theory}} tells us that market behavior is cyclical. That a downturn which produces a fall in prices will quickly correct itself.

If there's a crisis of unemployment which produces abundant surplus labor then that ought to incentivize entrepreneurs to open factories that will put some of surplus labor to work. This is how markets correct themselves in the classical theoretical model.

And Keynes argues that the classical theoretical model might work very well in the abstract but it does not sufficiently encapsulate the complexity of an advanced industrial economy.

Keynes tell us that in an advanced industrial economy prices are sticky, they're not as fluid as the classical theoretical models suggest they ought to be, that a market in a condition of recession can become stuck there. This is Keynes' crucial theoretical insight. We don't need to go into too deeply.

===== The Keynesian Solution =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:39]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

What's more important for our purposes is the [[WikipediaExtracts: Keynesian economics|Keynesian solution]][[wikipedia: Keynesian_economics#Active_fiscal_policy|↗]].<ref>The Wikipedia article on Keynesian economics has more information on Keynes's ideas for addressing the Great Depression in the section on [[wikipedia:Keynesian_economics#Active_fiscal_policy|active fiscal policy]].</ref>

Keynes argues that if markets are not self-correcting then somebody has to correct them.

And who is going to accomplish that?

What force is capable of intervening in the market with sufficient power as to be able to correct a structural downturn.

Government of course is the only power that can potentially accomplish this. Keynes argues that in order for the Great Depression to be solved, it's necessary for governments to spend enormous amounts of money in order to put workers back to work, in order to restore the smooth functioning of the capitalist system.

And Keynes, as he develops this argument, essentially invents the field of {{WPExtract|macroeconomics}}. It's an over simplification but it's not entirely untrue to say that before Keynes all economics was {{WPExtract|microeconomics}}. Keynes essentially invents the science of macroeconomics which is concerned with how the economy as a system ought to be managed and regulated.

=== Nation States Create Social Welfare Programs ===

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<nowiki>[45:49]</nowiki>

Alongside the rise of Keynesian economic thought the 1930s sees the introduction of new welfare provisions, of new welfare states, throughout the advanced industrialized world.

This occurs in the democracies, the {{WPExtract|New Deal}} in the United States produces a panoply of new welfare provisions, provisions that are intended to safeguard citizens from the worst that poverty can do. Similar schemes for social protection are established also in the {{WPExtract|fascism|fascist states}}. We'll have opportunities later on to go through some of the more detailed aspects of this. I just want to sketch out this basic big picture.

=== The Great Depression: Political Effects ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:37]]
<nowiki>[46:37]</nowiki>

So this is the economic transformation that the Great Depression brings -- a transformation in the relationship between societies, nation-states, and the market.

But the Great Depression also brings political consequences too. It has huge consequences for international relations. As I pointed out a few minutes ago by the 1930s workers in most democratic capitalist countries have the vote by the 1930s. And they can vote for political leaders, even demagogic political leaders, who promise them quick and easy solutions to their collective misery.

The prototypical case of this of course is Nazi Germany. It is no exaggeration to say that the Great Depression brings Hitler to power.

And that's really all that I have to say if I want to illustrate the catastrophic consequences of the Great Depression for international relations and for the European peace. A depression that produces a global crisis of liberalism allows really nasty, really radical people, like Hitler, into power. That same story is replicated elsewhere.

The Great Depression, for example, produces the {{WPExtract| Infamous_Decade|crisis of Argentinian liberalism and brings into power an authoritarian military regime}}.
==== The Soviet Union During the Great Depression ====

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<nowiki>[48:08]</nowiki>

The one country in the world that is really not affected by the Great Depression is the Soviet Union. And this is a really, really important point.

During the 1920s the Soviet Union had looked like an economic basket case. Early efforts to produce a sort of socialized system of public ownership in the Soviet Union, which begin in the early 1920s, turn out to be a catastrophe. And the Soviet Union ends up from about 1924 onwards undertaking a series of market reforms. It tolerates private property, it allows markets to have a sort of role in the determination of supply and demand.

This Soviet experiment in sort of reformed communism comes to an end in 1928 with the ascendancy of {{WPExtract|Joseph Stalin}}. Stalin decides to opt instead for a sort of breakneck program to socialize the Soviet economy, to transfer private property into the hands of the state, and to appropriate for the state ownership of all of the means of production, and this a really big transition in Soviet economic history.

Sort of fortunately for Stalin in some ways it coincides with the Great Depression in the West. The Soviet Union having decided to break itself off entirely from the larger world economy in the 1930s ends up industrializing fairly rapidly and producing sort of economic statistics, which though to some extent sort of are fictive, because these statistics are often manufactured by Soviet officials, nonetheless suggest that the Soviet economy is flourishing in the 1930s as the economies of the West lapse into malaise and crisis.

=== Comparing Communism and Capitalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:13]]
<nowiki>[50:13]</nowiki>

From the perspective of Western Europe the Soviet economy in the 1930s as it builds vast new industrial complexes like this factory in Magnitogorsk looks to be doing very, very well by comparison.

And this is really important. There are big political consequences to this comparison which people in the 1930s might want to make between the communist system and the capitalist system. With capitalism enmired in crisis communism looks for the first time relatively attractive as a way of organizing society.

Of course there are still tremendous costs associated with a communist style political system, even sort of the left wing Western intellectuals who go to Russia and fawn over Stalin's accomplishments, are for the most part not willing to sacrifice their own civil liberties in order to construct a communist system and we'll talk more about the political aspects of communism in due course.

But the point is that the specter of communism on the left, much like the specter of fascism on the right, imperils the historical prospects of liberalism in the 1930s. After a long era, 19th century globalization, restored in the 1920s in which liberalism looked to represent sort of the inevitable destiny of humankind, the 1930s mark a catastrophic disjuncture in the history of liberal societies.

=== Roosevelt and the Survival of Capitalism ===

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<nowiki>[51:54]</nowiki>

Capitalism looks to be in a state of real crisis during the 1930s. Contemporary figures, people like {{WPExtract| Franklin D. Roosevelt |Franklin Roosevelt}}, the President of the United States for much of the 1930s, take away profound lessons from the experience of that decade.

Roosevelt concludes that if capitalism is to survive over the long term it will be necessary for governments to take a proactive role in the management and stabilization of the capitalist system.

And it's exactly this sort of transformation in the relationship between the state and the market that Roosevelt credits himself with having accomplished.

==== The Old Gentlemen and the Silk Hat ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:41]]
<nowiki>[52:41]</nowiki>

And Roosevelt, running for reelection in 1936, tells an anecdote. This is probably fictional. In the summer of 1933 a nice old gentleman wearing a silk hat fell off the end of a pier, representing of course the affluent, the capitalist elite. He was unable to swim. A friend, FDR, ran down the pier, dived overboard and pulled him out but the silk hat floated off with the tide. Today three years the old gentleman is berating his friend because the silk hat was lost.

==== The Preservation of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:10]]
<nowiki>[53:10]</nowiki>

So what Roosevelt is in effect telling us, right, is that he has succeeded in preserving the capitalist system. He has succeeded in preserving the basic framework of liberal democracy and capitalist economics. The price that has had to be paid for that is a slight sort of increase in social transfers from the wealthy to the less wealthy. And that's what the New Deal does. It stabilizes capitalism through the establishment of a basic infrastructure for social provision.

And what's important for our purposes is that Roosevelt's reading of the history of the New Deal was very widely shared in the 1930s and 1940s. Economists, sociologists, historians, political leaders, most of them believe that Roosevelt really did succeed in stabilizing capitalism and in securing its future. The idea that you could go back to the 1920s, that you could strap away the social provision of the New Deal seems in the 1940s to be really catastrophic because the old, the system of liberalism unregulated by nation-states, liberalism without the welfare state, looks, looking back at recent history to be a formula for catastrophe. A formula that will produce major crises like the Great Depression and which might even allow radical political alternatives, fascists and communists to seize the day.

=== The Regulation of the Capitalist System by Nation States ===

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<nowiki>[54:46]</nowiki>

So what is learned in the 1930s, is really, really important for what comes next.

Those who live through the 1930s learn a couple of things. They learn that the capitalist system needs careful management if it is to survive. And they also learn that the institution that is best able to manage and regulate and safeguard the capitalist system is the nation-state. It is the nation-state that provides welfare, and it is the nation-state that regulates the national economy, that creates demand when the market fails to do so.

This is all very, very consequential for what comes next.

That's the revolt against globalization. We'll probably come back to it again, again, and again. But I wanted to give you a sense of the picture.

== The Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:43]]
<nowiki>[55:43]</nowiki>

Let's talk a little more briefly about the Second World War. What do we need to know about the Second World War in order to understand the postwar world?

First we need to understand that the Second World War was really really bad. In terms that is of the human catastrophe that it represented. The Second World War was by far history's deadliest war so far.

=== Deadliest War in History ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:07]]
<nowiki>[56:07]</nowiki>

A little less than half of one percent of the world's population perished in the {{WPExtract|Thirty Years' War}} running from about 1618 to 1648. A few more than that, a little over half of one percent of the world's population, died in the {{WPExtract|World War I|First World War}}, in the {{WPExtract| Battle of the Somme|trenches of the Somme}} and the fields of {{WPExtract|Battle of Passchendaele|fields of Passchendaele}}.

The {{WPExtract|World War II|Second World War}} was twice as deadly -- more than twice as deadly as the First World War. Nearly one and a quarter percent of the entire world's population died in the Second World War. This is a catastrophic death toll. No war in human history has been so deadly as this.

And that's really, really important to remember.

It was a searing catastrophic event for all who lived through it.

=== Different Wars Within the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:58]]
<nowiki>[56:58]</nowiki>

But the Second World War was not a single war. The Second World War involved multiple conflicts. They became joined together within the framework of the Second World War after 1941, but the Second World War unfolded in specific historical circumstances.

There were theaters of the war that were worse afflicted by the war's violence than others. Not all nations bore the burdens of the Second World War equally. This is really important to remember.

==== The War for China ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:34]]
<nowiki>[57:34]</nowiki>

What were the major wars that collectively constituted the Second World War? The four that I would suggest are the most important are: the war for China, which begins in 1937 and really does not resolve itself until 1949, until the {{WPExtract|Chinese Civil War}} ends with The triumph of {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong}}'s [[WikipediaExtracts: Communist Party of China|Communist Party]][[wikipedia: Communist Party_of_China#Chinese_Civil_War_and_World_War_II_(1927–1949)|↗]].<ref>[[wikipedia:Communist_Party_of_China#Chinese_Civil_War_and_World_War_II_(1927–1949)| Chinese Civil War and World War II (1927–1949) section of Wikipedia article on the Communist Party of China]]</ref>

==== The War for Western Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:57]]
<nowiki>[57:57]</nowiki>

There is of course the war for Western Europe, what we perhaps most instinctively think of when we think about the Second World War. The war that begins with Hitler's bid for European mastery and ends with his suicide in a Berlin bunker.

==== The War Between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:15]]
<nowiki>[58:15]</nowiki>

The most catastrophic war of all however is not the war for Western Europe but the war on the Eastern Front -- the war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Unlike the war for Western Europe this is not a war that can be plausibly presented as a conflict between {{WPExtract|fascism}} and {{WPExtract|democracy}}. Rather it is a conflict between two {{WPExtract| totalitarianism|totalitarian}} systems. Hitler's fascism and Stalin's {{WPExtract|communism}}. It also happens to be by far the deadliest of all of the Second World War struggles.

==== The War in the Pacific ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:55]]
<nowiki>[58:55]</nowiki>

Finally we have the war in the Pacific. A war that begins with Japan's sort of bid to create an economic empire in East and Southeast Asia and which ends ultimately with the triumph of United States naval power and the subjugation of Japan to American reconstruction.

=== Effects of the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:21]]
<nowiki>[59:21]</nowiki>

How did these wars shape the postwar world?

Superficially the map of the world in 1945 does not look dissimilar from the map of the world in 1939.

We might, if we just look at the political geography, see the result of the Second World War as a return more or less to the status quo ante, to the way things were before the war began.

This, I would argue, would be a really superficial reading of the wars geopolitical consequences. The war is utterly transformative. It devastates France and Britain, previously both of which had ranked amongst the world's {{WPExtract|great power|great powers}}. It devastates Japan, East Asia's rising power, and it leaves the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's two dominant powers.

==== Shift of Power From Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:19]]
<nowiki>[60:19]</nowiki>

For about three or four centuries European international relations, which is almost but not quite to say the world's international relations, had operated according to a system of power politics in which a handful of great powers had balanced each other, fought wars against each other, with the effect that no single power was able to dominate the international system as a whole.

The Second World War brings this era of European great power politics to a dramatic end. All that is left are the two superpowers. Nobody else really counts in 1945 in terms of their military and strategic capacities.

==== Divergent Experiences from the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:06]]
<nowiki>[61:06]</nowiki>

But there are other profound legacies to the Second World War besides the geopolitical ones.

Let's remember that the Second World War produces very divergent experiences for the people who wage it. The Second World War that Americans fight and experience is not the Second World War that Russians fight and experience, and it's very, very important to remember that if we want to grasp the politics of the postwar era.

Our war is not their war. And their war is not somebody else's war. How do we illustrate this? It would take a long time to do it at any level of satisfactory detail. But let's just look at the really big picture. How are the wars ultimate burdens distributed? Who dies in the Second World War and where?

The war's human death toll is concentrated overwhelming in two countries -- in the Soviet Union and China. And this is a fact that has really really important consequences for postwar history.

And you might say as you gaze at these numbers appalling as they are that China and the Soviet Union were big countries. Of course their death tolls were going to be higher. Perhaps.

Let's look at the death tolls...

I'm sorry.

(Student Question)

No, this figure which shows a death toll of about 23 million of the Soviet Union includes only deaths that are attributable to the Second World War. It does not include the victims of the {{WPExtract| Holodomor|Ukrainian Famine}} or of [[WikipediaExtracts:Joseph Stalin|Stalin's purges]][[wikipedia: Joseph_Stalin#The_Great_Terror|↗]].<ref>[[wikipedia: Joseph_Stalin#The_Great_Terror|Section of Wikipedia article on Joseph Stalin and The Great Terror]]</ref>

We'll talk about those in a different lecture.

Let's look at war deaths not in terms of the absolute numbers but rather as percentages of the pre-war populations of the afflicted countries.

And here the picture looks somewhat different but the indelible fact remains for the Soviet Union which loses almost 15% of its population in the Second World War. The experience of war is a truly catastrophic and harrowing one. Only one country, one big country, experiences the Second World War more severely than did the Soviet Union and that of course is Poland. The country that is invaded by Hitler in 1939 and ends up being subjected to the Red Army at the war's end.

The burdens of war are unequally distributed. Many more Germans, Poles, Russians, Yugoslavs, and Chinese die in the Second World War than do Americans or Britains.

Just contemplate the view from {{WPExtract|Times Square}} in August 1945 and the view of the {{WPExtract|Potsdamer Platz}} Berlin's Times Square around the same time.

[[File: V-J Day Times Square NYWTS.jpg|thumb|500px|center|V-J Day in Times Square]]
[[File: Fotothek df pk 0000145 001.jpg|thumb|500px|center|The Potsdamer Platz at the end of the Second World War]]

The legacies of the war for ordinary men and women are very, very different.

But it's not just the catastrophe of war that leaves a lasting impact. Might also think about the legacies of the war's economic mobilization. You might think about the legacies of political developments during the Second World War.

Some of these themes also bear serious consideration.

==== Economic Effects of the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:43]]
<nowiki>[64:43]</nowiki>

Let's think about the economic mobilization for war.

The Second World War was fought to a large extent as a war of production. One of the reasons that the Allies prevailed was that the United States, the {{WPExtract|Arsenal of Democracy|arsenal of democracy}}, as FDR put it,<ref>In Roosevelt's [[commons:File:State of the Union Address for 1943 by Franklin Roosevelt.ogg|1943 State of the Union address]] he said, "I suspect that Hitler and Tojo will find it difficult to explain to the German and Japanese people just why it is that "decadent, inefficient democracy" can produce such phenomenal quantities of weapons and munitions—and fighting men." [[File: State of the Union Address for 1943 by Franklin Roosevelt.ogg|500px|start=22:37]]
<nowiki>[22:37]</nowiki></ref> was able to produce more war equipment, more tanks, guns, and planes faster than could anybody else.

American war industries produced bombers and ships on a vast scale. They did this really succinctly because they applied the principles of {{WPExtract|Assembly line|production line assembly}} to the tasks of war production. Something which had never before been done.

===== Expansion of the Public Sector Throughout the World =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:29]]
<nowiki>[65:29]</nowiki>

Mobilization for the Second World War involves an unprecedented expansion of the public sector. This occurs in every single country that fights the Second World War except the Soviet Union where the public sector had already expanded to its maximum extent in the 1930s. But in Germany in Great Britain and in the United States and elsewhere the Second World War involves burgeoning of government.

Just look at the changes in federal spending in the United States as a fraction of GDP. During the New Deal Roosevelt spent money, much faster than any previous government had in peacetime. Federal spending as a fraction of GDP begins to approach 10% in the 1930s.

But in the 1940s with the Second World War federal spending just shoots up to unprecedented levels. Government spending begins to approach 40, 45% of gross domestic product. This is a leviathan state the likes of which the United States has never before seen.

And the American experience is not unusual. All of the war's belligerents tax and spend in order to wage the war.

Often taxes are not sufficient pay for the war. And if taxes won't pay for the war what will? Debt. The United States runs systemic budget deficits during the Second World War in order to pay for the war. So do other belligerent governments.

And this is really, really consequential. The experience of the Second World War compounds the experience of the Great Depression. If the Great Depression saw a sort of unprecedented expansion of the public sector in peacetime the Second World War takes that public sector and makes it much, much bigger than it had grown even in the 1930s. It creates what you might characterize as a leviathan state.

And some people see this a really positive thing. After all, FDR struggled to solve the Great Depression in the 1930s. Keynesian economists argued that even the deficit spending that the New Deal did, which actually wasn't very much, was insufficient to the magnitude of the problem.

It's not the New Deal but the Second World War that ultimately ends the Great Depression. You see an unprecedented marshaling of public resources for the purposes of waging the war which as a consequence end up restoring full employment in the United States. Only with the Second World War, only with the advent of massive government contracts for the manufacture of munitions will the Great Depression come to an end.

====== Friedrich Hayek and The Road to Serfdom ======

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<nowiki>[68:27]</nowiki>

Some people see this as troubling. The Austrian economist {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek}} publishes a book in 1944 titled {{WPExtract|The Road to Serfdom|''The Road to Serfdom''}}. And it argues that the concentration of economic power in the hands of the state is a profoundly troubling development. Hayek argues that, while he acknowledges that there are key differences between the United States and its fascist adversary Nazi Germany, he argues that the accumulation of economic resources in the hands of the state will lead ultimately to the creation of a tyrannical or authoritarian regime.

We'll talk more about Hayek and his influence later on in the semester.

So far as the 1940s are concerned the key point about Hayek is that very few people listen to him. Hayek warns that the excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of the state is a bad thing. But in the 1940s Hayek is a voice in the wilderness. Most professional economists align with Keynes and see the expansion of the public sector as a benign development that will stabilize the capitalist system.

====== Conclusion: Expansion of the Public Sector Throughout the World ======

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:40]]
<nowiki>[69:40]</nowiki>

So that's one really important legacy of war mobilization. It sort of consecrates the emergence of the public sector in the economy.

==== Technological Effects of the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:49]]
<nowiki>[69:49]</nowiki>

It's not all that the war leaves behind. It also leaves gargantuan technological legacies -- none more impressive than the atomic bomb.

===== The Atomic Bomb =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:58]]
<nowiki>[69:58]</nowiki>

Of course the creation of the atomic bomb itself involves a massive exertion of public resources. The {{WPExtract|Manhattan Project}} employs about a 150,000 people all of whom are government employees.

This is bigger than any government enterprise that had previously existed in all of the history of the United States.

And of course it produces the {{WPExtract| Trinity (nuclear test) |first detonation of an atomic device in July 1945}} -- a detonation that will have profound consequences for the geopolitics of the postwar world.

But the atomic bomb is not the only technological legacy of the Second World War. The Second World War leaves a host of technological legacies that will shape the world that we inhabit today.

===== Jet Engines =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:42]]
<nowiki>[70:42]</nowiki>

Jet engines were first developed in the 1930s but they did not fly until 1939. The Second World War greatly accelerates the application of {{WPExtract|Jet engine}} jet technology to the purposes of aviation. With the consequence that by the 1950s ordinary people can take flights on passenger jets. Presumably would not have happened without the Second World War -- a episode that accelerates the application of scientific innovation to military and ultimately civilian purposes.

===== Radar =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:17]]
<nowiki>[71:17]</nowiki>

There are other really important innovations. {{WPExtract|Radar}}, developed by the British to help intercept incoming German bombers and fighter planes, it will in the postwar era help to make possible a complex infrastructure for civilian aviation.

===== Penicillin =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:35]]
<nowiki>[71:35]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Penicillin}} is discovered in 1928 but it's not mass produced until the early 1940s. Why is it mass produced in the early 1940s? It's mass produced in order to help treat the wounds of soldiers.

But by 1945 it's available for purchase by ordinary citizens, initially in the United States, subsequently elsewhere.

Penicillin has huge, huge consequences. It means that ordinary men, women and children no longer die from simple infections. It's a big deal.

===== Nylon =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:05]]
<nowiki>[72:05]</nowiki>

There are other technologies too. {{WPExtract|Nylon}} is discovered in 1935 but it's not until the war that it is applied, that it begins to be mass produced. It's used initially to make parachutes but it has sort of consequences for fashion and consumer tastes after the war has been won.

==== Race Relations in the United States After the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:28]]
<nowiki>[72:28]</nowiki>

The war has consequences for race relations in the United States. How do you wage a war for democracy and human rights while denying human rights to a tenth of your population at home, right? The hypocrisy lingers and it helps to animate and inform the {{WPExtract|civil rights movement}} in the United States.

More than the hypocrisy perhaps, the example of Hitler's racial tyranny in Europe, the Holocaust, helps to discredit racism as a legitimate ideological construct. It's really important to remember that before the Second World War it wasn't a bad thing to be a racist. Racists could hold appointment at major research universities. And they could publish sort of ludicrous books that offered complex racial geographies of the world that commented on the aptitude of particular peoples for particular tasks.

If you want to you can go back to look at the examinations that were offered in geography at elite private universities in the United States and Great Britain in the 1920s, and you'll be really troubled by the questions that were asked.

The Second World War doesn't eliminate racism but it helps to begin the process of discrediting racism as a kind of legitimate frame of belief.

===== United Nations Statement on Race =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 73:51]]
<nowiki>[73:51]</nowiki>

One example of this is a {{WPExtract|The Race Question|a report that the United Nations publishes in 1950 called the race question}}.<ref>The Wikipedia article on the report states that the document was revised and republished [[wikipedia:The_Race_Question#Criticism_and_controversy|after being critiqued by a number of scientists]].</ref> It's a report that is authored by some of the most distinguished anthropologists and biologists in the world and it offers a very powerful conclusion that race is essentially a biological fiction and that racism is wrong.

This is the first time that a major international organization will sort of go on record as denouncing racism as {{WPExtract|prima facie}} false. We should remember that the League of Nations by contrast had sort of assimilated itself to the realities of racism that still existed very powerfully in the world of the 1920s. That's one consequence.

==== The Rise of the Left in Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 74:37]]
<nowiki>[74:37]</nowiki>

The rise of {{WPExtract| Left-wing politics|the left}} in Europe and elsewhere is another powerful consequence of the Second World War. Whereas as {{WPExtract| Right-wing politics|the right}} disgraces itself by its accommodation with fascism the left distinguishes itself through wartime resistance.

The Soviet example is a valiant one and only bolsters the prestige of the left in the world of the 1940s. We'll talk more about the rise of the left when we talk about the origins of the Cold War, but we should remember that the Second World War brings with it really profound ideological and political consequences which have to do with sort of the discrediting of the right, of the forces of conservatism, and with the rise of the popular ascendancy of the left.

In the elections that are held in France subsequent to the liberation in 1945 the Communists and the Socialists together win a majority.

== Institutional Framework of the Postwar Settlement ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 75:31]]
<nowiki>[75:31]</nowiki>

Let's talk for a couple of minutes at the very end (this was intentionally designed to be brief) about the sort of institutional legacies of the Second World War.

So far we've talked about the economic and technological and political legacies of the war. What about the international institutions that the leaders of the world's powerful states, particularly the United States, create in order to regulate and guide the postwar order?

The creation of new international orders at the end of major wars is hardly unprecedented. The First World War ends with the creation of the League of Nations. The Second World War ends with the creation of the United Nations.

What shapes the character of such peace settlements? Obviously it's the distribution of power in the international system at the end of the war and the preferences of the dominant power.

It is the United States in 1945 that is the dominant power from its position of dominance it creates a new sort of institutional framework for managing the affairs of the postwar world.

The institutions which we're going to talk about much more as the semester progresses are myriad but the most important ones are the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods economic institutions}} and the {{WPExtract|United Nations}} as a political framework for organizing the affairs of the postwar world.

=== Restoration of International Trade ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:54]]
<nowiki>[76:54]</nowiki>

The Bretton Woods system, and I'm going to talk, probably spend a whole lecture in a couple of weeks talking about how it works, essentially tries to accomplish two things. The first thing that it tries to do is to accomplish or to orchestrate a restoration of international trade.

Insofar as the 1930s saw a total breakdown of international trade, an embrace of {{WPExtract|Autarky|autarkic}} solutions by governments, the Bretton Woods Institutions try to restore the basic framework of multilateral free trade.

=== Accommodate the Rise of the Public Sector ===

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<nowiki>[77:30]</nowiki>

But they try to do a second thing too. And this is to accommodate the rise of the public sector that occurs during the 1930s. The Bretton Woods Institutions try to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable things: liberal free trade on the one hand, and the rise of {{WPExtract|statism|economic statism}} of states that try to manage and regulate and protect their own national economies on the other.

The Bretton Woods system will be fairly successful in its effort to reconcile liberal trade and the rise of the public sector for about 30 years. And we're going to talk much more about how Bretton Woods worked and why it came unstuck in due course.

=== The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:16]]
<nowiki>[78:16]</nowiki>

Just in case you're not familiar with the technical aspects: the two sort of major institutional components of the Bretton Woods order will be the {{WPExtract|International Monetary Fund}} and the {{WPExtract|World Bank}}.

But we're going to talk about all of this in due course so you don't need to worry about taking notes.

=== The United Nations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:31]]
<nowiki>[78:31]</nowiki>

Last thing: the United Nations. The United Nations emerges as a sort of international organization in which all of the governments of the world are represented. It comes out of two conferences. The first convened at {{WPExtract|Dumbarton Oaks Conference|Dumbarton Oaks in Washington in 1944}}. The second {{WPExtract|United Nations Conference on International Organization|held at San Francisco in 1945}}. The United Nations as all of you know includes a number of institutional apparatus, apparatuses, the General Assembly represents all of the nation-states of the world according to the principle one nation, one vote. The Security Council represents the interests of the powerful states. It gives them a special role in the preservation of international peace and security.

Besides these two core institutions the UN includes a Secretariat which is a little bit like the executive branch of the United Nations and a number of specialist agencies like UNESCO.

=== Human Rights and Human Hopes===

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One last thing. The international order that the United Nations consecrates is an international order that has to do primarily with nation-states. It represents nation-states and it propounds to defend peace in a world of nation-states. But of course nation-states are not all that there is in the world. History begins not with nation-states but with ordinary men and women.

And Franklin Roosevelt during the Second World War understood this. And he talked, when he talked about the character of the postwar order, he talked not only about peace as an objective for which the war would have to be fought and won but also about human rights. FDR insisted that the postwar world would be one in which the human rights of ordinary people would be honored and respected.

One of the great challenges that we'll exist for the architects of the postwar order is constructing an international system which will be able simultaneously to assure peace in a world of nation-states and to protect and defend the human rights of individuals.

Because insofar as individuals are ultimately accountable to their states and states ultimately accountable to individuals what role can an international organization have in protecting the interests and rights of individual men and women?

That's the question on which I would like to leave this lecture. The world ends, the world war ends in 1945, with the consecration of a new interstate order, yet the experience of war has raised the aspirations of ordinary men and women. It's raised their expectations. They now expect a certain modicum of economic well-being. They yearn for freedom -- even perhaps for justice.

What can be the relationship of the big international institutions that the war produces to those very fundamental, very elemental human hopes?

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s

2022-03-01T22:11:27Z

DavidKitFriedman: Changed the link to make it easier for people to find the place.

== Preliminaries ==

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Morning. It's about ten past the half hour so it's time to begin.

Welcome to History 186.

Let me just start with a quick note on the audio. You've managed to catch me at the end of a nasty cold. The end of a bad cold is better than the beginning, but by consequence the audio is going to be a little scratchier today than it will ordinarily be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px |start=0:21]]
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A more consequential issue with the audio that I wanted to be all aware of at the beginning is that this semester's lectures are being podcast which means that they're available for distribution via iTunes. Probably most of you know what podcasting lectures involves.

This is really good insofar and makes what we're doing in the classroom available to anybody outside of the classroom who's interested to listen in. The only downside of podcasting as I see it is that it makes it easy for all of you who ought to be in the classroom to sit at home on a cold morning like this and listen to the lecture remotely.

I would really prefer if you didn't. I don't have any mechanism enforce your attendance in the lectures. But I hope that you will not use the podcasting as a you know opportunity to avoid coming to lectures tempting as that might be when the weather is at frigid as it is today. It's all of what 50 degrees outside which is much colder than were accustomed to even in northern California.

== Introductory Anecdote: Nixon and Zhou Enlai ==

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This is a history class. It's a class in {{WPExtract|contemporary history}}. But it is a history class. I'm a historian and as such I would like to start the class with an historical anecdote

So I'm going to take you back to May 1972. {{WPExtract|Richard Nixon}} has landed in China the first American president ever to visit the People's Republic.

He meets, besides meeting with {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Chairman Mao}}, with {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai|Premier Zhou Enlai}} the effective Prime Minister of China.

Nixon, as those of you know anything about him may know, was a really socially awkward and inept personality in some respects.
He found it very difficult to make small talk. But he had been told by his advisors that Zhou Enlai was really interested in French history. So Nixon said, as you might in that situation, what do you think about the {{WPExtract|French Revolution}}? Zhou famously replied, "it's too soon to tell".

This anecdote is a suitable place to begin a history of recent world affairs. Zhou Enlai's reply might warn us against passing premature historical judgments. It's too soon to tell.

The episode I would suggest is cautionary in a different direction. It ought to caution us to get our facts right. Because Zhou Enlai was not referring to the French Revolution which you think of when we talk about the French Revolution (the Revolution of 1789) he was, according to Nixon's translator, referring to the {{WPExtract|May 1968 events in France|revolution of 1968}}.

So, besides cautioning us to avoid premature historical judgments, this episode might also remind us that when we do history it's important to get the history correct.

== Why Study History? ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:08]]
<nowiki>[3:08]</nowiki>

Nonetheless, the question that Zhou Enlai raised, when is it too soon to tell, is an important one. Should historians study recent events? What business do we have studying the history of contemporary world politics, or world economics? Why not favor alternative disciplinary approaches? What do historians have to tell us? What do you have to learn from me that you might not learn about it in some other disciplinary context?

Why not takes a class in economics or sociology or political science? Are these disciplines that not offer some superior insight into the workings of the contemporary world? What might history offer that these approaches do not?

To answer this question we're going to have to raise some really fundamental questions? What is history, and what is the historian's role? And perhaps most important for all of you what do we learn from history?

Is there any point in studying it? Is it just a random succession of facts and personalities? Or is there some larger purpose to the study of the past?

You know many philosophers and thinkers and historians have posed this question in the past. What is history? We might turn to some of the great canonical figures for answers.

=== Elbert Hubbard ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:24]]
<nowiki>[4:24]</nowiki>

Let's start first of all with {{WPExtract|Elbert Hubbard}}, an American radical and writer, famously described history as just one damn thing after another.<ref>See though [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/16/history/ "History Is Just One Damn Thing after Another"] and [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/ "Life Is Just One Damn Thing After Another"] from [https://quoteinvestigator.com/ Quote Investigator].
<br/><br/>
Quote Investigator believes that the quote "history is just one damn thing after another" originated from the quote "life is just one damn thing after another."
<br/><br/>
Elbert Hubbard printed the phrase "life is just one damn thing after another" in his publication [https://books.google.com/books?id=IhrZAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA32#v=snippet&q=%22life%20is%20just%22&f=false "The Philistine: A Periodical of Protest" in December of 1909]. As Quote Investigator speaks about in the post on [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/ "Life Is Just One Damn Thing After Another"] the phrase was in the air at the time without any specific well known originator.
<br/><br/>
In the post on [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/16/history/ "History Is Just One Damn Thing after Another"] Quote Investigator points out that although {{WPExtract|Arnold J. Toynbee}} may be associated with that phrase and speaking of such an overall notion he actually disagreed with it, and when using such phrases was doing so in that context.</ref>

This is one perspective on the past. It's just stuff that happens. Without any rhyme or reason or connection among events.

=== Karl Marx ===

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{{WPExtract|Karl Marx}}, one of the most celebrated and influential philosophers of history of all time, had a perspective on history which is about the exact opposite of Elbert Hubbard's. For Marx history had a very clear logic. You all know what that logic is, right? What's the logic of history for Marx?

That's right. The logic of history for Marx is a logic of class struggle leading ultimately to the creation of a {{WPExtract|communism|communist}} society -- a profoundly influential historical concept.

=== Thomas Macaulay ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:17]]
<nowiki>[5:17]</nowiki>

But there have been other influential historical concepts. Perhaps articulated somewhat less forthrightly than Marx.

Take another British 19th century historical figure: {{WPExtract|Thomas Babington Macaulay|Thomas Macaulay}}. Macaulay was one of the great {{WPExtract|Whigs (British political party)|Whig}} historians. His view of history was that history represented an inexorable march of progress -- the steady march of reform even justice.

=== Determinism and Randomness ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:47]]
<nowiki>[5:47]</nowiki>

The kind of historical determinism that figures like Marx and Macaulay favored, a determinism that sees history as having an ulterior logic, a direction, a purpose, has in some ways fallen out of favor with professional historians. We're much less inclined today to see all history as ultimately being reducible to the history of class struggle or to the history of Whiggish political reform than we might have been several generations ago.

But that doesn't mean that history is just one damn thing after another. We ought to be conscious of the ways in which history shapes us. How does history constrain our choices in the present? This is a question that historians have at some fundamental level to grapple with.

== Pólya's urn ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:33]]
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To think about this it may be useful to reflect upon a sort of mathematical problem: {{WPExtract|Pólya urn model|Pólya's urn}} problem.

How many of you have encountered Pólya's urn in probability classes?

Okay, just one of you.

That's good because I don't know this very well so please don't correct me if I make any mistakes. You can come and do it quietly after the class.

Pólya's urn is simply an experiment in probability but it's a useful vantage point for thinking about the utility of history as a way of knowing and a mode of learning.

What is Pólya's urn? A big urn. Contains at the beginning of the experiment just two balls. One white, one blue. They can be any color you want this doesn't really matter. But the idea is that we have a big urn with two balls, one of different color, each a different color. Let's say we remove one of those balls at random. We take out a white ball. Then we put it back in the urn adding another ball of the same color. So we take out one white ball we add two white balls back. We take out one blue ball we add two blue balls back.

We keep on repeating the experiment until the urn is full. Because eventually it will get full if we put two balls in for every ball that we remove.

What is the ultimate distribution of colored balls within the urn at the end of the experiment?

I don't have any idea, and nor do you. It's impossible to predict. But what the experiment does tell us if we think about the logic of it is that the early selections, the first balls that are removed and replaced are very consequential for determining the ultimate coloration of the urn at once the experiment has been concluded.

This is a experiment that is suggestive as to the importance of history, right?
Early choices have great consequences for determining subsequent outcomes. History in a sense is an iterative process in which early choices or decisions have great consequence for subsequent events.

=== Institutional Framework of American Politics ===

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Think about the sort of institutional framework of American politics. You know the basic system of government which the founding fathers bequeathed to us in the late 18th century. You know obviously that system has been modified in you know fundamental respects through subsequent Constitutional amendments and political innovations. But nonetheless the legacy of those early choices weighs very, very heavily on the present.

=== Conclusion: Pólya's Urn ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:06]]
<nowiki>[9:06]</nowiki>

So we can't predict the outcome of history. You know that's not what this experiment is intended to demonstrate. All that it ought to suggest is that early choices have consequences for subsequent outcomes and conditions.

== Path Dependence ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:24]]
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In a sense this is what economists call {{WPExtract|path dependence}}. That's sort of a key concept in the social sciences. How are the paths that we are on shaping conditions by prior choices over which we have no control?

== Different Approaches to History ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:39]]
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What does this have to do with the role of the historian? It depends really on the individual historian because different historians see their roles and their responsibilities in very different terms.

Some historians are fundamentally concerned with experience and meaning. They see the past as another country and they seek to sort of reconstruct even to inhabit the experience of men and women living in circumstance and conditions quite different from our own.

This is profoundly useful. We learn something fundamental about human nature perhaps by thinking about how men and women have lived in circumstances far removed from those that we inhabit today.

But not all historians are fundamentally concerned with meaning. With what you might call [[wikt:hermeneutics|hermeneutics]] to use a fancy word.

Other historians, and I would probably include myself in this latter camp, are more concerned with causation -- with how things came to be the way they are and implicitly why didn't they get to be some other way.

For these historians issues of path dependence are absolutely crucial. When we reconstruct the past we don't simply seek to recreate the past as it existed at some particular moment in history rather we seek to navigate historical transitions. To think about how we got from one past state to another past state. Or indeed how we got from a past state to the state that we inhabit today, which is of course the present.

This class is going to be concerned more with connection than with the pursuit of meaning.

I make no apologies for that. These are simply different approaches to the study of history. What we're going to do this semester is to think about how things came to be the way they are.

And we're concerned not with how things came to be the way they were in 1945 but with how things came to be the way they are today in 2012.

== Contemporary History ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:40]]
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In that respect this class is an exercise in {{WPExtract|contemporary history}}. What is contemporary history?

Contemporary history is sort of the keyword for what we're trying to do in this semester.

=== Geoffrey Barraclough ===

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Probably the best definition of contemporary history that I've ever come across was offered by {{WPExtract|Geoffrey Barraclough}} -- a medieval historian who became later on in his career one of the leading proponents and theorists of contemporary history. For Barraclough the key to contemporary history was the point of departure. Contemporary history for Barraclough is really concerned with the historical origins and constitution of the present. It's not concerned with explaining the origins of the First World War or the origins of the American Revolution rather it's concerned with explaining the origins of the present.

How do things get to be the way they are today?

And for Barraclough contemporary history is the history that seeks the answer to this question. It is the history that aims to clarify the basic structural changes which have shaped the modern world.

When does this history begin?
Well, it all depends what the particular problem that you want to comprehend and unpack might be.

Contemporary history begins when the problems which are actual in the world today first take visible shape. It could begin decades ago. It could begin centuries ago. It could begin millennia ago. It all depends what the particular problem on which we fixate might be.

What distinguishes contemporary history than is the vantage point from which it is pursued. Contemporary history is history that looks back from the present to try to search for, explain, and unpack the deep origins of issues on which we fixate in the world today.

=== Conclusion: Contemporary History ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:28]]
<nowiki>[13:28]</nowiki>

So the appropriate place to begin a course in contemporary history or history of the contemporary world might then be not the past but the present.

Looking back from the present moment what do we see in the past that captivates our attention and calls for a particular explanation?

== Current Events ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:52]]
<nowiki>[13:52]</nowiki>

Let's start by thinking about some of the big important events of recent months.

These may be a little outdated now. It's about a week since I put this slideshow together.

But let's just survey the world from the perspective of the present or last month perhaps.

What were the big major headlines of December 2012?<ref>Speaker most likely meant December 2011.</ref>

=== European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:22]]
<nowiki>[14:22]</nowiki>

Well, one of the big important headlines had to do with Europe's fiscal crisis. The European Summit, which took place in sort of early mid-December, aimed to address Europe's ongoing fiscal crisis.

What was really important about the Brussell's Summit, which took place, in I think December 11th, but I could be wrong,<ref>Meetings were held December 8th to December 9th. See Wikipedia article [[wikipedia: List of European Council meetings|List of European Council meetings]] and also:<br/><br/>
Rooney, Ben (2011-12-09). [https://money.cnn.com/2011/12/09/news/international/europe_debt_crisis/index.htm Europe debt saga far from over]. ''CNNMoney''. Retrieved:2018-08-15
<br/><br/>and:
<br/><br/>
Traynor, Ian; Watt, Nicholas; Gow, David; Wintour, Patrick (2011-12-09). [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty "David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift in Europe"]. ''The Guardian''. Retrieved 2018-08-15.</ref> is that it produced an agreement amongst all of the member states of the {{WPExtract|European Union}} with the exception, the important exception of Great Britain, to seek a fiscal stability pact which will impose sort of stringent budgetary conditions on member states of the European Union.

It's a really important landmark summit in the history of European integration. It's also really consequential episode insofar as it marked Great Britain's estrangement from the European project. It's probably too soon to tell what the eventual consequences will be but a very important episode in the history of Europe.

=== Moscow Street Protests ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:22]]
<nowiki>[15:22]</nowiki>

There have been other major headlines in the news over the past couple of months. Let's think about the view from Moscow where there have been massive street protests against the {{WPExtract|Vladimir Putin|Putin}} {{WPExtract| Dmitry Medvedev| Medvedev}} regime.

What's interesting about the Moscow crisis? Well, a great deal is interesting. We might highlight the role of digital communications in the production of street dissent.

Doing so might help us to link the Moscow protests of last month with the {{WPExtract|Arab Spring}} earlier in 2011 or even the {{WPExtract|Occupy Wall Street}} movement of the fall for example?

What is the larger significance of the Moscow protests?

Might we see this episode as representing the resurgence of civil society perhaps against what Putin would characterize as Russian's guided democracy.

Another really important episode than with sort of big historical implications perhaps.

=== Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

There have been other events. Some more geopolitical in character over the past couple of months. Earlier this month Iran tested a new kind of anti-ship missile in the {{WPExtract| Strait of Hormuz |Straits of Hormuz}}. Moreover the Iranian government has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz -- a narrow strait at the end of the {{WPExtract|Persian Gulf}} through which about one-fifth of the world's oil shipping passes.

This is just one episode in a kind of long running confrontation between the Iranian regime of {{WPExtract| Mahmoud Ahmadinejad|Ahmadinejad}} with the West sort of led of course by the United States.

There are a variety of larger perspectives which we might bring to bear on this crisis but it is you know sort of self-evidently an important flash point in world geopolitics today.

=== Death of Kim Jong-il ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:16]]
<nowiki>[17:16]</nowiki>

Probably no new story got more attention last month than did the death of {{WPExtract|Kim Jong-il}} in Pyongyang the capital of North Korea.

This was clearly a major, major turning point in the history of the North Korean regime. It's potentially a point of rupture. The regime of Kim Jong-il does not have such clear and cogent succession plans as did the regime of {{WPExtract|Kim Il-sung}} his father.

The transition although it seems to be proceed smoothly enough; nonetheless, raises a whole host of urgent and important questions as regards the future relationship of North Korea to its neighbor South Korea, to the United States, to China, to the larger international community.

The transition within the regime raises the prospect at least of larger regional instability perhaps even embroiling the United States and China.

== Interpretation of Current Events ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:20]]
<nowiki>[18:20]</nowiki>

My purpose though in sort of recapitulating these events is not to suggest that history is just a series of disconnected happenstance.
Rather it is to try to probe some of the larger themes to which we might connect particular developments and events in our recent history.

So I'd like to sort of pose the question of how we go about locating the deep origins of these particular crises or flash points.
Can we situate the events of our times in a larger historical perspective? Which is to say can we situate them within sort of a larger narrative framework? How do we relate past to present? How do we relate present to past in ways that grants new perspective perhaps even deeper perspective on the stakes and consequences of present day events.

Searching for the deep origins of particular events in the world today will not enable us to predict the future. But it might help us to get some sense of the vectors along which we might proceed as we move forward. Thinking about where we've come from can illuminate the possible paths that we might follow as we move forward. So to try to do this it might be useful to probe a little bit deeper into a least a couple of these episodes to think about how we could situate the events of the present in a larger historical context.

How might history as opposed to economics or political science help us to gain a vantage on the events of our own times?

So let's try to do this for just two of these particular episodes which I've identified here.

=== Interpretation of European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:14]]
<nowiki>[20:14]</nowiki>

Let's think about the European summit and the larger sort of European financial crisis of which it is part. How might we understand the summit among European heads of state that took place in Brussels last month?

One historical framework which might help us to understand the summit and its significance is of course the history of European integration.

==== European Integration ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:43]]
<nowiki>[20:43]</nowiki>

The European project as we might characterize it goes back a long way.

The first landmark treaty which sort of created the European economic community as it was at the time was signed all the way back in 1957 in Rome. The {{WPExtract|Treaty of Rome}} provided for a single European market and for regulatory harmonization within it. It marked the first really important step in what you might see as a sort of long historical march towards the construction of an integrated European society if not an integrated European state.

There have been other landmarks in this historical progression. The {{WPExtract|Maastricht Treaty}} of 1991 transformed the {{WPExtract|European Economic Community}} into the {{WPExtract|European Union}}.
It provided for monetary integration in the form of the single currency, the {{WPExtract|euro}}, which was introduced just before the turn of the millennium.

Thinking about these prior landmarks in the integration of Europe helps to us to see the integration of Europe as an iterative process, as a process in which the Europeans have edged closer and closer to more full and more formal integration of their political and especially economic affairs.

From this vantage point thinking about the history of European integration the Brussels Summit which was convened in response to the fiscal crisis in the {{WPExtract|Eurozone}} might appear as simply the latest in a series of landmark episodes which have pushed the Europeans closer and closer towards the creation of a single {{WPExtract|superstate}}.

Whereas the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 provided for monetary harmonization within the European Union the Brussels Summit provides for a degree of fiscal integration.

It's really the first; well, not quite, but it's the first sort of major effort to require the member states of the European Union to follow sort of coherent and integrated fiscal agenda in their public finances.

So that's one perspective on what happened in Brussels earlier this month. It's just the latest chapter in a long running saga of European integration.

But there are other frameworks within which we might situation events and they offer different vantage points on the significance and consequence of recent episodes.

==== Globalization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:13]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

We might see what happened in Brussels last month as an episode in the larger history of globalization.

{{WPExtract|Globalization}} after all is a force which has been corrosive of fiscal and monetary sovereignty that is the fiscal and monetary sovereignty of nation-states since at least the 1970s.

A globalization in the form of, particularly the integration of financial markets, has imposed constraints on the deficits that governments can run, on public spending. The advent of globalization has been a somewhat progressive process. The integration of {{WPExtract|capital markets}}, though it's a story that could be traced back centuries, really begins to accelerate in recent times during the 1970s.

During the 1990s globalization becomes a widely discussed and widely theorized phenomenon. We begin to see the development of what you might characterize as a sort of global public policy prescriptions for a globalizing world in the 1990s. And these dictate that countries that want to participate in globalization need to balance their budgets and cut back public spending.

It's familiar enough. This is a policy prescription which is sometimes characterized usually by its critics as the {{WPExtract|Washington Consensus}}. And it's applied in 1980s and 1990s primarily to the {{WPExtract| Developing country|developing world}}. This is really important.

North Americans and West Europeans don't really feel the constraining impact of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s. They might in fact have been its beneficiaries. You could certainly make that case so far as the United States is concerned.

Since the {{WPExtract| Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2008}} however this ceased to be so clear that the West gets to enjoy the benefits of globalization without subjecting itself to the discipline inherent within the globalization of financial markets.

We might see the Brussels summit, it's a summit which imposes rigid fiscal constraints on the member states of the European Union, as an episode in the larger history of globalization. The significance of which is that it marks the moment at which the West, previously the dominant center of the global economy, itself becomes subject to the rules and constraints that financial globalization implies.

So that's a quite different perspective. The Brussels crisis, not so much as an episode in the history of European integration, but as an episode in the history of globalization.

==== German Ascendancy ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 25:57]]
<nowiki>[25:57]</nowiki>

Thus far I've sort of focused on the economic aspects of the summit and their larger significance, but we must alternatively see the Brussel's summit as a sort of {{WPExtract|geopolitics|geopolitical}} episode. As an episode whose larger consequences lie ultimately not in the economic relations of nations but in {{WPExtract|power politics}}.

From a geopolitical perspective, which is say a perspective concerned with power ultimately, with military and political power in world affairs, the German problem has been European's fundamental problem since the 1870s.

Germany of course was unified at the beginning of the 1870s under the guidance of {{WPExtract|Otto von Bismarck}}. The creation of the German state in the 1870s created a big problem for Europe because, as most of you know, Germany is too big and too powerful for the European system to be able to contain it.
Germany twice tried to dominate Europe by military means in the 20th century. In 1914 {{WPExtract| Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser Wilheml II}} launched Germany's first bid for European mastery. It was defeated but only really through the intervention of the United States, and Great Britain. In 1939 under {{WPExtract|Adolf Hitler}} Germany launched a second bid for European mastery. Once again it was defeated, but only because of the intervention of the United States and Great Britain.

If we see the German problem as Europe's sort of fundamental geopolitical dilemma we gain a very different perspective on the Brussel's summit of last month. You might see the summit as less important for its political economic consequences than for its geopolitical ones.

Might the summit have signified the consolidation of German dominance of Europe?

After all German power has resurged since the {{WPExtract| German reunification | reunification of Germany in 1990}}. For almost half a century after the Second World War Germany was divided.

The United States and Great Britain and the Soviet Union all maintained troops in Germany in effect keeping the German problem resolved through the expedient solution of division.

Since German reunification Germany has necessarily become more powerful, more influential, and we might see the Brussels summit as marking the sort of consecration of German power within the Eurozone.

Berlin under {{WPExtract|Angela Merkel|Chancellor Angela Merkel}} is the driving force between fiscal discipline as a policy priority within the Eurozone. At the same time Germany has resisted sort of the more generous aspect of fiscal integration which would be the transfer of resources from the Eurozone's richest states to its less affluent states, primarily on the Mediterranean periphery.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 29:08]]
<nowiki>[29:08]</nowiki>

One of the consequences of the Brussels summit (it's probably too early to tell) looks to be the creation of a sort of imbalanced system of fiscal integration whereby the peripheral European states, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, the pigs, are subjected to harsh fiscal discipline, but do not enjoy the benefit of fiscal transfers from the affluent north.

So we might see the creation of a sort of European fiscal system which serves the interests of Germany at the expense of the European periphery as marking the consolidation, perhaps ultimately the final accomplishment, of German dominance of Europe.

The fact that this domination was achieved peacefully rather than through military means might not deter us from calling it what it is.

I'm not saying that's what it is. I'm just saying that's a perspective. What I wanted to propose is not any ultimate adjudication as to what the larger significance of last month's Brussel's summit is, but rather just three vantage paints.

==== Conclusion: Interpretation of European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 30:19]]
<nowiki>[30:19]</nowiki>

We might see this episode as marking the next chapter in the history of European integration, we might see it as a chapter in the history of globalization, or we might see it as another chapter in the long history of Germany's struggle to dominate the European continent.

I don't want to adjudicate as to which of these perspectives is correct. It may be that none of them is. They're all very partial and somewhat superficial. The point is just that by thinking about the particular event from these different historical vantage points we get very different perspectives on the ultimate significance and meaning of particular events.

And we can do this kind of exercises for other crises, other episodes too.

=== Interpretation of Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:02]]
<nowiki>[31:02]</nowiki>

Let's think briefly about the crisis over the Straits of Hormuz. What's happening in the Persian Gulf today? What is happening in Iran's relations with the West?

==== Rouge State ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:14]]
<nowiki>[31:14]</nowiki>

Are we simply seeing another episode in which a kind of {{WPExtract|rogue state}}, a state that refuses to submit to the civilized code of conduct of the international community, is playing up, is making itself a nuisance for its neighbors and for the larger international community?

There would be good reason to see Iran as a rogue state. Iran has after all been providing resources to terrorist organizations for decades, it's a bully in its regional neighborhood, like Germany it seeks to be the dominant regional power. It's clearly working very hard to influence events in Iraq right now. And Iran is also working to build, allegedly working to build a nuclear weapon. This is somewhat more contestable. But there is suggestive evidence that Iran is sort of in the process of trying to develop a nuclear bomb that would greatly enhance its capacity to influence regional and world politics.

If we see Iran as a rogue state, as a state that refuse to act according to the usual customary rules of international conduct, then we gain a certain vantage point on events in the Persian Gulf today, and tomorrow.

We will probably conclude that what we're dealing with is just another episode in a long history of Iranian belligerence which can be resolved perhaps only through the orchestration of some eventual regime change in Tehran.

So that's one perspective on the crisis in the Persian Gulf -- is to see it as just a consequence of Iran -- a rogue state acting out.

==== Resistance to Western Imperialism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:06]]
<nowiki>[33:06]</nowiki>

But there are other perspectives too which we might bring to bear on events. It's important to think about how particular events can be understood from a variety of vantage points.

From an Iranian perspective the crisis over the Straits of Hormuz might look like another sort of episode in the long history of Iranian or Middle Eastern resistance to Western imperialism.

After all the West's interests in the Middle East is motivated substantially by oil and this has been the case for a half-century. It would be, you know, just wrong to deny it.

Oil is what gives us as Westerners a sort of direct stake in the geopolitics of the Middle East.

And it's certainly the case that Iran like other Middle Eastern countries has been subject to political meddling even military intervention by Western powers in recent times. In 1953 of course the British intelligence and American intelligence agencies overthrew {{WPExtract|Mohammad Mosaddegh}}, the elected prime minister of Iran, and the history of British meddling in the region goes back even further than that.

From an Iranian perspective, the West's ... In treaties regarding Iran's nuclear aspirations, the threat of economic sanctions, might look rather like just another episode in a long history of Western meddling in Iranian affairs.

The Iranians might see their rather belligerent response as just another exhibition of anti-imperialism. A regime that defines itself in terms of opposition to the West, in terms of opposition particularly to the United States, since its 1979 coming to power in the {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|Islamic Revolution}} might well be inclined to locate the sort of present crisis in Iran's relations with the West as just another display of Western imperialism and Iranian resistance.

I don't want to suggest this perspective is right but it's a different perspective on events.

==== Clash of Civilizations ====

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<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

If we have much longer memories we might incline to see the conflict between Iran and the West over the Straits of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear ambitions as an episode in a long {{WPExtract|Clash of Civilizations|clash of civilizations}}.

Here the most influential theorist was {{WPExtract|Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington}}, a Harvard political scientist who offered a journal article which became a book called [https://books.google.com/books?id=1CM3GUNLzOAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''The Clash of Civilizations''] that famously argued, and this was in the mid 1990s, that the most important fault lines in world affairs are not ideological, are not geopolitical even but are civilizational.

The world as Huntington saw it was divided into a number of discrete civilizations. The Western civilization, Orthodox Christian civilization, which is Russia and the post Soviet successor states, Indian civilization, African civilization, and Islamic civilization.

This was Huntington's sort of view of the world, and it's a world view that has been quite influential, particularly on our public discourse in the United States I would suggest.

But is there cause to see you know sort of recent conflicts as simply another episode in a long running clash of civilizations? Can we link disagreements over Iran's nuclear program and the Straits of Hormuz to the {{WPExtract|Crusades}} of the 12th and 13th century?

Probably not, but some might be inclined to do so.

We could after all see sort of recent international crisis, the rise of {{WPExtract|Islamic extremism|radical Islamism}} in the Middle East since the 1950s, {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|the Iranian revolution of 1979}}, the rise of {{WPExtract|Al-Qaeda}} in the 1990s, the {{WPExtract|September 11 attacks|9/11 attack}} in 2001, as sort of flash points in a long running clash of civilizations.

My own view is that this would be far too simplistic a framework in which to understand the complex politics of the Middle East.

It's framework that obscures conflict within the Islamic world, profound differences between {{WPExtract|Shia Islam|Shiite}} Iran and its {{WPExtract|Sunni Islam|Sunni}} neighbors,<ref>One could also consider the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Shia–Sunni relations}}</ref> but it's a perspective that some commentators on the region would nonetheless favor.

So we sort of offer it as an alternative paradigm or vantage point on events.

==== Conclusion: Interpretation of Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:51]]
<nowiki>[37:51]</nowiki>

Here we have once again sort of three different perspectives. Do we see the friction that exists between Iran and the United States today as a rogue state acting out? As a consequence of the West's hegemonic aspirations? Or as the manifestation of a civilizational clash that is perhaps over a millennium old. So three different perspectives.

I'm not going to tell you which is correct. Probably none of them is correct as a singular construct.

=== Conclusion: Interpretation of Current Events ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:27]]
<nowiki>[38:27]</nowiki>

But thinking about how events look from different perspective helps us to get a handle on the range of possible interpretations. And that's really important. Because not everybody sees events in the same way. The Iranians may see the conflict over the Straits of Hormuz in very different terms from those in which we see them. And it's important for us to think about the historical reference points that Iranian leaders might use to comprehend an existing crisis.

== Utility of Interpretation ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:57]]
<nowiki>[38:57]</nowiki>

So what then is the sort of utility for historians of the kinds of explanatory narrative that I've just constructed?

By linking particular events to sort of larger frameworks of meaning what do we accomplish?

I think the first thing we do is we connect the present to the past in ways that help us to sort of comprehend the deeper significance of particular events. We get a vantage point -- some sense of the larger stakes -- and perhaps also of the larger consequences.

We should also be aware that different narrative interpretations of events, different kinds of frameworks, such as those which I've proposed, carry quite different political implications.

There are stakes in how we comprehend particular events. The larger frameworks of meaning within which we locate them are often very loaded ones. Let's think about this for a moment.

=== Implications of Different Interpretations: European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:07]]
<nowiki>[40:07]</nowiki>

Let's think just about the European case.

Do we think about the Brussels summit as fundamentally an accomplishment in the history of European integration?

Liberals who are in favor of globalization, and here I use the world {{WPExtract|liberal}} in sort of {{WPExtract|Classical liberalism |the more classical sense}}, might be inclined to do this, insofar as liberals have welcomed the European project as a project that has made Europe more peaceful, perhaps more prosperous, that has expanded the domain of markets. What we saw last month in Brussels might look very positive from that perspective. It might look simply to be the most recent episode in a long running history of progressive integration.

On the other hand people who sort of self-define as critics and opponents of globalization, who see globalization as a voracious force that undermines and erodes the sovereignty of nation-states, and in the process undercuts public well-being might be really wary of what happened in Brussels. They might adhere to a sort of view of events which emphasizes the corrosive and destructive consequences of globalization and sees the outcome of the Brussel's summit as sort of confirming the influence of global forces on nation-states -- insofar and it sort of qualifies the autonomy of governments to run fiscal deficits, and to spend to provide public welfare programs.

People who see themselves as {{WPExtract| Realism (international relations)|foreign policy realists}}, sort of a dying breed, but there are some still out there, might conversely want to emphasize the geopolitical aspects of the Brussels summit last month. They might emphasize the narrative of sort of German {{WPExtract|hegemony}} which I sketched out a few minutes ago.

And there are political stakes to each of these interpretations. I don't have to tell you. You know what they are. I think it's already clear enough.

=== Conclusion: Utility of Interpretation ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:13]]
<nowiki>[42:13]</nowiki>

Still with that caution, that the way in which we frame events is always to some extent political, I want to really emphasize the point that explanatory narratives such as these are very useful. They're useful because they help us to situate events within larger frameworks of meaning.

And ultimately doing that is what enables us to connect the past to the present. It's what enables us to see particular conflagrations or crises in the present moment as the construction of past circumstance.

It may even help us to make intelligent predictions as to where things might go in the future. At least as to what the consequences of particular developments in the future might be.

One of the great values of historical training I would suggest is that it helps to equip us with the skills necessary to locate particular events and crises within larger frameworks. And doing this, being able to segue between the particular and the profound, helps us to gain some vantage point on the larger stakes -- on the larger significance of events.

And that is in a sense what this class aspires to teach you to do. It's not a class in contemporary ... you know, it's not a class in the history of the present moment as such. We're going to be delving fairly deep into the past, into the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s. We're not going to be talking about current affairs. But by talking about the history of the world in the second half of the twentieth century I hope that we'll be able to gain the ability to link events in ways that suggest the larger stakes and the larger consequences of particular episodes and crises. I think the ability to do this is one of the most valuable things that historical training can offer.

And if you come out of this class feeling that you are better able to link the particular to the cosmic then I will feel that I have done my job.

We could talk more about events in the world today but doing so would not necessarily give you a clear sense of what this semester's lecture class is about.

== Course Overview ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:39]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

So in having sort of given you a sense of what I want to accomplish in terms of the larger pedagogic objectives in this class I would like to sort of take you through the nuts and bolts of the class so that you know exactly what we're going to be doing over the course of the semester ahead.

=== Questions Allowed During the Lecture ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:57]]
<nowiki>[44:57]</nowiki>

I should also say, particularly at this point, now that we're going through the specifics, if you have any questions, please do interrupt. And that goes for the entire semester. If you have any questions at any point, if anything is unclear, just raise your hand and I'll be glad to field questions. I don't want you to think that have to wait until the end of the lecture to field questions.

Have any of you been in lecture classes with me before? Okay.

So you know that I can run like right to the end of the allotted session, so if you save your questions to the end, you might not get to ask them, so raise your hands, and you know interrupt and I'll be happy.

=== Course Content ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:31]]
<nowiki>[45:31]</nowiki>

Okay, what are we going to be doing in this lecture theater this semester? What is this class all about?

How are we going to accomplish what I've just promised to do?

Well, the class is really about the postwar world, so sort of the history since 1945.

It's not a comprehensive history since 1945. There is a great deal that is left out. It would be impossible in a single semester to do a total history of the modern world.

Rather than tell you what I've left out, you'll figure that out as we go along, let me tell you about what the class focuses on. What are our priorities for the semester?

The class is most interested in big international themes. In geopolitics, the clash of great power rivalries, in the march of {{WPExtract|decolonization}}, the transformation of relations between the world's most affluent minority, the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}, and its impoverished majority, the {{WPExtract|Global South}}.

And in what we might call {{WPExtract|World economy|global economics}} or {{WPExtract|geoeconomics}}.

The march of globalization and its implications for international relations will be a sort of central concern.

So if there are two sort of narrative strands that run most boldly through the lecture series ahead they are I would suggest sort of geopolitics or sort of great power conflicts and global political economy.

Sort of the thinking about the changing organization of the world economy and the distribution of resources within it.

This course is fundamentally interested in the international panorama that it is with dealing with the world as a whole.

Of course comprehending complex events in world history requires us to pay careful attention to the interior histories of nation-states.

But we won't be focusing on just one or two nation-states, rather we'll be shifting our focus as the global panorama requires us to do.

Besides emphasizing sort of big international themes in the world's politics and economics we'll be attentive to what we might call structural developments in the history of international society.

