Academic Lecture Transcripts - User contributions [en]

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 20 - The End of the Cold War - 01h 22m 16s

2019-05-21T21:22:54Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

== The Final Paper ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:00]]
<nowiki>[00:00]</nowiki>

Okay, it's about time for us to get going. And I wanted to start out today by saying a few words about the final papers. It's about the time in semester after spring break in which you're probably starting to think about the final papers. Or maybe the particularly diligent among you are starting to think about the final papers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:19]]
<nowiki>[00:19]</nowiki>

But I thought it would be good to prompt some pondering on your part, and to answer any questions that you might have about the final papers. Let me, you know, start this just by kind of rearticulating the expectations that are laid out in the syllabus. What is it that we expect from you by way of the final assignment in the class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:39]]
<nowiki>[00:39]</nowiki>

The terms are fairly simple: six to seven page paper -- that's a little under 2,000 words due on May 4th to your GSI. These are the expectations as stipulated in the syllabus. The syllabus also tells you that you have the option of either engaging a historical problem drawing on course materials, or of writing a paper that explores the lessons of history for a particular dilemma in the present day world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:05]]
<nowiki>[01:05]</nowiki>

What do we mean when we offer you these two options? I thought that it would be most straightforward to illustrate the distinction by giving you some examples of the kinds of problems that you might engage with the two kinds of paper. So let's do that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:20]]
<nowiki>[01:20]</nowiki>

What are the kinds of historical problems that you could engage? You could, for example ask, how did West European countries shape the origins of the Cold War? You might want to write a paper that focuses on, you know, say British foreign policy and the advent of the Cold War. You might be interested in the {{WPExtract|Sino-Soviet split}} in the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:37]]
<nowiki>[01:37]</nowiki>

You might want to write a paper that evaluates the relative importance of say ideological disagreements in geopolitical rivalries in the estrangement between the Soviet Union and the United -- and the Soviet -- and China during the '60s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:51]]
<nowiki>[01:51]</nowiki>

You might, you know, prefer to focus on a political economic theme and look at the slowdown in growth in the Western world during the 1970s. You might want to evaluate in your paper sort of the hypothesis that the end of extensive growth is responsible for the slowdown in aggregate growth rates in the West during this era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:10]]
<nowiki>[02:10]</nowiki>

So these are, you know, the kinds of historical problems that you could engage in a classic kind of historical final paper.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:18]]
<nowiki>[02:18]</nowiki>

Alternatively, and this is the second option, you could explore the lessons of history for some, you know, dilemma in the present day world. You might want to ask what the oil crises of the 1970s have to teach us about, you know, the prospects for energy security and insecurity in our own times. You might want to ask what the lessons of the so-called third wave of democratization teach us about the prospects for democracy in the Middle East today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:43]]
<nowiki>[02:43]</nowiki>

You know a topic that would obviously have some resonance with the Arab Spring ongoing in that region. You might be interested in geopolitics and you know ask what the lessons of the Cold War, perhaps the lessons of the Cold War's origins, might teach us about the risks and of the opportunities for Sino-American relations today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:02]]
<nowiki>[03:02]</nowiki>

So this would be a different kind of paper -- a paper that sort of locates its central problem not in the past but in the present, but which is still a historical paper because it relies upon sort of processes of historical reasoning and argument to construct its analysis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:19]]
<nowiki>[03:19]</nowiki>

These are just examples. These are not the you know final paper questions which you are expected to answer; rather, we expect you to devise your own problem. The topic of your final paper will be for you to determine. So how are you going to determine it?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:35]]
<nowiki>[03:35]</nowiki>

I would just start by saying that you should think about what interests you. Of all of the you know diverse themes and issues that we've dealt with in the class this far, thus far, are there any which are of particular interest to you? Are you interested in the history of particular nation-state? The history of a particular region?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:52]]
<nowiki>[03:52]</nowiki>

Are you interested in particular historical episodes or crises? Particular historical themes or problems? This is for you to determine. But I would like for you to determine your final paper topic in consultation with your GSI. So I would suggest, I think the syllabus suggests, that at some point in the next couple of weeks, you arrange a appointment to go and speak with your GSI about the you know sort of possible range of topics for your final paper.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:21]]
<nowiki>[04:21]</nowiki>

That sort of consultation will be really useful as you try to whittle down the range of opportunities and to determine what your final paper is going to be about. If your final paper topic requires that you do any extra reading -- some may, some may not -- it will depend upon the nature of the topic -- then your GSI will be able to give you some advice about things that you might read.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:40]]
<nowiki>[04:40]</nowiki>

You are also very welcome to come and talk with me about your final paper topics. So my office hours as you know are Tuesdays and Thursdays from 11 until noon -- right after lectures. Quick caveat: I'm not having office hours today, so it wouldn't be a good option to come and see me today, because you'll be standing outside my office for an hour.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:01]]
<nowiki>[05:01]</nowiki>

But any other Tuesday or Thursday straight after lecture you can come talk with me about your final papers. You can also come and see me at other times besides Tuesdays and Thursdays from 11 until noon because I know some of you have classes or the office hours are not convenient for other reasons. If you want to come see me at a different time just email me to set up an appointment, and we can talk about possible final paper topics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:24]]
<nowiki>[05:24]</nowiki>

Now for the most sort of important question: what are our expectations? What do we want you to do in this final paper? I don't have a rigid blueprint to which you ought to try to adhere. I'm really very open-minded, as the GSIs are, as to the kind of final paper that you want to write.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:44]]
<nowiki>[05:44]</nowiki>

Your historical range can be very broad. You can deal with a substantial chunk of history and offer your own analysis of it. Or you can do something which is more focused, more fine grained, dealing with a particular historical episode or problem. So the scale of the final paper is really for you to determine.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:02]]
<nowiki>[06:02]</nowiki>

All that we expect is that your final paper have a cogent analysis and argument. We're really concerned by how you sort of use the historical evidence to sustain and defend a particular sort of argument as to why things unfolded the way they did, or how things developed according, you know, in one way rather than another.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:23]]
<nowiki>[06:23]</nowiki>

And it's important that you sustain your argument with appropriate historical evidence. So if you want to make the argument that the {{WPExtract|Sino-Soviet split}} in the 1960s was all about ideology -- that it had very little to do with sort of realistic differences in national interest and it had to do primarily with ideas -- then you should try to muster appropriate historical evidence to support that claim.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:46]]
<nowiki>[06:46]</nowiki>

You should also, you know, so far as you can, try to anticipate what the alternative points of view might be, and think about the evidence that could be used to discredit opposing perspectives. You don't do so in a sort of...character...you try not to do so in a, you know, simplistic or one-dimensional way, but to the extent that you can anticipate arguments that might be made against your argument, your paper will be all the stronger for it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:11]]
<nowiki>[07:11]</nowiki>

But the basic criteria which we will be applying when we grade your final papers have to do with: first, the clarity of your analysis and argument, and second the aptitude with which you use historical evidence to defend the argument that you choose to make. So that's essentially what we're doing in the final paper.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:30]]
<nowiki>[07:30]</nowiki>

If you have questions about this it may be best to bring them to office hours or to submit them over email because I don't want to devote a substantial portion of today's session to a discussion of the final paper cause we have a lot of history to get through. But if anybody has sort of any urgent questions that this prompts, if there are things that I've missed out, then I would be glad to take questions about the final paper right now.

== Lecture Overview: The End of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:53]]
<nowiki>[07:53]</nowiki>

Okay, terrific. So what are we going to do today? Today we're talking about the end of the Cold War. This is a big topic hence my reluctance to enter into a protracted discussion about the final paper. We're going to be asking how the Cold War world changed during the 1980s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:11]]
<nowiki>[08:11]</nowiki>

How did United States foreign policy change under Ronald Reagan? We've taken the story of US foreign policy in the Cold War all the way through to the end of the Carter administration. What we're going to do today is ask how US foreign policy changed under Reagan -- Carter's predecessor, sorry, successor as President of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:28]]
<nowiki>[08:28]</nowiki>

We're also going to ask how Soviet policy changed under Gorbachev -- not only how did Soviet policy change towards the world but also how did Soviet policy change at home, and whether there were relations between these two distinct categories of change: domestic and foreign.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:45]]
<nowiki>[08:45]</nowiki>

Finally we'll ask what happened to the Cold War in the 1980s. Did the Cold War end in the 1980s and if so when so? This is the central conundrum that we're going to try to answer today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:57]]
<nowiki>[08:57]</nowiki>

It will also be essential to ask what came after the Cold War. How did the Soviet Empire, the system of political and security relationships that the Soviet Union constructed in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, come to an end? How did the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe collapse?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:15]]
<nowiki>[09:15]</nowiki>

What would be the role of the United States -- the world's sole remaining superpower in a post Cold War world? After the Soviet Union's Cold War empire collapsed what would be the fate for the United States and the West in a post Cold War world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:29]]
<nowiki>[09:29]</nowiki>

What kind of international order would follow the bifurcated international order of the Cold War? This is a different set of questions -- a set of questions that has to do with the constitution of post Cold War international relations. And we're going to address this second set of questions next Tuesday when we talk about the post Cold War world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:48]]
<nowiki>[09:48]</nowiki>

Today what I'm going to focus upon is the end of the Cold War in the 1980s -- the transformation of the Cold War order and the end of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:00]]
<nowiki>[10:00]</nowiki>

So our agenda is going to focus first upon Reagan, and transformations in the American Cold War, then on Gorbachev and transformations in the Soviet Union, and finally on the relational aspects of the Cold War in the 1980s -- the developments in Sino-American, sorry, in Soviet-American relations, that are a consequence of changes implemented by leaders on both sides.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:24]]
<nowiki>[10:24]</nowiki>

So this is essentially what we're going to do. As always if you have any questions please, you know, feel free to raise them as we go along. As you know I'm not very good at leaving time for questions at the end of lectures.

== Ronald Reagan and the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

Okay, Ronald Reagan, first of all. What kind of Cold War president was Ronald Reagan? What did Ronald Reagan see as the primary challenges for the United States in the Cold War world? How did he define the Cold War adversary that the United States faced?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:53]]
<nowiki>[10:53]</nowiki>

One of the really fundamental questions that Cold War presidents in the United States had to face when defining the foreign policy of the United States was the question of what was the primary adversary of the United States? Was it Communism? A nebulous ideological movement? Or was it the Soviet Union -- a superpower?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:16]]
<nowiki>[11:16]</nowiki>

As we've already discussed, in the early Cold War, policymakers beginning with {{WPExtract|George F. Kennan|George Kennan}}, defined the Soviet Union as the problem. But then with the fall of China to Communism in 1949 and the Korean War there develops a tendency to see the Cold War adversary of the United States not as the Soviet Union, a great power, but as Communism -- an ideology, or sort of political movement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:42]]
<nowiki>[11:42]</nowiki>

During the 1970s conversely Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger would redefine the challenges of the Cold War world in terms of geopolitics. Nixon and Kissinger as we've discussed downplayed ideology somewhat and tended to see the world more in terms of great power rivalries and geopolitical interests.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:02]]
<nowiki>[12:02]</nowiki>

So how do we situate Reagan in this analytical framework? Did Reagan see the Cold War world in terms of ideological confrontation or did he see a world comprised rather of geopolitical rivalries?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:15]]
<nowiki>[12:15]</nowiki>

You know the Reagan Era is still a relatively fresh period for historical research, but based on, you know, what I have read and my understanding of the Reagan Era I would, you know, offer you the proposition that Reagan was an intensely ideological president.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:29]]
<nowiki>[12:29]</nowiki>

If you look at Reagan's own writings, both public and private, Reagan tended to define the challenges of a Cold War world in terms of ideological confrontation. Communism for Ronald Reagan was the fundamental problem -- not the Soviet Union as such.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:47]]
<nowiki>[12:47]</nowiki>

And this is really important. Henry Kissinger, conversely, paid relatively little attention to ideology. For Kissinger conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is basically hardwired into the distribution of power in the international arena. For Kissinger a world in which you have two great superpowers is likely to be a world in which those two great superpowers exist in a relationship of rivalry or conflict -- it is ordained by the fact of there being geopolitical rivals.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:17]]
<nowiki>[13:17]</nowiki>

For Reagan on the other hand the problem is ideology -- the problem is the Communist system to which the Soviet Union adheres.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:26]]
<nowiki>[13:26]</nowiki>

By consequence Reagan will be a transformative Cold War president. But that's not to say that Reagan's Cold War foreign policy lacks precedence. We saw in our discussion of the Carter administration how Carter put new emphasis on sort of ideological goals in US foreign policy -- specifically on the pursuit of human rights as a global objective.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:47]]
<nowiki>[13:47]</nowiki>

Carter talks a great deal about human rights -- including the promotion of human rights within the Soviet Union. Carter also shifts US foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cold War's nuclear arms race. Nixon and Kissinger following, you know, strategic thinkers like {{WPExtract|Robert McNamara}} in the 1960s, see nuclear weapons as a potential source of stability in the international system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:14]]
<nowiki>[14:14]</nowiki>

Carter sees things differently. Carter is very concerned about the prospects for nuclear war -- for unintended escalation. By consequence he seeks in a very bold...disarmament proposal in 1977 to denuclearize the Cold War -- to introduce sweeping reductions in Cold War nuclear weapon arsenals.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

Reagan, much like Carter, is disinclined to see nuclear weapons as a source of stability; rather, Reagan tends to see nuclear weapons as a threat to the stability of the world -- ultimately to the security of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:52]]
<nowiki>[14:52]</nowiki>

So Reagan...echoes Carter in two key respects. Like Carter he is somewhat more oriented towards ideological objectives. Like Carter he is disinclined to see nuclear weapons as a source of stability and by consequence somewhat prone to favor sweeping nuclear disarmament measures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:12]]
<nowiki>[15:12]</nowiki>

The Cold War under Reagan will be transformed. But it's transformed in ways that seem on the surface to be sort of paradoxical and confounding. After all Ronald Reagan, in the early 1980s, escalates the Cold War militarily. Reagan will increase military spending. Reagan will also provide American support to anti-Communist resistance movements in the developing world -- another kind of military escalation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:40]]
<nowiki>[15:40]</nowiki>

The global reach of the, sort of, Cold War as it is waged on the ground in the developing world, expands in the 1980s -- in large part in consequence of decisions that the Reagan administration takes. But it will also be Ronald Reagan that brings the Cold War to its [[wikt:dénouement|dénouement]] after 1985.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:59]]
<nowiki>[15:59]</nowiki>

After 1985 American Cold War policies undergo a sort of radical reorientation towards the pursuit of a new understanding with the Soviet Union. So making sense of Reagan's Cold War is really difficult for historians to do. Because Reagan starts out as one of the most hawkish of Cold War foreign policy presidents, and ends up as the Cold War's greatest dove -- as the man who reaches out to Gorbachev and works to bring the Cold War to an end.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:26]]
<nowiki>[16:26]</nowiki>

So this is a real paradox. How are we to explain it? Did Reagan simply pursue inconsistent foreign policies? That's one very plausible explanation -- that the man simply made a hundred and eighty degree turn somewhere around the middle of his presidency.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:41]]
<nowiki>[16:41]</nowiki>

Or is there a sort of consistency or logic that helps us to make sense of both the military escalation in the early 1980s and the pursuit of peace in the late 1980s? Might there be some sort of ulterior logic that helps to explain how these two things occurred under the watch of the same administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:00]]
<nowiki>[17:00]</nowiki>

So this is I think one of the key questions that we ought to reflect upon when we're thinking about the Reagan administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:06]]
<nowiki>[17:06]</nowiki>

Let's go into some of Reagan's policies in a little bit more detail. This will help us to do that. Okay, why does Reagan escalate military spending? Why does Reagan escalate the Cold War militarily? He does so in part because he's determined to overcome what he sees as the {{WPExtract|Vietnam Syndrome}} in American politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:24]]
<nowiki>[17:24]</nowiki>

Reagan argues that the Vietnam War has sort of wounded Americans' sense of self, it's wounded the self-confidence of the United States as an international actor, and he is determined to reassert the United States as a sort of superpower of the first order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:41]]
<nowiki>[17:41]</nowiki>

Accordingly he will increase defense spending substantially. If you look at the annual percentage change in US defense spending from the early 1970s through to the late 1980s you can see that in the early 1980s Reagan implements some fairly strident increases in the Pentagon's budget.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:00]]
<nowiki>[18:00]</nowiki>

It might also be noted however that the annual increases in US defense spending that are such a striking feature of this era do not begin under Ronald Reagan, but rather under Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter sort of initiates the military build-up with which Ronald Reagan will become very closely associated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:19]]
<nowiki>[18:19]</nowiki>

Besides spending more on weaponry for the United States the Reagan administration provides military assistance to anti-Communist freedom fighters in the developing world. The term freedom fighters is presented in quotation marks on the slide because it is of course a loaded term. So whether you prefer that term or not will probably depend upon the sides that you take in the particular struggles that the United States is involving itself in.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:46]]
<nowiki>[18:46]</nowiki>

What are the particular struggles with which the United States gets involved during the early 1980s? Well, Central America is really important. Reagan's Cold War escalation has a Central American focus. Reagan provides extensive military assistance to the anti-Communist {{WPExtract|Contras|Contra}} rebels in Nicaragua.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:10]]
<nowiki>[19:10]</nowiki>

Nicaragua in 1979 became a sort of nominally Communist state when a socialist regime, the {{WPExtract|Sandinista National Liberation Front|Sandanista}} regime, comes to power. In the United States conservatives were very critical of the Carter administration in 1979 for failing to do enough to prevent the coming to power of the Sandinista regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:30]]
<nowiki>[19:30]</nowiki>

Following the inauguration of the Reagan administration in 1981 a new president will do a great deal to provide sort of military and materiel assistance to the opponents of the Sandanistas on the ground in Nicaragua. These opponents are known as the Contras because they are against the Sandanista regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:49]]
<nowiki>[19:49]</nowiki>

And the White House supplies them with military aid. And it does so through covert means. Some of the means by which the White House provides the contras with assistance are illegal. The {{WPExtract|United States National Security Council|National Security Council}} sets up a sort of illegal operation that sells weapons, US weapons, to Iran and then use the pro -- and then uses the proceeds to channel money to the Nicaraguan Contras.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:12]]
<nowiki>[20:12]</nowiki>

The reason that it does this is that Congress, after the Vietnam War as we've already discussed, puts extensive restrictions on the delivery of US military assistance to Third World insurgent movements because Congress does not want to embroil the United States in another Vietnam War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:28]]
<nowiki>[20:28]</nowiki>

In order to avoid Congressional restrictions which would prohibit the delivery of aid to the Contras the Reagan administration sets up a, you know, sort of, illegal gun running operation -- which is run out of the White House, out of the National Security Council. This becomes the {{WPExtract|Iran–Contra affair|Iran-Contra scandal}} when it breaks publicly in 1986.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:49]]
<nowiki>[20:49]</nowiki>

It leads to the indictment and prosecution of {{WPExtract|Oliver North|Colonel Oliver North}} -- the man who was charged with running the operation. It comes very close to ending the Reagan presidency. There is talk of impeachment. Had Reagan been proven to be knowledgeable about the operation there would have been solid grounds for impeaching Reagan as President of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:11]]
<nowiki>[21:11]</nowiki>

Fortunately for Reagan his own involvement is never proven, and his presidency survives this scandal. Ultimately the Iran-Contra scandal will be overshadowed by what comes next which is the diplomacy of the Cold War's [[wikt:dénouement|dénouement]]. So Reagan is really a very fortunate president in that his great foreign policy triumph comes fast on the heels of this disgrace, and tends to obscure the disgrace, so far as his legacy is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:38]]
<nowiki>[21:38]</nowiki>

But Nicaragua is a central focus. Reagan escalates the Cold War. This escalation of the Cold War through the provision of materiel assistance to anti-Communist guerillas becomes known as the {{WPExtract|Reagan Doctrine}} -- a doctrine of providing aid to freedom fighters in the developing world. It's not Reagan who coins the phrase {{WPExtract|Reagan Doctrine}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:57]]
<nowiki>[21:57]</nowiki>

It is the conservative columnist {{WPExtract|Charles Krauthammer}} who coins the phrase Reagan Doctrine in the mid-1980s. But it applies to a sort of policy which the Reagan Administration follows in an fairly coherent manner -- a policy of providing aid to anti-Communist guerillas in the {{WPExtract|Global South}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:14]]
<nowiki>[22:14]</nowiki>

Another important site for the application of the Reagan Doctrine will be Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, as we've already discussed, invades Afghanistan at the very end of 1979. The Carter administration seizes this as a strategic opportunity. {{WPExtract|Zbigniew Brzezinski}} talks about making Afghanistan the Soviet Union's Vietnam.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:34]]
<nowiki>[22:34]</nowiki>

Accordingly the Carter administration begins to provide substantial amounts of materiel and military aid to the anti-Soviet {{WPExtract|Mujahideen|mujahideen}} fighting on the ground in Afghanistan to sort of repulse the Soviet invasion. Reagan steps up US support for the anti-Communist mujahideen in Afghanistan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

Here in the slide you can see a sort of blurred picture of a couple of Afghan mujahideen<ref name="pronunce_mujahideen>Speaker pronounced this word like "mujahadis" ([[wikt:mujahideen|Wikitionary:mujahideen]]).</ref> meeting with Ronald Reagan at the White House. The US provides the materiel assistance that will help to transform Afghanistan into a graveyard for the Soviet Empire. One of the most important sort of military assets that the US provides the Afghan insurgents with is the {{WPExtract|FIM-92 Stinger|Stinger missile}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:17]]
<nowiki>[23:17]</nowiki>

A shoulder launched ground-to-air missile that the Afghan mujahideen <ref name="pronunce_mujahideen/> used to very good effect to shoot down Soviet helicopters, and this is really important if you think about the sort of military landscape in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a very mountainous country. It's not a country which is well networked by roads and other land based communications like rail.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:39]]
<nowiki>[23:39]</nowiki>

Effective communications in Afghanistan depends upon air. So when the US provides shoulder launched ground-to-air missiles to the mujahideen<ref name="pronunce_mujahideen/> which they can use to shoot down Soviet helicopters -- Soviet military communications and transportation in the country become very difficult. This is one of the key sort of military innovations that helps to transform the Afghan War into the Soviet Union's Vietnam.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:04]]
<nowiki>[24:04]</nowiki>

Ultimately the Soviet Union loses some 15,000 lives in Afghanistan. Not quite as many as the United States loses in Vietnam, but it's still a substantial death toll. Afghanistan also becomes a substantial drain on the Soviet Union's economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:20]]
<nowiki>[24:20]</nowiki>

By the mid-1980s when a new leader becomes the sort of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it has become very clear that Afghanistan, much as Vietnam was for the United States, is for the Soviet Union an ulcer that is sapping the strength of Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:39]]
<nowiki>[24:39]</nowiki>

So this is Reagan's Cold War escalation -- an escalation in military spending, an escalation in the reach of US military assistance to the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:49]]
<nowiki>[24:49]</nowiki>

But there are other aspects to Reagan's Cold War policy that are also evident in the very first years of his administration. Reagan is very hostile to nuclear weapons in principle. And this is a somewhat surprising aspect of Reagan's foreign policy outlook that has only recently become obvious to historians as new documents have come to light that sort of shed illumination on the inner policy making of the Reagan administration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:15]]
<nowiki>[25:15]</nowiki>

Reagan was intensely fearful of the prospect of a nuclear apocalypse. He worried about what the consequences of the nuclear war would be for American society. It's hard to explain this. Some historians have argued that because Reagan was a, you know, Hollywood actor who'd starred in {{WPExtract|B movie|B movies}}, science-fiction B movies, he had a particular sensitivity to you know sort of apocalyptic fiction and that this informed his attitudes towards nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:42]]
<nowiki>[25:42]</nowiki>

Whereas, you know, Henry Kissinger's formative experience had been the Harvard Government Department, Kissinger was well schooled in, you know, theories of Cold War deterrence, Reagan's formative experience was Hollywood. And this may have inflected his attitudes towards nuclear weapons in ways that made them very different from Kissinger's attitudes towards atomic arms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:02]]
<nowiki>[26:02]</nowiki>

Indeed when the made-for-TV movie, {{WPExtract|The Day After|''The Day After''}} is released in, what, 1982<ref>According to Wikipedia the film first aired on November 20, 1983 ({{WPExtract|The Day After|Wikipedia article on ''The Day After''}}).</ref>, I think, Ronald Reagan arranged a special viewing at the White House. The movie ''The Day After'' is a movie that sort of presents the day after a nuclear apocalypse in, you know, small town America -- actually in Lawrence, Kansas just outside of Kansas City, Missouri.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:23]]
<nowiki>[26:23]</nowiki>

And Reagan screened this film in the White House and was reportedly very affected by the sort of presentation of, you know, sort of cinematic construction of what a nuclear apocalypse might look like for ordinary Americans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

Reagan's policies bear out his basic reflexive hostility towards nuclear weapons. In 1982 Ronald Reagan presents his first arms control proposal to the Soviet Union -- the so-called {{WPExtract|START I|START Proposal}}<ref>The [[wikipedia:START_I#Proposal|Proposal section of the Wikipedia START I article]] speaks about the proposal made by Ronald Reagan in May of 1982.</ref> -- S-T-A-R-T. The START Proposal proposes sweeping reductions in nuclear arsenals on both sides.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:00]]
<nowiki>[27:00]</nowiki>

Indeed the proposal is so ambitious that critics in the United States argue that the Reagan administration is not serious about it. That it is making such a sweeping proposal simply in order to...make no progress whatsoever on arms reductions. In fact, as more evidence has come to light, on the intentions of the Reagan administration, it's become more clear that Reagan was in fact quite serious when he put forward the START Proposal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:26]]
<nowiki>[27:26]</nowiki>

Like Jimmy Carter in 1977 Reagan was willing to take bold and radical steps to deescalate the Cold War's nuclear arms race. But the Soviets, like many critics in the United States, didn't quite get this. They didn't think that Reagan was being serious. They were not willing to countenance massive reductions in nuclear armaments. As a consequence the Soviets rebuff Reagan's START Proposal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:50]]
<nowiki>[27:50]</nowiki>

After this Reagan turns instead to missile defense. Reagan in the early 1980s introduces a proposal for what is called a {{WPExtract|Strategic Defense Initiative|Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI}}. This becomes known in the American media as {{WPExtract|Star Wars (film)|Star Wars -- sort of recognition of the 1977 movie}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:08]]
<nowiki>[28:08]</nowiki>

What the Star Wars concept envisages doing is using space based satellites to provide early warning of Soviet incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles which will then be intercepted using sort of ground launched anti-ballistic missile weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:26]]
<nowiki>[28:26]</nowiki>

The technical aspects of this are not terribly important. What is really consequential is that SDI proposes to establish a sort of defensive shield against incoming Soviet ballistic missiles. Now Reagan sees the SDI initiative as wholly defensive. Reagan presents SDI as an alternative to bilateral arms reductions, and argues that the ultimate purpose of this will be much the same as arms control -- to protect the United States, to make it secure.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:56]]
<nowiki>[28:56]</nowiki>

But the Soviets see SDI as an offensive move. The Soviets are appalled by the Star Wars proposal and see it as an attempt to destabilize the stable nuclear stalemate that had set in during the 1960s and which was consecrated by the {{WPExtract|Strategic Arms Limitation Talks|SALT Agreement}} during the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:14]]
<nowiki>[29:14]</nowiki>

Can any of you sort of hazard a guess as to why the Soviets might have seen SDI as an offensive move? It's a defensive system with no capacity to attack the Soviet Union, so why could it be offensive?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:29]]
<nowiki>[29:29]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:34]]
<nowiki>[29:34]</nowiki>

Yeah.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:42]]
<nowiki>[29:42]</nowiki>

That's absolutely correct. What Star Wars would do, if it were enacted, and if it were effective as a system, would be to undermine entirely the deterrent capabilities of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. It would in effect make it possible for the United States to launch a preemptive nuclear war against the Soviet Union without any fear of retaliation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:03]]
<nowiki>[30:03]</nowiki>

So SDI, or Star Wars, is profoundly destabilizing, in theory, to the Cold War military balance. Of course in practice SDI is very, very difficult to accomplish. We're still struggling to put together a working anti-ballistic missile system. Shooting down an incoming ballistic missile traveling at I don't know how many tens of thousand of miles per hour is harder than it might sound.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:31]]
<nowiki>[30:31]</nowiki>

Besides pursuing moves towards nuclear disarmament Reagan will, during his first term in office, make successive attempts to reach out to his Soviet counterparts. In 1981, shortly after Reagan survives an assassination attempt on his life, he drafts a letter, a handwritten letter to {{WPExtract|Leonid Brezhnev}}, the leader of the Soviet Union, calling for a sincere effort to surmount the differences and disagreements that exist between the two sides in the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:02]]
<nowiki>[31:02]</nowiki>

After Brezhnev dies Reagan writes a similar letter to his successor {{WPExtract|Yuri Andropov}} calling for an honest meeting of minds, an honest effort to surmount Cold War difficulties and to resolve the Soviet American Cold War. Neither of these letters achieve the sort of Soviet reaction that Reagan hopes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:22]]
<nowiki>[31:22]</nowiki>

So Reagan instead concentrates on bolstering US strength in the Cold War. But in 1984, this is three years into Reagan's presidency, Reagan delivers a landmark speech that sort of articulates his basic goals and purposes in foreign policy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:37]]
<nowiki>[31:37]</nowiki>

And this is somewhat belated because Reagan hasn't previously set down, at least in public, an overarching foreign policy concept. But in 1984 Reagan does. And it's a somewhat dramatic move. Reagan talks about the need to reduce the role of force in international relations -- to build a peaceful international system in which law rather than force will prevail.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

He talks about his commitment to eliminate nuclear stockpiles. This is not taken very seriously at the time. But looking back with some better understanding of the inner history of Reagan's early attempts to pursue arms control agreements via the START proposal we can see Reagan's commitment to nuclear disarmament as coming from somewhere you know more sincere than it might have seemed to observers at the time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:24]]
<nowiki>[32:24]</nowiki>

And Reagan also talks about the need to establish a new relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship based upon cooperation, not upon conflict.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:33]]
<nowiki>[32:33]</nowiki>

But the key question for Ronald Reagan is whether there is a Soviet [[wikt:interlocutor|interlocutor]] who is willing and able to deal with Reagan. Reagan during his first term in office proves himself willing to explore the possibilities for a new kind of détente relationship with the Soviet Union -- a détente that will be based not upon the stabilization of the existing status quo but upon a constructive to overcome Cold War disagreements.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:59]]
<nowiki>[32:59]</nowiki>

During the 19 -- the first Reagan administration from 1981 to January 1985 -- it doesn't seem that there's a Soviet leader who is willing to play along. The Soviet Union remains sort of committed to a conflict...bound view of the international system and of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:19]]
<nowiki>[33:19]</nowiki>

But in 1985 there are dramatic changes in the Soviet Union, in the leadership of the Soviet Union, that will make the Soviet Union more amenable to the kind of Cold War resolution that Reagan has already demonstrated himself sort of eager to seek and build.

== The USSR in the 1980s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:35]]
<nowiki>[33:35]</nowiki>

So it's at this point that will segue to talking about changes in the USSR during the 1980s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:42]]
<nowiki>[33:42]</nowiki>

In the early 1980s the Soviet Union looks less like a sort of totalitarian dictatorship than it looks like a [[wikt:gerontocracy|gerontocracy]]. The leaders of the Soviet Union, in the early 1980s, are...to a man, old, even decrepit men.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:58]]
<nowiki>[33:58]</nowiki>

Brezhnev is exhibit A in this gallery of gerontocratic Soviet leaders. He'd led the Soviet Union since the late 1960s -- an architect of détente with the United States -- Brezhnev stood for stability both at home and abroad.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:17]]
<nowiki>[34:17]</nowiki>

It was certainly the case that Brezhnev was sincerely committed to peace. Brezhnev had fought in the Second World War; it was harrowing experience for him, and he was determined as General Secretary of the Communist Party to ensure that no major war was fought to between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:33]]
<nowiki>[34:33]</nowiki>

As such he proved himself a sincere bargaining partner for Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger during the détente of the early 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:42]]
<nowiki>[34:42]</nowiki>

But by the late 1970s Brezhnev's grip upon reality is already slipping. I think I told you some Brezhnev jokes -- did I -- when we talked about Brezhnev last time?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:53]]
<nowiki>[34:53]</nowiki>

Did I tell you the joke about the Olympic rings?

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:56]]
<nowiki>[34:56]</nowiki>

No, okay. So this is a Soviet joke which is popular at the time of the Moscow Olympics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:02]]
<nowiki>[35:02]</nowiki>

I guess you know the Olympics were hosted in Moscow in 1980. Leonid Brezhnev is due to give the opening speech at the Olympic ceremony. And he gets up to speak. And he says: oh -- oh -- oh -- oh...an aide whispers, "You know, Leonid, that's not your teleprompter. Those are the Olympic rings." (laughter from the class).

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:25]]
<nowiki>[35:25]</nowiki>

Brezhnev dies in 1982, and is succeeded by another elderly man: {{WPExtract|Yuri Andropov|Andropov}}. Andropov was a reformer in some respects. He was a former head of the KGB, and was committed to increasing the sort of effectiveness and efficiency of the command economic system. He was also an authoritarian in political affairs as befits a former head of the KGB.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:50]]
<nowiki>[35:50]</nowiki>

Andropov was probably the outstanding intellect amongst the {{WPExtract|Politburo}} leaders of the late Brezhnev Era. You could probably construct a counterfactual argument along the lines that if Andropov had lived for longer he might have been able to reform the Soviet economic system without implementing a process of political change or reform which he would be disinclined to orchestrate as a political authoritarian.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:18]]
<nowiki>[36:18]</nowiki>

There's a sort of counterfactual that the Soviet Union might have followed something more like a Chinese model had Andropov become its leader, or had Andropov remained its leader, rather than dying in 1984.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:31]]
<nowiki>[36:31]</nowiki>

Andropov does die in 1984 and he is succeeded by another elderly leader -- {{WPExtract|Konstantin Chernenko}}. Chernenko lacks Andropov's intellect. He lacks Andropov's instincts to economic reform. Chernenko is a conservative choice as General Secretary of the Communist Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:52]]
<nowiki>[36:52]</nowiki>

Chernenko dies in 1985. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, attends his funeral as the representative of Great Britain and she has a conversation with Ronald Reagan, the US President, after returning to Great Britain. She's telling Ronald Reagan about Chernenko's funeral.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:09]]
<nowiki>[37:09]</nowiki>

And Thatcher tells Reagan -- it was a wonderful funeral -- you really should have come. They put on a great show. I'll be coming back next year.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:19]]
<nowiki>[37:19]</nowiki>

Fortunately for the Soviet Union, or fortunately, I guess for Mikhail Gorbachev, the man who becomes leader of the Soviet Union after Andropov's death, turns out not to be the case. Gorbachev is still very much alive and kicking.

=== Gorbachev and Reforms in the Soviet Union During the 1980s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:34]]
<nowiki>[37:34]</nowiki>

Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985. He was aged just 54 at the time. This makes him very young as a sort of -- in relation to the men who have preceded him as the supreme leaders of the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:49]]
<nowiki>[37:49]</nowiki>

Gorbachev is the youngest member of the Politburo in 1985. He is by far and away the outstanding intellect amongst the highest echelons of the Soviet leadership. Gorbachev also has a different set of generational experiences from those that the men who preceded had had.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:09]]
<nowiki>[38:09]</nowiki>

Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader not to have fought in the Second World War -- first postwar leader not to have fought in the Second World War. The Second World War for Gorbachev is not a defining experience. What is a defining experience for Gorbachev is the experience of the 1960s -- the experience in particular of the so-called thaw that sets in under Nikita Khrushchev.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:31]]
<nowiki>[38:31]</nowiki>

Remember that we talked about the 1960s as a period of relative opening in Soviet society -- a period when there was expanded opportunity for political dialog and discourse, an era which even heretical intellects like {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}} had opportunities to publish -- {{WPExtract|One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich|''A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich''}}

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:51]]
<nowiki>[38:51]</nowiki>

Solzhenitsyn's fictionalized account of life inside the gulag appears in 1962. And it's in this intellectual climate, a climate of intellectual opening and political opportunity, that Mikhail Gorbachev comes of age.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:06]]
<nowiki>[39:06]</nowiki>

With that said -- it is important to underscore that Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 is not a secret liberal democrat. Gorbachev in 1985 remains a convinced Leninist. Gorbachev believes in the Soviet project; he believes in a Marxist-Leninist concept of history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:25]]
<nowiki>[39:25]</nowiki>

The man whom Mikhail Gorbachev idealizes above all is Nikita Khrushchev. Gorbachev is an anti-Stalinist. He does not see Stalin's influence as having been positive or [[wikt:salutary|salutary]]. Rather Gorbachev from the very outset sees Stalin as a man who perverted the Soviet project -- who turned Lenin's socialist democracy -- this is sort of more fiction than reality, but it's what Gorbachev believes -- into a totalitarian state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:53]]
<nowiki>[39:53]</nowiki>

And Gorbachev idealizes Khrushchev as a reformer who tried to restore the true spirit of early Leninism. And as General Secretary of the Communist Party this is what Gorbachev will try to do himself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:07]]
<nowiki>[40:07]</nowiki>

Why do Gorbachev, this reform minded sort of charismatic man, become General Secretary of the Communist Party? Why does his colleagues on the Politburo put him forward? It's a good question -- particularly given the transformative change that Gorbachev would enact very quickly subsequent to his installation as the Soviet Union's supreme leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:31]]
<nowiki>[40:31]</nowiki>

It's certainly the case there were leaders on the Politburo who had misgivings about Gorbachev -- who feared that he could not be trusted to uphold the you know post-Khrushchev orthodoxy -- who worry about Gorbachev's capacity for implementing radical change.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:48]]
<nowiki>[40:48]</nowiki>

But ultimately there are few plausible alternatives to Gorbachev. Gorbachev is the outstanding man on the Politburo. He was passed over in 1985 -- in 1984 when Konstantin Chernenko became General Secretary. Following Chernenko's death the election of Gorbachev to be the supreme leader looks basically...inevitable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:11]]
<nowiki>[41:11]</nowiki>

On becoming General Secretary, upon his installation, Gorbachev tells his wife the morning of his installation as supreme leader, we can't go on living like this. Gorbachev at the very outset recognizes that the Soviet Union has become enmired in a serious social, economic and political malaise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:31]]
<nowiki>[41:31]</nowiki>

We can't go on living like this is Gorbachev's instinct at the very beginning of his administration. And what ails the Soviet Union? Why can't we go on living like this in Gorbachev's view?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:43]]
<nowiki>[41:43]</nowiki>

Gorbachev recognizes that the Soviet economy has become stagnant. He recognizes that public health is in decline amidst rampant alcoholism and degenerative disease. Indeed, in the Soviet Union, life expectancy for adult men, falls between 19 -- the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Adult life expectancy declines. And for an advanced industrial society, which the Soviet Union is, this is without precedent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:12]]
<nowiki>[42:12]</nowiki>

There are very few sort of cases in which an advanced country experiences a decline in life expectancy. And the Soviet Union does, and this is something which is very troubling to Gorbachev.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:22]]
<nowiki>[42:22]</nowiki>

Gorbachev is also concerned by the Afghan War. He believes that the Afghan War has become a costly ulcer and is determined from the outset to do something about it -- presumably to bring the Afghan War to its conclusion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:36]]
<nowiki>[42:36]</nowiki>

The difficulties that the Soviet Union faces, the obstacles to reform, become very clear in {{WPExtract|Chernobyl disaster|April 1986 when a nuclear reactor melts down at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant in the Ukraine}}. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster is the worst nuclear disaster of the atomic era -- far worse even than last year's {{WPExtract|Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster|Fukushima disaster}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:59]]
<nowiki>[42:59]</nowiki>

What's particularly pernicious about the Chernobyl disaster from Gorbachev's perspective is that it seems to encapsulate within itself all of the worst failures of the Soviet system. Local government authorities in Chernobyl are very slow to let authorities in Moscow know what has happened.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:17]]
<nowiki>[43:17]</nowiki>

They initially try to cover up the meltdown -- to pretend that this hasn't happened -- simply to bush the radiation under the rug. Of course this you know is unsuccessful particularly when West European countries report high levels of nuclear radioactivity in rainfall that is moving eastwards -- westwards from -- from the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:37]]
<nowiki>[43:37]</nowiki>

So the thing can't be covered up. But the crisis -- the meltdown itself -- and then the effort to disguise it represents the failures of the command economic system: the unaccountability of low-level officials, the lack of market discipline and incentives, and so on and so forth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:54]]
<nowiki>[43:54]</nowiki>

Insofar as Chernobyl indicts the system itself it's not a one-time event. It's the first in a long series of disasters that seem to strike at the very heart of the Soviet system's credibility. The Chernobyl disaster is followed by other major disasters in 1986.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:12]]
<nowiki>[44:12]</nowiki>

Later that year a cruise liner sinks on the Black Sea claiming some 400 lives. In October 1986 a Soviet nuclear submarine is lost without trace -- with all of the sailors on board. The system appears literally to be falling apart. The system appears like the Chernobyl reactor to be in a state of meltdown.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:31]]
<nowiki>[44:31]</nowiki>

So what is Gorbachev to do? What are the prospects for reforming and improving the system? What is Gorbachev's outlook? How does he seek to proceed?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:41]]
<nowiki>[44:41]</nowiki>

It's important when we think about Gorbachev to remind ourselves that Gorbachev had some awareness of the wold beyond the Soviet Union. Gorbachev grows up in the closed world that is the USSR, but as he attains privilege and status within the Soviet bureaucracy he begins to enjoy opportunities to travel beyond the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:01]]
<nowiki>[45:01]</nowiki>

And these travels will be very influential on Gorbachev's own political and economic outlook. Gorbachev travels to Western Europe repeatedly in the 1970s. He goes to first to Italy in 1971 and then subsequently to the Netherlands, France and West Germany. And these travels open Gorbachev's eyes to the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:20]]
<nowiki>[45:20]</nowiki>

He comes to realize that the West is not so atrocious as Soviet propaganda would have Soviet citizens believe. But is in fact more prosperous, more efficient and in some ways more egalitarian than the Soviet Union itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:35]]
<nowiki>[45:35]</nowiki>

Gorbachev visits Canada in 1983 just a couple of years before he becomes General Secretary. He is very impressed by what he sees in Canada -- particularly by the efficiency of Canadian agriculture. As a Communist Party bureaucrat Gorbachev has a particular interest in and responsibility for agriculture, and he's blown away by what he sees in Canada -- you know agricultural productivity far in excess of that which the Soviet Union has been able to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:03]]
<nowiki>[46:03]</nowiki>

And this is quite startling and it forces Gorbachev to rethink some of his own basic assumptions about how society and the economy should be organized.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:12]]
<nowiki>[46:12]</nowiki>

Gorbachev also gets to meet foreign leaders and these meetings will be influential upon him. Gorbachev meets in 1984, in December 1984, this is literally just months before his elevation to the General Secretaryship, with Margaret Thatcher -- the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:29]]
<nowiki>[46:29]</nowiki>

Gorbachev makes a very positive impression on Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher reports after the meeting with Gorbachev: I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together. Thatcher hails Gorbachev as a different kind of Soviet leader -- a Soviet leader who is open and spontaneous -- not who is rigid and ideological as his predecessors had been.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:48]]
<nowiki>[46:48]</nowiki>

Gorbachev is also impressed by what he sees in Great Britain. He's impressed that Thatcher seems open and willing to engage with him -- not ideologically hidebound. Gorbachev too realizes that he can engage in constructive dialog with the leaders of foreign states -- including even Great Britain -- a close ally of the United States of America.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:09]]
<nowiki>[47:09]</nowiki>

So far as the United States, and the Reagan administration is concerned, Thatcher actually plays a really important role as a bridge between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thatcher, who is very close to Reagan, Reagan trusts Thatcher...reassure...Thatcher reassures the American President that Gorbachev is a different kind of Soviet leader -- that he is a man with whom the West can do business.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:32]]
<nowiki>[47:32]</nowiki>

So these international contexts, even before Gorbachev's ascension to the General Secretaryship, give Gorbachev a different kind of orientation -- an orientation to the world that is open and integrative rather than the sort of reflexive anti-Westernism which animated his predecessors.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:51]]
<nowiki>[47:51]</nowiki>

Gorbachev, I should also, you know, just note, derives succor from his contacts with social democratic leaders in the West. The experience of Spain's {{WPExtract|Felipe González}} is particularly influential on Gorbachev. We talked about González on Tuesday when we talked about the third wave of democratization in the Iberian Peninsula.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:10]]
<nowiki>[48:10]</nowiki>

González is the socialist who becomes elected Spain's Prime Minister in 1981. And González's apparent ability to combine a commitment to socialism, to economic egalitarianism, with a commitment to democracy, with the rule of the ballot box, is very influential on Gorbachev. Gorbachev sees through the example of González and other West European social democrats that it might be possible to be both socially democratic and progressive on the one hand and committed to the rule of law and to electoral democracy on the other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:43]]
<nowiki>[48:43]</nowiki>

So what does Gorbachev do as a reformer at home? How does Mikhail Gorbachev proceed? Gorbachev pursues a three pronged reform agenda. There are three Russian words that it would be useful for you to be able to associate with the Gorbachev administration in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:05]]
<nowiki>[49:05]</nowiki>

The first of these is {{WPExtract|Uskoreniye|uskoreniye}} it translates as acceleration loosely. And what is represents is a commitment to speeding up the Soviet system -- to making the command economic system more efficient, more effective, than it has become.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:22]]
<nowiki>[49:22]</nowiki>

Uskoreniye is the attempt to make the Soviet system work better without changing the basic paradigm of the system. The pursuit of uskoreniye involves a basic continuity with the reform agenda of Yuri Andropov -- a leader who had committed himself to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the command economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:44]]
<nowiki>[49:44]</nowiki>

But Gorbachev's reform agenda will soon branch beyond the pursuit of uskoreniye or acceleration within an existing sort of socialist paradigm. Gorbachev will commit himself in fairly short order to a process of {{WPExtract|Perestroika|perestroika}} -- a word that translates as reconstruction.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:03]]
<nowiki>[50:03]</nowiki>

Perestroika goes beyond uskoreniye. It's not just an attempt to speed up the command economic system but it rather -- it will be an attempt to reform and even change the command economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:14]]
<nowiki>[50:14]</nowiki>

It will ultimately involve a willingness to countenance market oriented reforms -- to open up the command economic system to encompass some space for market based incentives. This...in contrast to uskoreniye which is an attempt to speed up and improve the existing paradigm will be an attempt to change the paradigm itself -- to take the Soviet command economic system and to turn it into a different kind of economic system -- one in which there will be more space for private enterprise and private individual economic initiative.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:47]]
<nowiki>[50:47]</nowiki>

Besides these two reform agenda, uskoreniye and perestroika, both of which are oriented towards the economy, Gorbachev will simultaneously pursue a reform agenda that is oriented towards politics and even civil society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:03]]
<nowiki>[51:03]</nowiki>

This will be a reform agenda known as {{WPExtract|Glasnost|glasnost}}. Glasnost translates as openness. What is it? It is an attempt to increase political pluralism within the Soviet system -- to expand the space for political dialog -- even to transform the Soviet Union into a democratic kind of system. It is reform with democratizing intent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:27]]
<nowiki>[51:27]</nowiki>

Glasnost is very difficult to accomplish. You have to remember that in the Soviet Union the party and the state are virtually indistinguishable. The party is the state -- hence the sort of aphorism<ref>[[wikt:aphorism|Wiktionary has an entry for aphorism]] and {{WPExtract|aphorism|Wikipedia has an entry for aphorism}}. The speaker is perhaps using the word in a somewhat non-conventional way. It's possible that neologism ([[wikt:neologism|Wiktionary entry]], {{WPExtract|Neologism|Wikipedia entry}}) is what was intended.</ref> party-state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:40]]
<nowiki>[51:40]</nowiki>

What glasnost will involve in practice will be the reconstruction of civil institutions, of state institutions, as a counterweight to the party. Gorbachev will try to sort of rebuild the state as a counterbalance to the influence of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This will involve later in the 1980s creating and empowering new institutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:04]]
<nowiki>[52:04]</nowiki>

A Presidency of the Soviet Union will supplant the General Secretary of the Communist Party as a source of leadership authority. The Chamber of Deputies, an old Soviet Era institution, will be reformed to become something more like a representative parliament. So glasnost tries to expand the space for political discourse and dialog on the one hand, and on the other hand to build state institutions as a counterweight to the party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:32]]
<nowiki>[52:32]</nowiki>

Reform however is an incremental process. The definition of each of these three major objectives: uskoreniye, perestroika and glasnost evolves over time. Reform passes through stages. Initially it's fairly cautious. It will become ambitious from 1987 onwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:52]]
<nowiki>[52:52]</nowiki>

Initially uskoreniye and then perestroika are the primary objectives of Gorbachev's reform agenda. Only later will Gorbachev commit himself more fully to political glasnost. As Gorbachev proceeds in this reformist project he builds upon the work of so-called internal dissidents.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:10]]
<nowiki>[53:10]</nowiki>

The internal dissidents are very important. These are not dissidents like {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn}} and {{WPExtract|Andrei Sakharov}} who live entirely outside of the party-state. Sakharov by the mid-1970s is totally outside of the mainstream of Soviet society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:26]]
<nowiki>[53:26]</nowiki>

He is indeed sent off to a -- to the gulag in the late 1970s for his opposition to the party's rule. The men on whom Gorbachev draws for inspiration are not the out-and-out dissidents. They're not the people who are wholly opposed to the Soviet system; rather, they are insiders, party members, party bureaucrats, who have by the mid-1980s serious doubts about the future viability of the Soviet model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:53]]
<nowiki>[53:53]</nowiki>

They are men like {{WPExtract|Alexander Yakovlev (Russian politician)|Alexander Yakovlev}}, a man who was a, you know, long party member of long and good standing, but who is dispatched to Canada, as the Soviet ambassador to Canada in 1973, in large part because he had become something of an internal heretic. Yakovlev questions sort of self-evident party truths. And as punishment was sent off to Canada for a decade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:17]]
<nowiki>[54:17]</nowiki>

In Canada of course Yakovlev's intellectual [[wikt:heterodox|heterodoxy]] only expanded. Yakovlev becomes a more convinced reformer as a consequence of his genteel exile in the Canadian embassy. Yakovlev becomes a major influence on Gorbachev. The two men meet when Gorbachev visits Canada in 1983 and its Yakovlev who is tasked with showing Gorbachev around.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:40]]
<nowiki>[54:40]</nowiki>

After Gorbachev becomes General Secretary he brings Yakovlev back to the Soviet Union and installs him as his closest policy advisor. Yakovlev is a man who is you know, sort of, commonly described as the intellectual godfather of détente<ref>According to Wikipedia {{WPExtract|Alexander Yakovlev (Russian politician)|Yakovlev}} is described as the "godfather of {{WPExtract|Glasnost|glasnost}}".</ref> -- as the man who is more responsible than any other for orchestrating the policies that Mikhail Gorbachev would implement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:02]]
<nowiki>[55:02]</nowiki>

Ultimately, Yakovlev will break with Gorbachev at the very end of the 1980s, because Yakovlev becomes convinced that Gorbachev is not reforming as quickly as he could. So Yakovlev is a very convinced systemic reformer. Other reformers who influence Gorbachev include {{WPExtract|Eduard Shevardnadze}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:20]]
<nowiki>[55:20]</nowiki>

Eduard Shevardnadze had been the head of the {{WPExtract|Communist Party of Georgia|Georgian Communist Party}}. You know as we've already discussed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the Communist Party that exists at the federation level. The Soviet republics that constitute the USSR have their own Communist parties. And Shevardnadze, a Georgian, is the head of the Georgian Communist Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:41]]
<nowiki>[55:41]</nowiki>

In this sort of role as a regional boss he establishes a reputation for himself as something of a reformer -- as a man who is willing to experiment with new solutions in order to improve the operation of the socialist system. Gorbachev appoints Shevardnadze as his foreign minister.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:59]]
<nowiki>[55:59]</nowiki>

As foreign minister Shevardnadze after 1985 gets to travel extensively to the West. He strikes up good relationships with Western interlocutors. His experiences in the West confirm his own orientation towards reform. Shevardnadze becomes in particular a very strong proponent of Soviet-American détente -- of transforming the conflict relationship between the United States and the USSR into a relationship of cooperation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:28]]
<nowiki>[56:28]</nowiki>

Bolstered by men like Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, internal reformers, inner critics of the system, Gorbachev following his installation in 1985, embarks upon a reform agenda. The initial process will be upon improving the efficiency of the socialist system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:48]]
<nowiki>[56:48]</nowiki>

Mikhail Gorbachev seeks to pursue a reformed, improved Communism, a Communism that will in his expectation, come closer to achieving the results that Lenin intended for it. This will involve, for example, an anti-alcoholism campaign. Gorbachev is absolutely convinced when he becomes General Secretary that alcoholism is one of the primary ills that ails the Soviet economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:15]]
<nowiki>[57:15]</nowiki>

Alcoholism he sees it is responsible not only for rising incidents of alcohol related deaths amongst Russian men, but also for a slowdown in production for industrial absenteeism and so on. The answer for this should be obvious to anybody who's ever had a bad hangover. It's difficult to go to work and make things when you're really sick. (laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:36]]
<nowiki>[57:36]</nowiki>

So Gorbachev tries to improve the efficiency of the system by implementing a tough campaign against alcoholism. This is important not so much for what it accomplishes -- which is not very much -- it actually accomplishes a substantial increase in the production of home brewed alcohol in the Soviet Union (laughter from the class) as Soviet citizens sort of try to avoid the official restrictions on alcohol.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:58]]
<nowiki>[57:58]</nowiki>

But it's important because of what it reveals about the nature of Gorbachev's reform agenda in the early stage. Fighting alcoholism is...revelatory because it suggests that Gorbachev's concern is with improving the system as it currently functions -- with eradicating specific social ills like alcoholism that act as impediments to the smooth operation of the socialist economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:24]]
<nowiki>[58:24]</nowiki>

So refining the efficiency, improving the efficiency of the system, through a process of uskoreniye is Gorbachev's initial objective. This does not achieve the results that Gorbachev hopes to achieve. The efficiency of the Soviet economy does not substantially increase as a consequence of uskoreniye so Gorbachev begins around 1987 to embark upon more far reaching economic reforms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:51]]
<nowiki>[58:51]</nowiki>

He begins to pursue a tentative economic liberalization. The 1987 law on state enterprises is an important turning point. What this law does is to devolve expanded control over industrial production to the factory level. It doesn't transfer factories to private ownership; rather, it seeks to give individual factory managers more autonomy -- autonomy to determine sort of what they will manufacture -- autonomy to determine how they will manufacture it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:21]]
<nowiki>[59:21]</nowiki>

In the context of a command economic system in which production has previously been centralized in Moscow this is a bold step. What Gorbachev is trying to do with the 1987 law on state enterprises is to decentralize the command economic system -- to expand the latitude of opportunity for private initiative in industrial manufacturing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:42]]
<nowiki>[59:42]</nowiki>

But there are series obstacles to reform. The Soviet economy has been socialized and centralized for a very long time. By the mid-1980s nobody in the Soviet Union can remember a pre-Soviet era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:58]]
<nowiki>[59:58]</nowiki>

This is different by the way from the experience of China. In China the socialist system is not consolidated until the early 1950s. By consequence when {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping}} embarks upon a reform agenda, in the late 1970s, there is still in China extensive folk memory of a pre-Communist world, of a world in which property was private, and in which the market provided a framework for the exchange of goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:23]]
<nowiki>[1:00:23]</nowiki>

In the Soviet Union by contrast there is very little popular memory of life outside of a Communist world. And this is an obstacle to reform. Labor also turns out to be an obstacle to reform. Gorbachev removes legal restrictions on labor demonstrations. Under the Brezhnev regime laborers, laborers who protested, laborers who stopped work in protest to their work conditions, were punished. They were subject to criminal sanction.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:54]]
<nowiki>[1:00:54]</nowiki>

Gorbachev liberalizes the regime of labor control in the Soviet Union and as a consequence workers go on strike.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:03]]
<nowiki>[1:01:03]</nowiki>

In effect Gorbachev's liberalization of labor controls demonstrates how important labor controls were to making the system function under Brezhnev. And there's an irony to this, right. The Soviet Union proclaimed itself to be a workers' state -- a state that was run you know for the bourgeoisie, by the bourgeoisie, for the bourgeoisie and so on.<ref>Speaker likely meant what had been said earlier in [[UC_Berkeley_-_HIST_186_-_2012_Spring_-_Sargent_-_International_and_Global_History_Since_1945_-_Lecture_16_-_The_Cold_War_Resurges_-_01h_21m_20s#Upheaval_in_Poland_During_the_1970s|Lecture 16 - The Cold War Resurges - in the section speaking about the Polish Solidarity Movement]], "Remember that Communist governments, socialist governments as they you know call themselves, proclaim themselves to be governments of the workers, you know government of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers. That workers would need an independent labor union to represent their interests against the state is sort of anathema to the you know basic ideological framework that is Soviet-style Communism."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:23]]
<nowiki>[1:01:23]</nowiki>

Well, what Gorbachev demonstrates once he begins to loosen the controls that had held the system together is that workers are not particularly happy. They go on strike. And this is revelatory but it also is an obstacle to the accomplishment of Gorbachev's reform project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:39]]
<nowiki>[1:01:39]</nowiki>

As Gorbachev's reforms struggle to achieve their desired goals it becomes clearer and clearer to observers within the Soviet Union, as well as in the larger world, that Gorbachev does not have a particularly coherent agenda. Unlike Deng Xiaoping Gorbachev lacks a cogent sense of what he wants to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:58]]
<nowiki>[1:01:58]</nowiki>

Gorbachev at some level is committed to refining the Leninist system -- to making socialism work better. But at another level he is willing to experiment so as to achieve his desired aim of reform and efficiency. And there is an obvious contradiction between these things. Gorbachev wants to preserve and improve the Soviet system, but he also wants to change the Soviet system so as to make it more productive and more efficient.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:22]]
<nowiki>[1:02:22]</nowiki>

And it's not entirely clear what Gorbachev proposes to do or how he proposes to accomplish it. Perestroika and uskoreniye point in different directions yet Gorbachev pursues them at the same time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:36]]
<nowiki>[1:02:36]</nowiki>

Beset by the travails of economic reform Gorbachev turns instead after 1987 to political reform. The pursuit of political reform will become the primary focus of Gorbachev's reform agenda. Glasnost displaces uskoreniye and perestroika as the primary focus of Gorbachev's reform efforts.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:59]]
<nowiki>[1:02:59]</nowiki>

Here substantial progress is made. Gorbachev removes restrictive controls on Soviet intellectual, cultural, and even political life. The formation of new civil society organizations, the so-called informals, or informal organizations is encouraged. This is a major breakthrough. Previously the Communist Party had prohibited the existence of civil society organizations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:27]]
<nowiki>[1:03:27]</nowiki>

Trade unions are an obvious example but also political organizations, organizations devoted to particular causes, the kind of civil societies organizations that flourish in the West had been prohibited in the Soviet Union. But Gorbachev encourages their formation. Something akin to a civil society begins to reassert itself in the context of glasnost.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:50]]
<nowiki>[1:03:50]</nowiki>

Gorbachev also encourages the formation of popular political organizations to support his perestroika agenda. The so-called popular fronts in support of perestroika are formed from 1987 onwards. And this is really important because Gorbachev faces serious political opposition to his reform agenda within the Communist Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:11]]
<nowiki>[1:04:11]</nowiki>

Hard liners, conservatives, and [[wikt:reactionary|reactionaries]] within the -- conserva -- within the Communist Party -- I almost called it the conservative party -- and there would be a certain logic to that linguistic slip -- oppose Gorbachev's reform effort.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:25]]
<nowiki>[1:04:25]</nowiki>

They oppose Gorbachev's effort to change the system. By encouraging the formation of grassroots political organizations, the so-called popular fronts, Gorbachev is trying to invoke mass politics, the people as a counterweight to the party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:41]]
<nowiki>[1:04:41]</nowiki>

In the context of the Soviet state this is a very bold unprecedented move. Besides expanding the scope of political freedom, Gorbachev also expands the domain of intellectual freedom. Literary and cultural outlets are given new freedom to publish materials previously considered heretical. Khrushchev in 1962 had permitted the publication of {{WPExtract|Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Solzhenitsyn}}'s {{WPExtract|One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich|''Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich''}}

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:08]]
<nowiki>[1:05:08]</nowiki>

Well, in 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev goes one better and allows the state publishing house {{WPExtract|Novy Mir|''Novy Mir''}} to publish Solzhenitsyn's {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''Gulag Archipelago''}}. -- a far more damning indictment of the Soviet gulag system than {{WPExtract|One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich|''A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich''}} had been.<ref>The Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|The Gulag Archipelago|''The Gulag Archipelago''}} states, "Following its publication, the book initially circulated in {{WPExtract|Samizdat|''samizdat''}} underground publication in the Soviet Union until its appearance in the literary journal {{WPExtract|Novy Mir|''Novy Mir''}} in 1989, in which a third of the work was published in three issues."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:26]]
<nowiki>[1:05:26]</nowiki>

So the scope of individual freedom expands dramatically from 1987 onwards. Gorbachev also implements serious structural political reforms. Here the 1988 party conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the 19th Party Conference, is a very important turning point.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:45]]
<nowiki>[1:05:45]</nowiki>

At this party conference Gorbachev somehow gets the Communist Party to endorse a far reaching reform agenda. The Communist Party endorses Gorbachev's demand for a program of accelerated democratization. It endorses Gorbachev's commitment to create an elected parliament -- a parliament that will be popularly elected by the people -- the Chamber of Soviet Deputies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:10]]
<nowiki>[1:06:10]</nowiki>

The party conference also creates a Soviet Presidency as a new institution within the Soviet state. This Presidency will not be directly elected. It is to be indirectly elected by the parliament. And this may have been one of the biggest tactical miscalculations that Mikhail Gorbachev made.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:29]]
<nowiki>[1:06:29]</nowiki>

Had Gorbachev introduced a directly elected Presidency in 1988 and then stood for election as President of the Soviet Union in 1989 it is highly likely that he would have won. But he's concerned about the prospects of his own election; he's concerned about pushing reform too hard, and he instead opts to have the presidency indirectly elected by the members of the parliament.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:57]]
<nowiki>[1:06:57]</nowiki>

Gorbachev will be elected in 1990 to be the President of the Soviet Union. So he assumes the new office himself. Had he been directly elected by the people rather than indirectly elected by the parliament he would have enjoyed sort of greater democratic legitimacy as leader of the Soviet Union and this would have had some implications for the sort of final politics of the Soviet Union's collapse which we'll come to in due course.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:23]]
<nowiki>[1:07:23]</nowiki>

But even with the sort of direct, with the indirectly elected presidency, the introduction of these structural political reforms represents a major turning point in the history of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is in effect building state institutions as a counterweight to the party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:42]]
<nowiki>[1:07:42]</nowiki>

Alexander Yakovlev wants to go even further than this. He wants the Communist Party to divide itself in two, so as to introduce a competitive political system, to the Soviet Union's politics. Yakovlev argues that Gorbachev should break away from the Communist Party and establish a new social democratic party which Gorbachev would head leaving the old [[wikt:reactionary|reactionaries]] to be a {{WPExtract|Rump party|rump Communist party}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:06]]
<nowiki>[1:08:06]</nowiki>

Gorbachev says it's not quite ready for that. It's not quite time to divide the Communist Party in two. But...the opportunities for political pluralism are increasing very rapidly.