{{WPExtract|Demography}}, for example, this is not a class about demography, but it's impossible to deal with the postwar world without thinking really carefully about the ways in which demographic change produces other kinds of transformation and development and that's something that we'll be doing.

We're also going to pay attention to the ways in which technological innovation afflicts larger international economic and political events.

We'll pay attention to cultural developments too. Particularly insofar as they have political and economic consequences for the affairs of the world.

So this is a course that is really focused on the sort of the big international themes but it's my conviction that being attentive to big international themes requires us to pay careful attention to a whole variety of historical topics and problems.

Besides being a course in the history of the world since 1945 this is of course a course in contemporary history.

As I've been explaining through the first part of today's session one of my overriding purposes in teaching this class is to help all of you to situate your own present circumstances in some larger historical context.

I believe that studying the history of recent world affairs will help you to do that. Where necessary we will delve deeper into the past than 1945. 1945 is a sort of crude point of departure and where the comprehension of the present requires us to go back beyond 1945 we will do so.

=== Organizing Narratives ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:56]]
<nowiki>[49:56]</nowiki>

So what are the sort of major organizing narratives that we're going to be dealing with? I've just presented for you a series of organizing narratives that could be used to comprehend a couple of episodes in the present. So it would be appropriate to tell you a little bit more about the organizing narratives that we're going to be dealing with in the course of the semester ahead.

==== The Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:18]]
<nowiki>[50:18]</nowiki>

One of the most obvious ones is the {{WPExtract|Cold War}}. The Cold War is the central geopolitical conflict of the postwar world (at least of the postwar world until the 1990s).

So we'll be paying careful attention to the history of the Cold War in this lecture class.

==== Decolonization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:36]]
<nowiki>[50:36]</nowiki>

No less important, and I might suggest even more important, than the history of the Cold War is the history of {{WPExtract|decolonization}}.

Remind yourselves that in 1945 many human beings in many parts of the world still inhabit colonial empires. That is to say they're the subjects of distant European colonial powers.

By the mid 1970s nobody really lives in a colony anymore. There are a few cases in which you might argue colonialism survives but they're the exception and not the rule. Comprehending how decolonization comes about is one of the really really big you know sort of historical challenges for anybody who wants to understand the postwar world. And it's a theme to which I'll draw substantial attention in the semester ahead.

==== Economic Development ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:25]]
<nowiki>[51:25]</nowiki>

We're also going to think a little bit about the history, or think quite a lot about the history of development -- economic development that is.

The world in 2012 is certainly more affluent than it was in 1950. Yet there have been changes in the distribution of affluence.

To put it most crudely the inequality within societies across the world has increased since 1945 while inequality between societies has decreased. Once poor countries like China have caught up considerably to the affluent West. Meanwhile within the West inequalities have widened.

So we're thinking about the history of economic development in terms that are sort of sensitive to the big global vectors. That's one major narrative strand that I want to emphasize.

==== Globalization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:25]]
<nowiki>[52:25]</nowiki>

And the last is globalization. Globalization is distinct from development insofar as it is the history of integration. Thinking about the history of development does not necessarily require us to be particularly attentive to the relationships among the world's economies. Thinking about the history of globalization does.

At the beginning of the postwar era in 1945 the world's major economic units, which are the world's major nation-states, are relatively self-contained, relatively autonomous, certainly by comparison with their relations today.

So understanding how the global economy becomes more integrated and reflecting upon the sort of political and international consequences of that integration, which is to say globalization, will be a central priority for this course.

=== Learning Objectives ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:20]]
<nowiki>[53:20]</nowiki>

What are you going to learn through all of this?

Besides gaining an overview of recent world history, which I presume is the reason that most of you are here, I hope that you are going to learn to be adept consumers of history. I'm not going to teach you everything you need to know about the recent past and nor is anybody else.

If you can come away from this class with a sense of the landscape and with the skills necessary to drill down into particular historical details, and to particular historical narratives, as your needs in the future require you to do then I will have done my job.

This is a course that doesn't aspire to teach you everything about history. That would be impossible. Even if we had two semesters. Rather what I want to do is to give you a sense of the historical landscape and to equip you with the skills and the tools that will enable you as you require and see fit to probe more deeply into events in your own time and on your own terms.

=== Schedule and Syllabus ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:24]]
<nowiki>[54:24]</nowiki>

How are we going to do this?

Well, at this point a walk through the syllabus might help.

Does anybody not have a copy of the syllabus by the way?

Okay, where are the remaining syllabi? Is there a pile of them somewhere?

Okay, maybe we could send one to the back and...

The syllabus is available on the bSpace website by the way so if you don't have a copy in front of you then you can easily acquire one.

The syllabus will just give you a basic overview of the sort of narrative progression of this lecture course.

* We're going to start off the substance on Thursday talking about the world crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. How did the Second World War and its resolution foreground the history of the postwar world?

* Next we'll talk about the Cold War in the second week or the origins of the Cold War.

* Week three we're going to talk about the creation of new nation-states in the {{WPExtract|Global South}} and the consolidation of welfare states in the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}.

* Week four we'll make comparisons between the political economy of the {{WPExtract|socialism|socialist}} world and the managed {{WPExtract|capitalism}} of the West in the 1950s and 1960s.

* We'll deal with decolonization as a sort of political rather than economic theme. In the fifth week of the course we'll look at the struggles that the European colonial powers waged to retain control of their empires and we'll think about the relationship between the Cold War as one big conflict and decolonization as another sort of historical macro narrative.

* In the sixth week we'll sort of think about why the Cold War was so stable as it was. We'll look at the efforts that political leaders made to stabilize the Cold War, and we will inquire as to who pushed against the sort of stability of the Cold War system as it came to be in the 1960s and 1970s and with what consequences.

* The seventh week looks at what I characterize as sort of a crisis of the Cold War international order in the 1970s.

* Week eight takes us through the oil crisis, a really important turning point in the relations between the Global North and Global South and the resurgence of the Cold War towards the end of the 70s.

* Week nine focuses on what I would characterize as the resurgence of globalization from the 70s. We look at the rise of free market economics in the West particularly in the United States and Great Britain and then the global dissemination of free market solutions in the 1980s and thereafter.

* Week ten will focus on the end of the Cold War.

* Week eleven on sort of the international relations of the 1990s.

* Week twelve we'll explore some of the tensions within the globalizing world of what we might by this point define loosely as the present -- including one lecture which will focus more carefully on the experiences of China -- arguably the world's rising {{WPExtract|superpower}}.

* Finally we'll conclude by thinking about the world since the {{WPExtract|Financial crisis of 2007–2008|2008 financial crisis}}. This is really recent history. But what I want to do in the last couple of lectures is to try to locate the economic malaise of the West since 2008 in a larger history of economic change since the Second World War. And to pose the question of whether the West may ultimately be in the throes of historical decline vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

So that's a very succinct overview I don't want to belabor this because I'll be belaboring it over the next thirteen weeks.

=== Student Assignments and Exams ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45]]
<nowiki>[58:45]</nowiki>

So that's what I'm going to do. What are you going to do?

What I have here is a table that identifies the basic assignments that we're going to use to grade you for want of a gentler verb.

This is a, you know, upper division lecture class. The nature of the assignments and the weighting assignments is fairly typical one for a class of this nature.

We do have sections they'll be a little bit more on sections to come. Section participation is worth 10% of your overall grade.

==== Response Papers ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:29]]
<nowiki>[59:29]</nowiki>

We also have response papers. There are going to be three response papers due during the course of the semester. Rather than have weekly responses, which can be rather {{WPExtract|pro forma}}, I'd prefer to have slightly more substantive response papers and to require fewer of them.

So you're going to do three response papers and the best two grades will count.

I think that that's written out in the syllabus.

If you're happy with the grades for your first two response papers you don't have to submit a third.

So you could end up submitting two response papers if you do well enough on the first two.

The topic of the response papers will be sort of determined by your graduate student instructors.

They'll talk more about the particular assignments in your first section meetings.

==== Final Paper ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:20]]
<nowiki>[60:20]</nowiki>

There's also going to be a final paper. This is worth a quarter of the overall grade. It's a fairly succinct final paper. Just six or seven pages.

I'll talk much more about the final paper as we get closer to it. But I'll simply say at this point that insofar as one of my objectives for this course is to help you develop a sort of historical perspective or a historian's perspective on present day events you will have the option in the final paper of writing a historically informed policy brief<ref> [https://writingcenter.unc.edu/policy-briefs/ Policy Briefs]. ''The Writing Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill''. Retrieved:2018-08-16</ref>
<ref>[http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2195e/i2195e03.pdf What are Policy Briefs?]. ''Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)''. Retrieved:2018-08-16</ref> on some issue of present day importance.

We'll talk more as we get closer to the final paper as about what exactly that might look like.

==== Exams ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:05]]
<nowiki>[61:05]</nowiki>

The examinations -- the best part of the course -- what are they going to look like?

There's a midterm exam. It's only worth 10% of the grade on Thursday, March 1st.

In an unusual display of generosity I decided to give you the Tuesday before the midterm off so that you can prepare for it.

The midterm will be a take-home midterm which I hope makes it a little bit easier for you to deal with.

Finally the final exam which is worth 30% of the grade will take place on Wednesday, May 9th.

It will cover the entirety of the course readings and course materials.

Are there any questions about the assignments or does this look sensible enough to all of you?

(Student Question)

It's not.

I would like for it to be but there are regulations at the level of the College of Letters and Sciences that restrict whether final exams can be take-home or not.

If those restrictions, if those regulations change, during the semester ahead then I will make it take-home.

So if any of you have any political influence then you could use it to accomplish that end.

==== Course Readings ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:25]]
<nowiki>[62:25]</nowiki>

Alright, what about the course readings? What are you going to be reading during the course of this semester that lies ahead of us?

This is a reading list that has been assembled with a great deal of sensitivity to the feedback that I have gotten from students in semesters past on the evaluation forms that are passed out at the end of the semester.

One of the concerns I always get on those evaluation forms is that there's too much reading in my lecture classes.

I think that this is probably true of history classes in general though there may be anomalous historians who were gentler in the readings they assign.

But this semester's I have really really tried hard to circumscribe the reading list. I think the last time I taught this course there were eight or nine books assigned. Seriously. I can circulate the syllabus if you don't believe me.

This semester we just have four books that are assigned.

These are books that are intended to provide a sort of comprehensive historical overview. The first two books, {{WPExtract|David Reynolds (British historian)|David Reynolds}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=nZy72wNdOuIC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''One World Divisible''], {{WPExtract|Daniel Yergin}}'s [https://books.google.com/books?id=uNYzPUhXhJYC&source=gbs_navlinks_s''The Commanding Heights''], together offer, you know pretty comprehensive perspective on postwar international and in Yergin's case sort of economic history.

The other two books, {{WPExtract|Menzie Chinn}} and [https://scholar.harvard.edu/jfrieden/home Jeff Frieden]'s [https://books.google.com/books?id=o-HlY_DLDM0C&dq=Lost+Decade&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''Lost Decades''], and [https://www.smu.edu/News/Experts/Jeffrey-Engel Jeff Engel]'s edited volume on [https://books.google.com/books?id=4nKz4YvPULcC&dq=Jeff+Engel+Wikipedia+Fall+of+the+Berlin+Wall&source=gbs_navlinks_s the fall of the Berlin Wall]. Fairly short books that are germane only to particular weeks of the syllabus.

Besides being shorter than in weeks past I hope that this semester's reading list is also a little bit cheaper than has been the case ... I always try to be sensitive to the costs of readings, but by assigning fewer books I hope that I've also been able to reduce the overall expenditure for all of you.

The total price of these books, I looked it up on Amazon, and I was really considerate, ranges from about $45 to about $70, depending on whether you buy the books used or new.

That's probably cheaper than the textbook layout for most of your classes is. At least I hope that I'm doing better than the chemistry and physics departments with their heavy textbooks.

If the cost is a concern my advice would be that the key texts to acquire are Reynolds and Yergin.

The others you'll find it easier to make due within the library. But I think you'll find it really useful to have the first two texts because those are utilized in multiple weeks readings.

There are other readings besides the four books that are recommended for purchase in the syllabus. These will all be available via bSpace. So you don't have to worry about buying copies of anything beyond the textbooks.

I very much hope that the readings are manageable. The reading load has been designed to be manageable. There may be two weeks in which you're expected to read an entire book. No more than that. And some weeks it's just a couple of chapters. If you have problems with the readings come talk to me, go talk to your GSI, and we can probably give you some counsel on how to read historical texts.

Look reading history is different from reading literature. The purpose in most of our readings is not to read every word of every sentence. Rather you need to sort of read for gist, you need to read so as to acquire some sense of what the really important events are, and of what the author's line of interpretation might happen to be.

But you're not reading this sort of to appreciate the prose. And if you find that you're struggling with the readings then I would humbly suggest that you might be reading in the wrong way for a course of this nature, and we can sort of talk about how you might do things a little differently.

Okay.

==== Sections and Section Attendance ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:39]]
<nowiki>[66:39]</nowiki>

The most important part of the class is not the, not the lectures, but the sections. That's where the real teaching and learning occurs.

I'm delighted that the history department was able to provide section meetings for this class. And I hope that you're as excited about them as I am.

We've two terrific GSIs who are going to be teaching the class. Maybe could I ask David and Brian to stand up.

(silence)

Okay, maybe I'll ask you each to introduce yourselves.

(inaudible)

Great. And Brian?

(silence)

Great. Thank you.

Let me simply reinforce the point. The sections serve a vital pedagogical purpose. They are where you learn what you need to know. The GSIs, not me, are really the ones who are going to be teaching you.

As an administrative point section participation really is mandatory. It's not optional. You can't download the lecture. You can't download the section on Itunes and listen to it. If you miss the section, you miss the section, and you've missed a great deal. As a way of enforcing section participation, which I hate to say, you're all adults you know what the deal is, but we need to have some you know kind of regulatory mechanism to enforce section participation if necessary and I believe that what is written in the syllabus is that if you miss three or more sections, or maybe more than three sections without a good explanation then you're in danger of failing the course.

So that's you know just important to remember. That we really do expect you to be present for section meetings. If you anticipate any problems with the section schedule please do get in contact with your GSI right away because you know we have ways in which we can resolve those kinds of dilemmas. But don't bring up the issue unless it's a real scheduling conflict. You know the fact that you know the eleven o'clock section coincides with Oprah is not ... Is Oprah still on? Or, no?

Okay, well, then in that case that won't be a problem for anybody.

That's why we're able to schedule sections at eleven now.

So if you're not enrolled in section ... You should all be enrolled in a section because I believe that ... What is the registrar's electronic system called? Is it Tele-BEARS? I believe that Tele-BEARS required you to sign up for a section when you signed up for the class. Is that correct?

Okay, so you should all be enrolled already in a section. If you're not then get in contact with us and we'll try to figure that out.

Okay, I think that's all that I wanted to cover in terms of the nuts and bolts of the course.

== Student Questions ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:13]]
<nowiki>[70:13]</nowiki>

So let me ask if you have any questions. What can I tell you about the semester ahead?

If any of you are sitting on the fence about whether to take the class or not if there's information that I can provide that would help you make your mind up one way or the other?

(inaudible)

Yeah.

I prefer essay questions. Historically I have not utilized ID sections I think I did in the first lecture class that I taught at this institution. But you can just expect three essays.

Are there any other questions?

== Office Hours ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:51]]
<nowiki>[70:51]</nowiki>

Okay, good. The last point that I wanted to make then is: I don't think that I included this in the slideshow but it is on the syllabus. I have office hours on Tuesdays and Thursdays which are also the days in which we meet for the lectures. The office hours run from eleven to noon. And please do come along and introduce yourselves even if you don't have particular questions then I'd be really glad to have the chance to meet all of you.

If you want to stop by and those office hours are not convenient for you because I understand that you have other classes then just send me an email and we can schedule some alternative time to meet.

But with that I think that I may have finished the section a little earlier for possibly the first time. So let's hope that's an omen for the rest of the semester.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s

2022-03-01T22:08:20Z

DavidKitFriedman: Minor change to wording.

== Preliminaries ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Morning. It's about ten past the half hour so it's time to begin.

Welcome to History 186.

Let me just start with a quick note on the audio. You've managed to catch me at the end of a nasty cold. The end of a bad cold is better than the beginning, but by consequence the audio is going to be a little scratchier today than it will ordinarily be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px |start=0:21]]
<nowiki>[0:21]</nowiki>

A more consequential issue with the audio that I wanted to be all aware of at the beginning is that this semester's lectures are being podcast which means that they're available for distribution via iTunes. Probably most of you know what podcasting lectures involves.

This is really good insofar and makes what we're doing in the classroom available to anybody outside of the classroom who's interested to listen in. The only downside of podcasting as I see it is that it makes it easy for all of you who ought to be in the classroom to sit at home on a cold morning like this and listen to the lecture remotely.

I would really prefer if you didn't. I don't have any mechanism enforce your attendance in the lectures. But I hope that you will not use the podcasting as a you know opportunity to avoid coming to lectures tempting as that might be when the weather is at frigid as it is today. It's all of what 50 degrees outside which is much colder than were accustomed to even in northern California.

== Introductory Anecdote: Nixon and Zhou Enlai ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18]]
<nowiki>[1:18]</nowiki>

This is a history class. It's a class in {{WPExtract|contemporary history}}. But it is a history class. I'm a historian and as such I would like to start the class with an historical anecdote

So I'm going to take you back to May 1972. {{WPExtract|Richard Nixon}} has landed in China the first American president ever to visit the People's Republic.

He meets, besides meeting with {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Chairman Mao}}, with {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai|Premier Zhou Enlai}} the effective Prime Minister of China.

Nixon, as those of you know anything about him may know, was a really socially awkward and inept personality in some respects.
He found it very difficult to make small talk. But he had been told by his advisors that Zhou Enlai was really interested in French history. So Nixon said, as you might in that situation, what do you think about the {{WPExtract|French Revolution}}? Zhou famously replied, "it's too soon to tell".

This anecdote is a suitable place to begin a history of recent world affairs. Zhou Enlai's reply might warn us against passing premature historical judgments. It's too soon to tell.

The episode I would suggest is cautionary in a different direction. It ought to caution us to get our facts right. Because Zhou Enlai was not referring to the French Revolution which you think of when we talk about the French Revolution (the Revolution of 1789) he was, according to Nixon's translator, referring to the {{WPExtract|May 1968 events in France|revolution of 1968}}.

So, besides cautioning us to avoid premature historical judgments, this episode might also remind us that when we do history it's important to get the history correct.

== Why Study History? ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:08]]
<nowiki>[3:08]</nowiki>

Nonetheless, the question that Zhou Enlai raised, when is it too soon to tell, is an important one. Should historians study recent events? What business do we have studying the history of contemporary world politics, or world economics? Why not favor alternative disciplinary approaches? What do historians have to tell us? What do you have to learn from me that you might not learn about it in some other disciplinary context?

Why not takes a class in economics or sociology or political science? Are these disciplines that not offer some superior insight into the workings of the contemporary world? What might history offer that these approaches do not?

To answer this question we're going to have to raise some really fundamental questions? What is history, and what is the historian's role? And perhaps most important for all of you what do we learn from history?

Is there any point in studying it? Is it just a random succession of facts and personalities? Or is there some larger purpose to the study of the past?

You know many philosophers and thinkers and historians have posed this question in the past. What is history? We might turn to some of the great canonical figures for answers.

=== Elbert Hubbard ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:24]]
<nowiki>[4:24]</nowiki>

Let's start first of all with {{WPExtract|Elbert Hubbard}}, an American radical and writer, famously described history as just one damn thing after another.<ref>See though [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/16/history/ "History Is Just One Damn Thing after Another"] and [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/ "Life Is Just One Damn Thing After Another"] from [https://quoteinvestigator.com/ Quote Investigator].
<br/><br/>
Quote Investigator believes that the quote "history is just one damn thing after another" originated from the quote "life is just one damn thing after another."
<br/><br/>
Elbert Hubbard printed the phrase "life is just one damn thing after another" in his publication [https://books.google.com/books?id=IhrZAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA32#v=onepage&q&f=false "The Philistine: A Periodical of Protest" in December of 1909]. As Quote Investigator speaks about in the post on [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/ "Life Is Just One Damn Thing After Another"] the phrase was in the air at the time without any specific well known originator.
<br/><br/>
In the post on [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/16/history/ "History Is Just One Damn Thing after Another"] Quote Investigator points out that although {{WPExtract|Arnold J. Toynbee}} may be associated with that phrase and speaking of such an overall notion he actually disagreed with it, and when using such phrases was doing so in that context.</ref>

This is one perspective on the past. It's just stuff that happens. Without any rhyme or reason or connection among events.

=== Karl Marx ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:44]]
<nowiki>[4:44]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Karl Marx}}, one of the most celebrated and influential philosophers of history of all time, had a perspective on history which is about the exact opposite of Elbert Hubbard's. For Marx history had a very clear logic. You all know what that logic is, right? What's the logic of history for Marx?

That's right. The logic of history for Marx is a logic of class struggle leading ultimately to the creation of a {{WPExtract|communism|communist}} society -- a profoundly influential historical concept.

=== Thomas Macaulay ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:17]]
<nowiki>[5:17]</nowiki>

But there have been other influential historical concepts. Perhaps articulated somewhat less forthrightly than Marx.

Take another British 19th century historical figure: {{WPExtract|Thomas Babington Macaulay|Thomas Macaulay}}. Macaulay was one of the great {{WPExtract|Whigs (British political party)|Whig}} historians. His view of history was that history represented an inexorable march of progress -- the steady march of reform even justice.

=== Determinism and Randomness ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:47]]
<nowiki>[5:47]</nowiki>

The kind of historical determinism that figures like Marx and Macaulay favored, a determinism that sees history as having an ulterior logic, a direction, a purpose, has in some ways fallen out of favor with professional historians. We're much less inclined today to see all history as ultimately being reducible to the history of class struggle or to the history of Whiggish political reform than we might have been several generations ago.

But that doesn't mean that history is just one damn thing after another. We ought to be conscious of the ways in which history shapes us. How does history constrain our choices in the present? This is a question that historians have at some fundamental level to grapple with.

== Pólya's urn ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:33]]
<nowiki>[6:33]</nowiki>

To think about this it may be useful to reflect upon a sort of mathematical problem: {{WPExtract|Pólya urn model|Pólya's urn}} problem.

How many of you have encountered Pólya's urn in probability classes?

Okay, just one of you.

That's good because I don't know this very well so please don't correct me if I make any mistakes. You can come and do it quietly after the class.

Pólya's urn is simply an experiment in probability but it's a useful vantage point for thinking about the utility of history as a way of knowing and a mode of learning.

What is Pólya's urn? A big urn. Contains at the beginning of the experiment just two balls. One white, one blue. They can be any color you want this doesn't really matter. But the idea is that we have a big urn with two balls, one of different color, each a different color. Let's say we remove one of those balls at random. We take out a white ball. Then we put it back in the urn adding another ball of the same color. So we take out one white ball we add two white balls back. We take out one blue ball we add two blue balls back.

We keep on repeating the experiment until the urn is full. Because eventually it will get full if we put two balls in for every ball that we remove.

What is the ultimate distribution of colored balls within the urn at the end of the experiment?

I don't have any idea, and nor do you. It's impossible to predict. But what the experiment does tell us if we think about the logic of it is that the early selections, the first balls that are removed and replaced are very consequential for determining the ultimate coloration of the urn at once the experiment has been concluded.

This is a experiment that is suggestive as to the importance of history, right?
Early choices have great consequences for determining subsequent outcomes. History in a sense is an iterative process in which early choices or decisions have great consequence for subsequent events.

=== Institutional Framework of American Politics ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:39]]
<nowiki>[8:39]</nowiki>

Think about the sort of institutional framework of American politics. You know the basic system of government which the founding fathers bequeathed to us in the late 18th century. You know obviously that system has been modified in you know fundamental respects through subsequent Constitutional amendments and political innovations. But nonetheless the legacy of those early choices weighs very, very heavily on the present.

=== Conclusion: Pólya's Urn ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:06]]
<nowiki>[9:06]</nowiki>

So we can't predict the outcome of history. You know that's not what this experiment is intended to demonstrate. All that it ought to suggest is that early choices have consequences for subsequent outcomes and conditions.

== Path Dependence ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:24]]
<nowiki>[9:24]</nowiki>

In a sense this is what economists call {{WPExtract|path dependence}}. That's sort of a key concept in the social sciences. How are the paths that we are on shaping conditions by prior choices over which we have no control?

== Different Approaches to History ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:39]]
<nowiki>[9:39]</nowiki>

What does this have to do with the role of the historian? It depends really on the individual historian because different historians see their roles and their responsibilities in very different terms.

Some historians are fundamentally concerned with experience and meaning. They see the past as another country and they seek to sort of reconstruct even to inhabit the experience of men and women living in circumstance and conditions quite different from our own.

This is profoundly useful. We learn something fundamental about human nature perhaps by thinking about how men and women have lived in circumstances far removed from those that we inhabit today.

But not all historians are fundamentally concerned with meaning. With what you might call [[wikt:hermeneutics|hermeneutics]] to use a fancy word.

Other historians, and I would probably include myself in this latter camp, are more concerned with causation -- with how things came to be the way they are and implicitly why didn't they get to be some other way.

For these historians issues of path dependence are absolutely crucial. When we reconstruct the past we don't simply seek to recreate the past as it existed at some particular moment in history rather we seek to navigate historical transitions. To think about how we got from one past state to another past state. Or indeed how we got from a past state to the state that we inhabit today, which is of course the present.

This class is going to be concerned more with connection than with the pursuit of meaning.

I make no apologies for that. These are simply different approaches to the study of history. What we're going to do this semester is to think about how things came to be the way they are.

And we're concerned not with how things came to be the way they were in 1945 but with how things came to be the way they are today in 2012.

== Contemporary History ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:40]]
<nowiki>[11:40]</nowiki>

In that respect this class is an exercise in {{WPExtract|contemporary history}}. What is contemporary history?

Contemporary history is sort of the keyword for what we're trying to do in this semester.

=== Geoffrey Barraclough ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:53]]
<nowiki>[11:53]</nowiki>

Probably the best definition of contemporary history that I've ever come across was offered by {{WPExtract|Geoffrey Barraclough}} -- a medieval historian who became later on in his career one of the leading proponents and theorists of contemporary history. For Barraclough the key to contemporary history was the point of departure. Contemporary history for Barraclough is really concerned with the historical origins and constitution of the present. It's not concerned with explaining the origins of the First World War or the origins of the American Revolution rather it's concerned with explaining the origins of the present.

How do things get to be the way they are today?

And for Barraclough contemporary history is the history that seeks the answer to this question. It is the history that aims to clarify the basic structural changes which have shaped the modern world.

When does this history begin?
Well, it all depends what the particular problem that you want to comprehend and unpack might be.

Contemporary history begins when the problems which are actual in the world today first take visible shape. It could begin decades ago. It could begin centuries ago. It could begin millennia ago. It all depends what the particular problem on which we fixate might be.

What distinguishes contemporary history than is the vantage point from which it is pursued. Contemporary history is history that looks back from the present to try to search for, explain, and unpack the deep origins of issues on which we fixate in the world today.

=== Conclusion: Contemporary History ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:28]]
<nowiki>[13:28]</nowiki>

So the appropriate place to begin a course in contemporary history or history of the contemporary world might then be not the past but the present.

Looking back from the present moment what do we see in the past that captivates our attention and calls for a particular explanation?

== Current Events ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:52]]
<nowiki>[13:52]</nowiki>

Let's start by thinking about some of the big important events of recent months.

These may be a little outdated now. It's about a week since I put this slideshow together.

But let's just survey the world from the perspective of the present or last month perhaps.

What were the big major headlines of December 2012?<ref>Speaker most likely meant December 2011.</ref>

=== European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:22]]
<nowiki>[14:22]</nowiki>

Well, one of the big important headlines had to do with Europe's fiscal crisis. The European Summit, which took place in sort of early mid-December, aimed to address Europe's ongoing fiscal crisis.

What was really important about the Brussell's Summit, which took place, in I think December 11th, but I could be wrong,<ref>Meetings were held December 8th to December 9th. See Wikipedia article [[wikipedia: List of European Council meetings|List of European Council meetings]] and also:<br/><br/>
Rooney, Ben (2011-12-09). [https://money.cnn.com/2011/12/09/news/international/europe_debt_crisis/index.htm Europe debt saga far from over]. ''CNNMoney''. Retrieved:2018-08-15
<br/><br/>and:
<br/><br/>
Traynor, Ian; Watt, Nicholas; Gow, David; Wintour, Patrick (2011-12-09). [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty "David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift in Europe"]. ''The Guardian''. Retrieved 2018-08-15.</ref> is that it produced an agreement amongst all of the member states of the {{WPExtract|European Union}} with the exception, the important exception of Great Britain, to seek a fiscal stability pact which will impose sort of stringent budgetary conditions on member states of the European Union.

It's a really important landmark summit in the history of European integration. It's also really consequential episode insofar as it marked Great Britain's estrangement from the European project. It's probably too soon to tell what the eventual consequences will be but a very important episode in the history of Europe.

=== Moscow Street Protests ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:22]]
<nowiki>[15:22]</nowiki>

There have been other major headlines in the news over the past couple of months. Let's think about the view from Moscow where there have been massive street protests against the {{WPExtract|Vladimir Putin|Putin}} {{WPExtract| Dmitry Medvedev| Medvedev}} regime.

What's interesting about the Moscow crisis? Well, a great deal is interesting. We might highlight the role of digital communications in the production of street dissent.

Doing so might help us to link the Moscow protests of last month with the {{WPExtract|Arab Spring}} earlier in 2011 or even the {{WPExtract|Occupy Wall Street}} movement of the fall for example?

What is the larger significance of the Moscow protests?

Might we see this episode as representing the resurgence of civil society perhaps against what Putin would characterize as Russian's guided democracy.

Another really important episode than with sort of big historical implications perhaps.

=== Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

There have been other events. Some more geopolitical in character over the past couple of months. Earlier this month Iran tested a new kind of anti-ship missile in the {{WPExtract| Strait of Hormuz |Straits of Hormuz}}. Moreover the Iranian government has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz -- a narrow strait at the end of the {{WPExtract|Persian Gulf}} through which about one-fifth of the world's oil shipping passes.

This is just one episode in a kind of long running confrontation between the Iranian regime of {{WPExtract| Mahmoud Ahmadinejad|Ahmadinejad}} with the West sort of led of course by the United States.

There are a variety of larger perspectives which we might bring to bear on this crisis but it is you know sort of self-evidently an important flash point in world geopolitics today.

=== Death of Kim Jong-il ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:16]]
<nowiki>[17:16]</nowiki>

Probably no new story got more attention last month than did the death of {{WPExtract|Kim Jong-il}} in Pyongyang the capital of North Korea.

This was clearly a major, major turning point in the history of the North Korean regime. It's potentially a point of rupture. The regime of Kim Jong-il does not have such clear and cogent succession plans as did the regime of {{WPExtract|Kim Il-sung}} his father.

The transition although it seems to be proceed smoothly enough; nonetheless, raises a whole host of urgent and important questions as regards the future relationship of North Korea to its neighbor South Korea, to the United States, to China, to the larger international community.

The transition within the regime raises the prospect at least of larger regional instability perhaps even embroiling the United States and China.

== Interpretation of Current Events ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:20]]
<nowiki>[18:20]</nowiki>

My purpose though in sort of recapitulating these events is not to suggest that history is just a series of disconnected happenstance.
Rather it is to try to probe some of the larger themes to which we might connect particular developments and events in our recent history.

So I'd like to sort of pose the question of how we go about locating the deep origins of these particular crises or flash points.
Can we situate the events of our times in a larger historical perspective? Which is to say can we situate them within sort of a larger narrative framework? How do we relate past to present? How do we relate present to past in ways that grants new perspective perhaps even deeper perspective on the stakes and consequences of present day events.

Searching for the deep origins of particular events in the world today will not enable us to predict the future. But it might help us to get some sense of the vectors along which we might proceed as we move forward. Thinking about where we've come from can illuminate the possible paths that we might follow as we move forward. So to try to do this it might be useful to probe a little bit deeper into a least a couple of these episodes to think about how we could situate the events of the present in a larger historical context.

How might history as opposed to economics or political science help us to gain a vantage on the events of our own times?

So let's try to do this for just two of these particular episodes which I've identified here.

=== Interpretation of European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:14]]
<nowiki>[20:14]</nowiki>

Let's think about the European summit and the larger sort of European financial crisis of which it is part. How might we understand the summit among European heads of state that took place in Brussels last month?

One historical framework which might help us to understand the summit and its significance is of course the history of European integration.

==== European Integration ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:43]]
<nowiki>[20:43]</nowiki>

The European project as we might characterize it goes back a long way.

The first landmark treaty which sort of created the European economic community as it was at the time was signed all the way back in 1957 in Rome. The {{WPExtract|Treaty of Rome}} provided for a single European market and for regulatory harmonization within it. It marked the first really important step in what you might see as a sort of long historical march towards the construction of an integrated European society if not an integrated European state.

There have been other landmarks in this historical progression. The {{WPExtract|Maastricht Treaty}} of 1991 transformed the {{WPExtract|European Economic Community}} into the {{WPExtract|European Union}}.
It provided for monetary integration in the form of the single currency, the {{WPExtract|euro}}, which was introduced just before the turn of the millennium.

Thinking about these prior landmarks in the integration of Europe helps to us to see the integration of Europe as an iterative process, as a process in which the Europeans have edged closer and closer to more full and more formal integration of their political and especially economic affairs.

From this vantage point thinking about the history of European integration the Brussels Summit which was convened in response to the fiscal crisis in the {{WPExtract|Eurozone}} might appear as simply the latest in a series of landmark episodes which have pushed the Europeans closer and closer towards the creation of a single {{WPExtract|superstate}}.

Whereas the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 provided for monetary harmonization within the European Union the Brussels Summit provides for a degree of fiscal integration.

It's really the first; well, not quite, but it's the first sort of major effort to require the member states of the European Union to follow sort of coherent and integrated fiscal agenda in their public finances.

So that's one perspective on what happened in Brussels earlier this month. It's just the latest chapter in a long running saga of European integration.

But there are other frameworks within which we might situation events and they offer different vantage points on the significance and consequence of recent episodes.

==== Globalization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:13]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

We might see what happened in Brussels last month as an episode in the larger history of globalization.

{{WPExtract|Globalization}} after all is a force which has been corrosive of fiscal and monetary sovereignty that is the fiscal and monetary sovereignty of nation-states since at least the 1970s.

A globalization in the form of, particularly the integration of financial markets, has imposed constraints on the deficits that governments can run, on public spending. The advent of globalization has been a somewhat progressive process. The integration of {{WPExtract|capital markets}}, though it's a story that could be traced back centuries, really begins to accelerate in recent times during the 1970s.

During the 1990s globalization becomes a widely discussed and widely theorized phenomenon. We begin to see the development of what you might characterize as a sort of global public policy prescriptions for a globalizing world in the 1990s. And these dictate that countries that want to participate in globalization need to balance their budgets and cut back public spending.

It's familiar enough. This is a policy prescription which is sometimes characterized usually by its critics as the {{WPExtract|Washington Consensus}}. And it's applied in 1980s and 1990s primarily to the {{WPExtract| Developing country|developing world}}. This is really important.

North Americans and West Europeans don't really feel the constraining impact of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s. They might in fact have been its beneficiaries. You could certainly make that case so far as the United States is concerned.

Since the {{WPExtract| Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2008}} however this ceased to be so clear that the West gets to enjoy the benefits of globalization without subjecting itself to the discipline inherent within the globalization of financial markets.

We might see the Brussels summit, it's a summit which imposes rigid fiscal constraints on the member states of the European Union, as an episode in the larger history of globalization. The significance of which is that it marks the moment at which the West, previously the dominant center of the global economy, itself becomes subject to the rules and constraints that financial globalization implies.

So that's a quite different perspective. The Brussels crisis, not so much as an episode in the history of European integration, but as an episode in the history of globalization.

==== German Ascendancy ====

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<nowiki>[25:57]</nowiki>

Thus far I've sort of focused on the economic aspects of the summit and their larger significance, but we must alternatively see the Brussel's summit as a sort of {{WPExtract|geopolitics|geopolitical}} episode. As an episode whose larger consequences lie ultimately not in the economic relations of nations but in {{WPExtract|power politics}}.

From a geopolitical perspective, which is say a perspective concerned with power ultimately, with military and political power in world affairs, the German problem has been European's fundamental problem since the 1870s.

Germany of course was unified at the beginning of the 1870s under the guidance of {{WPExtract|Otto von Bismarck}}. The creation of the German state in the 1870s created a big problem for Europe because, as most of you know, Germany is too big and too powerful for the European system to be able to contain it.
Germany twice tried to dominate Europe by military means in the 20th century. In 1914 {{WPExtract| Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser Wilheml II}} launched Germany's first bid for European mastery. It was defeated but only really through the intervention of the United States, and Great Britain. In 1939 under {{WPExtract|Adolf Hitler}} Germany launched a second bid for European mastery. Once again it was defeated, but only because of the intervention of the United States and Great Britain.

If we see the German problem as Europe's sort of fundamental geopolitical dilemma we gain a very different perspective on the Brussel's summit of last month. You might see the summit as less important for its political economic consequences than for its geopolitical ones.

Might the summit have signified the consolidation of German dominance of Europe?

After all German power has resurged since the {{WPExtract| German reunification | reunification of Germany in 1990}}. For almost half a century after the Second World War Germany was divided.

The United States and Great Britain and the Soviet Union all maintained troops in Germany in effect keeping the German problem resolved through the expedient solution of division.

Since German reunification Germany has necessarily become more powerful, more influential, and we might see the Brussels summit as marking the sort of consecration of German power within the Eurozone.

Berlin under {{WPExtract|Angela Merkel|Chancellor Angela Merkel}} is the driving force between fiscal discipline as a policy priority within the Eurozone. At the same time Germany has resisted sort of the more generous aspect of fiscal integration which would be the transfer of resources from the Eurozone's richest states to its less affluent states, primarily on the Mediterranean periphery.

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One of the consequences of the Brussels summit (it's probably too early to tell) looks to be the creation of a sort of imbalanced system of fiscal integration whereby the peripheral European states, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, the pigs, are subjected to harsh fiscal discipline, but do not enjoy the benefit of fiscal transfers from the affluent north.

So we might see the creation of a sort of European fiscal system which serves the interests of Germany at the expense of the European periphery as marking the consolidation, perhaps ultimately the final accomplishment, of German dominance of Europe.

The fact that this domination was achieved peacefully rather than through military means might not deter us from calling it what it is.

I'm not saying that's what it is. I'm just saying that's a perspective. What I wanted to propose is not any ultimate adjudication as to what the larger significance of last month's Brussel's summit is, but rather just three vantage paints.

==== Conclusion: Interpretation of European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ====

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<nowiki>[30:19]</nowiki>

We might see this episode as marking the next chapter in the history of European integration, we might see it as a chapter in the history of globalization, or we might see it as another chapter in the long history of Germany's struggle to dominate the European continent.

I don't want to adjudicate as to which of these perspectives is correct. It may be that none of them is. They're all very partial and somewhat superficial. The point is just that by thinking about the particular event from these different historical vantage points we get very different perspectives on the ultimate significance and meaning of particular events.

And we can do this kind of exercises for other crises, other episodes too.

=== Interpretation of Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ===

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Let's think briefly about the crisis over the Straits of Hormuz. What's happening in the Persian Gulf today? What is happening in Iran's relations with the West?

==== Rouge State ====

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<nowiki>[31:14]</nowiki>

Are we simply seeing another episode in which a kind of {{WPExtract|rogue state}}, a state that refuses to submit to the civilized code of conduct of the international community, is playing up, is making itself a nuisance for its neighbors and for the larger international community?

There would be good reason to see Iran as a rogue state. Iran has after all been providing resources to terrorist organizations for decades, it's a bully in its regional neighborhood, like Germany it seeks to be the dominant regional power. It's clearly working very hard to influence events in Iraq right now. And Iran is also working to build, allegedly working to build a nuclear weapon. This is somewhat more contestable. But there is suggestive evidence that Iran is sort of in the process of trying to develop a nuclear bomb that would greatly enhance its capacity to influence regional and world politics.

If we see Iran as a rogue state, as a state that refuse to act according to the usual customary rules of international conduct, then we gain a certain vantage point on events in the Persian Gulf today, and tomorrow.

We will probably conclude that what we're dealing with is just another episode in a long history of Iranian belligerence which can be resolved perhaps only through the orchestration of some eventual regime change in Tehran.

So that's one perspective on the crisis in the Persian Gulf -- is to see it as just a consequence of Iran -- a rogue state acting out.

==== Resistance to Western Imperialism ====

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<nowiki>[33:06]</nowiki>

But there are other perspectives too which we might bring to bear on events. It's important to think about how particular events can be understood from a variety of vantage points.

From an Iranian perspective the crisis over the Straits of Hormuz might look like another sort of episode in the long history of Iranian or Middle Eastern resistance to Western imperialism.

After all the West's interests in the Middle East is motivated substantially by oil and this has been the case for a half-century. It would be, you know, just wrong to deny it.

Oil is what gives us as Westerners a sort of direct stake in the geopolitics of the Middle East.

And it's certainly the case that Iran like other Middle Eastern countries has been subject to political meddling even military intervention by Western powers in recent times. In 1953 of course the British intelligence and American intelligence agencies overthrew {{WPExtract|Mohammad Mosaddegh}}, the elected prime minister of Iran, and the history of British meddling in the region goes back even further than that.

From an Iranian perspective, the West's ... In treaties regarding Iran's nuclear aspirations, the threat of economic sanctions, might look rather like just another episode in a long history of Western meddling in Iranian affairs.

The Iranians might see their rather belligerent response as just another exhibition of anti-imperialism. A regime that defines itself in terms of opposition to the West, in terms of opposition particularly to the United States, since its 1979 coming to power in the {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|Islamic Revolution}} might well be inclined to locate the sort of present crisis in Iran's relations with the West as just another display of Western imperialism and Iranian resistance.

I don't want to suggest this perspective is right but it's a different perspective on events.

==== Clash of Civilizations ====

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If we have much longer memories we might incline to see the conflict between Iran and the West over the Straits of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear ambitions as an episode in a long {{WPExtract|Clash of Civilizations|clash of civilizations}}.

Here the most influential theorist was {{WPExtract|Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington}}, a Harvard political scientist who offered a journal article which became a book called [https://books.google.com/books?id=1CM3GUNLzOAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''The Clash of Civilizations''] that famously argued, and this was in the mid 1990s, that the most important fault lines in world affairs are not ideological, are not geopolitical even but are civilizational.

The world as Huntington saw it was divided into a number of discrete civilizations. The Western civilization, Orthodox Christian civilization, which is Russia and the post Soviet successor states, Indian civilization, African civilization, and Islamic civilization.

This was Huntington's sort of view of the world, and it's a world view that has been quite influential, particularly on our public discourse in the United States I would suggest.

But is there cause to see you know sort of recent conflicts as simply another episode in a long running clash of civilizations? Can we link disagreements over Iran's nuclear program and the Straits of Hormuz to the {{WPExtract|Crusades}} of the 12th and 13th century?

Probably not, but some might be inclined to do so.

We could after all see sort of recent international crisis, the rise of {{WPExtract|Islamic extremism|radical Islamism}} in the Middle East since the 1950s, {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|the Iranian revolution of 1979}}, the rise of {{WPExtract|Al-Qaeda}} in the 1990s, the {{WPExtract|September 11 attacks|9/11 attack}} in 2001, as sort of flash points in a long running clash of civilizations.

My own view is that this would be far too simplistic a framework in which to understand the complex politics of the Middle East.

It's framework that obscures conflict within the Islamic world, profound differences between {{WPExtract|Shia Islam|Shiite}} Iran and its {{WPExtract|Sunni Islam|Sunni}} neighbors,<ref>One could also consider the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Shia–Sunni relations}}</ref> but it's a perspective that some commentators on the region would nonetheless favor.

So we sort of offer it as an alternative paradigm or vantage point on events.

==== Conclusion: Interpretation of Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:51]]
<nowiki>[37:51]</nowiki>

Here we have once again sort of three different perspectives. Do we see the friction that exists between Iran and the United States today as a rogue state acting out? As a consequence of the West's hegemonic aspirations? Or as the manifestation of a civilizational clash that is perhaps over a millennium old. So three different perspectives.

I'm not going to tell you which is correct. Probably none of them is correct as a singular construct.

=== Conclusion: Interpretation of Current Events ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:27]]
<nowiki>[38:27]</nowiki>

But thinking about how events look from different perspective helps us to get a handle on the range of possible interpretations. And that's really important. Because not everybody sees events in the same way. The Iranians may see the conflict over the Straits of Hormuz in very different terms from those in which we see them. And it's important for us to think about the historical reference points that Iranian leaders might use to comprehend an existing crisis.

== Utility of Interpretation ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:57]]
<nowiki>[38:57]</nowiki>

So what then is the sort of utility for historians of the kinds of explanatory narrative that I've just constructed?

By linking particular events to sort of larger frameworks of meaning what do we accomplish?

I think the first thing we do is we connect the present to the past in ways that help us to sort of comprehend the deeper significance of particular events. We get a vantage point -- some sense of the larger stakes -- and perhaps also of the larger consequences.

We should also be aware that different narrative interpretations of events, different kinds of frameworks, such as those which I've proposed, carry quite different political implications.

There are stakes in how we comprehend particular events. The larger frameworks of meaning within which we locate them are often very loaded ones. Let's think about this for a moment.

=== Implications of Different Interpretations: European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:07]]
<nowiki>[40:07]</nowiki>

Let's think just about the European case.

Do we think about the Brussels summit as fundamentally an accomplishment in the history of European integration?

Liberals who are in favor of globalization, and here I use the world {{WPExtract|liberal}} in sort of {{WPExtract|Classical liberalism |the more classical sense}}, might be inclined to do this, insofar as liberals have welcomed the European project as a project that has made Europe more peaceful, perhaps more prosperous, that has expanded the domain of markets. What we saw last month in Brussels might look very positive from that perspective. It might look simply to be the most recent episode in a long running history of progressive integration.

On the other hand people who sort of self-define as critics and opponents of globalization, who see globalization as a voracious force that undermines and erodes the sovereignty of nation-states, and in the process undercuts public well-being might be really wary of what happened in Brussels. They might adhere to a sort of view of events which emphasizes the corrosive and destructive consequences of globalization and sees the outcome of the Brussel's summit as sort of confirming the influence of global forces on nation-states -- insofar and it sort of qualifies the autonomy of governments to run fiscal deficits, and to spend to provide public welfare programs.

People who see themselves as {{WPExtract| Realism (international relations)|foreign policy realists}}, sort of a dying breed, but there are some still out there, might conversely want to emphasize the geopolitical aspects of the Brussels summit last month. They might emphasize the narrative of sort of German {{WPExtract|hegemony}} which I sketched out a few minutes ago.

And there are political stakes to each of these interpretations. I don't have to tell you. You know what they are. I think it's already clear enough.

=== Conclusion: Utility of Interpretation ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:13]]
<nowiki>[42:13]</nowiki>

Still with that caution, that the way in which we frame events is always to some extent political, I want to really emphasize the point that explanatory narratives such as these are very useful. They're useful because they help us to situate events within larger frameworks of meaning.

And ultimately doing that is what enables us to connect the past to the present. It's what enables us to see particular conflagrations or crises in the present moment as the construction of past circumstance.

It may even help us to make intelligent predictions as to where things might go in the future. At least as to what the consequences of particular developments in the future might be.

One of the great values of historical training I would suggest is that it helps to equip us with the skills necessary to locate particular events and crises within larger frameworks. And doing this, being able to segue between the particular and the profound, helps us to gain some vantage point on the larger stakes -- on the larger significance of events.

And that is in a sense what this class aspires to teach you to do. It's not a class in contemporary ... you know, it's not a class in the history of the present moment as such. We're going to be delving fairly deep into the past, into the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s. We're not going to be talking about current affairs. But by talking about the history of the world in the second half of the twentieth century I hope that we'll be able to gain the ability to link events in ways that suggest the larger stakes and the larger consequences of particular episodes and crises. I think the ability to do this is one of the most valuable things that historical training can offer.

And if you come out of this class feeling that you are better able to link the particular to the cosmic then I will feel that I have done my job.

We could talk more about events in the world today but doing so would not necessarily give you a clear sense of what this semester's lecture class is about.

== Course Overview ==

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<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

So in having sort of given you a sense of what I want to accomplish in terms of the larger pedagogic objectives in this class I would like to sort of take you through the nuts and bolts of the class so that you know exactly what we're going to be doing over the course of the semester ahead.

=== Questions Allowed During the Lecture ===

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<nowiki>[44:57]</nowiki>

I should also say, particularly at this point, now that we're going through the specifics, if you have any questions, please do interrupt. And that goes for the entire semester. If you have any questions at any point, if anything is unclear, just raise your hand and I'll be glad to field questions. I don't want you to think that have to wait until the end of the lecture to field questions.

Have any of you been in lecture classes with me before? Okay.

So you know that I can run like right to the end of the allotted session, so if you save your questions to the end, you might not get to ask them, so raise your hands, and you know interrupt and I'll be happy.

=== Course Content ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:31]]
<nowiki>[45:31]</nowiki>

Okay, what are we going to be doing in this lecture theater this semester? What is this class all about?

How are we going to accomplish what I've just promised to do?

Well, the class is really about the postwar world, so sort of the history since 1945.

It's not a comprehensive history since 1945. There is a great deal that is left out. It would be impossible in a single semester to do a total history of the modern world.

Rather than tell you what I've left out, you'll figure that out as we go along, let me tell you about what the class focuses on. What are our priorities for the semester?

The class is most interested in big international themes. In geopolitics, the clash of great power rivalries, in the march of {{WPExtract|decolonization}}, the transformation of relations between the world's most affluent minority, the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}, and its impoverished majority, the {{WPExtract|Global South}}.

And in what we might call {{WPExtract|World economy|global economics}} or {{WPExtract|geoeconomics}}.

The march of globalization and its implications for international relations will be a sort of central concern.

So if there are two sort of narrative strands that run most boldly through the lecture series ahead they are I would suggest sort of geopolitics or sort of great power conflicts and global political economy.

Sort of the thinking about the changing organization of the world economy and the distribution of resources within it.

This course is fundamentally interested in the international panorama that it is with dealing with the world as a whole.

Of course comprehending complex events in world history requires us to pay careful attention to the interior histories of nation-states.

But we won't be focusing on just one or two nation-states, rather we'll be shifting our focus as the global panorama requires us to do.

Besides emphasizing sort of big international themes in the world's politics and economics we'll be attentive to what we might call structural developments in the history of international society.

{{WPExtract|Demography}}, for example, this is not a class about demography, but it's impossible to deal with the postwar world without thinking really carefully about the ways in which demographic change produces other kinds of transformation and development and that's something that we'll be doing.

We're also going to pay attention to the ways in which technological innovation afflicts larger international economic and political events.

We'll pay attention to cultural developments too. Particularly insofar as they have political and economic consequences for the affairs of the world.

So this is a course that is really focused on the sort of the big international themes but it's my conviction that being attentive to big international themes requires us to pay careful attention to a whole variety of historical topics and problems.

Besides being a course in the history of the world since 1945 this is of course a course in contemporary history.

As I've been explaining through the first part of today's session one of my overriding purposes in teaching this class is to help all of you to situate your own present circumstances in some larger historical context.

I believe that studying the history of recent world affairs will help you to do that. Where necessary we will delve deeper into the past than 1945. 1945 is a sort of crude point of departure and where the comprehension of the present requires us to go back beyond 1945 we will do so.

=== Organizing Narratives ===

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<nowiki>[49:56]</nowiki>

So what are the sort of major organizing narratives that we're going to be dealing with? I've just presented for you a series of organizing narratives that could be used to comprehend a couple of episodes in the present. So it would be appropriate to tell you a little bit more about the organizing narratives that we're going to be dealing with in the course of the semester ahead.

==== The Cold War ====

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<nowiki>[50:18]</nowiki>

One of the most obvious ones is the {{WPExtract|Cold War}}. The Cold War is the central geopolitical conflict of the postwar world (at least of the postwar world until the 1990s).

So we'll be paying careful attention to the history of the Cold War in this lecture class.

==== Decolonization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:36]]
<nowiki>[50:36]</nowiki>

No less important, and I might suggest even more important, than the history of the Cold War is the history of {{WPExtract|decolonization}}.

Remind yourselves that in 1945 many human beings in many parts of the world still inhabit colonial empires. That is to say they're the subjects of distant European colonial powers.

By the mid 1970s nobody really lives in a colony anymore. There are a few cases in which you might argue colonialism survives but they're the exception and not the rule. Comprehending how decolonization comes about is one of the really really big you know sort of historical challenges for anybody who wants to understand the postwar world. And it's a theme to which I'll draw substantial attention in the semester ahead.

==== Economic Development ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:25]]
<nowiki>[51:25]</nowiki>

We're also going to think a little bit about the history, or think quite a lot about the history of development -- economic development that is.

The world in 2012 is certainly more affluent than it was in 1950. Yet there have been changes in the distribution of affluence.

To put it most crudely the inequality within societies across the world has increased since 1945 while inequality between societies has decreased. Once poor countries like China have caught up considerably to the affluent West. Meanwhile within the West inequalities have widened.

So we're thinking about the history of economic development in terms that are sort of sensitive to the big global vectors. That's one major narrative strand that I want to emphasize.

==== Globalization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:25]]
<nowiki>[52:25]</nowiki>

And the last is globalization. Globalization is distinct from development insofar as it is the history of integration. Thinking about the history of development does not necessarily require us to be particularly attentive to the relationships among the world's economies. Thinking about the history of globalization does.

At the beginning of the postwar era in 1945 the world's major economic units, which are the world's major nation-states, are relatively self-contained, relatively autonomous, certainly by comparison with their relations today.

So understanding how the global economy becomes more integrated and reflecting upon the sort of political and international consequences of that integration, which is to say globalization, will be a central priority for this course.

=== Learning Objectives ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:20]]
<nowiki>[53:20]</nowiki>

What are you going to learn through all of this?

Besides gaining an overview of recent world history, which I presume is the reason that most of you are here, I hope that you are going to learn to be adept consumers of history. I'm not going to teach you everything you need to know about the recent past and nor is anybody else.

If you can come away from this class with a sense of the landscape and with the skills necessary to drill down into particular historical details, and to particular historical narratives, as your needs in the future require you to do then I will have done my job.

This is a course that doesn't aspire to teach you everything about history. That would be impossible. Even if we had two semesters. Rather what I want to do is to give you a sense of the historical landscape and to equip you with the skills and the tools that will enable you as you require and see fit to probe more deeply into events in your own time and on your own terms.

=== Schedule and Syllabus ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:24]]
<nowiki>[54:24]</nowiki>

How are we going to do this?

Well, at this point a walk through the syllabus might help.

Does anybody not have a copy of the syllabus by the way?

Okay, where are the remaining syllabi? Is there a pile of them somewhere?

Okay, maybe we could send one to the back and...

The syllabus is available on the bSpace website by the way so if you don't have a copy in front of you then you can easily acquire one.

The syllabus will just give you a basic overview of the sort of narrative progression of this lecture course.

* We're going to start off the substance on Thursday talking about the world crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. How did the Second World War and its resolution foreground the history of the postwar world?

* Next we'll talk about the Cold War in the second week or the origins of the Cold War.

* Week three we're going to talk about the creation of new nation-states in the {{WPExtract|Global South}} and the consolidation of welfare states in the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}.

* Week four we'll make comparisons between the political economy of the {{WPExtract|socialism|socialist}} world and the managed {{WPExtract|capitalism}} of the West in the 1950s and 1960s.

* We'll deal with decolonization as a sort of political rather than economic theme. In the fifth week of the course we'll look at the struggles that the European colonial powers waged to retain control of their empires and we'll think about the relationship between the Cold War as one big conflict and decolonization as another sort of historical macro narrative.

* In the sixth week we'll sort of think about why the Cold War was so stable as it was. We'll look at the efforts that political leaders made to stabilize the Cold War, and we will inquire as to who pushed against the sort of stability of the Cold War system as it came to be in the 1960s and 1970s and with what consequences.

* The seventh week looks at what I characterize as sort of a crisis of the Cold War international order in the 1970s.

* Week eight takes us through the oil crisis, a really important turning point in the relations between the Global North and Global South and the resurgence of the Cold War towards the end of the 70s.

* Week nine focuses on what I would characterize as the resurgence of globalization from the 70s. We look at the rise of free market economics in the West particularly in the United States and Great Britain and then the global dissemination of free market solutions in the 1980s and thereafter.

* Week ten will focus on the end of the Cold War.

* Week eleven on sort of the international relations of the 1990s.

* Week twelve we'll explore some of the tensions within the globalizing world of what we might by this point define loosely as the present -- including one lecture which will focus more carefully on the experiences of China -- arguably the world's rising {{WPExtract|superpower}}.

* Finally we'll conclude by thinking about the world since the {{WPExtract|Financial crisis of 2007–2008|2008 financial crisis}}. This is really recent history. But what I want to do in the last couple of lectures is to try to locate the economic malaise of the West since 2008 in a larger history of economic change since the Second World War. And to pose the question of whether the West may ultimately be in the throes of historical decline vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

So that's a very succinct overview I don't want to belabor this because I'll be belaboring it over the next thirteen weeks.

=== Student Assignments and Exams ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:45]]
<nowiki>[58:45]</nowiki>

So that's what I'm going to do. What are you going to do?

What I have here is a table that identifies the basic assignments that we're going to use to grade you for want of a gentler verb.

This is a, you know, upper division lecture class. The nature of the assignments and the weighting assignments is fairly typical one for a class of this nature.

We do have sections they'll be a little bit more on sections to come. Section participation is worth 10% of your overall grade.

==== Response Papers ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:29]]
<nowiki>[59:29]</nowiki>

We also have response papers. There are going to be three response papers due during the course of the semester. Rather than have weekly responses, which can be rather {{WPExtract|pro forma}}, I'd prefer to have slightly more substantive response papers and to require fewer of them.

So you're going to do three response papers and the best two grades will count.

I think that that's written out in the syllabus.

If you're happy with the grades for your first two response papers you don't have to submit a third.

So you could end up submitting two response papers if you do well enough on the first two.

The topic of the response papers will be sort of determined by your graduate student instructors.

They'll talk more about the particular assignments in your first section meetings.

==== Final Paper ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:20]]
<nowiki>[60:20]</nowiki>

There's also going to be a final paper. This is worth a quarter of the overall grade. It's a fairly succinct final paper. Just six or seven pages.

I'll talk much more about the final paper as we get closer to it. But I'll simply say at this point that insofar as one of my objectives for this course is to help you develop a sort of historical perspective or a historian's perspective on present day events you will have the option in the final paper of writing a historically informed policy brief<ref> [https://writingcenter.unc.edu/policy-briefs/ Policy Briefs]. ''The Writing Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill''. Retrieved:2018-08-16</ref>
<ref>[http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2195e/i2195e03.pdf What are Policy Briefs?]. ''Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)''. Retrieved:2018-08-16</ref> on some issue of present day importance.

We'll talk more as we get closer to the final paper as about what exactly that might look like.

==== Exams ====

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The examinations -- the best part of the course -- what are they going to look like?

There's a midterm exam. It's only worth 10% of the grade on Thursday, March 1st.

In an unusual display of generosity I decided to give you the Tuesday before the midterm off so that you can prepare for it.

The midterm will be a take-home midterm which I hope makes it a little bit easier for you to deal with.

Finally the final exam which is worth 30% of the grade will take place on Wednesday, May 9th.

It will cover the entirety of the course readings and course materials.

Are there any questions about the assignments or does this look sensible enough to all of you?

(Student Question)

It's not.

I would like for it to be but there are regulations at the level of the College of Letters and Sciences that restrict whether final exams can be take-home or not.

If those restrictions, if those regulations change, during the semester ahead then I will make it take-home.

So if any of you have any political influence then you could use it to accomplish that end.

==== Course Readings ====

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Alright, what about the course readings? What are you going to be reading during the course of this semester that lies ahead of us?

This is a reading list that has been assembled with a great deal of sensitivity to the feedback that I have gotten from students in semesters past on the evaluation forms that are passed out at the end of the semester.

One of the concerns I always get on those evaluation forms is that there's too much reading in my lecture classes.

I think that this is probably true of history classes in general though there may be anomalous historians who were gentler in the readings they assign.

But this semester's I have really really tried hard to circumscribe the reading list. I think the last time I taught this course there were eight or nine books assigned. Seriously. I can circulate the syllabus if you don't believe me.

This semester we just have four books that are assigned.

These are books that are intended to provide a sort of comprehensive historical overview. The first two books, {{WPExtract|David Reynolds (British historian)|David Reynolds}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=nZy72wNdOuIC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''One World Divisible''], {{WPExtract|Daniel Yergin}}'s [https://books.google.com/books?id=uNYzPUhXhJYC&source=gbs_navlinks_s''The Commanding Heights''], together offer, you know pretty comprehensive perspective on postwar international and in Yergin's case sort of economic history.

The other two books, {{WPExtract|Menzie Chinn}} and [https://scholar.harvard.edu/jfrieden/home Jeff Frieden]'s [https://books.google.com/books?id=o-HlY_DLDM0C&dq=Lost+Decade&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''Lost Decades''], and [https://www.smu.edu/News/Experts/Jeffrey-Engel Jeff Engel]'s edited volume on [https://books.google.com/books?id=4nKz4YvPULcC&dq=Jeff+Engel+Wikipedia+Fall+of+the+Berlin+Wall&source=gbs_navlinks_s the fall of the Berlin Wall]. Fairly short books that are germane only to particular weeks of the syllabus.

Besides being shorter than in weeks past I hope that this semester's reading list is also a little bit cheaper than has been the case ... I always try to be sensitive to the costs of readings, but by assigning fewer books I hope that I've also been able to reduce the overall expenditure for all of you.

The total price of these books, I looked it up on Amazon, and I was really considerate, ranges from about $45 to about $70, depending on whether you buy the books used or new.

That's probably cheaper than the textbook layout for most of your classes is. At least I hope that I'm doing better than the chemistry and physics departments with their heavy textbooks.

If the cost is a concern my advice would be that the key texts to acquire are Reynolds and Yergin.

The others you'll find it easier to make due within the library. But I think you'll find it really useful to have the first two texts because those are utilized in multiple weeks readings.

There are other readings besides the four books that are recommended for purchase in the syllabus. These will all be available via bSpace. So you don't have to worry about buying copies of anything beyond the textbooks.

I very much hope that the readings are manageable. The reading load has been designed to be manageable. There may be two weeks in which you're expected to read an entire book. No more than that. And some weeks it's just a couple of chapters. If you have problems with the readings come talk to me, go talk to your GSI, and we can probably give you some counsel on how to read historical texts.

Look reading history is different from reading literature. The purpose in most of our readings is not to read every word of every sentence. Rather you need to sort of read for gist, you need to read so as to acquire some sense of what the really important events are, and of what the author's line of interpretation might happen to be.

But you're not reading this sort of to appreciate the prose. And if you find that you're struggling with the readings then I would humbly suggest that you might be reading in the wrong way for a course of this nature, and we can sort of talk about how you might do things a little differently.

Okay.

==== Sections and Section Attendance ====

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The most important part of the class is not the, not the lectures, but the sections. That's where the real teaching and learning occurs.

I'm delighted that the history department was able to provide section meetings for this class. And I hope that you're as excited about them as I am.

We've two terrific GSIs who are going to be teaching the class. Maybe could I ask David and Brian to stand up.

(silence)

Okay, maybe I'll ask you each to introduce yourselves.

(inaudible)

Great. And Brian?

(silence)

Great. Thank you.

Let me simply reinforce the point. The sections serve a vital pedagogical purpose. They are where you learn what you need to know. The GSIs, not me, are really the ones who are going to be teaching you.

As an administrative point section participation really is mandatory. It's not optional. You can't download the lecture. You can't download the section on Itunes and listen to it. If you miss the section, you miss the section, and you've missed a great deal. As a way of enforcing section participation, which I hate to say, you're all adults you know what the deal is, but we need to have some you know kind of regulatory mechanism to enforce section participation if necessary and I believe that what is written in the syllabus is that if you miss three or more sections, or maybe more than three sections without a good explanation then you're in danger of failing the course.

So that's you know just important to remember. That we really do expect you to be present for section meetings. If you anticipate any problems with the section schedule please do get in contact with your GSI right away because you know we have ways in which we can resolve those kinds of dilemmas. But don't bring up the issue unless it's a real scheduling conflict. You know the fact that you know the eleven o'clock section coincides with Oprah is not ... Is Oprah still on? Or, no?

Okay, well, then in that case that won't be a problem for anybody.

That's why we're able to schedule sections at eleven now.

So if you're not enrolled in section ... You should all be enrolled in a section because I believe that ... What is the registrar's electronic system called? Is it Tele-BEARS? I believe that Tele-BEARS required you to sign up for a section when you signed up for the class. Is that correct?

Okay, so you should all be enrolled already in a section. If you're not then get in contact with us and we'll try to figure that out.

Okay, I think that's all that I wanted to cover in terms of the nuts and bolts of the course.

== Student Questions ==

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So let me ask if you have any questions. What can I tell you about the semester ahead?

If any of you are sitting on the fence about whether to take the class or not if there's information that I can provide that would help you make your mind up one way or the other?

(inaudible)

Yeah.

I prefer essay questions. Historically I have not utilized ID sections I think I did in the first lecture class that I taught at this institution. But you can just expect three essays.

Are there any other questions?

== Office Hours ==

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Okay, good. The last point that I wanted to make then is: I don't think that I included this in the slideshow but it is on the syllabus. I have office hours on Tuesdays and Thursdays which are also the days in which we meet for the lectures. The office hours run from eleven to noon. And please do come along and introduce yourselves even if you don't have particular questions then I'd be really glad to have the chance to meet all of you.

If you want to stop by and those office hours are not convenient for you because I understand that you have other classes then just send me an email and we can schedule some alternative time to meet.

But with that I think that I may have finished the section a little earlier for possibly the first time. So let's hope that's an omen for the rest of the semester.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

WikipediaExtracts:Arnold J. Toynbee

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UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s

2022-03-01T21:59:44Z

DavidKitFriedman: Adding some more information concerning the origin of the quotations from Quote Investigator.

== Preliminaries ==

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Morning. It's about ten past the half hour so it's time to begin.

Welcome to History 186.

Let me just start with a quick note on the audio. You've managed to catch me at the end of a nasty cold. The end of a bad cold is better than the beginning, but by consequence the audio is going to be a little scratchier today than it will ordinarily be.

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A more consequential issue with the audio that I wanted to be all aware of at the beginning is that this semester's lectures are being podcast which means that they're available for distribution via iTunes. Probably most of you know what podcasting lectures involves.

This is really good insofar and makes what we're doing in the classroom available to anybody outside of the classroom who's interested to listen in. The only downside of podcasting as I see it is that it makes it easy for all of you who ought to be in the classroom to sit at home on a cold morning like this and listen to the lecture remotely.

I would really prefer if you didn't. I don't have any mechanism enforce your attendance in the lectures. But I hope that you will not use the podcasting as a you know opportunity to avoid coming to lectures tempting as that might be when the weather is at frigid as it is today. It's all of what 50 degrees outside which is much colder than were accustomed to even in northern California.

== Introductory Anecdote: Nixon and Zhou Enlai ==

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This is a history class. It's a class in {{WPExtract|contemporary history}}. But it is a history class. I'm a historian and as such I would like to start the class with an historical anecdote

So I'm going to take you back to May 1972. {{WPExtract|Richard Nixon}} has landed in China the first American president ever to visit the People's Republic.

He meets, besides meeting with {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong|Chairman Mao}}, with {{WPExtract|Zhou Enlai|Premier Zhou Enlai}} the effective Prime Minister of China.

Nixon, as those of you know anything about him may know, was a really socially awkward and inept personality in some respects.
He found it very difficult to make small talk. But he had been told by his advisors that Zhou Enlai was really interested in French history. So Nixon said, as you might in that situation, what do you think about the {{WPExtract|French Revolution}}? Zhou famously replied, "it's too soon to tell".

This anecdote is a suitable place to begin a history of recent world affairs. Zhou Enlai's reply might warn us against passing premature historical judgments. It's too soon to tell.

The episode I would suggest is cautionary in a different direction. It ought to caution us to get our facts right. Because Zhou Enlai was not referring to the French Revolution which you think of when we talk about the French Revolution (the Revolution of 1789) he was, according to Nixon's translator, referring to the {{WPExtract|May 1968 events in France|revolution of 1968}}.

So, besides cautioning us to avoid premature historical judgments, this episode might also remind us that when we do history it's important to get the history correct.

== Why Study History? ==

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Nonetheless, the question that Zhou Enlai raised, when is it too soon to tell, is an important one. Should historians study recent events? What business do we have studying the history of contemporary world politics, or world economics? Why not favor alternative disciplinary approaches? What do historians have to tell us? What do you have to learn from me that you might not learn about it in some other disciplinary context?

Why not takes a class in economics or sociology or political science? Are these disciplines that not offer some superior insight into the workings of the contemporary world? What might history offer that these approaches do not?

To answer this question we're going to have to raise some really fundamental questions? What is history, and what is the historian's role? And perhaps most important for all of you what do we learn from history?

Is there any point in studying it? Is it just a random succession of facts and personalities? Or is there some larger purpose to the study of the past?

You know many philosophers and thinkers and historians have posed this question in the past. What is history? We might turn to some of the great canonical figures for answers.

=== Elbert Hubbard ===

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Let's start first of all with {{WPExtract|Elbert Hubbard}}, an American radical and writer, famously described history as just one damn thing after another.<ref>See though [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/16/history/ "History Is Just One Damn Thing after Another"] and [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/ "Life Is Just One Damn Thing After Another"] from [https://quoteinvestigator.com/ Quote Investigator].
<br/><br/>
Quote Investigator believes that the quote "history is just one damn thing after another" originated from the quote "life is just one damn thing after another."
<br/><br/>
Elbert Hubbard printed the phrase "life is just one damn thing after another" in his publication [https://books.google.com/books?id=IhrZAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA32#v=onepage&q&f=false "The Philistine: A Periodical of Protest" in December of 1909]. As Quote Investigator speaks about in the post on [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/ "Life Is Just One Damn Thing After Another"] the phrase was in the air at the time without any specific well known originator.
<br/><br/>
In the post on [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/16/history/ "History Is Just One Damn Thing after Another"] Quote Investigator points out that although {{WPExtract|Arnold J. Toynbee}} may be associated with using that phrase and speaking of such an overall notion he actually disagreed with it, and when using such phrases was doing so in that context.</ref>

This is one perspective on the past. It's just stuff that happens. Without any rhyme or reason or connection among events.

=== Karl Marx ===

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{{WPExtract|Karl Marx}}, one of the most celebrated and influential philosophers of history of all time, had a perspective on history which is about the exact opposite of Elbert Hubbard's. For Marx history had a very clear logic. You all know what that logic is, right? What's the logic of history for Marx?

That's right. The logic of history for Marx is a logic of class struggle leading ultimately to the creation of a {{WPExtract|communism|communist}} society -- a profoundly influential historical concept.

=== Thomas Macaulay ===

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But there have been other influential historical concepts. Perhaps articulated somewhat less forthrightly than Marx.

Take another British 19th century historical figure: {{WPExtract|Thomas Babington Macaulay|Thomas Macaulay}}. Macaulay was one of the great {{WPExtract|Whigs (British political party)|Whig}} historians. His view of history was that history represented an inexorable march of progress -- the steady march of reform even justice.

=== Determinism and Randomness ===

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The kind of historical determinism that figures like Marx and Macaulay favored, a determinism that sees history as having an ulterior logic, a direction, a purpose, has in some ways fallen out of favor with professional historians. We're much less inclined today to see all history as ultimately being reducible to the history of class struggle or to the history of Whiggish political reform than we might have been several generations ago.

But that doesn't mean that history is just one damn thing after another. We ought to be conscious of the ways in which history shapes us. How does history constrain our choices in the present? This is a question that historians have at some fundamental level to grapple with.

== Pólya's urn ==

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To think about this it may be useful to reflect upon a sort of mathematical problem: {{WPExtract|Pólya urn model|Pólya's urn}} problem.

How many of you have encountered Pólya's urn in probability classes?

Okay, just one of you.

That's good because I don't know this very well so please don't correct me if I make any mistakes. You can come and do it quietly after the class.

Pólya's urn is simply an experiment in probability but it's a useful vantage point for thinking about the utility of history as a way of knowing and a mode of learning.

What is Pólya's urn? A big urn. Contains at the beginning of the experiment just two balls. One white, one blue. They can be any color you want this doesn't really matter. But the idea is that we have a big urn with two balls, one of different color, each a different color. Let's say we remove one of those balls at random. We take out a white ball. Then we put it back in the urn adding another ball of the same color. So we take out one white ball we add two white balls back. We take out one blue ball we add two blue balls back.

We keep on repeating the experiment until the urn is full. Because eventually it will get full if we put two balls in for every ball that we remove.

What is the ultimate distribution of colored balls within the urn at the end of the experiment?

I don't have any idea, and nor do you. It's impossible to predict. But what the experiment does tell us if we think about the logic of it is that the early selections, the first balls that are removed and replaced are very consequential for determining the ultimate coloration of the urn at once the experiment has been concluded.

This is a experiment that is suggestive as to the importance of history, right?
Early choices have great consequences for determining subsequent outcomes. History in a sense is an iterative process in which early choices or decisions have great consequence for subsequent events.

=== Institutional Framework of American Politics ===

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Think about the sort of institutional framework of American politics. You know the basic system of government which the founding fathers bequeathed to us in the late 18th century. You know obviously that system has been modified in you know fundamental respects through subsequent Constitutional amendments and political innovations. But nonetheless the legacy of those early choices weighs very, very heavily on the present.

=== Conclusion: Pólya's Urn ===

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So we can't predict the outcome of history. You know that's not what this experiment is intended to demonstrate. All that it ought to suggest is that early choices have consequences for subsequent outcomes and conditions.

== Path Dependence ==

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In a sense this is what economists call {{WPExtract|path dependence}}. That's sort of a key concept in the social sciences. How are the paths that we are on shaping conditions by prior choices over which we have no control?

== Different Approaches to History ==

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What does this have to do with the role of the historian? It depends really on the individual historian because different historians see their roles and their responsibilities in very different terms.

Some historians are fundamentally concerned with experience and meaning. They see the past as another country and they seek to sort of reconstruct even to inhabit the experience of men and women living in circumstance and conditions quite different from our own.

This is profoundly useful. We learn something fundamental about human nature perhaps by thinking about how men and women have lived in circumstances far removed from those that we inhabit today.

But not all historians are fundamentally concerned with meaning. With what you might call [[wikt:hermeneutics|hermeneutics]] to use a fancy word.

Other historians, and I would probably include myself in this latter camp, are more concerned with causation -- with how things came to be the way they are and implicitly why didn't they get to be some other way.

For these historians issues of path dependence are absolutely crucial. When we reconstruct the past we don't simply seek to recreate the past as it existed at some particular moment in history rather we seek to navigate historical transitions. To think about how we got from one past state to another past state. Or indeed how we got from a past state to the state that we inhabit today, which is of course the present.

This class is going to be concerned more with connection than with the pursuit of meaning.

I make no apologies for that. These are simply different approaches to the study of history. What we're going to do this semester is to think about how things came to be the way they are.

And we're concerned not with how things came to be the way they were in 1945 but with how things came to be the way they are today in 2012.

== Contemporary History ==

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In that respect this class is an exercise in {{WPExtract|contemporary history}}. What is contemporary history?

Contemporary history is sort of the keyword for what we're trying to do in this semester.

=== Geoffrey Barraclough ===

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Probably the best definition of contemporary history that I've ever come across was offered by {{WPExtract|Geoffrey Barraclough}} -- a medieval historian who became later on in his career one of the leading proponents and theorists of contemporary history. For Barraclough the key to contemporary history was the point of departure. Contemporary history for Barraclough is really concerned with the historical origins and constitution of the present. It's not concerned with explaining the origins of the First World War or the origins of the American Revolution rather it's concerned with explaining the origins of the present.

How do things get to be the way they are today?

And for Barraclough contemporary history is the history that seeks the answer to this question. It is the history that aims to clarify the basic structural changes which have shaped the modern world.

When does this history begin?
Well, it all depends what the particular problem that you want to comprehend and unpack might be.

Contemporary history begins when the problems which are actual in the world today first take visible shape. It could begin decades ago. It could begin centuries ago. It could begin millennia ago. It all depends what the particular problem on which we fixate might be.

What distinguishes contemporary history than is the vantage point from which it is pursued. Contemporary history is history that looks back from the present to try to search for, explain, and unpack the deep origins of issues on which we fixate in the world today.

=== Conclusion: Contemporary History ===

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So the appropriate place to begin a course in contemporary history or history of the contemporary world might then be not the past but the present.

Looking back from the present moment what do we see in the past that captivates our attention and calls for a particular explanation?

== Current Events ==

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Let's start by thinking about some of the big important events of recent months.

These may be a little outdated now. It's about a week since I put this slideshow together.

But let's just survey the world from the perspective of the present or last month perhaps.

What were the big major headlines of December 2012?<ref>Speaker most likely meant December 2011.</ref>

=== European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

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Well, one of the big important headlines had to do with Europe's fiscal crisis. The European Summit, which took place in sort of early mid-December, aimed to address Europe's ongoing fiscal crisis.

What was really important about the Brussell's Summit, which took place, in I think December 11th, but I could be wrong,<ref>Meetings were held December 8th to December 9th. See Wikipedia article [[wikipedia: List of European Council meetings|List of European Council meetings]] and also:<br/><br/>
Rooney, Ben (2011-12-09). [https://money.cnn.com/2011/12/09/news/international/europe_debt_crisis/index.htm Europe debt saga far from over]. ''CNNMoney''. Retrieved:2018-08-15
<br/><br/>and:
<br/><br/>
Traynor, Ian; Watt, Nicholas; Gow, David; Wintour, Patrick (2011-12-09). [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty "David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift in Europe"]. ''The Guardian''. Retrieved 2018-08-15.</ref> is that it produced an agreement amongst all of the member states of the {{WPExtract|European Union}} with the exception, the important exception of Great Britain, to seek a fiscal stability pact which will impose sort of stringent budgetary conditions on member states of the European Union.

It's a really important landmark summit in the history of European integration. It's also really consequential episode insofar as it marked Great Britain's estrangement from the European project. It's probably too soon to tell what the eventual consequences will be but a very important episode in the history of Europe.

=== Moscow Street Protests ===

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There have been other major headlines in the news over the past couple of months. Let's think about the view from Moscow where there have been massive street protests against the {{WPExtract|Vladimir Putin|Putin}} {{WPExtract| Dmitry Medvedev| Medvedev}} regime.

What's interesting about the Moscow crisis? Well, a great deal is interesting. We might highlight the role of digital communications in the production of street dissent.

Doing so might help us to link the Moscow protests of last month with the {{WPExtract|Arab Spring}} earlier in 2011 or even the {{WPExtract|Occupy Wall Street}} movement of the fall for example?

What is the larger significance of the Moscow protests?

Might we see this episode as representing the resurgence of civil society perhaps against what Putin would characterize as Russian's guided democracy.

Another really important episode than with sort of big historical implications perhaps.

=== Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ===

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There have been other events. Some more geopolitical in character over the past couple of months. Earlier this month Iran tested a new kind of anti-ship missile in the {{WPExtract| Strait of Hormuz |Straits of Hormuz}}. Moreover the Iranian government has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz -- a narrow strait at the end of the {{WPExtract|Persian Gulf}} through which about one-fifth of the world's oil shipping passes.

This is just one episode in a kind of long running confrontation between the Iranian regime of {{WPExtract| Mahmoud Ahmadinejad|Ahmadinejad}} with the West sort of led of course by the United States.

There are a variety of larger perspectives which we might bring to bear on this crisis but it is you know sort of self-evidently an important flash point in world geopolitics today.

=== Death of Kim Jong-il ===

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Probably no new story got more attention last month than did the death of {{WPExtract|Kim Jong-il}} in Pyongyang the capital of North Korea.

This was clearly a major, major turning point in the history of the North Korean regime. It's potentially a point of rupture. The regime of Kim Jong-il does not have such clear and cogent succession plans as did the regime of {{WPExtract|Kim Il-sung}} his father.

The transition although it seems to be proceed smoothly enough; nonetheless, raises a whole host of urgent and important questions as regards the future relationship of North Korea to its neighbor South Korea, to the United States, to China, to the larger international community.

The transition within the regime raises the prospect at least of larger regional instability perhaps even embroiling the United States and China.

== Interpretation of Current Events ==

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My purpose though in sort of recapitulating these events is not to suggest that history is just a series of disconnected happenstance.
Rather it is to try to probe some of the larger themes to which we might connect particular developments and events in our recent history.

So I'd like to sort of pose the question of how we go about locating the deep origins of these particular crises or flash points.
Can we situate the events of our times in a larger historical perspective? Which is to say can we situate them within sort of a larger narrative framework? How do we relate past to present? How do we relate present to past in ways that grants new perspective perhaps even deeper perspective on the stakes and consequences of present day events.

Searching for the deep origins of particular events in the world today will not enable us to predict the future. But it might help us to get some sense of the vectors along which we might proceed as we move forward. Thinking about where we've come from can illuminate the possible paths that we might follow as we move forward. So to try to do this it might be useful to probe a little bit deeper into a least a couple of these episodes to think about how we could situate the events of the present in a larger historical context.

How might history as opposed to economics or political science help us to gain a vantage on the events of our own times?

So let's try to do this for just two of these particular episodes which I've identified here.

=== Interpretation of European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

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Let's think about the European summit and the larger sort of European financial crisis of which it is part. How might we understand the summit among European heads of state that took place in Brussels last month?

One historical framework which might help us to understand the summit and its significance is of course the history of European integration.

==== European Integration ====

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The European project as we might characterize it goes back a long way.

The first landmark treaty which sort of created the European economic community as it was at the time was signed all the way back in 1957 in Rome. The {{WPExtract|Treaty of Rome}} provided for a single European market and for regulatory harmonization within it. It marked the first really important step in what you might see as a sort of long historical march towards the construction of an integrated European society if not an integrated European state.

There have been other landmarks in this historical progression. The {{WPExtract|Maastricht Treaty}} of 1991 transformed the {{WPExtract|European Economic Community}} into the {{WPExtract|European Union}}.
It provided for monetary integration in the form of the single currency, the {{WPExtract|euro}}, which was introduced just before the turn of the millennium.

Thinking about these prior landmarks in the integration of Europe helps to us to see the integration of Europe as an iterative process, as a process in which the Europeans have edged closer and closer to more full and more formal integration of their political and especially economic affairs.

From this vantage point thinking about the history of European integration the Brussels Summit which was convened in response to the fiscal crisis in the {{WPExtract|Eurozone}} might appear as simply the latest in a series of landmark episodes which have pushed the Europeans closer and closer towards the creation of a single {{WPExtract|superstate}}.

Whereas the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 provided for monetary harmonization within the European Union the Brussels Summit provides for a degree of fiscal integration.

It's really the first; well, not quite, but it's the first sort of major effort to require the member states of the European Union to follow sort of coherent and integrated fiscal agenda in their public finances.

So that's one perspective on what happened in Brussels earlier this month. It's just the latest chapter in a long running saga of European integration.

But there are other frameworks within which we might situation events and they offer different vantage points on the significance and consequence of recent episodes.

==== Globalization ====

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We might see what happened in Brussels last month as an episode in the larger history of globalization.

{{WPExtract|Globalization}} after all is a force which has been corrosive of fiscal and monetary sovereignty that is the fiscal and monetary sovereignty of nation-states since at least the 1970s.

A globalization in the form of, particularly the integration of financial markets, has imposed constraints on the deficits that governments can run, on public spending. The advent of globalization has been a somewhat progressive process. The integration of {{WPExtract|capital markets}}, though it's a story that could be traced back centuries, really begins to accelerate in recent times during the 1970s.

During the 1990s globalization becomes a widely discussed and widely theorized phenomenon. We begin to see the development of what you might characterize as a sort of global public policy prescriptions for a globalizing world in the 1990s. And these dictate that countries that want to participate in globalization need to balance their budgets and cut back public spending.

It's familiar enough. This is a policy prescription which is sometimes characterized usually by its critics as the {{WPExtract|Washington Consensus}}. And it's applied in 1980s and 1990s primarily to the {{WPExtract| Developing country|developing world}}. This is really important.

North Americans and West Europeans don't really feel the constraining impact of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s. They might in fact have been its beneficiaries. You could certainly make that case so far as the United States is concerned.

Since the {{WPExtract| Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2008}} however this ceased to be so clear that the West gets to enjoy the benefits of globalization without subjecting itself to the discipline inherent within the globalization of financial markets.

We might see the Brussels summit, it's a summit which imposes rigid fiscal constraints on the member states of the European Union, as an episode in the larger history of globalization. The significance of which is that it marks the moment at which the West, previously the dominant center of the global economy, itself becomes subject to the rules and constraints that financial globalization implies.

So that's a quite different perspective. The Brussels crisis, not so much as an episode in the history of European integration, but as an episode in the history of globalization.

==== German Ascendancy ====

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Thus far I've sort of focused on the economic aspects of the summit and their larger significance, but we must alternatively see the Brussel's summit as a sort of {{WPExtract|geopolitics|geopolitical}} episode. As an episode whose larger consequences lie ultimately not in the economic relations of nations but in {{WPExtract|power politics}}.

From a geopolitical perspective, which is say a perspective concerned with power ultimately, with military and political power in world affairs, the German problem has been European's fundamental problem since the 1870s.

Germany of course was unified at the beginning of the 1870s under the guidance of {{WPExtract|Otto von Bismarck}}. The creation of the German state in the 1870s created a big problem for Europe because, as most of you know, Germany is too big and too powerful for the European system to be able to contain it.
Germany twice tried to dominate Europe by military means in the 20th century. In 1914 {{WPExtract| Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser Wilheml II}} launched Germany's first bid for European mastery. It was defeated but only really through the intervention of the United States, and Great Britain. In 1939 under {{WPExtract|Adolf Hitler}} Germany launched a second bid for European mastery. Once again it was defeated, but only because of the intervention of the United States and Great Britain.

If we see the German problem as Europe's sort of fundamental geopolitical dilemma we gain a very different perspective on the Brussel's summit of last month. You might see the summit as less important for its political economic consequences than for its geopolitical ones.

Might the summit have signified the consolidation of German dominance of Europe?

After all German power has resurged since the {{WPExtract| German reunification | reunification of Germany in 1990}}. For almost half a century after the Second World War Germany was divided.

The United States and Great Britain and the Soviet Union all maintained troops in Germany in effect keeping the German problem resolved through the expedient solution of division.

Since German reunification Germany has necessarily become more powerful, more influential, and we might see the Brussels summit as marking the sort of consecration of German power within the Eurozone.

Berlin under {{WPExtract|Angela Merkel|Chancellor Angela Merkel}} is the driving force between fiscal discipline as a policy priority within the Eurozone. At the same time Germany has resisted sort of the more generous aspect of fiscal integration which would be the transfer of resources from the Eurozone's richest states to its less affluent states, primarily on the Mediterranean periphery.

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One of the consequences of the Brussels summit (it's probably too early to tell) looks to be the creation of a sort of imbalanced system of fiscal integration whereby the peripheral European states, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, the pigs, are subjected to harsh fiscal discipline, but do not enjoy the benefit of fiscal transfers from the affluent north.

So we might see the creation of a sort of European fiscal system which serves the interests of Germany at the expense of the European periphery as marking the consolidation, perhaps ultimately the final accomplishment, of German dominance of Europe.

The fact that this domination was achieved peacefully rather than through military means might not deter us from calling it what it is.

I'm not saying that's what it is. I'm just saying that's a perspective. What I wanted to propose is not any ultimate adjudication as to what the larger significance of last month's Brussel's summit is, but rather just three vantage paints.

==== Conclusion: Interpretation of European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ====

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We might see this episode as marking the next chapter in the history of European integration, we might see it as a chapter in the history of globalization, or we might see it as another chapter in the long history of Germany's struggle to dominate the European continent.

I don't want to adjudicate as to which of these perspectives is correct. It may be that none of them is. They're all very partial and somewhat superficial. The point is just that by thinking about the particular event from these different historical vantage points we get very different perspectives on the ultimate significance and meaning of particular events.

And we can do this kind of exercises for other crises, other episodes too.

=== Interpretation of Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ===

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Let's think briefly about the crisis over the Straits of Hormuz. What's happening in the Persian Gulf today? What is happening in Iran's relations with the West?

==== Rouge State ====

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Are we simply seeing another episode in which a kind of {{WPExtract|rogue state}}, a state that refuses to submit to the civilized code of conduct of the international community, is playing up, is making itself a nuisance for its neighbors and for the larger international community?

There would be good reason to see Iran as a rogue state. Iran has after all been providing resources to terrorist organizations for decades, it's a bully in its regional neighborhood, like Germany it seeks to be the dominant regional power. It's clearly working very hard to influence events in Iraq right now. And Iran is also working to build, allegedly working to build a nuclear weapon. This is somewhat more contestable. But there is suggestive evidence that Iran is sort of in the process of trying to develop a nuclear bomb that would greatly enhance its capacity to influence regional and world politics.

If we see Iran as a rogue state, as a state that refuse to act according to the usual customary rules of international conduct, then we gain a certain vantage point on events in the Persian Gulf today, and tomorrow.

We will probably conclude that what we're dealing with is just another episode in a long history of Iranian belligerence which can be resolved perhaps only through the orchestration of some eventual regime change in Tehran.

So that's one perspective on the crisis in the Persian Gulf -- is to see it as just a consequence of Iran -- a rogue state acting out.

==== Resistance to Western Imperialism ====

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But there are other perspectives too which we might bring to bear on events. It's important to think about how particular events can be understood from a variety of vantage points.

From an Iranian perspective the crisis over the Straits of Hormuz might look like another sort of episode in the long history of Iranian or Middle Eastern resistance to Western imperialism.

After all the West's interests in the Middle East is motivated substantially by oil and this has been the case for a half-century. It would be, you know, just wrong to deny it.

Oil is what gives us as Westerners a sort of direct stake in the geopolitics of the Middle East.

And it's certainly the case that Iran like other Middle Eastern countries has been subject to political meddling even military intervention by Western powers in recent times. In 1953 of course the British intelligence and American intelligence agencies overthrew {{WPExtract|Mohammad Mosaddegh}}, the elected prime minister of Iran, and the history of British meddling in the region goes back even further than that.

From an Iranian perspective, the West's ... In treaties regarding Iran's nuclear aspirations, the threat of economic sanctions, might look rather like just another episode in a long history of Western meddling in Iranian affairs.

The Iranians might see their rather belligerent response as just another exhibition of anti-imperialism. A regime that defines itself in terms of opposition to the West, in terms of opposition particularly to the United States, since its 1979 coming to power in the {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|Islamic Revolution}} might well be inclined to locate the sort of present crisis in Iran's relations with the West as just another display of Western imperialism and Iranian resistance.

I don't want to suggest this perspective is right but it's a different perspective on events.

==== Clash of Civilizations ====

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If we have much longer memories we might incline to see the conflict between Iran and the West over the Straits of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear ambitions as an episode in a long {{WPExtract|Clash of Civilizations|clash of civilizations}}.

Here the most influential theorist was {{WPExtract|Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington}}, a Harvard political scientist who offered a journal article which became a book called [https://books.google.com/books?id=1CM3GUNLzOAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''The Clash of Civilizations''] that famously argued, and this was in the mid 1990s, that the most important fault lines in world affairs are not ideological, are not geopolitical even but are civilizational.

The world as Huntington saw it was divided into a number of discrete civilizations. The Western civilization, Orthodox Christian civilization, which is Russia and the post Soviet successor states, Indian civilization, African civilization, and Islamic civilization.

This was Huntington's sort of view of the world, and it's a world view that has been quite influential, particularly on our public discourse in the United States I would suggest.

But is there cause to see you know sort of recent conflicts as simply another episode in a long running clash of civilizations? Can we link disagreements over Iran's nuclear program and the Straits of Hormuz to the {{WPExtract|Crusades}} of the 12th and 13th century?

Probably not, but some might be inclined to do so.

We could after all see sort of recent international crisis, the rise of {{WPExtract|Islamic extremism|radical Islamism}} in the Middle East since the 1950s, {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|the Iranian revolution of 1979}}, the rise of {{WPExtract|Al-Qaeda}} in the 1990s, the {{WPExtract|September 11 attacks|9/11 attack}} in 2001, as sort of flash points in a long running clash of civilizations.

My own view is that this would be far too simplistic a framework in which to understand the complex politics of the Middle East.

It's framework that obscures conflict within the Islamic world, profound differences between {{WPExtract|Shia Islam|Shiite}} Iran and its {{WPExtract|Sunni Islam|Sunni}} neighbors,<ref>One could also consider the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Shia–Sunni relations}}</ref> but it's a perspective that some commentators on the region would nonetheless favor.

So we sort of offer it as an alternative paradigm or vantage point on events.

==== Conclusion: Interpretation of Iran Missile Test in Strait of Hormuz ====

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Here we have once again sort of three different perspectives. Do we see the friction that exists between Iran and the United States today as a rogue state acting out? As a consequence of the West's hegemonic aspirations? Or as the manifestation of a civilizational clash that is perhaps over a millennium old. So three different perspectives.

I'm not going to tell you which is correct. Probably none of them is correct as a singular construct.

=== Conclusion: Interpretation of Current Events ===

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But thinking about how events look from different perspective helps us to get a handle on the range of possible interpretations. And that's really important. Because not everybody sees events in the same way. The Iranians may see the conflict over the Straits of Hormuz in very different terms from those in which we see them. And it's important for us to think about the historical reference points that Iranian leaders might use to comprehend an existing crisis.

== Utility of Interpretation ==

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So what then is the sort of utility for historians of the kinds of explanatory narrative that I've just constructed?

By linking particular events to sort of larger frameworks of meaning what do we accomplish?

I think the first thing we do is we connect the present to the past in ways that help us to sort of comprehend the deeper significance of particular events. We get a vantage point -- some sense of the larger stakes -- and perhaps also of the larger consequences.

We should also be aware that different narrative interpretations of events, different kinds of frameworks, such as those which I've proposed, carry quite different political implications.

There are stakes in how we comprehend particular events. The larger frameworks of meaning within which we locate them are often very loaded ones. Let's think about this for a moment.

=== Implications of Different Interpretations: European Fiscal Crisis and Brussels Summit ===

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Let's think just about the European case.

Do we think about the Brussels summit as fundamentally an accomplishment in the history of European integration?

Liberals who are in favor of globalization, and here I use the world {{WPExtract|liberal}} in sort of {{WPExtract|Classical liberalism |the more classical sense}}, might be inclined to do this, insofar as liberals have welcomed the European project as a project that has made Europe more peaceful, perhaps more prosperous, that has expanded the domain of markets. What we saw last month in Brussels might look very positive from that perspective. It might look simply to be the most recent episode in a long running history of progressive integration.

On the other hand people who sort of self-define as critics and opponents of globalization, who see globalization as a voracious force that undermines and erodes the sovereignty of nation-states, and in the process undercuts public well-being might be really wary of what happened in Brussels. They might adhere to a sort of view of events which emphasizes the corrosive and destructive consequences of globalization and sees the outcome of the Brussel's summit as sort of confirming the influence of global forces on nation-states -- insofar and it sort of qualifies the autonomy of governments to run fiscal deficits, and to spend to provide public welfare programs.

People who see themselves as {{WPExtract| Realism (international relations)|foreign policy realists}}, sort of a dying breed, but there are some still out there, might conversely want to emphasize the geopolitical aspects of the Brussels summit last month. They might emphasize the narrative of sort of German {{WPExtract|hegemony}} which I sketched out a few minutes ago.

And there are political stakes to each of these interpretations. I don't have to tell you. You know what they are. I think it's already clear enough.

=== Conclusion: Utility of Interpretation ===

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Still with that caution, that the way in which we frame events is always to some extent political, I want to really emphasize the point that explanatory narratives such as these are very useful. They're useful because they help us to situate events within larger frameworks of meaning.

And ultimately doing that is what enables us to connect the past to the present. It's what enables us to see particular conflagrations or crises in the present moment as the construction of past circumstance.

It may even help us to make intelligent predictions as to where things might go in the future. At least as to what the consequences of particular developments in the future might be.

One of the great values of historical training I would suggest is that it helps to equip us with the skills necessary to locate particular events and crises within larger frameworks. And doing this, being able to segue between the particular and the profound, helps us to gain some vantage point on the larger stakes -- on the larger significance of events.

And that is in a sense what this class aspires to teach you to do. It's not a class in contemporary ... you know, it's not a class in the history of the present moment as such. We're going to be delving fairly deep into the past, into the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s. We're not going to be talking about current affairs. But by talking about the history of the world in the second half of the twentieth century I hope that we'll be able to gain the ability to link events in ways that suggest the larger stakes and the larger consequences of particular episodes and crises. I think the ability to do this is one of the most valuable things that historical training can offer.

And if you come out of this class feeling that you are better able to link the particular to the cosmic then I will feel that I have done my job.

We could talk more about events in the world today but doing so would not necessarily give you a clear sense of what this semester's lecture class is about.

== Course Overview ==

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So in having sort of given you a sense of what I want to accomplish in terms of the larger pedagogic objectives in this class I would like to sort of take you through the nuts and bolts of the class so that you know exactly what we're going to be doing over the course of the semester ahead.

=== Questions Allowed During the Lecture ===

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I should also say, particularly at this point, now that we're going through the specifics, if you have any questions, please do interrupt. And that goes for the entire semester. If you have any questions at any point, if anything is unclear, just raise your hand and I'll be glad to field questions. I don't want you to think that have to wait until the end of the lecture to field questions.

Have any of you been in lecture classes with me before? Okay.

So you know that I can run like right to the end of the allotted session, so if you save your questions to the end, you might not get to ask them, so raise your hands, and you know interrupt and I'll be happy.

=== Course Content ===

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Okay, what are we going to be doing in this lecture theater this semester? What is this class all about?

How are we going to accomplish what I've just promised to do?

Well, the class is really about the postwar world, so sort of the history since 1945.

It's not a comprehensive history since 1945. There is a great deal that is left out. It would be impossible in a single semester to do a total history of the modern world.

Rather than tell you what I've left out, you'll figure that out as we go along, let me tell you about what the class focuses on. What are our priorities for the semester?

The class is most interested in big international themes. In geopolitics, the clash of great power rivalries, in the march of {{WPExtract|decolonization}}, the transformation of relations between the world's most affluent minority, the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}, and its impoverished majority, the {{WPExtract|Global South}}.

And in what we might call {{WPExtract|World economy|global economics}} or {{WPExtract|geoeconomics}}.

The march of globalization and its implications for international relations will be a sort of central concern.

So if there are two sort of narrative strands that run most boldly through the lecture series ahead they are I would suggest sort of geopolitics or sort of great power conflicts and global political economy.

Sort of the thinking about the changing organization of the world economy and the distribution of resources within it.

This course is fundamentally interested in the international panorama that it is with dealing with the world as a whole.

Of course comprehending complex events in world history requires us to pay careful attention to the interior histories of nation-states.

But we won't be focusing on just one or two nation-states, rather we'll be shifting our focus as the global panorama requires us to do.

Besides emphasizing sort of big international themes in the world's politics and economics we'll be attentive to what we might call structural developments in the history of international society.

{{WPExtract|Demography}}, for example, this is not a class about demography, but it's impossible to deal with the postwar world without thinking really carefully about the ways in which demographic change produces other kinds of transformation and development and that's something that we'll be doing.

We're also going to pay attention to the ways in which technological innovation afflicts larger international economic and political events.

We'll pay attention to cultural developments too. Particularly insofar as they have political and economic consequences for the affairs of the world.

So this is a course that is really focused on the sort of the big international themes but it's my conviction that being attentive to big international themes requires us to pay careful attention to a whole variety of historical topics and problems.

Besides being a course in the history of the world since 1945 this is of course a course in contemporary history.

As I've been explaining through the first part of today's session one of my overriding purposes in teaching this class is to help all of you to situate your own present circumstances in some larger historical context.

I believe that studying the history of recent world affairs will help you to do that. Where necessary we will delve deeper into the past than 1945. 1945 is a sort of crude point of departure and where the comprehension of the present requires us to go back beyond 1945 we will do so.

=== Organizing Narratives ===

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So what are the sort of major organizing narratives that we're going to be dealing with? I've just presented for you a series of organizing narratives that could be used to comprehend a couple of episodes in the present. So it would be appropriate to tell you a little bit more about the organizing narratives that we're going to be dealing with in the course of the semester ahead.

==== The Cold War ====

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One of the most obvious ones is the {{WPExtract|Cold War}}. The Cold War is the central geopolitical conflict of the postwar world (at least of the postwar world until the 1990s).

So we'll be paying careful attention to the history of the Cold War in this lecture class.

==== Decolonization ====

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No less important, and I might suggest even more important, than the history of the Cold War is the history of {{WPExtract|decolonization}}.

Remind yourselves that in 1945 many human beings in many parts of the world still inhabit colonial empires. That is to say they're the subjects of distant European colonial powers.

By the mid 1970s nobody really lives in a colony anymore. There are a few cases in which you might argue colonialism survives but they're the exception and not the rule. Comprehending how decolonization comes about is one of the really really big you know sort of historical challenges for anybody who wants to understand the postwar world. And it's a theme to which I'll draw substantial attention in the semester ahead.

==== Economic Development ====

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We're also going to think a little bit about the history, or think quite a lot about the history of development -- economic development that is.

The world in 2012 is certainly more affluent than it was in 1950. Yet there have been changes in the distribution of affluence.

To put it most crudely the inequality within societies across the world has increased since 1945 while inequality between societies has decreased. Once poor countries like China have caught up considerably to the affluent West. Meanwhile within the West inequalities have widened.

So we're thinking about the history of economic development in terms that are sort of sensitive to the big global vectors. That's one major narrative strand that I want to emphasize.

==== Globalization ====

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And the last is globalization. Globalization is distinct from development insofar as it is the history of integration. Thinking about the history of development does not necessarily require us to be particularly attentive to the relationships among the world's economies. Thinking about the history of globalization does.

At the beginning of the postwar era in 1945 the world's major economic units, which are the world's major nation-states, are relatively self-contained, relatively autonomous, certainly by comparison with their relations today.

So understanding how the global economy becomes more integrated and reflecting upon the sort of political and international consequences of that integration, which is to say globalization, will be a central priority for this course.

=== Learning Objectives ===

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What are you going to learn through all of this?

Besides gaining an overview of recent world history, which I presume is the reason that most of you are here, I hope that you are going to learn to be adept consumers of history. I'm not going to teach you everything you need to know about the recent past and nor is anybody else.

If you can come away from this class with a sense of the landscape and with the skills necessary to drill down into particular historical details, and to particular historical narratives, as your needs in the future require you to do then I will have done my job.

This is a course that doesn't aspire to teach you everything about history. That would be impossible. Even if we had two semesters. Rather what I want to do is to give you a sense of the historical landscape and to equip you with the skills and the tools that will enable you as you require and see fit to probe more deeply into events in your own time and on your own terms.

=== Schedule and Syllabus ===

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How are we going to do this?

Well, at this point a walk through the syllabus might help.

Does anybody not have a copy of the syllabus by the way?

Okay, where are the remaining syllabi? Is there a pile of them somewhere?

Okay, maybe we could send one to the back and...

The syllabus is available on the bSpace website by the way so if you don't have a copy in front of you then you can easily acquire one.

The syllabus will just give you a basic overview of the sort of narrative progression of this lecture course.

* We're going to start off the substance on Thursday talking about the world crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. How did the Second World War and its resolution foreground the history of the postwar world?

* Next we'll talk about the Cold War in the second week or the origins of the Cold War.

* Week three we're going to talk about the creation of new nation-states in the {{WPExtract|Global South}} and the consolidation of welfare states in the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}.

* Week four we'll make comparisons between the political economy of the {{WPExtract|socialism|socialist}} world and the managed {{WPExtract|capitalism}} of the West in the 1950s and 1960s.

* We'll deal with decolonization as a sort of political rather than economic theme. In the fifth week of the course we'll look at the struggles that the European colonial powers waged to retain control of their empires and we'll think about the relationship between the Cold War as one big conflict and decolonization as another sort of historical macro narrative.

* In the sixth week we'll sort of think about why the Cold War was so stable as it was. We'll look at the efforts that political leaders made to stabilize the Cold War, and we will inquire as to who pushed against the sort of stability of the Cold War system as it came to be in the 1960s and 1970s and with what consequences.

* The seventh week looks at what I characterize as sort of a crisis of the Cold War international order in the 1970s.

* Week eight takes us through the oil crisis, a really important turning point in the relations between the Global North and Global South and the resurgence of the Cold War towards the end of the 70s.

* Week nine focuses on what I would characterize as the resurgence of globalization from the 70s. We look at the rise of free market economics in the West particularly in the United States and Great Britain and then the global dissemination of free market solutions in the 1980s and thereafter.

* Week ten will focus on the end of the Cold War.

* Week eleven on sort of the international relations of the 1990s.

* Week twelve we'll explore some of the tensions within the globalizing world of what we might by this point define loosely as the present -- including one lecture which will focus more carefully on the experiences of China -- arguably the world's rising {{WPExtract|superpower}}.

* Finally we'll conclude by thinking about the world since the {{WPExtract|Financial crisis of 2007–2008|2008 financial crisis}}. This is really recent history. But what I want to do in the last couple of lectures is to try to locate the economic malaise of the West since 2008 in a larger history of economic change since the Second World War. And to pose the question of whether the West may ultimately be in the throes of historical decline vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

So that's a very succinct overview I don't want to belabor this because I'll be belaboring it over the next thirteen weeks.

=== Student Assignments and Exams ===

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<nowiki>[58:45]</nowiki>

So that's what I'm going to do. What are you going to do?

What I have here is a table that identifies the basic assignments that we're going to use to grade you for want of a gentler verb.

This is a, you know, upper division lecture class. The nature of the assignments and the weighting assignments is fairly typical one for a class of this nature.

We do have sections they'll be a little bit more on sections to come. Section participation is worth 10% of your overall grade.

==== Response Papers ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:29]]
<nowiki>[59:29]</nowiki>

We also have response papers. There are going to be three response papers due during the course of the semester. Rather than have weekly responses, which can be rather {{WPExtract|pro forma}}, I'd prefer to have slightly more substantive response papers and to require fewer of them.

So you're going to do three response papers and the best two grades will count.

I think that that's written out in the syllabus.

If you're happy with the grades for your first two response papers you don't have to submit a third.

So you could end up submitting two response papers if you do well enough on the first two.

The topic of the response papers will be sort of determined by your graduate student instructors.

They'll talk more about the particular assignments in your first section meetings.

==== Final Paper ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:20]]
<nowiki>[60:20]</nowiki>

There's also going to be a final paper. This is worth a quarter of the overall grade. It's a fairly succinct final paper. Just six or seven pages.

I'll talk much more about the final paper as we get closer to it. But I'll simply say at this point that insofar as one of my objectives for this course is to help you develop a sort of historical perspective or a historian's perspective on present day events you will have the option in the final paper of writing a historically informed policy brief<ref> [https://writingcenter.unc.edu/policy-briefs/ Policy Briefs]. ''The Writing Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill''. Retrieved:2018-08-16</ref>
<ref>[http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2195e/i2195e03.pdf What are Policy Briefs?]. ''Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)''. Retrieved:2018-08-16</ref> on some issue of present day importance.

We'll talk more as we get closer to the final paper as about what exactly that might look like.

==== Exams ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:05]]
<nowiki>[61:05]</nowiki>

The examinations -- the best part of the course -- what are they going to look like?

There's a midterm exam. It's only worth 10% of the grade on Thursday, March 1st.

In an unusual display of generosity I decided to give you the Tuesday before the midterm off so that you can prepare for it.

The midterm will be a take-home midterm which I hope makes it a little bit easier for you to deal with.

Finally the final exam which is worth 30% of the grade will take place on Wednesday, May 9th.

It will cover the entirety of the course readings and course materials.

Are there any questions about the assignments or does this look sensible enough to all of you?

(Student Question)

It's not.

I would like for it to be but there are regulations at the level of the College of Letters and Sciences that restrict whether final exams can be take-home or not.

If those restrictions, if those regulations change, during the semester ahead then I will make it take-home.

So if any of you have any political influence then you could use it to accomplish that end.

==== Course Readings ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:25]]
<nowiki>[62:25]</nowiki>

Alright, what about the course readings? What are you going to be reading during the course of this semester that lies ahead of us?

This is a reading list that has been assembled with a great deal of sensitivity to the feedback that I have gotten from students in semesters past on the evaluation forms that are passed out at the end of the semester.

One of the concerns I always get on those evaluation forms is that there's too much reading in my lecture classes.

I think that this is probably true of history classes in general though there may be anomalous historians who were gentler in the readings they assign.

But this semester's I have really really tried hard to circumscribe the reading list. I think the last time I taught this course there were eight or nine books assigned. Seriously. I can circulate the syllabus if you don't believe me.

This semester we just have four books that are assigned.

These are books that are intended to provide a sort of comprehensive historical overview. The first two books, {{WPExtract|David Reynolds (British historian)|David Reynolds}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=nZy72wNdOuIC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''One World Divisible''], {{WPExtract|Daniel Yergin}}'s [https://books.google.com/books?id=uNYzPUhXhJYC&source=gbs_navlinks_s''The Commanding Heights''], together offer, you know pretty comprehensive perspective on postwar international and in Yergin's case sort of economic history.

The other two books, {{WPExtract|Menzie Chinn}} and [https://scholar.harvard.edu/jfrieden/home Jeff Frieden]'s [https://books.google.com/books?id=o-HlY_DLDM0C&dq=Lost+Decade&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''Lost Decades''], and [https://www.smu.edu/News/Experts/Jeffrey-Engel Jeff Engel]'s edited volume on [https://books.google.com/books?id=4nKz4YvPULcC&dq=Jeff+Engel+Wikipedia+Fall+of+the+Berlin+Wall&source=gbs_navlinks_s the fall of the Berlin Wall]. Fairly short books that are germane only to particular weeks of the syllabus.

Besides being shorter than in weeks past I hope that this semester's reading list is also a little bit cheaper than has been the case ... I always try to be sensitive to the costs of readings, but by assigning fewer books I hope that I've also been able to reduce the overall expenditure for all of you.

The total price of these books, I looked it up on Amazon, and I was really considerate, ranges from about $45 to about $70, depending on whether you buy the books used or new.

That's probably cheaper than the textbook layout for most of your classes is. At least I hope that I'm doing better than the chemistry and physics departments with their heavy textbooks.

If the cost is a concern my advice would be that the key texts to acquire are Reynolds and Yergin.

The others you'll find it easier to make due within the library. But I think you'll find it really useful to have the first two texts because those are utilized in multiple weeks readings.

There are other readings besides the four books that are recommended for purchase in the syllabus. These will all be available via bSpace. So you don't have to worry about buying copies of anything beyond the textbooks.

I very much hope that the readings are manageable. The reading load has been designed to be manageable. There may be two weeks in which you're expected to read an entire book. No more than that. And some weeks it's just a couple of chapters. If you have problems with the readings come talk to me, go talk to your GSI, and we can probably give you some counsel on how to read historical texts.

Look reading history is different from reading literature. The purpose in most of our readings is not to read every word of every sentence. Rather you need to sort of read for gist, you need to read so as to acquire some sense of what the really important events are, and of what the author's line of interpretation might happen to be.

But you're not reading this sort of to appreciate the prose. And if you find that you're struggling with the readings then I would humbly suggest that you might be reading in the wrong way for a course of this nature, and we can sort of talk about how you might do things a little differently.

Okay.

==== Sections and Section Attendance ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:39]]
<nowiki>[66:39]</nowiki>

The most important part of the class is not the, not the lectures, but the sections. That's where the real teaching and learning occurs.

I'm delighted that the history department was able to provide section meetings for this class. And I hope that you're as excited about them as I am.

We've two terrific GSIs who are going to be teaching the class. Maybe could I ask David and Brian to stand up.

(silence)

Okay, maybe I'll ask you each to introduce yourselves.

(inaudible)

Great. And Brian?

(silence)

Great. Thank you.

Let me simply reinforce the point. The sections serve a vital pedagogical purpose. They are where you learn what you need to know. The GSIs, not me, are really the ones who are going to be teaching you.

As an administrative point section participation really is mandatory. It's not optional. You can't download the lecture. You can't download the section on Itunes and listen to it. If you miss the section, you miss the section, and you've missed a great deal. As a way of enforcing section participation, which I hate to say, you're all adults you know what the deal is, but we need to have some you know kind of regulatory mechanism to enforce section participation if necessary and I believe that what is written in the syllabus is that if you miss three or more sections, or maybe more than three sections without a good explanation then you're in danger of failing the course.

So that's you know just important to remember. That we really do expect you to be present for section meetings. If you anticipate any problems with the section schedule please do get in contact with your GSI right away because you know we have ways in which we can resolve those kinds of dilemmas. But don't bring up the issue unless it's a real scheduling conflict. You know the fact that you know the eleven o'clock section coincides with Oprah is not ... Is Oprah still on? Or, no?

Okay, well, then in that case that won't be a problem for anybody.

That's why we're able to schedule sections at eleven now.

So if you're not enrolled in section ... You should all be enrolled in a section because I believe that ... What is the registrar's electronic system called? Is it Tele-BEARS? I believe that Tele-BEARS required you to sign up for a section when you signed up for the class. Is that correct?

Okay, so you should all be enrolled already in a section. If you're not then get in contact with us and we'll try to figure that out.

Okay, I think that's all that I wanted to cover in terms of the nuts and bolts of the course.

== Student Questions ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:13]]
<nowiki>[70:13]</nowiki>

So let me ask if you have any questions. What can I tell you about the semester ahead?

If any of you are sitting on the fence about whether to take the class or not if there's information that I can provide that would help you make your mind up one way or the other?

(inaudible)

Yeah.

I prefer essay questions. Historically I have not utilized ID sections I think I did in the first lecture class that I taught at this institution. But you can just expect three essays.

Are there any other questions?

== Office Hours ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:51]]
<nowiki>[70:51]</nowiki>

Okay, good. The last point that I wanted to make then is: I don't think that I included this in the slideshow but it is on the syllabus. I have office hours on Tuesdays and Thursdays which are also the days in which we meet for the lectures. The office hours run from eleven to noon. And please do come along and introduce yourselves even if you don't have particular questions then I'd be really glad to have the chance to meet all of you.

If you want to stop by and those office hours are not convenient for you because I understand that you have other classes then just send me an email and we can schedule some alternative time to meet.

But with that I think that I may have finished the section a little earlier for possibly the first time. So let's hope that's an omen for the rest of the semester.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

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UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s

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== Lecture Overview: Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, today we're going to be talking about globalization in the 1970s. We'll be covering some historical terrain which we've already traversed. But we'll be doing so with a view to a quite different set of historical themes. The big problem that I'm going to be concerned with today is the emergence of what I would characterize as a distinctive new era of globalization in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:24 ]]
<nowiki>[00:24]</nowiki>

You know insofar as I'm going to be dealing with technical topics please you know do feel free to raise your hands and ask if you have questions or would like any clarification. I'm going to try to make this as nontechnical as possible but if you know we end up dealing with technical terms that are perplexing then let me know and I will pause to [[wikt:elucidate|elucidate]] them.

== The Meaning of the Term Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:44 ]]
<nowiki>[00:44]</nowiki>

But I'd like to start with a term that is one of the most confounding terms that we're going to encounter today, and this of course is the term globalization itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:53 ]]
<nowiki>[00:53]</nowiki>

What is globalization? Is it just a phenomenon of the past you know two or three decades or does globalization have a longer history than that? Perhaps a much longer history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:05 ]]
<nowiki>[01:05]</nowiki>

This is a contentious issue. You know historians and political scientists and economists will disagree as to what globalization is and when it begins. It's not my purpose today to try to reconcile those competing definitions. That would be too difficult a task, but rather I should just try to lay out for you how I understand the term globalization. I think my sense of what globalization is probably in line with what most historians who've thought about globalization as a problem would understand that term to mean.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:37 ]]
<nowiki>[01:37]</nowiki>

And this is globalization as a long historical process of social and economic integration. Globalization is the long term sort of integration of societies, nation-states in the modern era, across space. It obviously has a technological aspect. Technology underpins the shrinkage of time and space that is a crucial aspect of globalization's advance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:05 ]]
<nowiki>[02:05]</nowiki>

Over time globalization which involves the long term sort of expansion in the scale of social processes from a very local scale to a you know regional even global scale can produce what we might characterize as a increasing interdependence of societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:23 ]]
<nowiki>[02:23]</nowiki>

Interdependence is a term that is distinct from globalization but interdependence can be a state of affairs that globalization produces. As you know the scale of social processes expands as societies become meshed in ever thickening relationships of trade, financial transactions, social and cultural exchange, and so on then these societies can become more interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:48 ]]
<nowiki>[02:48]</nowiki>

And that is to say that developments in one society can have a determining impact on developments elsewhere. Interdependence involves a sort of meshing in the fates of social units.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:01 ]]
<nowiki>[03:01]</nowiki>

Of course when we talk about the modern era nation-states are the principle social units that we're talking about when we discuss globalization at the international scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:11 ]]
<nowiki>[03:11]</nowiki>

It's important when we talk about the history of globalization, even if it is a history that goes back a long way, to acknowledge that the term itself is of relatively recent coinage. It's not until the 1980s, really into the 1990s, that globalization becomes a subject of common discussion in the English language.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[03:32]</nowiki>

What I've have for you here on the slide show is a {{WPExtract|Google Ngram Viewer|Google Ngram}}. Do most of you know what the Google Ngram is?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[03:40]</nowiki>

Okay, the Google Ngram is a really cool tool.<ref>One could also take a look at some [[wikipedia:N-gram#Examples|examples of ''n''-grams in the Wikipedia ''n''-gram article.]]</ref> What it does is it allows you to plot on a time series chart the sort of frequency with which particular words are used in the entire canon of published English language books. As you know Google has been scanning you know sort of the corpus of English language literature held by major university libraries over a period of about ten years now.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:07 ]]
<nowiki>[04:07]</nowiki>

Most of this text has been digitized. And this allows us to see how the usage of particular terms has evolved over time. And this you know is a really good sort of tool for analyzing the evolution of discourse. How does the sort of frequency with which particular used words -- words are used evolve over time?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:27 ]]
<nowiki>[04:27]</nowiki>

And if you look at globalization you can see that globalization is really not used at all in the English language until the 1990s. This is 1990 on the chart. And the frequency with which the word globalization is used increases very dramatically from the early 1990s. So globalization is a term of very recent coinage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:50 ]]
<nowiki>[04:50]</nowiki>

Interdependence, which is indicated in the blue line, goes back a lot longer in terms of the sort of frequency with which social scientists and historians and journalists you know really have used the term. Of course interdependence can mean a whole lot of things outside of the context of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:10 ]]
<nowiki>[05:10]</nowiki>

Interdependence when it appears in print can mean you know any number of things. It can be used in any number of contexts. The word globalization has a particular meaning that has to do with international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:22 ]]
<nowiki>[05:22]</nowiki>

So that's a you know quick footnote on the language. I don't know want to belabor that point but just remember that globalization is a relatively new term even if we use it to describe developments that go a long way back.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:34 ]]
<nowiki>[05:34]</nowiki>

In fact just to give you a second footnote on this point the first usage of the term globalization in the English language in print comes in the mid-1980s. It's used in an article in the ''Harvard Business Review''.<ref>The [https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets full text of "The Globalization of Markets" from May 1983] is available on the Harvard Business Review website.</ref>

== Globalization Over the Course of Time ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:48 ]]
<nowiki>[05:48]</nowiki>

But if we think about globalization not just as a phenomenon of recent years but rather as a very long term historical process we can date its origins much, much earlier. If globalization involves simply the expansion in the scale of social and economic processes from the local level to the world scale then globalization could be seen to have begun...as early as the earliest human civilizations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[06:18]</nowiki>

After all processes of sort of interregional trade are familiar to historians of the ancient world. You know one of the accomplishments that the Roman Empire achieves for example is to create a sort of integrated trading arena within the Mediterranean. Roman imperial power will make possible the linkage of North Africa to Europe via you know permanent trade routes. At least trade routes that endure as long as the empire does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:45 ]]
<nowiki>[06:45]</nowiki>

So globalization could be said to have a very old history. It has a history that dates back perhaps as far as the {{WPExtract|Silk Road}} -- at least so far as trade is concerned. If we expand our definition of globalization to include the movement of peoples as well as goods then we might think of the recurrent movements of people from the {{WPExtract|Eurasian Steppe}} into Western Europe and the Middle East as sort of demographic aspects of globalization's long history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:12 ]]
<nowiki>[07:12]</nowiki>

If we think about the diffusion of ideas and ideologies as part of globalization's history then there may be cause to consider the rise of Christianity from about two thousand years ago or the rise of Islam a little more recently than that as globalizing developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:24 ]]
<nowiki>[07:24]</nowiki>

As developments that produce a sort of convergence in belief systems across vast expanses of space. So globalization has a potentially very long history; it has a host of sort of ancient precursors depending of course on how we define it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:44]]
<nowiki>[07:44]</nowiki>

In the modern era globalization accelerates and expands in scope. 1492 is a really important year in the history of globalization. Because we talk about globalizing processes before 1492 we're really talking about developments within the Eurasian world. 1492 is a crucial date because with Columbus's discovery of the New World Eurasia and the America's effect, in effect, become sort of integrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:13]]
<nowiki>[08:13]</nowiki>

At least the moment of departure for a process of global reintegration occurs with the passage of the Columbine threshold. You can think for example about the reintegration of disease across the hemispheres as an example of that with the you know sort of transmission of smallpox to the Americas from Eurasia -- Americans -- which is to say -- indigenous Americans -- become sort of the subjects of an integrated global...environment for disease, and its transmission.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:50 ]]
<nowiki>[08:50]</nowiki>

So the Columbine threshold is important because it brings the Old World and the New together. It creates the possibility for the first time of an integrated global sort of arena on the world scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:04 ]]
<nowiki>[09:04]</nowiki>

Empire in the modern era is a crucial force that pushes forward the advance of globalization. Colonial empires build linkages between continents and between regions. The European trading companies: the {{WPExtract|East India Company|British East India Company}}, the {{WPExtract|Hudson's Bay Company|Hudson Bay Company}}, {{WPExtract|Dutch East India Company|the Dutch VOC, the Dutch East India Company}}, these are all you know sort of crucial builders of globalization. Empires build ships, they build railroads, they build the infrastructure that pulls the world together into a more convergent future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[09:36]</nowiki>

Of course industrial technology is a crucial underpinning of this imperial era of globalization. As the you know sort of sailing ship is replaced in the 19th century by the steamship the pace of integration can quicken, the pace of global transportation increases, accelerates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:55 ]]
<nowiki>[09:55]</nowiki>

From approximately the 1860s forwards processes of globalization will produce conditions of accelerating and increasing interdependence among nation-states. Especially amongst the nation-states of the North Atlantic world. Globalization in the last decades of the 19th century is most pronounced within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:17 ]]
<nowiki>[10:17]</nowiki>

North America is the principle destination in the late 19th century for British foreign investment overseas. North America is the primary destination for European migrants. Migrants from Europe go elsewhere. They go to Latin America, they go to Australia, they go to New Zealand, but North America is the primary destination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36 ]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

And within the North American world thickening ties of capital mobility, of international trade, and of...demographic movement, the movement of peoples produce something resembling a sort of convergence of economic fortunes. And we can chart this by looking at the convergence of factor prices within the North Atlantic world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:00 ]]
<nowiki>[11:00]</nowiki>

In 1860 you know wage differentials between North America and Western Europe are very great. North Americans typically earn much, much higher wages then do North, then do West Europeans in 1860.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:13 ]]
<nowiki>[11:13]</nowiki>

By 1900 those differentials have begun to close somewhat. And the reason that they close of course is that Europeans migrate in you know millions and millions annually from Western Europe to North America. And this has an effect of tightening labor markets in North America and loosening labor markets in Western Europe such that the wage differentials you know sort of tend to diminish over time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:40 ]]
<nowiki>[11:40]</nowiki>

Through this era of late 19th century globalization the classical gold standard provides a sort of basic infrastructure as we've discussed for maintaining price stability amongst national currencies. This you know framework is something which makes possible and facilitates the advent of sort of integrative globalizing economic processes. The monetary, the gold standard, for example, reassures investors that the sort of value of investments is not likely to change over time as a consequence of currency price fluctuations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:17 ]]
<nowiki>[12:17]</nowiki>

So the classical gold standard provides a certain sort of institutional stability within which late 19th century globalization can proceed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:27 ]]
<nowiki>[12:27]</nowiki>

In the 20th century however really interesting things happen. Globalization does not continue to accelerate. On the contrary globalization is reversed. The First World War is a big [[wikt:exogenous|exogenous]] shock.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:40 ]]
<nowiki>[12:40]</nowiki>

It -- doesn't have much to do with globalization in terms of its origins, the origins of the First World War have to do with the alliance system and Germany's bid for European mastery, but the First World War is nonetheless a sort of catastrophic moment of disrupture for the globalizing world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55 ]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

During the First World War the European belligerent powers throw up you know trade barriers, they throw up {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}}, they take their currencies off the gold standard. And they do all of these things in order to be able to manage their own economies so as to produce the maximal amount possible of war [[wikt:materiel|materiel]].