== The International Aspects of Soviet Reforms ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:18]]
<nowiki>[1:08:18]</nowiki>

What are the international aspects of Gorbachev's reform agenda? How does Gorbachev's reform agenda at home alter the place of the Soviet Union in the world? This is our sort of last theme.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:30]]
<nowiki>[1:08:30]</nowiki>

Gorbachev, we should note, believes that reform at home will require change in the international relations of the Soviet Union. This is a very deep conviction for Gorbachev. That there is a fundamental relationship between reform at home and change in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:47]]
<nowiki>[1:08:47]</nowiki>

Gorbachev believes first off that the Cold War is unsustainable. He believes that the costs of waging the Cold War are weighing down the Soviet Union -- that the extensive commitment of resources -- the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction is a drag on the Soviet economy. He believes that the Afghan War has become an unsustainable cancer and that it is time to end the Afghan War which Gorbachev does in 1988.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:13]]
<nowiki>[1:09:13]</nowiki>

But ending the Afghan War is not enough. Gorbachev wants to redivert all of the resources that are being committed to the nuclear arms race to civilian production. And he understands that in order to do that he will have to end the Cold War -- that he will have to strike up some new relationship with the United States that will enable the Soviet Union to dismantle its military-industrial complex and to instead divert those resources to the purposes of civilian economic production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:40]]
<nowiki>[1:09:40]</nowiki>

Gorbachev also believes that economic reform will at some fundamental level depend upon at the opening of the Soviet economy to the world. He believes that the Soviet Union will require participation in international trade relationships to stimulate technology led growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:58]]
<nowiki>[1:09:58]</nowiki>

He believes that the United -- that the Soviet Union -- should recommit itself to Europe. In the context of European integration, which is far advanced by the 1980s, Gorbachev wants to reinsert the Soviet Union within a larger sort of European economic and political system -- for the Soviet Union to take its place in what he calls a common European home.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:18]]
<nowiki>[1:10:18]</nowiki>

So Gorbachev proposes to transcend the division between East and West with the purpose of reintegrating the Soviet Union to the world. And he does this not only because he wants to secure peace but also because he believes that the Soviet economy cannot be reformed in isolation -- that real reform will depend upon the discipline of international competition, upon the stimulative effects that trade has on economic innovation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:42]]
<nowiki>[1:10:42]</nowiki>

So this will require transforming the Cold War world. It will require a new kind of relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union -- the Cold War's two principle adversaries.

=== Meetings Between Reagan and Gorbachev ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:55]]
<nowiki>[1:10:55]</nowiki>

Reagan and Gorbachev strike up a warm relationship from the very beginning. They meet for the first time in a summit meeting at Geneva in 1985. This meeting is not particularly consequential in terms of its tangible achievements. It doesn't achieve much by way of specific agreement. But what it does achieve is a warm rapport between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:24]]
<nowiki>[1:11:24]</nowiki>

Reagan sees Gorbachev right away as a man with whom he can deal -- like Thatcher. Reagan believes that Gorbachev is a different kind of Soviet leader. In fact Reagan is so convinced that Gorbachev is different that Reagan even concludes that Gorbachev might be secretly a Christian.(laughter from the class)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:40]]
<nowiki>[1:11:40]</nowiki>

Reagan says after the summit, I honestly think he believes in a higher power. And this is actually really important. Because for Reagan one of the problems with Communism is that Communism recognizes no higher source of authority. For Communism, in Reagan's view, all that matters is the accomplishment of a Communist system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:00]]
<nowiki>[1:12:00]</nowiki>

The idea that human rights, or religious values, or even the rule of law could impede the realization of a Communist society is anathema to Communist ideology, at least in Reagan's understanding of it. So Reagan's notion that Gorbachev believes in a higher power is very important. Because Reagan immediately presumes that Gorbachev might be willing to concede that there are, sort of, metaphysical limits upon what the state can do to its citizens in the name of the Communist ideological project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:30]]
<nowiki>[1:12:30]</nowiki>

The next {{WPExtract|Reykjavík Summit|summit in Reykjavík}} in 1986 pushes the two parties close towards a very dramatic accomplishment. Reagan and Gorbachev, in a sort of fairly open dialog, come very close to agreeing to abolish nuclear arsenals on both side of the Cold War. They countenance a program of total nuclear disarmament.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:54]]
<nowiki>[1:12:54]</nowiki>

This is really striking. Never been in the history of the Cold War have two leaders come so close to a discussion of real disarmament. But Gorbachev and Reagan do at Reykjavík. The leaders on both sides go far ahead of where their closest advisors want them to go. But they are willing on both sides to contemplate very bold moves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:15]]
<nowiki>[1:13:15]</nowiki>

SDI ends up being an obstacle. Reagan is very committed to the SDI concept. He's not willing to dismantle it as a quid pro quo for wholesale nuclear disarmament. He does offer to share the SDI system with the Soviet Union so as to give the Soviet Union Star Wars technology. But that's not sufficient to bridge the divide over SDI.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:36]]
<nowiki>[1:13:36]</nowiki>

Though the Reykjavík meeting does not achieve the sweeping disarmament deal that both Reagan and Gorbachev hoped that it might it does confirm a close partnership between the two men. This partnership will produce tangible results very quickly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:50]]
<nowiki>[1:13:50]</nowiki>

After the Reykjavík Summit Reagan has, you know, convinces himself that the Soviet Union is changing in very profound ways. And he sets out to encourage change. He dispatches to Moscow his Secretary of State, {{WPExtract|George P. Shultz|George Shultz}}. Shultz is a former economist, before he becomes Secretary of State, and Gorbachev sends him to Moscow to hold informal seminars with Gorbachev on market economics. Reagan figures that Shultz can sort of help Gorbachev to make the transition to a more liberalized, more market oriented, economic system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:22]]
<nowiki>[1:14:22]</nowiki>

Reagan also reaches a new arms control agreement. The {{WPExtract|Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty|INF or Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty}} of 1987. The INF Treaty does something very sweeping. It commits both sides to remove all intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe. It doesn't compass the big intercontinental ballistic missiles but it encompasses all intermediate range nuclear forces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:47]]
<nowiki>[1:14:47]</nowiki>

And Reagan agrees to their total abolition in the 1987 treaty. This is a very, very dramatic move. Within the United States Reagan comes in for intense criticism -- particularly from the conservative wing of the Republican party. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger both lambaste Ronald Reagan over the INF Treaty.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:06]]
<nowiki>[1:15:06]</nowiki>

They argue that Ronald Reagan is gambling away the farm. They say that INF -- that intermediate range nuclear forces are an important element of the overall sort of deterrent...that the United States maintains. But Reagan isn't concerned. Reagan is more concerned to make progress on ambitious disarmament objectives than he is concerned to maintain the old nuclear deterrent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:32]]
<nowiki>[1:15:32]</nowiki>

This sort of begs the question: why is Reagan so willing to make peace? We've talked about Gorbachev's reform agenda. It's clear enough why Gorbachev sought a new relationship with the West. He believed after all that the accomplishment of domestic reform depended upon the creation of a new relationship with the West and with the United States. But why is Ronald Reagan so willing to reach out to Gorbachev? To make progress towards peace?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:57]]
<nowiki>[1:15:57]</nowiki>

I would suggest that part of the answer has to do with the ideological aspect of Reagan's Cold War world view. Reagan sees the problem in the Cold War as being not the Soviet Union but Communism. The problem is not a great power rival. The problem for the United States is an ideological system -- an ideological system that Reagan in 1983 calls evil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:19]]
<nowiki>[1:16:19]</nowiki>

Well, as the Soviet Union, moves to dismantle this ideological system, the {{WPExtract|Casus belli|''casus belli''}}, the cause of confrontation, in effect disappears. A Cold War ideologue -- Reagan can be a radical peacemaker as the Soviet Union moves to dismantle the ideological system that had in Reagan's view been the cause of the Cold War in the first place. The fact that Reagan is terrified of nuclear weapons only sort of confirms his basic instincts which are to make peace when given the opportunity to do so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:52]]
<nowiki>[1:16:52]</nowiki>

Indeed Reagan proves himself to be a very sensitive and nuanced analyst of the Soviet Union -- much more sensitive to the changes that Gorbachev is implementing than are many of his advisors. Advisors like {{WPExtract|Alexander Haig}}, his first Secretary of State, observers like Richard Nixon, a very astute student of world politics, are suspicious of Gorbachev. They worry that Gorbachev is trying to lull the West into a sense of false security.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:18]]
<nowiki>[1:17:18]</nowiki>

But Reagan is not concerned. Reagan is a careful observer of the Soviet Union and he concludes that Gorbachev is for real -- that the reforms that Gorbachev is implementing are for real.

== Reagan's Humor and Domestic Life in the Soviet Union ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:29]]
<nowiki>[1:17:29]</nowiki>

As an example of sort of Reagan's close engagement with change in the Soviet Union I want to show you a quick video clip in which Reagan reflects upon some of the shortcomings of the Soviet system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:40]]
<nowiki>[1:17:40]</nowiki>

It shows both, you know, I think, Reagan's attentiveness to change in the USSR and Reagan's, you know, sort of willingness to talk about the Soviet Union with a sense of humor.

{{#ev:youtube|https://youtu.be/w7Jy6ZXTKQM||center|||start=823&end=904}}

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:49]]
<nowiki>[1:17:49]</nowiki>

''Reagan:...by their people among themselves which reveal they've got a great sense of humor but they've also got a pretty cynical attitude toward their system. And I told this, and Bill<ref>This most likely is referring to Bill Bourke the president and chief executive officer of the Reynolds Metals Company where Reagan gave the speech. The [https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/032888a transcript from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library] mentions that, "In his [Reagan's] opening remarks, he referred to Bill Bourke, president and chief executive officer, and David Reynolds, chairman of the board of directors."</ref> you'll have to hear it again, I told it in the car. I didn't tell this one to Gorbachev. (laughter from the audience in the video).''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:11]]
<nowiki>[1:18:11]</nowiki>

''You know there's a ten year delay in the Soviet Union of delivery of an automobile, and only one out of seven families in the Soviet Union own automobiles. There's a ten year wait and you go through quite a process when you're ready to buy and then you put up the money in advance.''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:30]]
<nowiki>[1:18:30]</nowiki>

''And this happened to a fellow and this is their story that they tell -- this joke. That this man, he laid down his money, and then the fellow he was...that was in charge said to him, "okay, come back in ten years and get your car". And he said, "morning or afternoon?" (laughter from the audience in the video).''

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:49]]
<nowiki>[1:18:49]</nowiki>

''And the fellow beyond the counter said, "well, ten years from now what difference does it make?" And he said, "well, the plumber's coming in the morning." (laughter from the audience in the video).''<ref>This was from a speech that Ronald Reagan gave to the Reynolds Metal Company in Richmond, Virginia on March 28, 1988. A [https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/032888a transcript of the speech is available via the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum].</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:02]]
<nowiki>[1:19:02]</nowiki>

So Reagan was attentive to change in the Soviet Union -- interested in the Soviet Union, engaged with the Soviet Union. In 1988 he visits the Soviet Union. He walks the streets of Moscow and meets with ordinary Russians. A reporter asks Reagan, do you still believe that the Soviet Union is an evil empire? And Reagan says no, that was a different time, a different place.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:25]]
<nowiki>[1:19:25]</nowiki>

In a sense Reagan's conviction that the Soviet Union is no longer an evil empire marks an ending of the Cold War. It marks Reagan's recognition that the Soviet Union is no longer meaningfully a Communist society, and as such is no longer a threat to the security interests, indeed the preservation of the free world.

== Ending Points of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:19:48]]
<nowiki>[1:19:48]</nowiki>

This is one possible ending point for the Cold War -- 1988 -- the Soviet Union is no longer an evil empire. Of course there are other possible ending points too. And we're going to talk about some of these a little bit more on Tuesday, but let's quickly survey the landscape.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:03]]
<nowiki>[1:20:03]</nowiki>

In 1989 the Soviet Empire disintegrates. The Soviet Union allows the East European countries to go their way. Gorbachev in December 1988 tells the United Nations that the Soviet Union will no longer use military force to compel the allegiance of its East European satellite states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:22]]
<nowiki>[1:20:22]</nowiki>

A Soviet press secretary says that the Brezhnev Doctrine, a doctrine that proclaimed the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in Eastern Europe has been replaced by the Sinatra Doctrine -- a doctrine that says that the East Europeans can do it their way.<ref>A reference to the {{WPExtract|Frank Sinatra}} song {{WPExtract|My Way}} which has the refrain, "I did it my way" ([https://genius.com/Frank-sinatra-my-way-lyrics lyrics] via {{WPExtract|Genius (website)|Genius.com}}).</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:20:36]]
<nowiki>[1:20:36]</nowiki>

A series of revolutions quickly ensue in Eastern Europe and these are a subject for Tuesday's lecture. But the disintegration of the Soviet Empire is one possible point of ending for the Cold War itself. Another would be the disillusion of the Soviet Union, which comes only in 1991. An attempted coup against Gorbachev by hard line Communists in 1991, in that August, precipitates the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:03]]
<nowiki>[1:21:03]</nowiki>

The coup will be defeated but it is defeated only by the rallying of pro-democratic forces under Boris Yeltsin -- the elected President of Russia. The coup ends the Soviet Union as a sort of political entity. The Soviet Union dissolves. Political power reverts to the fifteen republics that constitute the USSR: Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:26]]
<nowiki>[1:21:26]</nowiki>

We're going to talk a lot about the process of this next week but I wanted simply to sort of identify the collapse of the USSR as an alternative point of destination for the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:37]]
<nowiki>[1:21:37]</nowiki>

Very quickly -- the question of endings has a great bearing on the questions of meanings. When did the Cold War end? Did it end in 1988 with the collapse of the evil empire? Did it end in 1989 with the disillusion of the East European empire? Or did it end it 1991 with the crisis and implosion of the Soviet Union itself?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:21:56]]
<nowiki>[1:21:56]</nowiki>

How we determine the ending of the Cold War will have a great bearing on how we define the meaning of the Cold War. Was a geopolitical struggle? Was it an ideological struggle? How we answer that question will necessarily shape the question of when the Cold War ended. And we'll talk on Tuesday about what comes next.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 12 - Against the Status Quo - 01h 19m 14s

2019-05-21T21:05:49Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Was problematic last week but I changed the battery and the microphone is now working. If only I could just change the battery in the projector and have that work too, but we can't, so...Okay, we've got a fair amount to get through today, so let me you know try to begin and if we are able to resolve the technical issues with the projector as the lecture proceeds then we'll do that. Brian is, trying to find some technical solution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=00:26 ]]
<nowiki>[00:26]</nowiki>

So let me start by sort of returning us to the history of superpower intervention in the developing world during the Cold War. We talked last Tuesday, last meeting, about the stabilization of Cold War politics. We pay particular attention to the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and we discussed the sort of asymmetric equilibrium that evolves in the Cold War during the 1950s, an equilibrium whereby the United States possesses superior resources of nuclear or strategic weapons and the Soviet Union possesses superior resources of conventional force.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:08 ]]
<nowiki>[01:08]</nowiki>

And the two things, crudely, balance each other out. But of course a missile gap evolves during the 1950s and it's a missile gap that runs in the favor of the United States. That was something that one of the charts that we looked at towards the end of Tuesday's lecture illustrated fairly starkly. By 1960 the United States has many more missiles than does the Soviet Union. And this creates a position of strategic vulnerability perhaps for the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:36 ]]
<nowiki>[01:36]</nowiki>

And this is something that will concern Khrushchev and which Khrushchev will seek to remedy. And that's part of the explanation for the Cuban Missile Crisis. But another vital part of the story is the story of superpower interventions in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=01:51 ]]
<nowiki>[01:51]</nowiki>

And Cuba is where these two stories, the nuclear story, and the story of superpower interventions in the developing world, really meet and intersect. So let's recapitulate some of the you know sort of key themes in the history of superpower interventions in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:07 ]]
<nowiki>[02:07]</nowiki>

We'll talk first about Soviet interventions in the developing world. So, how interventionist is the USSR? Well, it depends which USSR we're talking about. Are we talking about the USSR. of Khrushchev or the USSR of Stalin because the Soviet propensity to intervene evolves over time. It should suffice to say that Stalin in the 1920s and the 1930s associates himself with the doctrine of socialism in one country.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:35 ]]
<nowiki>[02:35]</nowiki>

Stalin in effect privileges the construction of a socialist state within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the export of the Bolshevik Revolution to the developing world. So a strategic choice is made to prioritize the accomplishment of the revolution at home over its export to the rest of the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=02:55 ]]
<nowiki>[02:55]</nowiki>

Indeed this is one of the issues that differentiates Stalin from Trotsky. Left<ref>Speaker may have meant "Leon" there instead of "Left".</ref> Trotsky associates himself much more with sort of cosmopolitan doctrine of exporting the revolution. Stalin by contrast stands for you know revolution at home.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:10 ]]
<nowiki>[03:10]</nowiki>

Of course after the Second World War the Soviet Union will exert responsibilities, call them imperial, for the nations of Eastern Europe that are occupied by the Red Army at the war's end. It was clear that Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romanian, Bulgaria, Hungary and so on are assimilated within a Soviet sphere of influence. That much we've already discussed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:34 ]]
<nowiki>[03:34]</nowiki>

To what extent does this amount to a coherent program of ideological expansionism? It's really hard to say. Historians still debate the relative importance of ideology and geopolitics in the Soviet move into Eastern Europe at the Second World War's end.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=03:51 ]]
<nowiki>[03:51]</nowiki>

It's probably most reasonable to say that for Stalin at least ideology served the purposes of geopolitics. Ideas served security rather than the reverse. Stalin did not make much of an effort to export the revolution beyond Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:09 ]]
<nowiki>[04:09]</nowiki>

This begins to change of course with Nikita Khrushchev from the early 1950s. Stalin dies in 1953. Khrushchev by 1955 emerges as the preeminent Soviet leader. We've talked about Khrushchev. Khrushchev was far more ideological than Joseph Stalin. That you already know.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:30 ]]
<nowiki>[04:30]</nowiki>

As a ideologue, as a sort of true believer as it were, in the socialist revolution, Khrushchev will try to export socialism to the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:41 ]]
<nowiki>[04:41]</nowiki>

Who is the major beneficiary of Soviet sort of material assistance during the early Khrushchev era? Which country, in which country does the Soviet Union intervene most directly?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=04:55 ]]
<nowiki>[04:55]</nowiki>

(student response)

China. Absolutely. China is the key beneficiary. After 1953 Soviet assistance becomes a vital source of support for this, for the first Chinese five year plan which is initiated in 1953. During this period of state led economic development China attempts to emulate the lessons of Soviet modernization, and it does so with extensive assistance from the USSR. The USSR devotes substantial resources. Estimates of how much it spent on China amount to up to you know 7% of its annual GDP for the entire period of the Chinese, first Chinese five year plan, which lasted from 1953 through to 1958.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:38 ]]
<nowiki>[05:38]</nowiki>

Besides providing material resources the Soviet Union provides China with extensive technical and scientific assistance, including assistance to develop an atomic weapons program, which is done covertly but is very significant in terms of the sort of future geopolitical divergence between China and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=05:59 ]]
<nowiki>[05:59]</nowiki>

Why does Khrushchev favor intervention of this kind? Well, in part it owes to his ideological convictions insofar as Khrushchev believes socialism to be the wave of the future he sees the socialist project as having a sort of universal applicability. It's relevant to all peoples. Socialism is not simply a tool for maintaining his own power. Khrushchev is not cynical like that. Rather he believes that the socialist revolution can be accomplished you know sort of regardless of the national or cultural context in which it is implanted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:35 ]]
<nowiki>[06:35]</nowiki>

There are great opportunities, as Khrushchev perceives it, for advancing the cause of socialist revolution beyond China. Beyond the Northern Hemisphere even. The developing world, the postcolonial world, seem to Khrushchev to represent a sort of ripe terrain for the exporting of a Bolshevik model of Soviet revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=06:55 ]]
<nowiki>[06:55]</nowiki>

In part this owes to the receptivity of postcolonial elites to Marxist ideas. Why might this be? Why might postcolonial leaders be receptive to Marxian concepts?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:09 ]]
<nowiki>[07:09]</nowiki>

(student response)

Absolutely. If you're looking at the world circa 1955, right, so it's the mid-1950s, the Soviet model looks pretty good by comparison with the Western model, after all, the Western capitalist model came apart during the depression. It didn't do terribly well during that time which is still you know relatively recent memory, the Soviet system accomplished remarkable industrialization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:39 ]]
<nowiki>[07:39]</nowiki>

Stalin succeeded, at great cost, but succeeded nonetheless, in transforming a basically agrarian peasant society, into a basically industrial society, in a very short span of time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=07:52 ]]
<nowiki>[07:52]</nowiki>

And he did this despite fighting a catastrophic war against Nazi Germany. So when you look at the two systems, from the standpoint of the sort of mid-1950s from the perspective of postcolonial leaders who preside over predominantly agrarian societies the Soviet model seems to hold certain advantages.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:15 ]]
<nowiki>[08:15]</nowiki>

Of course it has major drawbacks which we've already discussed and which we'll come to explore in greater detail as we move forward. But those have not yet made themselves clear. Looking back at the experience of the recent past the Soviet model seems to hold certain advantages.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:30 ]]
<nowiki>[08:30]</nowiki>

So this receptivity to Marxist concepts is really important. Of course it probably should be noted that the most astute leaders in the developing world, Jawaharlal Nehru for example, are not delusional about the nature of the Soviet political system. Nehru knows totalitarianism when he sees it and he does not want to emulate it in the Indian context.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=08:53 ]]
<nowiki>[08:53]</nowiki>

So what Nehru will try to accomplish in India, and we've already talked about this, will be to appropriate aspects of Soviet style economic planning without the political authoritarianism that accompanied them in the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:08 ]]
<nowiki>[09:08]</nowiki>

Nehru will try to construct a democratic socialist alternative as it were. But the Soviet Union under Khrushchev is well aware of the advantages and opportunities that are available for revolutionizing the Global South.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:24 ]]
<nowiki>[09:24]</nowiki>

Maybe we have some technical assistance here so we can go to the slide show. I'll carry on talking while we try to figure this out.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=09:32 ]]
<nowiki>[09:32]</nowiki>

So what does the USSR do to try to take advantages of these opportunities in the 1950s? Initially most attention is paid to the study of the Global South, new institutes are constructed for language training, for what we could call area studies knowledge, for the acquisition of it, so as to equip Soviet policy elites with the expertise necessary to engage themselves more fully in the Global South as the opportunities to do so present themselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:06 ]]
<nowiki>[10:06]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union will also provide direct assistance to Third World revolutionaries. As Third World revolutionaries come to power and begin to contest power the Soviet Union will provide direct assistance in the form of funds, really important, and even weapons. Here of course the Cuban example will be an exemplary one.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:28 ]]
<nowiki>[10:28]</nowiki>

During the 1950s however it is not the Soviet Union but the United States which is, at least overtly, the more interventionist of the superpowers. The Soviet intervention in China is gargantuan in scale but it doesn't capture a great deal of attention outside of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In the sort of world's eye it is the United States that is the more vigorous interventionary superpower during the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:58 ]]
<nowiki>[10:58]</nowiki>

We've talked about two of the most consequential, perhaps, unfortunate interventions that take place during this period, the intervention in Iran in 1953 in which the CIA helps to orchestrate the overthrew of Muhammad Mosaddegh and the intervention in Guatemala in 1954 in which the CIA helps to orchestrate the overthrow of Árbenz.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:19 ]]
<nowiki>[11:20]</nowiki>

In retrospect neither of those interventions seems necessarily to have served the long term strategic interests of the United States. Neither Mosaddegh nor Árbenz was a Communist. Overthrowing them created opportunities for political chaos that certainly in the case of Iran ended up having disadvantageous consequences over the long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:41 ]]
<nowiki>[11:41]</nowiki>

But the commitment of the United States to intervene in the developing world, to thwart unfavorable outcomes, is clearly established by the mid-1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:55 ]]
<nowiki>[11:55]</nowiki>

Intervention does not always take the form of covert assistance to sort of reactionary elements within developing countries however. This is what happens in Iran and Guatemala. The United States provides covert support to enemies of sort of progressive regimes and helps you know to achieve sort of authoritarian coup d'etat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:17 ]]
<nowiki>[12:17]</nowiki>

That's the story of those two interventions. But intervention takes many different forms. In Vietnam for example we see a different kind of American intervention. And we should talk more about Vietnam because of course of where that intervention leads to during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:33 ]]
<nowiki>[12:33]</nowiki>

What is the situation in Vietnam during the 1950s? We've talked a little bit about the contestation of Vietnam after the Second World War, the three way struggle between Vietnamese Communists and anti-Communist and the French colonial state. This leads of course to something resembling a civil war by the late 1940s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:55 ]]
<nowiki>[12:55]</nowiki>

The French try to set up a proxy regime: the state of Vietnam in the southern part of Vietnam. A Communist state is established in the north under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:11 ]]
<nowiki>[13:11]</nowiki>

Relations between these two contesting sort of entities, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, are not really resolved instead an international conference at Geneva in 1954 simply establishes a temporary division of the country. So Vietnam much like Korea will be divided into two parts: Communist North, and an anti-Communist South.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:33 ]]
<nowiki>[13:34]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:38 ]]
<nowiki>[13:38]</nowiki>

The United States after Geneva takes substantial responsibility for the sustenance and indeed the development of the anti-Communist southern part of Vietnam. Military assistance is provided, but perhaps even more important, at least initially, developmental assistance is provided.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:55 ]]
<nowiki>[13:55]</nowiki>

American economists provide technical aid to South Vietnam. American engineers will provide assistance to help build civil engineering projects, roads and so on, all of the sort of infrastructural elements of a modern state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:12 ]]
<nowiki>[14:12]</nowiki>

Building a modern South Vietnam is the sort of overriding purpose of American involvement in that country during the second half the 1950s. This is a very different kind of intervention from the intervention that occurs in Iran or Guatemala. Those were covert interventions, orchestrated without substantial direct involvement of United States assets. In South Vietnam it's very different.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:36 ]]
<nowiki>[14:36]</nowiki>

The United States deploys a wide range of resources, technical material, and scientific to help develop a flourishing modern state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:47 ]]
<nowiki>[14:47]</nowiki>

What is the overarching strategic purpose of this? Why would the United States be particularly concerned to develop a modern state? A resilient society?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:58 ]]
<nowiki>[14:58]</nowiki>

What is it to be resilient against?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:01 ]]
<nowiki>[15:01]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:06 ]]
<nowiki>[15:06]</nowiki>

Absolutely. The Domino Theory which is articulated in 1953 by both Nixon and Eisenhower posits that if a country falls to Communism than its neighbors may fall next to Communism too. The Domino Theory identifies Communism as a sort of contagion as it were.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:24 ]]
<nowiki>[15:24]</nowiki>

I mean the metaphor is literally one of dominoes being knocked over. But the way in which Communism is thought about is really you know more like an epidemic in American policy circles in the early Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:38 ]]
<nowiki>[15:38]</nowiki>

So...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:43 ]]
<nowiki>[15:43]</nowiki>

Sorry, it sounds like we have some technical problems which we're going to resolve.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:46 ]]
<nowiki>[15:46]</nowiki>

So Communism is an epidemic. How do you protect against an epidemic? Well, there are different ways of doing it. You can fight the virus directly which is what the United States tries to do in Iran and Guatemala or you can try to inculcate resistance in a population that might be afflicted by it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:07 ]]
<nowiki>[16:07]</nowiki>

And that's essentially what the United States tries to do in Vietnam in the second half of the 1950s as it works to build a modern and dynamic and resilient society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:17 ]]
<nowiki>[16:17]</nowiki>

The logic is much the same as that of the logic of the the Marshall Plan. The United States will try to build up Vietnam economically and politically so as to make South Vietnam more resilient to Communist influence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:33 ]]
<nowiki>[16:33]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:39 ]]
<nowiki>[16:39]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:44 ]]
<nowiki>[16:44]</nowiki>

Just bare with me for a second I'm trying to alter the screen here so that I can see my notes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:51 ]]
<nowiki>[16:51]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:56 ]]
<nowiki>[16:56]</nowiki>

Okay.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:59 ]]
<nowiki>[16:59]</nowiki>

But the intervention in Vietnam in the second half of the 1950s is not so successful as the intervention to build up Europe in the second half of the 1940s had been.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:10 ]]
<nowiki>[17:10]</nowiki>

The Marshall Plan is very successful. But of course it is implemented in a wholly different context from the context in which you know the intervention in Vietnam will be implemented.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:24 ]]
<nowiki>[17:25]</nowiki>

In Europe the United States is working with societies with a long tradition of political democracy, effective you know bureaucratic governance, and so on and so forth. It looks like we have our slide show back so we can continue with the pictures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:43 ]]
<nowiki>[17:43]</nowiki>

Do you have any idea of what was the problem with the slide show?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:45 ]]
<nowiki>[17:45]</nowiki>

(response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:52 ]]
<nowiki>[17:53]</nowiki>

Okay, great. I thought that the problem was with the cable but it seems like it was something else. Okay, good, well, now we can have the pictures.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:02 ]]
<nowiki>[18:02]</nowiki>

So we've talked a little about the purposes of the American intervention in Vietnam. Let me, I'm sorry, let me just pause for a minute and try to figure this out. Because we need to get the images on the right screen and I need to be able to see what I want to see on this screen. So I'm sorry about this.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:27 ]]
<nowiki>[18:27]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:31 ]]
<nowiki>[18:31]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:35 ]]
<nowiki>[18:35]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:40 ]]
<nowiki>[18:40]</nowiki>

Does anybody have any idea what the resolution for the projector should ordinarily be is it...? It's not as high as this, right? It should be something more like 1280 by 960?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:57 ]]
<nowiki>[18:57]</nowiki>

Let's try that and see. I don't know. It should do it automatically. That looks ... No, that doesn't look good.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:06 ]]
<nowiki>[19:06]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

Um, hang on, hang on. Did it get -- I'm sorry did... somebody say something?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:12 ]]
<nowiki>[19:12]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:16 ]]
<nowiki>[19:16]</nowiki>

Sixty hertz. Alright. So that's gonna be here, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:26 ]]
<nowiki>[19:26]</nowiki>

That looks great. So let's do that there, and then on my computer I just want this to go to whatever the standard is which is ... hang on, hang on, which ones which?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:38 ]]
<nowiki>[19:38]</nowiki>

I guess this is LCD. And I want that to be ... That one maybe? I don't know...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:48 ]]
<nowiki>[19:48]</nowiki>