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:12 ]]
<nowiki>[13:12]</nowiki>

But the effect for the world economy is...a moment of deglobalization. The world economy ceases to integrate. Of course globalizing processes continue during the war and to some extent change direction. New opportunities for example for Latin American food producers arrive as a consequence of Europe's...catastrophic war, but the basic pattern is one of disruption in the second decade of the twentieth century as a consequence of the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:46 ]]
<nowiki>[13:46]</nowiki>

During the 1920s globalization is to some extent restored. This is something that you know we've discussed. There's a restoration of the classical gold standard. Trade begins to pick up from the mid-1920s onwards. But this will be a very fleeting resurgence. The Great Depression really puts an end to a class -- the era of classical globalization. And makes deglobalization permanent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:10 ]]
<nowiki>[14:10]</nowiki>

In the early 1930s countries throw up very substantial barriers to international trade. The {{WPExtract|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act|Smoot–Hawley Tariff}} in the United States is one example of that but it has parallels elsewhere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:21 ]]
<nowiki>[14:21]</nowiki>

International trade grinds to a halt. Governments take their countries off the gold standard and manipulate sort of national currencies with little regard to the international consequences thereof.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:33 ]]
<nowiki>[14:33]</nowiki>

Whether the gold -- world economy can ever be put back together again does not appear entirely obvious at the end of the 1930s. The world has substantially deglobalized. Nation-states have turned in upon themselves. They've become economically more autonomous than ever before.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:50 ]]
<nowiki>[14:50]</nowiki>

It's in this context, as we've discussed, that the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}} tries to orchestrate a qualified reglobalization of the world economy. It was certainly the objective of British and American policy planners at Bretton Woods to establish a framework in which international trade could resume.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:10 ]]
<nowiki>[15:10]</nowiki>

It's one of the reasons that the policy planners who create the Bretton Woods system are so anxious to restore a modicum of international currency stability. Because currency stability is widely believed to be a prerequisite for international trade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:23 ]]
<nowiki>[15:23]</nowiki>

But the Bretton Woods reestablishment of globalization is sharply qualified by a commitment to maintain the macroeconomic autonomy of nation-states. And this is where Keynes's influence on the postwar settlement is pronounced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:40 ]]
<nowiki>[15:40]</nowiki>

Keynes argues of course that in order for governments to manage their own economies so as to sustain full employment governments need to be able to work the levers of economic policy -- those levers being fiscal policy and monetary policy. An effective manipulation of fiscal and monetary policy depends upon a certain degree of separation between the national economy and the world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:01 ]]
<nowiki>[16:01]</nowiki>

If your domestic economy is entirely open to international movements of capital for example then it's very, very difficult to regulate a national monetary policy. Because the monetary policy determines the supply of money in the economy and if your borders are open to you know foreign funds washing in and out of your economy then you really can't control your monetary policy on your own terms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:25 ]]
<nowiki>[16:25]</nowiki>

You may have some influence over the sort of direction in which international funds flow whether they flow into or out of your economy but your sort of magnitude of control will be much less in an open market economy than it is in a closed market economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:41 ]]
<nowiki>[16:41]</nowiki>

And Bretton Woods tries to strike a compromise between sort of reglobalization on the one hand and national economic autonomy on the other. And this is really crucial. It's sort of the basis of the postwar economic settlement -- a settlement which tries to combine aspects of market economics with aspects of planned economics in the capitalist West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:04 ]]
<nowiki>[17:04]</nowiki>

This is the mixed economy. This is the economy which we've been talking about. We've talked about the mixed economy sort of within a comparative framework by looking at the experience of different West European economies and comparing them to the United States, but the Bretton Woods framework as I've explained is the international framework within which the mixed economy can flourish. And it's a framework that begins with a compromise between globalization and national policy autonomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:34 ]]
<nowiki>[17:34]</nowiki>

The 1970s are a decade of crucial disjuncture for this postwar compromise. It's in the 1970s that this compromise between the mixed -- this compromise between sort of capitalism and planning, the so-called mixed economy begins to come apart.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:51 ]]
<nowiki>[17:51]</nowiki>

And this process of, you know, deconstruction occurs both within nation-states as the mixed economy compromise breaks down, and at the international level as the Bretton Woods framework breaks down and is replaced by something you know sort of altogether new.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:10 ]]
<nowiki>[18:10]</nowiki>

This you know passage from an era of planned capitalist economics to an era of relatively sort of free market economics that occurs during the 1970s is a critical disjuncture for the capitalist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:25 ]]
<nowiki>[18:25]</nowiki>

And it you know can be traced both at the international scale and at the scale of particular national experience. But situated within a larger historical context this disjuncture looks like a really important moment in the larger history of globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:41 ]]
<nowiki>[18:41]</nowiki>

If the mid-20th century from the 1930s through to the 1960s was an era in which globalization was held at bay, held at bay by controls, held at bay by restrictions on the movement of capital and goods, then the 1970s are a period in which globalization accelerates once again. In which the world begins to reglobalize after a long mid-20th century phase in which globalization is held by you know the consensus of governments at bay.

== Globalization in the 1970s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:13 ]]
<nowiki>[19:13]</nowiki>

What are the basic dynamics of globalization in the 1970s? What was globalization in the 1970s? Well globalization in the 1970s is much the same as it had been in the late 19th century. It's a set of processes that tends over time to integrate societies and their economies. Globalization involves in the 1970s, as it had done in the late 19th century, a growing awareness of the basic interdependence of nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:42 ]]
<nowiki>[19:42]</nowiki>

The dynamics of this globalization include the rise of international trade and financial flows. These economic vectors are crucial to the production of a more sort of globalized international economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:57 ]]
<nowiki>[19:57]</nowiki>

But they're not the only signs that a new era of globalization might be taking shape. Economic vectors are very important to the production of economic interdependence. But there's much more to the globalizing shift of the 1970s than that. We might think about sort of the rise of global concerns. Human rights, an issue that we've talked about, is in some aspects a global issue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:21 ]]
<nowiki>[20:21]</nowiki>

Right, the proponents of international human rights proclaim that rights are not a subject for nation-states anymore, that rights are an issue for the international community, that your rights are the same whether you happen to live in Syria or in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:36 ]]
<nowiki>[20:36]</nowiki>

And this is a globalizing shift. It's a globalizing shift in sort of legal discourse. It's a globalizing shift in the scope of rights claims. For most of the modern era the idea of rights had been utterly entwined with the nation-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[20:52]</nowiki>

It was nation-states that bestowed rights and defended them. Well, the {{WPExtract|Universal Declaration of Human Rights|Universal Declaration in 1948}} signals a sort of move to the global scale but it's in the 1970s that a political, and even a social movement to affirm and uphold that shift in the scale of human rights from the nation-state to the world as a whole really occurs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:12 ]]
<nowiki>[21:12]</nowiki>

So human rights are a global concern that sort of hinge on the 1970s. But there are other global issues too. It's in the 1970s that global environmentalism really takes off as a political movement. Awareness of the basic unity of the planet's biosphere is one factor as we'll discuss that helps to inform a new age of environmental activism and consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:35 ]]
<nowiki>[21:35]</nowiki>

There is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> a glowing awareness that the world, in the, there is in sum<ref>Speaker might possibly have meant "some" instead of "sum".</ref> in the 1970s a growing awareness, that the world constitutes an integrated whole, that the world is not just a patchwork of nation-states. each of which is basically independent and autonomous, that the world constitutes something like an integrated and cohesive system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:57]]
<nowiki>[21:57]</nowiki>

Now this awareness is more pronounced in some spheres of human activity than in others. It's easier to make a you know case for the cohesiveness of the planet's ecology perhaps than it is to make a case for the integration of the world economy, which is you know less tangible. But this basic awareness that the world is integrating, that its fate is you know somehow entwined, is a sort of critical marker of globalization's ascent during the 1970s. Consciousness is very important to the history of globalization.

== The Earthrise Moment ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:32 ]]
<nowiki>[22:32]</nowiki>

Here no single moment is more you know evocative perhaps than you know what I would call the {{WPExtract|Earthrise|Earthrise Moment}}, the moment in December 1968 when Apollo 8 circumnavigates the moon, and takes a picture of the earth from space. And this is the picture that forms the backdrop to this slide.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52 ]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

[[File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24 1022x1024.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Photograph of Planet Earth taken on December 24, 1968 by NASA astronaut William Anders during the Apollo 8 mission (downloaded from [[commons:Main_Page|Wikimedia Commons]]).]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:54 ]]
<nowiki>[22:54]</nowiki>

The ''Earthrise'' image as this becomes known, the photograph is called ''Earthrise'', is not the first image of the world to be taken from space. You know satellites in the 1960s take photographs and return them to earth. But what you get from going to the moon is not only soil samples you also get a unique vantage point on life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:13 ]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

And this is what ''Earthrise'' presents -- a view of the earth as seen from another celestial body -- from the moon.

{{#ev:youtube|https://youtu.be/dE-vOscpiNc||center|Video from NASA reenacting the taking of the ''Earthrise'' photograph (1m 38s excerpt)||start=213&end=321}}

<br />
<br />

And this image becomes very quickly one of the twentieth centuries most iconic images. Lyndon Johnson who's President of the United States at the time of the Apollo 8 expedition sends a copy to every head of state in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:34 ]]
<nowiki>[23:34]</nowiki>

The image adorns a postage stamp in 1969 -- the next year. And the image has profound political implications. What does the image signify? What does it reveal? What does it not reveal?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:48 ]]
<nowiki>[23:48]</nowiki>

The image does not reveal political borders. When you look at the earth from space you don't see nation-states. You don't even see...you know, well, I guess you do see continents, but you don't see...(laughs) (laughter from the class), you don't, but you don't see, a, you don't see the difference between Europe and Asia. You can't really see that when you look at the world from space.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:10 ]]
<nowiki>[24:10]</nowiki>

You see only...you know land and sea and clouds. You see...an integrated ecological unit. You don't see a world divided into sort of politics of nation-states. You don't see an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. You don't see a Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:30 ]]
<nowiki>[24:30]</nowiki>

All you see is an integrated biosphere floating in vast empty space. Of course I know space isn't really empty but this isn't a physics class...so...(laughter from the class).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:40 ]]
<nowiki>[24:40]</nowiki>

And this political, you know, these political implications, are you know very powerful ones, and they help to animate in the 1970s a sense that the world is becoming a singular entity, perhaps that it is a singular entity and needs to be governed and led as such.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:00 ]]
<nowiki>[25:00]</nowiki>

This image -- ''Earthrise'' -- becomes the sort of visual counterpart to a set of discursive claims that you know futurists and visionaries make for the unity of Planet Earth. And this is a theme which you know predates the taking of the photograph itself.

== Futurists and Visionaries on the Unity of Planet Earth ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:17 ]]
<nowiki>[25:17]</nowiki>

During, in 1964, {{WPExtract|Marshall McLuhan}}, sort of media studies scholar, an iconic scholar in the intellectual history of the postwar world, calls the world a {{WPExtract|Global village|global village}}. It's a you know notion that is intended to capture a basic you know sort of interdependence in the affairs of the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:37 ]]
<nowiki>[25:37]</nowiki>

McLuhan argues that the world is you know shrinking as a consequence of you know globalizing processes, the shrinkage of time and space as a consequence of technological innovation, and as a consequence the entire world is coming to resemble a village -- a village in which social life is integrated and interdependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:54 ]]
<nowiki>[25:54]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Buckminster Fuller}}, an architect and futurist, describes the planet as {{WPExtract|Spaceship Earth}} in 1967. This has a somewhat different set of implications. What Fuller is trying to communicate when he describes the world as Spaceship Earth is the idea that the world...exists kind of alone in space as a finite unit, as a unit with finite resources. Fuller argues that you know political leaders need to be much more aware than they are of the basic limits to the expansion of you know sort of material life on earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:29 ]]
<nowiki>[26:29]</nowiki>

He says that the world is like a spaceship that is traveling through space and contains only limited supplies. How are those supplies to be conserved and marshaled over time? This is one of the you know sort of conservationist implications that McLuhan pulls -- sorry -- that Buckminster Fuller takes out of the idea that the Earth is a sort of solitary spaceship traveling through the universe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:51 ]]
<nowiki>[26:51]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Lester R. Brown|Lester Brown}}, a Canadian ecologist and diplomat, publishes a book in 1972 titled ''World Without Borders''. Brown is probably more of a pragmatist than either McLuhan or Fuller were but he is no less attentive to a sort of new category of public policy issues that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:11 ]]
<nowiki>[27:11]</nowiki>

Issues that transcend and transgress the borders of nation-states. Issues like you know sort of the global food supply, global population growth, global pollution and so on. I mean these are issues which are becoming increasingly urgent topics of concern in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:27]]
<nowiki>[27:27]</nowiki>

And this photograph really captures how...an evolving consciousness of planetary interdependence might have sort of you know led contemporaries in the 1970s to conclude that global integration demanded new kinds of solutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:49 ]]
<nowiki>[27:49]</nowiki>

So globalization in the 1970s is an intellectual and a perceptual phenomenon as well as an economic one. It's a very complex phenomenon that involves you know sort of processes of integration and accelerating interdependence.

== Questions On Globalization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03 ]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Why did this globalization occur? Was it a consequence of specific choices? Could we see political leaders perhaps as having chosen globalization? Did business leaders push them in this direction?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:19 ]]
<nowiki>[28:19]</nowiki>

Or was globalization something that occurred more as a process of structural change beyond the capacity of sovereign power to orchestrate or promote? This is a very basic question and it's a question which remains very divisive amongst social scientists who study globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:36 ]]
<nowiki>[28:36]</nowiki>

To put it very crudely I would suggest that sort of liberals, people who, accept that the world as it is, you know, presently constituted is more or less the sort of optimal state in which it can be constituted see globalization as a natural or inevitable process, a process that is brought about by structural changes outside of the control of, you know, individual nations or you know sovereign powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:05 ]]
<nowiki>[29:05]</nowiki>

Political radicals on the other hand are probably more inclined to see globalization as the achievement of specific policy choices. You know insofar as the...radical left is critical of globalization the proposition that globalization represents the accomplishment of specific policy choices is an appealing one because it carries with it the implication that different choices could produce a different ordering of global political and economic affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:32 ]]
<nowiki>[29:32]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of political aspect to this question of whether globalization is a choice or not. I don't want to get too caught up in the politics of it today but I wanted just to sort of draw your attention to that point as we consider this very fundamental question. You know to what extent is globalization chosen or to what extent is it produced by structural forces outside of the power of nations and political and economic leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:57 ]]
<nowiki>[29:57]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with {{WPExtract|Neoliberalism|neoliberalism}}? Well, here's a loaded question. What is neoliberalism? Well, we could think of neoliberalism as a set of economic policies that emphasize market determination over determination by government -- as a sort of -- as the optimal means to produce economic outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:18 ]]
<nowiki>[30:18]</nowiki>

Is globalization synonymous with neoliberalism? We'll come back to this question but it's a question that you should bear in mind as we proceed forwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:27 ]]
<nowiki>[30:27]</nowiki>

Finally, what was the scope of globalization in the 1970s? Where did globalization occur? This is a point that is worth thinking about carefully. Insofar as we defined globalization as a process that involves rising interdependence, the acceleration and expansion of transnational movements of goods and ideas and money, it doesn't necessarily follow that globalization affects the entire planet at an even rate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:58 ]]
<nowiki>[30:58]</nowiki>

We should be open to the possibility that globalization was more pronounced among certain countries or within certain regions than it was among others. And my argument about the 1970s would be that globalization in the 1970s was really a phenomenon that occurred among the advanced industrial economies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:18]]
<nowiki>[31:18]</nowiki>

That it is to say within the {{WPExtract|OECD}} world. The OECD is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It encompasses Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:30 ]]
<nowiki>[31:30]</nowiki>

So when we talk about the OECD world we're really talking about sort of the advanced industrial West -- if you want to call it that. And globalization in the '70s was most pronounced among these countries. Later on from the 1980s and subsequently...the rest of the world will come to participate in globalization, but in this initial sort of break through phase it's most pronounced within the OECD universe.

== Questions Overview: Global Dilemmas, Economic Interdependence, Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58 ]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

Okay, well, we're going to try to do today then is...go through the history of this globalizing shift. And I'm going to basically...take you through three aspects of this you know sort of big development that we call globalization. I don't think this this can be a comprehensive history but hopefully I can give you a sense of some of the different aspects to globalization as it proceeds during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:26 ]]
<nowiki>[32:26]</nowiki>

We have about 15 minutes for each theme so we'll try to keep this succinct. First, I want to talk about the emerging awareness in the 1970s of global issues -- that is to say policy dilemmas that affect the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:40 ]]
<nowiki>[32:40]</nowiki>

This is a development that we might call the Shock of the Global. It's a title of a book that I had some involvement with: [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674061866 ''The Shock of the Global''] -- developments that pertain to the world as a whole -- global phenomena, global problems, global issues. How do they strike or shock the policy arena? The world of nation-states in the 1970s? That's our first question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:01 ]]
<nowiki>[33:01]</nowiki>

Second question has to do with the emergence and development of economic interdependence among the advanced capitalist countries, among the countries of the OECD world, how did it happen? What were its you know most important phenomena or symptoms?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:17 ]]
<nowiki>[33:17]</nowiki>

Finally, we're going to talk about the transformation of capitalism in the 1970s. Or the transformation of capitalist economies from the mixed economy synthesis that still is very successful, or appears very successful, at the beginning of the 1970s to the more market oriented policy formulae that nation-states are beginning to embrace at the end of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:40 ]]
<nowiki>[33:40]</nowiki>

How do we get from the sort of Keynesian world of the 1970s to the world in the 1980s in which sort of so-called neoliberal solutions, more market oriented solutions, are displacing the old Keynesian mixed economy consensus?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:56 ]]
<nowiki>[33:56]</nowiki>

That's our third theme -- the transformation of capitalism. As we work through this I want you to you know reflect upon a number of big questions. How was the world changing? You know what are the big contours of global change during the 1970s? What are the consequences of global integration, of globalization even, for international relations? What does this mean for the basic configuration of international order? What does it mean for the configuration of the international economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:23 ]]
<nowiki>[34:23]</nowiki>

And what are the consequences for individual nation-states? How different does globalization look if we view if from the perspective of a particular nation as opposed from looking at it at the world scale?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:35 ]]
<nowiki>[34:35]</nowiki>

There are other urgent questions too. How did globalization spread beyond the OECD economies to encompass the developing world? A theme of the 1980s and 1990s. What have been globalization's consequences?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:49 ]]
<nowiki>[34:49]</nowiki>

Has globalization made the world happier and more affluent or has it produced unequal, you know, sort of distributions of wealth and you know economic responsibilities? These are questions which will have to wait for our next lecture on globalization on I think April 22nd. It's going to be the lecture titled Contesting Globalization. Today we're going to focus on the sort of early phase of globalization's acceleration during the 1970s.

== Global Dilemmas ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:18 ]]
<nowiki>[35:18]</nowiki>

Okay, global dilemmas. What are global problems? What was the Shock of the Global in the 1970s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

You know global problems, global dilemmas, could be construed very simply as the set of problems that escape the managerial regulatory capacities of individual nation-states. They are problems that affect the world as a whole. They might also be construed as problems that attract the attention of the world as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:47 ]]
<nowiki>[35:47]</nowiki>

You know this is more contestable but there's an argument to be made that issues that unfold within a local or national context but which attract you know sort of global attention and perhaps demand a global response, a famine in sub-Saharan Africa for example, are global issues of a different kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:06 ]]
<nowiki>[36:06]</nowiki>

But what kinds of issue are we talking about when we talk about issues that affect the world as a whole?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:12 ]]
<nowiki>[36:12]</nowiki>

Are there issues that, you know, besides climate change or you know sort of global ecological catastrophe that would seem to you to be global issues of a sort that affect you know multiple nations or perhaps the entire world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:26 ]]
<nowiki>[36:26]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:27 ]]
<nowiki>[36:27]</nowiki>

Yeah, nuclear weapons is a really good one. The possibility of nuclear war is obviously a very global problem.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:36 ]]
<nowiki>[36:36]</nowiki>

Disease is also terrific, you know global public health, because disease respects no barriers of sovereignty, no distinctions between one nation-state and another. Disease that was you know prominent amongst the concerns with which you know sort of policymakers had to grapple, have had to grapple, as the world has become more integrated.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:57 ]]
<nowiki>[36:57]</nowiki>

Energy is also a terrific global issue insofar as the world's energy resources are distributed unequally across space, as is the world's demand for energy, the...process of bringing sort of energy resources to market is an implicitly global dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:18 ]]
<nowiki>[37:18]</nowiki>

We might about other issues that don't necessarily affect the ecological fortune of the planet, but which lie beyond the capacities of sovereign nation-states as being global issues of sorts. You know the illegal drug trade is one good example of an issue that really lies outside of the competence of any nation-state to regulate and manage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:36 ]]
<nowiki>[37:36]</nowiki>

Terrorism is an issue that, you know, sort of lies outside of the capacity of singular nation-states. It requires cooperation amongst nations if it to be effectively engaged and redressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:48 ]]
<nowiki>[37:48]</nowiki>

Why did these kinds of issues attract rising attention in the the 1970s? There are a variety of possible explanations. It could be because they were becoming more urgent. Perhaps the global environment attracted more attention in the 1970s because the rate of its degradation was accelerating.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:04]]
<nowiki>[38:04]</nowiki>

But it's also possible that global issues attracted rising attention in 1970s because of the emerging global consciousness that the ''Earthrise'' photograph signified -- that people like Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan were working hard to cultivate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:21 ]]
<nowiki>[38:21]</nowiki>

So global consciousness can sort of feed engagement with global issues. It's also possible that the diminution of Cold War tensions during the 1970s played a role in creating space in the policy arena for global issues to stake their claim.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:38 ]]
<nowiki>[38:38]</nowiki>

As the urgency of Cold War containment, for example, lessened in the United States, there was more and more time available for policymakers both in the Executive Branch and in the Legislature to pay attention to so-called sort of global issues.

=== The Rise of Global Environmentalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:54 ]]
<nowiki>[38:54]</nowiki>

So the reasons for this are complicated. Let's talk about some specific issues. I'm going to talk first of all about the rise of global environmentalism. We could at the outset draw a distinction between two different kinds of ecological globalization. We might think about the ways in which sort of local environmental catastrophes attract global or transnational opinion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:20 ]]
<nowiki>[39:20]</nowiki>

And indeed oil spills in the 1970s, in particular places, in places like California, in Cornwall off the west coast of England attract global attention. They become sort of, at least for a brief moment, global issues on which international attention fixates. This is significant.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:39 ]]
<nowiki>[39:39]</nowiki>

The fact that you know international audiences are paying more attention during the 1970s to you know for example the deforestation of the Amazon is illustrative of a sort of developing global ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52 ]]
<nowiki>[39:52]</nowiki>

The deforestation of the Amazon may have you know sort of consequences for the global environment as a whole. But it's really a sort of local issue at least in its locus. It affects you know northeastern Brazil primarily. That it is becoming, you know, sort of an increasingly global issue during the 1970s reflects one sort of globalization, a rising sort of international attentiveness, to particular environmental issues or catastrophes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:23 ]]
<nowiki>[40:23]</nowiki>

But there's a second kind of ecological globalization going on during the 1970s and this will involve the rise of concern, or growing concern, with issues affecting the international...ecology as a whole. For example the rise of concern with chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs, in the world's atmosphere is a very global dilemma. CFCs affect not individual nation-states but the entire planet earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:53 ]]
<nowiki>[40:53]</nowiki>

Population growth will be another sort of ecological issue that in the eyes of contemporaries during the 1970s affects the world as a whole and demands global policy responses.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:07 ]]
<nowiki>[41:07]</nowiki>

Why was ecological consciousness rising in the 1970s? Why did it rise in the West? Why did in the rise in the United States in particular?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:18 ]]
<nowiki>[41:18]</nowiki>

To some extent the growth of sort of ecological consciousness during the 1970s is a legacy of the 1960s -- of the political and social mobilizations associated with that decade. It might be a legacy even of the counterculture that developed during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:33 ]]
<nowiki>[41:33]</nowiki>

Probably no single published book is more influential upon the rise of an organized environment movement in the United States at least than {{WPExtract|Rachel Carson|Rachel Carson's}} {{WPExtract|Silent Spring|Silent Spring}} -- a book that documented the adverse effects of pollution upon the American ecosystem.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:50 ]]
<nowiki>[41:50]</nowiki>

Whether as a consequence of sort of activism or simply awareness the 1970s bring a rise in sort of organized political mobilizations on behalf of the global environment. New organizations are created. {{WPExtract|Greenpeace}} for example is founded in 1971 with its mission being to protect the Earth's ecology against the encroachment of human activity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:19]]
<nowiki>[42:19]</nowiki>

Environmentalism becomes a popular political cause during the 1970s. The first {{WPExtract|Earth Day}} is held in 1970, and it attracts massive participation. Some 20 million Americans participate in the first Earth Day, so this is one marker of sort of rising ecological consciousness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:38]]
<nowiki>[42:38]</nowiki>

In 1972 the United Nations holds its first international conference on environmental problems which is a marker of how sort of environmentalism is becoming a prominent issue on the global stage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:52 ]]
<nowiki>[42:52]</nowiki>

Where does this awareness come from? Is it just driven by politics? Is it just driven by sort of consciousness? Perhaps. Technology I would suggest also plays an important role in shaping public and political awareness of environmental issues. Space photography as we've already discussed affords a new perspective on Planet Earth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:12 ]]
<nowiki>[43:12]</nowiki>

Computers allow scientists to model climate change. So this is an important development. Before computers become cheap enough to be situated in university laboratories it's really difficult for climatologists to develop plausible models of global climate change.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:28 ]]
<nowiki>[43:28]</nowiki>

Once that technology is more readily available then the range of you know sort of opportunities for climate scientists expands.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37 ]]
<nowiki>[43:37]</nowiki>

Satellite imagery also affords sort of kind of a useful research tool. It allows scientists to map deforestation over time because you can take photographs of say the Brazilian rainforest and see how the scope of the forest is retreating in the face of tract farming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:55 ]]
<nowiki>[43:55]</nowiki>

So there are a number of you know sort of developments that go into the production of a ecological environmental moment in the 1970s -- a moment in which rising attention is being paid to the earth's environment and to humankind's fraught relationship with it.

==== Limits to Growth Debate ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:12 ]]
<nowiki>[44:12]</nowiki>

One of the most prominent sort of themes in this global environmental moment of the 1970s will be the limits to growth debate that hinges on the early decades of the 1970s. The limits to growth debate is particularly concerned with population growth though it also emcompasses other forms of economic growth too -- the expansion of industrial production and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:39 ]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

As we think about the sort of discourse on growth and it limits in the 1970s it's important to begin by reminding ourself that population growth and economic growth are from the global perspective overriding themes of the postwar experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:54 ]]
<nowiki>[44:54]</nowiki>

The world's population grows very, very quickly from what, under 3 billion in 1950 to...close to over 4 billion by 1970. Economic growth you know sort of proceeds more or less in tandem with population growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:15 ]]
<nowiki>[45:15]</nowiki>

The world's GDP increases too. And all of this growth creates sort of widespread concern as to...how sustainable growth is. Can the world's population continue to grow at these impressive rates or will growth at some point hit inexorable and inevitable limits, and what then will be the consequences? Will the world's food supply, for example, sustain its rising population or will a growing population at some point face an inevitable famine produced by you know a population increase that expands beyond the capacity of the world to feed it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:53 ]]
<nowiki>[45:53]</nowiki>

These are the issues that the {{WPExtract|Club of Rome}} grapples with in its 1972 report {{WPExtract|The Limits to Growth|''The Limit to Growth''}}<ref>Note that the title is actually ''The Limits to Growth''.</ref>. The Club of Rome is an informal assemblage of demographers and environmentalists, scientists, that convenes in the early 1970s and produces a report that attracts widespread international attention.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:13 ]]
<nowiki>[46:13]</nowiki>

''The Limits to Growth'' argues that the world's population and economic growth rates are unsustainable and it predicts catastrophe if these basic rates of growth are not slowed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:23 ]]
<nowiki>[46:23]</nowiki>

It argues that policymakers need to strive to achieve a so-called stable equilibrium, a situation in which the world's population will not grow, in which there will be zero growth. To achieve this the Club of Rome proposes global management of the world's demographic growth. It's a basic assumption of the Club of Rome that international growth cannot be managed at the national level.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:48 ]]
<nowiki>[46:48]</nowiki>

That global dilemmas demand global solutions. So there's a political implication to this. And it is that nation-states are unable of responding adequately to new global dilemmas.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:00 ]]
<nowiki>[47:00]</nowiki>

Is population growth a security threat? What are its implications for matters of war and peace? This is a question that the United States government actually grapples with. In 1974 the national security council of the United States produces a very lengthy report on population growth as a national security dilemma.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:17]]
<nowiki>[47:17]</nowiki>

And the US government concludes that population growth will lead to rising food shortages in the developing world, that these will produce political instability, and that the consequences will be upheaval, that you know could be disadvantageous to the national interests of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:34 ]]
<nowiki>[47:34]</nowiki>

So much as national security specialists in recent years have begin to engage with global climate change as a national security threat so too did national security specialists in the 1970s address population growth as a sort of national security challenge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:51 ]]
<nowiki>[47:51]</nowiki>

If this is the threat what is to be done about it? How can the world's population be controlled or managed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:59 ]]
<nowiki>[47:59]</nowiki>

The developing countries, you know, emphasize contraception and family planning as the means to control a accelerating or expanding global population. They promote these policies with particular regard to the developing world. Here of course reactions will be somewhat mixed. China is an interesting case because China decides of its own volition to support you know policies to control and limit the growth of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:29 ]]
<nowiki>[48:29]</nowiki>

In 1978 China implements a {{WPExtract|One-child policy|one-child policy}}. This is a policy that repudiates Mao Zedong's conviction that there could never be too many Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong saw population growth as a source of national strength. But in 1978 the post-Maoist regime rebukes, you know, this view very powerfully.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:51]]
<nowiki>[48:51]</nowiki>

It introduces a one-child policy, a policy that is often brutal in its implementation and in its consequences, but which does succeed in ending China's long history of recurrent food catastrophe. Famines were until 1978 a recurrent aspect of China's historical experience. After 1978, or since 1978, China has not experienced a famine. And China has been better able to feed itself since making a sort of self-conscious decision to limit the expansion of its population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:23 ]]
<nowiki>[49:23]</nowiki>

But other developing countries are much less enthusiastic than China is to limit their growth in the name of global stability. Developing countries ask, quite reasonably, why should we impose limits on our growth, when the West has grown over a period of centuries within any limits to its growth? The population of Britain expands for example from about 5 to 6 million at the beginning of the 19th century to 30 million by the end of the 19th century. That's a six fold increase over a period of a hundred years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:57]]
<nowiki>[49:57]</nowiki>

Why should developing countries not have the opportunity to expand like Britain has done? To industrialize like Britain has done? From their perspective, which are national perspectives, the imperatives of national growth take precedence over the regulation of the world's population as a whole.

===== The Green Revolution =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:16 ]]
<nowiki>[50:16]</nowiki>

Of course the catastrophe that is predicted by the Club of Rome does not come to pass -- at least not yet. It doesn't come to pass in the 1970s. The limits to growth are avoided, or at least the limits are moved.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:29]]
<nowiki>[50:29]</nowiki>

To explain this we need to think about how global agricultural production develops during the 1970s. One of the critical innovations of this decade is a set of associated transformations in agricultural practices in the developing world that are collectively known as the {{WPExtract|Green Revolution}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:49 ]]
<nowiki>[50:49]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution involves high yield varieties of grain, the pioneer of which, probably the most important pioneer of which, is the agronomist {{WPExtract|Norman Borlaug}} pictured in the slide. Perhaps the most important you know figure in the history of the twentieth century whom you've never heard of.

[[File:Norman Borlaug, 2004 (cropped).jpg|thumb|250px|center|Norman Borlaug in 2004]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:05 ]]
<nowiki>[51:05]</nowiki>

How many of you had heard of Norman Borlaug before? Okay, one or two. I mean this is a man whose sort of consequence for world history I mean far, far outweighs the reach of his reputation. The high yield grain varieties which he pioneers at the University of Iowa -- I mean are...above all what enables the developing world to escape the {{WPExtract|Malthusianism|Malthusian}} trap that the Club of Rome prophesies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:30 ]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

But high yield grain varieties are not all that the Green Revolution depends upon. Fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and the mechanization of agriculture all help to expand grain yields.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:42 ]]
<nowiki>[51:42]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution has transformative consequences for global food production. It enables the increase of agricultural production by a factor of about two or three. So production of food per hectare of land can double or even triple thanks to the application of these advanced farming techniques.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:02 ]]
<nowiki>[52:02]</nowiki>

The Green Revolution on a global scale represents the ecological equivalent of discovering an entirely new North America. It's as if you could create another, you know, continent the size of North America, stick it in the Pacific Ocean and use it to grow food on. That's what the green revolution accomplishes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:19 ]]
<nowiki>[52:19]</nowiki>

So the Green Revolution will allow a growing world to feed itself. Of course the Green Revolution is a one-time fix. You can't continue to expand grain yields beyond the levels that are attained or, you know, in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:35]]
<nowiki>[52:35]</nowiki>

So whether the dire warnings that the club of Rome offered in the early 1970s are you know still relevant just to a different generation, perhaps our generation, as opposed to the generation of our parents, is an interesting question. It's a discomforting question too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:53 ]]
<nowiki>[52:53]</nowiki>

Because the quick fix that the Green Revolution offered will not necessarily be so easy to achieve as global population once again approaches the limits of global food production. Still the Green Revolution in its own time represents a important, you know, vitally important, accomplishment. It's benefits are particularly pronounced for the developing world.

=== The Economic Divergence Between the West and the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:19 ]]
<nowiki>[53:19]</nowiki>

Of course in larger terms the developing world continues to lag behind the advanced industrial West. What this chart shows you is GDP per capita organized on a regional basis over the entire second half of the twentieth century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:37]]
<nowiki>[53:37]</nowiki>

And what the data shows is that during the 1970s the developing world continues to lag behind the countries of Western Europe, and you know what I've identified here as the Western offshoots -- North America, Australia, and New Zealand -- the settler societies populated primarily by Europeans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:59 ]]
<nowiki>[53:59]</nowiki>

These Western countries continue to proceed far ahead of the developing world. And this divergence in human realities at a time of rising awareness of planetary integration is an awkward thing, it's an uncomfortable thing, and it's a challenge that leaders of developing world countries strive to overcome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:23 ]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

At a time when developing countries are becoming more modern, when literacy is spreading, when inhabitants of developing societies are beginning to have you know expanded access to television, television that affords a window on Western lifestyles, human aspirations in the 1970s are beginning to converge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:43 ]]
<nowiki>[54:43]</nowiki>

And this is a really important theme which attracts you know quite widespread attention in the sort of international relations scholarship of the era: convergent human aspirations in a time of widespread modernization. But the disjoint between the convergence of human aspirations and the ongoing divergence of human realities is striking. Even as the world is becoming one the West continues to have a whole lot more than the developing world does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:14 ]]
<nowiki>[55:14]</nowiki>

Westernerns continue to have more than their counterparts in the developing world. How are these basic inequalities to be overcome? The experience of the 1970s offers few answers. Developing economies continue to adhere to the ISI led growth strategies which had been so popular for the generation of, for the first generation of post colonial leaders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:36]]
<nowiki>[55:36]</nowiki>

There's some experimentation with alternative growth models, growth models more oriented towards exports in a few places, places like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, will experiment will export led growth models that sort of connect developing economies to the expanding global economy. But for the most developing countries remain in the 1970s beholden to nationalistic growth strategies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:03 ]]
<nowiki>[56:03]</nowiki>

Yet all is not well in the developing world during the 1970s. ISI led growth is, by the 1970s, failing to deliver the returns that it had promised to achieve. The oil shocks are a big exogenous crisis for most developing economies. For all developing world economies that don't produce their own oil a four fold increase in the rise in the price of energy inputs is catastrophic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:27]]
<nowiki>[56:27]</nowiki>

It produces price inflation. Price inflation in turn produces political instability. If you want to explain why India, the developing world's exemplary postcolonial democracy, experienced a brief period in which ordinary democratic rules were suspended, the so-called {{WPExtract|The Emergency (India)|Emergency of 1975 to 1977}}, you should pay some reference to the influence of the oil crisis on India's economics and its politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:53 ]]
<nowiki>[56:53]</nowiki>

At a time of rampant inflation, of rising political instability, {{WPExtract|Indira Gandhi}} in 1975 declares a brief emergency during which the rule of law is suspended. So the developing world struggles in an era of accelerating interdependence and this becomes a concern even for the leaders of the rich industrial world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:12 ]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What are to be the solutions to the divergence between the developing world's aspirations and its enduring poverty? Developing world leaders in the 1970s propose a radical reform of the international economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:27 ]]
<nowiki>[57:27]</nowiki>

A new bloc emerges at the United Nations, the so-called {{WPExtract|Group of 77|G77}} Bloc -- a self-conscious counterpart to the {{WPExtract|Group of Seven|G7}} -- the advanced industrial club. The G77 argues for a radical transformation in the international terms of trade. It argues for a set of international cartel agreements that will raise the price for the developing world's agricultural output. You know cartels on the model of OPEC for the producers of other primary commodities like coffee and rubber and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:56 ]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

Developing world political leaders talk about a new international economic order -- an economic order that will be oriented towards the achievement of international distributive justice. These initiatives ultimately come to nothing. What happens instead will be that the developing world comes from the 1980, from the 1980s onwards, to participate increasingly in the globalizing international economic system that takes shape in the West during the 1970s.

== Economic Interdependence ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:25 ]]
<nowiki>[58:25]</nowiki>

And it's to this Western system that we should now turn. I'll try to be brief and succinct.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:32]]
<nowiki>[58:32]</nowiki>

Let's start just by reminding ourselves that the West at the end of the 1960s is still very much in the throes of the economic controls that are established during the 1930s and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:50]]
<nowiki>[58:50]</nowiki>

At the end of the 1960s {{WPExtract|Capital control|capital controls}} continue to restrict the international movement of money. Trade barriers have been liberalized somewhat. But international trade is still sort of relatively small-scale in relation to the size of Western capitalist economies. This is a point which we can perhaps illustrate most succinctly by looking at the data.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:13 ]]
<nowiki>[59:13]</nowiki>

I'm just going to show you data from one nation-state here. Because it's in some ways easiest to look at this phenomenon from a particular national perspective. The chart on the right of the slide shows the interdependence of the United States with the larger world economy in the financial sector and in the trade sector.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:34 ]]
<nowiki>[59:34]</nowiki>

And what you can see is that in 1950 US sort of interdependence, financially and in terms of trading goods, is much lower than it will become by the sort of 1980s and 1990s. The value of annual trade flows both exports and imports as a fraction of US GDP increases very rapidly particularly from the 1970s. The US becomes increasingly enmeshed with the larger global economy from the 1970s forward.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:03]</nowiki>

Similarly US stocks of you know, stocks of foreign investment in the United States plus US owned stocks of foreign investment elsewhere, sort of financial interdependence, increases dramatically particularly from the 1980s onwards. The US becomes from the 1970s and 1980s much more enmeshed with the larger global economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:29]</nowiki>

How does this happen? Technology plays a role. We should think if we want to explain processes of financial and trade globalization about the role of technological innovations. Communication satellites which become available from the late 1960s onwords accelerate the velocity with which information can be transmitted around the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:51]</nowiki>

New transatlantic cables, fiber optic cables from the 1980s, reduce the costs of transmitting information and this is really crucial. It facilitates other changes, like the growth of multinational corporations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:04]</nowiki>

There are changes that are more you know prosaic than the advent of high technology communications -- simple changes in techniques. The containerization of shipping: a development that begins in the late 1960s. I don't know did any of you see today's ''San Francisco Chronicle''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:19]</nowiki>

I needn't have asked; nobody reads the ''San Francisco Chronicle''. (laughter from the class). But...there's an interesting story...interesting in its relation to today's lecture. Apparently today or yesterday the biggest ship ever to enter the San Francisco Bay entered the San Francisco Bay.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:36]</nowiki>

And this is a container ship. It's a container ship that holds a third more containers than the previous biggest container ship to enter the San Francisco Bay. I don't remember how much but you can look it up in the Chronicle. But the containerization of shipping is a development that has huge implications for international trade. Substantially reduces transportation costs over the you know sort of medium to long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:58]</nowiki>

Computers are also very important to the story of globalization. They facilitate the outsourcing of production -- the movement of goods. It's very difficult to have containerization without computers because who knows where all the goods are on the boat if you don't have a computer, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:14]</nowiki>

It's very important to have a sort of computer card index that explains what...which containers contain which goods and where they need to go. So the advent of sort of high-tech computer based systems for managing the shipment of goods is an important aspect. These are sort of to a great extent interlinked developments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:32]</nowiki>

And they produce substantial changes in the structure of the global economy. Consider the rise of the multinational corporation. This is one of the signal developments of the 1970s. One of the really important, really powerful symptoms, that suggest that big things are changing in the structure of the international economy.

=== Multinational Corporations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:51]]
<nowiki>[1:02:51]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations are crucial -- are crucial motors of globalization. Up to a third of all international trade is [https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7262 intra-firm] trade -- which is to say it occurs within corporations

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:04.]]
<nowiki>[1:03:04.]</nowiki>

Multinational corporations don't only move goods they also move knowledge and techniques -- techniques for manufacturing you know particular commodities, and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:17]</nowiki>

The history of multinational corporations of course goes back a long way. I referred earlier in the lecture to the European trading companies of the 18th century: the British East India Company, the Dutch VOC -- these could be seen as precursors to the modern multinational corporation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:32]</nowiki>

But there are crucial distinctions to be made. The modern multinational corporation is different in key respects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:40]</nowiki>

Whereas foreign direct investment in the age of British imperialism had tended to take the form of standalone investments, you know, the creation of a you know sort of British financed railroad in North America for example. Foreign direct investment, after the Second World War involves the creation of vast networks of corporate subsidiaries and affiliates. IBM for example will invest aggressively in the creation of research and production facilities in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:12]</nowiki>

It's not creating standalone investments that manage themselves. Rather it's creating subsidiary branches of the IBM corporation linked within some vast transnational corporate structure.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:24 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:24]</nowiki>

One of the key developments which really distinguishes the modern multinational corporation from its historical predecessors is the transnationalization of production. The breakdown in effect of the old factory conveyor belt into...a set of separate processes that can be parceled out internationally so as to take advantage of the comparative advantages that particular nations offer as sites for particular phases of the productive process.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:53]</nowiki>

So Apple for example can design a computer here in you know Cupertino, California where you know skilled knowledge workers are readily available. And then outsource the manufacturing of that computer to China where you know cheap skilled labor is available to assemble the whole thing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:09]</nowiki>

And of course the you know process is much more complicated than that. Because the computer that is assembled in China is not manufactured entirely in China. You know the aluminum that goes into it will be mined somewhere else based upon the comparative availability of aluminum and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:23 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:23]</nowiki>

The transnationalization of production is a distinctive and novel characteristic of the modern multinational. And it depends upon the modularization of production -- upon the breaking down of productive processes into distinct steps that can be outsourced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:40]</nowiki>

The idea that you know...article like a computer would be manufactured in the same factory complex in which it's designed -- you know that's a 19th century model of capitalism or maybe an early 20th century model of capitalism. It is not how the transnational corporation works. The transnational corporation will disaggregate production so as to be able to take advantages of the comparative -- so as to be able to benefit from the comparative advantages that an integrating global economy offers.

=== Foreign Direct Investment Within the Capitalist West ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:08 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:08]</nowiki>

Where does this mostly happen? I mean what is the scope of the multinationalization of business during the 1970s? Here the answer may be surprising.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:18]</nowiki>

If we look at where the money goes, where foreign direct investment takes place, then what we see is that during the 1970s most foreign direct investment occurs within the OECD economies, among Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:35]</nowiki>

Western corporations are investing in Western countries for the most part. The developing world receives much less FDI from the United States than Western Europe does. Indeed Western Europe is the principle, you know sort of site of development, for the modern you know multinational business. American car corporations, American computer corporations and so on, create affiliates in Western Europe -- not in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:00]</nowiki>

The United States itself is a recipient of substantial FDI. German car manufacturers for example will invest heavily in the southern states of the United States in production facilities. Why do they do this? Why do Western businesses invest in other Western countries?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:20]</nowiki>

Well, there are advantages in this multinationalization of production. It enables corporations to surmount tariff barriers. Mercedes doesn't have to pay American import duties on a car that it manufactures in the United States. So it makes their products more competitive in US markets. It also locates the production of the products closer to the markets in which they can be sold.

=== The Implications of Economic Interdependence in the Larger World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:43 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:43]</nowiki>

So it reduces you know transportation costs. What are the consequences of this for international relations? What does the rise of the multinational signify about the changing state of world affairs?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:54]]
<nowiki>[1:07:54]</nowiki>

Here one of the most sort of articulate spokespeople for the transformative impact of multinationalization is {{WPExtract|Jacques Maisonrouge}} -- a man who was himself an exemplary sort of multinational businessman. Maisonrouge was a French engineer who became a high level vice president at IBM. He was IBM's vice president for international operations in the late '60s and 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:18]</nowiki>

Maisonrouge also became a sort of notoriously effective spokesperson for the transformation that multinational business was producing. And here's an example. The world's political structures are completely obsolete Maisonrouge declared in a public speech. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the global optimization of resources and the independence of nation-states.<ref>As quoted in [https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/23/archives/planet-earth-a-whollyowned-subsidiary.html ''The New York Times'' from January 23, 1975], Maisonrouge said, "The world's political structures are completely obsolete. They have not changed in at least a hundred years and are woefully out of tune with technological progress. The critical issue of our time is the conceptual conflict between the search for global optimization of resources and the independence of nation‐states."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:40]</nowiki>

So for Maisonrouge national sovereignty, political sovereignty, isn't anachronism. It's just an impediment to the the most efficient possible allocation of resources -- something that multinational corporations are much better positioned than nation-states to accomplish.

== The Transformation of Capitalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:58]</nowiki>

Let's talk next about finance. Talked about production -- what about finance? The story of financial globalization begins in the 1960s. Here the signal development is the rise of the Euromarket? What is the Euromarket?<ref>Along with [[wikt:Euromarket|Wiktionary]], [https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/euromarket.asp Investopedia] and the [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/euromarket Cambridge English Dictionary] have definitions for the term. Some sources are capitalizing while others are not. In [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-superpower-transformed-9780195395471?cc=us&lang=en& ''A Superpower Transformed''] by Daniel Sargent the word is capitalized.</ref> The Euromarket is an offshore market for dollars -- held mostly in London.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:21]</nowiki>

It grows quickly during the 1960s and plays a role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The end of Bretton Woods delivers a further impetus to the globalization of finance. It creates opportunities for bankers to you know profit from [[wikt:arbitrage|arbitrage]] based upon fluctuating currency values. The petrodollar crisis as I've already discussed further bolsters the development of a globalizing financial system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:47]</nowiki>

Banks can profit through the recycling of petrodollar earnings, earnings that accrue to the exporting states, by lending those monies to oil importers so as to finance the balance of payments deficits that the oil crisis produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:04]</nowiki>

So the history of financial globalization really hinges on a series of key developments in the late '60s and early '70s. The rise of the Euromarkets, an offshore market for dollars based in London, the end of the Bretton Woods system and the opportunities that that creates for sort of further financial globalization. And the oil crisis which delivers a big shot in the arm to financial market integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:29]</nowiki>

What are the underlying causes? Technology is important, the reduction in the costs of communications technology facilitates the rise of international banking.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:41]</nowiki>

Business innovation is important. You know bankers are adept at devising ways to avoid the capital controls that nation-states try to implement to restrict the international movement of funds.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:52]</nowiki>

Policy choices are also important. Governments decide to reduce controls on international capital mobility. The United States in 1974 removes all of the capital controls which had been you know...used during the Bretton Woods era to defend the fixed exchange rate of the dollar. Great Britain in 1979 follows suit and removes all of its capital controls.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:17]</nowiki>

West European countries, other West European countries, will follow in the 1980s. So there are policy choices that are made to...accept if not to advance the cause of financial globalization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:30]</nowiki>

Financial globalization has important political consequences. It renders national macroeconomies more interdependent -- far more interdependent than they had been in the heyday of the Bretton Woods era. It also raises the you know prospect that national economic sovereignty is being you know sort of penetrated by, qualified by, free floating movements of global financial capital.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:55]]
<nowiki>[1:11:55]</nowiki>

This is remarked upon at the time, I'm going to show you a video clip even though I don't have time really that comes from a terrific 1976 movie {{WPExtract|Network (1976 film)|''Network''}} in which one of the characters, Ned Beatty, played by {{WPExtract|Ned Beatty}}<ref>Speaker was clarifying that he was saying the name of the actor and not the name of the character -- the name of the character being Arthur Jensen.</ref>, delivers a sort of [[wikt:homily|homily]] on the globalization of finance and it's implications for international politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:15]</nowiki>

''Arthur Jensen: You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians. There are no Arabs. There are no Third Worlds. There is no West. This is only one holistic system of systems. One vast and [[wikt:immane|immane]], interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of dollars: petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars, reichmarks, rins, rubles, pounds, and shekels.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:52]]
<nowiki>[1:12:52]</nowiki>

''Arthur Jensen: It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:02]</nowiki>

This is a great movie. One of my favorite '70s movies, so I really recommend it if you haven't seen it. But...it gives you a sense of the...discourse of the time, a discourse that is really not so different from the discourse of our own times when it comes to the relationship between global finance and nationality constituted political authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:22]</nowiki>

Indeed the acceleration of financial interdependence, the rise of the multinational corporation during the '70s, create a set of questions as to the future of political management of economic affairs. Is public policy up to the task or does globalization render national regulation irrelevant or ultimately futile?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:44]</nowiki>

Perhaps there is is a dynamic in play whereby globalization, a process that enables business actors and financial actors to escape the bounds of national regulation implies an implicit process of deregulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:59]</nowiki>

That would be you know kind of logical enough to infer. Insofar at capital becomes in a globalizing world less subject to the jurisdiction of national political authorities what restrictions, what regulations, are to bind business actors? These are questions that globalization conjures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:19]</nowiki>

One alternative would be the reconstitution of regulation on a transnational or even global scale. Can nation-states cooperate to achieve the kinds of sort of regulatory function collectively that individual nation-states used to be able to exercise within their own sort of territorial domains? This is one possibility. International organizations like the International Monetary Fund try during the 1970s to reconstitute stable sort of institutional regulatory arrangements on a transnational scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:52]</nowiki>

The IMF tries to devise sort of new rules for international monetary order to replace the Bretton Woods rules that collapsed in 1971 to 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:02]</nowiki>

Compromise on sort of the constitution of a recast international regulatory order proves very difficult to accomplish however. In part this is because the interests of nation-states are enduringly national and there not always convergence. Instead market determination, at least of currency values, ends up being the de facto solution to the management of international monetary relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:25]</nowiki>

It's too difficult to get nations to agree on a sort of consensual multilateral framework for managing currency values in a post Bretton Woods world. So the de facto alternative is to let markets determine the value of currencies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:38]</nowiki>

Still governments will come together to manage at least the most disruptive aspects of economic globalization. This is something that the {{WPExtract|Trilateral Commission}} proposes. We've talked a little about the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral Commission in essence comes into being as a sort of answer to the question of what are globalization's implications for governance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:03]</nowiki>

The trilateral concept is that an informal dialog amongst business leaders, policymakers and academics within the OECD countries will be able to devise sort of consensual solutions that countries will follow of their own volition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:17]</nowiki>

By consequence we see the rise of new relationships of policy coordination during the 1970s. The most sort of important symbol of which is the G7 summits -- summits that begin in the mid-1970s and continue through to the present day.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:31]</nowiki>

But still the question of whether globalization necessarily limits the scope of government endures. Will it ever be possible for governments acting collectively and multilaterally to regulate and to govern economies so effectively as nation-states had once been able to do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:49]</nowiki>

Here we have to you know sort of ask the question of whether governments in the 1970s are becoming less willing, less eager, to attempt the tasks of economic regulation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:00]</nowiki>

The Keynesian consensus after all experiences a crisis during the 1970s. Interdependence makes it harder for governments to exercise the regulatory managerial responsibilities that Keynes argued that they should exercise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:15]</nowiki>

The great inflation disrupts the credibility of Keynesian solutions as a sort of plausible framework for managing national macroeconomies. Instead classical liberalism, liberalism that emphasizes the utility of markets as mechanisms for determining the allocation of scarce resources, reasserts itself. After Keynes, {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek}} the exemplary sort of liberal economist of the twentieth century, experiences a heyday.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:44]</nowiki>

Hayek's writings become widely circulated and widely discussed in the 1970s. Hayek will -- wins the Nobel Prize for economics in 1974 -- which is illustrative of the ways in which the priorities of professional economists are shifting.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:59]</nowiki>

But the most influential economist of the decade is not Hayek who by this point is a very old man but {{WPExtract|Milton Friedman}}. A liberal economist who insists upon the preferability of market-based solutions over regulatory solutions. Friedman argues that government has gotten too big in the age of Keynes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:19]]
<nowiki>[1:18:19]</nowiki>

That big government is part of the problem. That government is responsible for the inflationary crisis of the 1970s -- for the failure of sort of growth to reassert itself. Friedman offers a set of radical solutions: spending cuts, tight money policies, reduction in sort of interest, increase in interest rates that will he argues quench the great inflation of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:42 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:42]</nowiki>

But the basic concept is one that advocates markets as the solution to the ills that ail the West. The rediscovery of markets is a overriding theme in the sort of economic thought, professional economics thought, of the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:58]</nowiki>

But how and when is it translated into policy practice? Great Britain here is in the vanguard of the neoliberal shift. Intellectuals within the {{WPExtract|Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party}}, in particular {{WPExtract|Keith Joseph}}, who'll you have the opportunity to read about in this week's reading package, offer a set of neoliberal policy solutions as a prescription for the dilemmas of the Keynesian welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:20]</nowiki>

In Britain it's Margaret Thatcher who puts this neoliberal synthesis into action as Prime Minister -- a role that she assumes in 1979 when she leads the Conservative Party to election victory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:31]</nowiki>

Thatcher privatizes some of the state industries that had been nationalized after the Second World War. She privatizes coal and steel. She privatizes electricity. She privatizes telecommunications. She implements a broader set of market oriented reforms. She enables sort of individuals who live in public housing for example to purchase the public housing units that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:51]</nowiki>

She argues that this will create a stakeholder society in which individuals have a sort of direct investment in the housing that they inhabit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:02]</nowiki>

How crucial was Thatcher? Well, this is a question that we can sort of discuss when we return to the neoliberal shift. But let's, by way of conclusion, think about the ways in which similar changes proceed elsewhere including in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:17]</nowiki>

In the United States it was not a Republican administration, an administration of the right, but a Democratic administration that made the first really key moves. Jimmy Carter as President is unfortunate enough to inherit a stagnant economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:30]</nowiki>

He's caught in a very difficult bind. Inflation is a huge dilemma for the Carter administration. How to slay inflation? That's one big policy dilemma. On the other hand unemployment is a big problem for the Carter administration in the second half of the 1970s. How to expand employment? How to reduce unemployment? These are the two dilemmas that Carter has to, has to address.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:52]</nowiki>

At the same time Carter is eager to deregulate the economy. He has a small business background. He believes that excessive regulation is stifling to business and innovation. So the Carter administration makes moves to deregulate trucking and aviation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:07]</nowiki>

Around the same time a Supreme Court decision results in the effective deregulation of some personal financial services. The details are not important. What's important is the ways in which these shifts adhere to a common logic, a logic of deregulation, a logic of market determination.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:25]</nowiki>

Carter initially prioritizes the fight over inflation. He pursues a stimulus package to expand the economy, to put Americans back to work, but in 1979 he makes a key shift to prioritize the fight against inflation over the fight against unemployment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:21:39]</nowiki>

This is a shift that is...sort of a key pivot in the transition from Keynesian welfare economics to what we would -- might characterize instead as neoliberal economics. Economics more oriented with market solutions, with allowing markets to determine their own sort of trajectories.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:00]</nowiki>

The Reagan administration essentially accepts the policy synthesis that Carter produces. Reagan will cut tax rates and continue deregulation. But Reagan does not orchestrate much sort of radical reform beyond that which has already been set in motion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:15]</nowiki>

On the contrary he will govern as a pragmatic President who has to rule with a Democratic legislature. So the United States experiences a sort of shift towards the market at around the same time that Great Britain does. But it's a shift that occurs under a different kind of administration, a Democratic center-left administration, rather than a Conservative center-right administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:22:35]</nowiki>

And this ought to provocative as we think about the role that politics play in determining the sort of market oriented shifts of the 1970s. You know these are issues that we'll return to and they're issues that you'll engage in your readings and your section discussions. But what's clear is that by the end of the 1970s the capitalist world is headed in a very different direction from that which it appeared to be following at the beginning of the decade.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24 1022x1024.jpg

2022-02-16T05:18:16Z

DavidKitFriedman: == Summary == This file was downloaded from Wikimedia Commons: File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg And is in the Public Domain because it...

== Summary ==
This file was downloaded from [[commons:Main_Page|Wikimedia Commons]]:

[[:commons:File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg|File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg]]

And is in the Public Domain because it was the work of the United States government.

More information on licensing and restrictions can be found on the Wikimedia Commons page:

[[:commons:File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg#Licensing|File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg#Licensing]]

File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24.jpg

2022-02-16T05:12:27Z

DavidKitFriedman:

File:NASA Earthrise AS08-14-2383 Apollo 8 1968-12-24.jpg

2022-02-16T05:06:58Z

DavidKitFriedman: This file is from Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg

== Summary ==
This file is from Wikimedia Commons.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NASA_Earthrise_AS08-14-2383_Apollo_8_1968-12-24.jpg
== Licensing ==
{{PD-USGov}}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2022-01-19T06:20:43Z

DavidKitFriedman: Minor change in wording

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a good edit to make to a Wikipedia article or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2021-12-15T07:03:33Z

DavidKitFriedman: The intro was revised at this point in time.

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a productive edit to make on a Wikipedia page or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

''Intro Revised: [[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:03, 15 December 2021 (UTC)''

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s

2021-12-15T06:59:11Z

DavidKitFriedman: I think alloy is a common enough word that there doesn't need to be a Wiktionary link.

== Introduction: The Importance of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Today we're going to be talking about the origins of the Cold War.

The Cold War is a definitive theme of the postwar era. Sometimes when historians of international relations talk about the postwar era they describe it simply as the era of the Cold War, i.e. the Cold War is such a big, such a crucial theme, that it can be a synonym almost for postwar international history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:31]]
<nowiki>[0:31]</nowiki>

Personally I wouldn't want to go that far. I think that there are dangers in seeing the Cold War as sort of the singular overarching framework within which the history of the postwar world needs to be understood. I think that we get a better historical understanding of the postwar world if we see the Cold War as one of a number of defining themes or struggles which we might use to comprehend the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:59]]
<nowiki>[0:59]</nowiki>

But even if we try to situate the Cold War in context, if we try to take the Cold War as one of a range of important historical themes that we need to understand its significance is still very substantial. The Cold War was a defining geopolitical confrontation of the postwar era and it will be one of the central issues that we have to try to comprehend as we move forward this semester.

== Aspects of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:28]]
<nowiki>[1:28]</nowiki>

What then was the Cold War? How should we understand it? And the Cold War had a number of different faces or aspects.

=== Geopolitical and Ideological Struggle ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:39]]
<nowiki>[1:39]</nowiki>

At one level the Cold War was simply a great power rivalry between two superpowers. A geopolitical confrontation between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:51]]
<nowiki>[1:51]</nowiki>

But at the same time the Cold War also had a central ideological aspect. It's difficult to understand the Cold War without paying central attention to the struggle between communism as an ideological system and capitalism as an ideological system. After all during the Cold War both Communists and capitalists claimed to be able to offer a superior way of organizing societies and economies. Both Communists and capitalist claimed that history was on their side.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:31]]
<nowiki>[2:31]</nowiki>

So when we think about the history of the Cold War we ought to think not only about the confrontation between two great powers: the United States and the Soviet Union, but also about the confrontation between two rival ideological systems: Communism and capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:46]]
<nowiki>[2:46]</nowiki>

The slide shows you a photograph of {{WPExtract|Richard Nixon}} and {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} arguing in the late 1950s about which of their social systems: Communism or capitalism was superior. It's significant that the debate took place inside a model kitchen because the kitchen was part of the American exhibition at the Moscow World's Fair and it modeled what Nixon saw as the superior merits and virtues of the capitalist system.

[[File:Kitchen debate.jpg|thumb|500px|center|[[wikipedia:Kitchen Debate|Kitchen Debate]] between Nixon and Khrushchev]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:15]]
<nowiki>[3:15]</nowiki>

So the Cold War was both an ideological struggle and a geopolitical confrontation. But there were more aspects to the Cold War than these.

=== The Nuclear Arms Race ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:26]]
<nowiki>[3:26]</nowiki>

The history of nuclear weapons has a central role in the history of the Cold War. And at some level we ought to see the nuclear arms race, the struggle for strategic superiority, and then from the early 1970s the struggle to control the nuclear arms and to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a history that is to some extent autonomous from the history of the geopolitical rivalry and the ideological struggle.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:56]]
<nowiki>[3:56]</nowiki>

Nuclear weapons were an invention of the postwar era. It might not be an exaggeration to say that nuclear weapons invented the postwar era in international relations and their history is from a certain point of view distinct from the history of the Cold War of which they were such a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:14]]
<nowiki>[4:14]</nowiki>

After all dilemmas over nuclear proliferation have continued beyond the end of the Cold War. This is a history that is both part of the Cold War and which transcends the Cold War itself.

=== Struggle Over the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:26]]
<nowiki>[4:26]</nowiki>

Besides the history of nuclear weapons as a central theme of Cold War history we ought to think too about the struggle to influence the postcolonial or decolonizing world that was such a central aspect of the Cold War's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:45]]
<nowiki>[4:45]</nowiki>

The Cold War was not just a struggle between social systems. Not just a struggle between great powers, superpowers, it was also a struggle for the soul of the developing world. And this was a struggle in which developing world actors like {{WPExtract|Ho Chi Minh }} played central roles themselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:04]]
<nowiki>[5:04]</nowiki>

It was not just a history in which the superpowers did things to the developing world. It was also a history in which developing world leaders and actors were themselves central players.

=== Conclusion: Aspects of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:16]]
<nowiki>[5:16]</nowiki>

The Cold War had many different facets and during the course of the semester we will be visiting as many of them as we have time to.

== Understanding the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:27]]
<nowiki>[5:27]</nowiki>

How then do we explain the Cold War? How did it come to pass? Was the Cold War inevitable or was the Cold War a product of specific choices, specific actions, for which we might hold individual historical actors accountable?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:44]]
<nowiki>[5:44]</nowiki>

Historians of the Cold War have tended to fixate on the question of origins. In part this is a reflection of sort of when the history of the Cold War was written. After all a great deal of Cold War {{WPExtract|historiography}} was written before the Cold War ended.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:02]]
<nowiki>[6:02]</nowiki>

Historians writing in the 1970s and 1980s could not very well be concerned with the question of endings. They sort of had to as a function of their own perspectives be concerned with the question of origins because that was really all that there was to write about the '70s and '80s.

=== Cold War Historiography and the Question of Accountability ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:18]]
<nowiki>[6:18]</nowiki>

One of the sort of central preoccupations for historians who have dealt with the origins of the Cold War has been the question of accountability. Who ultimately was to blame for the Cold War's arrival?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:33]]
<nowiki>[6:33]</nowiki>

I don't want to belabor the historiographical discussion. It would be more appropriate in a class on the history of US foreign relations than it is this semester's lecture series.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:45]]
<nowiki>[6:45]</nowiki>

But it's still worth thinking a little bit about the sort of ways in which scholars have tried to ascribe responsibility for the coming of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:56]]
<nowiki>[6:56]</nowiki>

And let me just give you a very simple run down of how this history works.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:02]]
<nowiki>[7:02]</nowiki>

(static like noise)

I don't know what that noise is.

Does anybody have any idea?

I'm sorry.

Okay, let's ...

I could do without the microphone in a room of this size but it's essential for the podcast so ...

==== Orthodox View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:25]]
<nowiki>[7:25]</nowiki>

Okay, so sort of the first generation of Cold War scholarship in the United States. Genre of scholarship which we commonly refer to as sort of orthodox history of the Cold War laid the blame for the Cold War's origins on the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:42]]
<nowiki>[7:42]</nowiki>

They said, well really the Cold War emerged out of Stalin's efforts to create a empire in Eastern Europe and the history of the early Cold War can be understood as a series of sort of Western reactions to Soviet provocations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:58]]
<nowiki>[7:58]</nowiki>

That's in a nutshell the first generation of Cold War historiography.

==== Revisionist View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:05]]
<nowiki>[8:05]</nowiki>

During the 1960s this sort of one dimensional interpretation of Cold War history is counted by an alternative one dimensional interpretation of Cold War history which sort of inverts responsibility for the coming of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:21]]
<nowiki>[8:21]</nowiki>

It says, well, you know really the Cold War was about American efforts to create an empire of sort of economic exploitation and influence in Western Europe and the origins of the Cold War can be understood in terms of a series of rational Soviet responses to American expansionism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:37]]
<nowiki>[8:37]</nowiki>

This emphasis on sort of American expansion as the root cause of the Cold War, an interpretation that flourishes in the 1960s, has something to do with the Vietnam War and the influence that the Vietnam War has on historians who are working at the time of it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:56]]
<nowiki>[8:56]</nowiki>

This genre of scholarship that tries to lay the blame for the Cold War on the United States is usually referred to as revisionist historiography.

==== Post-Revisionist View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:05]]
<nowiki>[9:05]</nowiki>

Out of this conflict between revisionists and orthodox historians of the Cold War something akin to a synthesis begins to emerge in the 1970s. The synthesis is usually labeled a sort of post-revisionist synthesis. And its great virtue I would suggest is that it seeks to transcend the question of accountability entirely. Rather than sort of looking to blame either side for the origins of the Cold War the post-revisionists are more concerned with understanding how the Cold War came to pass.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:41]]
<nowiki>[9:41]</nowiki>

They tend to emphasize sort of the conflicting visions that American and Soviet leaders had for the postwar order and the essential incompatibility between the expectations of the two sides. Post-revisionists tend to see two, the two sides, as sometimes unintentionally creating the sensation of insecurity on the part of the other superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

So the post-revisionists understand the Cold War less as a case of provocation and reaction but rather as a series of escalations sometimes unintentional that have the effect of reinforcing the mutual insecurities that both sides feel as they sort of look at the map of Europe and look at the actions of the other superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

So that's a very quick overview of Cold War historiography.

=== Questions about the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:40]]
<nowiki>[10:40]</nowiki>

What do we need to know about the Cold War in this class? In History 186? This is not a class on sort of the historiography of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:51]]
<nowiki>[10:51]</nowiki>

What it is important for you to think about as the semester moves forwards: I would say that the first question that you want to think about is how the Cold War came to pass. How did the world transition from a condition of world war between sort of 1939 and 1945 and a condition of Cold War from the late 1940s? How was this transition accomplished? Was it inevitable or was it the achievement of specific choices and actions?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:27]]
<nowiki>[11:27]</nowiki>

So the question of origins is a question that it is important to reflect upon just as generations of Cold War historians have concerned themselves with origins so too should you be concerned with the question of origins because it's really important.

==== The Cold War International System ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:42]]
<nowiki>[11:42]</nowiki>

Beyond the question of origins you should think about how the Cold War functioned as an international system. How did the Cold War world work? Did the Cold War transform the world into a bipolar world in which two superpowers predominates it and everybody else was subject to them?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:03]]
<nowiki>[12:03]</nowiki>

Or did smaller powers, did second tier powers, retain a certain historical autonomy? Did they retain a capacity to influence events despite the overarching condition of Cold War bipolarity? How did the Cold War system work?

==== Internal Politics and International Relations ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:20]]
<nowiki>[12:20]</nowiki>

You might also think about the relationship between internal politics, the domestic politics of nation-states, and the larger condition of global Cold War division. This relationship between sort of interior politics and international politics is one of the defining characteristics of the Cold War era. And it's something which you should reflect upon when you think about how the Cold War system worked.

==== The Cold War and Other Historical Themes Such as Decolonization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:45]]
<nowiki>[12:45]</nowiki>

It's also very important, sort of in a third theme, to consider how the Cold War related to other major historical themes of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:56]]
<nowiki>[12:56]</nowiki>

How do we relate the history of the Cold War, for example, to the history of decolonization? Decolonization as a historical theme was in some ways autonomous from the history of the Cold War. After all decolonization antedated the Cold War by decades if not by centuries. But the last phase of decolonization, the phase of decolonization that follows the Second World War, will be profoundly affected by the simultaneous outplaying of Cold War rivalries in the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

How did the two themes intersect? How did they interact? That's something which you should sort of think about as you try to sort of locate the Cold War in relation to other major historical developments of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:44]]
<nowiki>[13:44]</nowiki>

=== The End of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:44]]
<nowiki>[13:44]</nowiki>

And finally the question of endings. Why did the Cold War end as it did and when it did? This we will come to in due course.

=== Conclusion: Understanding the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:54]]
<nowiki>[13:54]</nowiki>

But as we reflect upon these various aspects of Cold War history I hope that we will come to some deeper understanding not only of the Cold War, what was it, how did it work, and why did it end but also of the Cold War's significance for understanding our own times.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

We are very much the products of the Cold War world. Our era is fundamentally a Cold War era, so we should try to think out the ways in which the realities of our own times have been shaped and defined by the experiences of the Cold War era.

== Organization and Schedule as Relates to the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:31 ]]
<nowiki>[14:31]</nowiki>

So how are we going to do this? We will be returning to the Cold War at various points during the course of the semester. This week we're really concerned with the question of origins. The other is sort of aspects of Cold War history which I've just outlined we'll be reserved for subsequent weeks. This week we're going to deal with the question of origins.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:54 ]]
<nowiki>[14:54]</nowiki>

Today we will focus on Europe, Thursday we'll focus on Asia. When we think about the Cold War in Europe, which is our task for today, we're going to think first of all about the Soviet Union, and Communism, what was the Soviet Union, what was Communism, what were the Soviet Union's aspirations for the postwar world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:14]]
<nowiki>[15:14]</nowiki>

We'll think next about the United States. What kind of postwar order did the United States want to create? And we'll think about the condition of Europe at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:24]]
<nowiki>[15:24]</nowiki>

In what situation did Europeans find themselves subsequent to the end of the Second World War? How did the vacuum of European politics following the defeat of Nazi Germany help to precipitate confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:45]]
<nowiki>[15:45]</nowiki>

And finally how did the division of Europe between the two superpowers play itself out in the late 1940s. That's what we're going to deal with today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:54]]
<nowiki>[15:54]</nowiki>

And then on Thursday we'll deal with the parallel history of East Asia in the period between the end of the Second World War, the defeat of Japan's new order in the Asia Pacific region, through to the sort of formal military division of East Asia at the end of the Korean war. So Asia we'll wait for Thursday today we're going to deal with Europe.

== Communism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:24]]
<nowiki>[16:24]</nowiki>

A fundamental question that we have to address when we think about the history of the Cold War is the question of communism. What is communism? Perhaps it would be more historically accurate to ask what was communism. Why did it have such a sort of disruptive impact on the international politics of the twentieth century?

=== Karl Marx ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:49]]
<nowiki>[16:49]</nowiki>

Of course to understand the history of communism it's not sufficient to deal with the history of the twentieth century. We have to go back to the history of the 19th century and to the political philosophy and economic sociology of {{WPExtract|Karl Marx}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:09]]
<nowiki>[17:09]</nowiki>

How many of you have had a chance to read Marx in your undergraduate studies so far? Okay, about half of you which is sort of a testament to Marx's enduring significance as a sociologist of capitalism which is really what he was.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:28]]
<nowiki>[17:28]</nowiki>

Let me push that question a little further though. Of those of you who have read Marx how many of you have read {{WPExtract|The Communist Manifesto|''The Communist Manifesto''}}? Okay. How many of you have read something other than ''The Communist Manifesto''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:43]]
<nowiki>[17:43]</nowiki>

Okay, what have you read?

(Student response)

{{WPExtract|Das Kapital|''Das Kapital''}}. All of it? Okay, that's hardcore (laughter). So...

==== Marx's Views on Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:54]]
<nowiki>[17:54]</nowiki>

Okay, those of you who have read ''Das Kapital'' will know that what Marx is really concerned about is capitalism not communism. This the grand irony of Karl Marx.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:05]]
<nowiki>[18:05]</nowiki>

For a thinker who is so singularly associated with the political and economic project of communism. He actually had a lot more to say about capitalism than he did about communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

Besides an expansive analysis of capitalism as a productive system, which is really what constitutes the greater part of Karl Marx's work and writings, Marx offers a sort of political doctrine of revolutionary communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:35]]
<nowiki>[18:35]</nowiki>

This is doctrine that is stated most succinctly, most quotably, in ''The Communist Manifesto'', sort of political pamphlet, published in 1848.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:46]]
<nowiki>[18:46]</nowiki>

To understand Marx's vision of communism, of the communist future (static like sound) ... alright.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:00]]
<nowiki>[19:00]</nowiki>

It's important to think about what Marx says about capitalism too. We should remember that Marx is writing in the middle of the 19th century in Great Britain at a moment when the Industrial Revolution is utterly transforming British society, but also a moment in which memory of the preindustrial world is still sort of tangible.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:31]]
<nowiki>[19:31]</nowiki>

For Marx the accumulation of wealth, the accumulation of capital, in a capitalist system depends fundamentally upon the expropriation of labor. This a really sort of crucial insight for Marxist economic sociology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:52]]
<nowiki>[19:52]</nowiki>

The accumulation of wealth depends upon the expropriation of labor -- since it's your labor that pays for somebody else's prosperity. Marx argues that the capitalist system depending as it does upon the expropriation of labor and upon the accumulation of capital via labor expropriation is inherently unstable because it has a built in tendency towards the concentration of wealth, the concentration of resources in the hands of a few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:29]]
<nowiki>[20:29]</nowiki>

In the hands of a very wealthy, a very affluent minority. Ultimately, Marx argues, the history of capitalism veers unavoidable towards conflict. In a world in which resources are finite, which Marx profoundly believed, the concentration of more and more resources in fewer and fewer hands will produce conflict amongst those in whose hands wealth is vested.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:56]]
<nowiki>[20:56]</nowiki>

That sort of makes sense as abstract theory, right. The concentration of resources in the hands of the few will produce a situation of conflict between those in whose hands wealth is concentrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:11]]
<nowiki>[21:11]</nowiki>

Because as a smaller and smaller number of sort of powerful, of empowered capitalists, fight over finite resources, their confrontation will become increasingly bitter, increasingly, sort of ferocious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:29]]
<nowiki>[21:29]</nowiki>

So Marx offers a theory of capitalism in which all wealth derives from exploitation, from the exploitation of labor, and in which the accumulation of wealth tends over time to produce a concentration of resources in the hands of a few. That's really exactly to understanding sort of Marx's theory of capitalism.

==== Marx's Meta-Historical Framework ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:50]]
<nowiki>[21:50]</nowiki>

Besides sort of offering a sociological analysis of capitalism that emphasized labor expropriation as the ultimate source or engine of wealth and accumulation and concentration of wealth as sort of capitalism's inner dynamic Marx also offered a historical framework, a framework, a sort meta-historical framework, that tried to situate capitalism in relation to earlier phases of history defined by the relationship of labor to production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:28]]
<nowiki>[22:28]</nowiki>

For Marx history in the very largest sense had an internal logic. History Marx argued could be divided into a series of stages or phases each of which could be defined by the relationship between labor and production. For Marx this with really the crucial relationship in human history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

Marx argued that we could understand the entire course of human history as a sort of progression from one historical phase defined by the relationship of labor to production to another.

===== Marx's Stages of History =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:04]]
<nowiki>[23:04]</nowiki>

To understand this it might help to sketch out the stages of history as Marx construed them.

For Marx the first stage of history is what Marx called a stage of sort of primitive communism and this is what we sort of more commonly identify as a hunter-gatherer stage of human existence. A sort of sociology in which human beings lived in small bands of a dozen, two dozen, individuals no larger than that. Subsisted on hunting and the gathering of plant stuffs, and in which, this is really fundamental, all food was shared more or less equally amongst members of the hunter-gatherer band. Marx characterized this kind of very small-scale subsistence lifestyle as a condition of primitive communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:01]]
<nowiki>[24:01]</nowiki>

How do we get from a world of hunter-gatherer tribes to a world of vast empires capable of orchestrating large construction projects like the pyramids of Egypt or the Roman Coliseum? For Marx the answer is slavery.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:19]]
<nowiki>[24:19]</nowiki>

Only the legal enslavement of labor and the exploitation thereof will permit the creation of sort of vast complex societies on the model of Greco-Roman antiquity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:33]]
<nowiki>[24:33]</nowiki>

So for Marx slavery as a social institution is absolutely crucial to understanding how we get from sort of a world of primitive hunter-gatherer tribes to a world of sophisticated urban imperial structures like Rome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:50]]
<nowiki>[24:50]</nowiki>

The slave societies of the ancient world, Marx argues, eventually deteriorate into a feudal order. The transition to the feudal order is characterized by the tethering of slaves to particular plots of land. Individuals in effect become sort of the wards of the land rather than of powerful owners. This is for Marx what defines the transition from a slave society to a feudal society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:27]]
<nowiki>[25:27]</nowiki>

None of this is going to be on the exam by the way, so...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:30]]
<nowiki>[25:30]</nowiki>

Then following the sort of creation of a feudal economic sociology Marx identifies in the late 18th century the advent of a capitalist system. And this is really what Marx is concerned with explaining. How does the capitalist world come to be?

==== Marx on the Advent of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

What defines the advent of capitalism? And for Marx capitalism has to do fundamentally with the transition or with the transfer of power from the feudal aristocracy, from landowners, to an urban {{WPExtract|bourgeoisie}} whose wealth is defined not in terms of ownership of land but in terms of the ownership of industrial production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:20]]
<nowiki>[26:20]</nowiki>

So with industrialization, the mill owner, the railroad baron, will replace the feudal lord as the sort of dominant economic figures of their times.

==== Marx on the Fate of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:34]]
<nowiki>[26:34]</nowiki>

For Marx though, capitalism as we've already discussed, is inherently unstable. Moreover it depends upon exploitation, upon the appropriation of labor, the labor of the many, by the sort of vested power of the few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:52]]
<nowiki>[26:52]</nowiki>

And for Marx capitalism is destined to collapse. This is really, really, important. It's a sort of historical inevitably as Marx puts it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:01]]
<nowiki>[27:01]</nowiki>

That capitalism will eventually collapse because of its own internal contradictions. Perhaps capitalists will fight amongst themselves in the internal struggle for finite resources. Or perhaps workers, who grow tired of being exploited, will raise up and overthrow the capitalist {{WPExtract|plutocracy}} in a revolution.

==== Marx on Socialism Replacing Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:22]]
<nowiki>[27:22]</nowiki>

And what will follow capitalism, Marx argues, is a new stage of history, a stage that Marx defines as the socialist stage of history, an era in which a revolution will create a new socialist order, an order in which a sort of powerful state will seize control of factories, of the means of production, and will utilize those resources to benefit the many and not the few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:52]]
<nowiki>[27:52]</nowiki>

And this transition from capitalism to socialism is what Marx is really concerned with in his writings. How will it come about? How can it be achieved?

==== Marx on Communism after Socialism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Finally the socialist order as Marx prophesies it will be followed by a communist era of history. Sorry the slide says capitalism but it should read communism. A communist era of history in which the revolutionary state withers away and in which sort of workers administer their own affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

For Marx the existence of a revolutionary state is a sort of necessary aspect of the socialist transition between capitalism and communism.

=== Karl Marx, ''The Communist Manifesto'', and the Russian Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:37]]
<nowiki>[28:37]</nowiki>

So that in a nutshell is Karl Marx's sociology of capitalism and his conception of the course of world history. Capitalism is unstable and it's destined to collapse.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:50]]
<nowiki>[28:50]</nowiki>

And what Marx offers in his sort of political pamphlet, ''The Communist Manifesto'', which famously begins with the declaration, "Workers of the world, unite!", is a program, a very skeletal program, but a program nonetheless, for achieving the transition from a capitalist world to a socialist world. Marx calls for a revolution, a revolution of workers, to rise up and overthrow the capitalist order, and to create in its wake a new socialist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

Marx might have been surprised that the sociologist revolution that he prophesied and called for occurred ultimately when it did occur, not in Germany, not in Great Britain, but in Russia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:46]]
<nowiki>[29:46]</nowiki>

Insofar as Marx believed that revolution would emerge out of a sort of crisis of capitalism it was plausible to imagine that the revolution would come first of all to Europe's most developed capitalist economies, namely...

(static like noise)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:07]]
<nowiki>[30:07]</nowiki>

I don't know what the problem with this is.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:13]]
<nowiki>[30:13]</nowiki>

Not to Russia, or ... But to Germany, or ... I'm sorry ...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:24]]
<nowiki>[30:24]</nowiki>

(silence)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:34]]
<nowiki>[30:34]</nowiki>

Apparently my cell phone is responsible for the interruption with the microphone and this actually works much, much better so thank you very much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:41]]
<nowiki>[30:41]</nowiki>

Okay, now, I can concentrate on this and not on that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:45]]
<nowiki>[30:45]</nowiki>

So Marx predicts that the revolution will occur in the most advanced, most developed, capitalist economies of Europe, which is to say Germany, Great Britain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:57]]
<nowiki>[30:57]</nowiki>

Of course that's not where the revolution ends up happening. The revolution ends up in happening in Russia -- a vast overwhelmingly agrarian society on the periphery of the European economy.

== The Russian Revolution ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:09]]
<nowiki>[31:09]</nowiki>

Why does the revolution happen in Russia? Why does it not happen in Germany or in Great Britain? A simple answer to that question is that Russia is devastated, exhausted, and impoverished by the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:26]]
<nowiki>[31:26]</nowiki>

The First World War exhausts Russia. It exhausts Russia's limited industrial resources. Russia is also you know very badly afflicted by the fighting on the Eastern Front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:42]]
<nowiki>[31:42]</nowiki>

The czarist regime, an autocratic monarchy which ruled Russia, had already been weakened even before the First World War by the pressure of political reform within the Russian state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

There were a handful of liberal reformers who envisaged that Russia would sort of reform itself in a state resembling Britain or France or the United States. The opponents, among the opponents, of the czar, sort of radical revolutionary socialists, were more numerous and more capable often than were the sort of liberal reformers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:22]]
<nowiki>[32:22]</nowiki>

The disruption that the First World War produces in Russia creates avenues of opportunity for the czar's opponents as the sort of men of the Russian imperial armed forces experience the sort of upheaval and convulsions of war. They become radicalized. The Russian army becomes a sort of potential source of political instability for the state.

=== The Kerensky Regime ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:55]]
<nowiki>[32:55]</nowiki>

And for reasons that are far too complicated to get into today Russia ends up experiencing a revolution early in 1917. The czar abdicates and a liberal regime comes to power under the leadership of {{WPExtract|Alexander Kerensky}}, a progressive, sort of non-Communist politician.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:18]]
<nowiki>[33:18]</nowiki>

This is never a terribly strong regime. But it is a regime that seeks to sort of remake Russia, an authoritarian monarchical society, in a sort of liberal democratic mold.

=== The October Revolution and the Rise of the Bolsheviks ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:31]]
<nowiki>[33:31]</nowiki>

The Kerensky regime does not last a year. It comes to power in February of 1917. In October 1917 it is overthrown in a coup. And the person who overthrows it is {{WPExtract|Vladimir Lenin}} -- the leader of Russia's {{WPExtract|Bolsheviks|Bolshevik}} Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:50]]
<nowiki>[33:50]</nowiki>

The Bolsheviks are a minority faction of the Revolutionary Socialist Left in Russia. This is really important to remember. Lenin does not represent the socialist left in Russia. The socialist left is divided into multiple parties. And Lenin's party represents a small but unusually radical faction of the Russian revolutionary left.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:20]]
<nowiki>[34:20]</nowiki>

It's Lenin's conviction that a determined Communist Party can orchestrate a revolution on its own accord. Most other Russian leftists say: look, this is ridiculous, Russia is a big poor country, we need to wait for Russia to develop, for Russia to industrialize, before trying to create something like a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:43]]
<nowiki>[34:43]</nowiki>

How do you create a socialist society in a predominantly agrarian context? That's what Lenin's critics say. Lenin has no time for this. Lenin says, well, all we have to do is seize control of the state -- is to seize the control of the levers of the power, and we can use the state as an instrument for orchestrating social and economic transformation of the profoundest kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:05]]
<nowiki>[35:05]</nowiki>

This is Lenin's revolutionary theory. It's a theory that tells us that a determined vanguard party can seize control of the state and use the state as an instrument of social and historical transformation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:20]]
<nowiki>[35:20]</nowiki>

This is what Lenin tries to do in October 1917 -- when his Bolsheviks come to power in a coup d'etat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

Lenin in October 1917 seizes control of the state, or at least he seizes control of the state's capital, St. Petersburg, but he does not seize control of the country writ large.

=== The Russian Civil War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:40 ]]
<nowiki>[35:40]</nowiki>

The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 will be followed by a long period of civil war in which anti-Communist White Russians who predominate in the countryside struggle to sort of regain control against the Bolsheviks, the revolutionary Communists, who predominate in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04]</nowiki>

This war ultimately ends in 1921 with the triumph of the Bolsheviks but there is great deal of consequence that happens between 1917 and 1921.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:18 ]]
<nowiki>[36:18]</nowiki>

Great Britain and the United States send limited military forces and economic aid to help the White Russians. This is really important because the Bolsheviks remember that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:31 ]]
<nowiki>[36:31]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Russian Civil War}}, as it is known, also involves an international war. Poland goes to war against Russia in 1919. Essentially what Poland tries to do is to achieve a land grab at Russia's expense while Russia is preoccupied with its internal civil war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:52 ]]
<nowiki>[36:52]</nowiki>

And both of these sort of aspects of the civil war, the war with Poland and the allied intervention are really, really important for sort of shaping the Bolshevik concept of the external world.

=== Conclusion: The Russian Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:09]]
<nowiki>[37:09]</nowiki>

So that's the Russian Revolution in about two minutes. And next let's deal with the transition from Lenin to Stalin in a similarly cursory manner.

== From Lenin to Stalin ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:21 ]]
<nowiki>[37:21]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Vladimir Lenin|Lenin}} is the singular charismatic leader of the Russian Revolution. It's hard to conceive of the Russian Revolution without Lenin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:31]]
<nowiki>[37:31]</nowiki>

His death in 1924 is a catastrophe for the Revolution that he led and for the party that he created, the Bolshevik party. The question of what comes next and what comes after Lenin is a profoundly divisive one amongst Lenin's potential heirs.

=== Leon Trotsky ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:50 ]]
<nowiki>[37:50]</nowiki>

Perhaps Lenin's most sort of brilliant and charismatic would be successor -- {{WPExtract|Leon Trotsky|Trotsky}} -- argues that a continuation of Lenin's work would involve an export of the Russian Revolutionary model to the larger world. Trotsky, who is the one of the figures vying to succeed Lenin, argues that Russia should now take it upon itself to create a sort of global revolutionary front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:17]]
<nowiki>[38:17]</nowiki>

The Bolsheviks, Trotsky argues, should build alliances with Communists in other countries, specifically in Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:25 ]]
<nowiki>[38:25]</nowiki>

Trotsky is sort of concerned that the Russian Revolution having occurred as it did in a poor agrarian country may not survive unless the larger revolution which Marx prophesied -- the revolution in Germany -- also sort of takes place. Consolidating and broadening the gains of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

=== Joseph Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:49 ]]
<nowiki>[38:49]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Joseph Stalin}}, another putative successor to Lenin, takes a very different view of the revolution's future. Whereas Trotsky favors a globalization of the revolution Stalin instead argues that the Bolsheviks should focus upon the construction of an effective socialist system within Russia. His slogan will be socialism in one country.

=== Trotsky and Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:15 ]]
<nowiki>[39:15]</nowiki>

To see the struggle for succession as a struggle between Trotsky and Stalin is an oversimplification, but we don't have time for much else. Ultimately it is Stalin who wins. Stalin wins in large part because he controls the party apparatus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:32 ]]
<nowiki>[39:32]</nowiki>

Trotsky controls the Red Army but Stalin controls the internal sort of bureaucratic apparatus of the party and this proves to be a very useful asset in seizing control of the state.

== Stalin's Rule ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:47 ]]
<nowiki>[39:47]</nowiki>

Having seized control of the party in the mid 1920s, Stalin in the second half of the 1920s, consolidates his personal power. And he does this by first of all purging the Bolshevik left, and by then at the end of the 1920s, turning against the moderates within the Bolshevik Party.

=== The Great Turn ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:05 ]]
<nowiki>[40:05]</nowiki>

As he turns against the moderates, you know those who favor a more gradual transition to socialism, Stalin in 1928 embarks what is known as the {{WPExtract|Great Break (USSR)|Great Turn}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:16 ]]
<nowiki>[40:16]</nowiki>

He launches a five year plan for the rapid industrialization of the country. What Stalin initiates in the late 1920s is an effort to transform the Russian economy, to transform Russian society, through the orchestration of a sort of gargantuan process of top down change.

=== The Transformation of Agriculture and Turning Peasants into Industrial Workers ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:41 ]]
<nowiki>[40:41]</nowiki>

Besides creating new factories, state owned enterprises, Stalin will try to sort of transform Russian agriculture. And this is really important because most Russians in the late 1920s are still peasants.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:56]]
<nowiki>[40:56]</nowiki>

Stalin's purpose is to take these peasants, remove them from the land and transform them into factory workers. After all this is what a Marxist theory of history dictates will happen. Having committed himself to accelerating the transition to communism Stalin will try to transform peasants into industrial workers.

=== The Repression of Joseph Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:21 ]]
<nowiki>[41:21]</nowiki>

Doing this will entail the construction of a vast apparatus of political repression. Having alloyed the party to the power of the state Stalin will turn the instrument of the party-state into a machinery of repression. Who is repressed? Anybody who stands between Stalin and the accomplishment of his sort of radical transformative agenda. Anybody who represents a threat to the personal authority of Joseph Stalin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:59 ]]
<nowiki>[41:59]</nowiki>

The death toll in the 1930s will be catastrophic. The imposition of a forced top down campaign of agricultural collectivization claims millions and millions of victims.

=== The Ukrainian Famine ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:20 ]]
<nowiki>[42:20]</nowiki>

In the Ukraine, which is the most agriculturally productive part of the Soviet Union, Stalin introduces a program of collectivization which forcibly removes peasants from their small plots of land and concentrates them in collective farms. This is done with the purposes of making agricultural production more efficient.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:45]]
<nowiki>[42:45]</nowiki>

In practice, of course, what it enables the state to achieve, is to requisition grain from the peasantry, to take grain from the countryside, and to use it to feed urban workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:57 ]]
<nowiki>[42:57]</nowiki>

As a consequence of the {{WPExtract|Holodomor|famine}} that collectivization causes in the Ukraine about 3 million people die. And those who die are often amongst the youngest and the oldest and the otherwise most vulnerable members of Ukrainian society.

=== Stalin's Campaign of Political Terror ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:17 ]]
<nowiki>[43:17]</nowiki>

Besides the millions of peasants who succumb to the collectivization campaign Stalin launches a campaign of political terror against his political opponents. During the 1930s a series of purges remove and then liquidate individuals and factions whom Stalin considers to be sort of a threat to his own personal authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:45 ]]
<nowiki>[43:45]</nowiki>

The death toll of the purges of the 1930s amounts to the hundreds of thousands. So we're not talking about as many human victims as the campaign of agricultural collectivization produces but we are talking about a campaign of intentional state murder.

=== The Death Toll of Stalinization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:03 ]]
<nowiki>[44:03]</nowiki>

The consequences of Stalinization will be sort of catastrophic in terms of the overall death toll. It's really hard to estimate the total number of human fatalities that we can ascribe to the Stalin regime. One estimate which was sort of put together by a group of admittedly sort of anti-Communist historians about fifteen years ago puts the death toll at somewhere around 20 million human deaths that can be ascribed to the project of Stalinization in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:44]]
<nowiki>[44:44]</nowiki>

It's a death toll that sort of pales by comparison with the death toll that could be ascribed to the Maoist regime in China but that's a topic that we will come to in due course.<ref>One could visit the [[wikipedia:Great_Leap_Forward#Famine_deaths|famine deaths section]] of the Wikipedia article on the {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:55]]
<nowiki>[44:55]</nowiki>

Whatever way you look at it the human costs of Stalinization in the 1930s are very, very high.

== Western Response to the Human Toll of Stalinization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:02 ]]
<nowiki>[45:02]</nowiki>

How does the West react to this? How do Western intellectuals, Western public leaders, respond to the vast human upheaval and human misery that the Stalinist experiment produces in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:20 ]]
<nowiki>[45:20]</nowiki>

Western intellectuals for the most part are not particularly bothered by the crimes of Stalinism. We should remember that the West itself is in the 1930s enmired in a Great Depression. The Soviet system seems for some sympathetic Western intellectuals to represent the wave of the future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:40]]
<nowiki>[45:40]</nowiki>

Some sympathetic Western observers are willing to overlook and disregard the crimes of Stalinism as simply being sort of the necessary [[wikt:detritus|detritus]] of the revolution.

=== Beatrice and Sidney Webb's Laudatory Reports on the Soviet Union ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:57 ]]
<nowiki>[45:57]</nowiki>

Two prominent British socialists, {{WPExtract|Beatrice Webb|Beatrice}} and {{WPExtract|Sidney Webb, 1st Baron Passfield|Sidney Webb}} travel to Russia in the early 1930s and they, on their return to London, publish a very kind of laudatory book titled ''Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?'' which lauds the accomplishments of the Stalinist state and praises Stalin for sort of leading humanity forward into a new era of history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:22 ]]
<nowiki>[46:22]</nowiki>

That represents one reaction to the Soviet project.

=== Western Governments' Hostility to Stalinism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:27 ]]
<nowiki>[46:27]</nowiki>

Western governments on the other hand are much more hostile to Stalinism. We should remember that Great Britain and the United States tried to intervene in the Soviet Union in order to aid the opponents of the revolution after 1917, and the governments of Britain and the United States remain hostile to Bolshevism, to the Soviet Union, through the 1920s and into the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:53]]
<nowiki>[46:53]</nowiki>

The United States does not even recognize the Bolshevik regime as the legitimate government of the Soviet Union until 1933 when {{WPExtract|Franklin D. Roosevelt|Franklin Roosevelt}}, Roosevelt, becomes President of the United States.

== Stalin's Popular Front Strategy ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:06 ]]
<nowiki>[47:06]</nowiki>

Stalin in the 1930s is focused much more upon the accomplishment of rapid domestic transformation than he is upon foreign policy. But he is concerned by the rise of {{WPExtract|fascism}} in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:22]]
<nowiki>[47:22]</nowiki>

In order to sort of create an international coalition to contain the fascist threat Stalin in the mid 1930s promotes what becomes known as a popular front strategy -- a strategy that tries to rally progressives and leftists of all kinds: liberals, socialists, revolutionary as well as non-revolutionary, anarchists, everybody except the Trotskyites, into a broad coalition known as a sort of popular front.<ref>One could visit the [[wikipedia:Popular_front#The_Comintern's_Popular_Front_policy_1934–39|section on the Comintern's Popular Front policy 1934–39 in the Wikipedia article on popular front]]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:55 ]]
<nowiki>[47:55]</nowiki>

It's ironic in some ways that Stalin promotes an ecumenical international strategy at the same time as he is purging his ideological opponents at home, but that is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:07]]
<nowiki>[48:07]</nowiki>

He tries to promote a sort of popular front approach in the 1930s that will rally anti-fascists of all kind into a grand coalition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:19 ]]
<nowiki>[48:19]</nowiki>

The West, or at least the governments of the Western Powers, the French, actually, the French are somewhat more sympathetic to this for a period in 1936, but the British and the Americans have very little interest in joining with the Soviet Union in an anti-fascist popular front. Instead they sort of continue to spurn the USSR.

== The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its Termination ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:41 ]]
<nowiki>[48:41]</nowiki>

Having failed to create a coalition with the West, Stalin will in 1939, sign a pact with Hitler, the {{WPExtract|Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact|Nazi-Soviet Pact}}. This represents a very different kind of response to the fascist threat. Stalin continues to believe that Nazi Germany represents a mortal threat to the Soviet Union but he decides in 1939 to sign a pact with Hitler in the hope of buying time that will enable the Soviet Union to better prepare itself for confrontation with Nazi Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:12]]
<nowiki>[49:12]</nowiki>

This strategy endures until 1941, until June 1941, when Hitler of course invades the Soviet Union -- an invasion that really took Stalin by surprise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:26]]
<nowiki>[49:26]</nowiki>

Stalin had not expected that Hitler would turn on the Soviet Union as quickly as he did. Having been sort of surprised by the Nazi attack Stalin will forge in the early 1940s a grand alliance with Great Britain and the United States for the purposes of waging war against Nazi Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:49]]
<nowiki>[49:49]</nowiki>

But it's really important to remember that the grand alliance emerges in the very unusual circumstance of 1941. Only after Hitler has attacked the Soviet Union will a coalition between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union emerge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:08]]
<nowiki>[50:08]</nowiki>

The democracies in the 1930s had not allied with the Soviet Union for the purposes of containing fascism. That happened only in the context of the Second World War.

== Grand Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies during the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:21]]
<nowiki>[50:21]</nowiki>

The wartime {{WPExtract|Grand Alliance (World War II)|grand alliance}} is highly effective. It ultimately accomplishes the defeat of Nazi Germany but that is not to say that the alliance is without internal friction. There are profound disagreements between the Allies particularly over the issue of the second front. The question of how soon the British and the Americans will attack Nazi Germany and the West is a really contentious issue amongst the wartime allies. Insofar as the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944 is the only power that is waging a land war against Nazi Germany Stalin can't wait for the British and the Americans to join the Second World War to open a second front in France.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:09]]
<nowiki>[51:09]</nowiki>

Because you know Stalin expects that will ease the pressure on Soviet forces in the east -- because Germany's resources will be divided by the opening of the second front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:19]]
<nowiki>[51:19]</nowiki>

The fact that it takes the British and the Americans so long to open a second front is an irritant to Stalin during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:30]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

It should be said, just to give you a little more background on that issue, that the United States under Franklin Roosevelt is eager to open a second front. It's Britain which is really the major obstacle to the opening of a second front earlier than 1944.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:48]]
<nowiki>[51:48]</nowiki>

It's not until 1944 with {{WPExtract|Normandy landings|D-Day}} that the Anglo-Americans finally attack continental Europe, but they do so later than FDR and the United States would have wanted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:01]]
<nowiki>[52:01]</nowiki>

So that is the grand alliance, an alliance that finally brings the Soviet Union together with the Western Democracies, in a coalition intended to defeat Hitlerism.

== From the Grand Alliance to the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:16]]
<nowiki>[52:16]</nowiki>

But this hardly explains why American forces will by the 1950s be permanently stationed in Europe, their mission being the containment of the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:31]]
<nowiki>[52:31]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Elvis Presley}} in the late 1950s has to do military service, and this is a unprecedented thing in the American experience. Never before in the United States had there been a peacetime military draft -- a peacetime military draft which capable of taking a sort of popular entertainment figure like Elvis across the seas to Germany where he would be tasked with sort of serving in the American army of occupation in Germany, in that country.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:09]]
<nowiki>[53:09]</nowiki>

The question of explaining sort of how the United States transitions from the grand alliance, an alliance of convenience with the Soviet Union, to a state of Cold War in which American forces will be permanently located in Europe in order to contain Soviet power is sort of the question of the Cold War's origins.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:32]]
<nowiki>[53:32]</nowiki>

How did we get from the alliance of the early 1940s to the estrangement of the late 1940s? Was that transition inevitable or was it a consequence of specific circumstance and specific choices that might have been made differently that could have produced different kinds of outcomes.

== Origins of the Cold War ==

=== US Aspirations and Goals for the Postwar Era ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:53]]
<nowiki>[53:53]</nowiki>

Let's start by asking what American wanted from the postwar settlement? What kind of world did American leaders want to create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:04]]
<nowiki>[54:04]</nowiki>

It's important to remember that the United States in 1945 is very much the world's dominant power. American military forces are victorious in Europe and Asia. The United States is by far and away the world's predominant economic power as well.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:23]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

What do Americans want to accomplish from this position of paramount power and influence what kind of world does the United States want to create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:35]]
<nowiki>[54:35]</nowiki>

There is a prehistory and it weighs powerfully on the minds of American decision-makers. The experiences of the 1930s, the experiences of a decade in which an integrated global economy broke apart, the experiences of a decade in which America experienced unprecedented economic misery weighs powerfully on the minds of American policy planners as they look at the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:03]]
<nowiki>[55:03]</nowiki>

Americans to put it succinctly want to put the world economy back together. They want to reintegrate a world that came apart in the 1930s and they want to create new international institutions that will superintend an integrated global system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:22]]
<nowiki>[55:22]</nowiki>

There are political aspects to this as well and economic aspects. The primary economic institutional framework which we're going to talk about in more detail next week will be the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}}, the political institution that Americans promote to sort of put the world back together is the {{WPExtract|United Nations}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:44]]
<nowiki>[55:44]</nowiki>

And there is strong, strong public support for the United Nations in the United States during the Second World War. And this may surprise those of you know anything about American attitudes towards the UN today. But during the Second World War leaders of both major parties support active American involvement in the United Nations and public support for the United Nations is overwhelming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:08]]
<nowiki>[56:08]</nowiki>

You know 85% of Americans are strongly in favor of active American involvement in the UN during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:18]]
<nowiki>[56:18]</nowiki>

Americans want to lead the world and they want to make a world safe for globalization. They want a world in which free trade will prevail as a worldwide norm. And this is what the Bretton Woods institutions will try to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:36]]
<nowiki>[56:36]</nowiki>

This commitment to the reintegration of the world is powerfully informed, as I've tried to emphasize, by the experience of the 1930s. Convinced as they are that the American economy requires an open world economy in order to be prosperous American leaders in the 1940s will try to sort of put the world back together, to put the world economy back together, in order to avoid a return to the depression conditions of the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:12]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What should we call this American vision of the postwar world? It's easy enough to pin a label on Stalin's ideological agenda. We simply call it Communism. But what do we call the American ideological project for the postwar world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:29]]
<nowiki>[57:29]</nowiki>

Do we call it sort of a democratic project? There would be good reason to do so. Democracy, self-government, and human rights, are central aspects of the American vision for the postwar world. FDR, after all, talks about four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom of fear, which he argues everybody in the entire world should enjoy at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:56]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

So there's a strong sort of democratic aspect to the American vision of the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:02]]
<nowiki>[58:02]</nowiki>

It's also a liberal vision, liberal in the sense that it promotes free trade, free economic exchange as a universal standard. It's a capitalist vision too. The United States is an economy in which the means of production reside in private hands. Americans presume capitalism to be sort of the natural condition of a market society and the condition best configured to produce widespread growth and prosperity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:35]]
<nowiki>[58:35]</nowiki>

So this is a world order that will be democratic, liberal, and capitalist.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:40]]
<nowiki>[58:40]</nowiki>

But it's also a world order that defines itself in opposition to its antagonist. It is anti-Communist. It is opposed in the world vision that Stalin projects. So whether we call this an anti-Communist liberalism, or capitalist democracy, what the United States tries to create is a sort of liberal democratic world order in which the private sort of market economy will prevail.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:12]]
<nowiki>[59:12]</nowiki>

I would suggest that sort of Cold War liberalism is as succinct a label as any other for this ideological synthesis, but you can call it whatever you like. The key elements will be sort of individual rights, democratic self-government, capitalist economics and, and this is sort of interesting -- a modicum of welfare protection for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:37]]
<nowiki>[59:37]</nowiki>

It's really important to remember that the experience of the 1930s tempers American capitalism in important ways. Roosevelt creates an array of new social protections for workers in the United States. Social Security for example is introduced in 1935. Extensive new regulations are introduced, to provide say, a minimum price for farm production, and the international synthesis that the United States offers in the mid 1940s is very much a product of the New Deal era transformation of American capitalism. In a sense what American leaders in the 1940s propose to do is to make the lessons of the New Deal globally applicable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:26]]
<nowiki>[60:26]</nowiki>

So this Cold War liberal synthesis, this capitalist anti-Communist synthesis, is a synthesis which includes a sort of range of social protections as well as protections for property and political rights.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:43]]
<nowiki>[60:43]</nowiki>

And it's a synthesis that American leaders hold to be universally applicable. It's a synthesis that manifests itself in particular institutions: Bretton Woods and the United Nations. These are institutions that are conceived respectively in New Hampshire and San Francisco.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:02]]
<nowiki>[61:02]</nowiki>

The sites of conception tell you something about the influence of the United States upon the postwar design. None of this is to say that Americans act in isolation when they create a new order for the postwar world. Non-Americans play really important roles in the construction of the postwar institutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:23]]
<nowiki>[61:23]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes}}, about whom we're going to talk a great deal more, is instrumental to the creation of the Bretton Woods settlement. {{WPExtract|Jan Smuts}} a South African political leader is one of the central figures involved in the creation of the United Nations, so non-Americans are crucial to this postwar project too.

=== The Soviet Union and American Goals and Aspirations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:41 ]]
<nowiki>[61:41]</nowiki>

But if South African politicians and British economists can assimilate themselves relatively easily to an American led world order the role of the Soviet Union in this Americanized postwar world is much less clear.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:01]]
<nowiki>[62:01]</nowiki>

Will the Soviet Union be able to participate in the open and integrated world that American leaders project and hope to create? Franklin Roosevelt hopes that cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:17 ]]
<nowiki>[62:17]</nowiki>

Whether Roosevelt was guilty of sort of wishful thinking in imagining that it might is something that we'll have to answer for ourselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:29]]
<nowiki>[62:29]</nowiki>

But there are key questions to be answered. At the end of the Second World War, in August 1945, there are sort of key questions that will ultimately determine the extent to which the Soviet Union participates in the Americanized postwar order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:43 ]]
<nowiki>[62:43]</nowiki>

Will the Soviet Union, for example, join the {{WPExtract|International Monetary Fund}}? To do so would be to commit the Soviet Union to participating in a liberal world economy. Will the United States provide material assistance to the Soviet Union? Aid to facilitate the USSR's recovery from the Second World War and to sort of facilitate the accommodation of the Soviet Union to a liberal US led international order?

=== Context at the End of the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:12 ]]
<nowiki>[63:12]</nowiki>

These are important questions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:14 ]]
<nowiki>[63:14]</nowiki>

The world in which these questions will be answered is a world transformed by the outcome of the Second World War. Europe in August 1945 is dominated by external powers. In the east, it's dominated by the Red Army, which pushes through Eastern Europe all the way to Central Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:42]]
<nowiki>[63:42]</nowiki>

In the west, the forces of the US Army, and the British Army hold sway over the other half of the continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:52]]
<nowiki>[63:52]</nowiki>

The future of the continent and the future of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States will hinge upon, sort of, choices.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:06]]
<nowiki>[64:06]</nowiki>

We've talked about the ways in which the expectations and visions of the two sides for the postwar world might vary, but the outcomes of this conflicting set of expectations will ultimately depend upon the choices that historical actors, leaders for the most part, end up making.

=== Deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Relations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:29 ]]
<nowiki>[64:29]</nowiki>

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States begin to deteriorate fairly quickly -- even before the end of 1945. The reasons for this are complicated.

==== Soviet Occupation of Eastern Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:46]]
<nowiki>[64:46]</nowiki>

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe is offensive to American public opinion. As Americans who have fought for the freedom of Europe see the Red Army sort of ride roughshod over democratic freedoms in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, American public opinion always somewhat suspicious of the Soviet Union, turns fairly hard against Stalin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:09]]
<nowiki>[65:09]</nowiki>

The occupation of Eastern Europe, as it proceeds, sort of conjures the specter of an Eastern Europe dominated by Soviet imperial power. And Americans ask themselves, with some reason, whether this is what they fought the Second World War to accomplish? Of course they're not in much of a position to do anything about it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:33 ]]
<nowiki>[65:33]</nowiki>

What can the United States do? Could continue to provide aid to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it could attach political conditions to that assistance, but it does not.

==== Termination of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:44]]
<nowiki>[65:44]</nowiki>

In August 1945, immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities, the United States cancels the lend-lease assistance program under which material aid had been sent to the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:58 ]]
<nowiki>[65:58]</nowiki>

The reasons that it does that are fairly straightforward and they have to do with domestic policy. The Congress doesn't want to continue to fund an assistance program to the Soviet Union after the war has been won. But the cancellation of lend-lease sort of comes as an affront to Stalin and to the Soviet leadership.

==== The Soviet Union's Absence from Bretton Woods ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:18 ]]
<nowiki>[66:18]</nowiki>

In December 1945 the Soviet Union decides that it not will participate in the Bretton Woods institutions. The Soviet decision not to participate in Bretton Woods is understandable enough. What Stalin has tried to construct in the 1930s is a very centralized planned economy in which all production is owned by the state. The Soviet economy, as it developed in the 1930s, was almost entirely separated from the larger world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:52]]
<nowiki>[66:52]</nowiki>

Insofar as the Bretton Woods institutions envisage the reintegration of the world economy it's not likely that the Soviet planned and closed economy could be easily assimilated to them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:05]]
<nowiki>[67:05]</nowiki>

But Stalin's announcement of Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods nonetheless marks an important turning point. It sort of marks a clear declaration on the Soviet Union's part that the Soviet Union will not participate in the open integrated postwar world order that the United States starts to build.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:27 ]]
<nowiki>[67:27]</nowiki>

Subsequent to this declaration in 1945, in December 1945, of Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods, there begins to be, sort of more powerful discursive acknowledgment, on both sides of the inevitably of postwar estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Stalin in February 1946...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:50]]
<nowiki>[67:50]</nowiki>

(Student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:58]]
<nowiki>[67:58]</nowiki>

No, it really was that key in the postwar world. You're absolutely right to caution against reading history from a particular national standpoint. But the power, importance, and influence of the United States in 1945 I don't think can be overstated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:16 ]]
<nowiki>[68:16]</nowiki>

This is not like 1919. At the end of the First World War the United States is one of several victorious powers. In 1945 the United States really is the victorious power. The West Europeans are absolutely devastated by the war. They look to the United States to restore prosperity, to provide security.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:35]]
<nowiki>[68:35]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union is the only power that begins to compare with the United States in terms of its wealth and military capabilities in 1945. But it's a poor second.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:45 ]]
<nowiki>[68:45]</nowiki>

So I would not in this case want you to sort of avoid focusing on the United States as a central aspect of the international settlement because of a sort of wariness of reading history through an American lens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:04]]
<nowiki>[69:04]</nowiki>

When we sort of come to talk a little bit more about the West Europeans will see just how dependent they believed themselves to be on the United States.

==== Soviet Hostility to Capitalism and the United States ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:12 ]]
<nowiki>[69:12]</nowiki>

So Stalin in February 1946 gives a speech called The Election Speech, even through there was no real election, in which he denounced capitalism and denounced the United States, accusing the capitalists of seeking to encircle and destroy the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:31 ]]
<nowiki>[69:31]</nowiki>

This was not unprecedented. He had offered similar speeches in the 1930s but coming after the Second World War it represented a reversion to a sort of hostile rhetoric which had been dormant for the duration of the war itself.

==== George Kennan and the Long Telegram ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:47]]
<nowiki>[69:47]</nowiki>

The next month, in March 1946, {{WPExtract|George F. Kennan|George Kennan}}, the attaché at the US embassy in Moscow sends to the State Department a document which has become known as the {{WPExtract|X Article|"Long Telegram"}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:00]]
<nowiki>[70:00]</nowiki>

It's still the longest telegram that the State Department has ever received from one of its officers overseas. And in it Kennan offered a very lengthy analysis of Soviet behavior. His central point is that the Soviet Union is intractably opposed to the liberal integrated postwar order that the United States wants to build.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:22]]
<nowiki>[70:22]</nowiki>

Kennan argues that it's foolish to even try to integrate the Soviet Union to the US led postwar design. Instead he argues the Soviet Union should be carefully contained.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:32]]
<nowiki>[70:32]</nowiki>

Note that Kennan does not say that the Soviet Union should be confronted through military means. Kennan simply says that the United States ought to focus on building up the strength of its allies, on building a Europe which that will be sort of resilient in the face of Soviet power.

==== Winston Churchill and the Iron Curtain Speech ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:50]]
<nowiki>[70:50]</nowiki>

Later that month, later in March 1946, Winston Churchill, who's no longer the Prime Minister of Great Britain, he lost an election at the end of the Second World War, but he's still a public figure of great consequence, gives a public speech in Fulton, Missouri.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:06]]
<nowiki>[71:06]</nowiki>

Sitting next to him on the podium is Harry Truman -- the President of the United States of America. In this speech Churchill offers an analysis of the European situation. He proclaims that an iron curtain has divided the European continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:20]]
<nowiki>[71:20]</nowiki>

And this is the first sort of very public acknowledgment by a leading Western politician that Europe has been sort of irrevocably divided between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:34]]
<nowiki>[71:34]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of growing rhetorical acknowledgment of a situation of Cold War on both sides in the early months of 1946.

==== Conflict Between the Soviet Union and the US in Iran and Turkey ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:45]]
<nowiki>[71:45]</nowiki>

Later that year the two sides, East and West, begin to encounter, serious substantive crises.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:52]]
<nowiki>[71:52]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union in September refuses to withdraw occupation troops from Northern Turkey. The United States sides powerfully with the Turkish government and eventually helps to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed forces from Turkey.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:06]]
<nowiki>[72:06]</nowiki>

I'm sorry I got that a little bit mixed up. That happens in Iran at the end of the year.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:12]]
<nowiki>[72:12]</nowiki>

What happens in Turkey is that there is a, is that the Soviet Union demands passage for Soviet naval vessels through the {{WPExtract|Dardanelles|Dardanelles Straits}}.<ref>See also [[wikipedia:Dardanelles#Turkish_republican_and_modern_eras_(1923–present)|the Wikipedia article on the Dardanelles in the section on Turkish republican and modern eras (1923–present)]]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:21]]
<nowiki>[72:21]</nowiki>

The Turkish government is unwilling to grant this and the United States stands with the Turkish government and US support bolsters Turkish resolve and ultimately that concession is not granted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:35]]
<nowiki>[72:35]</nowiki>

But in both circumstances the dynamic is basically the same. The Soviet government makes demands against its neighbors, Turkey and Iran, and the United States stands by the affected countries and sort of helps to persuade local leaders to stand firm and to reject Soviet demands for territorial and military concessions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:58]]
<nowiki>[72:58]</nowiki>

<span id="iron_curtain_speech">I'm not going to play that because we're running out of time but I have a video clip of Churchill speaking at Fulton and I can put it online for you.</span>

{{#ev:youtube| https://youtu.be/5QuSXZTo3Uo||center}}

== Tumult in Europe After the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:07]]
<nowiki>[73:07]</nowiki>

Okay, so as relations between the two sides become more fractious during 1945 and into 1946 the attention of American policy planners comes to fixate more and more upon Europe. Europe was devastated by the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:25]]
<nowiki>[73:25]</nowiki>

Capital plant was destroyed, the economy is in chaos, there is widespread price instability, a lack of convertible currency. Europe is in a state of great tumult.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:36]]
<nowiki>[73:36]</nowiki>

It's not only Europe's economy that is in crisis. European societies have been torn apart by the Second World War. They've been torn apart and they are being put back together in altered configurations.

=== Ethnic Cleansing in the Postwar Period ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:49]]
<nowiki>[73:49]</nowiki>

Europe during and after the Second World War experiences a prolonged bout of what we might euphemistically describe as ethnic cleansing. The most notorious effort to ethnically cleanse Europe is of course Adolf Hitler's. But ethnic cleansing in Europe does not end with Hitler's suicide in a Berlin bunker.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:08]]
<nowiki>[74:08]</nowiki>

With the end of the Second World War, the Germans who inhabit the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, the Germans whose presence in Poland had provided Hitler with a sort of justification, specious as it was, for the invasion of Poland will be ejected from the countries which they have long inhabited.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:30]]
<nowiki>[74:30]</nowiki>

The ejection of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe is one of the major aspects to the postwar European sort of ethnic sorting that is a powerful legacy of the war itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:46]]
<nowiki>[74:46]</nowiki>

It's not only Germans who are ejected from Eastern Europe. Poland ejects the few surviving Jews who have survived Hitler's Holocaust. It says that they have no place in the postwar Polish state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:59]]
<nowiki>[74:59]</nowiki>

The logic of ethnic cleansing in postwar Europe produces a continent that is sort of by 1947-48, more ethnically homogeneous that at any other point in its history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:12]]
<nowiki>[75:12]</nowiki>

It's ironic in a way that postwar Central and East European governments ultimately accomplish and realize what Hitler set out to do.

=== Europe in the Winter of 1946-47 ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:21]]
<nowiki>[75:21]</nowiki>

This forced movement of populations exacerbates the economic and social instability of Europe. It doesn't help that the winter of 1946-47 is one of the coldest winters in European history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:35]]
<nowiki>[75:35]</nowiki>

Transportation links, canals, and railroads freeze and become inoperable. It becomes very difficult to move food from ports and storage depots to markets. By consequence Europe experiences widespread starvation. Millions of people subsist in refugee camps. Displaced persons camps operated by the United Nations and funded almost entirely the United States.

=== American Fears that European Tumult Will Lead to Gains for Socialists and Communists ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:00]]
<nowiki>[76:00]</nowiki>

This is a very volatile situation. Europe in the winter of 1946-47 does not appear to be recovering from the Second World War. On the contrary, Europe's economic situation, its political tumult, appear to be getting worse.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:16]]
<nowiki>[76:16]</nowiki>

American policy planners fear that this upheaval and uncertainty in Europe's affairs will ultimately produce gains for Communist parties in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:31]]
<nowiki>[76:31]</nowiki>

You know disenchanted, disillusioned hopeless people, so the logic goes, may ultimately end up voting for radical political alternatives, for socialists and Communists, who promise a radical new order of things.

== Allied Postwar Policy Concerning Germany ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:44]]
<nowiki>[76:44]</nowiki>

There are also major geostrategic issues to be confronted -- none greater than the question of Germany. What ultimately is to be done with Germany?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:55]]
<nowiki>[76:55]</nowiki>

Germany as we've already acknowledged, you know, in the first meeting of this class, is a problem for Europe's international relations. Germany is too big, too powerful, to be easily contained by a European balance of power. Germany twice in the space of a generation in 1914 and in 1939 tried to conquer Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:18]]
<nowiki>[77:18]</nowiki>

Can Germany continue to exist as a unified state or should Germany be dismantled? Be transformed into a number of successor states which would presumably be less threatening to the overall European balance of power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:33]]
<nowiki>[77:33]</nowiki>

This is one of the really big questions that American and British and French and Russian policy makers face at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:41]]
<nowiki>[77:41]</nowiki>

How to keep Germany down? How to stop Germany from ever again threatening the peace of Europe?

=== Allied Occupation of Germany ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:48]]
<nowiki>[77:48]</nowiki>

The initial interim answer to that question is a joint occupation. At the end of the Second World War Germany is divided into four occupation zones: a Soviet occupation zone in the east, an American occupation zone in the south, a French occupation zone in the west, and a British occupation zone in the north.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:07]]
<nowiki>[78:07]</nowiki>

But this is only an interim solution. It's clearly not the case that the four victorious powers can continue to occupy Germany indefinitely.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:18]]
<nowiki>[78:18]</nowiki>

But there's no clear political solution in 1945. A long term political future for Germany remains to be determined.

=== Germany's Political Future and Europe's Economic Future ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:27]]
<nowiki>[78:27]</nowiki>

But the question of Germany's political future is intimately linked to the question of Europe's economic future, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:35]]
<nowiki>[78:35]</nowiki>

Europe is devastated, it's economically distraught at the end of the Second World War, and the catastrophe that is Germany doesn't help matters. Because Germany is not only Europe's dominant sort of political force. It's also the heart of the European economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:51]]
<nowiki>[78:51]</nowiki>

Can Europe recover economically without German recovery? After all Germany is the center of Europe's industrial production. The factories of the Ruhr in Western Germany are the center of the European industrial economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:08]]
<nowiki>[79:08]</nowiki>

French and Belgian and Dutch industry is intimately linked to German industry. Whether Western Europe can recover without some rehabilitation of Germany is you know a good question and the obvious answer is no it cannot.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:27]]
<nowiki>[79:27]</nowiki>

So the dilemma that the victorious allies face at the end of the Second World War, is the dilemma of how to rehabilitate Germany without restoring German political power. Can you make Germany a vibrant sort of economic center of Europe again without sort of unleashing the potential political and military power of a would be European hegemon.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:54]]
<nowiki>[79:54]</nowiki>

(Student question)

That comes much later. It comes subsequent to a process of Cold War division. But you're absolutely right that the creation of European wide institutions will be the ultimate answer to that question.

== Cold War Division of Europe and Division of East Asia for Next Lecture ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:09]]
<nowiki>[80:09]</nowiki>

To understand how we get to that question we have to think about how the Cold War divides Europe, which we should have done at the end of this lecture, but we'll do it on Thursday at the beginning of that lecture. And then we'll go and talk about sort of the parallel division of East Asia.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2021-12-15T06:55:39Z

DavidKitFriedman: Looking back the paragraph on the word definitions seems a little awkward, and so that can be removed.

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, word definitions, and occasionally embedded images and video.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a productive edit to make on a Wikipedia page or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2021-12-15T06:52:38Z

DavidKitFriedman: Simple changes can usually be done quickly, and fixing a broken link could be a productive edit to make to a Wikipedia page or to a wiki page, but more substantial changes to the this wiki may not be worth it.

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, and occasionally embedded images and video.

Consistent with this as an experiment in creating both a research resource and an educational resource links to definitions are provided for words that people who access the site might not be familiar with.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, or if there's a broken link and the new URL is easily obtained that could be a productive edit to make on a Wikipedia page or a wiki page. More substantial changes and fixes to this wiki may not be worth it though. Depending on how things go I might not get to it for a few weeks or a month.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2021-12-15T06:47:59Z

DavidKitFriedman: I just now changed passwords for the accounts on the wiki.

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, and occasionally embedded images and video.

Consistent with this as an experiment in creating both a research resource and an educational resource links to definitions are provided for words that people who access the site might not be familiar with.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, but if there are more significant changes I might defer on it because I don't feel I have the time.

My pattern has been to check my email approximately once every 7-14 days, so it might be up to a few weeks before I would get to it.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

For security I changed all the passwords for the accounts on this wiki, but if any of the people to whom I sent login credentials would like to have access or to talk about any changes then feel free to email me at the address mentioned above and include "AcLeTr:" in the subject.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 06:47, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s

2020-05-14T05:27:00Z

DavidKitFriedman: Just added that according to Quote Investigator Sinatra's opinion of Elvis Presley changed over time, and that he later had kind words for him.

== The Affluence of the West ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:00 ]]
<nowiki>[00:00]</nowiki>

Start by sort of recapitulating the accomplishments of the era of extensive growth that came to an end in the 1960s. I'm going to begin with {{WPExtract|Harold Wilson}}, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, who famously proclaimed in 1959, "you've never had it so good".