This is ridiculous. So... let's try this... and what I want to do is make sure that the things, um...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:03 ]]
<nowiki>[20:03]</nowiki>

Here it is.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:06 ]]
<nowiki>[20:06]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:10 ]]
<nowiki>[20:10]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:13 ]]
<nowiki>[20:13]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:16 ]]
<nowiki>[20:16]</nowiki>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:21 ]]
<nowiki>[20:21]</nowiki>

Okay, this will do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:24 ]]
<nowiki>[20:24]</nowiki>

This is... I've lost about a third of my screen but hopefully I'll be able to get it back because this is a pretty small computer as it is. So if I've lost a third of the screen I have very little left to work with, but...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:34 ]]
<nowiki>[20:34]</nowiki>

I'm sure it's resolvable. More resolvable probably than Vietnam was for the United States (laughter from the class) in the second half of the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:44 ]]
<nowiki>[20:44]</nowiki>

The problem for the United States in Vietnam was that the effort to build a you know flourishing, economically prosperous, politically stable, modern society in the context of postcolonial Indochina was always going to be a challenging one.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:05 ]]
<nowiki>[21:05]</nowiki>

And that's probably to put the case a little bit lightly. Who was the United States to work with in South Vietnam? Who would be the indigenous rulers whom the United States could support and provide assistance to on whom the United States could depend to develop and modernize Vietnam?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:24 ]]
<nowiki>[21:24]</nowiki>

In Western Europe of course the United States is able to depend upon very competent and experienced people -- people like De Gasperi in Italy, Konrad Adenauer in Germany, the postwar Labor government of Clement Atlee in Great Britain, these are you know serious and experienced democratic politicians.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:44 ]]
<nowiki>[21:44]</nowiki>

In South Vietnam the range of potential American allies is far, far smaller. And the United States will end up depending primarily upon this man -- Ngo Dinh Diem.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:59 ]]
<nowiki>[21:59]</nowiki>

Who is Diem? Besides being sort of the principle US ally in South Vietnam from the late '50s onwards? Diem has a strong record as an anticolonial political leader which is good. You can't build a postcolonial state around the leadership of a former collaborator with colonialism -- that wouldn't work. Such a person would not command the legitimacy or political support at home.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:23 ]]
<nowiki>[22:24]</nowiki>

Diem had been a you know anticolonialist so that makes him a potentially viable leader for South Vietnam. He was also a fierce anti-Communist. This was really important. As a fierce anti-Communist who's a long time opponent of Ho Chi Minh -- the dominant but Communist leader of the Vietnamese nationalist movement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:44 ]]
<nowiki>[22:44]</nowiki>

His anti-Communism owed in no small measure to his staunch Catholicism which makes him all the more attractive to American political elites in the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:55 ]]
<nowiki>[22:55]</nowiki>

This is in some way an aside note but you might want to reflect upon the fact that Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is a very religious man. He's a staunch Presbyterian and there is a sort of religious aspect to the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:13 ]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

It's not just a rhetorical trope when Communism is described by American leaders as godless. And the fact that Diem is a devout man is of some reassurance to his American patrons in the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:29 ]]
<nowiki>[23:30]</nowiki>

With Diem as the major beneficiary the US in the 1950s invests extensive resources in South Vietnam. South Vietnam in a sense becomes the world's preeminent laboratory for development economics. The United States will try to develop Vietnam and Vietnam is the sort of pioneering case study for what development economics can do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:55 ]]
<nowiki>[23:55]</nowiki>

And it's in Vietnam too that development economics and modernization theory encounts a sort of major structural obstacles. You know what are these obstacles? Why is it so difficult to modernize Vietnam from the top down?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:09 ]]
<nowiki>[24:09]</nowiki>

Diem turns out to be part of the problem. He's corrupt. He's authoritarian. He's ultimately not a leader who is capable of implementing a sort of top down democratic modernizing revolution in Vietnam.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:26 ]]
<nowiki>[24:26]</nowiki>

Diem is also something of a sort of religious bigot, and this is really important to remember. Catholics in Vietnam constitute a minority. The animosity, the historical animosity, between the Catholic population and the Buddhist population is very substantial.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:42 ]]
<nowiki>[24:42]</nowiki>

Diem does not do a great deal to reconcile South Vietnam's Buddhists to his regime, and this religious fracture becomes a major source of instability and conflict within South Vietnam.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:55 ]]
<nowiki>[24:55]</nowiki>

The Americans try to encourage Diem to behave more generously towards the Buddhist population, but it's not ultimately something that he is willing or even able to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:05 ]]
<nowiki>[25:05]</nowiki>

The Americans become so frustrated with Diem that in 1963 the American ambassador to South Vietnam, a very powerful figure, because it's through the ambassador's office that most of the US aid to South Vietnam is orchestrated and discharged. The ambassador, who at that time is Henry Cabot Lodge,<ref>{{WPExtract|Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.}} (1902-1985), also called Henry Cabot Lodge II, was the ambassador to Vietnam at the time. His grandfather was {{WPExtract|Henry Cabot Lodge}} (1850-1924).</ref>argues in favor of overthrowing Diem. The United States, Lodge argues, should facilitate a coup against Diem that will replace him with a more effective leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:35 ]]
<nowiki>[25:35]</nowiki>

And with this the history of American interventionism in a sense turns full circle. Right, in 1953, in 1954, the United States intervenes in order to overthrow indigenous leaders so as to replace them with alternatives more amendable to US interests.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:55 ]]
<nowiki>[25:55]</nowiki>

In 1963 the United States overthrows its own guy in order to replace him with a more effective guy, at least, that is the you know hope that animates the coup against Diem.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:08 ]]
<nowiki>[26:08]</nowiki>

Kennedy very reluctantly gives approval for the coup -- just weeks before his own assassination in Dallas. Kennedy has many misgivings about intervening to overthrow Diem but he does so nonetheless in large part because the alternatives do not seem especially clear nor especially appealing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:30 ]]
<nowiki>[26:30]</nowiki>

The murder of Diem, he's murdered by domestic antagonists with the support and encouragement of the United States, marks a key turning point in the war. With the assassination of Diem the United States in effect assumes an expanded responsibility for the Vietnam War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:49 ]]
<nowiki>[26:49]</nowiki>

Vietnam becomes the most consequential site of American intervention in the 1950s. But it's not the only one. We've talked a little bit about the coup in Iran in 1953 and I've mentioned in conjunction with that episode the coup against {{WPExtract|Jacobo Árbenz|Jacob Árbenz}}<ref>The first name of the Guatemalan leader was actually Jacobo and not Jacob.</ref> of Guatemala in 1954. These two episodes are you know sort of forever joined by their chronological proximity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:16 ]]
<nowiki>[27:16]</nowiki>

But we could also see the Guatemalan intervention in 1954 as an episode in a much longer history of United States interventionism in Latin America. This is a history of course that transcends the history of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:28 ]]
<nowiki>[27:28]</nowiki>

We could take the history of American hegemony, if we call it that, in Latin America back all the way to the 1820s. It's in 1823 after all that President Monroe articulates the {{WPExtract|Monroe Doctrine}}, a doctrine that was drafted primarily by John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:45 ]]
<nowiki>[27:45]</nowiki>

The Monroe Doctrine affirmed on the part of the United States a special prerogative to intervene sort of in the affairs in the Western Hemisphere so as to preempt European meddling in the New World. The doctrine was really more of a defensive or protective doctrine than it was an offensive or interventionist one. But it's a doctrine that would be sort of interpreted as time progressed to legitimate American intervention in the affairs of the southern neighbors of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:18 ]]
<nowiki>[28:18]</nowiki>

This intervention sort of increases fairly steadily in the years subsequent to the civil war by the turn of the twentieth century parts of Latin America, particularly Central America and the Caribbean, are you know sort of intensely penetrated by American influence -- the influence of American capital and American political influence too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:40 ]]
<nowiki>[28:40]</nowiki>

So Latin America is an arena in which the sort of history of United States interventionism goes a long way back.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:46 ]]
<nowiki>[28:46]</nowiki>

And we could see the Guatemalan Coup in 1954 as simply the latest in a long chain of American sort of engagements in Latin America.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:56 ]]
<nowiki>[28:56]</nowiki>

But there is a Cold War aspect to this too. And the Cold War aspect is really, really crucial.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:02 ]]
<nowiki>[29:02]</nowiki>

It's crucial in part because the Guatemalan intervention in 1954 comes subsequent to a long phase in which the United States had been much more respectful of the sovereign rights of its Latin American neighbors. Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 inaugurates a policy that becomes known as the Good Neighbor policy. And it's a policy that says that the United States will not intervene unilaterally in Latin America but will instead treat its neighbors with the respect that they are due as you know fellow sovereign states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:33 ]]
<nowiki>[29:33]</nowiki>

The Guatemalan intervention marks a reversion to older patterns. And it happens in part because the Eisenhower administration is fearful of the influence of Communism in Guatemala.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:45 ]]
<nowiki>[29:45]</nowiki>

How legitimate is this fear? Well, to answer that question we need to talk a little bit about Jacob Árbenz -- the man who is deposed in the 1954 coup. Árbenz is elected to the presidency of Guatemala in 1951. What are his politics?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:00 ]]
<nowiki>[30:00]</nowiki>

The man is a progressive reformer. He's not a Communist. He's not waving a red flag. But he does make tactical political alliances with the Guatemalan Communist party. He also receives material assistance from the Soviet Bloc. Specifically he purchases a small load of light arms from Czechoslovakia. But this arouses suspicions in Washington that Árbenz is a Communist.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:24 ]]
<nowiki>[30:24]</nowiki>

It might also be noted that much of the land in Guatemala is owned by the United Fruit Company, a US based multinational corporation, a corporation that Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, has previously represented as a corporate lawyer. So there's an entanglement of interests between the administration and United Fruit which predisposes, at least the Secretary of State, to take a close and careful interest in Guatemala's affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:52 ]]
<nowiki>[30:53]</nowiki>

When Árbenz proposes nationalizing foreign owned land in Guatemala, specifically the holdings of United Fruit, so as to enable the redistribution of land to landless peasants, vested interests are challenged and these are interests with which Dulles is associated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:10 ]]
<nowiki>[31:10]</nowiki>

So there's a complex conjuncture of interests -- material interests and Cold War geostrategic interests that come together in 1954 and create a circumstance in which the Eisenhower administration decides to sponsor a coup against Árbenz.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:29 ]]
<nowiki>[31:29]</nowiki>

This is not to say that the United States intervenes directly in Guatemala with its own military forces. What happens is simply that the Central Intelligence Agency provides a limited amount of assistance to reactionaries in the Guatemalan military -- some of them are pictured in this slide poking guns at a dummy with a cut out of Árbenz's face on it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:52 ]]
<nowiki>[31:52]</nowiki>

And these sort of reactionary elements within the Guatemalan military in '54 overthrow the president's, the president, with American support.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:03 ]]
<nowiki>[32:03]</nowiki>

There are major costs in all of this, and those costs are borne in the most part by Guatemalans. The 1954 coup ushers in a long period of political destabilization which leads ultimately to a civil war that breaks out in 1960 and endures until 1996.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:20 ]]
<nowiki>[32:20]</nowiki>

This is a very ideological civil war. It pitches sort of self-defined and self-proclaimed leftists, revolutionaries, Communists on the one side, against conservatives, Catholics, authoritarians on the other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:33 ]]
<nowiki>[32:33]</nowiki>

So it's a classic sort of Cold War conflagration. It's fought in this case in Guatemala with catastrophic violence -- up to 200,000 Guatemalans die in the course of their country's long civil war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:49 ]]
<nowiki>[32:49]</nowiki>

It would be a gross exaggeration to say that the United States is solely responsible for this civil war. It's a civil war that owed primarily to indigenous consequences as you know as the case in sort of any civil war. It can't be attributed in the most part to an external power but the United States in the 1954 lights the fuse -- that will ultimately lead to Guatemala's implosion and to all of the mayhem that it produces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:18 ]]
<nowiki>[33:18]</nowiki>

This kind of interventionism is not pretty. It's not especially progressive. In 1960 when a new American President, John F. Kennedy comes to power he tries self-consciously to break with the pattern that Guatemala has set.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:35 ]]
<nowiki>[33:35]</nowiki>

Kennedy articulates a new doctrine. He calls it the Alliance for Progress which identifies the United States not as a would-be intervener in the affairs of Latin America but rather as a benign power that will provide assistance to promote progressive political and social reform and development in Latin America.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:59 ]]
<nowiki>[33:59]</nowiki>

If Eisenhower in 1954 aligned the United States with the Latin American right what Kennedy tries to do in 1960 is to align the United States with Latin American center-left -- to provide support to progressive reformers who will sort of over time make their societies more democratic, more prosperous, within a basically anti-Communist framework. This move attempts to emulate the successes of the Marshall Plan in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:31 ]]
<nowiki>[34:31]</nowiki>

Only it's not very successful. Latin America in the 1960s will experience a wave of right-wing coup d'etat most consequentially perhaps in Brazil in 1964. The United States will itself intervene in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. Chile experiences a coup d'etat, one encouraged by the United States, in 1973 about which we will talk more.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:57 ]]
<nowiki>[34:57]</nowiki>

Intervention it seems has its on self-sustaining dynamic. But for the purposes of today's lecture the intervention that counts most of all is that which occurs in Cuba after Cuba's 1959 revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:13 ]]
<nowiki>[35:13]</nowiki>

What do we need to know about the Cuban Revolution? For the purposes of this class not a whole lot. What happens in Cuba in 1959 is that a corrupt pro-American authoritarian regime, the Batista Regime, is overthrown by the man pictured in the slide on the right of the photograph: Fidel Castro.

[[File:CheyFidel.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Che Guevara and Fidel Castro]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:35 ]]
<nowiki>[35:35]</nowiki>

Castro was a professional revolutionary who had been fighting a tiny, tiny guerilla insurgency against Batista since 1956. In 1959 this revolution is finally successful. Castro and his small band of revolutionaries come down out of the Sierra Maestra Mountains and seize power in Havana.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:56 ]]
<nowiki>[35:56]</nowiki>

With their seizure of power left wing nationalism in Cuba is ascendant. But what kind of revolution is this? Could this be described as a Marxist revolution? You know perhaps but that would really be a stretch -- at least in 1959. Fidel Castro is not himself a Marxist. It's not to say that he's not familiar with the writings of Karl Marx but he is not in 1959 an avowed Marxist.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:20 ]]
<nowiki>[36:20]</nowiki>

Moreover Cuba really doesn't have a viable Communist party. There are very, very few Communists in Cuba in 1959. It is significant for the future of the Cuban Revolution that some of Cuba's staunchest Communists are close confidants of Fidel Castro.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:38 ]]
<nowiki>[36:38]</nowiki>

Che Guevara is a paid up Communist already in 1959 as is Fidel Castro's brother Raul Castro. So Castro is close to Communists though he is not a Communist himself but he is a sufficiently savvy political operator to understand that the ideological base for Communism in Cuba is not a deep one.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:00 ]]
<nowiki>[37:00]</nowiki>

Nonetheless Cuba quickly tilts left after 1959. And this is a tilt which owes to some extent to sort of ideological impulses that are already present in the Cuban Revolution. It owes to the sort of influence to people like Che Guevara and Raul Castro who want to push the revolution leftwards but it also owes to the history of American intervention in Cuba after 1959.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:28 ]]
<nowiki>[37:28]</nowiki>

Because the United States does not take the Cuban Revolution as a very positive development. Instead the United States first under Eisenhower and then under Kennedy will concoct a series of plans to intervene in Cuba to reverse the outcome of the revolution -- to overthrow Castro and to replace him with somebody who will be more sympathetic or accommodating to United States interests.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:56 ]]
<nowiki>[37:56]</nowiki>

Dwight Eisenhower in 1960 inaugurates {{WPExtract|Operation Condor}} which prepares a plan for a military invasion of Cuba that will overthrow Castro and replace him with a pro-American regime. This is not an intervention that is to be conducted by the military forces of the United States. Rather it is to be orchestrated and implemented by anti-Communist Cuban exiles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:25 ]]
<nowiki>[38:25]</nowiki>

After Castro's revolution opponents of Communism, anti-Communists, flee to the United States and what Operation Condor envisages doing is providing them with training and equipment that will enable them to stage a landing on Cuba that will sort of overthrow Castro and seize power in Havana.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:44 ]]
<nowiki>[38:44]</nowiki>

This becomes the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. It's an attempt to land Cuban exiles on Cuba with the purpose of overthrowing the Castro regime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:58 ]]
<nowiki>[38:58]</nowiki>

By April 1961 of course Eisenhower who initiated the planning for this operation is no longer President. John F. Kennedy is President and he has serious doubts about the viability of the whole thing. He's concerned that it may not succeed. He's concerned about the reputational costs to the United States of sponsoring an overt military invasion against a small vulnerable neighbor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:20 ]]
<nowiki>[39:20]</nowiki>

But despite these misgivings Kennedy goes along with the plot. He is after all a relatively new and inexperienced President. To step in at the very last stage of the planning for this military operation and to stop it would put Kennedy in conflict with an intelligence and military bureaucracy that is already well advanced in its plans to orchestrate this thing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:44 ]]
<nowiki>[39:44]</nowiki>

So Kennedy goes along. But he imposes some restrictions on the operation and specifically Kennedy determines that the United States will not provide air support to cover the Cuban exiles as they land on Cuba.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:00 ]]
<nowiki>[40:00]</nowiki>

Without air power the invasion is doomed. And the Cuban exiles land and they are quickly sort of rounded up, shot and killed, or arrested by Castro's forces. The whole thing is a debacle, a real catastrophe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:16]]
<nowiki>[40:16]</nowiki>

It also has a consequence of pushing Castro leftwards. The Bay of Pigs invasion signifies that the United States means business so far as Castro is concerned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:30 ]]
<nowiki>[40:31]</nowiki>

Having you know come very close to you know being invaded by anti-Communist forces sponsored by the United States Castro now begins to edge closer to the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:43 ]]
<nowiki>[40:43]</nowiki>

Castro perceives his own vulnerability to the United States and in order to sort of protect himself and to protect his revolution he will edge closer to the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:53 ]]
<nowiki>[40:54]</nowiki>

After all if you're threatened by one superpower in the Cold War world what do you do? You edge closer to the other superpower who might be able to protect you against the antagonistic one. So Castro in November 1961 declares himself a Communist. This is the first time that Castro you know goes on the record and says I'm a Communist. He says more than that. He says Moscow is our great leader and our great brain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:18 ]]
<nowiki>[41:18]</nowiki>

And with that Cuba's Cold War alignment is made clear. The United States doesn't stop trying to overthrow Castro. Kennedy just takes a different route to the same destination. Or at least the same prospective destination. Whereas Eisenhower had favored an overt military intervention by Cuban exiled forces Kennedy prefers more covert means.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:44 ]]
<nowiki>[41:44]</nowiki>

The Kennedy Administration creates a new operation. It's called {{WPExtract|Cuban Project|Operation Mongoose}} and it tries to devise you know sort of covert methods to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime. This operation is led, at least initially, by President Kennedy's brother, Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:05 ]]
<nowiki>[42:05]</nowiki>

It doesn't ever amount to very much but it sort of concocts and contemplates a whole range of schemes including even poison cigars to get rid of Fidel Castro. Ultimately none of this is successful. It's harder than you might imagine to overthrow covertly a leader of a you know sort relatively weak state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:26 ]]
<nowiki>[42:26]</nowiki>

What about the Soviet role in all of this? The United States has intervened in Cuba. It's going to push Cuba leftwards. Cuba has edged in search of protection into the arms of the Soviet Union. But has the Soviet Union been a you know bystander in this process? Or has the USSR played an active role?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:51 ]]
<nowiki>[42:51]</nowiki>

What are the Soviet Union's interests in Cuba? What do the Soviet Union have to do with Castro's leftward tilt?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:59 ]]
<nowiki>[43:00]</nowiki>

First point that you want to contemplate is that Khrushchev is in no position to defend Cuba militarily. At least not by conventional means. Cuba is just ninety miles away from Key West. It's very, very close to the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:15 ]]
<nowiki>[43:15]</nowiki>

As a outward sort of protrusion of the Eastern Bloc it would be very, very vulnerable. Think about how vulnerable West Berlin is to Soviet military power in Europe. Well, Cuba would be far more vulnerable than that as a Soviet client. What can the Soviet Union do to protect Cuba from you know 4,000 miles away? Not a whole lot. But despite the extreme military vulnerability of Cuba Nikita Khrushchev in 1962 commits to defend Cuba.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:55 ]]
<nowiki>[43:55]</nowiki>

And as he does so he secretly decides to send nuclear weapons to the island. Why? What is the rationale for sending nuclear weapons? Well, we might understand the decision in terms of Cuba's extreme military vulnerability to the armed forces of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13 ]]
<nowiki>[44:13]</nowiki>

Insofar as the Soviet Union is wholly incapable of defending Cuba by conventional means nuclear weapons do offer potential method to accomplish what Khrushchev has committed to do -- which is to defend Cuba against the armed forces of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:29 ]]
<nowiki>[44:29]</nowiki>

But there are other reasons too why Khrushchev might have chosen to send nuclear weapons to Cuba. Remember the missile gap: the real missile gap as it exists in the early 1960s. The United States, in the early 1960s far out powers the Soviet Union in terms of its strategic firepower. Well, by sending missiles to Cuba the Soviet Union gets a quick and dirty fix to the missile gap.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:57 ]]
<nowiki>[44:58]</nowiki>

The installation of medium range ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba gives the Soviet Union the capacity to project nuclear weapons against the continental United States with great rapidity and ease.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:13 ]]
<nowiki>[45:13]</nowiki>

So the installation of missiles on Cuba allows the Soviet Union to close the missile gap with existing resources -- it doesn't have to go and build a whole lot of new missiles. It can simply put medium range missiles in Cuba from where you know virtually all of the territory of the continental United States will be exposed and threatened. So that's one of the rationales which may have animated Khrushchev's decision.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:39 ]]
<nowiki>[45:39]</nowiki>

There are other concerns too. Insofar as China and the Soviet Union are by the early 1960s at odds, we are going to talk about that in just a moment, aligning the Soviet Union closely with Castro preempts the possibility that Castro will tilt towards Mao Zedong and China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:59 ]]
<nowiki>[45:59]</nowiki>

So the Sino-Soviet split has some implications for Cuba too. Khrushchev is you know very much aware by the early 1960s that the struggle for the Third World has become a three way struggle in which China and the Soviet Union are antagonists and not allies. To explain why that is the case we need to talk about the Sino-Soviet split which we're going to do later in today's lecture.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:22 ]]
<nowiki>[46:22]</nowiki>

Finally having missiles in Cuba asserts a symbolic equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, right. The United States after all has missiles in Turkey, which is a neighbor of the Soviet Union, by putting Soviet missiles in Cuba the Soviet Union would assert that it is you know just as great a superpower as the United States -- that its freedom of maneuver, its freedom of choice is no less than that of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:49 ]]
<nowiki>[46:49]</nowiki>

So there are symbolic aspects to the decision too. For a variety of reasons then, it's very difficult to ascertain exactly which was paramount in Khrushchev's mind, Nikita Khrushchev in 1962, in the summer of 1962 initiates {{WPExtract|Operation Anadyr}} which is the Soviet military operation to install nuclear weapons in Cuba.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:10 ]]
<nowiki>[47:10]</nowiki>

These weapons are discovered by a US surveillance aircraft, a U-2 aircraft, in October 1962. The revelation that the Soviet Union has medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba is stunning for the Kennedy administration. After all it puts American cities in range of Soviet offensive nuclear forces. Of course there was already a vulnerability of US cities to intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles but in 1962 we're still in the early stages of the ICBM race.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:49 ]]
<nowiki>[47:49]</nowiki>

What the missiles on Cuba do is to make American cities very immediately and very obviously vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:01 ]]
<nowiki>[48:01]</nowiki>

How to respond? This is the dilemma that weighs upon the Kennedy administration immediately following the discovery of the Soviet missiles. A number of different responses are considered. Should the United States initiate a surgical air strike to take out the Soviet missile strikes? This is one possibility.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:19 ]]
<nowiki>[48:19]</nowiki>

A second possibility might be an all out air offensive against Cuba. A wave of bombings to you know sort of devastate Cuba's military and even civilian infrastructure such that Cuba could no longer be a base from which offensive operations against the United States could be launched.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:38 ]]
<nowiki>[48:38]</nowiki>

A third possibility would be a ground invasion. Why not send US troops to Cuba? Do the job properly, get rid of Castro for once and for all and ensure that Cuba could never again be a base from which Soviet power could be projected against the continental United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:54 ]]
<nowiki>[48:54]</nowiki>

The fourth option is not a naval blockage as this slide suggests but a naval blockade. These are different things.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:02 ]]
<nowiki>[49:03]</nowiki>

It would involve establishing a naval cordon around Cuba to prevent the shipment of additional Soviet missiles to the Caribbean island. Blockading the island would not of course do anything about the Soviet missiles that are already on Cuba. It would only prevent the Soviet Union from delivering additional supplies via boat to Cuba.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:26 ]]
<nowiki>[49:26]</nowiki>

Each of these options is fraught with risk. A ground invasion is you know for obvious reasons the riskiest of all. There are already Soviet forces on Cuba -- not a large number of Soviet forces but there are technicians, and some you know military personnel. If the United States were to attack Cuba using amphibious forces it would put American and Soviet forces in a shooting war for the first time since Korea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:57 ]]
<nowiki>[49:57]</nowiki>

To do that would risk the escalation of the Cold War into an all out exchange of firepower including nuclear firepower. Kennedy is very, very wary of doing this.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:12 ]]
<nowiki>[50:12]</nowiki>

Kennedy's advisors on the other hand conclude that the optimal options are the military ones. They don't concur around a specific military option. There are some people like McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, who favor a surgical air strike. Others like Curtis LeMay the chair, the head of Strategic Air Command, favor an all out invasion. But Kennedy's advisors overwhelming come down on the side of military action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:42 ]]
<nowiki>[50:42]</nowiki>

President Kennedy for his part is very skeptical. He's skeptical because he is very fearful that initiating any military action, any direct confrontation with Soviet forces, could lead to unplanned and unpredictable consequences. Kennedy has read enough history to understand that leaders who initiate war cannot control its outcome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:06 ]]
<nowiki>[51:07]</nowiki>

He thinks in particular of the analogy of August 1914. He thinks of the European leaders, David Lloyd George, and so on, who initiated a war with the expectation that it would be over by Christmas. That it would be a short and relatively inexpensive confrontation. And Kennedy does not want to plunge the world into a third world war -- a thermonuclear crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:29 ]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

So he engages in a sort of secret deal with Nikita Khrushchev -- a deal that proposes to remove American nuclear weapons from Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet weapons from Cuba. This is a deal that is brokered by his brother Robert Kennedy through a series of secret contacts with a KGB representative in Washington.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:56 ]]
<nowiki>[51:56]</nowiki>

It's a deal that ultimately succeeds in resolving the missile crisis without a shooting war taking place. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev in the final analysis feared that the potential for escalation and the potential costs of escalation far outweighed any benefit that either party might have accrued by holding firm -- by using military force.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:23 ]]
<nowiki>[52:23]</nowiki>

The crisis, the missile crisis, was a transformative crisis in the history of the Cold War. Both superpowers came very close to the brink of outright confrontation. Kennedy after the crisis had been resolved estimated that the odds of all out war were about one in three. Kennedy perceived that the United States came very, very close to the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:46 ]]
<nowiki>[52:46]</nowiki>

Later sort of historical reconstructions of the crisis including evidence from the Soviet side certainly corroborate Kennedy's estimate of the risk and would perhaps put the risk even higher than Kennedy did.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:58 ]]
<nowiki>[52:58]</nowiki>

We now know for example that Soviet forces on Cuba were equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. American decision-makers did not know that at the time. Had US forces tried to invade Cuba it's very likely that they would have been met with tactical nuclear weapons. That Soviet ground commanders who had the authority to use these weapons would have fired small-scale sort of battlefield nuclear weapons against incoming American forces.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:25 ]]
<nowiki>[53:25]</nowiki>

What would happened after that is all conjecture, but you can sort of imagine how things might have escalated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:31 ]]
<nowiki>[53:31]</nowiki>

So Cuba was a moment of clarification for the Cold War. It laid manifest the Cold War's instability and it motivated leaders on both sides to initiate a process of Cold War stabilization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:44 ]]
<nowiki>[53:45]</nowiki>

Kennedy was himself sort of preempt...deeply troubled by the experience of the missile crisis. Kennedy perceived that the brush with catastrophe had been a close one and he undertook to do what he could subsequent to Cuba to diminish tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union -- to lower the risk of nuclear war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:09 ]]
<nowiki>[54:09]</nowiki>

The two superpowers after Cuba will begin a slow and incremental process to improve their relations, to make the bipolar world safer and more secure than it had been in the 1950s. So for this reason we can see the missile crisis as a really significant turning point in the history of the Cold War, a moment that makes leaders on both sides, particularly Kennedy and Khrushchev, sort of wake up to the possibility and the awful prospect of accidental escalation and to initiate efforts to guard against such an awful, awful prospect.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:46 ]]
<nowiki>[54:46]</nowiki>

What does Kennedy do then? We understand why Kennedy moves to try to stabilize the Cold War after Cuba but what in substance does he do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:55 ]]
<nowiki>[54:55]</nowiki>

He moves with Khrushchev to conclude a treaty, the {{WPExtract|Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty|Limited Test Ban Treaty}}, that prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the earth's atmosphere. This does not prohibit all testing of nuclear weapons, it's still possible to test nuclear weapons underground. But it will no longer be permissible for signatories of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which is concluded in 1963, to test nuclear weapons in the earth's atmosphere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:22 ]]
<nowiki>[55:22]</nowiki>

This is a small move to reduce the intensity of the Cold War arms race. It's also a move that has beneficial consequences for the earth's environment. Think about the amount of radiation that nuclear testing unleashes in the 1950s. It's not an inconsequential problem in the Pacific in particular where a great deal of nuclear testing is done by the United States. So the Limited Test Ban Treaty has beneficial environment consequences too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:50 ]]
<nowiki>[55:50]</nowiki>

Besides undertaking preliminary efforts to control the nuclear arms race the two superpowers after Cuba create a hotline, a special telephone link, between the White House and the Kremlin. The purpose of this is to facilitate conversation and dialog in the context of crises like the missile crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:11 ]]
<nowiki>[56:11]</nowiki>

In during the missile crisis it was really difficult for Kennedy and Khrushchev to dialog with each other directly. They had to go through a back channel that Robert Kennedy opened to Khrushchev via a KGB agent in Washington. With the hotline it will be much easier for the superpowers to talk directly to each other as they struggle to manage unpredictable and unexpected crises.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:34 ]]
<nowiki>[56:34]</nowiki>

During the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt for example the Moscow-Washington hotline is utilized so as to coordinate superpower reactions and to inhabit the escalation of the crisis. Kennedy even talks about becoming the first American President to visit Moscow.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:54 ]]
<nowiki>[56:54]</nowiki>

He makes very clear that he wants to go to Moscow. He wants to do what he can to bring the Cold War to an end.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:00 ]]
<nowiki>[57:00]</nowiki>

In June 1963 he gives one of the most consequential speeches of his career when he delivers a commencement address at the American University in Washington, D.C. In this address Kennedy talks about the need to transcend the Cold War, to work with the Soviet Union to make the world safer and more secure and more peaceful, to establish a stable relationship, a peaceful relationship between the two superpowers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:23 ]]
<nowiki>[57:23]</nowiki>