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:18 ]]
<nowiki>[00:18]</nowiki>

And it was the British public who'd never had it so good in Wilson's formula. What Wilson intended to say when he ... I'm sorry it wasn't Harold Wilson it was Macmillan, {{WPExtract|Harold Macmillan}}, the British Prime Minister. What Macmillan meant to say when he said you never had it so good was that the British public in 1959 had enjoyed an extraordinary period, 15 years, of widespread rising affluence -- of sustained growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:47 ]]
<nowiki>[00:47]</nowiki>

This was an experience that was replicated broadly. After all real incomes rise substantially throughout the West in the decades after the Second World War. Between 1950 and 1973 German wages triple. Italian wages rise even more than that. They rise more than threefold. Even in Great Britain wages double. And Britain is one of the countries whose economic performance after the Second World War is least impressive when situated in a comparative perspective.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:20 ]]
<nowiki>[01:20]</nowiki>

The rising affluence that ordinary citizens in Western Europe, the United States and Japan experience after the Second World War has you know important cultural and social consequences. I mean the economic trend lines are impressive enough. But think about the range of expanded, the expanded range of amenities that consumers are able to purchase with these rising real incomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:46 ]]
<nowiki>[01:47]</nowiki>

The postwar decades, the 1950s and the 1960s will be a decade of mass affluence. Households will purchase labor saving devices like you know refrigerators and washing machines. Before the Second World War these things, as you've read, were anomalies in ordinary European homes. By the late 1960s most European homes had basic labor saving devices like washing machines.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:13 ]]
<nowiki>[02:13]</nowiki>

They also had televisions. You know sources of entertainment which previously had been sort of unavailable even unimaginable. It's not just labor saving household devices and entertainment devices that are becoming sort of widespread in postwar Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:30 ]]
<nowiki>[02:30]</nowiki>

It's also source<ref>Speaker possibly meant "of course" there instead of "source".</ref> you know mobility devices, automobile ownership becomes fairly commonplace in postwar Europe. Look at how automobile ownership increases in Britain, Italy and France after the 1950s. In 1950 there are very few automobiles on Italian roads. By 1970 there are you know almost 12 million automobiles in Italy. This isn't quite an automobile for every family but it's approaching that level of automobile ownership.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:01 ]]
<nowiki>[03:01]</nowiki>

And this is a you know common experience in the West. People who don't you know who are not able to afford automobiles, young people for example, have other you know kinds of mobility device: scooters. Actually a terrific mobility device in Berkeley where the weather is good and it's free to park scooters.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:19 ]]
<nowiki>[03:20]</nowiki>

But this is not entirely facetious because the rise of scooter ownership amongst young people in Europe has cultural consequences too. Right insofar as it gives scooter owners a degree of mobility independent from the family it facilitates the development of what you might call sort of an autonomous youth culture once young people are able to you know travel beyond their homes to meet with each other -- something which you know scooters permit. Then it becomes easier for you know young people, the baby boomers, to generate sort of an autonomous youth culture.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:56 ]]
<nowiki>[03:56]</nowiki>

So this is you know consequential. Besides the affluence that you know postwar growth produces and the amenities that you know capitalism provides in the form of you know cars, household appliances, entertainment devices and so on the postwar decades, the 1950s and the 1960s, will also be characterized by the expansion of public provision for individual and familial well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:25 ]]
<nowiki>[04:25]</nowiki>

These are decades of expanding welfare commitments, of expanding social spending, throughout the Western world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:35 ]]
<nowiki>[04:35]</nowiki>

Government mobilizes itself to sustain high levels of employment. This is an era in which government's target, the expansion of employment, as the primary sort of purpose for public economic policy. In the United States even the federal government makes a formal commitment to target full employment as the basic goal of macroeconomic policy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:58 ]]
<nowiki>[04:58]</nowiki>

It's a goal that is somewhat sort of qualified in the United States in its implementation but West European governments do much the same thing. They orchestrate public policy around the production of full employment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:11 ]]
<nowiki>[05:11]</nowiki>

For those who are not employed, for those who are retired, governments provide pensions, Social Security for elderly people. Even health care is provided. We've already talked about how the British government in the aftermath of the Second World War creates a national service of health care -- the National Health Service or NHS.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:30 ]]
<nowiki>[05:30]</nowiki>

In the United States there's no public health care, no universal public health care, but important strides are taken by the Johnson administration in the 1960s to provide health care for the elderly and the indigent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:44 ]]
<nowiki>[05:44]</nowiki>

Medicare is established in 1965 to provide guaranteed health care for retired people. Medicaid provides health care for the indigent. The absence of universal public health care in the United States might make the United States look like something of an outlier but you should remember that this is a period when you know many working Americans hold good unionized jobs which provide health care at the...via through an employer rather than through the state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:13 ]]
<nowiki>[06:13]</nowiki>

So the method of providing health care in the United States might be a little different from what it is in Europe. Private employers take on more responsibility in the United States than they do in Western Europe or Japan but the end result is essentially comparable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:30 ]]
<nowiki>[06:30]</nowiki>

Americans have access to sort of affordable high quality health care plans; at least if they're fortunate enough to hold down jobs with Ford or General Motors and so on and so forth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:41 ]]
<nowiki>[06:41]</nowiki>

So in terms of social provision too, the postwar era, the era of the 1950s and the 1960s, will be an era of expanding expectations and expanding commitments. By the late 1960s however strains in this golden age are beginning to show. If we look at the era from sort of 1950 through 1973 in a larger perspective, this is a chart that we've seen before, then it stands out throughout the Western world as an era of high sustained, of sustained high growth rates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:18 ]]
<nowiki>[07:18]</nowiki>

By the late 1970s the end of this era, sorry, by the late 1960s, the end of this era of sustained high growth will be approaching. And this will be a sort of traumatic transition. And it's on this transition, from an era of sustained high growth rates, to an era of diminished growth rates that we will be focusing today.

== Opposition to Postwar Abundance and Postwar Prosperity ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:40 ]]
<nowiki>[07:40]</nowiki>

But it's important to remember that even in the 1960s which in many respects was the heyday of the postwar golden years there were critiques of postwar abundance, postwar prosperity, that manifest themselves on both the left and the right. And these critiques sort of merit sustained attention.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:02 ]]
<nowiki>[08:02]</nowiki>

As they you know tell us something about the partial nature of postwar political economic accomplishments as well as sort of illuminating sort of the deep origins of political critiques of economic statism in our own times.

=== Critique from the Left ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:22 ]]
<nowiki>[08:22]</nowiki>

So let's start with the sort of left critique of postwar prosperity and abundance. In 1958 the economist {{WPExtract|John Kenneth Galbraith}} publishes a book titled ''The Affluent Society''.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:35 ]]
<nowiki>[08:35]</nowiki>

It's a very influential and very subtle critique of the postwar culture of economic abundance. And Galbraith argues in this book that policymakers and the general public alike, and this is true not just in the United States but also in Western Europe as Galbraith sees it, have privileged the production of economic growth over a more expansive concept of human development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:00 ]]
<nowiki>[09:00]</nowiki>

He argues that policymakers and publics alike are preoccupied with what he characterizes as a cult of GDP, a cult of gross domestic product. They're concerned with expanding the size of the economy but are overlooking the more qualitative aspects of economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:19 ]]
<nowiki>[09:19]</nowiki>

Galbraith argues for example that the breakneck rush to produce growth has led you know Western governments to disregard for example the ecological consequences of growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:31 ]]
<nowiki>[09:31]</nowiki>

What does growth deliver, Galbraith asks, when it comes at the cost of economic, of ecological pollution that contaminates our rivers, and our you know sort of wilderness areas.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:43 ]]
<nowiki>[09:43]</nowiki>

This is a critique that is in some ways ahead of its time. By you know the late 1950s there is still not as yet widespread attention being paid to the ecological consequences of industrial capitalism. But Galbraith sounds themes that will resonate sort of more and more powerfully in the years to come.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[10:06]</nowiki>

When Robert Kennedy runs for the Presidency of the United States for example in 1968 he will talk about the cult of GDP. And will argue that you know the United States should pursue so more holistic, more qualitative measure of economic and human development. He also discusses the sort of ecological consequences of high sustained growth as an issue with which Americans ought to be concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:35 ]]
<nowiki>[10:35]</nowiki>

So Galbraith raises questions that will resonate sort of more and more powerfully in the years to come.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:41 ]]
<nowiki>[10:42]</nowiki>

Other critics of postwar capitalism discuss the perseverance of economic inequalities amidst abundance and plenty. Here no book is more influential than Michael Harrington's ''The Other America'' which is published in 1962.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:00 ]]
<nowiki>[11:00]</nowiki>

Have any of you read Harrington's ''The Other America''? Or even heard of the book?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:07 ]]
<nowiki>[11:07]</nowiki>

Okay, a few of you have heard of the book. And what Harrington does is to sort of dissemble the economics of plenty that you know represent the mainstream experience of postwar American growth. A typical American family experience the postwar decades as a period of great abundance but Harrington argues that there are many Americans who have been left behind by...the remarkable rates of sustained growth and sustained prosperity that the economy as a whole experiences after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:45 ]]
<nowiki>[11:45]</nowiki>

Harrington juxtaposes the perseverance of poverty, rural poverty, in you know Appalachian Tennessee for example, urban poverty in the inner cities of the United States, with the remarkable abundance and plenty that sort of the mainstream experiences during the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:06 ]]
<nowiki>[12:06]</nowiki>

Harrington makes what might be best characterized as a moral case for public attentiveness to poverty and for its amelioration. This is an argument which will inform federal policy during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:22 ]]
<nowiki>[12:22]</nowiki>

Lyndon Johnson as President of the United States declares a war on poverty in 1964. Johnson introduces a series of new programs, aid for families with dependent children for example, Medicaid, is another example. That are intended to redress sort of the worst inequalities that exist in the abundant affluent United States of the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:47 ]]
<nowiki>[12:47]</nowiki>

That public policy becomes more oriented towards the needs of the marginal, the needs of the impoverished, during the 1960s is in part a reflection of the influence that people like Harrington have. Harrington sort of draws the public's attention to the endurance of poverty amidst a culture of economic abundance and plenty.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:11 ]]
<nowiki>[13:11]</nowiki>

There are other kinds of critiques too. Critiques that have less to do with the emissions. What Harrington is really concerned about is those who live on the margins of an affluent society. There are other critics who engage the affluent society itself and argue that the whole you know sort of edifice is misbegotten -- even fatally flawed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:34 ]]
<nowiki>[13:34]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Herbert Marcuse}} for example, a sort of social theorist on the radical left, argues that capitalism creates a culture of consumption that is ultimately detrimental to more authentic human wants. Marcuse argues that even you know sort of people who seem to be doing relatively well in America in the 1950s and 1960s are you know in a sense being duped by advertising, being duped by the culture of false needs, that capitalism creates into sort of you know prostrating themselves before a culture of mass abundance, a culture of mass consumption.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:14 ]]
<nowiki>[14:14]</nowiki>

And Marcuse argues that this is ultimately sort of detrimental to the satisfaction of real human needs. He says that people should not be so concerned with acquisition, with consumerism, and they should be more concerned with satisfying you know sort of more elemental, more basic human needs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:32 ]]
<nowiki>[14:32]</nowiki>

Of course one of the illusive aspects of Marcuse's argument is what these real needs are. He offers a more incisive critique of mass consumer society than he provides a sort of cogent explanation of what the alternatives to it would be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:50 ]]
<nowiki>[14:50]</nowiki>

But Marcuse is nonetheless influential, particularly amongst the young, amongst you know sort of people who have coming, people who are coming of age, in the early 1960s and who rebel against the culture of mass consumption, the culture of mass affluence, to which their you know parents' generation is so closely tethered and associated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:13 ]]
<nowiki>[15:13]</nowiki>

It's not only on the left that thinkers and theorists during the 1960s move to critique and condemn the culture of mass affluence, the culture of mass consumption, that emerges in the West after the Second World War.

=== Critique from the Right ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29 ]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

There's also a conservative critique that merits our attention. In large part because it's the conservative critique that over the next thirty years proves to be the more influential. Our politics today have been far more powerfully shaped by a conservative critique of the mass consumer, mass production society of the 1950s and 1960s, than they have been shaped by the sort of left radical critique that Marcuse offers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:56 ]]
<nowiki>[15:57]</nowiki>

I'm going to show you a you know quick video clip which features Ronald Reagan speaking at the 1964 Republican convention. And it's an interesting speech which we'll sort of view an excerpt of because Reagan launches a sort of frontal assault on the political economy of sort of postwar managed capitalism. Reagan is particularly critical of the role of the state in the management of the macroeconomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:29 ]]
<nowiki>[16:29]</nowiki>

He's critical of the role of the state in the production of economic abundance and plenty. Little of what Reagan says is truly original. Reagan is in a sense recapitulating and repackaging a critique of political economic [[wikt:statism|statism]] that {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek|Hayek}} formulated at the sort of moment of departure for the Keynesian welfare state in the mid-1940s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:53 ]]
<nowiki>[16:53]</nowiki>

But Reagan's critique repackaged as it is turns out to be very influential as it inspires sort of a generation of conservatives, young conservatives in particular, to sort of challenge what had been a sort of center-right accommodation with the political economy of the welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:16 ]]
<nowiki>[17:16]</nowiki>

Eisenhower during the 1950s and the Christian Democrats in Europe agree to accept...I'm sorry...the innovations of...I'm sorry I've got something stuck in my throat. I should have brought some water.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:35 ]]
<nowiki>[17:35]</nowiki>

Maybe one of the...could one of the GSIs go try to find me some water? That would be great.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:40 ]]
<nowiki>[17:40]</nowiki>

Okay, thank you.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:42 ]]
<nowiki>[17:42]</nowiki>

Don't infer that there's any political implication to the point in the lecture at which I had something stuck in my throat. (laughter from the class).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:52 ]]
<nowiki>[17:53]</nowiki>

There's really not.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:55 ]]
<nowiki>[17:55]</nowiki>

So, conservative political leaders in the 1950s, and Eisenhower is a good example but we could also talk about the experience of Christian Democracy in Europe, accommodate themselves to the accomplishments of the postwar welfare state. Eisenhower doesn't try to roll back the New Deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16 ]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

On the contrary he sees New Deal programs, New Deal institutions, as a source of stability for American society. You know in the context of the Cold War this makes particular sense.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:29 ]]
<nowiki>[18:29]</nowiki>

Similarly in Western Europe {{WPExtract|Konrad Adenauer|Konrad Adenauer}} presides over, you know, what Germans describe as a social market economy, an economy which will be capitalist, which will be a market economy, but in which the government will also take substantial responsibility for providing for the basic economic needs of the citizenry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:52 ]]
<nowiki>[18:52]</nowiki>

This entails a historical expansion in the fiscal role and responsibilities of the state. Thank you.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:01 ]]
<nowiki>[19:02]</nowiki>

Thank you very much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:03 ]]
<nowiki>[19:03]</nowiki>

That's better.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:10 ]]
<nowiki>[19:10]</nowiki>

And one of the things that Reagan does in 1964 when he speaks on Barry Goldwater's behalf to the Republican National Convention is to assault sort of the conventional wisdom that politics have converged around a sort of centrist consensus, a consensus in which there will be a you know capitalist market economy, but in which the state will also take on substantial responsibility for meeting the basic needs of citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:42 ]]
<nowiki>[19:43]</nowiki>

Reagan argues that the rise of economic statism represents a you know troubling departure in sort of the history of you know the capitalist economy. And he argues that it's time to pull back, it's time to begin to reduce the scale of the state, so as to restore sort of the market freedoms which in his view have been lost or sacrificed amidst the rise of economic statism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:10 ]]
<nowiki>[20:11]</nowiki>

I'm going to play the clip for you and you can make of it what you will.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:13 ]]
<nowiki>[20:14]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:17 ]]
<nowiki>[20:17]</nowiki>

Alright. The volume's not there. So let's try to raise the volume. Let's see if we can get some...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:25 ]]
<nowiki>[20:25]</nowiki>

That's the wrong volume.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:27 ]]
<nowiki>[20:28]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:33 ]]
<nowiki>[20:33]</nowiki>

''Reagan: This is the issue of this election. Whether we believe in our capacity for self-government or whether we abandon the American Revolution and confess that a little intellectual elite in a far distant capital can plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves. You and I are told increasingly we have to choose between a left or right.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:53 ]]
<nowiki>[20:54]</nowiki>

''Reagan: But I'd like to suggest there is no such thing as a left or right. There is only an up or down. Man's old, old age dream, the ultimate in the individual freedom consistent with law and order, or down to the ant heap of totalitarianism.''<ref>Wikipedia has an article on the speech called {{WPExtract|A Time for Choosing|"A Time for Choosing"}} and [[commons:File:A_Time_for_Choosing_by_Ronald_Reagan.ogv|the video is also on Wikimedia Commons]].</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:11 ]]
<nowiki>[21:11]</nowiki>

In a sense you've heard this all before, right. You can turn on last night's Republican debate and hear much the same themes being thrashed through. Will big government ultimately lead to decline and ruination? Sort of these are you know questions which we continue to debate through to the present and I'm sure that we'll be debating them tomorrow and beyond.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:33 ]]
<nowiki>[21:34]</nowiki>

But what's really important about Reagan's 1964 speech to the Republican Convention is that it marks a point of departure for a discourse of anti-statism that has powerfully animated conservative politics through to the present day.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:51 ]]
<nowiki>[21:51]</nowiki>

Reagan sort of drawing upon Hayek and other sort of classically liberal economists argues that the postwar welfare state is leading in a sort of direction that will initially be adverse to economic freedom and ultimately adverse to political freedom as well.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:14 ]]
<nowiki>[22:14]</nowiki>

Now this move, a move that links economic freedom, economic liberty with political liberty, is not an original one, right. That's the move that {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek|Hayek}} makes in ''The Road to Serfdom''.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:23 ]]
<nowiki>[22:24]</nowiki>

Hayek argues that a government that begins by regulating markets will end by regulating people, by regulating society. But it's a move that is you know constituentive of a sustained sort of right-wing critique of the postwar welfare state that remains very influential through to the present day.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:49 ]]
<nowiki>[22:49]</nowiki>

During the 1960s however Reagan's critique of sort of postwar economic statism remains a relatively marginal phenomenon. Goldwater who is sort of the first Republican Presidential candidate after the Second World War to embrace the politics of anti-statism loses by a catastrophic margin. Lyndon Johnson wins the 1964 election by a big landslide margin of victory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:22 ]]
<nowiki>[23:23]</nowiki>

And this election result seems to you know sort of demonstrate, at least for the time being, that you know Goldwater's critique, Reagan's critique, lacks sort of wide popular appeal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:35 ]]
<nowiki>[23:35]</nowiki>

By the late 1970s it will be a very different story. But the mid-1960s are a decade in which the postwar sort of centrist consensus, a consensus built around the political management of capitalism by the state, still seems very much to be holding true.

== The Narrative of Civil Rights ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:54 ]]
<nowiki>[23:54]</nowiki>

The more obvious sort of you know narrative which emerges during the 1960s is a narrative of civil rights, a narrative in which groups that have long been sort of marginalized and alienated from mainstream economic prosperity and social acceptance, struggle to achieve you know sort of full, the rights associated with, full membership in and participation in mainstream society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:29 ]]
<nowiki>[24:29]</nowiki>

Here the experience of the United States is exemplary but it's worth thinking about how the experience of the United States in the 1960s might parallel the experience of other countries. What are the sort of overarching themes that we might use to link civil rights in the United States with movements for you know civil rights elsewhere?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:50 ]]
<nowiki>[24:50]</nowiki>

At the beginning it would be useful to make a distinction between European welfare projects and the United States because there are important structural differences which it is important to acknowledge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:03 ]]
<nowiki>[25:03]</nowiki>

Right, after the Second World War Europe's nation-states are more ethnically and culturally and linguistically homogeneous than at any point in their past. One of the legacies of the Second World War particularly in sort of Central and Eastern Europe is the... sort of... redistribution of populations, what has euphemistically been called ethnic cleansing in more recent years, with the effect of creating a Europe of relatively homogeneous nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:39 ]]
<nowiki>[25:39]</nowiki>

This will begin to change in places like Great Britain and France as postcolonial populations immigrate to the sort of metropolitan nations but the basic story of postwar Europe is a story in which nation-states are you know relatively homogeneous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00 ]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

Sweden is a good example. In Sweden through the 1950s and 1960s virtually all voters, virtually all beneficiaries of public largess are Swedes. People who are ethnically Swedish, culturally Swedish, speaking the Swedish language.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:14 ]]
<nowiki>[26:14]</nowiki>

Compared to the United States Europe's welfare states are homogeneous entities. And this has implications for the politics of redistribution. It's easier to redistribute wealth, it's easier for the public to take responsibility for its most vulnerable members, in a society that is you know relatively homogeneous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:34 ]]
<nowiki>[26:35]</nowiki>

Where bonds of social and cultural and historical affinity are strongest wealth redistribution will in general be less controversial than in places where you know greater diversity exists. And the experience of the United States you know sort of illustrates this case.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:54 ]]
<nowiki>[26:54]</nowiki>

African-Americans are at the beginning of the 1960s by far and away sort of the most obvious marginalized minority in American life. They constitute around 10% of the population. They're a minority that had been excluded from sort of the accomplishments of rising prosperity not just in the 1950s but in the longer duray<ref>Word uncertain:"duray".</ref> of American history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:23 ]]
<nowiki>[27:23]</nowiki>

The marginalization and oppression of African-Americans produces as you all know a movement to redress fundamental inequalities, to achieve for African-Americans the full rights and prerogatives of citizenship, that is to say, the full rights and prerogatives of membership in American society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:44 ]]
<nowiki>[27:44]</nowiki>

The Civil Rights Movement, antedates the Second World War but it receives sort of an important boost from wartime mobilizations on behalf of civil rights. {{WPExtract|A. Philip Randolph}} who is the leader of the largest African-American trades union in the United States for example pushes Roosevelt to desegregate war industries during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:11 ]]
<nowiki>[28:11]</nowiki>

Randolph threatens to lead a march on Washington unless Roosevelt takes some proactive effort to ameliorate the economic disadvantages that African-Americans experience. So the movement for Civil Rights sort of begins to pick up in tempo during the 1940s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:30 ]]
<nowiki>[28:30]</nowiki>

During the 1950s the NAACP, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, pursues a sort of legalistic strategy to surmount and overcome the substantial barriers that African-Americans still face particularly in the segregated South.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:48 ]]
<nowiki>[28:48]</nowiki>

The most important accomplishment here of course is Brown v. Board of Education, a 1956 ruling of the Supreme Court, that rules the separation of educational facilities for black and white children to be unconstitutional under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:05 ]]
<nowiki>[29:05]</nowiki>

For all of the gains that legalism accomplishes during the 1950s, and Brown is a significant accomplishment, it's not until the late 1950s that civil rights becomes a mass movement. {{WPExtract|Martin Luther King Jr.|Martin Luther King}} founds the {{WPExtract|Southern Christian Leadership Conference|Southern Churches Leadership Council}}<ref>The agreed upon name of the organization in 1957 actually being the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.</ref> in 1957. The {{WPExtract|Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee|Student's Nonviolent Coordinating Committee}}, SNCC, is founded in 1960.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:29 ]]
<nowiki>[29:30]</nowiki>

These organizations provide, or at least facilitate, the transformation of the African-American freedom struggle into a mass movement. By the beginning of the 1960s, 1961, civil rights activists, both black and white, are orchestrating freedom rides, rides on sort of segregated bus facilities through the South to protest the segregation of interstate transportation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:58 ]]
<nowiki>[29:58]</nowiki>

In 1963 Martin Luther King leads sort of the Birmingham mass marches against segregation and these represent something like an emotional high point for civil rights as a mass movement. Television images of Birmingham police brutalizing African-American protestors are beamed not just around the United States but around the entire world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:25 ]]
<nowiki>[30:25]</nowiki>

Civil rights becomes a sort of global preoccupation. Substantial attention is paid in Europe to the plight of the African-American freedom struggle in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:35 ]]
<nowiki>[30:35]</nowiki>

Pushed by the mass movement Lyndon Johnson, as President of the United States, will embrace reform in the mid-1960s. Johnson in 1964 orchestrates the passage of the Civil Rights Act. The following year the Voting Rights Act is signed into law.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:52 ]]
<nowiki>[30:52]</nowiki>

This is a history with which you all should have some familiarity. It's one of the most important sort of episodes in the history of the United States. But what of the larger significance of the civil rights movement? What is civil rights all about? Is civil rights about claiming human rights? Are Martin Luther King and the other leaders of the civil rights movement claiming rights simply by virtue of their humanity?

=== Civil Rights and Human Rights ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:19 ]]
<nowiki>[31:19]</nowiki>

Which is which human rights are, right. Rights that we all enjoy by virtue of being human. Or is civil rights distinct as a category from human rights?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:32 ]]
<nowiki>[31:32]</nowiki>

I would suggest that civil rights constitutes a distinctive category for action and mobilization. Civil rights presume the existence of a sort of society of which one can be a citizen. There is a profound link between civil rights and citizenship. What segregation did prior to the accomplishments of civil rights was to exclude African-Americans from full membership of the American nation -- of American society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:02 ]]
<nowiki>[32:02]</nowiki>

It established a color bar and said that if you fall on the wrong side of this color bar then you know opportunities will be closed to you. You will not enjoy the full rights and prerogatives of American citizens. It's not to say that African-Americans were not allowed to carry passports, of course they were, but in the states of the former confederacy, formally and informally elsewhere in the United States, African-Americans were excluded from full participation in the social, economic and political life of the nation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:34 ]]
<nowiki>[32:35]</nowiki>

And civil rights seek to overcome this historic exclusion -- this historic injustice. It seeks to win for African-Americans full, the full rights and prerogatives of American citizenship, of membership in the American community.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:52 ]]
<nowiki>[32:52]</nowiki>

And this is a project which we can see in some basic respect as having important links to the sort of culture of affluence and prosperity -- to the achievements of postwar economic growth and abundance. After all growth after the Second World War is orchestrated by national governments. Growth represents...sort of the accomplishment of progressive you know Keynesian style economic policies combined with the opportunities that exist after the Second World War for extensive growth --for sort of adopting, sort of existing industrial techniques of production on a mass scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:40 ]]
<nowiki>[33:40]</nowiki>

Growth will be something which occurs within the sort of paradigm, within the economic paradigm, of the nation-state. Bretton Woods as we've discussed allows nation-states a latitude of autonomy for managing their domestic sort of macroeconomic policies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:01 ]]
<nowiki>[34:01]</nowiki>

The [[wikt:ulterior|ulterior]] logic, to use a highfalutin turn of phrase, of postwar capitalism is a logic of national capitalism, right. What Bretton Woods sets up is a sort of political economic system on the world scale in which nation-states will enjoy substantial latitude of autonomy to manage their domestic economies in accord with sort of nationally defined goals.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:33 ]]
<nowiki>[34:34]</nowiki>

Nation-states take on new responsibilities for reducing unemployment, for promoting growth, for providing welfare. In Britain you have a National Health Service. In Germany you have a social market economy which is also a national economy. Nations take on expansive new responsibilities for not only the management of their national economies but also for the provision you know basic welfare goods so far as their citizens are concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:05 ]]
<nowiki>[35:05]</nowiki>

The postwar decades, the 1950s, and the 1960s, will be characterized by the expansion of government responsibility for society. And this is a move that is orchestrated on a national scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:22 ]]
<nowiki>[35:22]</nowiki>

And civil rights reflects this logic of nationalization. What civil rights seeks to accomplish is rights for African-Americans as members of an American nation. So it's a logic that parallels the logic of Medicare. It's a logic that parallels the logic of Keynesian macroeconomic management in the United States. Civil rights is concerned with the rights of African-Americans as citizens of an American nation-state. Just as you know sort of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs, the economic programs which expand the American welfare state, will be concerned with making sort of poor Americans better off as members of a sort of cohesive national community.

== Civil Rights Globally ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:13 ]]
<nowiki>[36:14]</nowiki>

To what extent is civil rights in the United States paralleled by similar movements elsewhere? Well, we should first point out that civil rights is not just an American movement but it is a movement that has global repercussions. Foreign television audiences tune in to watch you know appalling television coverage of police brutality in the southern states of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:46 ]]
<nowiki>[36:47]</nowiki>

And this has political consequences within the United States. The Kennedy administration and the Johnson administration are concerned that the specter of Southern sheriffs turning fire hoses on unarmed demonstrators doesn't make the United States look very good in the larger world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:03 ]]
<nowiki>[37:03]</nowiki>

In the context of the Cold War the reputational costs of domestic police brutality are in the minds of American policymakers substantial. So concern over what the denial of civil rights to African-Americans might be doing for the reputation of the United States in the larger global community is one of the factors that pushes Lyndon Johnson to act decisively in 1964 and 1965 to meet the demands of the civil rights movement for sort of federal protection of civil and political rights.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:38 ]]
<nowiki>[37:39]</nowiki>

So there is a global aspect to civil rights which is really important. You know conversely prominent civil rights leaders like {{WPExtract|Martin Luther King Jr.|Martin Luther King}} and {{WPExtract|Bayard Rustin}} are influenced by the example of anti-colonial nationalism in other countries.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:55 ]]
<nowiki>[37:55]</nowiki>

India is probably the most prominent example. Rustin and King are both careful students of {{WPExtract|Mahatma Gandhi}}. Martin Luther King visits India in 1959 in order to sort of study Gandhi's teachings and to immerse himself in the political culture of Gandhian nonviolence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:17 ]]
<nowiki>[38:17]</nowiki>

So civil rights though it is a national movement also has a global dimension this is important to sort of comprehend. But to what extent are there parallel movements elsewhere? Well, as I've already mentioned European nation-states for the most part do not have the same kinds of diversity issue with which to deal as the United States has.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:43 ]]
<nowiki>[38:43]</nowiki>

Sweden does not have a large minority population that has you know historically been expressed<ref>Speaker may have meant a word other than "expressed" at that point.</ref> and exploited.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:51 ]]
<nowiki>[38:52]</nowiki>

Europe will develop problems resembling the dilemmas of the -- racial dilemmas that the United States has as postcolonial sort of immigrants come to Western European countries, particularly Britain and France, after the Second World War. But in the 1960s Europe is a place in which societies are relatively homogeneous by comparison with the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:15 ]]
<nowiki>[39:15]</nowiki>

There simply are not the same kinds of structural inequalities that civil rights moves to overcome in the United States. So there are fewer of these parallels to the civil rights mobilization in the United States in Western Europe at least at this time. In other countries there may be circumstances that are more similar to those that exist in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:36 ]]
<nowiki>[39:36]</nowiki>

India is one possible example. Caste in India is a sort of framework for categorizing difference that is quite distinct from race in the United States. It is not binary like race is. It's something which exists in finer gradations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:55 ]]
<nowiki>[39:55]</nowiki>

But the situation of the so-called {{WPExtract|Dalit|Dalits}} or Untouchables in India, people who exist at the very bottom of the social hierarchy, who are considered to be sort of outsiders to the caste system, is a circumstance that in some ways parallels the plight of civil rights in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:18 ]]
<nowiki>[40:18]</nowiki>

In India leaders of the sort of {{WPExtract|Dalit Buddhist movement|Dalit Movement}}, the sort of civil rights movement of the Untouchables as it were, pressed from the very beginning of the national project for government protection. {{WPExtract|B. R. Ambedkar|Ambedkar}}, Dr. Ambedkar, who is the leading Dalit sort of organizer pressed very hard for specific constitutional protections which are enshrined in the Indian Constitution to protect the rights of Indian Untouchables.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48 ]]
<nowiki>[40:48]</nowiki>

During the 1950s and 1960s the Indian government undertakes sort of important measures to protect and to promote the economic and social and political interests of the so-called Untouchables. And here there are parallels to the experience of civil rights in the United States, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:08 ]]
<nowiki>[41:08]</nowiki>

Civil rights in the United States calls upon the federal government to intervene, to protect the interests of marginal and vulnerable peoples, of peoples who constitute a racial minority in states like Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi. And who will require the protection of federal authorities if they are to overcome the hurdles of discrimination and oppression that they have long faced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:32 ]]
<nowiki>[41:32]</nowiki>

And there are similarities here in the Indian case. Insofar as the Untouchables in India, the Dalits, constitute a minority, they're not able to win for themselves expanded sort of acceptance or opportunity simply by dint of their own efforts government power has a vital role to play in redressing longstanding and historic inequalities and grievances.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:53 ]]
<nowiki>[41:53]</nowiki>

So what does the government in India do? Well, it will put aside public jobs for members of Untouchable castes. It tries to create affirmative action programs to overcome historic inequalities and grievances. So there are similarities here with civil rights in the United States. The power of a centralized federal state is to be the mechanism by which historic injustices are to be overcome and corrected.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:23 ]]
<nowiki>[42:23]</nowiki>

This strikes a contrast with the experience of South Africa in the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:30 ]]
<nowiki>[42:30]</nowiki>

South Africa as we have discussed is an apartheid society by the 1960s. The apartheid system is constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War as a way of making racial inequality rigid and permanent. At least that's the goal of the white minority that controls South Africa's wealth and controls South Africa's politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:53 ]]
<nowiki>[42:53]</nowiki>

While South Africa in the 1950s does witness the emergence of a mass civil rights movement, the African National Congress, the 1960s will be a decade of harsh oppression in South Africa. Rather than supporting the integration of the minorities as is the case in India and the United States the South African state aligns itself on the side of discrimination and oppression.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:23 ]]
<nowiki>[43:24]</nowiki>

In 1960 ANC demonstrators are massacred at {{WPExtract|Sharpeville massacre|Sharpeville}}. {{WPExtract|Nelson Mandela}}, the leader, the most prominent leader of the African National Congress, is arrested in 1962. The South African state resorts to methods of oppression in order to maintain and defend a social order that is racist, discriminatory, exploitative, and oppressive.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:50 ]]
<nowiki>[43:50]</nowiki>

And during the 1960s the utilization of government power appears to be sort of reasonably successful in maintaining the basic structure of an apartheid society. It's not until the 1970s that the anti-apartheid movement really begins to sort of reassert itself and the possibility of sort of long term change in South Africa sort of reemerges.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:15 ]]
<nowiki>[44:15]</nowiki>

(student comment)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:22 ]]
<nowiki>[44:22]</nowiki>

Yes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:24 ]]
<nowiki>[44:24]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:28 ]]
<nowiki>[44:28]</nowiki>

Absolutely. I think that's the key distinction between the cases, and if you want to explain why cases go differently then I think that is the explanation to which I would point.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:39 ]]
<nowiki>[44:39]</nowiki>

South Africa is an unusual case. I mean the South African case bears more resemblance to you know colonial societies than it does to societies like India or the United States that deal sort of with difficult dilemmas involving the integration of minorities to the national project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:58 ]]
<nowiki>[44:58]</nowiki>

In South Africa the possibility of mass politics, the possibility of a democratic nation-state, is inherently threatening to the interests of the minority that control most of the society's wealth and power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:13 ]]
<nowiki>[45:13]</nowiki>

And this will make South Africa's sort of reckoning with injustice belated and difficult by comparison with the experience of most other nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:25 ]]
<nowiki>[45:25]</nowiki>

But in the United States, in India, movements for civil rights, establish claims to citizenship, claims upon the full rights and prerogatives of citizenship on behalf of those who have been excluded historically from its benefits. Civil rights, much like Keynesian macroeconomics, is a project with nationalizing implications.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:54 ]]
<nowiki>[45:54]</nowiki>

The nation is to be sort of the basic framework in which justice is to be realized -- in which historic inequities are to be redressed.

== Protest and Opposition From the Youth ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:05 ]]
<nowiki>[46:05]</nowiki>

By the late 1960s however the national projects which are consolidated in the aftermath of the Second World War are coming under widespread assault.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:23 ]]
<nowiki>[46:24]</nowiki>

The accomplishments of postwar prosperity, the gains of a consumer society, will be indicted in particular by young people. The legitimacy of postwar capitalism, postwar managed capitalism, postwar progressive capitalism, call it what you will, its legitimacy is nonetheless indicted and sort of held up for ridicule even by student demonstrators in the streets of Paris, London, Berkeley and New York and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:55 ]]
<nowiki>[46:55]</nowiki>

So, by the late 1960s a very different kind of movement is developing. Civil rights had been a movement that sought inclusion for the marginalized within the mainstream. By the late 1960s a different kind of movement, a student movement, an anti-establishment movement will be critiquing the mainstream itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:17 ]]
<nowiki>[47:17]</nowiki>

Will be sort of questioning the legitimacy of sort of postwar managed capitalist affluence. How to understand this insurgency against the mainstream? This insurgency against the accomplishments of postwar welfarism?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:37 ]]
<nowiki>[47:37]</nowiki>

The most basic frame of analysis would start with demographics. Growth, population growth, is a startling and impressive phenomenon of the postwar world. Between 1950 and 2000 the world's population grows more than it had done over you know the proceeding millennia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:04 ]]
<nowiki>[48:04]</nowiki>

Growth is a defining characteristic of the postwar world and it's not just growth in economics. It's also growth in population that is striking, novel and consequential. This has major ramifications for the demographic structure of societies. After the Second World War, throughout the West, nations experience so-called baby booms. Soldiers return from the Second World War. They start families, they have children, and by consequence the number of young people increases.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:39 ]]
<nowiki>[48:39]</nowiki>

We could measure this for example by looking at the expansion of higher education on a global scale. Between 1950 and 1970 the number of college students enrolled worldwide increases dramatically from around six million in 1950 to 25 million in 1970.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:58 ]]
<nowiki>[48:58]</nowiki>

This is a development that has major sort of political consequences. It has social and cultural consequences too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:06 ]]
<nowiki>[49:06]</nowiki>

Youth emerges as a distinct category between childhood and adulthood. People start talking in the 1950s about teenagers. Previously nobody would have known what a teenager was but the... but the Baby Boom creates this new category: teenagers. Teenagers have their own distinctive culture -- their own distinctive fashions. Much of this you are sort of familiar with from other history classes you might have taken or from your own general knowledge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:35 ]]
<nowiki>[49:35]</nowiki>

Now this was your parents' experience. This isn't your experience. You have the experience of being a generation that is demographically smaller than the generation that proceeded it. This is a different kind of burden.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:47 ]]
<nowiki>[49:47]</nowiki>

But in the 1950s and 1960s teenagers construe themselves to represent the wave of the future. In a sense they are. But their rise comes with certain associated frictions. Generational friction becomes a you know sort of distinctive characteristic of Western societies in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:13 ]]
<nowiki>[50:13]</nowiki>

Consider {{WPExtract|Frank Sinatra|Frank Sinatra's}} perspective on rock 'n' roll, right. Rock 'n' roll really begins in the mid-1950s with you know Elvis, from the late 1950s, and Frank Sinatra who made his career as a entertainer for you know responsible [[wikt:sentient|sentient]] adults is appalled by the phenomenon. Sinatra says, this a wonderful quote, "...rock n' roll smells phony and false. It is sung, played and written for by the most part cretinous goons...".<ref>Additional information on the debate between Sinatra and Presley can be found in [https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/07/13/rock-degenerate/ Quote Investigator: Rock n Roll: The Most Brutal, Ugly, Degenerate, Vicious Form of Expression]. According to Quote Investigator though Sinatra's opinion, "changed over time, and he later had kind words for Elvis Presley."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:41 ]]
<nowiki>[50:41]</nowiki>

And this is a you know line that's sort of a throwaway line but it captures something of the generational friction that manifests itself in the 1950s and 1960s amidst the rise and the rising assertiveness of youth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:58 ]]
<nowiki>[50:58]</nowiki>

The assertion of youth will initially be cultural. It will be an assertion of consumers. People who buy rock 'n' roll records instead of jazz records, or you know...vocal records of the kind that Sinatra had produced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:13 ]]
<nowiki>[51:14]</nowiki>

But by the late 1960s the rise of youth will manifest itself in increasingly violent and increasingly critical street protests. These protests have to do in part with the Vietnam War. In the United States and in Western Europe student demonstrators lambaste the war that the United States is waging in Vietnam. They are fiercely critical of the war's human consequences particularly its consequences for the Vietnamese civilians who find themselves sort of the victims caught in the crossfire of a confrontation between the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Vietnamese National Liberation Force, or NLF.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:58 ]]
<nowiki>[51:58]</nowiki>

But it's not only the Vietnam War with which student demonstrators are concerned. Rather student demonstrators are eager to assault the entire sort of structure of postwar abundance, prosperity, and as they see it, consumerism and conformity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:16 ]]
<nowiki>[52:17]</nowiki>

Recall that the {{WPExtract|Free Speech Movement|Free Speech Movement at Berkeley}} is a phenomenon of the early to mid-1960s. The Vietnam War at this point has barely has gotten going. Most Americans in 1964 still couldn't point to Vietnam on a map. Whether that's true in 1968 may not be the case either. But...but Vietnam is not an especially prominent concern at the movement of departure for free speech on this campus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:45 ]]
<nowiki>[52:45]</nowiki>

What is the Free Speech Movement concerned with? What are the issues that animate it?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:50 ]]
<nowiki>[52:50]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:53 ]]
<nowiki>[52:53]</nowiki>

Okay. (laughs).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:55 ]]
<nowiki>[52:55]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:58 ]]
<nowiki>[52:58]</nowiki>

Absolutely. It has to do with free speech on campus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:00 ]]
<nowiki>[53:01]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:05 ]]
<nowiki>[53:05]</nowiki>

Very much. Civil rights is the initial issue which is you know sort of catalytic of the Free Speech Movement which then develops into a sort of larger movement or at least the claims of the movement, a larger, insofar as they have to do with free speech rights on campus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:21 ]]
<nowiki>[53:21]</nowiki>

The students object to sort of the claim of university administration that it should have a prerogative to determine you know sort of what is done on {{WPExtract|Sproul Plaza}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:33 ]]
<nowiki>[53:34]</nowiki>

The administration established limits to sort of political mobilization on Sproul and this was the sort of spark that triggered the free speech movement. But the implications of free speech are much larger than you know sort of Berkeley's intramural policies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:51 ]]
<nowiki>[53:51]</nowiki>

Rather free speech has to do with a sort of critique of postwar conformity. What seems to you know students, members of the baby boom generation, to be the excessive rigidity, the excessive conformity, the excessive control, of postwar institutions. The university in this case but by no means limited to the university.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:15 ]]
<nowiki>[54:15]</nowiki>

As the student movement develops during the 1960s it develops into something more akin to a sort of wholesale movement against the culture and the politics and the institutional fabric of postwar liberal capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:33 ]]
<nowiki>[54:34]</nowiki>

Students object not only to capitalism but also to the Cold War structure of international relations. Students sort of not all of them, but some of them, sort of revolt against society as it is you know constituted both at the national scale at the world scale and ask whether something better cannot be accomplished.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:55 ]]
<nowiki>[54:56]</nowiki>

So there's a powerful utopian streak to the student movement of the late 1960s. It seeks to sort of create some alternative reality. And of course this is [[wikt:chimerical|chimerical]] but it is no less compelling for those who participate in the movement for that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:15 ]]
<nowiki>[55:15]</nowiki>

As the goals of the student movement are you know ultimately unsatisfied. They were so utopian that they you know hardly could be the movement degenerates on the far you know radical fringes into a violent movement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:29 ]]
<nowiki>[55:29]</nowiki>

Germany will experience a sort of violent insurgency with the {{WPExtract|Red Army Faction}}. Italy has its {{WPExtract|Red Brigades}} and the United States the {{WPExtract|Weather Underground|Weathermen}} undertake a campaign of sort of... low level minor key terrorism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:44 ]]
<nowiki>[55:44]</nowiki>

In itself this is you know fairly inconsequential at least in the United States. A tiny handful of people are directly harmed or killed by you know attacks that the Weathermen plant. In Italy sort of the violent left in the 1970s will be more consequential. A Prime Minister of Italy, {{WPExtract|Aldo Moro}}, is taken hostage and then murdered by the Red Brigades.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:08 ]]
<nowiki>[56:08]</nowiki>

So in Italy the sort of consequences of sort of violent anti-establishment politics on the left are more far reaching than they are in the United States. But everywhere the specter of large scale street demonstrations, of casual student violence, of bomb throwing in the case of the you know violent fringe seems to represent an existential challenge to the stability of postwar societies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:36 ]]
<nowiki>[56:36]</nowiki>

Can the center hold? You know this is sort of the question that {{WPExtract|W. B. Yeats}} posed in the early 1920s, you know, can the center hold?<ref>From W. B. Yeats's poem "The Second Coming" whose first four lines are: "Turning and turning in the widening gyre/The falcon cannot hear the falconer;/ Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world," [[wikiquote:William_Butler_Yeats#The_Second_Coming_(1919)|available via Wikiquote]] and also [https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/second-coming via poets.org from the Academy of American Poets].</ref> And by the late 1960s sort of informed commentators, ordinary voters, are questioning the bases of social and economic stability as it has come to be constituted after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:59 ]]
<nowiki>[57:00]</nowiki>

Can mainstream society hold out against the widespread mass resistance of youth?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:10 ]]
<nowiki>[57:10]</nowiki>

This is a issue that is taken seriously. In retrospect the sort of global revolution as you know one historian has described it of 1968 looks to be a failure. It ultimately didn't change a great deal but at the time the revolts which you know take place in university campuses from Berkeley to Berlin seem to represent a sort of coherent challenge to the status quo, to the constituted social order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:39 ]]
<nowiki>[57:39]</nowiki>

And this is a threat that is taken seriously. The National Security Council of the United States for example, this is the sort of institution within the White House that is responsible for national security and foreign policy, commissions papers on student violence, on the student revolt, it is considered by policymakers to represent a threat to the status quo.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:03 ]]
<nowiki>[58:03]</nowiki>

Certainly it marks the beginnings of, or it marks the crumbling of the postwar sort of social and political consensuses that had held societies together.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:15 ]]
<nowiki>[58:15]</nowiki>

So, youth, ends up having a sort of disruptive impact in the world of the 1960s at least in the Western capitalist world of the 1960s. Youth aligns itself against the status quo and it is unclear whether the status quo can stand firm or not.

== The Collapse of Bretton Woods ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:33 ]]
<nowiki>[58:33]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, some of the structuring institutions which were established in the mid-1940s to manage and organize the postwar liberal world economy are themselves beginning to crumble. The Bretton Woods framework begins to come undone during the late 1960s

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:56 ]]
<nowiki>[58:56]</nowiki>

The 1960s of course were a period in which Keynesian macroeconomics enjoyed their heyday. Richard Nixon pronounced in 1971, {{WPExtract|We are all Keynesians now|"We are all Keynesians now"}}. But what he's offering in a sense is an epitaph of an era that has been rather than a you know statement about the likely shape of the future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:17 ]]
<nowiki>[59:17]</nowiki>

In the United States the Johnson administration marked the high point for Keynesian macroeconomics. In 1964 for example Johnson orchestrated a stimulus package that was absolutely Keynesian in its intent. Johnson introduced a tax cut that was intended to stimulate growth and to sort of accelerate the rate of economic expansion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:46 ]]
<nowiki>[59:46]</nowiki>

In the United States Keynesian policies are pursued with the purpose of stimulating growth and full employment and much the is also true in Europe. In Europe governments target full employment and they use the sort of instruments of fiscal and monetary policy to pursue the ends of growth and widespread affluence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:10]</nowiki>

There are different varieties of Keynesianism. In the United States military spending has a major stimulative effect on the economy so some economists would sort of characterize the United States as an example of military Keynesianism. In Europe military spending is much less than it is in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:26 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:27]</nowiki>

In part because the European are able to depend upon the United States to defend them against the Soviet Union. And social spending will be the major you know source of stimulus to the economy. So Keynesianism has different accents depending upon the context in which it's implemented.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:44 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:45]</nowiki>

But throughout the Western capitalist world there is a basic confidence in the 1950s and particularly in the 1960s that governments can through manipulation of fiscal policy and monetary policy manage growth so as to produce socially desirable economic outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:03]</nowiki>

There is even believed to be a benign tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. This is a notion that is predicated upon sort of empirical data, upon data from sort of Britain actually, which seemed to demonstrate a sort of positive correlation between inflation and employment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:26 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:27]</nowiki>

And this becomes known as the {{WPExtract|Phillips curve}}. And it's something which is sort of worth mentioning even though it's a sort of technical issue which isn't going to be on the exam because it's illustrative of some of the sort of intellectual presumptions that sustain the Keynesian consensus in the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:41]</nowiki>

What the Phillips curve tells us is straightforward enough, right. It tells us that tolerating inflation can have beneficial consequences for employment. That is that high rates of employment, low rates of unemployment, correlate historically with high rates of inflation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:04]</nowiki>

And this is important insofar as it legitimates some of the tradeoffs that governments make in pursuit of full employment and growth during the 1960s. Stimulating economies in order to produce growth has inflationary consequences, right. As governments purchase you know whether military supplies or you know welfare goods...government activity has a simulative impact on the economy. So too do loose monetary policies which governments pursue for Keynesian reasons have a stimulative effect on the economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:41]</nowiki>

As governments stimulate growth they also stimulate inflation. And the Phillips curve is really important insofar as it convinces policymakers that they don't have to worry too much about inflation. Insofar as the Phillips curve identifies a benign trade off between employment and inflation policymakers throughout the West persuade themselves that inflation is something that can be tolerated and even disregarded in the name of high employment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:10]</nowiki>

And the Phillips curve enjoys sort of widespread influence throughout the West in the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:19]</nowiki>

This will have consequences for the stability of sort of the Western economic system writ large. To understand this we should think about Bretton Woods and think in particular about what happens to Bretton Woods in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But to do that I want to recapitulate for you some of the basic aspects of the Bretton Woods system. It's been a few weeks since we've talked about Bretton Woods so let me just go over the basic you know characteristics of the Bretton Woods system as it constituted you know at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:53]</nowiki>

You know what is Bretton Woods? Bretton Woods is an institutional framework for organizing the capitalist world economy that operates according to several cardinal principles. And these are first that nation-states should enjoy a degree of macroeconomic autonomy so that governments can manage their own economies in accord with some nationally defined you know vision of prosperity and well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:19]</nowiki>

So the Bretton Woods settlement tries to create a certain sort of autonomy for nation-states. In doing this it reflects a Keynesian consensus, a consensus that tells us that governments should be responsible for managing their economies so as to correct cyclical downturns and to produce growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:37 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:38]</nowiki>

Now Bretton Woods tries to achieve this space for national macroeconomic management by imposing limits on transnational global capitalism. Capital controls are permissible within the Bretton Woods framework. Governments are not required to even make their currency convertible until such a point as they feel ready to do so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:59]</nowiki>

This is 1958 for the countries of Western Europe which return to convertibility in 1958. So Bretton Woods then tries to create a sort of global economic system in which fixed exchange rates can exist, mediated via the dollar, which is the central element of the system, the dollar is fixed in value to gold, and other currencies fix in value to the dollar. So there are to be fixed exchange rates but there is also to be a substantial latitude for national policy autonomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:30]</nowiki>

So by combining these two elements, Bretton Woods tries to strike a compromise between globalization as it were and sort of national economic policy. This is a delicate compromise. It works pretty well in the 1950s. During the 1960s it begins to become unstuck.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:49]</nowiki>

Why is this? Well part of the explanation has to do with the central role of the United States in the system. The US dollar, as you all understand by now, is the central element of the Bretton Woods currency matrix. The US dollar is the [[wikt:numéraire|numéraire]]; that is to say the dollar is the unit of value in which other units of value are expressed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:11 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:11]</nowiki>

Other countries define the values of their currencies in direct relationship to the United States dollar.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:18]</nowiki>

The US dollar is also a source of reserve assets for the international system writ large. Other currencies maintain the values of their currencies by holding US dollars as reserve assets. But all of this will impose a burden on the United States, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:35 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:35]</nowiki>

The United States in 1944, at the moment when Bretton Woods is created, enjoys a disproportionate sort of preeminence in the capitalist world economy. The other countries have been devastated by the Second World War; the United States has been enriched by the Second World War. The US share of the industrial world's total economic output is more than 50% in 1944.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:02 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:02]</nowiki>

And the Bretton Woods system sort of institutionalizes this exceptional margin of American primacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:10]</nowiki>

Indeed the United States will subsidize it allies after the Second World War. It disburses Marshall Aid in the late 1940s and military assistance in the 1950s which has you know beneficial consequences for the Bretton Woods system. Wealth transfers from the United States to Western Europe and Japan are something which helps to enable the system to function as it was intended to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:33 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:34]</nowiki>

But during the 1950s, and the 1960s Western Europe and Japan grow faster than the United States does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:41]</nowiki>

The margin of relative ascendancy that the United States enjoyed in 1944 narrows. The US share of the capitalist world's total output declines. And as a consequence Bretton Woods, a monetary system that had been predicated upon an exceptional margin of American superiority becomes destabilized.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:05]</nowiki>

Consider the American balance of payments in the 1960s. Through the 1960s the United States runs small overall deficits on the balance of payments. And what this chart shows you, to sort of unpick the details, is the US balance of payments broken down into four major categories.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:25]</nowiki>

Current account transactions, which are sort of trading goods for the most part, trading services, are marked in green. Military spending, money that the US government spends on military purposes overseas, is marked in blue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:41]</nowiki>

Long term capital flows, foreign investment, FDI, is marked in yellow, short term capital movements, liquid capital movements, are marked in red. This is a simplification of the balance of payments but it's as complex as I want to go today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:57]</nowiki>

In the chart balance of payments deficits fall sort of below the x-axis. Everything below the line is a deficit. Everything above the line is a surplus. If you add together the two things, you know, I mean, sorry, if you add together the transactions above the line and below the line the overall balance for most of the 1960s is a little bit below the line.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:22]</nowiki>

The United States runs a series of trade deficits. But what I'm interested in here is not the overall trade balance but rather the composition of it. Because that's what's interesting and it helps to reveal why Bretton Woods comes to an end at the end of the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:36]</nowiki>

Through most of the 1960s the United States enjoys a substantial trade surplus. American factories are still sufficiently productive that the US exports more to the world than it imports. And it runs a trade surplus. And that's really important because this trade surplus makes possible American military spending overseas.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:59 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:00]</nowiki>

Military spending is a drain on the American balance of payments. But it is paid for in effect by the export surplus that the United States enjoys on the current account. The United States exports enough goods and services to the world that it can well afford to pay for its you know sort of expansive military presence in East Asia and in Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:23 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:23]</nowiki>

More than that the United States can afford to sustain large outflows of investment capital overseas. During the 1960s American corporations invest substantial amounts of money outside the United States particularly in Western Europe. This is an outflow of capital that might have been destabilizing on the balance of payments except for the fact that the United States is running a fairly healthy trade surplus during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:52]</nowiki>

So earnings from you know the trade account, earrings on the export of goods, offset outflows of investment capital from the United States ensuring that the balance of payments remains in an overall sort of equilibrium of sorts.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:09 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:09]</nowiki>

The situation will change quite dramatically from the late 1960s. And what happens from the late 1960s is that American industry is losing its competitive edge. The United States runs its first trade deficit since 1893 in 1971. This is a historical watershed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:27]</nowiki>

Since the 1970s the United States has run trade deficit after trade deficit after trade deficit. The trade deficit becomes very, very big in the 1980s and 1990s but prior to 1971 trade surpluses are in essence what pays for the expansive military role of the United States in the Cold War world and for American outflows of investment capital to Western Europe and elsewhere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:54]</nowiki>

That trade surplus collapses after sort of the late 1960s, and its collapse will have destabilizing effects for the Bretton Woods system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:04]</nowiki>

Let's think a little bit about the role of the dollar as a system wide reserve asset because this is intimately related to the problem of America's waning balance of payments. The United States during the 1950s and the 1960s exports dollars to Western Europe and Japan. We've already talked about this to some extent. This is useful from the point of view of the Bretton Woods system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:31]</nowiki>

The United States pays for its deficits insofar as it runs small deficits with dollars. But this is beneficial enough for countries that receive dollars because dollars are reserve assets. Right, if you're Germany or France or Great Britain, then it's no hardship in the 1950s to hold dollars in your central bank because these dollars are a vital source of liquidity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:54 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:54]</nowiki>

Insofar as the Deutsche Mark, the franc, and the British pound sterling are based upon the dollar, that is to say the dollar in the unit of value which you know the {{WPExtract|Deutsche Bundesbank|Bundesbank}} holds as a reserve asset, holding more dollars in your central bank means that you can circulate more currency. Your monetary, your money supply, can grow accordingly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:14]</nowiki>

So in the 1950s and into the mid-1960s dollar deficits, the expanding circulation of dollars outside the United States, has some beneficial impact for the monetary system writ large -- it underwrites the expansion of global liquidity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:31]</nowiki>

But there are problems. Under the Bretton Woods rules the United States is formally obligated to exchange dollars for gold at $35 dollars per ounce. The value of the dollar is fixed in relation to gold. Now this is a problem insofar as the expansion of dollar liabilities over time creates uncertainty as to whether the United States is capable of making good on its formal obligation to convert dollars into gold on the demand of the dollar holder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:03]</nowiki>

When there are more dollars circulating outside the United States in value than the United States possesses gold reserves in Fort Knox then the United States is technically no longer able to convert all of the dollars that it is obliged to convert in theory into gold before gold should the demand to do so present itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:26]</nowiki>

And this you know is known in sort of technical economics as the point of gold dollar overhang. The point where the total dollar obligations of the United States exceed the reserve assets which the United States has to meet those obligations. That point is passed in 1965. Or thereabouts.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:46]</nowiki>

Eventually the system collapses in 1971. And it collapses because the United States government fears a rush on the dollar. It fears a dollar crisis in which foreign countries will come to the treasury and they will demand conversion of their paper dollars into gold -- into precious metal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:07]</nowiki>

And they would do that because they would be fearful of a dollar crisis that might slash the value of the dollar assets which they're holding in their central banks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:17]</nowiki>

Nixon, who's President of the United States in 1971, acts preemptively to forestall a dollar crisis. He acts preemptively to forestall a run on the dollar. And he does so by slamming the gold window closed. The gold window is sort of the euphemism which is used, or the metaphor, which describes the obligation of the United States to convert dollars for gold upon demand of the dollar holder.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:41]</nowiki>

And Nixon in 1971, in August 1971, unilaterally reneges upon this commitment. He declares that the United States will no longer convert dollars into gold. Indeed he, by doing this, he marks the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods system. That American commitment to convert dollars for gold had been sort of a vital component of the Bretton Woods order. It was in essence what underwrote the legitimacy of the system -- writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:10]</nowiki>

After closing the gold window Nixon tries very hard to secure a dollar devaluation. He wants to reduce the value of the dollar in relation to foreign currencies because doing so will help to sort of restore the competitive edge of American industry in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:24 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:24]</nowiki>

Insofar as the dollar by the late 1960s is overpriced it is pricing American exports out of world markets. Nixon wants to remedy an overvalued dollar so he slams the gold window closed and initiates a very harried round of negotiations with American trade partners in order to secure a negotiated devaluation. This is achieved in December 1971. The {{WPExtract|Smithsonian Agreement}} produces a sort of multilateral agreement to devalue the dollar against rival currencies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:57 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:57]</nowiki>

But ultimately this devaluation does not hold. There is a second dollar crisis in February 1973 in which sort of private money holders, private holders of dollars, dump the currency because they fear that despite the Smithsonian devaluation the dollar is still overvalued.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:15]</nowiki>

In this moment of second crisis, in February 1973, the United States and its allies agree to abandon fixed exchange rates entirely. They agree that trying to uphold and maintain a system of fixed exchange rates has become far too difficult.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:31]</nowiki>

That it is sort of beyond their basic capacities as governments to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. This marks a really important transition in the sort of international political economy of postwar sort of international history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:49 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:49]</nowiki>

The shift marks a transition from an era in which capitalism had been fairly carefully and closely regulated by nation-states to an era in which capital will flow much more freely across borders. Indeed free flowing international capital had a really important role to play in the transition itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:10 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:10]</nowiki>

During the late 1960s short term capital had been attracted to the United States by interest rates that were relatively high by comparison with European ones. There was an influx of short term capital as this you know graph suggests. Movements of capital map fairly closely onto interest rates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:31 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:31]</nowiki>

Ultimately it's a reduction in US interest rates and an exodus of capital that triggered the end of the Bretton Woods system, and this is something which you can also see in this chart when you come back to it. Short term capital flees the dollar in 1970 and 1971 prompting Nixon to devalue the dollar and to end gold dollar convertibility.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:55]</nowiki>

This demonstrates the rising importance of financial capital -- of global free flowing capital in the world economy. And it signifies that a transition from a world of relatively compartmentalized managed capitalism to a world of increasingly globalized capitalism has already begun.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:13 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:13]</nowiki>

And we're going to talk much more about the consequences of that transition next -- the week after next -- but you can see in the death throes of Bretton Woods the emergence of a new kind of international financial system already taking shape.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:28]</nowiki>

Is there a quick question?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:29 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:29]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:34 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:34]</nowiki>

Yes, it is. But it doesn't hold over the long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:19:38]</nowiki>

So, this in is a sense is the moment of crisis. The moment in which a political economic concept, the Bretton Woods Keynesian concept, comes apart and the future is as of yet still to be determined but in the crisis itself the role of sort of transnational capital, of short term international flows of money, can already be discerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:20:03]</nowiki>

And we'll talk in I think two weeks time about where the capitalist world economy goes next.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2019-12-12T04:55:51Z

DavidKitFriedman: I just removed the title "Associate Professor" as that seems like it sounds better especially in the second instance...

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, and occasionally embedded images and video.

Consistent with this as an experiment in creating both a research resource and an educational resource links to definitions are provided for words that people who access the site might not be familiar with.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, but if there are more significant changes I might defer on it because I don't feel I have the time.

My pattern has been to check my email approximately once every 7-14 days, so it might be up to a few weeks before I would get to it.

I tried to contact Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s

2019-07-23T22:57:42Z

DavidKitFriedman: insertion of line break

== Political Economy ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Talking about political economy. What is political economy? It's not economics as such rather it's that set of political, institutional and sort of ideological factors that determine how the economy is structured and how it operates. We're talking not about economic history as such but rather about sort of the larger political and institutional circumstances that framed the operation of the global economy. We're not talking exclusively about the international economy. We're also going to talk about sort of domestic economies and in particular about the relationship between the international economy, what you might call the international regime, and the domestic economies that exists within it.

== Lectures Structure and Schedule ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:50]]
<nowiki>[0:50]</nowiki>

Just to be really clear at the outset, today I'm going to be talking about the advanced industrial and capitalist world. We're going to talk on Thursday about the developing world. So on Thursday, we'll deal with the circumstance of nations that are primarily agrarian but which want to industrialize and to develop and to modernize. That waits for Thursday. We're not going to talk about the communist world for another couple of weeks. You can look up on the syllabus and see exactly when that is. I couldn't tell you off the top of my head but we are going to do it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 1:20]]
<nowiki>[1:20]</nowiki>

Today, we're talking about the advanced capitalist economies of the West. So if it seems like I'm omitting important regions of the world, all I can say is that I am but we're going to deal with them when it's time to do so. For the purposes of analytical clarity, it makes sense I think to break up the discussion of global political economy into a regional framework that aligns with the organic organization of the world economy as it was in the time which we're dealing with it which is the early postwar era.

== Postwar Economic Boom ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 1:56]]
<nowiki>[1:56]</nowiki>

With that disclaimer let me begin. How to define the period of economic history that we're dealing with -- which is to say the first decade or so after the Second World War. What should we make of the postwar years? What makes this a remarkable or distinctive phase in the economic history of the world?

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the first two postwar decades, the 1950s and the 1960s, is really clear when we look at this slide. These are a period of world history that saw remarkable economic growth. Average annual growth rates between 1950 and 1973 were just a little bit under 3%. This is very, very impressive when you're situated in broader historical context.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 2:48]]
<nowiki>[2:48]</nowiki>

I mean, look, between the beginning of the Common Era and the early 19th century, the world economy barely grows at all. Average annual growth rates are close to zero. This is the long era of the {{WPExtract|Malthusian trap}} which we've already discussed. With the industrial revolution, growth rates begin to pick up in the 19th century. Average annual growth rates approach 1.5% for the world as a whole in the last decades of the 19th century but this is nothing compared to what the world experiences in the two decades subsequent to the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 3:26]]
<nowiki>[3:26]</nowiki>

Let's zoom in a little bit on the 20th century. This will give us a closer perspective on the postwar decades. We can compare them to the prewar era and also to the sort of more recent post-1973 period in world economic history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 3:46]]
<nowiki>[3:46]</nowiki>

What this chart does is it breaks down growth by region -- in some cases by nation. This is important because when we deal with sort of global growth rates we're taking a very sort of crude aggregate perspective on the world economy as a whole. It's important to remember that the experiences of different nations and regions were potentially quite different and this chart tries to illuminate some of those differences.

=== Postwar Economic Growth in Western Europe ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 4:14]]
<nowiki>[4:14]</nowiki>

Let's look at Western Europe. In the case of Western Europe, we see fairly sluggish growth before the Second World War. The European economy does not grow all that much. It's after the Second World War that European growth rates are really, really impressive -- around 4% annual growth per year, but that doesn't quite compare with China's economic performance over the past decade, but it's nonetheless very impressive when you situate it in historical context. Europe's growth since the early '70s has not been nearly so rapid as that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 4:46]]
<nowiki>[4:46]</nowiki>

As a similar picture, intriguingly, in the case of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union also grows fairly quickly after the Second World War. We'll talk about this in due course when we come to talk about sort of the communist world economy, but it's important to remind ourselves at the very outset that some key aspects of the Western capitalist experience are paralleled in the East Bloc.

=== Postwar Economic Growth in Japan ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:10]]
<nowiki>[5:10]</nowiki>

Japan is by far and away the most impressive example of postwar economic growth. Average annual growth rates in Japan between the early 1950s and the early 1970s top out at a little under 9% -- around 8% average annual growth. It's very, very impressive.