So after the missile crisis the move is you know sort of bold and clear. Kennedy will try to transcend the Cold War, to stabilize and even normalize relations between the superpowers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:37 ]]
<nowiki>[57:37]</nowiki>

Kennedy of course is assassinated in Dallas in November 1973.<ref>Kennedy being assassinated in November 1963 actually</ref> But there are real continuities and policies subsequent to the assassination. Lyndon Johnson perseveres with the policy of Cold War détente that he inherits from Jack Kennedy. Cooperative contacts will continue to be pursued during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:58 ]]
<nowiki>[57:58]</nowiki>

In 1967 Johnson will meet with the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. He doesn't meet in Moscow as Kennedy has proposed to do. He meets in New Jersey instead at Glassboro. But the thrust of the policy is a continuation of the one that Kennedy had sought to initiate after Cuba.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:19 ]]
<nowiki>[58:19]</nowiki>

Let's look at the aftermath of Cuba from a Soviet perspective. What happens here? Khrushchev is the major victim of the missile crisis -- rather Khrushchev's political career is the victim of the missile crisis. Khrushchev is blamed within the Politburo for having created the crisis. It was Nikita Khrushchev after all who decided to send Soviet missiles to Cuba. This was a idiosyncratic decision on his part and after the crisis his colleagues on the Politburo berate him for it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:50 ]]
<nowiki>[58:50]</nowiki>

Khrushchev is not only blamed for having created the crisis. He's also blamed for having backed down in the, at the height of the missile crisis. This opprobrium leads in fairly short order to Khrushchev being ousted from the leadership of the Soviet Union in 1964. Khrushchev is sort of pushed aside and forced into retirement, a retirement that resembles sort of house arrest which is how he lives out the rest of his life.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:20 ]]
<nowiki>[59:20]</nowiki>

The Soviet leaders who take over from Khrushchev, a new period of collective leadership is initiated, learn a different set of lessons from those that American leaders had learned. Whereas Kennedy's takeaway from the missile crisis is that the Cold War is very dangerous and needs to be transcended Soviet leaders learn a different set of lessons. They conclude that the Soviet Union got pushed around because it was weak.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:45 ]]
<nowiki>[59:45]</nowiki>

And they undertake after Cuba to ensure that the Soviet Union will not be pushed around again.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:52 ]]
<nowiki>[59:52]</nowiki>

How do they do this? After 1962 the Soviet Union rapidly expands its nuclear missile fleet. The 1960s are a period of impressive stunning military construction so far as the Soviet nuclear weapons program is concerned. By the end of the 1960s the United States has as many strategic weapons as the United States does.<ref>Speaker likely meaning the Soviet Union has as many strategic weapons as the United States does.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:22]</nowiki>

The missile gap is closed. Thereafter the Soviet Union will possess many more nuclear missiles, intercontinental nuclear missiles, than does the United States. From sort of the early 1970s onwards, the United States though it is preemptively in you know most criteria of international power, economic, capacity to project conventional force and so on, will arguably run beyond the Soviet Union in its ability to launch nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:00:53 ]]
<nowiki>[1:00:53]</nowiki>

This is not a predicament that American leaders are excessively concerned about however. And the reason that they're not excessively concerned is that they have by the end of the 1960s diagnosed a new international sort of condition -- an unprecedented international condition -- in the military balance between the two superpowers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:15]</nowiki>

This is a condition that becomes known as MAD or {{WPExtract|mutual assured destruction}}. What is mutual assured destruction? It is to put it really simply a predicament in which war would annihilate both parties -- the victim and the aggressor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:34 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:34]</nowiki>

MAD exists once both nuclear superpowers possess sufficient firepower that a war would be catastrophic for both of them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:01:46 ]]
<nowiki>[1:01:46]</nowiki>

How does this state of affairs, MAD, come to be? What are its preconditions? And very simply the precondition for MAD is two nuclear superpowers each of which has enough nuclear forces to be able to withstand a preemptive attack and to retaliate with sufficient force as to devastate the attacker.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:08 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:08]</nowiki>

This becomes known in the strategic parlance of the day as a second strike capability. The first strike is the aggressive one and the second strike is the retaliatory one. Once both superpowers have sufficient military capability to be able to withstand a first strike and to launch a retaliatory second strike that would inflict catastrophic and unacceptable damage upon the aggressor then a condition of mutual assured destruction can be said to exist.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:02:40]</nowiki>

This is a predicament that Robert McNamara, a Berkeley graduate as well as the Secretary of Defense, articulates in a 1967 speech, a landmark speech on American Cold War strategy. In this speech McNamara makes the distinction between first strike and second strike capabilities.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:00 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:00]</nowiki>

And he argues that by 1967 both superpowers now possess an unambiguous second strike capability. Each superpower is capable of absorbing a preemptive attack by the other with sufficient strategic nuclear forces intact so as to be able to retaliate with catastrophic firepower against the aggressor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:21 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:22]</nowiki>

And for McNamara it's very, very clear by 1967 that both the Soviet Union and the United States possess this capability.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:03:30]</nowiki>

Does this mean for McNamara that the two superpowers are dancing on the edge of the apocalypse? No. Quite the opposite. McNamara argues that a world in which two superpowers both possess second strike stability<ref>Speaker likely meant second strike capability and not second strike stability.</ref> will be a fairly stable world. Because it would not be rational for either superpower to initiate war against the other. If going to war would lead logically and necessarily to your own inevitable doom then there is no incentive to go to war. Nothing in a sense becomes worth waging war over.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:05]</nowiki>

And this for McNamara is the stabilizing sort of implication of mutual assured destruction. It makes the Cold War world far safer and far more secure than it had been in the 1950s back in the days of asymmetric deterrence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:21]</nowiki>

The arrival of a MAD world, of a world in which mutually assured destruction is a real prospect and possibility, at least in theory, if not in practice, has serious consequences for the Cold War alliances -- particularly for the {{WPExtract|NATO|Western Alliance}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:38]</nowiki>

Let's think about the nature of American commitments to Western Europe as they emerge in the late 1940s. With the NATO treaty of 1949 the United States in effect commits itself to go to war to defend its West European allies against Soviet aggression.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:04:55 ]]
<nowiki>[1:04:55]</nowiki>

This is, I don't know, the accomplishment of the NATO treaty: collective security. During the 1950s the United States determines that it will depend upon nuclear weapons to defend its allies. That is to say that the United States commits to retaliate against any Soviet attack, including a conventional military attack on it allies, with nuclear force. The threat of an American nuclear retaliation is what inhibits the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe during the era of asymmetric deterrence in the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:30]</nowiki>

The arrival of mutually assured destruction challenges this basic presumption of American Cold War strategy because the question has to be asked would the United States really put its own cities, its own society on the line in order to defend Western Europe?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:05:51 ]]
<nowiki>[1:05:51]</nowiki>

If the Soviet Union were, for example to seize West Berlin, would the United States really initiate strategic nuclear war with full knowledge that this would involve the deaths of hundreds of millions of Americans? Surely not.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:07 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:08]</nowiki>

At least it's, you know plausible to argue, that the United States would not, when confronted with a conventional Soviet attack, on for example West Berlin, that it would not retaliate with nuclear weapons. If doing so would mean the end of civilized life as we know it? Surely no rational statesman would initiate such a -- such a catastrophe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:30 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:30]</nowiki>

So the arrival of mutually assured destruction brings into question the commitments that the United States has previously made to defend its West European allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:06:41 ]]
<nowiki>[1:06:41]</nowiki>

Because nuclear retaliation can no longer be plausibly countenanced as a means of collective defense for the Western Alliance. And this is the fundamental issue with which American Cold War strategy grapples during the 1960s. How can the United States make a credible commitment to defend its West European allies in a world of mutual assured destruction?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:05 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:05]</nowiki>

A variety of you know sort of stopgap measures are introduced during the 1960s to try to solve this credibility problem. One of them is called flexible response and it involves the deployment of more conventional US forces in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:20 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:20]</nowiki>

The United States you know will during the 1960s expand its conventional force commitments to Europe. The logic being that if the Soviet Union were to attack Berlin by conventional means, using tanks and artillery, the United States could retaliate in kind, and the conflict could be waged at a subnuclear level.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:07:40 ]]
<nowiki>[1:07:41]</nowiki>

So conventional weapons during the 1960s will be necessary to offer plausible defense against the prospect of a conventional offensive. But that's not all that the United States does. Also initiates new programs to share American nuclear weapons with its allies. During the 1960s NATO devolves operational responsibility for tactical nuclear weapons to allied military forces. You know German war planes for example will be equipped to deliver American nuclear bombs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:16 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:16]</nowiki>

And this is really important because it gives the Germans a plausible deterrent of their own. They can't have nuclear bombs in practice -- it would not be acceptable for Germany to have a nuclear program -- but if the Germans can have operational authority over American nuclear weapons then they have a plausible means to retaliate against a Soviet attack on their territory. So NATO will devolve operational responsibility for tactical nuclear weapons in the '60s in order to provide American allies with a plausible deterrent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:08:48 ]]
<nowiki>[1:08:48]</nowiki>

This might seem on the face of things to represent a dangerous proliferation of nuclear forces. But the intent underlying it could not be more contrary to that. The United States is very concerned in the 1960s that without nuclear weapons of their own the West European states will be so fearful for their security that they initiate nuclear weapons programs and create their own nuclear weapons so as to be able to deter Soviet offensive action.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:19 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:19]</nowiki>

It's in order to preempt the proliferation of nuclear weapons that the United States agrees to share operational responsibility for nuclear weapons with its allies.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:32]</nowiki>

I was going to show you a clip from ''Dr. Strangelove'' but thanks to the technical interruption that we had earlier this is just going to have go online. Last time I showed you a video clip I ended running beyond so I'm not going to do it again, and I'm going to blame the technical team for that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:09:47 ]]
<nowiki>[1:09:47]</nowiki>

Meanwhile the Soviet Union and the United States undertake sort of preliminary efforts to improve their relations -- a summit in Glassboro, New Jersey which I've already mentioned produces few tangible results but it seems to represent a new atmosphere of cooperation between the superpowers. Lyndon Johnson talks publicly in 1966 about the need to build bridges to the East.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:14 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:14]</nowiki>

Relations between the blocs improves steadily during the second half of the 1960s -- at least through to 1968 which we'll come to.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:22]</nowiki>

Earlier in 1968 the two superpowers sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a landmark treaty in the history of nuclear weapons. It commits it signatories not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10:22 ]]
<nowiki>[1:10:22]</nowiki>

The nuclear sharing program within NATO is somewhat anomalous but it doesn't count under this clause of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it's not an actual transfer. Weapons are simply being temporarily made the responsibility of foreign military forces, but the weapons, and the technologies for producing them more importantly, are not transferred within NATO's nuclear sharing program.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:03 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:03]</nowiki>

The NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty, commits non-nuclear signatories not to build nuclear weapons. If you're a non-nuclear country and you sign the NPT you are committing yourself never to build nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:15 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:15]</nowiki>

All of the signatories, nuclear and non-nuclear states, also commit themselves to pursue global nuclear disarmament as a long term objective.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:25 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:26]</nowiki>

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is enthusiastically supported by both the Soviet Union and the United States and by an array of small militarily inconsequential countries. The two countries that propose the NPT at the United Nations are Ireland and Finland.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:11:43 ]]
<nowiki>[1:11:43]</nowiki>

It's the countries that come somewhere between the United States and the Soviet Union and Finland that are more skeptical of the NPT -- the so called {{WPExtract|Middle power|middle powers}}. Neither France nor China signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both France and China dispute the Non-Proliferation Treaty and they see it as an effort by the two superpowers to consecrate their own preeminence in the international system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:08 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:09]</nowiki>

They see it as a cooperative move by the superpowers to establish a permanent differentiation between the superpowers and everybody else.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:17 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:17]</nowiki>

This has serious consequences for the two Cold War blocs. Let's run very quickly through some of the transformations that occur within the Cold War world during the 1960s that seem to point in the direction of bloc disillusion.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:32 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:32]</nowiki>

First of all the Sino-Soviet split: why did it happen? There's a historical debate on this. Some historians emphasize ideology. They argue that the Chinese revolution was developing in a direction quite distinct from the Soviet socialist model and that ideology was the ultimate cause for estrangement between the two Communist powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:12:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:12:52]</nowiki>

Other historians point to irreconcilable national interests: geopolitics. There's a debate. It has hardly been resolved yet. How did it happen? How did the Sino-Soviet split come about?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:04 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:04]</nowiki>

It begins fairly early. Mao objects to Khrushchev's {{WPExtract|On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences|Secret Speech}}. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin seems to Mao to represent revisionism -- conservative turn in the socialist revolution. Mao's {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}} from the late 1950s on the other hand seems to represent from a Soviet standpoint a reckless radicalization of the Chinese revolution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:13:27 ]]
<nowiki>[1:13:27]</nowiki>

International differences exacerbate the split. During the 1960s, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union moves to repair and improve its relationship with the United States. Mao by contrast depends upon animosity with the United States to sustain the legitimacy of the socialist revolution in China. Whereas Mao wants a confrontational relationship with the West the Soviet Union prefers to improve relations with the West and this basic divergence underlies the widening disagreement between the Soviet Union and the United States during the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:06]</nowiki>

The two Communist superpowers will struggle for influence in the developing world too. The beneficiaries of this struggle include Third World revolutionaries who are able to play China and the Soviet Union off against each other to ensure more and more supplies of military and material assistance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:23 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:23]</nowiki>

The split begins in the late 1950s. By 1969 it has become absolutely manifest. China and the Soviet Union will even exchange gunfire over the Ussuri River -- the river that marks their common border.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:14:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:14:36]</nowiki>

It's not only in the East that the Soviet Bloc seems to be coming apart. Czechoslovakia erupts in a revolt in 1967/68. Czechoslovakia was always something of a special case within the Soviet Bloc. Has a larger you know sort of bourgeois population, a larger sort of intellectual world. In 1967 a series of street demonstrations erupt in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev decides that Czechoslovakia needs a coherent program of reform so he appoints a man, Alexander Dubček, to be the leader of the Czech Communist Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:12 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:13]</nowiki>

Dubček initiates a program of reform that ends up being political as well as economic. It ultimately goes far further than Brezhnev wanted. When Dubček removes all press censorship and introduces a more sort of politically open culture Brezhnev decides that the experiment in reformed Communism has gone too far -- that Czechoslovakia risks jeopardizing the unity of the Eastern Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:15:39 ]]
<nowiki>[1:15:39]</nowiki>

In the summer of 1968 the Soviet Union invades Czechoslovakia. It sends you know hundreds of thousands of troops into the country to occupy it and to restore sort of Communist orthodoxy. Later on Brezhnev will articulate what becomes known as the {{WPExtract|Brezhnev Doctrine}}. It's a doctrine that claims for the Soviet Union a prerogative to intervene in Eastern Europe to correct ideological deviations from Communist orthodoxy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:06]</nowiki>

So in Czechoslovakia the sort of Czech reform Communists seem to be going their own way and the Soviet Union intervenes to stop them. Skip that slide because we've already talked about the sort of logic of you know nuclear credibility and its erosion in a MAD world. Let's just talk very quickly to wrap up about the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:28 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:28]</nowiki>

In the West similar kinds of centrifugal pressures manifest themselves. Here the best case is France. France during the 1960s is led by Charles de Gaulle -- a staunch nationalist a man for whom it is very important to establish an independent course in foreign policy. De Gaulle in the early 1960s initiates a series of sort of revolts against the logic of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:16:54 ]]
<nowiki>[1:16:54]</nowiki>

He challenges American leadership in a number of areas. France conducts its first successful nuclear test in 1960. Thereafter it begins to build up its own independent nuclear deterrent -- the so called {{WPExtract|Force de dissuasion|Force de frappe}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:06 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:06]</nowiki>

In 1965 France challenges the dollar's primacy in the international monetary system -- something we're going to talk much more about when we return to the international political economy theme.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:16 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:16]</nowiki>

In 1966 de Gaulle leads France out of NATO's unified command structure. Beside challenging American leadership of the West de Gaulle pursues an independent opening to the East. In 1964 France normalizes relations with China. In 1966 de Gaulle visits the Soviet Union and talks about France and the USSR as having a common community of interests.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:38 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:38]</nowiki>

It's not that de Gaulle is trying to lead France out of the West Bloc and into the East Bloc. On the contrary de Gaulle believes that the basic division of Europe is so well established, is so you know resolute, that France can pursue an independent foreign policy within it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:17:54 ]]
<nowiki>[1:17:54]</nowiki>

The Cold War superpowers, de Gaulle perceives, have become so entrenched in their antagonism that their antagonism has ceased to be relevant to the affairs of the world. And that France, he argues, ought instead to pursue a more independent foreign policy, a foreign policy subordinate not to the interests of the United States, but which will serve a French definition of French national interests.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:18 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:18]</nowiki>

And with this we see the emergence of what we might call centrifugal pressures within this Cold War world. We'll come back to Vietnam. The key point is a structural one, and it is this. By the late 1960s on both sides of the Cold War it begins to look as if the logic of Cold War politics is coming apart.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:36 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:36]</nowiki>

The Vietnam War of course contributes to this sense of division and breakup but it is the primary cause of it. The primary causes of it are more structural than that. They have to do with nuclear weapons, with the achievement of a condition of mutually assured destruction.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:18:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:18:52]</nowiki>

But the consequences are profound. The bipolar world seems to be fracturing, fragmenting, transforming itself into something more complex, something less controllable, and perhaps also something more interesting. And it's to this world that we will turn when we reconvene after the midterm. Instructions on the midterm will be forthcoming via email.

----

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 11 - The Cold Peace - 01h 21m 00s

2019-05-21T21:03:36Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

== The Socialist Economy Continued from Last Lecture ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

About sort of the socialist economy, we didn't quite get to the end of our discussion of the socialist economy, last Thursday.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:09]]
<nowiki>[0:09]</nowiki>

It's an important topic so I would just like to continue last Thursday's lecture which I don't ordinarily like to do but...this material is important to get through.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:22]]
<nowiki>[0:22]</nowiki>

I'll try not to include any video clips this week because I blame last week's video clip for my not having finished this lecture.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:29]]
<nowiki>[0:29]</nowiki>

Okay, so where did we get to at the end of last Thursday's lecture?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:35]]
<nowiki>[0:35]</nowiki>

We recapitulated the distinction between {{WPExtract|Extensive growth|extensive}} and {{WPExtract|Economic development|intensive growth}}.<ref>In Wikipedia "intensive growth" is a redirect to the article on {{WPExtract|Economic development}}</ref> That's an important distinction so I'd just like to go over it one more time to make sure that you all understand it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:45]]
<nowiki>[0:45]</nowiki>

Would anybody care to sort of formulate the distinction between extensive and intensive growth for the class?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:53]]
<nowiki>[0:53]</nowiki>

What are these? What are the, you know, key distinctions between them? Where does extensive growth come from?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:02]]
<nowiki>[1:02]</nowiki>

Sorry...

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:10]]
<nowiki>[1:10]</nowiki>

Absolutely. Extensive growths comes from an expansion of inputs to the you know process of production. You add more factors. Whether those be land, labor or capital, extensive growth is about sort of expanding the factors of production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:25]]
<nowiki>[1:25]</nowiki>

Intensive growth -- where does that come from?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:28]]
<nowiki>[1:28]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:30]]
<nowiki>[1:30]</nowiki>

Absolutely -- from improving the productivity of existing factors of production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:36]]
<nowiki>[1:36]</nowiki>

So if you grow your population and that makes your economy grow that's extensive growth. If you devise ways of doing more with the same factor inputs that's intensive growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:48]]
<nowiki>[1:48]</nowiki>

Understandably intensive growth is harder to achieve than extensive growth. Achieving extensive growth can be as you know straightforward as reproducing biologically or expanding the domain of your territory, or increasing your savings rate. Intensive growth is harder to achieve.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:05]]
<nowiki>[2:05]</nowiki>

Socialist economies do a pretty good of producing extensive growth in the decades immediately subsequent to the Second World War. Why is this?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:14]]
<nowiki>[2:14]</nowiki>

Well, of course of the starting point is very low. The Second World War has rendered immense destruction. The opportunities for extensive growth are bountiful. It's also the case that the command economy does a pretty good job of orchestrating extensive growth. It's able to mobilize a high rate of savings.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:14]]
<nowiki>[2:31]</nowiki>

It's able to some extent to command the expansion of the labor market. The fast growth of the postwar decades, the immediate postwar decades, of course hits limits. It begins to, you know sort of, we begin to see signs of this from the early 1960s onwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:50]]
<nowiki>[2:50]</nowiki>

The limits to extensive growth are sort of hit when the available labor is all mobilized. When all of the, you know, sort of surplus agricultural labor that the Soviet Union had available to it has become industrialized then the opportunities for converting farm workers into industrial workers are exhausted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:10]]
<nowiki>[3:10]</nowiki>

Once women for the most part working then that available pool of surplus labor has also been exhausted. So the opportunities for extensive growth are finite.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:20]]
<nowiki>[3:20]</nowiki>

And by the 1960s the Soviet Union has begin to exhaust them. Of course...there are other ways to produce growth, you can try to make the transition from extensive to intensive growth. But this is difficult to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:38]]
<nowiki>[3:38]</nowiki>

The command economic system is not a terribly sort of effective mechanism for producing the improvements in efficiency and productivity upon which intensive growth depends.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:49]]
<nowiki>[3:49]</nowiki>

To understand we should think a little bit more about the nature of the planning system. So let me just talk about the planned economy for a few moments.

=== The Planned Economy of the Soviet Union ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:57]]
<nowiki>[3:57]</nowiki>

How does a planned economy function? How is it distinct from a market economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:01]]
<nowiki>[4:01]</nowiki>

Well, very crudely, the market economy is the economy with which you're familiar. It's a sort of institutional framework in which the market supply and demand is the basic framework for the allocation of scarce resources.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:17]]
<nowiki>[4:17]</nowiki>

The planned economy is very different. There's no market for the allocation of resources in the planned economy. Scarce resources, you know land, capital, inputs to the manufacturing process, and so on are allocated not by market demand but by the state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:33]]
<nowiki>[4:33]</nowiki>

So you might think of the planned economy as being a little bit like a firm or a corporation, right, in which all decisions are centralized at the top of the firm.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:42]]
<nowiki>[4:42]</nowiki>

In which a planning apparatus determines how scarce resources are to be allocated. If the market economy is driven by bottom-up demand the planned economy operates according to a top-down design.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:55]]
<nowiki>[4:55]</nowiki>

It's orchestrated according to the sort of [[wikt:diktat|diktat]] of a political leadership. In the Soviet Union the principle institution responsible for economic planning is {{WPExtract|Gosplan}} -- the main planning agency. Its name changes and evolves over time but for most of the period that we're concerned with Gosplan is the state planning agency.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:16]]
<nowiki>[5:16]</nowiki>

And Gosplan sort of allocates instructions and expectations to state owned industries. So if you are you know a manufacturer, manufacturing refrigerators, we talked a little bit about the refrigerator manufacturer at the end of Thursday's lecture, then you receive your planning targets from Gosplan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:33]]
<nowiki>[5:33]</nowiki>

And it is your job as manufacturer of, as a manager of a state owned manufacturing plant, to manufacture a predetermined quota of refrigerators.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:45]]
<nowiki>[5:45]</nowiki>

Now let me be clear about the limits of the planned economy. It's not as if everything is planned in the Soviet Union. It is production that is planned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:53]]
<nowiki>[5:53]</nowiki>

Some other aspects of sort of economic life are you know more loosely controlled. Though labor is forcibly mobilized by the state during the 1930s and during the Second World War labor is not planned subsequent to the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:09]]
<nowiki>[6:09]</nowiki>

You know Soviet citizens are sort of free to work for the most part where they want to work. If you're an inmate in a, you know in the gulag, then of course you're not free to work where you want to work. But if you are an ordinary Soviet citizen then you can pick your choice of occupation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:25]]
<nowiki>[6:25]</nowiki>

So it's not as if labor inputs are planned as such. Nor is household consumption planned. The state doesn't tell you, you know, which toothbrush to purchase. Of course there may be only toothbrush which you can choose to purchase (laughter from the class). But the state doesn't dictate you know what you do with your scarce household resources.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:43]]
<nowiki>[6:43]</nowiki>

Nor is foreign trade planned. Of course foreign trade by definition can't be planned insofar as it's undertaken with you know other planned or even non-planned economies. Foreign trade is not something that the state can orchestrate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:56]]
<nowiki>[6:56]</nowiki>

On the other hand there's not a whole lot of foreign trade -- at least in the 1950s and 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:02]]
<nowiki>[7:02]</nowiki>

It's easy to talk about the adverse consequences of planning. We, for the most part, agree that the planned economy had numerous deficiencies and debilities. It was not conducive to innovation. Over the long term it fared poorly in the competition with its capitalist competitor.

==== Advantages of a Planned Economy ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:25]]
<nowiki>[7:25]</nowiki>

But what of the advantages of planning? Are there any advantages to the planned economy?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:31]]
<nowiki>[7:31]</nowiki>

If we look at the history of the Soviet Union this is what we might see. The planned economy did produce impressive macroeconomic stability. It was less prone to recession than the market economy was.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:43]]
<nowiki>[7:43]</nowiki>

In part this is because a centrally planned economy is not so subject to recessionary downturns caused by tailing off of demand -- as the market economy is.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:55]]
<nowiki>[7:55]</nowiki>

Rates of investment were fairly high. This is because the state was able to forcibly mobilize savings. State banks were able to maintain high rates of capital investment. So the planned economy does a pretty good job of capital formation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:09]]
<nowiki>[8:09]</nowiki>

And there's also low unemployment in the planned economy. State owned enterprises, not so concerned about the bottom line as capitalist enterprises are, thus they're able to maintain sort of high rates of employment across the economy as a whole.

==== Disadvantages of a Planned Economy ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:24]]
<nowiki>[8:24]</nowiki>

The disadvantages are more familiar. The planned economy is inefficient. Ratios of inputs to outputs are very high which is not good. The composition of output is also rigidly determined by central planning.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:40]]
<nowiki>[8:40]</nowiki>

It's difficult for managers of state owned enterprises to innovate. There's little incentive to devise new kinds of product.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:49]]
<nowiki>[8:49]</nowiki>

Right, if your production targets are set with you know one particular product in mind then you have no incentive to innovate or provide different kinds of products. In fact there may even be disincentives that inhibit you from doing so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:03]]
<nowiki>[9:03]</nowiki>

The fact that sort of output from state owned enterprises was valued in terms of its weight, you know, of course incentivizes the production of, you know, clunky heavy consumer goods, and we talked a little bit about the refrigerator last Thursday.

=== International Connectedness of the Planned Economy ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:21]]
<nowiki>[9:21]</nowiki>

Let's talk about the international connectedness of the planned economy. To what extent was the Soviet economy or the socialist economy more broadly an international economy? What was the range and nature of its connections with the larger world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:36]]
<nowiki>[9:36]</nowiki>

Let's talk first of all about relations between the socialist world economy and the capitalist world. How extensive were these connections? They weren't terribly substantial.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:47]]
<nowiki>[9:47]</nowiki>

The planning system inhibits East-West trade. It's difficult for a planned economy to trade profitably with a capitalist economy. In part this is because of the way in which prices are set.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:59]]
<nowiki>[9:59]</nowiki>

In the socialist economy prices are not set by market demand. They are rather determined by central planners. And this makes it difficult for the Soviet manufacturers to trade with Western purchasers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:16]]
<nowiki>[10:16]</nowiki>

The prices were often incompatible. From the 1970s onwards there will be more trade between the socialist world and the capitalist world. But it will be financed for the most part by debt. And that is to say that socialist economies take on debt in order to finance imports from the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:35]]
<nowiki>[10:35]</nowiki>

This will be a really interesting theme in the evolution of the socialist economy. And it's something that we'll talk about much more as we sort of progress towards the contemporary era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:46]]
<nowiki>[10:46]</nowiki>

It might be worth sort of momentarily talking a little bit about investment in the East Bloc because this is one area where interaction between the capitalist and socialist worlds is especially pronounced and consequential.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:01]]
<nowiki>[11:01]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union solicits foreign investment in the Soviet economy from fairly early on. By the late 1950s Khrushchev is encouraging Western chemical manufacturers, for example, to set up factory plants and to operate factory plants within the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:17]]
<nowiki>[11:17]</nowiki>

Probably the most famous example of Western investment in the Soviet Union in the postwar era involved the construction of a {{WPExtract|Fiat Automobiles|Fiat}} plant in the city of {{WPExtract|Tolyatti}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:30]]
<nowiki>[11:30]</nowiki>

The interesting thing about Tolyatti is that it was initially named Togliatti for the Italian Communist leader {{WPExtract|Palmiro Togliatti}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:38]]
<nowiki>[11:38]</nowiki>

So Italy, a capitalist, an Italian capitalist auto manufacturer, Fiat, is invited into the Soviet Union to create a manufacturing city which will be named after a prominent Italian Communist leader.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:52]]
<nowiki>[11:52]</nowiki>

Sort of the irony abounds and the cars were made. For the most part they were fairly, you know, shoddy cars by comparison with those that Fiat was manufacturing in Italy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:01]]
<nowiki>[12:01]</nowiki>

Which were fairly shoddy compared to the cars being manufactured in Germany at the time. So it's a pretty low bar. But the phenomenon of sort of capitalist investment in the heart of the Soviet Bloc is nonetheless a striking one.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:16]]
<nowiki>[12:16]</nowiki>

By the mid-1970s these vehicles were rolling off the production line.

=== Trade Within the Soviet Bloc ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:20]]
<nowiki>[12:20]</nowiki>

Okay, what about trade within the Soviet Bloc, sort of that is to say, among the economies that constitute the {{WPExtract|Comecon|CMEA -- the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance}} that was created in 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:37]]
<nowiki>[12:37]</nowiki>

Under Stalin economic relations are, you know, relatively circumscribed even between the socialist countries. These relations expand somewhat under Khrushchev who was eager to cultivate and build the East Bloc as an interdependent sort of economic entity or unit.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 12:57]]
a<nowiki>[12:57]</nowiki>

However, intra-bloc trade is difficult to orchestrate. In part this is because much of the trade that takes place within the East Bloc is bilateral. That is to say the Soviet Union is sort at the core of the system; other countries like Poland and Romania and Czechoslovakia and Hungary conduct bilateral trade with the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:17]]
<nowiki>[13:17]</nowiki>

But they don't conduct a great deal of trade with each other. So trade is not multilateral as it will be in the West; rather, it operates on a sort of bilateral hub and spokes model with the Soviet Union sitting at the hub and trade occurring mainly along the spokes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:33]]
<nowiki>[13:33]</nowiki>

Some specialization based upon comparative advantage does emerge within the East Bloc. The Soviet Union will end up, you know for the most part, importing advanced industrial machinery from the more developed East Bloc economies like Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Less developed East Bloc economies like Romania and Bulgaria will specialize in agricultural output.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:57]]
<nowiki>[13:57]</nowiki>

So there is some degree of trade specialization but it doesn't really constitute a complex sort of interdependent economic system; rather, the system as a whole resembles a sort of dependency framework almost with the Soviet Union at the core and the less developed East European economies existing at the periphery of that system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:23]]
<nowiki>[14:23]</nowiki>

The more developed East European economies, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, are better able to fulfill their own economic needs; however, they will also be at the forefront of the turn to the West in the 1970s for reasons that you know have to do with the political imperatives of satisfying consumer expectations for advanced products. All of this we'll come to a little bit more in due course.

=== Economic Reform in the Khrushchev Era ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:51]]
<nowiki>[14:51]</nowiki>

What about economic reform in the Khrushchev era? How successful is it? What are its limitations? Khrushchev of course struggles to reform the Soviet economy. But he embarks upon a reform project that at least at the outset has clear goals. What are these goals? First Khrushchev wants to sort of refocus the planned economy on the production of consumer goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 15:16]]
<nowiki>[15:16]</nowiki>

Under Stalin the Soviet Union had focused upon the production of heavy industrial output: coal and steel and so on. Khrushchev seeks to sort of refocus planning targets so as to emphasize consumer durables.

(silence beginning at 15:30 and ending at 17:21)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 17:21]]
<nowiki>[17:21]</nowiki>

Okay, so we're talking about the failures of the Stalin era: the overwhelming emphasis on heavy capital formation, the neglect of consumer needs, and of course the brutal and frequently violent exploitation of the peasantry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:36]]
<nowiki>[17:36]</nowiki>

Khrushchev seeks to remedy each of these deficiencies. But, and here is the crucial point, the basic structural framework of central planning endures. Khrushchev does not embark upon a phase of structural reform rather he simply sort of redirects the purposes of the planned economy towards the satisfaction of consumer needs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:03]]
<nowiki>[18:03]</nowiki>

He doesn't try to rethink or reform the system itself. There's no effort to introduce market incentives for example. There's no real effort undertaken to decentralize or reform the planning process. The Stalinist system endures even as the goals of the Stalinist system are sustained.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:25]]
<nowiki>[18:25]</nowiki>

And there's an irony to all of this, and the irony is this. The Stalinist system was much better suited to the pursuit of Stalinist objectives than it will be to the pursuit of the objectives that Khrushchev sets for it. The system is pretty good at mobilizing high rates of savings in order to sustain heavy capital formation.

==== The Failure of Economic Reform Under Khrushchev ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:51]]
<nowiki>[18:51]</nowiki>

It's less adept when it comes to the development of new consumer goods. It's less adept at applying technology to the purposes of advanced production. There are few incentives in the system to produce and sustain innovation over the long term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:09]]
<nowiki>[19:09]</nowiki>

By consequence the system will enter a phase of crisis, which becomes particularly clear from the 1970s onwards. As the opportunity for extensive growth expire growth rates begin to recede.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:26]]
<nowiki>[19:26]</nowiki>

As a consequence reform as a sort of project of improving the economy will become abandoned. It's hard to sustain a reform project when it doesn't produce results. So Khrushchev's reforms taper off, and the system enters a sort of phase of you know kind of [[wikt:ossify|ossified]] stagnation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:47]]
<nowiki>[19:47]</nowiki>

During this phase of stagnation which sets in from the '70s onwards, and this is something that we'll talk about more in due course, I just want to sort of anticipate that history for you, the socialist system becomes increasingly dependent upon [[wikt:palliative|palliatives]]. What are these palliatives?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:03]]
<nowiki>[20:03]</nowiki>

Well, borrowing from the West is one. In order to finance imports of consumer goods from the West, the socialist economies of Eastern Europe will turn to borrowing from the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:15]]
<nowiki>[20:15]</nowiki>

They become heavily indebted sovereign borrowers. There are other palliatives too. The Soviet Union itself is richly endowed with natural resources -- particularly oil.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:26]]
<nowiki>[20:26]</nowiki>

Insofar as the price of oil goes up in the 1970s the Soviet Union is in a position to export oil to the world in order to be able to finance imports: imports of grain, imports of consumer goods. So the Soviet Union, in effect, transforms itself into a petrostate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:46]]
<nowiki>[20:46]</nowiki>

The system in short is headed towards crisis. This will not be obvious necessarily until the 1970s but if you look at the dwindling of growth rates within the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after 1973 the overarching trajectories are clear enough.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:07]]
<nowiki>[21:07]</nowiki>

A system that had sustained high levels of growth driven by extensive growth in the 1950s and 1960s slows dramatically in the 1970s and after.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:21]]
<nowiki>[21:21]</nowiki>

Of course China's experience is very, very different. And the reasons for that we'll have to consider in due course. Does China successfully make the transition from extensive to intensive growth?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:32]]
<nowiki>[21:32]</nowiki>

That's one possibility. Or is it China's growth from the 1970s onwards driven by an ongoing process of extensive growth? Are the opportunities for extensive growth in China larger than they are in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:49]]
<nowiki>[21:49]</nowiki>

These are you know kind of different possibilities and we'll explore them in due course. For now let's just take stock of the striking divergence between the Soviet Union's performance after 1973 and China's performance after 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:03]]
<nowiki>[22:03]</nowiki>

Okay, that's where we should have concluded on Thursday.

== The Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:07]]
<nowiki>[22:07]</nowiki>

So let's talk now about the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:17]]
<nowiki>[22:17]</nowiki>

So far we've talked about the Cold War as a process of division -- a process of division that ultimately transformed the international system in the five years or so subsequent to the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:30]]
<nowiki>[22:30]</nowiki>

The Cold War of course bifurcated the postwar international order -- divided it in two. Within this divided world two distinctive international systems develop: a Western system led by, arguably dominated by, the United States, and an Eastern or socialist system dominated by the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:54]]
<nowiki>[22:54]</nowiki>

But what of the relationships between these worlds? The East Bloc and the West Bloc? Were relations between them essentially stable? Even benign? Or was the world, for the duration of the Cold War, dancing on the brink of catastrophe?

=== Views of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:13]]
<nowiki>[23:13]</nowiki>

What was the Cold War? Was it a long war? Or was it a long peace? You know these are very fundamental questions about the Cold War's nature and historians continue to debate them through to the present day.

==== Bipolar Stability ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:26]]
<nowiki>[23:26]</nowiki>

How should we conceptualize the Cold War as an era of international history? Is it an era in which bipolarity, the division of the world in two, produced stability?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:36]]
<nowiki>[23:36]</nowiki>

After all no major wars were fought between the superpowers between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. But how inevitable was this? Was it simply by chance that the Cold War remained stable? Or were there structural aspects to the Cold War division of the world which diminished the risk of conflict and helped to insure that the Cold War world remained peaceful?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:02]]
<nowiki>[24:02]</nowiki>

Different historians will offer, you know sort of, different answers to this question. The Cold War historian {{WPExtract|John Lewis Gaddis|John Gaddis}} famously wrote an article titled "The Long Peace"<ref>There is a Wikipedia article titled {{WPExtract|Long Peace}} and Gaddis's article from 1986 can be obtained as of May 2019 via JSTOR: [https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2538951 doi:10.2307/2538951].</ref> which made the argument that there were structural aspects to the Cold War which diminished the risk of conflict and helped to ensure the basic peacefulness of the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:23]]
<nowiki>[24:23]</nowiki>

What might these structural aspects have been?

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:28]]
<nowiki>[24:28]</nowiki>

Nuclear weapons, of course. Those are utterly crucial. Really the two structural conditions which helped to make the Cold War world so peaceful, in Gaddis's framework, are nuclear weapons and bipolarity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:43]]
<nowiki>[24:43]</nowiki>

Bipolarity is important because it's relatively stable; Gaddis is certainly not the only person to have made this argument. Probably the most influential theory of bipolar stability was articulated by the political scientist {{WPExtract|Kenneth Waltz}} in the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:01]]
<nowiki>[25:01]</nowiki>

But theorists of sort of bipolar stability argue that a world divided in two is relatively stable because the two power blocs balance each other. Nuclear weapons compound this stability because they raise the stakes of conflict to such an unacceptably atrocious level that both sides have powerful incentives to avoid conflict at virtually all costs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:26]]
<nowiki>[25:26]</nowiki>

And this sort of constitutes one view of the Cold War as an international system. It was peaceful because of structural conditions integral to the system that made it so.

==== Peace Achieved by Statecraft ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:40]]
<nowiki>[25:40]</nowiki>

Another perspective would take the peacefulness of the Cold War less for granted and would see the fact that no major conflict was waged between the superpowers as owing to serendipity as much as to structural conditions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:59]]
<nowiki>[25:59]</nowiki>

In this view the Cold War ended up being peaceful because, in part of good fortune, also because leaders on both sides had the wherewithal to avoid conflict at particularly dangerous moments.

==== The Cold War as not Inherently Peaceful ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:14]]
<nowiki>[26:14]</nowiki>

But historians who are more skeptical about the claim that the Cold War was inherently or intrinsically a peaceful configuration of international relations might be able to point to particular flash points -- such as the {{WPExtract|Cuban Missile Crisis}} or the {{WPExtract|Korean War}} or the sort of military escalations of the early 1980s and construct counterfactual arguments to the effect that the world came very close to confrontation and that things might very well have played out differently.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:44]]
<nowiki>[26:44]</nowiki>

You know but for certain events, you know, falling as they did we could have been plunged into a sort of catastrophic confrontation. This is a sort of counterfactual mode of arguing that challenges the hypothesis that the Cold War was a structurally stable configuration of international relations.

=== The Cold War Over Time ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:06]]
<nowiki>[27:06]</nowiki>

As we sort of think about this basic conundrum -- was the Cold War structurally stable or was it poised on the brink of catastrophe -- we should reflect about the ways in which the Cold War changed over time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:18]]
<nowiki>[27:18]</nowiki>

My own perspective as a historian is that it's dangerous to talk about the Cold War as a monolithic whole. The Cold War after all went on for four decades, and we should be sensitive to the ways in which the Cold War evolved during that period of time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:34]]
<nowiki>[27:34]</nowiki>

Of course the relationship of military power to the bipolar structuring of international relations changed considerably between the late 1940s and the late 1980s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:44]]
<nowiki>[27:44]</nowiki>

At the beginning of the period the United States was the world's sole nuclear power. At the end of the period the Soviet Union had more nuclear missiles than the United States and there were four other nuclear powers, at least four other nuclear powers, in the world system.<ref>One could visit the Wikipedia article: {{WPExtract|List of states with nuclear weapons}}. Speaker seems to be saying that at the end of the period in addition to the United States four other nations have nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:00]]
<nowiki>[28:00]</nowiki>

So the role of nuclear power, or nuclear weapons, evolves considerably during the era of the Cold War. So too do relations between the superpowers evolve considerably between the late 1940s and the late 1980s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 28:12]]
<nowiki>[28:12]</nowiki>

The Cold War will pass through a number of distinct phases. Estrangement in the late 1940s gives way to a period of sort of relative cooperativeness from the late 1960s through to the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:27]]
<nowiki>[28:27]</nowiki>

Then the estrangement will reassert itself in the 1980s. So the diplomatic relationship is a dynamic one. It's not something which is fixed and unchanging.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:37]]
<nowiki>[28:37]</nowiki>

Of course sort of being able to perceive this requires some familiarity with the history of the Cold War which of course you will all acquire during the course of this semester.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:49]]
<nowiki>[28:49]</nowiki>

But even you know at this stage in our learning we might try to, you know, sort of represent the dynamic evolution of the Cold War by thinking about sort of the ways in which the risk of catastrophic nuclear conflict evolved and changed over time.

=== The Doomsday Clock ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:05]]
<nowiki>[29:05]</nowiki>

How did we quantify something so you know inherently unquantifiable as the risk of nuclear war?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:13]]
<nowiki>[29:13]</nowiki>

What I've you know tried to do in this chart is to use a you know fairly available source of data which is the estimates of nuclear risk that were made by the {{WPExtract|Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}}, a...well-known and highly respected policy journal published by a consortium of nuclear physicists, to gauge the risk of nuclear war as it evolved during the course of the entire Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:43]]
<nowiki>[29:43]</nowiki>

This data is taken from the {{WPExtract|Doomsday Clock}}. How many of you have heard of Doomsday Clock?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:48]]
<nowiki>[29:48]</nowiki>

Okay, a good number of you. The Doomsday Clock for those of you who haven't heard of it was a clock that the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a policy journal, created to represent the risk of catastrophic war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:02]]
<nowiki>[30:02]</nowiki>

This clock was created in 1947 and the people who created it did so in part because you know many of them had been involved with the {{WPExtract|Manhattan Project}} they felt, you know, a sense of responsibility for the atomic bomb and the Bulletin was conceived to offer you know sort of guidance to the policy makers who would be charged with sort of using nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:21]]
<nowiki>[30:21]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:28]]
<nowiki>[30:28]</nowiki>

I'm just going, I'm going to explain that. The graph is upside down. But let me tell you about the...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:33]]
<nowiki>[30:33]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

Let me tell you about the Doomsday Clock first of all and that will explain why the graph is upside down.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:39]]
<nowiki>[30:39]</nowiki>

So the Doomsday Clock is created by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and what it tries to do is to measure the risk of nuclear war. And it does this with a clock.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:48]]
<nowiki>[30:48]</nowiki>

Literally -- a traditional clock, not a digital watch, but one like the one in the back of the room, with hands.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:54]]
<nowiki>[30:54]</nowiki>

And the clock shows how close to midnight the world is. And this is a metaphor for you know proximity to nuclear annihilation. If the hands of the clock, as they move closer to midnight, then the risks of nuclear war are you know greater and greater.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:11]]
<nowiki>[31:11]</nowiki>

So if it's two minutes to midnight things are really bad. You know start packing for another planet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:17]]
<nowiki>[31:17]</nowiki>

(laughter from the class)

If it's ten to midnight than you can breathe a little bit more easily. So this is how the Doomsday Clock works. During the course of the Cold War the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists adjusts the hands on the Doomsday Clock a number of times so as to represent the dwindling or increasing probability of nuclear conflict as the Bulletin sees it. And it is this metric, the location of the hands on the Doomsday Clock, that this chart plots for you.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:51]]
<nowiki>[31:51]</nowiki>

What you can see here is a history of the evolution of catastrophic risk during the Cold War as a, you know, sort of number of distinguished analysts and observers at the time perceived it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:06]]
<nowiki>[32:06]</nowiki>

When the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is created in 1947 there's only one nuclear power in the world: the United States. The risk of nuclear war is put at about seven minutes to midnight. This is your baseline.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:17]]
<nowiki>[32:17]</nowiki>

With the detonation in 1949 of a Soviet nuclear bomb the risk of nuclear war seems to increase significantly. It's now, what, three minutes to midnight.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:28]]
<nowiki>[32:28]</nowiki>

As tensions escalate over the Korean War the probability of nuclear war seems even closer. It's now two minutes to midnight. It remains two minutes to midnight which is to say, really, really, risky, for most of the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:42]]
<nowiki>[32:42]</nowiki>

Towards the end of the 1950s the probability of major conflict begins to recede somewhat. It goes up to, what, seven minutes to midnight in 1960.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:51]]
<nowiki>[32:51]</nowiki>

During the 1960s the Cold War system seems to becoming so peaceful that the bulletin of the atomic scientists puts the hands on the Doomsday Clock back to twelve minutes to midnight.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:03]]
<nowiki>[33:03]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:05]]
<nowiki>[33:05]</nowiki>

That's a terrific question. Why doesn't it plunge downwards in 1962? Because this is not done...What you're referring to of course is the Cuban Missile Crisis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:15]]
<nowiki>[33:15]</nowiki>

Probably the single most dangerous episode in the entire history of the Cold War. Why does the chart not reflect a vastly heightened probability of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:27]]
<nowiki>[33:27]</nowiki>

The answer is really simple and I'm afraid fairly mundane. The clock was not updated with sufficient rapidity to enable the data to take account of you know kind of short-term risks. or short-term escalations in the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:45]]
<nowiki>[33:45]</nowiki>

So what this is a representation of is kind of long-term trends in the diplomacy and you know kind of military relations of the two superpowers. It doesn't reflect episodic crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis or the crisis over the Middle East in 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 34:03]]
<nowiki>[34:03]</nowiki>

You can see that the risk of nuclear war seems to become a little greater in the late 1960s in part as a consequence of the escalation in Vietnam. During the mid-1970s relations essentially stabilize again. The risk of nuclear war looks to be as distant as it had been during the 1960s. Then from the late 1970s the Cold War world again becomes a much more risky place.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:31]]
<nowiki>[34:31]</nowiki>

By the early 1980s it is again three minutes to midnight. The risks of nuclear catastrophe seem to be much greater than they had been a decade earlier.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:31]]
<nowiki>[34:41]</nowiki>

Then of course from late 1980s as the Cold War ends and...major new arms controls negotiations are reached between the two superpowers the risk of nuclear confrontation seems to wither away.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:55]]
<nowiki>[34:55]</nowiki>

So that's the history of the Cold War as a history of the risk of catastrophe as gauged by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. This is a really superficial overview of Cold War history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:08]]
<nowiki>[35:08]</nowiki>

(student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:15]]
<nowiki>[35:15]</nowiki>

These were serious nuclear physicists and as such they knew that there was no algorithm that could adequately sort of calculate the risk of nuclear war and that trying to quantify this was going to produce a worse outcome than taking a subjective position which is what they did.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:32]]
<nowiki>[35:32]</nowiki>

So this is based on a qualitative not a quantitative estimation of the risk of catastrophic nuclear war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:41]]
<nowiki>[35:41]</nowiki>

So -- so this is a panorama on the history of the Cold War. And having dealt so far with this bit of it what we're going to do today is deal with this bit of it.

== The Stabilization of the Cold War from the 1950s to the 1960s ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:53]]
<nowiki>[35:53]</nowiki>

The stabilization of the Cold War from the 1950s into the 1960s. We'll try to explain why.

=== Summary and Overview ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:01]]
<nowiki>[36:01]</nowiki>

So let's just recapitulate what we've already done and talk about what we're going to do today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:05]]
<nowiki>[36:05]</nowiki>

So we've talked about the Cold War division of Europe, the Cold War division of East Asia, and we've dealt at some length with the political economy of the Cold War Era with attentiveness to both the capitalist world and the socialist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:18]]
<nowiki>[36:18]</nowiki>

We've also talked about American interventionism in the developing world. We haven't talked so much about Soviet intervention, which is something that we'll try to cover today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:26]]
<nowiki>[36:26]</nowiki>

But what we're going to do today is sort of continue the story of Cold War division and Cold War escalation with the particular attentiveness to the history of nuclear weapons, and to their relationship to the geopolitics of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:40]]
<nowiki>[36:40]</nowiki>

We'll also talk about Soviet interventions in the developing world and those aspects of American interventionism, particularly in Vietnam and Latin America, which we've haven't yet had opportunity to deal with.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53]]
<nowiki>[36:53]</nowiki>

And all of this will lead us towards the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Missile Crisis represented sort of...an important episode in the history of the Cold War. It was in a sense a climatic episode that brought together underlying sort of rivalries: the nuclear arms race, and the struggle for influence in the developing world that had been bubbling for over a decade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:22]]
<nowiki>[37:22]</nowiki>

It would also be a turning point in the history of the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the superpowers very close to the brink of catastrophe. After the Cold War, sorry, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, new steps would be taken to diminish and control the risks of catastrophic confrontation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:41]]
<nowiki>[37:41]</nowiki>

So it's a vital episode both as an episodic instantiation of Cold War rivalries and as a turning point in the history of the Cold War competition.

=== Nuclear Weapons ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:52]]
<nowiki>[37:52]</nowiki>

Let's start by talking about nuclear weapons and their relationship to the Cold War. Of course the Cuban Missile Crisis would demonstrate very vividly the catastrophic potential of nuclear weapons. It was a confrontation that was borne out of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:13]]
<nowiki>[38:13]</nowiki>

But how did it get to that point? How do we explain the arms race? How did we end up coming so close to catastrophe and ruin over Cuba?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:23]]
<nowiki>[38:23]</nowiki>

As we think about the history of the arms race it's important not just to fixate on the Cold War but to see nuclear weapons as a development that have implications for international relations more broadly. The history of nuclear weapons cannot be confined to the history of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=<]]
<nowiki>[38:40]</nowiki>

Of course we continue to live in a nuclear world -- a world in which nuclear weapons remain both an asset and a problem for statecraft.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:50]]
<nowiki>[38:50]</nowiki>

Nuclear weapons of course originated in 1945. That was the moment of detonation so to speak. This might be seen as a revolutionary turning point in the larger history of international relations. With nuclear weapons of course military conflict became inestimably more destructive, at least potentially more destructive, than it had ever been in human history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:16]]
<nowiki>[39:16]</nowiki>

What were the consequences of this nuclear revolution for international relations?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:21]]
<nowiki>[39:21]</nowiki>

Nuclear weapons certainly made war more deadly. At least in theory, or at least in terms of the, its capacity for destruction. Did they also make war less likely?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:32]]
<nowiki>[39:32]</nowiki>

What about relations between the superpowers within the specific context of the Cold War? When we talk about nuclear weapons we do so within a historical context -- that of the bipolar Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:44]]
<nowiki>[39:44]</nowiki>

Did nuclear weapons within this context make relations between the two superpowers more peaceful?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:52]]
<nowiki>[39:52]</nowiki>

What was the relationship of nuclear weapons moreover to the superpowers themselves? Was it possession of nuclear weapons that made the superpowers super or vice versa?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:06]]
<nowiki>[40:06]</nowiki>

After all possession of large nuclear arsenals is one of the criteria that differentiates the superpowers from other powers in the postwar international system, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:16]]
<nowiki>[40:16]</nowiki>

The monopoly on nuclear power, on nuclear weapons is not absolute. Great Britain will detonate its first nuclear bomb in the 1950s. China and France will follow course in the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:27]]
<nowiki>[40:27]</nowiki>

But for the duration of the Cold War the superpowers have more and deadlier nuclear weapons than anybody else. So when we think about sort of the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War we should think not only about how nuclear weapons mediate relations between the superpowers but also about whether it is possession of nuclear weapons that differentiates the superpowers from the rest of the international system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:51]]
<nowiki>[40:51]</nowiki>

How did the balance between the two nuclear superpowers evolve over time?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:56]]
<nowiki>[40:56]</nowiki>

It was not stable. What were the consequences of its evolution for the course of the Cold War?

==== The Manhattan Project and the Development of Nuclear Weaponry in the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:05]]
<nowiki>[41:05]</nowiki>

Then of course we should also think about nuclear proliferation. This is a theme that has more to do with the history of the 1960s than it does with the history of 1950s, so we'll deal with it on Thursday not today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:16]]
<nowiki>[41:16]</nowiki>

But let's sort of recapitulate some of the history of this. Where do nuclear weapons come from? What is the context in which they are developed? Nuclear weapons, most directly, were a legacy of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:31]]
<nowiki>[41:31]</nowiki>

The quest to build a nuclear bomb in the United States antedated the entry of the United States to the Second World War. In 1939, {{WPExtract|Leo Szilard}}, a émigré physicist, he was originally from Hungary, came to the United States during the 1930s, persuaded Albert Einstein, then the world's most famous scientist, to write a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt warning of the immense capacity for destruction that an atomic bomb might be able to produce.<ref>One could visit the Wikipedia article: {{WPExtract|Einstein–Szilárd letter}}.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:05]]
<nowiki>[42:05]</nowiki>

The letter was intended to sort of warn Roosevelt of the adverse consequences that might ensue should Nazi Germany succeed in developing a nuclear bomb.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:16]]
<nowiki>[42:16]</nowiki>

Einstein, after talking with Szilard, was very concerned about this prospect, and though Einstein was a pacifist of, you know, deep conviction, he was sufficiently alarmed by the prospect that somebody else, other than the United States, might develop a nuclear bomb that he consented to write a letter to Roosevelt, encouraging Roosevelt to initiate a program to develop an American nuclear bomb first of all.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:44]]
<nowiki>[42:44]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Manhattan Project}} began to 1942, early in 1942. It was the sort of major institutional framework in which the United States would try to build an atomic bomb.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:58]]
<nowiki>[42:58]</nowiki>

It was led, at least the scientific side of the Manhattan Project, was led by {{WPExtract|J. Robert Oppenheimer|Robert Oppenheimer}}, a physicist associated with this institution, the University of California, Berkeley. Oppenheimer taught here before going on to lead the atomic bomb project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:14]]
<nowiki>[43:14]</nowiki>

In fact UC Berkeley's involvement with the atomic bomb project was even greater than that. The University of California, Berkeley played a managerial role in the sort of national nuclear laboratory at Los Alamos for much of its history. So Berkeley has a history which is sort of intimately connected with the history of nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:34]]
<nowiki>[43:34]</nowiki>

The Manhattan Project very quickly achieved the major scientific breakthrough that enabled the construction of the nuclear bomb. In December 1942, this is less than a year after the initiation of the Manhattan Project, the first chain reaction in uranium was initiated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:57]]
<nowiki>[43:57]</nowiki>

Not at Los Alamos, not at Berkeley, but at the University of Chicago in a lab led by the nuclear physicist {{WPExtract|Enrico Fermi|Fermi}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:07]]
<nowiki>[44:07]</nowiki>

The initiation of the first chain reaction in a pile of uranium, made it, sort of offered in a sense proof, that a fission reaction was possible, that it would be technically feasible to create a nuclear bomb.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:23]]
<nowiki>[44:23]</nowiki>

Before this, you know chain reaction was produced in practice, the theory that atoms of uranium could be split releasing massive destructive energy in the process, was just a theory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:36]]
<nowiki>[44:36]</nowiki>

The chain reaction of December 1942,<ref>One could visit the Wikipedia article on this experiment with the title {{WPExtract|Chicago Pile-1}}.</ref> provided you know sort of empirical validation of that theory and demonstrated that under the right conditions atoms could be split with an accompanying release of great, great energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:53]]
<nowiki>[44:53]</nowiki>

Thereafter the challenge for the Manhattan Project was to engineer a device, a bomb, that would be capable of producing a chain reaction in uranium under sort of battlefield circumstances.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:05]]
<nowiki>[45:05]</nowiki>

The first such device was tested at Alamogordo, New Mexico in July 1945. This was known as the {{WPExtract|Trinity (nuclear test)|Trinity Test}} -- a test that detonated the world's first atomic bomb.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:20]]
<nowiki>[45:20]</nowiki>

That bomb would of course be used in fairly short order to bring the Pacific War to a halt. Bombs were dropped over two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945. Thereafter Japan surrendered shortly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:31]]
<nowiki>[45:38]</nowiki>

You know I don't know want to sort of delve into the utilization of the atomic bomb during the Pacific War. That's sort of a different story and it raises a different set of issues.

==== Nuclear Development in the United States and in Other Nations ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:51]]
<nowiki>[45:51]</nowiki>

More interesting question for our purposes might be the question of why the United States ultimately ended up getting there first. Why was it the United States, of all of the combating powers during the Second World War, that succeeded in developing an atomic bomb?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:09]]
<nowiki>[46:09]</nowiki>

Can anybody offer any suggestions as to why the United States might have become the world's first nuclear power?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:19]]
<nowiki>[46:19]</nowiki>

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:27]]
<nowiki>[46:27]</nowiki>

Yeah, that's a really crucial point. The openness of the United States to immigration from Europe, particularly to the immigration of Jewish scientists, is a major asset for the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:39]]
<nowiki>[46:39]</nowiki>

Several of the men who are most essential to the success of the atom bomb project are refugees who flee Europe because of Nazi persecution. Einstein of course is the most prominent though Einstein is not centrally involved with the development of the atomic bomb.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:57]]
<nowiki>[46:57]</nowiki>

But others who are Fermi, Szilard, and {{WPExtract|Edward Teller|Teller, Edward Teller}}, are all refugees from Hitler's Europe. So the openness of the United States to immigration is a, you know, crucial asset for the U.S.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:15]]
<nowiki>[47:15]</nowiki>

It's also the case that building an atomic bomb is really, really costly. It involves a vast mobilization of resources: financial, engineering, and technical. Of the Second World War's combatants the United States was uniquely well positioned to orchestrate this grand project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:36]]
<nowiki>[47:36]</nowiki>

One estimate which one historian has offered as a way of sort of gauging the scale of the Manhattan Project as an industrial and engineering undertaking is to compare it to the size of the prewar automobile industry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:51]]
<nowiki>[47:51]</nowiki>

And it has been argued that the scale of the Manhattan bomb project, in terms of the inputs that it required, was crudely similar to the scale of the prewar automobile industry. So this is a big, big undertaking. And of the war's protagonists the United States is uniquely well equipped to undertake it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:11]]
<nowiki>[48:11]</nowiki>

Germany might have tried to build an atomic bomb. After all Germany had tremendous scientific and technical resources -- a vast and sophisticated industrial base. Why did Germany not try to build an atomic bomb? Which is what Einstein and Leo Fermi had so feared?<ref>Speaker likely meant, "Einstein and Leo Szilard" (see {{WPExtract|Einstein–Szilárd letter}}).</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:29]]
<nowiki>[48:29]</nowiki>

In part the answer had to do with priorities. The Nazi leadership of Germany was very suspicious of nuclear physics. Hitler believed that nuclear physics was Jewish physics -- that no good could come of it, no use could come of it. And accordingly choose not to pursue an atomic bomb project. It simply was not a priority for the Nazis.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:49]]
<nowiki>[48:49]</nowiki>

Of course the fact that the Nazis had already hounded most of Germany's top nuclear physicists out of the country meant that Germany would not have been in a very strong position to build an atomic bomb had it even tried to do so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:03]]
<nowiki>[49:03]</nowiki>

Japanese military leaders by contrast were much more receptive to the possibilities of nuclear physics for waging war, but Japan simply lacked the technical means and infrastructure to undertake a project of this scale.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:21]]
<nowiki>[49:21]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union will of course be the next power to build an atomic bomb. And the Soviet Union has many of the same resources: a large industrial base, impressive scientific expertise, that allow the United States to succeed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:36]]
<nowiki>[49:36]</nowiki>

It's also the case that when the Soviet Union detonates its first atomic bomb in 1949, in August 194, that it benefits from what development economists would call the advantages of relative backwardness.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:49]]
<nowiki>[49:49]</nowiki>

Which is a polite euphemism for saying that the Soviet Union copied aspects of the American atomic bomb. This owed in part to espionage. The Soviet Union certainly had representatives within the Manhattan Project who conveyed vital technical data back to Moscow. So spying helps the Soviets to imitate the American bomb design.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:13]]
<nowiki>[50:13]</nowiki>

But that was not all. It was also the case that the United States government published, shortly after the completion of the atomic bomb project, an official history of the Manhattan Project, the {{WPExtract|Smyth Report}}, which provided a, you know, fairly detailed account of how the atomic bomb was built.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:31]]
<nowiki>[50:31]</nowiki>

This is all true. The Soviet Union was able to utilize this report, a report that was available in all good book stores, and would have been available on Amazon.com had it existed, (laughter from the class), as a sort of how-to manual.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:45]]
<nowiki>[50:45]</nowiki>

So the episode, you know, may be illustrative, of...the difficulties that an open society faces when you know waging a Cold War against a relatively, you know, closed society. And this issue will sort of recur through the history of the Cold War. But for now it helps us to understand how the Soviets got to build an atomic bomb so quickly.

==== Soviet Development of Nuclear Weapons and US Development of Thermonuclear Weapons ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:10]]
<nowiki>[51:10]</nowiki>

The fact that the Soviets catch up with the United States in just four years was a psychological shock to Americans. American atomic scientists had not for the most part expected the Soviet Union to get there so quickly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:25]]
<nowiki>[51:25]</nowiki>

The fact that they do transforms nuclear weapons into a source of urgent rivalry between the superpowers. Now that the Soviet Union in 1949 possess an atomic bomb similar to the one that the United States used in Hiroshima. The question of how to trump the Soviets is the most urgent one that American nuclear physicists have to address.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:53]]
<nowiki>[51:53]</nowiki>

The Soviets have their bomb what can we do to build a bigger bomb? That is the question that American nuclear physicists like Edward Teller ask themselves in the fall of 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:05]]
<nowiki>[52:05]</nowiki>

The answer to that question is simple: you have to build a bigger bomb -- a better bomb, a more destructive bomb. How is this to be accomplished?