=== Postwar Economic Growth in the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:33]]
<nowiki>[5:33]</nowiki>

When you come to the developing world, the story is somewhat more complicated. In Latin America, there is sort of an impressive rate of postwar growth which tails off as it does in Western Europe and the United States from the early 1970s. In China and India, it's a very different story. The growth of the early postwar decades is eclipsed by what comes next. This is you know sort of the history that leads us towards the present and to the rise of China as a global economic power, but I don't want to get too deep into that story today. That's a story that we'll pick up later on in the course of the semester.

=== Postwar Economic Growth in the Western Capitalist Economies ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:15]]
<nowiki>[6:15]</nowiki>

What I want you to focus on today is the experience of the West. What's particular about the early postwar decades, the '50s and the '60s, from a Western vantage point is that the economies of the Western capitalist world grow faster in this period than they had done before or than they would do since.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:37]]
<nowiki>[6:37]</nowiki>

By consequence, Western publics, come to consider this period of history as a period of remarkable affluence and prosperity -- a golden era. It's sometimes described as sort of the postwar golden years. It's how it's described in English. The French will tend to describe the postwar decades as {{WPExtract|Trente Glorieuses|Les Trente Glorieuses}} -- the thirty glorious years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:04]]
<nowiki>[7:04]</nowiki>

We can drill down a little deeper into the data if we want and consider the experiences of diverse nation-states. Was the story necessarily the same everywhere even within Europe? The basic narrative framework is fairly similar. Growth is much more impressive after the Second World War than it had been before. The general picture is one of sort of declining growth rates from the early 1970s. The reasons for that we'll come to sort of deal with in our discussion of the 1970s later in this semester.

==== Great Britain as an Anomaly ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:42]]
<nowiki>[7:42]</nowiki>

The only anomaly that I would point out at the very beginning which is something that you might want to bear in mind is that Great Britain's experience of postwar growth is much less impressive than is the rest of Europe's. Just hold that at the back of your heads and we'll sort of come back to that point as the lecture progresses.

== Explanations for Postwar Growth Writ Large ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:59]]
<nowiki>[7:59]</nowiki>

But let's think not about the experiences of individual nation-states -- at least not initially. Let's try to think about the experience of postwar growth writ large. What hypothetical explanations might we be able to offer for it? Why does the industrial capitalist West, grow so impressively after the Second World War?

=== Necessity of Replacing Lost Infrastructure ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:25]]
<nowiki>[8:25]</nowiki>

Let's try to posit some sort of broad brushstroke explanations. First point that we might want to consider is the economic legacy of the Second World War. Insofar as the Second World War devastates Europe, destroys a great deal of capital stock, there is a great deal at the end of the war that has to be replaced. Factories have to be rebuilt. Railroad lines have to be sort of reconstructed. Highways that have been bombed have to be repaved and so on and so forth. So the replenishment of stock damaged and devastated in the Second World War is one explanation for the rapidity of postwar growth. It's a sort of rebuilding after a great and devastating conflict.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:12]]
<nowiki>[9:12]</nowiki>

It's probably not a sufficient explanation. We don't see a comparable period of sustained growth after the First World War. There's a brief postwar boom as there often is following a major catastrophic war, but it's not sustained into the 1930s. Europe's post Second World War recovery would be sustained into the subsequent decade -- the 1960s.

=== The Application of Technological Advances ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:37]]
<nowiki>[9:37]</nowiki>

To get a more substantive explanation for Europe's post-war prosperity, I would suggest, and here I'm sort of merely borrowing from what much more informed economic historians have had to say, I would suggest that you think about the ways in which European economies apply existing technological methods, methods of production, to the purposes of industrial production -- industrial output. Remember that the basic use of technological foundations for the postwar European economy already exists by the time of the Second World War, right? Insofar as Europe industrializes or Europe's industrialization is sort of completed after the Second World War, Europe is merely applying technological innovations that have already been developed -- often developed in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 10:33]]
<nowiki>[10:33]</nowiki>

What are the core innovations that sort of drive and sustain European productivity after the Second World War? Some of these are technological but there are also institutional and procedural. Think about the organization of the factory for example. It's here in the United States that Henry Ford pioneers mass conveyor belt production. The production line is an innovation that is pioneered and improved in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:03]]
<nowiki>[11:03]</nowiki>

After the Second World War, Europeans who had not previously embraced the principles of American style Fordist mass production can do so. They're able to take advantage of industrial techniques, techniques that provide for a greater efficiency and output, that have been developed elsewhere. This is one of the reasons for Europe's impressive postwar growth. Europeans are able to apply existing productive technologies, to take advantage of innovations that have been pioneered elsewhere, usually in North America.

=== The Role of Cheap Energy ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:35]]
<nowiki>[11:35]</nowiki>

We might also emphasize the role of cheap energy in the sustenance of Europe's postwar growth. At the beginning of the post-war era, Europe's economy is primarily coal-fired. Coal is not such as efficient fuel source as oil. The postwar decades will be decades of bountiful cheap oil. In real terms the price of oil declines between 1950 and 1970. Cheap energy inputs help to sustain Europe's rapid industrial growth through this period.

=== Transfer of Workers from the Farm to the Factory ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 12:06]]
<nowiki>[12:06]</nowiki>

Another really important factor that we should think about when we try to explain Europe's postwar growth is labor. In order for an economy to grow it needs new sources of labor. Where do the people come from? It's really important when we think about European economic growth, and let's take say France as a prototypical example, to remember just how agrarian Europe still was at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 12:35]]
<nowiki>[12:35]</nowiki>

This is not to say that Europe didn't have extensive industry but that many laborers still labored on the land at the end of the war. This substantial reservoir of agricultural labor contains within it the sort of capacity or the potential for rapid industrialization. If you can take workers off the land and transform them into factory workers then you can accelerate your rate of economic growth. Of course to do that is conditioned upon your capacity to improve agricultural productivity such that you can maintain constant or improving farm output with diminishing labor inputs. But that is something which improvements in agrarian productivity are well able to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:27]]
<nowiki>[13:27]</nowiki>

By consequence, the sort of urbanization of European demographics, the movement of people from the countryside to the city, after the Second World War, goes hand in hand with the expansion of Europe's industrial economy. Farmers become factory workers and in the process propel and sustain economic growth.

=== The Postwar Baby Boom ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:52]]
<nowiki>[13:52]</nowiki>

Besides the transfer of agrarian labor to the industrial context, it's important to remember the major demographic bubble of the postwar era, the postwar baby boom.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:06]]
<nowiki>[14:06]</nowiki>

After the Second World War Europeans like North Americans marry. They settle down and they have children. This is sort of a crude explanation but it's not entirely inaccurate as an explanation, as a framework, for postwar European demographic history. There are many more people after the Second World War, more young people, more potential workers. Demographic growth will help to explain economic growth.

=== Conclusion: Explanations for Postwar Growth Writ Large ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:35]]
<nowiki>[14:35]</nowiki>

So these are some of the very basic explanations for Europe's postwar prosperity. We want to think about the transfer of existing technologies and we want to think about abundant cheap energy inputs. We want to think about the one-time transfer of agrarian labor to industrial purposes and we want to think about demographic growth. All of these factors have explanatory value when we confront the question: "Why did Europe's economy grow so impressively after the Second World War?"

== Extensive Growth in the Postwar Economic Boom ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 15:07]]
<nowiki>[15:07]</nowiki>

There is a name for this kind of growth -- growth that is driven by the adaption of preexisting technologies. It's called {{WPExtract|Extensive growth|extensive growth}}. Think about it like this. You already have your basic industrial framework and you just expand its domain so as to include more and more people, more and more workers within it. Once all of your farm workers, all of your surplus of agricultural workers have become industrial workers, once all of the new technologies that exist out there have been adopted, once energy prices increase perhaps because demand for them, for energy inputs has risen, extensive growth hits a wall, right? You reach a limit at which you can no longer convert abundant inputs to industrial outputs because the inputs have been used up.

=== Europe Hits the Limits of Extensive Economic Growth in the Late 1960s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 16:04]]
<nowiki>[16:04]</nowiki>

And this is in a sense what happens from the late 1960s in Europe. Europe hits that wall. It encounters a sort of crisis of extensive growth. What happens next? We'll come to this in due course but thinking about the question what comes next may help us to get a better handle on what happens in the 1950s. So let's just ponder it for a moment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 16:29]]
<nowiki>[16:29]</nowiki>

When extensive growth hits the wall an economy sort of reaches a historical moment in which further growth depends upon technological innovation. It comes to depend upon finding new ways to manufacture things more efficiently, more productively. The economy transitions from a phase of extensive growth to a phase of {{WPExtract|Extensive growth|intensive growth}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 16:57]]
<nowiki>[16:57]</nowiki>

And intensive growth is more difficult. It depends upon inventing new products. It depends upon devising more efficient ways to manufacture the products which you have previously been manufacturing. You can't simply build new factories that are sort of exactly the same as the factories that you already have manufacturing exactly the same goods. But we're not going to get too deep into that transition from extensive to intensive growth because it's something that we'll need to deal with much more substantively in due course, but at least thinking about what is to come next might help us to sort of grapple better with what we have to deal with today.

== The Postwar Rise in Government Spending ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 17:37]]
<nowiki>[17:37]</nowiki>

So extensive growth is one defining characteristic of Europe's postwar economic boom. Another distinctive characteristic of Europe's postwar economic history will be the rise of government spending. This occurs almost everywhere. It's a universal theme of sort of postwar economic history throughout the advanced capitalist world. The Second World War, of course, ratchets up government spending in all of the belligerent countries. Governments tax their populations and they borrow in order to wage war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 18:15]]
<nowiki>[18:15]</nowiki>

In the British case for example, government spending by 1950 is well over 35% of GDP. This is much, much higher than it had been before the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 18:29]]
<nowiki>[18:29]</nowiki>

The war sort of transforms the relationship between the state and the economy, and after the war, it will be really hard to reverse that transformation. We're going to talk much more about why it is so difficult to reverse that transformation, but look at the data and you can see sort of the general pattern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 18:45]]
<nowiki>[18:45]</nowiki>

By 1950 state spending as a fraction of GDP is fairly high throughout Western Europe, in Great Britain, France, Germany, The Netherlands -- four cases here. It will be even higher by the early 1970s. The general trend after the Second World War is towards increased state activity in the economy.

=== Postwar Government Spending in the United States Comparatively Lower than in Western Europe ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 19:07]]
<nowiki>[19:07]</nowiki>

Let's just talk for a moment about the United States. This is a course in sort of world history not a course in American History but the US experience offers us an interesting counterpoint. In the United States, government spending is in broader comparative terms, relatively low. Compare the American case in the slide with the German case or the British case. Our government's spending as a fraction of GDP is much lower in 1950 and it's still much lower in 1973. Why is that?

==== The United States as a Composition of Separate Fiscal Authorities ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 19:36]]
<nowiki>[19:36]</nowiki>

In part, it has to do with a very basic institutional distinction. The United States is a federal system. The federal government is not the only fiscal authority that counts in the US context. In the West European states that appear on the slide, the situation is really different. The central government is really the prime sort of fiscal authority, the source of all public spending and the collector of taxes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:07]]
<nowiki>[20:07]</nowiki>

In the United States, as those of you who file tax returns will know, you don't only pay taxes to the federal government, you also pay taxes to the state in which you reside. Unless you live in one of the half dozen states that doesn't require income taxes and even then you still pay sales taxes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:23]]
<nowiki>[20:23]</nowiki>

So when you situate the US in comparative context and you look at sort of the fiscal profile of the American state, you have to remember that you're comparing apples with oranges -- when you compare the United States to a more centralized political system. A more accurate representation of US government spending, as a fraction of overall economic activity, would also take account of state spending, right? Otherwise, you can't sort of make a fair comparison between the American experience and the West European experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:55]]
<nowiki>[20:55]</nowiki>

But even with that said government spending in the United States is still fairly low by comparison with Western Europe. That's sort of an interesting problem and one that we will you know have to think about as this lecture progresses.

==== Similarities in Government Spending Between the US and Western Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 21:10]]
<nowiki>[21:10]</nowiki>

Yet there are sort of key respects in which the American experience resembles that of Western of Europe. I'm going to show you a little bit more American data here just because the American data is really accessible and very easy to use.

===== Shift from Military Spending to Domestic Spending =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 21:24]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

One of the interesting aspects of sort of the economic history of the American state after the Second World War has to do with the shifting purposes of government spending over time. During the 1950s the primary purpose of American government spending is national defense -- military security functions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 21:52]]
<nowiki>[21:52]</nowiki>

By the mid-1950s, government spending on national defense is approaching 15% of GDP. This is really, really high. There's no precedent for this in the peacetime history of the United States. But during the history of the postwar era, military spending dwindles actually fairly impressively as a fraction of total US economic activity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 22:16 ]]
<nowiki>[22:16]</nowiki>

By the end of the century, by the end of the 20th century, the US spends about 3% of its GDP on military purposes. That increases a little bit after 9/11 but we see nothing like a return to the fiscal circumstance of the early Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 22:33]]
<nowiki>[22:33]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, social spending, spending on human resources, spending on social security, Medicare, Medicaid, the whole [[wikt:panoply|panoply]] of welfare programs that the federal government sponsors increases fairly dramatically over the fifty years between sort of 1950 and 2000.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 22:52]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

You can see that indicated in the chart by the green line. What's interesting about this story is that this is a story that replicates itself almost everywhere. In fact, by showing you the American data rather than say the British data or the French data or the West German data, I'm actually understating the case. This transformation from what you might call the warfare state to the welfare state is even more dramatic in Western Europe than it is in North America.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:20]]
<nowiki>[23:20]</nowiki>

So the American data gives you a sense of the picture but it doesn't give you nearly such a strong sense of the transformation as you would get if you looked at West European data, especially if you looked at West European data over a broader time frame, say the entire 20th century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:38]]
<nowiki>[23:38]</nowiki>

But that's a really important shift -- the shift from the warfare state to the welfare state. It's one of the defining sort of developments of postwar European economic history.

== State Spending and Economic Growth ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:52]]
<nowiki>[23:52]</nowiki>

So let's consider some key questions. Why did the state expand? Why did the state grow? That's one key question that we ought to think about. Why did Western Europe's economies grow so rapidly? Why did the advanced capitalist West experience such a sort of [[wikt:munificent|munificent]] phase of economic growth?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:15 ]]
<nowiki>[24:15]</nowiki>

We might posit that the two questions are linked, that there is a relationship between the two things. Maybe the rise in public spending made the economy grow. That's one hypothetical explanation, but remember that correlation is not causation, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:33]]
<nowiki>[24:33]</nowiki>

The fact that these two trend lines sort of parallel each other, the rise of government spending and the rise of growth, does not mean that the two things are causally linked, and we should remember that growth slows dramatically from in the early 1970s while state spending continues to increase. So if there was a causal link, then it's presumably broken at some point in the late 1960s or early 1970s.

=== The Relevance of Political Economy ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:56]]
<nowiki>[24:56]</nowiki>

As we answer these two questions, there are a number of different variables that we need to ponder. We should think about the evolution of European political economy. How are economies organized within individual nation-states? What kinds of institutional provision do governments provide for example to promote and sustain economic growth? How will the economic pie be divided amongst the multitude of claimants within the nation-state? It's one question that we want to think about -- has to do with transformations in political economy.

=== The Relevance of the Global Economy ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 25:34]]
<nowiki>[25:34]</nowiki>

We should also think about the larger global economy. That's a really important consideration. How does the world economy develop subsequent to the Second World War? It's one of the central themes that we should think about when we try to explain postwar growth in the capitalist world.

=== National Cases ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 25:50]]
<nowiki>[25:50]</nowiki>

And then we'll contemplate some national cases. After getting a sense of the big picture we should ask how does this look from the vantage point of particular nation-states? Do the experiences of individual nations vary broadly or is there more similarity than difference?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 26:08]]
<nowiki>[26:08]</nowiki>

Having said all that let me just reiterate the point that the focus of today's lecture, which is on the advanced capitalist world, is deliberate. We'll come to the rest of the world in due course. So, don't remind me at the end of the lecture that I didn't say anything about Latin America. I'll talk about Latin America along with Africa and developing Asia in Thursday's lecture. We'll talk about the communist world -- I don't think next week -- but the subsequent week.

== Vocabulary for Economic Ideas, Ideologies, and Practices ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 26:37]]
<nowiki>[26:37]</nowiki>

Okay. Before plunging deeper into the history, I wanted to talk with you just for a moment about the language that we used to describe economic ideas, economic ideologies and sort of economic practices -- because the vocabulary is a contested one. I know that some of you have in sections already been debating key terms like {{WPExtract|Liberalism|liberalism}}. What does liberalism mean? It's one of the most confounding words in the English language because there are many different meanings that you can ascribe to it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 27:10]]
<nowiki>[27:10]</nowiki>

Just to give you a quick sense of how contentious the language that we're going to be dealing with is I thought that I would show you a quick clip from a Republican presidential debate.

So, in case you've been hibernating for 12 months, then you'll know that the word {{WPExtract|socialism|socialist}} is a contentious word in our present day political lexicon. If you have been hibernating I have a video clip for you just to bring you up to speed, so check this out.<ref>This was the [[wikipedia:Republican_Party_presidential_debates_and_forums,_2012#September_22,_2011_–_Orlando,_Florida|September 22, 2011 Republican presidential debate taking place in Orlando, Florida]]. Unfortunately it appears the video is no longer available for this event; however, [http://web.archive.org/web/20180207221814/http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/22/fox-news-google-gop-2012-presidential-debate.html the transcript is still accessible via Waybackmachine].</ref>

''{{WPExtract|Megyn Kelly}}: We've got plenty of questions for all the other candidates up here tonight, but I want to stick with you on this, one Governor Romney. Congresswoman Bachmann has said that President Obama has "ushered in socialism" during his first term. Governor Perry says that this administration is "hell-bent" toward taking America towards a socialist country. When Speaker Gingrich was asked, if he believes President Obama is a socialist, he responded, "Sure. Of course, he is." Do you, Governor Romney, believe that President Obama is a socialist?''

''{{WPExtract|Mitt Romney}}: Let me tell you the title that I want to hear said about President Obama, and that is, "Former President Barack Obama". That's the title I want to hear. Let me tell you this. What President Obama is, is a big-spending liberal and he takes his political inspiration from Europe and from the {{WPExtract|Social Democratic Party|socialist democrats}} in Europe. Guess what? Europe isn't working in Europe. It's not going to work here. I believe in America."''

There you saw Mitt Romney almost hold on to his intellectual integrity but not quite. (laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 28:52]]
<nowiki>[28:52]</nowiki>

But at least, he didn't go so far as to call President Obama a socialist. What are the key terms that we need to think about? We should remember this language is loaded even sort of toxic.

=== Liberalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 29:08]]
<nowiki>[29:08]</nowiki>

What is liberalism? Who is a liberal? What is a liberal? I know some of you have been discussing this in sections so let me pose the question: What is a liberal? Who is a liberal? Would anyone hazard a guess?
The illustrations on the slide are sort of designed to be suggestive, but...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 29:33]]
<nowiki>[29:33]</nowiki>

Look, we can take the genealogy of liberalism all the way back to {{WPExtract|Adam Smith}}. You've all heard of Adam Smith, right? Small government, free markets. A mantle that Mitt Romney today would presumably be proud to claim. Liberalism in its sort of classical definition has to do with a political economic philosophy that emphasizes individual initiative, free markets, entrepreneurship, the rule of law as a sort of framework in which the capitalist economy can function.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 30:16]]
<nowiki>[30:16]</nowiki>

It's a economic philosophy that sees private property and the pursuit of individual self-interest as sort of forces for positive good in the world, as forces that are sort of dynamos of growth, development and prosperity. This is an economic philosophy that Adam Smith is sort of closely associated with but there's a long sort of genealogy of liberal, economic and political philosophers running through the 19th century into the 20th century that we could get into if we had the time. We won't because it's not really what the class is about.

==== Transformation of Liberalism in the United States ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 30:53]]
<nowiki>[30:53]</nowiki>

But let's just sort of think about the transformation in the definition of liberalism that occurs during the course of the 20th century, particularly in the United States, because that's a transformation that we are going to be dealing with today. It's really important to think about if we're to understand why the word liberal, a word which in its initial meaning seems to come very close to the kind of free market philosophy that Mitt Romney embraces, ends up being a term of political abuse, one that Mitt Romney deploys against his political opponent, Obama.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 31:26]]
<nowiki>[31:26]</nowiki>

What happens to liberalism in the 20th century is that the heirs of Adam Smith, particularly Keynes, who we're going to talk about a great deal more, end up embracing a somewhat different version of liberal political and economic philosophy, one which accepts the provision of sort of basic welfare goods to working and unemployed men and women as a necessary function of state power in the economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:01]]
<nowiki>[32:01]</nowiki>

So liberalism comes to sort of assume a set of commitments to [[wikt:welfarism|welfarism]] that makes 20th century liberalism distinct from 19th century liberalism.

===== Keynes and the Transformation of Liberalism =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:15]]
<nowiki>[32:15]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes|Keynes}} is the sort of key theoretical figure in this transformation. {{WPExtract|Franklin D. Roosevelt|Franklin Roosevelt}}, who we're going to talk about more, is the key sort of political figure. But let's just sort of put that transformation out there and remember that the word liberalism does not have a consistent meaning over two centuries. So it's important when we use the word liberal to be specific as to what exactly we mean.

=== Socialism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:39]]
<nowiki>[32:39]</nowiki>

Alright, now let's come to the word socialist. Who is a socialist? What does the word {{WPExtract|socialism}} mean? Is it fair, legitimate to call Barack Obama a socialist? Of course, it's not. It's a sort of political insult. But when we try to pin down the word socialist to a specific and precise meaning, we still encounter sort of major definitional obstacles -- definitional obstacles that are not so different from those which confound the term liberalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 33:09]]
<nowiki>[33:09]</nowiki>

After all, how did Marx define socialism? Socialism for Marx is a stage of history in which a revolutionary proletariat seizes control of the means of production, makes public all private property, and in which the state manages the economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 33:30]]
<nowiki>[33:30]</nowiki>

So socialism does mean in the Marxist lexicon a type of sort of economic framework in which private property is abolished, in which the state is all powerful, and in which the workers, the proletariat rules. It's a very radical thing -- at least in the Marxist definition.

==== The Bifurcation of Socialism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 33:51]]
<nowiki>[33:51]</nowiki>

Yet socialism experiences a series of transformations from the late 19th century that will ultimately alter sort of the working definition of that word, "socialism", as it comes to be understood, particularly in Europe. From the late 19th century, and we're going to talk about this much more, a current of reform socialism develops within the socialist movement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 34:14]]
<nowiki>[34:14]</nowiki>

Leading socialists give up on the agenda of revolutionary transformation. They argue that this really isn't going to happen. It may not be necessary. We can do good things to improve the lives of working people within the framework of a capitalist democratic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 34:34]]
<nowiki>[34:34]</nowiki>

So socialism sort of bifurcates, early in the 20th century, arguably even as early as the late 19th century. A revolutionary model of socialism endures, represented of course in the East Bloc in the Soviet Union, and in the West, socialists become sort of reformists. That is to say they accept the basic institutional framework of capitalist democracy. These socialists are socialists for whom reform socialism and capitalism are not necessarily incompatible.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:06]]
<nowiki>[35:06]</nowiki>

So it's sort of complicated but if you think about the evolution of the political and ideological movements you'll get a sense of how the meaning of the words themselves have changed over time. Though some European socialists still call themselves socialists, the French socialist party is just the socialist party, it may be useful to use the term "social democrat" to distinguish reformed socialism as it comes to be in Europe from the revolutionary socialism that Marx propounds, and which the Soviet Union continues to represent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:43]]
<nowiki>[35:43]</nowiki>

You don't have to do that. I'm just suggesting the terminological distinction as a useful one insofar as it helps us to be you know more specific about what we're talking about when we use the word "socialist".

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:55]]
<nowiki>[35:55]</nowiki>

There are key differences between Marxist revolutionary socialists and European style social democrats. These differences are really profound. Social democrats accept the legitimacy of capitalism, which is to say they accept the legitimacy of an economic system in which most property resides in private hands. They don't want the state to appropriate private property for a public purpose; rather, they simply want the state to sort of to intervene to ameliorate socially undesirable outcomes like gratuitous poverty or mass unemployment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:32]]
<nowiki>[36:32]</nowiki>

Social democrats are fundamentally committed to democracy. They're absolutely committed to the rule of law. They don't believe in a dictatorship of the proletariat; rather they want to operate within parliamentary institutions, those which the 19th century sort of consecrates in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:50]]
<nowiki>[36:50]</nowiki>

Most important, we should remember that there is a profound animosity between revolutionary socialists and social democrats. The revolutionary socialists hate social democrats much more than they hate conservatives. Lenin famously described reform socialists as false friends of the people, as stooges of capitalism, who, by ameliorating the conditions in which the working classes exist, make the revolution harder to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:22]]
<nowiki>[37:22]</nowiki>

So if you're a revolutionary socialist, you would rather see a conservative government in power than a social democratic government, because the conservative government will presumably do things which...or it will not do things that would make life better for working people, and would thereby make sort of a revolutionary uprising more likely than would a social democratic government, that would, by sort of ameliorating conditions in which the working classes live and labor, forestall or potentially prevent revolutionary transformation of the social order from ever coming to pass.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:58]]
<nowiki>[37:58]</nowiki>

So this is a sort of crude synopsis but it should give you some sense of just how distinct the various meanings of these terms can be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:08]]
<nowiki>[38:08]</nowiki>

''Student Question: I didn't catch the difference between the 20th century liberals and the social democrats. Are they essentially the same but in different regions?''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:15]]
<nowiki>[38:15]</nowiki>

They're extremely similar. There are distinct intellectual genealogies, right? They come from different places but I would suggest that there is a convergence in the mid-20th century of what you might call social democracy and progressive liberalism. There are probably still different accents, but that's a terrific question because one of the key points that I want to make in the lecture and I think you anticipate it really nicely; and this is that reformed socialists and progressive liberals are coming from different places. They're coming from quite different intellectual traditions, but they ultimately end converging around a sort of a more or less consensual set of institutional and policy-based solutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:01]]
<nowiki>[39:01]</nowiki>

This is something which is really kind of important to remember and it's central to the history, to the economic history, of the capitalist world in the middle of the 20th century.

== Revolutionary Socialism and Reform Socialism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:15]]
<nowiki>[39:15]</nowiki>

So let's think sort of just a little bit more detail about some of these historical narratives. I'm given you a sense of the big picture, now let's delve into each of these intellectual streams and think about how the progression from revolutionary socialism to reform socialism for example gets made.

=== Marx and Socialism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:39]]
<nowiki>[39:39]</nowiki>

The history of socialist thought of course doesn't begin with Marx but we might as well take it as if it did. Marx is a historical determinist. We've already sort of talked about that aspect of Marxist political philosophy. All history is the history of class struggle leading through a progression of sort of historical phases or orders leading ultimately to a socialist revolution and then the creation of a communist utopia. Historical determinism and the preeminence of class struggle are sort of crucial aspects of Marx's political philosophy.

=== The Rise of Reform Socialism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:14]]
<nowiki>[40:14]</nowiki>

But by the late 19th century many people sort of within the international Marxist movement were beginning to question the necessity of revolution. While true revolutionaries like Lenin continued to argue vociferously in favor of a revolution, a revolution that would accomplish the kind of socialist state that Marx prophesied, critics of revolutionary socialism particularly within Western Europe argue that things are really going pretty well for the working class within the framework of the capitalist system. New protections to limit working hours are being introduced, prohibitions on child labor are being passed, wages are in relative terms improving. It looks as if life is improving for workers and thus a new genre of reformist socialism begins to emerge within the international worker's movement reformist strand that will seek to reconcile the working class to the basic institutional framework of liberal capitalism.

==== Reform Socialist Eduard Bernstein, Revolutionary Socialist Rosa Luxemburg ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:24]]
<nowiki>[41:24]</nowiki>

One of the most influential reform socialists will be {{WPExtract|Eduard Bernstein}}, a German socialist who becomes a sort of social democrat subsequent to the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:36]]
<nowiki>[41:36]</nowiki>

Whereas revolutionary socialists like {{WPExtract|Rosa Luxemburg}}, another German socialist thinker, continue to emphasize the imperatives of class-based revolution, Bernstein argues that, you know, there's no need to overthrow the existing political order. Socialists can work within the framework of the political status quo; moreover, Bernstein accepts the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy. He doesn't want to overthrow democracy in a violent revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:09]]
<nowiki>[42:09]</nowiki>

So there's a fundamental sort of political commitment that distinguishes reformists like Bernstein from revolutionaries like Luxemburg. That has to do with a sort of commitment to work within the institutional framework of parliamentary democracy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:24]]
<nowiki>[42:24]</nowiki>

Another key factor that distinguishes the revolutionaries from the reformers has to do with their willingness to work with liberals. Bernstein is perfectly happy to cooperate with economic liberals where cooperation can serve a progressive end.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:41]]
<nowiki>[42:41]</nowiki>

So even in the early decades of the 20th century, you begin to see this synergy of reform socialism and liberalism beginning to emerge. Luxemburg, on the other hand, will denounce all cooperation with liberals as sort of class treason.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:58]]
<nowiki>[42:58]</nowiki>

==== Reform Socialism in Germany ====

What are the consequences of reform socialism's emergence in the early 20th century? One will be the rise of socialism or social democracy as a mass political movement. The German Socialist Party becomes the majority party in the Reichstag in 1912. This is a really big deal. This is the first time that a socialist party has become the majority party in a European parliament.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:23]]
<nowiki>[43:23]</nowiki>

But the socialist party that wins the Reichstag majority in 1912 is not a revolutionary socialist party. It's a reformist party and that is in large part why it is able to win a majority. There wouldn't be political support in the democratic context for a radical revolutionary party such as Lenin's -- a party preaching the overthrow of the existing political and social order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:45]]
<nowiki>[43:45]</nowiki>

But reformers can win through political means as the German socialists demonstrate two years before the Second World War.

=== The Division of the Left ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:53]]
<nowiki>[43:53]</nowiki>

Another really important consequence will be the division of the left. This is a really profound division. It's a division that ultimately the Cold War will consecrate but it has a long prehistory which I've sort of alluded to here.

== The Rise of Fascism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:08]]
<nowiki>[44:08]</nowiki>

Of course, the rise of reform socialism is not the only major political economic development of the first half of the 20th century that has consequences for what comes next. We might think also about the rise of fascism as another sort of reaction to the collision of mass politics and the sort of economic crisis of the interwar years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:37]]
<nowiki>[44:37]</nowiki>

The First World War does not only compound the division of the left, the division between reformists and revolutionaries, it also provides for the emergence of what you might call a socialist right wing. It's not a good sort of terminological way to link {{WPExtract|fascism}} and socialism, but there are sort of [[wikt:familial|familial]] similarities that are worth sort of pointing out.

=== Mussolini and the Rise of Italian Fascism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:02]]
<nowiki>[45:02]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Benito Mussolini|Mussolini}} here is a good sort of prototypical case in part because he's the first fascist to come to power in Italy in 1922, but also because his fascism is not quite so tainted by sort of racism and anti-Semitism as the Nazi variant will be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:22]]
<nowiki>[45:22]</nowiki>

Mussolini propounds a sort of pseudo-political philosophical synthesis that emphasizes that leading role of the state in the organization of the economy. So Mussolini is not by any means a free market liberal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:41]]
<nowiki>[45:41]</nowiki>

On the contrary he believes that government has a sort of vital role to play in marshaling and manhandling the economy to produce growth and sort of politically desirable economic outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:53]]
<nowiki>[45:53]</nowiki>

Mussolini is also an international imperialist. He believes that the Italian nation-state, the state that he leads, should try to sort of conquer and accumulate as much wealth for itself as it can within the international arena. In pursuit of imperial aggrandizement, Mussolini will invade Ethiopia in 1935.<ref>Discussed in the Wikipedia article on the {{WPExtract|Second Italo-Ethiopian War}}.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:17]]
<nowiki>[46:17]</nowiki>

Mussolini, is also anti-individualist, and here you see a really stark break with the tenets of 19th century liberalism. Insofar as 19th century liberalism exalted the rights of the individual, vis-à-vis the state, Mussolini pronounces that the individual has no rights against the state, that the state is omnipotent and all-powerful and that the individual exists sort of only to serve the state.

== Totalitarianism on the Left and on the Right ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:41]]
<nowiki>[46:41]</nowiki>

So in Mussolini's fascism, you see a different kind of [[wikt:statist|statist]] agenda develop, a statist politics and economics of the right, not as a statist politics and economics of the left.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:56]]
<nowiki>[46:56]</nowiki>

These are very different movements, but at the same time there are some sort of resemblances in the sort of repudiation of liberal democracy that fascism makes in the 1920s and the 1930s and the repudiation of liberal democracy that revolutionary socialism makes in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:19]]
<nowiki>[47:19]</nowiki>

These familial resemblances lead some political scientists and political theorists to concoct the conceptual framework of {{WPExtract|totalitarianism}} as a way of sort of describing and analyzing sort of both fascism and revolutionary socialism within the same analytical framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:42]]
<nowiki>[47:42]</nowiki>

So that's fascism. We're not going to drill too deep into it but it's worth, you know, just setting it on the table as a different kind of sort of reaction to the crisis of liberalism in the early 20th century.

== The Survival of Liberalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:55]]
<nowiki>[47:55]</nowiki>

But what of liberalism's saviors? Why does liberalism ultimately survive the crisis of the 1930s and prevail? To answer that question, we might begin by sort of thinking about some of the individuals who are most responsible for reinvigorating liberalism, for energizing it, and ultimately for sustaining it through the sort of crisis, the grievous crisis of the 1930s.

=== John Maynard Keynes and Liberal Economic Theory ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:26]]
<nowiki>[48:26]</nowiki>

None is more important than {{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes|Keynes}}. We've already talked a little bit about Keynes, but let's just remind ourselves of what Keynes's major contributions to liberal economic theory are.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:37]]
<nowiki>[48:37]</nowiki>

Whereas the classical liberals, including say {{WPExtract|Alfred Marshall}}, who was Keynes's mentor at Cambridge, markets were self-correcting, what goes down must go up and vice versa, Keynes' vital contribution to economic theory is to sort of develop the argument that in a complex industrial economy, markets are not always self-correcting -- that a recession can be sticky. This is, this was, in the context of the 1930s, a really valuable insight.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:09]]
<nowiki>[49:09]</nowiki>

The economy that crashed in the late 1920s did not restore itself in the early 1930s, and Keynes offered a persuasive theoretical explanation as to why not. I'm not going to try to drill too deep into the details of Keynesian theory right now because if I would do so, it will probably take the rest of the lecture, and we don't want to sort of get distracted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:32]]
<nowiki>[49:32]</nowiki>

But the key sort of takeaway point from Keynes's general theory, which was published in 1936, is that economic downturns are not always self-correcting. The economy does not always fix itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:47]]
<nowiki>[49:47]</nowiki>

The corollary of this for Keynes is that government has a role of paramount responsibility to play as a corrector of economic downturns. If the economy won't mend itself, then somebody has to mend it, and that somebody for Keynes can only be central government authorities.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:09]]
<nowiki>[50:09]</nowiki>

Governments are the only sort of actors in the economic world with the requisite power to be able to correct a cyclical downturn in the real economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:20]]
<nowiki>[50:20]</nowiki>

How do governments do this? Well, they do it through the exercise of macroeconomic policy functions: through fiscal policy, taxing and spending; and monetary policy, printing bank notes.

==== Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:36]]
<nowiki>[50:36]</nowiki>

Do all of you have a sense of the distinction between {{WPExtract|monetary policy|monetary}} and {{WPExtract|fiscal policy}}? Does anybody not know the difference between the two? Because I can talk about it for a moment, but I won't ... Okay, a few of you.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:51]]
<nowiki>[50:51]</nowiki>

So let me just try to give a really succinct overview keeping my eye on the clock.

==== Keynes and the Role of Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economies ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:56]]
<nowiki>[50:56]</nowiki>

Fiscal policy, as I just mentioned, has to do with a state's power to tax and spend. Taxing and spending have consequences for the real economy. Insofar as the government taxes it takes dollars out of circulation. It takes dollars out of private hands, and by doing so reduces consumption. If the government taxes you, then you've less money to spend. That can slow down economic activity because consumer demand is diminished by taxation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:27]]
<nowiki>[51:27]</nowiki>

If you turn on the TV to the Republican debates this is the point that they make again and again and again.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:33]]
<nowiki>[51:33]</nowiki>

But the government can also spend, and spending increases demand in the real economy and thereby stimulates growth. That's the point which is less easily conceded in the Republican debates -- is that government spending through the fiscal power can have a stimulative effect on the economy writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:53]]
<nowiki>[51:53]</nowiki>

And what Keynes argues is that government fiscal policy ought to be sensitive to the macroeconomic circumstances in which it's made. Keynes argues that in a recession a government should not increase taxes. If anything it should cut taxes in a recession in order to stimulate growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:10]]
<nowiki>[52:10]</nowiki>

A government should also spend to stimulate growth in the context of a recession. Government policy should, in other words, be countercyclical.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:18]]
<nowiki>[52:18]</nowiki>

Now, for Keynes, the injunction to pursue countercyclical fiscal policy applied to bubbles as well as to busts. It was not only in a recession that government policy should be countercyclical but also in moments of irrational exuberance such as, say, the period between 2001 and 2008.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:42]]
<nowiki>[52:42]</nowiki>

Keynes would argue that in that time, cutting taxes was not prudent, that government policy should have tried to sort of dampen irrational exuberance, say, in the housing market by increasing taxes, perhaps by implementing regulatory solutions that would have sort of discouraged the expansion of price bubbles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:07]]
<nowiki>[53:07]</nowiki>

Government should not have done what it did and sort of poured gasoline on the fire by cutting taxes and continuing to spend at high rates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:17]]
<nowiki>[53:17]</nowiki>

So Keynes is not just a proponent of big government spending. That's sort of a caricature of Keynes. The real Keynes was sort of the architect of a much more sophisticated argument that had to do not just with government's role as a motor of growth but more profoundly with the role that government can play as a stabilizer of macroeconomic conditions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:45]]
<nowiki>[53:45]</nowiki>

So Keynes tries to make capitalism more stable, to level out the troughs and peaks, which had been so characteristic of the capitalist economy in the 19th century.

==== Keynes and the Role of Monetary Policy ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:54]]
<nowiki>[53:54]</nowiki>

Though Keynes emphasized fiscal policy, he also allowed a substantial role for monetary policy, in the management of the macroeconomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:04]]
<nowiki>[54:04]</nowiki>

You know, monetary policy doesn't have to do with the government's power to tax and spend, it has to do with the government's power to print money. And this is really important for the real economy because if you print more money then money becomes cheaper -- simple supply-demand curve, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:22]]
<nowiki>[54:22]</nowiki>

And why does the price of money matter for the real economy, for growth? Because what is the price of money in the economy?

I'm sorry?

That's right -- the interest rate. The interest rate is the price of money. And if the price of money is low borrowing is incentivized and that helps to stimulate growth. If you're an entrepreneur you're more likely to borrow more money to create a new business venture if the interest rate is low. If the interest rate rises and the cost of borrowing becomes higher then that disincentivizes investment and ultimately subdues growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:01]]
<nowiki>[55:01]</nowiki>

So monetary policy provides a second crucial lever of policy control over the macroeconomy. Though Keynes emphasize fiscal policy and is known for emphasizing fiscal policy, he also accorded a substantial role to monetary policy in the management of real economic conditions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:24]]
<nowiki>[55:24]</nowiki>

By sort of reinventing the role of government in relation to the economy, Keynes substantially transforms the sort of liberal economic philosophy of which he is such an important kind of interpreter in the 1930s. As a student of Alfred Marshall, one of the great late 19th century liberals, Keynes takes that inheritance and sort of molds it into something new.

=== Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:51]]
<nowiki>[55:51]</nowiki>

Perhaps even more influential than Keynes; however, at least in the world of politics, is Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt probably never read Keynes's general theory. It didn't come out until 1936 and it was a sort of complicated technical text. I would be very surprised if Roosevelt read it with any care or particular attention. But Roosevelt nonetheless implements a set of economic policies in the United States that could be described as sort of practical Keynesianism -- Keynesianism without the theoretical apparatus and super structure. This is really interesting.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:32]]
<nowiki>[56:32]</nowiki>

In some ways the American experience of the 1930s is unique. Whereas Britain and France continue to adhere to sort of classical policy prescriptions, the British and French governments do not implement countercyclical responses to the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration in the United States does. In the 1930s at least, the United States is the cutting edge of progressive liberalism in the capitalist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:57]]
<nowiki>[56:57]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|New Deal}} tries to do a number of things. It tries to create employment as in, say, the {{WPExtract|Civilian Conservation Corps}} among other public employment initiatives. It tries to regulate prices, the {{WPExtract|Agricultural Adjustment Act}}. It tries to stimulate industrial growth, the {{WPExtract|National Recovery Administration}}, and it even tries to provide public goods. The {{WPExtract|Tennessee Valley Authority}} builds hydroelectric plants on the Tennessee River.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:23]]
<nowiki>[57:23]</nowiki>

The government in effect sort of takes over a vast area of the Tennessee Valley and runs it as a state-owned enterprise. The New Deal does a lot of different experimental things all with the ulterior purpose of getting the economy moving again.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:39]]
<nowiki>[57:39]</nowiki>

I don't want to go so far as to suggest that there is a coherent theoretical or philosophical purpose underlying the New Deal. The New Deal does not unfold according to some strategic plan. It's much more a sort of process of experimentation, but there is ultimately a logic to this experimentation. And the logic is a logic of sort of tempering liberalism through the power of the state -- of deploying the authority of the state so as to ameliorate economic and social outcomes particularly as they afflict the working class, and by doing this Roosevelt stabilizes capitalism and transforms liberalism.

=== The Synthesis of Socialism and Liberalism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:21]]
<nowiki>[58:21]</nowiki>

And here we sort of get to our synthesis, a synthesis that emerges in the mid-20th century, of democratic reformist currents within socialism and of socially reformist currents within liberalism. They're coming from different places but they're ultimately pointing in the same direction.

== International Regimes of the International Economy ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:39]]
<nowiki>[58:39]</nowiki>

Alright, let's think about the international economy. What we might call the international regime that takes shape at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:48]]
<nowiki>[58:48]</nowiki>

What is an international regime? How many of you have had a chance to read {{WPExtract|John Ruggie}}'s article? Okay. The rest of you will presumably be reading it at some point really soon. It's a really, really useful piece for understanding sort of the idea of an international regime in general and the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods}} international regime in particular. I think it's one of the most important essays written on 20th century international history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:17]]
<nowiki>[59:17]</nowiki>

An international regime, to put it succinctly, is the set of institutional arrangements that determines how the world economy functions. Rather than describing an international regime in the abstract it may be more useful to think about the evolution of international regimes in history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:38]]
<nowiki>[59:38]</nowiki>

Prior to the First World War, the prevailing international regime was that of the {{WPExtract|Gold standard|gold standard}} about which I'm going to talk more in just a moment. The gold standard regime collapses with the First World War. It's briefly restored in the 1920s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:51]]
<nowiki>[59:51]</nowiki>

The 1930s bring something like an anti-regime period. Nation-states sort of breakaway from the global economy and pursue their own national economic self-interest. The international regime, as it were, collapses. It's restored in the Bretton Woods system, a system that functions for about three decades, a little less than three decades, and is substantially transformed in the early 1970s when a transition to what we might call a post Bretton Woods international regime occurs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:25]]
<nowiki>[60:25]</nowiki>

We're going to talk about that much more in due course so I'm not going to belabor it right now. The international regime is important not only because it structures the operation of the international economy but also because it has serious consequences for domestic economic policies, for the institutional configurations of domestic political economy within the nation-states that comprise the international regime, and this we're going to talk about right now with regard to the gold standard.

=== The Gold Standard ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:52]]
<nowiki>[60:52]</nowiki>

What was the gold standard? The gold standard was an international economic regime that developed in the second half of the 19th century. What was it? How did it function? I'm going to give you a really quick and superficial overview.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:07]]
<nowiki>[61:07]</nowiki>

In the gold standard system governments tied the value of their currencies directly to gold. The British government was the first to do it. In 1821 it linked the value of the pound sterling directly to the value of gold -- the precious metal. Other governments would eventually follow course. In 1873, Germany, France and the United States all joined the gold standard. The Scandinavian countries did so a couple of years later. Russia not until the very end of the 19th century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:41]]
<nowiki>[61:41]</nowiki>

What did the gold standard do? What were the consequences of fixing the value of your currency in direct relation to gold? One of the things that this does is to facilitate international trade. If the value of currencies is always fluctuating trade becomes uncertain. How do you know what the relationship of value between two currencies will be at the end of a transaction that takes six months to complete? It's difficult to predict in a world of fluctuating currency values.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:13]]
<nowiki>[62:13]</nowiki>
The gold standard provides a basic monetary stability for the international economy. It makes prices predictable into the future. It also has serious consequences for the economic policies of individual nation-states because there are costs to fixing the value of your currency in stable relation to gold. If you do that you have to be able to maintain the value of your currency against gold.

=== The Gold Standard and International Stability Versus Domestic Stability ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:50]]
<nowiki>[62:50]</nowiki>

What happens if you are a country on the gold standard and you import much more than you export? If your balance of payments is imbalanced? If you run a balance of trade deficit?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:09]]
<nowiki>[63:09]</nowiki>

Doing that could sort of undermine the capacity of your currency to maintain its stable valuation in relationship to gold. If you input more than you export then you have to pay for those imports somehow, and how are you going to pay for them? You could pay for them in paper currency, but if you do that, you will experience an outflow of money that ultimately can serve to undercut the credibility of your currency's valuation in relationship to gold [[wikt:specie|specie]].

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:48]]
<nowiki>[63:48]</nowiki>

The mechanism, the price-specie mechanism, that connects the value of gold to the value of individual currencies is something which has to be defended and the defense of it imposes strict restrictions on government policy, and the restrictions go something like this.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:48]]
<nowiki>[63:48]</nowiki>

If you're on the gold standard and you experience a trade deficit, you have to finance that deficit through the export of monetary reserves -- namely gold. This is more how the system works in the abstract than the practice but the abstract is probably more useful for illustrating the basic principles of the system and the restrictions that it imposed on national governments. So, you run a trade deficit. You have to pay for that by exporting gold, a store value to pay for your deficit. This has real consequences for your national macroeconomy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:44]]
<nowiki>[64:44]</nowiki>

Insofar as your currency, the value of your currency, is fixed to gold in sort of a stable relationship, exporting gold diminishes the monetary base of your economy, right? The supply of money in your economy is linked to gold. You have to export gold to pay for your trade deficit thus the supply of money in your economy contracts and that inhibits growth, slows growth. We talked about the role of monetary policy in the management of a macroeconomy just a few minutes ago.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:19]]
<nowiki>[65:19]</nowiki>

What the gold standard does, and this is really what you need to remember, is it makes that monetary function sort of automatic. Governments don't have much of a role in the determination of monetary policy in a gold standard system. The system sort of regulates itself, and this is part of the appeal. It's self-correcting.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:39]]
<nowiki>[65:39]</nowiki>

But there's very little latitude for government to ameliorate undesirable outcomes. You run a trade deficit. That deficit has to be paid for. You pay for the deficit by exporting gold specie. Your monetary base contracts, you experience a recession.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:58]]
<nowiki>[65:58]</nowiki>

Well, that's all fine in theory because it's ultimately self-correcting because the recession pushes down prices and pushing down prices makes your goods more competitive in world markets and thereby the trade deficit will sort of correct itself. So, it works well in theory but there's a price to be paid. A recession is socially undesirable. It throws people out of work. It pushes down the price of labor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:22]]
<nowiki>[66:22]</nowiki>

So what the gold standard does is it sacrifices macroeconomic stability within nation-states to the ulterior purpose of international stabilization. It sort of puts the global economy first and the national economy second, and that's something which is politically costly to do. Because if workers keep on getting thrown out of work and you tell them this has to happen in order for our balance of payments to be stable, they might start voting for revolutionary socialists or for fascists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:50]]
<nowiki>[66:50]</nowiki>

So the sustenance of political stability in the context of the gold standard system comes to be in tension with the maintenance of economic stability, so that's a real problem for the gold standard order.

=== The Bretton Woods System Seeks to Improve on the Gold Standard ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:03]]
<nowiki>[67:03]</nowiki>

And it's this problem, this relationship, potentially destabilizing relationship, between economics and politics that the Bretton Woods system tries to resolve. The Bretton Woods system is the set of institutional arrangements that are created at the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods Conference|Bretton Woods Economic Conference in New Hampshire in 1944}}. The key institution here is the {{WPExtract|International Monetary Fund}} -- the IMF.

==== The International Monetary Fund ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:29]]
<nowiki>[67:29]</nowiki>

What does the IMF do? The key innovation is a sort of dollar exchange standard. Everybody at Bretton Woods agrees that the basic principle of fixed exchange rates needs to be preserved. One of the things that the gold standard did --I may not have made this point clearly enough so let me just make it again -- one of the things that the gold standard does is it fixes the value of currencies in relation to each other, but it does so indirectly. Insofar as the deutschmark, the pound, the yen and the dollar are all fixed in this diagram in direct relationship to gold, their values are fixed in indirect relationship to each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:07]]
<nowiki>[68:07]</nowiki>

So there's a stability of exchange rates that the system provides. Everybody at Bretton Woods wants to retain the basic stability of exchange rates.

''Student Question: How is the determination made?''

By the national government in question. So If you're Britain, you decide what the value of your currency in relation to gold is going to be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:23]]
<nowiki>[68:23]</nowiki>

So there's no international sort of organization or institution that surveils parities. Those are for national governments to decide.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:32]]
<nowiki>[68:32]</nowiki>

Bretton Woods tries to preserve the basic principle of fixed exchange rates. Nobody in 1944 wants to do away with fixed exchange rates. Everybody still believes that fixed exchange rates are vital in order for trade to flourish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:47]]
<nowiki>[68:47]</nowiki>

But the International Monetary Fund tries to make fixed exchange rates more palatable. One of the ways it does this is by supplanting gold as the sort of monetary center of the international system with the United States dollar. Bretton Woods makes the dollar a system-wide reserve asset. Henceforth, national governments can hold not only gold but also US dollars as reserve assets -- as assets on which the value of their paper currencies will be sort of predicated.

===== Limitations of the Gold Standard =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:24]]
<nowiki>[69:24]</nowiki>

This is really important in a number of respects but probably the most important benefit of the dollar exchange standard is that it allows the monetary base of the whole system to grow much faster than it had done in the past. In a gold standard system, the growth of the money supply at the system level is limited, by what?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:48]]
<nowiki>[69:48]</nowiki>

By the amount of gold in the world. Right, if there's a direct relationship between gold and the money supply, then literally digging stuff up out of the ground is what monetary growth depends upon. That's not terribly rational -- With all due apologies to {{WPExtract|Ron Paul}} (class laughs).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:08]]
<nowiki>[70:08]</nowiki>

And the gold standard system will be plagued by crisis -- a series of troughs and peaks.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:15]]
<nowiki>[70:15]</nowiki>

Now the really interesting thing about the troughs and peaks is that you can line them up on a chart and connect them fairly precisely to major gold discoveries. The opening of the Klondike in the late 19th century helps to sustain a sort of economic boom because it increases the money supply available in the gold economy. There's an economic boom in the 1850s that accompanies the California gold rush because the more gold you have in the economy the more monetary growth that can be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:46]]
<nowiki>[70:46]</nowiki>

Now this works in the 19th century well enough but it's clearly not the most sensible or rational basis on which to organize the post Second World War economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:57]]
<nowiki>[70:57]</nowiki>

By supplementing gold with dollars as, at the sort of heart of the global economy, the Bretton Woods framework tries to improve upon this deficiency of the old gold standard system. Monetary growth can be accomplished now simply by printing dollars. It's a solution that is sort of key to the production of growth in a way that the old gold standard framework never had been.

===== IMF Assistance to Nations with Trade Deficits =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:26]]
<nowiki>[71:26]</nowiki>

Besides accommodating growth at the system level the Bretton Woods system also tries to facilitate the process of adjustment as individual nation-states experience it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:40]]
<nowiki>[71:40]</nowiki>

Under the old gold standard system, if you run a trade deficit, you had to experience a macroeconomic contraction in order to balance the books. The International Monetary Fund tries to mitigate the consequences of trade imbalances. One of the ways it does so is by providing loans to countries that find themselves experiencing trade deficits. You have a trade deficit, you have to pay for it. Well, you could experience a loss of gold or dollars which would contract your economy, but never fear because the IMF will simply lend you the money to tide you over.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:17]]
<nowiki>[72:17]</nowiki>

This provides governments with the space to implement solutions of their own devising to mitigate and correct sort of the circumstance that produce deficits over the medium to long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:32]]
<nowiki>[72:32]</nowiki>

So, the IMF, far from sort of imposing discipline on nation-states tries to mitigate the consequences of the discipline that the gold standard system had imposed much more harshly. So the IMF is an institution that tries to compromise between the rather stark and sort of automated discipline that the gold standard had required and the imperatives of allowing individual countries to pursue their own national economic policies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:06]]
<nowiki>[73:06]</nowiki>

All this is complicated and technical. The Ruggie article will help to explain it. But these were issues that are worth thinking through because they have real consequences for the ways in which the world economy functions in the second half of the 20th century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:21]]
<nowiki>[73:21]</nowiki>

If anybody wants to work through a written description of the Bretton Woods system which goes over the ways in which Bretton Woods improves upon and modifies the gold standard system, I can certainly circulate one. So write to me if you would like me to circulate a written discussion of this and I will do so.

==== The International Bank ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:43]]
<nowiki>[73:43]</nowiki>

Besides the International Monetary Fund, which serves as the primary sort of institutional framework for adjustment, the Bretton Woods institutions will include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The purpose of the IBRD, which later becomes known as the {{WPExtract|World Bank}}, is simply to lend money to countries, particularly countries that have been devastated by the Second World War in order to facilitate postwar reconstruction.

==== General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:13]]
<nowiki>[74:13]</nowiki>

The last so-called Bretton Woods institution is not created at Bretton Woods at all. It's created three years later. It's the {{WPExtract| General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade|General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs}}. The issue of trade liberalization was simply too contentious to really be dealt with at Bretton Woods in 1944. So the issue is deferred. The can is kicked down the road, and three years later, the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs is negotiated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 74:41]]
<nowiki>[74:41]</nowiki>

What does the GATT do? The GATT does not provide for the immediate reduction in tariffs. Following the Second World War, tariffs are still pretty high. What the GATT does is it provides a sort of multilateral framework in which signatory nations agree that the benefits of tariff reduction will be universally shared.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 75:05]]
<nowiki>[75:05]</nowiki>

If for example the United States and Great Britain, after 1944, agree to reduce tariffs on, say, automobile parts, the benefits of that tariff reduction will have to be shared with all other countries with whom Britain and the United States maintain full trading relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 75:30]]
<nowiki>[75:30]</nowiki>

So rather than sort of tariffs being reduced on a bilateral basis, which is slow, the GATT ensures that tariff liberalization will proceed in a multilateral manner. In other words tariff reduction will be faster and more comprehensive than it would be in the absence of the GATT. In a world in which all tariff reduction is bilateral, it takes a long, long time to introduce use of trade liberalization and doing so will always be substantially incomplete.

===== Later Trade Negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:04 ]]
<nowiki>[76:04]</nowiki>

Through the '50s and particularly in the 1960s, there will be a series of major rounds of multilateral tariff negotiations that do substantially succeed in bringing down levels of trade barriers among the advanced industrial countries. This is something that we'll talk about a little bit more in due course.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:24]]
<nowiki>[76:24]</nowiki>

The basic institutional framework is all that is created in the 1940s but it is consequential for what comes next.

==== The Politics of Bretton Woods ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:32]]
<nowiki>[76:32]</nowiki>

What about the politics of Bretton Woods? Who supports Bretton Woods? Who opposes Bretton Woods? What the slide shows you is the Bretton Woods resort in New Hampshire. It's a hotel in the White Mountains where the Bretton Woods institutions were conceived.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:47]]
<nowiki>[76:47]</nowiki>

Bretton Woods is not popular on Wall Street. This is really important to remember. Wall Street opposes Bretton Woods. They argue that Bretton Woods in effect consecrates government intervention, government macroeconomic management, as a permanent feature of economic life in the capitalist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 77:08]]
<nowiki>[77:08]</nowiki>

The opponents in Wall Street were not wrong. They perceived an essential truth about Bretton Woods. The Bretton Woods represented an effort to make globalization safe for social democracy or for progressive liberalism. Bretton Woods aspired to carve out space for governments to manage their own macroeconomies and then it tried to protect that space.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 77:36]]
<nowiki>[77:36]</nowiki>

This is what Bretton Woods did. It struck a very delicate compromise between the restoration of globalization on the one hand and the sustenance of autonomous national economic policies on the other.

==== The United States on the World Stage and the Implementation of Bretton Woods to Balance Globalization with Internal Domestic Prosperity ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 77:50]]
<nowiki>[77:50]</nowiki>

One of the grand ironies of Bretton Woods is that the United States, a sort of superpower which historians often associated with the promotion of globalization, with the promotion of sort of free market solutions -- the United States was the principal power behind this compromise between the market and progressive governments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 78:16]]
<nowiki>[78:16]</nowiki>

The United States was the orchestrator of the Bretton Woods Conference and it would be the sort of primary power on which the Bretton Woods system would depend in practice. The dollar was of course a system-wide reserve asset under the Bretton Woods system. The growth of dollar liquidity was essential for the sustenance of system-wide liquidity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 78:37]]
<nowiki>[78:37]</nowiki>

The United States also underwrites the recovery of its allies. It underwrites European recovery through the {{WPExtract|Marshall Plan|Marshall Aid}}. Thereafter, the {{WPExtract|Mutual Defense Assistance Act|Mutual Defense Act}} provides for military spending that will help to sustain the growth of the capitalist economy writ large.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 78:53 ]]
<nowiki>[78:53]</nowiki>

There's less US support from the non-European world. That's something that we'll deal with in due course.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 78:58]]
<nowiki>[78:58]</nowiki>

But American hegemony is a key institutional legacy of Bretton Woods. This is very, very different from the experience of the 1920s in which the United States had disdained the role of economic hegemon for the world economy as a whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 79:13]]
<nowiki>[79:13]</nowiki>

In the 1940s, the United States gleefully accepts the responsibilities of hegemonic power and it exercises those responsibilities in ways that try to sort of reconcile globalization with the emergence of the postwar welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 79:29]]
<nowiki>[79:29]</nowiki>

The question of course is: How long this can endure? That's a question that we'll come to in due course. Let me know if you have any questions about the technical aspects of this because I'll be glad to talk them through.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2019-06-14T20:54:43Z

DavidKitFriedman: noting that I just submitted a review of the lecture series on Internet Archive

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Associate Professor Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, and occasionally embedded images and video.

Consistent with this as an experiment in creating both a research resource and an educational resource links to definitions are provided for words that people who access the site might not be familiar with.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, but if there are more significant changes I might defer on it because I don't feel I have the time.

My pattern has been to check my email approximately once every 7-14 days, so it might be up to a few weeks before I would get to it.

I tried to contact Associate Professor Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

I just submitted a review of the lecture series which is available on the [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ details page] on Internet Archive for the course.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 20:54, 14 June 2019 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

Academic Lecture Transcripts

2019-05-26T07:05:18Z

DavidKitFriedman: adding a link to my Wikipedia user page as well as to my Wikipedia contribs

This is a volunteer project transcribing academic lectures. The content is from [https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ HIST 186 International and Global History since 1945] taught by [https://history.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/current/daniel-sargent Associate Professor Daniel Sargent] at UC Berkeley in the spring of 2012.

The transcription was done using [https://www.openstenoproject.org/plover/ Plover] which is part of the [http://www.openstenoproject.org/ Open Steno Project]. I also tried out adding headings, links, notes, references, and occasionally embedded images and video.

Consistent with this as an experiment in creating both a research resource and an educational resource links to definitions are provided for words that people who access the site might not be familiar with.

The wiki is not currently world editable, but people can send me email with corrections or comments. In the subject of the email include at the beginning "AcLeTr:". The username for my Gmail address is david.kit.friedman .

Typos and minor errors can most often be corrected quickly, but if there are more significant changes I might defer on it because I don't feel I have the time.

My pattern has been to check my email approximately once every 7-14 days, so it might be up to a few weeks before I would get to it.

I tried to contact Associate Professor Daniel Sargent and other people at UC Berkeley on this transcription work at the end of 2018 and at the beginning of 2019, but I didn't get any response.

There are no plans currently to transcribe any additional classes, but that could nevertheless be a possibility for the future.

[https://archive.org/details/ucberkeley_webcast_itunesu_496100096/ Internet Archive Page for HIST 186]

(see also [[Technical Comments]])

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 22:19, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

Brief Postscript: My username on Wikipedia is [[wikipedia:User:Jjjjjjjjjj|Jjjjjjjjjj]] ([[wikipedia:Special:Contributions/Jjjjjjjjjj|contribs]]) and in the course of listening to the lectures and doing the transcriptions I did various Wikipedia editing.

[[User:DavidKitFriedman|DavidKitFriedman]] ([[User talk:DavidKitFriedman|talk]]) 07:05, 26 May 2019 (UTC)

----

{| style="border-spacing:10px"
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 02 - World Crisis, World Recast - 01h 21m 39s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 05 - The Keynesian Era - 01h 19m 46s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 07 - Capitalism Bridled - 01h 18m 27s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 08 - The Socialist Alternative - 01h 20m 43s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 10 - The Cold War and Decolonization - 01h 15m 35s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s]]
|-
|[[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 13 - The West's Malaise - 01h 20m 09s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 14 - Crises of Political Utopias - 01h 20m 56s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 15 - A Decade of Shocks - 01h 19m 53s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - 01h 21m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 17 - Embracing the Market - 01h 19m 20s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 18 - Globalizing the Market - 01h 22m 59s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 19 - Democracy Resurgent - 01h 21m 01s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 21 - The New World Order - 01h 22m 08s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 22 - Contesting Globalization - 01h 18m 03s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 23 - Fractures and Fissures - 00h 44m 15s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 24 - To Get Rich is Glorious - 01h 20m 00s]]
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| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 25 - A Crisis of Capitalism? - 01h 12m 14s]]
|-
| [[UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 26 - The Eclipse of the West? - 01h 22m 33s]]
|}

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s

2019-05-26T06:57:03Z

DavidKitFriedman: I don't think it's necessary to make such an extended note on deaths during the Great Leap Forward.

== Introduction: The Importance of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Today we're going to be talking about the origins of the Cold War.