===== Fission Bombs and Fusion Bombs =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:14]]
<nowiki>[52:14]</nowiki>

You know, very simply, I don't want to delve too deep into the nuclear physics, which I'm not qualified to do, the answer is to build a different kind of atomic weapon, an atomic weapon that uses a sort of different method, a different principle of creating energy from the sort of chain reaction of, you know, in this case...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:43]]
<nowiki>[52:43]</nowiki>

The distinction is that the first bomb, the bomb which is dropped on Hiroshima, depends upon splitting atoms -- bombards heavy unstable uranium atoms, a particular isotope of uranium, U-235, such that they split releasing kind of new atoms and energy in the process.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:08]]
<nowiki>[53:08]</nowiki>

But splitting is what produces the initial atomic bomb in 1945. The new bomb, the potentially more destructive bomb, that Edward Teller and other nuclear physicists want to create, will operate according to a different principle, will operate according to a principle of nuclear fusion, which is to say joining rather than fission, which is splitting, the principle according to which the first bomb had operated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:31]]
<nowiki>[53:31]</nowiki>

The fusion bomb depends upon fusing two isotopes of hydrogen, hydrogen-2, {{WPExtract|deuterium}}, and hydrogen-3, {{WPExtract|tritium}}, to create a new atom: helium.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:48]]
<nowiki>[53:48]</nowiki>

It's sort of relatively, you know, conventional inert kind of atom, helium atom. But this reaction does more than produce helium. It also produces a spare neutron and a lot of energy -- a whole lot of energy -- and this is where the sort of destructive power of the {{WPExtract|Thermonuclear weapon|hydrogen bomb}} comes from.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:09]]
<nowiki>[54:09]</nowiki>

The hydrogen bomb using a different kind of fuel: hydrogen, two different isotopes of hydrogen, and it joins them together to produce helium and a whole lot of energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:19]]
<nowiki>[54:19]</nowiki>

The geopolitical, you know, implications of this, are you know very simply, that the bomb is much bigger, it's explosive yield is much greater, and it is much deadlier than the conventional fission bomb had been.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:35]]
<nowiki>[54:35]</nowiki>

The genealogy of this is important insofar as creating a sort of fusion bomb can only be undertaken once a fission bomb exists. These are two different kinds of atomic weapon but creating the fusion bomb depends upon the preexistence of a fission bomb.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:53]]
<nowiki>[54:53]</nowiki>

And this is, you know, where some technical explanation is required. Creating a fusion reaction is really, really difficult to do. Or, you know, it can only be accomplished under very specific circumstances. Where does, where do fusion reactions happen, you know, constantly on an unimaginably vast scale all of the time.

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:13]]
<nowiki>[55:13]</nowiki>

The sun. Exactly. Our sun is a great fusion reactor. What might that tell us about the circumstances under which fusion reactions can take place?

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:27]]
<nowiki>[55:27]</nowiki>

That's right. They can only take place under conditions of immense heat and pressure. So to create a fusion reaction on earth you have to in a sense create conditions which resemble those on the surface of the sun.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:40]]
<nowiki>[55:40]</nowiki>

It has to be really, really hot and under really, really high pressure in order for deuterium and tritium to be able to fuse to produce helium and energy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:52]]
<nowiki>[55:52]</nowiki>

So how do you make conditions on earth that resemble the conditions on the surface of the sun?

(student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:58]]
<nowiki>[55:58]</nowiki>

A fission reaction. That's right. You use your fission bomb to create conditions, temporarily, that resemble those on the surface of the sun. And then in that context of immense heat and immense pressure you can orchestrate a fusion reaction that will fuel an even bigger nuclear weapon than your fission reaction could have done.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:22]]
<nowiki>[56:22]</nowiki>

So the thing is staged and the basic design for the hydrogen bomb, or the superbomb as it was known at the time, depends upon the utilization of a fission bomb to create conditions in which a fusion reaction can be achieved.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:37]]
<nowiki>[56:37]</nowiki>

So the hydrogen bomb will contain two distinct fuel sources. It will contain a fission bomb and it will also contain a sort of source of hydrogen fuel which permits a fusion reaction to take place. And the fission reaction is necessary in order to accomplish the fusion reaction.

=== The Destructive Capacity of Fission Bombs and Fusion Bombs ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:57]]
<nowiki>[56:57]</nowiki>

This transforms the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. The first American and Soviet nuclear weapons, actually the date on this one, {{WPExtract|RDS-1|Joe-1}} is the first Soviet nuclear bomb and it's detonated in 1949, not 1945, as it says on the slide.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:18]]
<nowiki>[57:18]</nowiki>

But the destructive power of the first American and Soviet nuclear tests in 1945 and 1949 is about 0.2 megatons<ref>The Wikipedia article {{WPExtract|Trinity (nuclear test)}} lists the yield as being 22 kilotons of TNT which is [https://www.google.com/search?q=22+kilotons+to+megatons equivalent to 0.022 megatons].</ref>. This is pretty destructive by comparison with the kinds of bombs that you can build with conventional explosives.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:37]]
<nowiki>[57:37]</nowiki>

But it pales by comparison with the first American fusion bomb test. The {{WPExtract|Ivy Mike}} test in 1953<ref>According to the Wikpedia article {{WPExtract|Ivy Mike}} the test was conducted November 1, 1952.</ref>, just eight years after the first fission bomb test, produces a destructive yield of about 11 megatons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:55]]
<nowiki>[57:55]</nowiki>

That is more destructive by some what fifty times.<ref>With the {{WPExtract|Trinity (nuclear test)|Trinity}} test at 22 kilotons and the {{WPExtract|Ivy Mike}} test at 10.4 megatons = 10,400 kilotons the ratio would actually be about 500.</ref> It's a substantial order of magnitude more destructive. The next year the United States tests a fusion bomb that produces a yield of about 48 megatons.<ref>According to the Wikipedia article {{WPExtract|Operation Castle}} of all the bombs tested as part of the operation the maximum yield produced was 15 megatons (this was from the {{WPExtract|Castle Bravo}} bomb). The {{WPExtract|List of United States' nuclear weapons tests}} article has a value of 48 megatons for {{WPExtract|Operation Castle}} as a sum of the actual yields for all of the bombs tested. One could also visit the Wikipedia article: {{WPExtract|List of nuclear weapons tests}} which includes tests from several different nations.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:15]]
<nowiki>[58:15]</nowiki>

The improvement, if that's, you know, the right word, over the first atomic bombs, the atomic bombs that we used in Hiroshima is stunning. I mean exponential would hardly suffice to describe it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:30]]
<nowiki>[58:30]</nowiki>

In 1961 the Soviet Union tests a bomb which produces a yield of about 57 megatons.<ref>The Wikipedia article {{WPExtract|Tsar Bomba}} has a value of 50 megatons for the blast yield, but there is a note in the article which redirects to a page: [http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html The Tsar Bomba (“King of Bombs”)] and to the section on that page: Was it 50 Megatons or 57?. The information is from the [http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/ Nuclear Weapons Archive] which is run by Carey Sublette. Nuclear Weapons archive has a [http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/About/Charter.html charter], and although Sublette doesn't provide a bio on the site some further information on background was provided in response to a question on a [https://groups.google.com/d/msg/alt.war.nuclear/9-u9aGrKDaY/mfECh2q8DfAJ public forum]. It's also the case that the Nuclear Weapons Archive page on [http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html Tsar Bomba] provides numerous references to other sources in the analysis.</ref> This is the biggest bomb ever tested in the history of humanity. The Soviets call it {{WPExtract|Tsar Bomba}} -- King Bomb.

=== The Unprecedented Destructive Power of Nuclear Weapons ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:47]]
<nowiki>[58:47]</nowiki>

It's an appropriate name. But the scale of the destruction that these weapons are you know capable of producing is simply sort of unimaginable and that's very, very important to remember.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:59]]
<nowiki>[58:59]</nowiki>

That in just fifteen years, nuclear weapons are transformed from being devices that had some familial resemblance to the most powerful conventional weapons, maybe not to single conventional bombs, but to the kind of destruction that a fleet of aircraft equipped with conventional bombs could achieve.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:19]]
<nowiki>[59:19]</nowiki>

After all the bombing of Hiroshima is not really any deadlier than the bombings of Tokyo that took place that same year. You know a fleet of a hundred aircraft equipped with, you know, incendiary conventional bombs are capable of inflicting the same kinds of devastation that a single Hiroshima type bomb can do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:38]]
<nowiki>[59:38]</nowiki>

It might take them six hours as opposed to six minutes but the effects are you know more or less comparable. So that's sort of the beginning of the nuclear era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:47]]
<nowiki>[59:47]</nowiki>

It represents a sort of quantum shift from the era of conventional warfare. But the consequences so far as the waging of war is concerned are not all that transformative -- at least not yet.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:00]]
<nowiki>[60:00]</nowiki>

By 1960 we're in a different world. We're in a world in which a single nuclear bomb can destroy an entire large city, and pollute its water, its air, the atmosphere around it for hundreds if not thousands of miles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:16]]
<nowiki>[60:16]</nowiki>

I mean how many bombs would it take on a scale of the, you know, {{WPExtract|Castle Bravo}} or {{WPExtract|Tsar Bomba}} device, to make the territory of the United States uninhabitable. The question could never be answered. It could be hypothesized. It can't be answered without an empirical test which nobody, you know, wants to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:35]]
<nowiki>[60:35]</nowiki>

But...it wouldn't be all that many. So the destructiveness of these weapons escalates very, very quickly. And that's really, really consequential.

=== American Grand Strategy and Nuclear Weapons ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:47]]
<nowiki>[60:47]</nowiki>

There's real important consequences for nuclear strategy. Let's talk a little bit about the relationship of American sort of grand strategy to nuclear weapons, and here you can see the essential relationship between nuclear weapons and strategic choice laid out very clearly.

==== American Strategy Prior to NSC 68 ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:05]]
<nowiki>[61:05]</nowiki>

During the Cold War's very earliest phase, the period in which the United States maintains an effective nuclear monopoly, American Cold War strategy is really more focused on economics than it is upon military methods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:16]]
<nowiki>[61:16]</nowiki>

During the era of the {{WPExtract|Marshall Plan}} the United States focuses on building up its allies. It tries to contain Communism as a kind of political [[wikt:contagion|contagion]] by making societies, the societies of Western Europe in principle, resilient against it, by putting people back to work, by stimulating economic growth and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:37]]
<nowiki>[61:37]</nowiki>

There is you know relatively little attention paid to the military containment of Communism during the first years of the Cold War. The Cold War in this period is waged primarily as an economic struggle, a struggle to rebuild Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:55]]
<nowiki>[61:55]</nowiki>

After 1949, when the Soviet Union detonates its atomic bomb, things begin to develop in a rather different direction. The winter of 1949 to 1950 is a sort of bleak moment, a [[wikt:nadir]] of sorts, for the United States in the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:12]]
<nowiki>[62:12]</nowiki>

The explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb comes as a shock. Mao's triumph in China in October 1949 is less shocking. It had been obvious for years which way China was going. But the declaration of the People's Republic in October 1949 is nonetheless a setback. Then of course in the summer of 1950 the Korean War breaks out. So for the United States it looks you know rather as if the world is slipping away.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:39]]
<nowiki>[62:39]</nowiki>

Things are developing in a direction disadvantageous to the United States. In this context the Truman administration articulates a bold, coherent, and new definition of American Cold War strategy.

==== NSC 68 ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:55]]
<nowiki>[62:55]</nowiki>

This is a definition that is articulated in a policy planning document: {{WPExtract|NSC 68}} -- arguably the most important strategic document of the entire Cold War era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:08]]
<nowiki>[63:08]</nowiki>

NSC 68 marks a major shift in American Cold War strategy. Whereas the United States had previously focused its efforts upon ameliorating the economic circumstance of Western Europe after the Second World War NSC 68 signals a bold shift towards the military containment of Soviet power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:28]]
<nowiki>[63:28]</nowiki>

NSC 68 envisages full spectrum containment. It is a military containment that is to be orchestrated using conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons, but there's no ambiguity as to what the United States wants to achieve.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:41]]
<nowiki>[63:41]</nowiki>

And this is to develop military resources sufficient to dissuade the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China from expanding their influence beyond their current borders.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:56]]
<nowiki>[63:56]</nowiki>

Doing this the authors of NSC 68 understand will require a vast mobilization of American economic resources. The United States in 1950 was not the military power that it would become by 1960.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:15]]
<nowiki>[64:15]</nowiki>

In order to successfully contain the Soviet Union and China, two vast powers in terms of their expanse, the United States would have to mobilize its industry, mobilize its society even, so as to develop a large and capable military apparatus. This is what NSC 68 proposed doing.

==== The Eisenhower Administration and the Shift to Nuclear Weapons ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:36]]
<nowiki>[64:36]</nowiki>

The transition in leadership in the United States from Truman to Eisenhower, a transition that occurred in 1953 when Eisenhower was inaugurated, marked a important shift in the underlying premises of American Cold War strategy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:55]]
<nowiki>[64:55]</nowiki>

The Truman administration, at least with NSC 68, had in effect been willing to pay whatever it cost to contain Soviet power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:04]]
<nowiki>[65:04]</nowiki>

Truman had envisaged mobilization of men, industry, as well as nuclear weapons. This was very expensive. The waging of the Korean War was very expensive for the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:17]]
<nowiki>[65:17]</nowiki>

There was reason to fear, at least Eisenhower argued, that the Truman administration was transforming the United States into a garrison society -- into a society whose sort of primary purpose and function was to organize itself for war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:33]]
<nowiki>[65:33]</nowiki>

And this prospect troubled Eisenhower. Though Eisenhower had made his career as a great general he did not want to transform the United States into a garrison state. He wanted to preserve what he saw as the essential sort of free market nature of American society. He didn't want to transform the United States into a facsimile of the United States, into a facsimile of the Soviet Union, into a society whose economy would be planned for the explicit purpose of organizing for and preparing for war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:06]]
<nowiki>[66:06]</nowiki>

Eisenhower then wanted to cut military spending. He was concerned that military spending under Truman had increased. He wanted to figure out some way to reduce military spending, perhaps quite dramatically, while maintaining an effective containment of the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:23]]
<nowiki>[66:23]</nowiki>

These were seemingly contradictory objectives. How do you reduce military spending on the one hand while continuing to contain and deter the Soviet Union on the other?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:38]]
<nowiki>[66:38]</nowiki>

This was a conundrum. And nuclear weapons were the answer to it. Nuclear weapons relatively cost-efficient, by comparison with other sorts of military resources, like standing armies, or you know large battalions of tanks. Nuclear weapons are relatively cheap to manufacture and maintain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:58]]
<nowiki>[66:58]</nowiki>

Of course the initial development of nuclear weapons is really expensive. The Manhattan Project was very costly, but once you've figured out how to build nuclear weapons, once you've created, you know, nuclear reactors for the purpose of refining weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, then making more nuclear weapons and building more nuclear weapons is pretty cheap.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:18]]
<nowiki>[67:18]</nowiki>

How many people does it take to maintain a nuclear weapon in its silo?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:23]]
<nowiki>[67:23]</nowiki>

Not all that many. These are fairly coast efficient weapons of war in the, you know, comparative scheme of things. So in order to keep the costs of the Cold War manageable the Eisenhower administration during the 1950s will develop a Cold War grand strategy that places overwhelming emphasis upon nuclear weapons as a source of military power.

===== The Massive Retaliation Doctrine =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:46]]
<nowiki>[67:46]</nowiki>

In 1954 Eisenhower Secretary of State, {{WPExtract|John Foster Dulles}}, articulates a doctrine that becomes known as the [[wikipedia:Massive_retaliation#History|Massive Retaliation Doctrine]]. What this doctrine puts forth is that the United States will retaliate against any Soviet attack, including conventional attacks, on Western Europe with nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:06]]
<nowiki>[68:06]</nowiki>

So even a nonnuclear offensive, a conventional offensive in Europe, will be met the United States proclaims, with a nuclear response. Of course this is all logical and necessary, if you're determined to keep costs down and to minimize your troop presence in Europe for economic reasons, you have to retaliate with nuclear weapons because if you're not prepared to do so then you're in effect inviting Soviet aggression into Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:35]]
<nowiki>[68:35]</nowiki>

So the nuclear retaliation doctrine, the Massive Retaliation Doctrine, is a sort of prerequisite for any credible effort to cut the costs of the Cold War by you know shifting American military strategy to a dependence on nuclear arms.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:53]]
<nowiki>[68:53]</nowiki>

The only, the conventional forces that the United States maintains in Europe in the 1950s, are not intended to be capable of holding off the Red Army.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:03]]
<nowiki>[69:03]</nowiki>

The United States doesn't maintain anything like enough military forces in Europe during the 1950s for those forces to have any plausible prospect of holding off a Soviet invasion. If the Soviets chose to invade Western Europe they would have very quickly succeeded.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:20]]
<nowiki>[69:20]</nowiki>

The Red Army was much larger, had more tanks, had more men than the United States and the countries of Western Europe had. But what the United States has is nuclear weapons. And its conventional forces exist in Europe principally to provide a pretext for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:38]]
<nowiki>[69:38]</nowiki>

So they provide a tripwire. This is the term that is used at the time to describe the role of the US conventional forces in Europe. If the Soviet Union invades Europe, it will necessarily have to engage in some conflict with American conventional forces, that conflict will provide a pretext for the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against the USSR.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:00]]
<nowiki>[70:00]</nowiki>

So the US develops a Cold War grand strategy that is heavily, profoundly, dependent upon the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of massive retaliation.

==== Delivery of Nuclear Weapons via Bombers and via Missiles ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:10]]
<nowiki>[70:10]</nowiki>

How are these nuclear weapons to be delivered? Initially via bombers. It's a misconception to presume that the nuclear arms race was waged by sort of missiles from the very beginning. For most of the 1950s airplanes, bombers, are the essential sort of instrument in the arsenal of {{WPExtract|Strategic Air Command}} -- the branch of the United States Air Force that is responsible for waging nuclear war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:39]]
<nowiki>[70:39]</nowiki>

During the 1950s of course the United States will experiment with rocket technology, so too does the Soviet Union. Both superpowers utilize sort of the resources of German rocket building during the Second World War. They both recruit Nazi, former Nazi rocket scientists, to try to build ballistic missiles for them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:00]]
<nowiki>[71:00]</nowiki>

There's an application of these technologies too in the space programs of both superpowers. But the key point that you ought to remember is that developing rockets is a technically complex and difficult process. For most of the 1950s rockets, rocket technologies, have very little application to the nuclear arms race. Airplanes and bombers are the mainstays of strategic power during the 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:28]]
<nowiki>[71:28]</nowiki>

It's only from the late 1950s that viable {{WPExtract|Intercontinental ballistic missile|intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs}}, begin to come online. The first American ICBM, actually, it's not quite the first, but the mainstay of the American ICBM force in the 1960s, the {{WPExtract|LGM-30 Minuteman|Minuteman Missile}} is not introduced until the late 1950s.

===== Advantages of Missiles over Bombers =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:48]]
<nowiki>[71:48]</nowiki>

The advent of rocket technology and its marriage to hydrogen bombs has really important, really transformative implications for the Cold War arms race. Missiles have a number of really important advantages over bombers as vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:10]]
<nowiki>[72:10]</nowiki>

First of all they're must faster. Second they're much cheaper to manufacture and maintain. You don't have to keep a crew, a flight crew, you know housed and paid, you just keep a bomber in a concrete silo<ref>Speaker likely meant, "keep a missile in a concrete silo".</ref> with somebody watching a computer ready to fire it if necessary.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:25]]
<nowiki>[72:25]</nowiki>

And of course you have mechanics and so on but these are much cheaper, more cost-efficient weapons than bombers are. Even more important it's much easier to defend nuclear missiles against preemptive attack than it is to defend airplanes. Airplanes are very vulnerable to enemy attack when they're sitting on the ground.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:44]]
<nowiki>[72:44]</nowiki>

Right, if you have a squadron of heavy bombers that are sitting out, you know, kind on an airstrip somewhere in, you know, the northeastern United States, a Soviet preemptive attack would be able to do catastrophic damage to those airplanes. Just one bomb well positioned could prevent any of them from flying ever again and attacking the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:07]]
<nowiki>[73:07]</nowiki>

If you have nuclear missiles which are buried deep in concrete silos in the earth's surface, which is how they're stored, it's much harder for an enemy to preemptively attack and to take out your offensive capability.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:21]]
<nowiki>[73:21]</nowiki>

So nuclear weapons are much more survivable than bombers had been. Survivability is a keyword that nuclear strategists, you know, talk about in the late 1950s and 1960s. One of the myriad advantages of missiles over bombers is that they have much greater capacity for surviving a nuclear attack.

==== Preemption and Mutually Assured Destruction ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:40]]
<nowiki>[73:40]</nowiki>

And this is really important and it brings us back to the theme of preemption, right. A nuclear world, a world in which both superpowers possess nuclear weapons, is a world in which, at least in theory, there might be structural incentives to launch a preemptive war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:55]]
<nowiki>[73:55]</nowiki>

If you think that you can get away with attacking your opponent preemptively, if you think that you can take out their capacity to retaliate against you in a preemptive sneak attack, you'd be crazy not to do it. I mean, putting aside the ethical implications, as a strategic issue, preemption would make a certain sense in a nuclear world if you could ensure that it was successful because preemptively attacking your opponent would assure your own safety.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:27]]
<nowiki>[74:27]</nowiki>

Now the only deterrence against preemption, the only plausible deterrence against preemption, will be the capacity to maintain sufficient survivable nuclear forces that you would be able to withstand a preemptive attack against your territory with sufficient nuclear forces intact, to be able to retaliate against your opponent with devastating force.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:55]]
<nowiki>[74:55]</nowiki>

You have to have enough nuclear weapons buried in silos deep in, you know, the mountains of Colorado and you know the plains of Nebraska to be able to be fairly confident that, even if the Soviet Union preemptively attacked you, enough of your nuclear forces would survive that attack that you could launch a devastating retaliatory attack against the USSR. Because that capacity makes it not in the interest of the Soviet Union to attack you under any circumstances. Right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:25]]
<nowiki>[75:25]</nowiki>

And it's not until the early 1960s that both sides will sort of reach the position, maybe even later, this is something which is very difficult to know for sure, but it's not until the 1960s that both sides will reach the situation at which they have sufficient survivable nuclear forces to be able to, at least in theory, withstand a preemptive attack by the other superpower with enough nuclear forces intact to be able to launch a devastating counteroffensive.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:56]]
<nowiki>[75:56]</nowiki>

This is really, really crucial to the logic of Cold War stability. Because it's only once both superpowers have enough resources, enough nuclear weapons that are able to survive a potential preemptive attack, that a situation of stable deterrence could be said to exist. Right, because without that capacity for survivability there's no logical reason why the other superpower shouldn't preemptively attack you first of all.

==== American Grand Strategy and Survivability ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:28]]
<nowiki>[76:28]</nowiki>

So American sort of strategic policy from the late 1950s becomes in a sense a quest to build a survivable nuclear force. A nuclear force that will be able to withstand sneak attack and to deliver a knockout punch against the Soviet Union in return.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:46]]
<nowiki>[76:46]</nowiki>

To this end the United States will complement the bomber fleet that is built in the 1950s with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which live in concrete silos and are relatively defensible, and with sea launched ballistic missiles. These are missiles that are located on nuclear submarines which patrol the oceans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:06]]
<nowiki>[77:06]</nowiki>

And the sole purpose of these nuclear submarines armed with nuclear weapons is to be able to retaliate against the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet preemptive attack on the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:19]]
<nowiki>[77:19]</nowiki>

Submarines are you know terrific as a source of deterrent nuclear power because it's impossible to preemptively take out a nuclear submarine fleet. These are vessels that are located deep under water. They're indestructible.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:33]]
<nowiki>[77:33]</nowiki>

And what they offer is a guarantee to both superpowers that if the other superpower should launch a preemptive attack against them then they will have sufficient strategic offensive power located aboard submarines to be able to retaliate against the attacker with overwhelming force.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:53]]
<nowiki>[77:53]</nowiki>

And this is vital to the accomplishment of the stability of the bipolar nuclear system. Because only once both superpowers are in that, you know, situation of having enough and a sufficiently diverse arsenal of nuclear weapons to be able to survive a prospective preemptive attack with enough power to retaliate against the aggressor will the nuclear system become in a word stable.

==== Cold War Stability and the Arsenals of the Superpowers ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:19]]
<nowiki>[78:19]</nowiki>

When does this moment of stability arrive? Well, Americans in the late 1950s fear the prospect of preemptive attack. {{WPExtract|Sputnik 1|Sputnik}} as we talked about is launched in 1950. It seems to signal that the Soviets are stealing ahead in the nuclear arms race.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:38]]
<nowiki>[78:38]</nowiki>

John F. Kennedy running for the presidency in 1960 talks about a missile gap which he accuses the Eisenhower administration of having permitted to develop. Kennedy warns that the United States is falling so far behind -- so far behind that it might invite a Soviet sneak attack against it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:54]]
<nowiki>[78:54]</nowiki>

The truth in fact, and this is where we will conclude for today, is very different. There is a missile gap in the early 1960s but it runs in the favor of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:06]]
<nowiki>[79:06]</nowiki>

Despite Soviet success in space rocketry, in launching Sputnik into orbit in 1957, it is the United States that leads in the effort to construct intercontinental ballistic missiles during the late 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:22]]
<nowiki>[79:22]</nowiki>

What this chart shows you in gray is the missile gap between the two powers in terms of the balance of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Above the line the balance runs in the favor of the Soviet Union, in the favor of the United States, below the line it runs in favor of the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:39]]
<nowiki>[79:39]</nowiki>

Until the late 1960s the United States enjoys a substantial margin of advantage in the missile race. In the arms race writ large, this is an arms race that includes not just nuclear tipped missiles but also bombers and submarines, the United States has an even more impressive margin of advantage.

== American Advantage in Missile Strength Over the Soviet Union and the Cuban Missile Crisis ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:58]]
<nowiki>[79:58]</nowiki>

The real missile gap, at the beginning of the 1960s, runs in favor of the United States -- not in favor of the Soviet Union. This is not something that Kennedy is willing to admit, running for the presidency, because berating Eisenhower over an alleged missile gap that runs in the other direction is an easy way to win votes. You make your opponent look weak and you promise to do better. This is politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:21]]
<nowiki>[80:21]</nowiki>

For Khrushchev the missile gap, the real missile gap, is a strategic liability. How is it to be closed? The United States has so many more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union in the early 1960s that there appears to be a sufficient margin perhaps of superiority that the United States could conceivably attack the Soviet Union and gain advantage by doing so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:46]]
<nowiki>[80:46]</nowiki>

So what is Khrushchev to do? You know we should ponder that between now and Thursday when we'll talk about the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the sort of larger development of Cold War politics in the 1960s.

----
<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 09 - Letting Go of Empire, or Not - 01h 16m 49s

2019-05-21T21:02:50Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

== Introduction and Lecture Overview: Keynesian Economic Theory and Liberalism in Western Europe ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, apologies for the slow start. We're trying an experiment today in which the lecture notes appear on the screen with the slideshow so we'll see how it works. But when I first tried to do this the notes were not appearing so I had to figure out how to make them appear, but now they're here so ... We can talk about the transformation of capitalism in the postwar, first postwar decades, the 1950s and the 1960s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:26 ]]
<nowiki>[0:26]</nowiki>

We've talked a little bit already about sort of the large scale transformations that occurred in liberalism during the mid-decades of the 20th century. We've talked about sort of the ascendancy of Keynesian economic theory in the context of the New Deal, the practice of the New Deal itself, and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:47 ]]
<nowiki>[0:47]</nowiki>

So what I'd to do today is to sort of shift our focus to postwar Europe. We're going to talk about Western Europe today we'll talk about Eastern Europe and the Communist world more broadly on Thursday.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 0:59 ]]
<nowiki>[0:59]</nowiki>

But today our focus is exclusively on the advanced industrial capitalist world. And what we're going to be talking about in particular is you know what I would characterize as the social democratic moment. The sort of particular moment in postwar European history when political parties of both of the center-left and the center-right converged around a set of common solutions that might be characterized as social democratic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 1:24 ]]
<nowiki>[1:24]</nowiki>

What were these solutions? How did they come into being? These are the questions that we want to grapple with today. We'll also talk about the experience of the United States and sort of the question of whether the experience of the United States was different from that of Western Europe in the '50s and '60s or whether there were similarities in the political economic transformations that occurred in Europe and in the US from about the end of the Second World War through to the late 1960s.

== Smithian Liberalism to Keynesian Liberalism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 1:52 ]]
<nowiki>[1:52]</nowiki>

Let me just start by sort of recapitulating some of the issues that we've previously discussed just to make sure you haven't forgotten them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 1:58 ]]
<nowiki>[1:58]</nowiki>

What changes in liberal economic theory between the era of {{WPExtract|Adam Smith}} in the late 18th century and that of {{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes}} in the 1930s?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 2:13 ]]
<nowiki>[2:13]</nowiki>

How would we summarize the transition from Smithian liberalism to Keynesian liberalism? What are the distinguishing characteristics of the two?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:23]]
<nowiki>[2:23]</nowiki>

(Student response)

Absolutely. It's really the key, key transition. Whereas Smith famously talks about the market as a self-regulating mechanism, the {{WPExtract|Invisible hand|invisible hand}}, Keynes argues that in a complex modern economy markets don't necessarily regulate themselves. They don't always self-correct.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 2:41 ]]
<nowiki>[2:41]</nowiki>

This transformation as the slide posits it from Smithian economic to Keynesian liberalism does not of course command an absolute consensus. We've already talked about {{WPExtract|Friedrich Hayek}} and Hayek's critique of Keynes. Hayek argues that the consolidation of a powerful managerial state will ultimately have fraught political consequences.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 3:05]]
<nowiki>[3:05]</nowiki>

It may ultimately lead to the consolidation of political authoritarianism. That's one critique of managerial liberalism. But for the most part this transition from Smithian liberalism to Keynesian liberalism commands a broad consensus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 3:19 ]]
<nowiki>[3:19]</nowiki>

Not only in Europe but also in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 3:23 ]]
<nowiki>[3:23]</nowiki>

Of course the intellectual genealogy of Europe's social democratic moment is more complicated than that. It's not as if the only social democrats are former liberals. We talked about a week ago about the sort of inner history of European socialism, the rise of the reform socialist movement from the late 19th century. Socialists who accept the basic institutional framework of parliamentary democracy are also you know absolutely critical to the creation of Europe's postwar social democratic moment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 3:56 ]]
<nowiki>[3:56]</nowiki>

We can see the moment, you know as I previously discussed, as representing a convergence of reform socialism and progressive liberalism. These are really the two intellectual strands that help to constitute the social democratic moment after the Second World War.

== The Swedish Model ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 4:13 ]]
<nowiki>[4:13]</nowiki>

But these are issues that we've you know already dealt with. Let's talk today about what actually happens and where. I'm going to start by talking about the Swedish model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 4:22 ]]
<nowiki>[4:22]</nowiki>

You know Sweden is an appropriate place to start because it's frequently invoked through the present day as an exemplar of social democracy. What is the Swedish model? How does it come to be? What are its distinguishing characteristics?