The Cold War is a definitive theme of the postwar era. Sometimes when historians of international relations talk about the postwar era they describe it simply as the era of the Cold War, i.e. the Cold War is such a big, such a crucial theme, that it can be a synonym almost for postwar international history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:31]]
<nowiki>[0:31]</nowiki>

Personally I wouldn't want to go that far. I think that there are dangers in seeing the Cold War as sort of the singular overarching framework within which the history of the postwar world needs to be understood. I think that we get a better historical understanding of the postwar world if we see the Cold War as one of a number of defining themes or struggles which we might use to comprehend the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:59]]
<nowiki>[0:59]</nowiki>

But even if we try to situate the Cold War in context, if we try to take the Cold War as one of a range of important historical themes that we need to understand its significance is still very substantial. The Cold War was a defining geopolitical confrontation of the postwar era and it will be one of the central issues that we have to try to comprehend as we move forward this semester.

== Aspects of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:28]]
<nowiki>[1:28]</nowiki>

What then was the Cold War? How should we understand it? And the Cold War had a number of different faces or aspects.

=== Geopolitical and Ideological Struggle ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:39]]
<nowiki>[1:39]</nowiki>

At one level the Cold War was simply a great power rivalry between two superpowers. A geopolitical confrontation between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:51]]
<nowiki>[1:51]</nowiki>

But at the same time the Cold War also had a central ideological aspect. It's difficult to understand the Cold War without paying central attention to the struggle between communism as an ideological system and capitalism as an ideological system. After all during the Cold War both Communists and capitalists claimed to be able to offer a superior way of organizing societies and economies. Both Communists and capitalist claimed that history was on their side.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:31]]
<nowiki>[2:31]</nowiki>

So when we think about the history of the Cold War we ought to think not only about the confrontation between two great powers: the United States and the Soviet Union, but also about the confrontation between two rival ideological systems: Communism and capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:46]]
<nowiki>[2:46]</nowiki>

The slide shows you a photograph of {{WPExtract|Richard Nixon}} and {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} arguing in the late 1950s about which of their social systems: Communism or capitalism was superior. It's significant that the debate took place inside a model kitchen because the kitchen was part of the American exhibition at the Moscow World's Fair and it modeled what Nixon saw as the superior merits and virtues of the capitalist system.

[[File:Kitchen debate.jpg|thumb|500px|center|[[wikipedia:Kitchen Debate|Kitchen Debate]] between Nixon and Khrushchev]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:15]]
<nowiki>[3:15]</nowiki>

So the Cold War was both an ideological struggle and a geopolitical confrontation. But there were more aspects to the Cold War than these.

=== The Nuclear Arms Race ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:26]]
<nowiki>[3:26]</nowiki>

The history of nuclear weapons has a central role in the history of the Cold War. And at some level we ought to see the nuclear arms race, the struggle for strategic superiority, and then from the early 1970s the struggle to control the nuclear arms and to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a history that is to some extent autonomous from the history of the geopolitical rivalry and the ideological struggle.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:56]]
<nowiki>[3:56]</nowiki>

Nuclear weapons were an invention of the postwar era. It might not be an exaggeration to say that nuclear weapons invented the postwar era in international relations and their history is from a certain point of view distinct from the history of the Cold War of which they were such a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:14]]
<nowiki>[4:14]</nowiki>

After all dilemmas over nuclear proliferation have continued beyond the end of the Cold War. This is a history that is both part of the Cold War and which transcends the Cold War itself.

=== Struggle Over the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:26]]
<nowiki>[4:26]</nowiki>

Besides the history of nuclear weapons as a central theme of Cold War history we ought to think too about the struggle to influence the postcolonial or decolonizing world that was such a central aspect of the Cold War's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:45]]
<nowiki>[4:45]</nowiki>

The Cold War was not just a struggle between social systems. Not just a struggle between great powers, superpowers, it was also a struggle for the soul of the developing world. And this was a struggle in which developing world actors like {{WPExtract|Ho Chi Minh }} played central roles themselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:04]]
<nowiki>[5:04]</nowiki>

It was not just a history in which the superpowers did things to the developing world. It was also a history in which developing world leaders and actors were themselves central players.

=== Conclusion: Aspects of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:16]]
<nowiki>[5:16]</nowiki>

The Cold War had many different facets and during the course of the semester we will be visiting as many of them as we have time to.

== Understanding the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:27]]
<nowiki>[5:27]</nowiki>

How then do we explain the Cold War? How did it come to pass? Was the Cold War inevitable or was the Cold War a product of specific choices, specific actions, for which we might hold individual historical actors accountable?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:44]]
<nowiki>[5:44]</nowiki>

Historians of the Cold War have tended to fixate on the question of origins. In part this is a reflection of sort of when the history of the Cold War was written. After all a great deal of Cold War {{WPExtract|historiography}} was written before the Cold War ended.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:02]]
<nowiki>[6:02]</nowiki>

Historians writing in the 1970s and 1980s could not very well be concerned with the question of endings. They sort of had to as a function of their own perspectives be concerned with the question of origins because that was really all that there was to write about the '70s and '80s.

=== Cold War Historiography and the Question of Accountability ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:18]]
<nowiki>[6:18]</nowiki>

One of the sort of central preoccupations for historians who have dealt with the origins of the Cold War has been the question of accountability. Who ultimately was to blame for the Cold War's arrival?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:33]]
<nowiki>[6:33]</nowiki>

I don't want to belabor the historiographical discussion. It would be more appropriate in a class on the history of US foreign relations than it is this semester's lecture series.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:45]]
<nowiki>[6:45]</nowiki>

But it's still worth thinking a little bit about the sort of ways in which scholars have tried to ascribe responsibility for the coming of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:56]]
<nowiki>[6:56]</nowiki>

And let me just give you a very simple run down of how this history works.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:02]]
<nowiki>[7:02]</nowiki>

(static like noise)

I don't know what that noise is.

Does anybody have any idea?

I'm sorry.

Okay, let's ...

I could do without the microphone in a room of this size but it's essential for the podcast so ...

==== Orthodox View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:25]]
<nowiki>[7:25]</nowiki>

Okay, so sort of the first generation of Cold War scholarship in the United States. Genre of scholarship which we commonly refer to as sort of orthodox history of the Cold War laid the blame for the Cold War's origins on the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:42]]
<nowiki>[7:42]</nowiki>

They said, well really the Cold War emerged out of Stalin's efforts to create a empire in Eastern Europe and the history of the early Cold War can be understood as a series of sort of Western reactions to Soviet provocations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:58]]
<nowiki>[7:58]</nowiki>

That's in a nutshell the first generation of Cold War historiography.

==== Revisionist View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:05]]
<nowiki>[8:05]</nowiki>

During the 1960s this sort of one dimensional interpretation of Cold War history is counted by an alternative one dimensional interpretation of Cold War history which sort of inverts responsibility for the coming of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:21]]
<nowiki>[8:21]</nowiki>

It says, well, you know really the Cold War was about American efforts to create an empire of sort of economic exploitation and influence in Western Europe and the origins of the Cold War can be understood in terms of a series of rational Soviet responses to American expansionism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:37]]
<nowiki>[8:37]</nowiki>

This emphasis on sort of American expansion as the root cause of the Cold War, an interpretation that flourishes in the 1960s, has something to do with the Vietnam War and the influence that the Vietnam War has on historians who are working at the time of it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:56]]
<nowiki>[8:56]</nowiki>

This genre of scholarship that tries to lay the blame for the Cold War on the United States is usually referred to as revisionist historiography.

==== Post-Revisionist View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:05]]
<nowiki>[9:05]</nowiki>

Out of this conflict between revisionists and orthodox historians of the Cold War something akin to a synthesis begins to emerge in the 1970s. The synthesis is usually labeled a sort of post-revisionist synthesis. And its great virtue I would suggest is that it seeks to transcend the question of accountability entirely. Rather than sort of looking to blame either side for the origins of the Cold War the post-revisionists are more concerned with understanding how the Cold War came to pass.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:41]]
<nowiki>[9:41]</nowiki>

They tend to emphasize sort of the conflicting visions that American and Soviet leaders had for the postwar order and the essential incompatibility between the expectations of the two sides. Post-revisionists tend to see two, the two sides, as sometimes unintentionally creating the sensation of insecurity on the part of the other superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

So the post-revisionists understand the Cold War less as a case of provocation and reaction but rather as a series of escalations sometimes unintentional that have the effect of reinforcing the mutual insecurities that both sides feel as they sort of look at the map of Europe and look at the actions of the other superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

So that's a very quick overview of Cold War historiography.

=== Questions about the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:40]]
<nowiki>[10:40]</nowiki>

What do we need to know about the Cold War in this class? In History 186? This is not a class on sort of the historiography of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:51]]
<nowiki>[10:51]</nowiki>

What it is important for you to think about as the semester moves forwards: I would say that the first question that you want to think about is how the Cold War came to pass. How did the world transition from a condition of world war between sort of 1939 and 1945 and a condition of Cold War from the late 1940s? How was this transition accomplished? Was it inevitable or was it the achievement of specific choices and actions?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:27]]
<nowiki>[11:27]</nowiki>

So the question of origins is a question that it is important to reflect upon just as generations of Cold War historians have concerned themselves with origins so too should you be concerned with the question of origins because it's really important.

==== The Cold War International System ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:42]]
<nowiki>[11:42]</nowiki>

Beyond the question of origins you should think about how the Cold War functioned as an international system. How did the Cold War world work? Did the Cold War transform the world into a bipolar world in which two superpowers predominates it and everybody else was subject to them?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:03]]
<nowiki>[12:03]</nowiki>

Or did smaller powers, did second tier powers, retain a certain historical autonomy? Did they retain a capacity to influence events despite the overarching condition of Cold War bipolarity? How did the Cold War system work?

==== Internal Politics and International Relations ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:20]]
<nowiki>[12:20]</nowiki>

You might also think about the relationship between internal politics, the domestic politics of nation-states, and the larger condition of global Cold War division. This relationship between sort of interior politics and international politics is one of the defining characteristics of the Cold War era. And it's something which you should reflect upon when you think about how the Cold War system worked.

==== The Cold War and Other Historical Themes Such as Decolonization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:45]]
<nowiki>[12:45]</nowiki>

It's also very important, sort of in a third theme, to consider how the Cold War related to other major historical themes of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:56]]
<nowiki>[12:56]</nowiki>

How do we relate the history of the Cold War, for example, to the history of decolonization? Decolonization as a historical theme was in some ways autonomous from the history of the Cold War. After all decolonization antedated the Cold War by decades if not by centuries. But the last phase of decolonization, the phase of decolonization that follows the Second World War, will be profoundly affected by the simultaneous outplaying of Cold War rivalries in the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

How did the two themes intersect? How did they interact? That's something which you should sort of think about as you try to sort of locate the Cold War in relation to other major historical developments of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:44]]
<nowiki>[13:44]</nowiki>

=== The End of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:44]]
<nowiki>[13:44]</nowiki>

And finally the question of endings. Why did the Cold War end as it did and when it did? This we will come to in due course.

=== Conclusion: Understanding the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:54]]
<nowiki>[13:54]</nowiki>

But as we reflect upon these various aspects of Cold War history I hope that we will come to some deeper understanding not only of the Cold War, what was it, how did it work, and why did it end but also of the Cold War's significance for understanding our own times.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

We are very much the products of the Cold War world. Our era is fundamentally a Cold War era, so we should try to think out the ways in which the realities of our own times have been shaped and defined by the experiences of the Cold War era.

== Organization and Schedule as Relates to the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:31 ]]
<nowiki>[14:31]</nowiki>

So how are we going to do this? We will be returning to the Cold War at various points during the course of the semester. This week we're really concerned with the question of origins. The other is sort of aspects of Cold War history which I've just outlined we'll be reserved for subsequent weeks. This week we're going to deal with the question of origins.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:54 ]]
<nowiki>[14:54]</nowiki>

Today we will focus on Europe, Thursday we'll focus on Asia. When we think about the Cold War in Europe, which is our task for today, we're going to think first of all about the Soviet Union, and Communism, what was the Soviet Union, what was Communism, what were the Soviet Union's aspirations for the postwar world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:14]]
<nowiki>[15:14]</nowiki>

We'll think next about the United States. What kind of postwar order did the United States want to create? And we'll think about the condition of Europe at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:24]]
<nowiki>[15:24]</nowiki>

In what situation did Europeans find themselves subsequent to the end of the Second World War? How did the vacuum of European politics following the defeat of Nazi Germany help to precipitate confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:45]]
<nowiki>[15:45]</nowiki>

And finally how did the division of Europe between the two superpowers play itself out in the late 1940s. That's what we're going to deal with today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:54]]
<nowiki>[15:54]</nowiki>

And then on Thursday we'll deal with the parallel history of East Asia in the period between the end of the Second World War, the defeat of Japan's new order in the Asia Pacific region, through to the sort of formal military division of East Asia at the end of the Korean war. So Asia we'll wait for Thursday today we're going to deal with Europe.

== Communism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:24]]
<nowiki>[16:24]</nowiki>

A fundamental question that we have to address when we think about the history of the Cold War is the question of communism. What is communism? Perhaps it would be more historically accurate to ask what was communism. Why did it have such a sort of disruptive impact on the international politics of the twentieth century?

=== Karl Marx ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:49]]
<nowiki>[16:49]</nowiki>

Of course to understand the history of communism it's not sufficient to deal with the history of the twentieth century. We have to go back to the history of the 19th century and to the political philosophy and economic sociology of {{WPExtract|Karl Marx}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:09]]
<nowiki>[17:09]</nowiki>

How many of you have had a chance to read Marx in your undergraduate studies so far? Okay, about half of you which is sort of a testament to Marx's enduring significance as a sociologist of capitalism which is really what he was.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:28]]
<nowiki>[17:28]</nowiki>

Let me push that question a little further though. Of those of you who have read Marx how many of you have read {{WPExtract|The Communist Manifesto|''The Communist Manifesto''}}? Okay. How many of you have read something other than ''The Communist Manifesto''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:43]]
<nowiki>[17:43]</nowiki>

Okay, what have you read?

(Student response)

{{WPExtract|Das Kapital|''Das Kapital''}}. All of it? Okay, that's hardcore (laughter). So...

==== Marx's Views on Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:54]]
<nowiki>[17:54]</nowiki>

Okay, those of you who have read ''Das Kapital'' will know that what Marx is really concerned about is capitalism not communism. This the grand irony of Karl Marx.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:05]]
<nowiki>[18:05]</nowiki>

For a thinker who is so singularly associated with the political and economic project of communism. He actually had a lot more to say about capitalism than he did about communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

Besides an expansive analysis of capitalism as a productive system, which is really what constitutes the greater part of Karl Marx's work and writings, Marx offers a sort of political doctrine of revolutionary communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:35]]
<nowiki>[18:35]</nowiki>

This is doctrine that is stated most succinctly, most quotably, in ''The Communist Manifesto'', sort of political pamphlet, published in 1848.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:46]]
<nowiki>[18:46]</nowiki>

To understand Marx's vision of communism, of the communist future (static like sound) ... alright.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:00]]
<nowiki>[19:00]</nowiki>

It's important to think about what Marx says about capitalism too. We should remember that Marx is writing in the middle of the 19th century in Great Britain at a moment when the Industrial Revolution is utterly transforming British society, but also a moment in which memory of the preindustrial world is still sort of tangible.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:31]]
<nowiki>[19:31]</nowiki>

For Marx the accumulation of wealth, the accumulation of capital, in a capitalist system depends fundamentally upon the expropriation of labor. This a really sort of crucial insight for Marxist economic sociology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:52]]
<nowiki>[19:52]</nowiki>

The accumulation of wealth depends upon the expropriation of labor -- since it's your labor that pays for somebody else's prosperity. Marx argues that the capitalist system depending as it does upon the expropriation of labor and upon the accumulation of capital via labor expropriation is inherently unstable because it has a built in tendency towards the concentration of wealth, the concentration of resources in the hands of a few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:29]]
<nowiki>[20:29]</nowiki>

In the hands of a very wealthy, a very affluent minority. Ultimately, Marx argues, the history of capitalism veers unavoidable towards conflict. In a world in which resources are finite, which Marx profoundly believed, the concentration of more and more resources in fewer and fewer hands will produce conflict amongst those in whose hands wealth is vested.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:56]]
<nowiki>[20:56]</nowiki>

That sort of makes sense as abstract theory, right. The concentration of resources in the hands of the few will produce a situation of conflict between those in whose hands wealth is concentrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:11]]
<nowiki>[21:11]</nowiki>

Because as a smaller and smaller number of sort of powerful, of empowered capitalists, fight over finite resources, their confrontation will become increasingly bitter, increasingly, sort of ferocious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:29]]
<nowiki>[21:29]</nowiki>

So Marx offers a theory of capitalism in which all wealth derives from exploitation, from the exploitation of labor, and in which the accumulation of wealth tends over time to produce a concentration of resources in the hands of a few. That's really exactly to understanding sort of Marx's theory of capitalism.

==== Marx's Meta-Historical Framework ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:50]]
<nowiki>[21:50]</nowiki>

Besides sort of offering a sociological analysis of capitalism that emphasized labor expropriation as the ultimate source or engine of wealth and accumulation and concentration of wealth as sort of capitalism's inner dynamic Marx also offered a historical framework, a framework, a sort meta-historical framework, that tried to situate capitalism in relation to earlier phases of history defined by the relationship of labor to production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:28]]
<nowiki>[22:28]</nowiki>

For Marx history in the very largest sense had an internal logic. History Marx argued could be divided into a series of stages or phases each of which could be defined by the relationship between labor and production. For Marx this with really the crucial relationship in human history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

Marx argued that we could understand the entire course of human history as a sort of progression from one historical phase defined by the relationship of labor to production to another.

===== Marx's Stages of History =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:04]]
<nowiki>[23:04]</nowiki>

To understand this it might help to sketch out the stages of history as Marx construed them.

For Marx the first stage of history is what Marx called a stage of sort of primitive communism and this is what we sort of more commonly identify as a hunter-gatherer stage of human existence. A sort of sociology in which human beings lived in small bands of a dozen, two dozen, individuals no larger than that. Subsisted on hunting and the gathering of plant stuffs, and in which, this is really fundamental, all food was shared more or less equally amongst members of the hunter-gatherer band. Marx characterized this kind of very small-scale subsistence lifestyle as a condition of primitive communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:01]]
<nowiki>[24:01]</nowiki>

How do we get from a world of hunter-gatherer tribes to a world of vast empires capable of orchestrating large construction projects like the pyramids of Egypt or the Roman Coliseum? For Marx the answer is slavery.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:19]]
<nowiki>[24:19]</nowiki>

Only the legal enslavement of labor and the exploitation thereof will permit the creation of sort of vast complex societies on the model of Greco-Roman antiquity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:33]]
<nowiki>[24:33]</nowiki>

So for Marx slavery as a social institution is absolutely crucial to understanding how we get from sort of a world of primitive hunter-gatherer tribes to a world of sophisticated urban imperial structures like Rome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:50]]
<nowiki>[24:50]</nowiki>

The slave societies of the ancient world, Marx argues, eventually deteriorate into a feudal order. The transition to the feudal order is characterized by the tethering of slaves to particular plots of land. Individuals in effect become sort of the wards of the land rather than of powerful owners. This is for Marx what defines the transition from a slave society to a feudal society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:27]]
<nowiki>[25:27]</nowiki>

None of this is going to be on the exam by the way, so...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:30]]
<nowiki>[25:30]</nowiki>

Then following the sort of creation of a feudal economic sociology Marx identifies in the late 18th century the advent of a capitalist system. And this is really what Marx is concerned with explaining. How does the capitalist world come to be?

==== Marx on the Advent of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

What defines the advent of capitalism? And for Marx capitalism has to do fundamentally with the transition or with the transfer of power from the feudal aristocracy, from landowners, to an urban {{WPExtract|bourgeoisie}} whose wealth is defined not in terms of ownership of land but in terms of the ownership of industrial production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:20]]
<nowiki>[26:20]</nowiki>

So with industrialization, the mill owner, the railroad baron, will replace the feudal lord as the sort of dominant economic figures of their times.

==== Marx on the Fate of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:34]]
<nowiki>[26:34]</nowiki>

For Marx though, capitalism as we've already discussed, is inherently unstable. Moreover it depends upon exploitation, upon the appropriation of labor, the labor of the many, by the sort of vested power of the few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:52]]
<nowiki>[26:52]</nowiki>

And for Marx capitalism is destined to collapse. This is really, really, important. It's a sort of historical inevitably as Marx puts it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:01]]
<nowiki>[27:01]</nowiki>

That capitalism will eventually collapse because of its own internal contradictions. Perhaps capitalists will fight amongst themselves in the internal struggle for finite resources. Or perhaps workers, who grow tired of being exploited, will raise up and overthrow the capitalist {{WPExtract|plutocracy}} in a revolution.

==== Marx on Socialism Replacing Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:22]]
<nowiki>[27:22]</nowiki>

And what will follow capitalism, Marx argues, is a new stage of history, a stage that Marx defines as the socialist stage of history, an era in which a revolution will create a new socialist order, an order in which a sort of powerful state will seize control of factories, of the means of production, and will utilize those resources to benefit the many and not the few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:52]]
<nowiki>[27:52]</nowiki>

And this transition from capitalism to socialism is what Marx is really concerned with in his writings. How will it come about? How can it be achieved?

==== Marx on Communism after Socialism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Finally the socialist order as Marx prophesies it will be followed by a communist era of history. Sorry the slide says capitalism but it should read communism. A communist era of history in which the revolutionary state withers away and in which sort of workers administer their own affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

For Marx the existence of a revolutionary state is a sort of necessary aspect of the socialist transition between capitalism and communism.

=== Karl Marx, ''The Communist Manifesto'', and the Russian Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:37]]
<nowiki>[28:37]</nowiki>

So that in a nutshell is Karl Marx's sociology of capitalism and his conception of the course of world history. Capitalism is unstable and it's destined to collapse.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:50]]
<nowiki>[28:50]</nowiki>

And what Marx offers in his sort of political pamphlet, ''The Communist Manifesto'', which famously begins with the declaration, "Workers of the world, unite!", is a program, a very skeletal program, but a program nonetheless, for achieving the transition from a capitalist world to a socialist world. Marx calls for a revolution, a revolution of workers, to rise up and overthrow the capitalist order, and to create in its wake a new socialist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

Marx might have been surprised that the sociologist revolution that he prophesied and called for occurred ultimately when it did occur, not in Germany, not in Great Britain, but in Russia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:46]]
<nowiki>[29:46]</nowiki>

Insofar as Marx believed that revolution would emerge out of a sort of crisis of capitalism it was plausible to imagine that the revolution would come first of all to Europe's most developed capitalist economies, namely...

(static like noise)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:07]]
<nowiki>[30:07]</nowiki>

I don't know what the problem with this is.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:13]]
<nowiki>[30:13]</nowiki>

Not to Russia, or ... But to Germany, or ... I'm sorry ...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:24]]
<nowiki>[30:24]</nowiki>

(silence)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:34]]
<nowiki>[30:34]</nowiki>

Apparently my cell phone is responsible for the interruption with the microphone and this actually works much, much better so thank you very much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:41]]
<nowiki>[30:41]</nowiki>

Okay, now, I can concentrate on this and not on that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:45]]
<nowiki>[30:45]</nowiki>

So Marx predicts that the revolution will occur in the most advanced, most developed, capitalist economies of Europe, which is to say Germany, Great Britain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:57]]
<nowiki>[30:57]</nowiki>

Of course that's not where the revolution ends up happening. The revolution ends up in happening in Russia -- a vast overwhelmingly agrarian society on the periphery of the European economy.

== The Russian Revolution ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:09]]
<nowiki>[31:09]</nowiki>

Why does the revolution happen in Russia? Why does it not happen in Germany or in Great Britain? A simple answer to that question is that Russia is devastated, exhausted, and impoverished by the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:26]]
<nowiki>[31:26]</nowiki>

The First World War exhausts Russia. It exhausts Russia's limited industrial resources. Russia is also you know very badly afflicted by the fighting on the Eastern Front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:42]]
<nowiki>[31:42]</nowiki>

The czarist regime, an autocratic monarchy which ruled Russia, had already been weakened even before the First World War by the pressure of political reform within the Russian state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

There were a handful of liberal reformers who envisaged that Russia would sort of reform itself in a state resembling Britain or France or the United States. The opponents, among the opponents, of the czar, sort of radical revolutionary socialists, were more numerous and more capable often than were the sort of liberal reformers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:22]]
<nowiki>[32:22]</nowiki>

The disruption that the First World War produces in Russia creates avenues of opportunity for the czar's opponents as the sort of men of the Russian imperial armed forces experience the sort of upheaval and convulsions of war. They become radicalized. The Russian army becomes a sort of potential source of political instability for the state.

=== The Kerensky Regime ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:55]]
<nowiki>[32:55]</nowiki>

And for reasons that are far too complicated to get into today Russia ends up experiencing a revolution early in 1917. The czar abdicates and a liberal regime comes to power under the leadership of {{WPExtract|Alexander Kerensky}}, a progressive, sort of non-Communist politician.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:18]]
<nowiki>[33:18]</nowiki>

This is never a terribly strong regime. But it is a regime that seeks to sort of remake Russia, an authoritarian monarchical society, in a sort of liberal democratic mold.

=== The October Revolution and the Rise of the Bolsheviks ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:31]]
<nowiki>[33:31]</nowiki>

The Kerensky regime does not last a year. It comes to power in February of 1917. In October 1917 it is overthrown in a coup. And the person who overthrows it is {{WPExtract|Vladimir Lenin}} -- the leader of Russia's {{WPExtract|Bolsheviks|Bolshevik}} Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:50]]
<nowiki>[33:50]</nowiki>

The Bolsheviks are a minority faction of the Revolutionary Socialist Left in Russia. This is really important to remember. Lenin does not represent the socialist left in Russia. The socialist left is divided into multiple parties. And Lenin's party represents a small but unusually radical faction of the Russian revolutionary left.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:20]]
<nowiki>[34:20]</nowiki>

It's Lenin's conviction that a determined Communist Party can orchestrate a revolution on its own accord. Most other Russian leftists say: look, this is ridiculous, Russia is a big poor country, we need to wait for Russia to develop, for Russia to industrialize, before trying to create something like a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:43]]
<nowiki>[34:43]</nowiki>

How do you create a socialist society in a predominantly agrarian context? That's what Lenin's critics say. Lenin has no time for this. Lenin says, well, all we have to do is seize control of the state -- is to seize the control of the levers of the power, and we can use the state as an instrument for orchestrating social and economic transformation of the profoundest kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:05]]
<nowiki>[35:05]</nowiki>

This is Lenin's revolutionary theory. It's a theory that tells us that a determined vanguard party can seize control of the state and use the state as an instrument of social and historical transformation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:20]]
<nowiki>[35:20]</nowiki>

This is what Lenin tries to do in October 1917 -- when his Bolsheviks come to power in a coup d'etat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

Lenin in October 1917 seizes control of the state, or at least he seizes control of the state's capital, St. Petersburg, but he does not seize control of the country writ large.

=== The Russian Civil War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:40 ]]
<nowiki>[35:40]</nowiki>

The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 will be followed by a long period of civil war in which anti-Communist White Russians who predominate in the countryside struggle to sort of regain control against the Bolsheviks, the revolutionary Communists, who predominate in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04]</nowiki>

This war ultimately ends in 1921 with the triumph of the Bolsheviks but there is great deal of consequence that happens between 1917 and 1921.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:18 ]]
<nowiki>[36:18]</nowiki>

Great Britain and the United States send limited military forces and economic aid to help the White Russians. This is really important because the Bolsheviks remember that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:31 ]]
<nowiki>[36:31]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Russian Civil War}}, as it is known, also involves an international war. Poland goes to war against Russia in 1919. Essentially what Poland tries to do is to achieve a land grab at Russia's expense while Russia is preoccupied with its internal civil war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:52 ]]
<nowiki>[36:52]</nowiki>

And both of these sort of aspects of the civil war, the war with Poland and the allied intervention are really, really important for sort of shaping the Bolshevik concept of the external world.

=== Conclusion: The Russian Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:09]]
<nowiki>[37:09]</nowiki>

So that's the Russian Revolution in about two minutes. And next let's deal with the transition from Lenin to Stalin in a similarly cursory manner.

== From Lenin to Stalin ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:21 ]]
<nowiki>[37:21]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Vladimir Lenin|Lenin}} is the singular charismatic leader of the Russian Revolution. It's hard to conceive of the Russian Revolution without Lenin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:31]]
<nowiki>[37:31]</nowiki>

His death in 1924 is a catastrophe for the Revolution that he led and for the party that he created, the Bolshevik party. The question of what comes next and what comes after Lenin is a profoundly divisive one amongst Lenin's potential heirs.

=== Leon Trotsky ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:50 ]]
<nowiki>[37:50]</nowiki>

Perhaps Lenin's most sort of brilliant and charismatic would be successor -- {{WPExtract|Leon Trotsky|Trotsky}} -- argues that a continuation of Lenin's work would involve an export of the Russian Revolutionary model to the larger world. Trotsky, who is the one of the figures vying to succeed Lenin, argues that Russia should now take it upon itself to create a sort of global revolutionary front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:17]]
<nowiki>[38:17]</nowiki>

The Bolsheviks, Trotsky argues, should build alliances with Communists in other countries, specifically in Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:25 ]]
<nowiki>[38:25]</nowiki>

Trotsky is sort of concerned that the Russian Revolution having occurred as it did in a poor agrarian country may not survive unless the larger revolution which Marx prophesied -- the revolution in Germany -- also sort of takes place. Consolidating and broadening the gains of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

=== Joseph Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:49 ]]
<nowiki>[38:49]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Joseph Stalin}}, another putative successor to Lenin, takes a very different view of the revolution's future. Whereas Trotsky favors a globalization of the revolution Stalin instead argues that the Bolsheviks should focus upon the construction of an effective socialist system within Russia. His slogan will be socialism in one country.

=== Trotsky and Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:15 ]]
<nowiki>[39:15]</nowiki>

To see the struggle for succession as a struggle between Trotsky and Stalin is an oversimplification, but we don't have time for much else. Ultimately it is Stalin who wins. Stalin wins in large part because he controls the party apparatus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:32 ]]
<nowiki>[39:32]</nowiki>

Trotsky controls the Red Army but Stalin controls the internal sort of bureaucratic apparatus of the party and this proves to be a very useful asset in seizing control of the state.

== Stalin's Rule ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:47 ]]
<nowiki>[39:47]</nowiki>

Having seized control of the party in the mid 1920s, Stalin in the second half of the 1920s, consolidates his personal power. And he does this by first of all purging the Bolshevik left, and by then at the end of the 1920s, turning against the moderates within the Bolshevik Party.

=== The Great Turn ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:05 ]]
<nowiki>[40:05]</nowiki>

As he turns against the moderates, you know those who favor a more gradual transition to socialism, Stalin in 1928 embarks what is known as the {{WPExtract|Great Break (USSR)|Great Turn}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:16 ]]
<nowiki>[40:16]</nowiki>

He launches a five year plan for the rapid industrialization of the country. What Stalin initiates in the late 1920s is an effort to transform the Russian economy, to transform Russian society, through the orchestration of a sort of gargantuan process of top down change.

=== The Transformation of Agriculture and Turning Peasants into Industrial Workers ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:41 ]]
<nowiki>[40:41]</nowiki>

Besides creating new factories, state owned enterprises, Stalin will try to sort of transform Russian agriculture. And this is really important because most Russians in the late 1920s are still peasants.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:56]]
<nowiki>[40:56]</nowiki>

Stalin's purpose is to take these peasants, remove them from the land and transform them into factory workers. After all this is what a Marxist theory of history dictates will happen. Having committed himself to accelerating the transition to communism Stalin will try to transform peasants into industrial workers.

=== The Repression of Joseph Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:21 ]]
<nowiki>[41:21]</nowiki>

Doing this will entail the construction of a vast apparatus of political repression. Having [[wikt:alloy|alloyed]] the party to the power of the state Stalin will turn the instrument of the party-state into a machinery of repression. Who is repressed? Anybody who stands between Stalin and the accomplishment of his sort of radical transformative agenda. Anybody who represents a threat to the personal authority of Joseph Stalin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:59 ]]
<nowiki>[41:59]</nowiki>

The death toll in the 1930s will be catastrophic. The imposition of a forced top down campaign of agricultural collectivization claims millions and millions of victims.

=== The Ukrainian Famine ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:20 ]]
<nowiki>[42:20]</nowiki>

In the Ukraine, which is the most agriculturally productive part of the Soviet Union, Stalin introduces a program of collectivization which forcibly removes peasants from their small plots of land and concentrates them in collective farms. This is done with the purposes of making agricultural production more efficient.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:45]]
<nowiki>[42:45]</nowiki>

In practice, of course, what it enables the state to achieve, is to requisition grain from the peasantry, to take grain from the countryside, and to use it to feed urban workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:57 ]]
<nowiki>[42:57]</nowiki>

As a consequence of the {{WPExtract|Holodomor|famine}} that collectivization causes in the Ukraine about 3 million people die. And those who die are often amongst the youngest and the oldest and the otherwise most vulnerable members of Ukrainian society.

=== Stalin's Campaign of Political Terror ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:17 ]]
<nowiki>[43:17]</nowiki>

Besides the millions of peasants who succumb to the collectivization campaign Stalin launches a campaign of political terror against his political opponents. During the 1930s a series of purges remove and then liquidate individuals and factions whom Stalin considers to be sort of a threat to his own personal authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:45 ]]
<nowiki>[43:45]</nowiki>

The death toll of the purges of the 1930s amounts to the hundreds of thousands. So we're not talking about as many human victims as the campaign of agricultural collectivization produces but we are talking about a campaign of intentional state murder.

=== The Death Toll of Stalinization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:03 ]]
<nowiki>[44:03]</nowiki>

The consequences of Stalinization will be sort of catastrophic in terms of the overall death toll. It's really hard to estimate the total number of human fatalities that we can ascribe to the Stalin regime. One estimate which was sort of put together by a group of admittedly sort of anti-Communist historians about fifteen years ago puts the death toll at somewhere around 20 million human deaths that can be ascribed to the project of Stalinization in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:44]]
<nowiki>[44:44]</nowiki>

It's a death toll that sort of pales by comparison with the death toll that could be ascribed to the Maoist regime in China but that's a topic that we will come to in due course.<ref>One could visit the [[wikipedia:Great_Leap_Forward#Famine_deaths|famine deaths section]] of the Wikipedia article on the {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:55]]
<nowiki>[44:55]</nowiki>

Whatever way you look at it the human costs of Stalinization in the 1930s are very, very high.

== Western Response to the Human Toll of Stalinization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:02 ]]
<nowiki>[45:02]</nowiki>

How does the West react to this? How do Western intellectuals, Western public leaders, respond to the vast human upheaval and human misery that the Stalinist experiment produces in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:20 ]]
<nowiki>[45:20]</nowiki>

Western intellectuals for the most part are not particularly bothered by the crimes of Stalinism. We should remember that the West itself is in the 1930s enmired in a Great Depression. The Soviet system seems for some sympathetic Western intellectuals to represent the wave of the future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:40]]
<nowiki>[45:40]</nowiki>

Some sympathetic Western observers are willing to overlook and disregard the crimes of Stalinism as simply being sort of the necessary [[wikt:detritus|detritus]] of the revolution.

=== Beatrice and Sidney Webb's Laudatory Reports on the Soviet Union ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:57 ]]
<nowiki>[45:57]</nowiki>

Two prominent British socialists, {{WPExtract|Beatrice Webb|Beatrice}} and {{WPExtract|Sidney Webb, 1st Baron Passfield|Sidney Webb}} travel to Russia in the early 1930s and they, on their return to London, publish a very kind of laudatory book titled ''Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?'' which lauds the accomplishments of the Stalinist state and praises Stalin for sort of leading humanity forward into a new era of history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:22 ]]
<nowiki>[46:22]</nowiki>

That represents one reaction to the Soviet project.

=== Western Governments' Hostility to Stalinism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:27 ]]
<nowiki>[46:27]</nowiki>

Western governments on the other hand are much more hostile to Stalinism. We should remember that Great Britain and the United States tried to intervene in the Soviet Union in order to aid the opponents of the revolution after 1917, and the governments of Britain and the United States remain hostile to Bolshevism, to the Soviet Union, through the 1920s and into the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:53]]
<nowiki>[46:53]</nowiki>

The United States does not even recognize the Bolshevik regime as the legitimate government of the Soviet Union until 1933 when {{WPExtract|Franklin D. Roosevelt|Franklin Roosevelt}}, Roosevelt, becomes President of the United States.

== Stalin's Popular Front Strategy ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:06 ]]
<nowiki>[47:06]</nowiki>

Stalin in the 1930s is focused much more upon the accomplishment of rapid domestic transformation than he is upon foreign policy. But he is concerned by the rise of {{WPExtract|fascism}} in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:22]]
<nowiki>[47:22]</nowiki>

In order to sort of create an international coalition to contain the fascist threat Stalin in the mid 1930s promotes what becomes known as a popular front strategy -- a strategy that tries to rally progressives and leftists of all kinds: liberals, socialists, revolutionary as well as non-revolutionary, anarchists, everybody except the Trotskyites, into a broad coalition known as a sort of popular front.<ref>One could visit the [[wikipedia:Popular_front#The_Comintern's_Popular_Front_policy_1934–39|section on the Comintern's Popular Front policy 1934–39 in the Wikipedia article on popular front]]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:55 ]]
<nowiki>[47:55]</nowiki>

It's ironic in some ways that Stalin promotes an ecumenical international strategy at the same time as he is purging his ideological opponents at home, but that is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:07]]
<nowiki>[48:07]</nowiki>

He tries to promote a sort of popular front approach in the 1930s that will rally anti-fascists of all kind into a grand coalition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:19 ]]
<nowiki>[48:19]</nowiki>

The West, or at least the governments of the Western Powers, the French, actually, the French are somewhat more sympathetic to this for a period in 1936, but the British and the Americans have very little interest in joining with the Soviet Union in an anti-fascist popular front. Instead they sort of continue to spurn the USSR.

== The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its Termination ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:41 ]]
<nowiki>[48:41]</nowiki>

Having failed to create a coalition with the West, Stalin will in 1939, sign a pact with Hitler, the {{WPExtract|Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact|Nazi-Soviet Pact}}. This represents a very different kind of response to the fascist threat. Stalin continues to believe that Nazi Germany represents a mortal threat to the Soviet Union but he decides in 1939 to sign a pact with Hitler in the hope of buying time that will enable the Soviet Union to better prepare itself for confrontation with Nazi Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:12]]
<nowiki>[49:12]</nowiki>

This strategy endures until 1941, until June 1941, when Hitler of course invades the Soviet Union -- an invasion that really took Stalin by surprise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:26]]
<nowiki>[49:26]</nowiki>

Stalin had not expected that Hitler would turn on the Soviet Union as quickly as he did. Having been sort of surprised by the Nazi attack Stalin will forge in the early 1940s a grand alliance with Great Britain and the United States for the purposes of waging war against Nazi Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:49]]
<nowiki>[49:49]</nowiki>

But it's really important to remember that the grand alliance emerges in the very unusual circumstance of 1941. Only after Hitler has attacked the Soviet Union will a coalition between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union emerge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:08]]
<nowiki>[50:08]</nowiki>

The democracies in the 1930s had not allied with the Soviet Union for the purposes of containing fascism. That happened only in the context of the Second World War.

== Grand Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies during the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:21]]
<nowiki>[50:21]</nowiki>

The wartime {{WPExtract|Grand Alliance (World War II)|grand alliance}} is highly effective. It ultimately accomplishes the defeat of Nazi Germany but that is not to say that the alliance is without internal friction. There are profound disagreements between the Allies particularly over the issue of the second front. The question of how soon the British and the Americans will attack Nazi Germany and the West is a really contentious issue amongst the wartime allies. Insofar as the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944 is the only power that is waging a land war against Nazi Germany Stalin can't wait for the British and the Americans to join the Second World War to open a second front in France.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:09]]
<nowiki>[51:09]</nowiki>

Because you know Stalin expects that will ease the pressure on Soviet forces in the east -- because Germany's resources will be divided by the opening of the second front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:19]]
<nowiki>[51:19]</nowiki>

The fact that it takes the British and the Americans so long to open a second front is an irritant to Stalin during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:30]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

It should be said, just to give you a little more background on that issue, that the United States under Franklin Roosevelt is eager to open a second front. It's Britain which is really the major obstacle to the opening of a second front earlier than 1944.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:48]]
<nowiki>[51:48]</nowiki>

It's not until 1944 with {{WPExtract|Normandy landings|D-Day}} that the Anglo-Americans finally attack continental Europe, but they do so later than FDR and the United States would have wanted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:01]]
<nowiki>[52:01]</nowiki>

So that is the grand alliance, an alliance that finally brings the Soviet Union together with the Western Democracies, in a coalition intended to defeat Hitlerism.

== From the Grand Alliance to the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:16]]
<nowiki>[52:16]</nowiki>

But this hardly explains why American forces will by the 1950s be permanently stationed in Europe, their mission being the containment of the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:31]]
<nowiki>[52:31]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Elvis Presley}} in the late 1950s has to do military service, and this is a unprecedented thing in the American experience. Never before in the United States had there been a peacetime military draft -- a peacetime military draft which capable of taking a sort of popular entertainment figure like Elvis across the seas to Germany where he would be tasked with sort of serving in the American army of occupation in Germany, in that country.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:09]]
<nowiki>[53:09]</nowiki>

The question of explaining sort of how the United States transitions from the grand alliance, an alliance of convenience with the Soviet Union, to a state of Cold War in which American forces will be permanently located in Europe in order to contain Soviet power is sort of the question of the Cold War's origins.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:32]]
<nowiki>[53:32]</nowiki>

How did we get from the alliance of the early 1940s to the estrangement of the late 1940s? Was that transition inevitable or was it a consequence of specific circumstance and specific choices that might have been made differently that could have produced different kinds of outcomes.

== Origins of the Cold War ==

=== US Aspirations and Goals for the Postwar Era ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:53]]
<nowiki>[53:53]</nowiki>

Let's start by asking what American wanted from the postwar settlement? What kind of world did American leaders want to create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:04]]
<nowiki>[54:04]</nowiki>

It's important to remember that the United States in 1945 is very much the world's dominant power. American military forces are victorious in Europe and Asia. The United States is by far and away the world's predominant economic power as well.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:23]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

What do Americans want to accomplish from this position of paramount power and influence what kind of world does the United States want to create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:35]]
<nowiki>[54:35]</nowiki>

There is a prehistory and it weighs powerfully on the minds of American decision-makers. The experiences of the 1930s, the experiences of a decade in which an integrated global economy broke apart, the experiences of a decade in which America experienced unprecedented economic misery weighs powerfully on the minds of American policy planners as they look at the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:03]]
<nowiki>[55:03]</nowiki>

Americans to put it succinctly want to put the world economy back together. They want to reintegrate a world that came apart in the 1930s and they want to create new international institutions that will superintend an integrated global system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:22]]
<nowiki>[55:22]</nowiki>

There are political aspects to this as well and economic aspects. The primary economic institutional framework which we're going to talk about in more detail next week will be the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}}, the political institution that Americans promote to sort of put the world back together is the {{WPExtract|United Nations}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:44]]
<nowiki>[55:44]</nowiki>

And there is strong, strong public support for the United Nations in the United States during the Second World War. And this may surprise those of you know anything about American attitudes towards the UN today. But during the Second World War leaders of both major parties support active American involvement in the United Nations and public support for the United Nations is overwhelming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:08]]
<nowiki>[56:08]</nowiki>

You know 85% of Americans are strongly in favor of active American involvement in the UN during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:18]]
<nowiki>[56:18]</nowiki>

Americans want to lead the world and they want to make a world safe for globalization. They want a world in which free trade will prevail as a worldwide norm. And this is what the Bretton Woods institutions will try to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:36]]
<nowiki>[56:36]</nowiki>

This commitment to the reintegration of the world is powerfully informed, as I've tried to emphasize, by the experience of the 1930s. Convinced as they are that the American economy requires an open world economy in order to be prosperous American leaders in the 1940s will try to sort of put the world back together, to put the world economy back together, in order to avoid a return to the depression conditions of the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:12]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What should we call this American vision of the postwar world? It's easy enough to pin a label on Stalin's ideological agenda. We simply call it Communism. But what do we call the American ideological project for the postwar world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:29]]
<nowiki>[57:29]</nowiki>

Do we call it sort of a democratic project? There would be good reason to do so. Democracy, self-government, and human rights, are central aspects of the American vision for the postwar world. FDR, after all, talks about four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom of fear, which he argues everybody in the entire world should enjoy at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:56]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

So there's a strong sort of democratic aspect to the American vision of the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:02]]
<nowiki>[58:02]</nowiki>

It's also a liberal vision, liberal in the sense that it promotes free trade, free economic exchange as a universal standard. It's a capitalist vision too. The United States is an economy in which the means of production reside in private hands. Americans presume capitalism to be sort of the natural condition of a market society and the condition best configured to produce widespread growth and prosperity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:35]]
<nowiki>[58:35]</nowiki>

So this is a world order that will be democratic, liberal, and capitalist.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:40]]
<nowiki>[58:40]</nowiki>

But it's also a world order that defines itself in opposition to its antagonist. It is anti-Communist. It is opposed in the world vision that Stalin projects. So whether we call this an anti-Communist liberalism, or capitalist democracy, what the United States tries to create is a sort of liberal democratic world order in which the private sort of market economy will prevail.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:12]]
<nowiki>[59:12]</nowiki>

I would suggest that sort of Cold War liberalism is as succinct a label as any other for this ideological synthesis, but you can call it whatever you like. The key elements will be sort of individual rights, democratic self-government, capitalist economics and, and this is sort of interesting -- a modicum of welfare protection for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:37]]
<nowiki>[59:37]</nowiki>

It's really important to remember that the experience of the 1930s tempers American capitalism in important ways. Roosevelt creates an array of new social protections for workers in the United States. Social Security for example is introduced in 1935. Extensive new regulations are introduced, to provide say, a minimum price for farm production, and the international synthesis that the United States offers in the mid 1940s is very much a product of the New Deal era transformation of American capitalism. In a sense what American leaders in the 1940s propose to do is to make the lessons of the New Deal globally applicable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:26]]
<nowiki>[60:26]</nowiki>

So this Cold War liberal synthesis, this capitalist anti-Communist synthesis, is a synthesis which includes a sort of range of social protections as well as protections for property and political rights.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:43]]
<nowiki>[60:43]</nowiki>

And it's a synthesis that American leaders hold to be universally applicable. It's a synthesis that manifests itself in particular institutions: Bretton Woods and the United Nations. These are institutions that are conceived respectively in New Hampshire and San Francisco.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:02]]
<nowiki>[61:02]</nowiki>

The sites of conception tell you something about the influence of the United States upon the postwar design. None of this is to say that Americans act in isolation when they create a new order for the postwar world. Non-Americans play really important roles in the construction of the postwar institutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:23]]
<nowiki>[61:23]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes}}, about whom we're going to talk a great deal more, is instrumental to the creation of the Bretton Woods settlement. {{WPExtract|Jan Smuts}} a South African political leader is one of the central figures involved in the creation of the United Nations, so non-Americans are crucial to this postwar project too.

=== The Soviet Union and American Goals and Aspirations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:41 ]]
<nowiki>[61:41]</nowiki>

But if South African politicians and British economists can assimilate themselves relatively easily to an American led world order the role of the Soviet Union in this Americanized postwar world is much less clear.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:01]]
<nowiki>[62:01]</nowiki>

Will the Soviet Union be able to participate in the open and integrated world that American leaders project and hope to create? Franklin Roosevelt hopes that cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:17 ]]
<nowiki>[62:17]</nowiki>

Whether Roosevelt was guilty of sort of wishful thinking in imagining that it might is something that we'll have to answer for ourselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:29]]
<nowiki>[62:29]</nowiki>

But there are key questions to be answered. At the end of the Second World War, in August 1945, there are sort of key questions that will ultimately determine the extent to which the Soviet Union participates in the Americanized postwar order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:43 ]]
<nowiki>[62:43]</nowiki>

Will the Soviet Union, for example, join the {{WPExtract|International Monetary Fund}}? To do so would be to commit the Soviet Union to participating in a liberal world economy. Will the United States provide material assistance to the Soviet Union? Aid to facilitate the USSR's recovery from the Second World War and to sort of facilitate the accommodation of the Soviet Union to a liberal US led international order?

=== Context at the End of the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:12 ]]
<nowiki>[63:12]</nowiki>

These are important questions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:14 ]]
<nowiki>[63:14]</nowiki>

The world in which these questions will be answered is a world transformed by the outcome of the Second World War. Europe in August 1945 is dominated by external powers. In the east, it's dominated by the Red Army, which pushes through Eastern Europe all the way to Central Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:42]]
<nowiki>[63:42]</nowiki>

In the west, the forces of the US Army, and the British Army hold sway over the other half of the continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:52]]
<nowiki>[63:52]</nowiki>

The future of the continent and the future of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States will hinge upon, sort of, choices.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:06]]
<nowiki>[64:06]</nowiki>

We've talked about the ways in which the expectations and visions of the two sides for the postwar world might vary, but the outcomes of this conflicting set of expectations will ultimately depend upon the choices that historical actors, leaders for the most part, end up making.

=== Deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Relations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:29 ]]
<nowiki>[64:29]</nowiki>

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States begin to deteriorate fairly quickly -- even before the end of 1945. The reasons for this are complicated.

==== Soviet Occupation of Eastern Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:46]]
<nowiki>[64:46]</nowiki>

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe is offensive to American public opinion. As Americans who have fought for the freedom of Europe see the Red Army sort of ride roughshod over democratic freedoms in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, American public opinion always somewhat suspicious of the Soviet Union, turns fairly hard against Stalin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:09]]
<nowiki>[65:09]</nowiki>

The occupation of Eastern Europe, as it proceeds, sort of conjures the specter of an Eastern Europe dominated by Soviet imperial power. And Americans ask themselves, with some reason, whether this is what they fought the Second World War to accomplish? Of course they're not in much of a position to do anything about it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:33 ]]
<nowiki>[65:33]</nowiki>

What can the United States do? Could continue to provide aid to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it could attach political conditions to that assistance, but it does not.

==== Termination of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:44]]
<nowiki>[65:44]</nowiki>

In August 1945, immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities, the United States cancels the lend-lease assistance program under which material aid had been sent to the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:58 ]]
<nowiki>[65:58]</nowiki>

The reasons that it does that are fairly straightforward and they have to do with domestic policy. The Congress doesn't want to continue to fund an assistance program to the Soviet Union after the war has been won. But the cancellation of lend-lease sort of comes as an affront to Stalin and to the Soviet leadership.

==== The Soviet Union's Absence from Bretton Woods ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:18 ]]
<nowiki>[66:18]</nowiki>

In December 1945 the Soviet Union decides that it not will participate in the Bretton Woods institutions. The Soviet decision not to participate in Bretton Woods is understandable enough. What Stalin has tried to construct in the 1930s is a very centralized planned economy in which all production is owned by the state. The Soviet economy, as it developed in the 1930s, was almost entirely separated from the larger world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:52]]
<nowiki>[66:52]</nowiki>

Insofar as the Bretton Woods institutions envisage the reintegration of the world economy it's not likely that the Soviet planned and closed economy could be easily assimilated to them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:05]]
<nowiki>[67:05]</nowiki>

But Stalin's announcement of Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods nonetheless marks an important turning point. It sort of marks a clear declaration on the Soviet Union's part that the Soviet Union will not participate in the open integrated postwar world order that the United States starts to build.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:27 ]]
<nowiki>[67:27]</nowiki>

Subsequent to this declaration in 1945, in December 1945, of Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods, there begins to be, sort of more powerful discursive acknowledgment, on both sides of the inevitably of postwar estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Stalin in February 1946...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:50]]
<nowiki>[67:50]</nowiki>

(Student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:58]]
<nowiki>[67:58]</nowiki>

No, it really was that key in the postwar world. You're absolutely right to caution against reading history from a particular national standpoint. But the power, importance, and influence of the United States in 1945 I don't think can be overstated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:16 ]]
<nowiki>[68:16]</nowiki>

This is not like 1919. At the end of the First World War the United States is one of several victorious powers. In 1945 the United States really is the victorious power. The West Europeans are absolutely devastated by the war. They look to the United States to restore prosperity, to provide security.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:35]]
<nowiki>[68:35]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union is the only power that begins to compare with the United States in terms of its wealth and military capabilities in 1945. But it's a poor second.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:45 ]]
<nowiki>[68:45]</nowiki>

So I would not in this case want you to sort of avoid focusing on the United States as a central aspect of the international settlement because of a sort of wariness of reading history through an American lens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:04]]
<nowiki>[69:04]</nowiki>

When we sort of come to talk a little bit more about the West Europeans will see just how dependent they believed themselves to be on the United States.

==== Soviet Hostility to Capitalism and the United States ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:12 ]]
<nowiki>[69:12]</nowiki>

So Stalin in February 1946 gives a speech called The Election Speech, even through there was no real election, in which he denounced capitalism and denounced the United States, accusing the capitalists of seeking to encircle and destroy the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:31 ]]
<nowiki>[69:31]</nowiki>

This was not unprecedented. He had offered similar speeches in the 1930s but coming after the Second World War it represented a reversion to a sort of hostile rhetoric which had been dormant for the duration of the war itself.

==== George Kennan and the Long Telegram ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:47]]
<nowiki>[69:47]</nowiki>

The next month, in March 1946, {{WPExtract|George F. Kennan|George Kennan}}, the attaché at the US embassy in Moscow sends to the State Department a document which has become known as the {{WPExtract|X Article|"Long Telegram"}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:00]]
<nowiki>[70:00]</nowiki>

It's still the longest telegram that the State Department has ever received from one of its officers overseas. And in it Kennan offered a very lengthy analysis of Soviet behavior. His central point is that the Soviet Union is intractably opposed to the liberal integrated postwar order that the United States wants to build.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:22]]
<nowiki>[70:22]</nowiki>

Kennan argues that it's foolish to even try to integrate the Soviet Union to the US led postwar design. Instead he argues the Soviet Union should be carefully contained.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:32]]
<nowiki>[70:32]</nowiki>

Note that Kennan does not say that the Soviet Union should be confronted through military means. Kennan simply says that the United States ought to focus on building up the strength of its allies, on building a Europe which that will be sort of resilient in the face of Soviet power.

==== Winston Churchill and the Iron Curtain Speech ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:50]]
<nowiki>[70:50]</nowiki>

Later that month, later in March 1946, Winston Churchill, who's no longer the Prime Minister of Great Britain, he lost an election at the end of the Second World War, but he's still a public figure of great consequence, gives a public speech in Fulton, Missouri.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:06]]
<nowiki>[71:06]</nowiki>

Sitting next to him on the podium is Harry Truman -- the President of the United States of America. In this speech Churchill offers an analysis of the European situation. He proclaims that an iron curtain has divided the European continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:20]]
<nowiki>[71:20]</nowiki>

And this is the first sort of very public acknowledgment by a leading Western politician that Europe has been sort of irrevocably divided between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:34]]
<nowiki>[71:34]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of growing rhetorical acknowledgment of a situation of Cold War on both sides in the early months of 1946.

==== Conflict Between the Soviet Union and the US in Iran and Turkey ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:45]]
<nowiki>[71:45]</nowiki>

Later that year the two sides, East and West, begin to encounter, serious substantive crises.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:52]]
<nowiki>[71:52]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union in September refuses to withdraw occupation troops from Northern Turkey. The United States sides powerfully with the Turkish government and eventually helps to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed forces from Turkey.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:06]]
<nowiki>[72:06]</nowiki>

I'm sorry I got that a little bit mixed up. That happens in Iran at the end of the year.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:12]]
<nowiki>[72:12]</nowiki>

What happens in Turkey is that there is a, is that the Soviet Union demands passage for Soviet naval vessels through the {{WPExtract|Dardanelles|Dardanelles Straits}}.<ref>See also [[wikipedia:Dardanelles#Turkish_republican_and_modern_eras_(1923–present)|the Wikipedia article on the Dardanelles in the section on Turkish republican and modern eras (1923–present)]]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:21]]
<nowiki>[72:21]</nowiki>

The Turkish government is unwilling to grant this and the United States stands with the Turkish government and US support bolsters Turkish resolve and ultimately that concession is not granted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:35]]
<nowiki>[72:35]</nowiki>

But in both circumstances the dynamic is basically the same. The Soviet government makes demands against its neighbors, Turkey and Iran, and the United States stands by the affected countries and sort of helps to persuade local leaders to stand firm and to reject Soviet demands for territorial and military concessions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:58]]
<nowiki>[72:58]</nowiki>

<span id="iron_curtain_speech">I'm not going to play that because we're running out of time but I have a video clip of Churchill speaking at Fulton and I can put it online for you.</span>

{{#ev:youtube| https://youtu.be/5QuSXZTo3Uo||center}}

== Tumult in Europe After the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:07]]
<nowiki>[73:07]</nowiki>

Okay, so as relations between the two sides become more fractious during 1945 and into 1946 the attention of American policy planners comes to fixate more and more upon Europe. Europe was devastated by the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:25]]
<nowiki>[73:25]</nowiki>

Capital plant was destroyed, the economy is in chaos, there is widespread price instability, a lack of convertible currency. Europe is in a state of great tumult.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:36]]
<nowiki>[73:36]</nowiki>

It's not only Europe's economy that is in crisis. European societies have been torn apart by the Second World War. They've been torn apart and they are being put back together in altered configurations.

=== Ethnic Cleansing in the Postwar Period ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:49]]
<nowiki>[73:49]</nowiki>

Europe during and after the Second World War experiences a prolonged bout of what we might euphemistically describe as ethnic cleansing. The most notorious effort to ethnically cleanse Europe is of course Adolf Hitler's. But ethnic cleansing in Europe does not end with Hitler's suicide in a Berlin bunker.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:08]]
<nowiki>[74:08]</nowiki>

With the end of the Second World War, the Germans who inhabit the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, the Germans whose presence in Poland had provided Hitler with a sort of justification, specious as it was, for the invasion of Poland will be ejected from the countries which they have long inhabited.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:30]]
<nowiki>[74:30]</nowiki>

The ejection of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe is one of the major aspects to the postwar European sort of ethnic sorting that is a powerful legacy of the war itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:46]]
<nowiki>[74:46]</nowiki>

It's not only Germans who are ejected from Eastern Europe. Poland ejects the few surviving Jews who have survived Hitler's Holocaust. It says that they have no place in the postwar Polish state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:59]]
<nowiki>[74:59]</nowiki>

The logic of ethnic cleansing in postwar Europe produces a continent that is sort of by 1947-48, more ethnically homogeneous that at any other point in its history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:12]]
<nowiki>[75:12]</nowiki>

It's ironic in a way that postwar Central and East European governments ultimately accomplish and realize what Hitler set out to do.

=== Europe in the Winter of 1946-47 ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:21]]
<nowiki>[75:21]</nowiki>

This forced movement of populations exacerbates the economic and social instability of Europe. It doesn't help that the winter of 1946-47 is one of the coldest winters in European history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:35]]
<nowiki>[75:35]</nowiki>

Transportation links, canals, and railroads freeze and become inoperable. It becomes very difficult to move food from ports and storage depots to markets. By consequence Europe experiences widespread starvation. Millions of people subsist in refugee camps. Displaced persons camps operated by the United Nations and funded almost entirely the United States.

=== American Fears that European Tumult Will Lead to Gains for Socialists and Communists ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:00]]
<nowiki>[76:00]</nowiki>

This is a very volatile situation. Europe in the winter of 1946-47 does not appear to be recovering from the Second World War. On the contrary, Europe's economic situation, its political tumult, appear to be getting worse.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:16]]
<nowiki>[76:16]</nowiki>

American policy planners fear that this upheaval and uncertainty in Europe's affairs will ultimately produce gains for Communist parties in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:31]]
<nowiki>[76:31]</nowiki>

You know disenchanted, disillusioned hopeless people, so the logic goes, may ultimately end up voting for radical political alternatives, for socialists and Communists, who promise a radical new order of things.

== Allied Postwar Policy Concerning Germany ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:44]]
<nowiki>[76:44]</nowiki>

There are also major geostrategic issues to be confronted -- none greater than the question of Germany. What ultimately is to be done with Germany?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:55]]
<nowiki>[76:55]</nowiki>

Germany as we've already acknowledged, you know, in the first meeting of this class, is a problem for Europe's international relations. Germany is too big, too powerful, to be easily contained by a European balance of power. Germany twice in the space of a generation in 1914 and in 1939 tried to conquer Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:18]]
<nowiki>[77:18]</nowiki>

Can Germany continue to exist as a unified state or should Germany be dismantled? Be transformed into a number of successor states which would presumably be less threatening to the overall European balance of power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:33]]
<nowiki>[77:33]</nowiki>

This is one of the really big questions that American and British and French and Russian policy makers face at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:41]]
<nowiki>[77:41]</nowiki>

How to keep Germany down? How to stop Germany from ever again threatening the peace of Europe?

=== Allied Occupation of Germany ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:48]]
<nowiki>[77:48]</nowiki>

The initial interim answer to that question is a joint occupation. At the end of the Second World War Germany is divided into four occupation zones: a Soviet occupation zone in the east, an American occupation zone in the south, a French occupation zone in the west, and a British occupation zone in the north.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:07]]
<nowiki>[78:07]</nowiki>

But this is only an interim solution. It's clearly not the case that the four victorious powers can continue to occupy Germany indefinitely.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:18]]
<nowiki>[78:18]</nowiki>

But there's no clear political solution in 1945. A long term political future for Germany remains to be determined.

=== Germany's Political Future and Europe's Economic Future ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:27]]
<nowiki>[78:27]</nowiki>

But the question of Germany's political future is intimately linked to the question of Europe's economic future, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:35]]
<nowiki>[78:35]</nowiki>

Europe is devastated, it's economically distraught at the end of the Second World War, and the catastrophe that is Germany doesn't help matters. Because Germany is not only Europe's dominant sort of political force. It's also the heart of the European economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:51]]
<nowiki>[78:51]</nowiki>

Can Europe recover economically without German recovery? After all Germany is the center of Europe's industrial production. The factories of the Ruhr in Western Germany are the center of the European industrial economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:08]]
<nowiki>[79:08]</nowiki>

French and Belgian and Dutch industry is intimately linked to German industry. Whether Western Europe can recover without some rehabilitation of Germany is you know a good question and the obvious answer is no it cannot.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:27]]
<nowiki>[79:27]</nowiki>

So the dilemma that the victorious allies face at the end of the Second World War, is the dilemma of how to rehabilitate Germany without restoring German political power. Can you make Germany a vibrant sort of economic center of Europe again without sort of unleashing the potential political and military power of a would be European hegemon.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:54]]
<nowiki>[79:54]</nowiki>

(Student question)

That comes much later. It comes subsequent to a process of Cold War division. But you're absolutely right that the creation of European wide institutions will be the ultimate answer to that question.

== Cold War Division of Europe and Division of East Asia for Next Lecture ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:09]]
<nowiki>[80:09]</nowiki>

To understand how we get to that question we have to think about how the Cold War divides Europe, which we should have done at the end of this lecture, but we'll do it on Thursday at the beginning of that lecture. And then we'll go and talk about sort of the parallel division of East Asia.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>