=== Saltsjöbaden Pact of 1938 ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 4:36 ]]
<nowiki>[4:36]</nowiki>

You know where do we begin the history of Swedish social democracy? Probably as good a point as any to begin is with the {{WPExtract| Saltsjöbaden Agreement|Saltsjöbaden Pact of 1938}} which is a formal agreement between the representatives of capital, business, and labor, trade unions, and the state to regulate the economy in pursuit of some, you know, consensual vision of national well-being.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:03 ]]
<nowiki>[5:03]</nowiki>

This agreement between capital, labor and the state is in some ways sort of prototypical of for what will happen elsewhere in other national contexts, but most directly it facilitates the creation of a postwar welfare state in Sweden.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:19 ]]
<nowiki>[5:19]</nowiki>

A state, in which the national government, the nation-state will play a crucial role as sort of mediator between the competing interests of capital and labor as provider of basic welfare guarantees which sustain a minimum level of social and economic well-being.

=== The Swedish Model in Practice ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:37 ]]
<nowiki>[5:37]</nowiki>

What defines this Swedish model in practice? Well, to start off with it's a model that depends upon very high levels of taxation. Swedish tax revenues are sort of notoriously high through to the present day. The government taxes a great deal and it spends a great deal too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:55]]
<nowiki>[5:55]</nowiki>

What does it spend on? Benefits are you know a central priority for Swedish social democracy. This is a very redistributive model in which you know taxes are collected and benefits are paid out. The government in a sense tries to sort of mitigate unequal social outcomes by taking from those who earn more and redistributing to those who have less. So it's a model that pursues social egalitarianism through the mechanism of state redistribution.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:26 ]]
<nowiki>[6:26]</nowiki>

And this is not necessarily true in every social democratic model. This is a distinctive aspect of the Swedish experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:33 ]]
<nowiki>[6:33]</nowiki>

What does the government not do? And this is important to ask particularly when we you know compare and contrast the Swedish model to you know for example the socialist models that develop in China and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:45]]
<nowiki>[6:45]</nowiki>

How different is Sweden from these? Well, actually the answer is quite different. And you know one of the key variables that distinguishes the Swedish model from the Soviet model of socialism is that the state in Sweden does not take ownership of private industry, of what Marx called the means of production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:05 ]]
<nowiki>[7:05]</nowiki>

Factories, extractive industries like mining, timber, and so on these all remain in the hands of you know private owners. So capitalism remains essentially unchanged. Which is to stay the structure of ownership of the economy doesn't change in the Swedish model.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:21]]
<nowiki>[7:21]</nowiki>

What does happen is that the state taxes earnings at very high rates and uses those revenues in order to ameliorate unequal social outcomes.

=== The Swedish Model in the Social Democratic Moment and the Intrusive State ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:33 ]]
<nowiki>[7:33]</nowiki>

Is this a positive model? Well, that's really a political question and the answer depends upon your own point of view. It might be worth sort of emphasizing a point which {{WPExtract|Tony Judt}} makes in the readings for this week.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:47 ]]
<nowiki>[7:47]</nowiki>

Which is that the sort of managerial controlling ethos of the Swedish state has a dark side which is sort of represented in the state's commitment to {{WPExtract|eugenics}}. The intrusive state doesn't only redistribute wealth but it also tries to determine the biological fitness of its citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:08 ]]
<nowiki>[8:08]</nowiki>

Sweden runs a eugenics program from the mid-'30s through to the early 1970s in which around 60,000 people are forcibly sterilized over the period of about half a century because the state deems them to be you know sort of unfit to reproduce.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:23 ]]
<nowiki>[8:23]</nowiki>

So while there may be a great deal to admire in the Swedish model in terms of the egalitarianism of its social outcomes it's also you know worth just being mindful of the fact that the intrusive state doesn't limit itself to mitigating economic outcomes it also tries to intervene, you know, directly to assure the biological fitness of its population.

== The British Model ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:45 ]]
<nowiki>[8:45]</nowiki>

Probably more familiar than the Swedish model is the British model of social democracy, which develops sort of in the immediate context and aftermath of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 8:56 ]]
<nowiki>[8:56]</nowiki>

Of course the British economy is substantially transformed by the war itself and this is an important sort of point of departure. In order to wage the war at maximum efficiency, to channel resources to the purposes of war production, the British state during the Second World War establishes broad controls over the economy. It implements sort of unprecedented kinds of economic planning.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:23 ]]
<nowiki>[9:23]</nowiki>

So the basic you know sort of apparatus of government economic planning is established during the war itself. Not to serve the purposes of social welfare but so as to enable the British state to wage the war with what planners presume to be maximum efficacy.

=== The Beveridge Report ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 9:39 ]]
<nowiki>[9:39]</nowiki>

But during the war a set of commitments to social amelioration also develops. The key document here is the 1942 {{WPExtract|Beveridge Report}}. How many of you have heard of the Beveridge Report? Okay, a few of you. Would anybody offer a quick description? What does the Beveridge Report do?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:57]]
<nowiki>[9:57]</nowiki>

(Student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:04]]
<nowiki>[10:04]</nowiki>

Absolutely -- it offers a set of prescriptions for the improvement of social outcomes in Britain. Essentially it's a blueprint for the postwar British welfare state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:15]]
<nowiki>[10:15]</nowiki>

What {{WPExtract|William Beveridge|Beveridge}} envisages in his 1942 report is a really profound transformation of British liberalism. The British liberal state had previously been fairly limited. It hadn't provided a great deal by way of public benefits to its citizens. And Beveridge wants to transform that. He wants to create sort of new institutions to support and sustain the well-being of the British population.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 10:40 ]]
<nowiki>[10:40]</nowiki>

You know one of the turns of phrase which becomes associated with the British welfare state is that it's a state that supports its citizens from cradle to grave. And the blueprint for that design comes out of Beveridge's 1942 report.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 10:54 ]]
<nowiki>[10:54]</nowiki>

The fact that the Labor Party, the party of the center-left, wins the election, the general election in June 1945, creates a sort of political climate that is hospitable to the implementation of Beveridge's proposals.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:11 ]]
<nowiki>[11:11]</nowiki>

With that, it should you know nonetheless be noted, that even the Conservative Party, Winston Churchill's party which was defeated by the Labor Party in 1945, was also supportive of the Beveridge recommendations. So Beveridge's report commands a broad consensus of support within British political opinion. Both the center-left, the Labor Party, and the center-right party support it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:38 ]]
<nowiki>[11:38]</nowiki>

And that fact is indicative of the ways in which the war transforms sort of the political, economic expectations of British society.

=== The Transformation of British Society by the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:48 ]]
<nowiki>[11:48]</nowiki>

The war itself has transformed the relationship of government to society and more than that the war has helped to create a set of expectations about the peace.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 11:59 ]]
<nowiki>[11:59]</nowiki>

Insofar as the war has been hugely costly, a major exertion of national resources and of human lives, Britains across the political spectrum expect that the peace, or hope that the peace, will be better than the situation that had existed prior to the war. For what has the war been fought?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:17]]
<nowiki>[12:17]</nowiki>

Has it been fought merely to defeat Nazi Germany or has it also been fought to build a better Britain? The notion that the war has been fought to make Britain better is in part what helps to explain the broad groundswell of support for the Beveridge recommendations in British politics in the mid-1940s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:35]]
<nowiki>[12:35]</nowiki>

But it's the Labor Party that wins the election and it's the Labor Party that plays the leading role in the construction of the postwar welfare state.

=== Implementation of the Postwar Welfare State in Britain ===

==== National Insurance Act ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:43]]
<nowiki>[12:43]</nowiki>

Now what does this involve? In 1946 Labor introduces the {{WPExtract|National Insurance|National Insurance Act}}. This establishes a nationwide scheme of unemployment insurance for the first time. There had previously been sort of partial unemployment schemes but the National Insurance Act of '46 introduces a comprehensive nationwide system of social insurance.

==== National Health Service ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:07 ]]
<nowiki>[13:07]</nowiki>

Even more striking is the {{WPExtract|National Health Service Act 1946|National Health Service Act of 1948}}. This establishes a publicly funded system of health care in which all, you know, British people have equal access without any payment of fees. The whole thing is sustained by central government revenues. And that's created in 1948 -- the National Health Service Act, or sort of NHS Act. The health service in Britain today is usually known by that acronym -- NHS.

==== Nationalization of Core Industries: Coal, Gas and Electric ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:35]]
<nowiki>[13:35]</nowiki>

Besides creating new provisions to sustain and support social well-being the Labor government goes about nationalizing core industries and this is one difference between the British model and the Swedish model. Coal, gas and the electric industry are all nationalized by the postwar Labor government.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 13:55 ]]
<nowiki>[13:55]</nowiki>

This is really interesting. Because Labor is doing what you know Marx had recommended, right, which is that the state is seizing control of the {{WPExtract|commanding heights of the economy}} -- the phrase commanding heights, is Lenin's by the way.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:10]]
<nowiki>[14:10]</nowiki>

Not necessarily sort of in order to transform social outcomes however. And this is a key difference between nationalization in the Soviet context and nationalization in the British context.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:23]]
<nowiki>[14:23]</nowiki>

But the state takes over these enterprises, but it continues to run them on more or less the same basis as they had been run before the war as private industries.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:33 ]]
<nowiki>[14:33]</nowiki>

Which is to say you know that the nationalized industries still maintain pay differentials -- managers are paid more than ordinary workers and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:44 ]]
<nowiki>[14:44]</nowiki>

And one of the things which is interesting when you actually look at the history of nationalization in Britain is that the terms on which it is justified have far more to do with the experience of the war than they do with socialist doctrine.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:56]]
<nowiki>[14:56]</nowiki>

The idea of making these industries more efficient is absolutely central to the nationalizing project. It doesn't have to do you know nearly so much with sort of a Marxian or revolutionary agenda as it does with preserving what is widely understood at the times to be the accomplishments of wartime government mobilization of the economy.

==== Nationalization of the Bank of England ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 15:22 ]]
<nowiki>[15:22]</nowiki>

Besides nationalizing these core industries the British government nationalizes the {{WPExtract|Bank of England}}. The Bank of England had previously been a private bank even though it had a special sort of role in that it was the only bank in England by the 20th century that printed paper currency.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:39]]
<nowiki>[15:39]</nowiki>

The British government nationalizes it after the Second World War. This is really important because controlling the central bank enables the government to control monetary policy. If you don't control the central bank you don't control monetary policy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:52]]
<nowiki>[15:52]</nowiki>

Indeed fifty years later one of the first things that {{WPExtract|Tony Blair}} does when he comes to power as the new Labor Prime Minister is to ... He doesn't transform the Bank of England back into a private bank but he substantially reduces the government's capacity to control the Bank of England.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:12]]
<nowiki>[16:12]</nowiki>

He makes it independent for the purposes of decision-making which has the effect of diminishing government control over monetary policy. Because Blair in the 1990s, in 1997, wants to sort of depoliticize monetary policy, and to make it more, you know, and to render it more immune to political influence than it had been from sort of the late 1940s through to the late 1990s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:38]]
<nowiki>[16:38]</nowiki>

But the nationalization of the Bank of England is sort of a key development of the postwar Labor government

=== Broad Support for the Welfare State in Great Britain ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 16:47 ]]
<nowiki>[16:47]</nowiki>

It's important when we sort of think about these changes, and these are big changes, they represent a substantial transformation in the political economy of Great Britain, it's really important to remember that there is an authentic breadth of support for them. These are not changes that are being imposed upon a reluctant country by a, you know, leftist government that somehow manages to win power in the aftermath of the war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:12]]
<nowiki>[17:12]</nowiki>

These are changes that are supported not only by Labor but also by the center-right Conservative Party. Indeed when the Conservative Party comes back to power in 1951, which is does under Winston Churchill who will lead Britain for another four years, the Conservative party does not try to roll back any of these welfarist accomplishments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:33]]
<nowiki>[17:33]</nowiki>

In fact the Conservatives add new welfare entitlements, for housing for example, and they also nationalize the steel industry which Labor hadn't done.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:43]]
<nowiki>[17:43]</nowiki>

So the creation of the postwar welfare state is supported by a kind of broad swathe of opinion in the United Kingdom.

== The French Model ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 17:53 ]]
<nowiki>[17:53]</nowiki>

Okay let's talk next about the French case. What kind of social democracy is created in France after the Second World War? How does it differ from the British and the Swedish models?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 18:06 ]]
<nowiki>[18:06]</nowiki>

One of the differences between the French experience and the British experience, or the Swedish experience for that matter, is that the French state is dominated by the political center after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:20]]
<nowiki>[18:20]</nowiki>

It's not to say that there was not a strong left in France. Indeed as we've already discussed the left does very, very well in the elections that take place in the fall of 1945.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:29]]
<nowiki>[18:29]</nowiki>

But by 1947-48 the center has stabilized. Moderates are in the political ascendant in the postwar {{WPExtract|French Fourth Republic|Fourth Republic}}. As a consequence it will be political moderates, not socialists, but liberals, who dominate the process of postwar sort of political economic construction.

=== The French Model and Pursuit of Growth ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 18:52 ]]
<nowiki>[18:52]</nowiki>

Whereas the British welfare state and the Swedish welfare state make the pursuit of social equality their overriding objectives, the French postwar state is much more concerned with the production and sustenance of growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 19:10 ]]
<nowiki>[19:10]</nowiki>

This is a really important distinction. The French state will do certain things to try to promote growth that resemble the innovations of the British and Swedish welfare states. Well, at least -- I'm sorry -- that will resemble the British state -- industries core industries are nationalized -- rail for example. This in some ways resembles the British experience.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:34]]
<nowiki>[19:34]</nowiki>

The overriding objective however is somewhat distinct. Nationalization of core industries is not linked to a socially egalitarian agenda rather it is undertaken with the express purpose of making France more efficient, more modern, more dynamic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:55]]
<nowiki>[19:55]</nowiki>

Besides nationalizing core industries, the postwar French state, also provides incentives to private investment -- particularly in sort of core sectors of the economy. And it constructs an enhanced and improved national infrastructure particularly for transportation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:14]]
<nowiki>[20:14]</nowiki>

Indeed the sort of modernizing accomplishments of the Fourth Republic are now being taken much more seriously by historians who look at issues like the construction of the postwar highway system, the {{WPExtract|Autoroutes of France|autoroutes}}, and sort of emphasize the importance of these developments as preconditions for France's impressive postwar growth rates.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 20:36 ]]
<nowiki>[20:36]</nowiki>

The pursuit of economic growth by the state does not come in the French case with such a, you know, well developed commitment to public, to welfare, as it does in Great Britain. Unlike the British case where the government establishes a national health system the French continue to depend upon insurance in which private individuals sort of pay into health insurance schemes rather than the public provision of health. So social insurance rather than outright welfare becomes the sort of basic modus operandi of the French postwar social state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 21:22 ]]
<nowiki>[21:22]</nowiki>

Unlike Britain and Sweden inequality is not such a central focus for postwar French welfare policy. France is, you know, thus representative of a different kind of model. There's still a central role for the state but the purposes are somewhat distinct from what they are in Britain or in Sweden.

== The German Model ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:42]]
<nowiki>[21:42]</nowiki>

Let's talk finally about Germany. Germany is also a really interesting important case. Of course in some ways the circumstances in Germany are a little bit different from what they are in France or Sweden or Britain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:55]]
<nowiki>[21:55]</nowiki>

And this has to do of course with the Nazi legacy, which is a particular aspect of Germany's 20th century experience. Ironically one of the consequences of the Nazi legacy in Germany is to make Germany after the Second World War very committed to liberalism. Germans will be much less willing than Swedes, ironically, to sustain eugenics programs after the Second World War because the Nazi experience has been so harrowing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:28]]
<nowiki>[22:28]</nowiki>

The leaders of postwar Germany are for the most part staunch liberals who believe, you know, very firmly in a sort of doctrine of individual rights -- particularly in a doctrine of individual rights vis-à-vis the state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:42]]
<nowiki>[22:42]</nowiki>

And this commitment to liberalism imposes some checks on the expansion of the postwar German welfare state. Germany is also somewhat distinct in that the left is less powerful after the Second World War than it is elsewhere. That owes in part to Germany's particularly sort of international location. The division of Germany into two parts, East and West, also has the effect of making West Germany more staunchly centrist than might have been the case had Germany remained an integral whole.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:15]]
<nowiki>[23:15]</nowiki>

Of course a number of German left-wingers, Communists in particular, go to the East which becomes a sort of Communist state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:22 ]]
<nowiki>[23:22]</nowiki>

The West is very much recreated after the war as a liberal state in which the political center, moderate conservatives, will be ascendant.

=== The Christian Democrats and Konrad Adenauer ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:33]]
<nowiki>[23:33]</nowiki>

The party of the center-right, the Christian Democratic Party, led by {{WPExtract|Konrad Adenauer}}, dominates German's politics after the Second World War. You know dominates is probably too weak a word. The Christian Democrats rule Germany from 1949 until 1966. That's 17 years of uninterrupted Christian Democratic ascendancy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:55]]
<nowiki>[23:55]</nowiki>

Which is quite different from say the British experience where the center-left and the center right, you know, vie for dominance.

=== The Social Market Economy and Ludwig Erhard ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:03]]
<nowiki>[24:03]</nowiki>

The Christian Democrats are not you know necessarily a free market party however. On the contrary the Christian Democrats embrace the doctrine of what becomes known as the {{WPExtract|Social market economy|social market economy}}. Both the social and the market are really important to this concept.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:22]]
<nowiki>[24:22]</nowiki>

It's a concept that is particularly associated with {{WPExtract|Ludwig Erhard}}, who's an economist and the German Economics Minister under Konrad Adenauer. He's economic minister for a long time, about 14 years, and then he becomes Chancellor of Germany, which is Germany's prime minister role in 1963.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:40]]
<nowiki>[24:40]</nowiki>

So Erhard has a very long influence on postwar German politics. His aim, in the promulgation of the social market doctrine, is to reconcile socialism and liberalism. Erhard remains a liberal but he understands that liberalism, if it is to flourish, has to do a better job of ameliorating adverse social outcomes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 25:04 ]]
<nowiki>[25:04]</nowiki>

In order to do this the social market doctrine commits the state to intervene in the economy where necessary to sustain growth, to keep inflation low -- inflation, you should remember, had been very disruptive in Germany before the Second World War, and to keep unemployment low.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:21]]
<nowiki>[25:21]</nowiki>

So there's a substantial sort of managerial role for government in the framework of the social market.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 25:29 ]]
<nowiki>[25:29]</nowiki>

The government will also tax and spend in order to mitigate social inequalities. The government provides for Germans who cannot provide for themselves. Indeed economic rights will be guaranteed by law in the postwar Federal Republic.

=== The Grundgesetz: Political, Social and Economic Rights ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:44]]
<nowiki>[25:44]</nowiki>

The basic constitutional law of postwar Germany, the {{WPExtract|Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|Grundgesetz}}, which is sort of inaugurated with the state in 1949, identifies a broad range of rights that Germans have as citizens of the Federal Republic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:00]]
<nowiki>[26:00]</nowiki>

These don't just include the predictable political rights, you know, to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and so on, they also include social and economic rights: right to work, rights to a guaranteed income, right to housing, and so on.

==== Further Expansion of Rights ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:15]]
<nowiki>[26:15]</nowiki>

These rights are expanded even further by subsequent innovations. The 1957 Employment Law for example offers a very ambitious expansive set of commitments to Germans who become unemployed. Indeed it commits the state to continue to pay you when you become unemployed at the same salary which you had been earning when you were, you know, working in your job.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 26:38]]
<nowiki>[26:38]</nowiki>

So this a, you know, costly commitment for the state, particularly when the beneficiaries are middle class people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:44]]
<nowiki>[26:44]</nowiki>

You know unemployed bankers can continue to be paid at the rates that they would ... actually -- we had something like that here didn't we ... But (laughter)... but in Germany it's guaranteed for all people not just representatives of the financial sector.

== The Social Democratic Moment's Effects ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:00]]
<nowiki>[27:00]</nowiki>

Okay, let's try to draw some generalizations across these different national experiences.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:05]]
<nowiki>[27:05]</nowiki>

First question that any good social scientist should ask: [[wikt:cui bono|''cui bono'']? This doesn't have to do with the Irish rock band. It's Latin. Who benefits? Who wins?

=== The Benefit to the Middle Classes ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 27:16]]
<nowiki>[27:16]</nowiki>

Who are the beneficiaries of the postwar European welfare state? And in general the middle classes are the major beneficiaries -- not the poor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:27]]
<nowiki>[27:27]</nowiki>

You know this is really, really important to remember. The British welfare state for example: What does it do? From who does it redistribute and to whom. For the most part it's the top 10% who pay into the system in Britain. The major beneficiaries are the next 40%. It doesn't do so much for the really poor. It does more for the ranks of the middle class entitlements like you know public funding for higher education for example really of greater benefit to the middle classes than they are to the very poorest members of society.

=== Greater Social Stability ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 28:05]]
<nowiki>[28:05]</nowiki>

The welfare state does, you know, besides benefiting sort of the working middle classes, serve to produce great social stability. The value of this particularly in the aftermath of fascism and the Second World War should not be underestimated.

=== Growth and the Social Welfare State ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:23]]
<nowiki>[28:23]</nowiki>

What about growth? We've talked about the impressive rates of economic growth that Europe experiences after the Second World War. To what extent was welfarism the construction and consolidation of postwar welfare states an important factor in the achievement of high and sustained rates of growth?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 28:43]]
<nowiki>[28:43]</nowiki>

This is really, really difficult to say. I think that the most that could be said is that the expansion of state economic regulation and management is one variable amongst many to which we might want to make reference in the explanation of Europe's postwar growth. It's probably not the most important.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:08]]
<nowiki>[29:08]</nowiki>

More important than the role of the state is, you know, simply the expansion of economic inputs -- demographic growth, the transformation of agricultural labor into industrial labor, which enables Europe to grow at a very high sustained rate for about two decades.

==== Comparison of the French Case and the British Case ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:29]]
<nowiki>[29:29]</nowiki>

The state may have played some role and the role may of course have varied from one context to another. Here a comparison of the French and the British experience might be instructive. The French state which you know makes the promotion of growth its central objective after Second World War grows at a fairly impressive clip -- sustains an average annual growth rate of about 4% between, you know, 1950 and 1973.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:57]]
<nowiki>[29:57]</nowiki>

Part of that is presumably attributable to the work of the state and the provision of a transportation and communications infrastructure are friendly to the growth of private business. In Britain growth rates are less impressive. Now that of course doesn't just have to do with government policy it also has to do with the fact that Britain had much more substantially industrialized than France had before the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:21]]
<nowiki>[30:21]</nowiki>

So there's simply less slack in the economy, less room for growth in Britain than there was in France at the beginning of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:30]]
<nowiki>[30:30]</nowiki>

These kinds of comparisons are difficult because the variables are so many. But they may help us you know to get some perspective on the possible role that government played in promoting and sustaining growth in postwar Europe.

=== Political Consequences of the Social Democratic Moment ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:46]]
<nowiki>[30:46]</nowiki>

What about the political consequences though? These are probably easier to identify and to talk about than are the economic consequences. The single most important overarching political consequence of the social democratic moment in my view is the transformation of the left.

==== The Diminishment of Radicalism and the Growth of Liberalism Within the Left ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:04]]
<nowiki>[31:04]</nowiki>

The left had for you know almost a century since the last decades of the 19th century, been a revolutionary force in European, West European, political life, a force that had challenged the political status quo.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:20]]
<nowiki>[31:20]</nowiki>

Revolutionary socialists, of course, had proposed replacing the liberal order with an entirely different social and political order of things. This radical left dies a death very quickly after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:34]]
<nowiki>[31:34]</nowiki>

Why does it die a death? Well, in part because its natural constituency, the working class, is won over to liberalism, or to a transformed version of liberalism, by the social democratic moment. The postwar welfare state secures, you know, the support and loyalty of the working classes to the political economic and institutional status quo. Sort of one consequence will be the effective death of radicalism, at least of economic radicalism, as a sort of viable political force in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:12]]
<nowiki>[32:12]</nowiki>

Indeed most people who call themselves socialists in Western Europe will abandon Marxist revolutionary doctrine after the Second World War if they haven't done so already.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:25]]
<nowiki>[32:25]</nowiki>

There is a convergence moreover between social democrats -- people coming from the left -- and Christian democrats people coming from a more you know liberal or even conservative tradition around a shared set of commitments to sort of welfarism.

==== The Bad Godesberg Meeting in 1959 ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:40]]
<nowiki>[32:40]</nowiki>

One symbolic moment that you know sort of represents this transformation in the politics of the left really well comes in 1959 when the German Socialist Party, which remember has been out of office for a very long, time because the Christian Democrats have been dominant ever since the inauguration of the Federal Republic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:02]]
<nowiki>[33:02]</nowiki>

The socialists, out of power, {{WPExtract|Godesberg Program|meet in Bad Godesberg in 1959}}, in order to sort of formulate a new agenda and shared set of commitments for the party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:12]]
<nowiki>[33:12]</nowiki>

This meeting produces a manifesto, the Godesberg Manifesto, which formally renounces the party's commitment to Marxism. It formally renounces its commitment to class struggle as the basic sort of conceptual framework for political action, and commits the Socialist Party to seek the political support of all social classes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 33:38]]
<nowiki>[33:38]</nowiki>

To seek you know the support of bourgeoisie voters as well as working class voters. This is a major transformation right. For a party that had historically defined itself at the party of the working class the formalization in 1959 of a commitment to pursue middle class votes as well as the votes of workers suggests that something really big has changed in the relationship of the Social Democratic Party to German society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 34:06]]
<nowiki>[34:06]</nowiki>

1959, you know, in effect marks a renunciation of radicalism and a formal acceptance of the sort of institutional status quo of liberal democracy.

=== The Social Democratic Moment and the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 34:18]]
<nowiki>[34:18]</nowiki>

Now what did this all of you know transformation have to do with the Cold War? It's a really important question.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:25]]
<nowiki>[34:25]</nowiki>

It's certainly the case that the accomplishment of social and economic stabilization in postwar Europe serves Cold War purposes -- serves the purposes of the United States for example.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:37]]
<nowiki>[34:37]</nowiki>

And the United States both supports and encourages Europe's postwar social democratic transformation. This is a really important point. The United States does not see the construction of welfare states in Europe as a threat to American interests. Even when these welfare states, you know, protect their economies with tariff barriers, even when they engage in sort of extensive social redistribution as the British welfare state does, the United States doesn't see this as you know representing a threat to the West either in terms of a threat to American economic interests or the beginnings of a potential slippery slope that might lead to Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:16]]
<nowiki>[35:16]</nowiki>

On the contrary the United States sees the consolidation of European welfare states after the Second World War as a guarantee against Communism, as the construction of a sort of bulwark that will inhibit the success of you know Communist parties within the nation-states of Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:35]]
<nowiki>[35:35]</nowiki>

So it would be wrong to see the consolidation of welfarism after the Second World War as serving an agenda that could in anyway be construed as sort of pro-Soviet. On the contrary the leaders of European social democratic parties are often among the most, you know, vigorous anti-Communists that there are in the European continent.

==== British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's Opposition to Communism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:59]]
<nowiki>[35:59]</nowiki>

You know to illustrate that point we might just you know sort of go back to the postwar Labor government in Great Britain. The foreign secretary in that Labor government, {{WPExtract|Ernest Bevin|Bevin}}, was as you know a convinced and dogged an anti-Communist as just about anybody in the history of Cold War diplomacy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:18]]
<nowiki>[36:18]</nowiki>

It was Bevin's absolute, you know, conviction that you couldn't trust the Russians, you couldn't trust Communists, there was no useful dealing to be done with them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:28]]
<nowiki>[36:28]</nowiki>

In part that represented Bevin's own experience as a man of the left. Bevin as a trade unionist had had contact with socialists. I mean with real revolutionary socialists. So he had a sense for the power that ideology exerted over you know committed Marxist revolutionaries and this is one of the factors that sort of informs his own anti-Communism which is very influential on British and Western policy after the Second World War.

==== Conclusion: The Social Democratic Moment and the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:58]]
<nowiki>[36:58]</nowiki>

But the key point you know to remember is that social democracy does not represent in anybody's mind a step on the road to the accomplishment of a Soviet style socialist state. Rather it represents an alternative, an alternative that is closely aligned with the United States, and which self-conceives as committed to sort of the institutions of liberal democracy.

== European Integration ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:25]]
<nowiki>[37:25]</nowiki>

Let's talk a little bit now about the creation of Europe as a political and economic project. European integration is a project that is in many respects closely linked to the consolidation of social democracies within Europe's postwar welfare states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:42]]
<nowiki>[37:42]</nowiki>

At the same time there are, you know, kind of distinct aspects to the history of European integration that ought to be understood and discussed on their own terms.

=== Origins of European Integration ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:52]]
<nowiki>[37:52]</nowiki>

Where does the European integration come from? How far back does it go?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:00]]
<nowiki>[38:00]</nowiki>

Would anybody offer a guess as to you know how far back we should take the history of European integration?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:09]]
<nowiki>[38:09]</nowiki>

(Student response)

==== The Congress of Vienna ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:14]]
<nowiki>[38:14]</nowiki>

Yeah, 1815 is a really good point of departure actually because the peace settlement that brings the Napoleonic Wars to an end, the so-called Congress of Europe system, does involve a set of, you know, shared commitments by Europe's political elites to maintain international peace and social order within 19th century Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:36]]
<nowiki>[38:36]</nowiki>

Now of course this is a conservative settlement. The elites who come together in the {{WPExtract|Congress of Vienna}} want to preserve the ascendancy of European aristocracy. So it's an anti-revolutionary peace, but it you know certainly reflects a set of shared commitments, a belief that Europe constitutes a sort of organic whole, that can be administered cooperatively if not from a single political center.

==== Military Conquest of Europe Throughout the Centuries ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:04 ]]
<nowiki>[39:04]</nowiki>

So 1815 is really important. But I would suggest that we can take the history of European integration back even further than that, right. For how long have Europeans construed of themselves as members of a common sort of civilizational or cultural if not political unit?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:23]]
<nowiki>[39:23]</nowiki>

It's, these are all contestable points, but we could take the history of European integration perhaps back as far as {{WPExtract|Charlemagne}}. Frankish king who ruled in the late 8th and early 9th century and who accomplished the transient political integration of much of you know what is today Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:50]]
<nowiki>[39:50]</nowiki>

Of course, you know, Charlemagne did this a very long time ago, more recent attempts to sort of integrate Europe have, had also have occurred.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:04]]
<nowiki>[40:04]</nowiki>

Napoleon, after, sort of 1793, attempts a political project this is an integrationist project. It's a different kind of integrationist project perhaps from that which the European economic community will attempt, and Napoleon attempts to integrate Europe within a sort of imperial framework of French rule. But the project is nonetheless an integrationist one.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:27]]
<nowiki>[40:27]</nowiki>

So too will Hitler during the Second World War very briefly integrate Europe. Now Hitler's project is even more imperialistic, even more hierarchical, even more vile than Napoleon's had been. But it nonetheless achieves a sort of transient integration of the West European continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:51]]
<nowiki>[40:51]</nowiki>

These are all efforts that you know powerful political and military leaders undertook to integrate Europe by force.

=== The Intellectual History of European Integration ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:59]]
<nowiki>[40:59]</nowiki>

But the history of integration is also an intellectual history. It's not just a history of conquest and power. But it's also a history of visions. Visions of Europe transformed perhaps by common institutions unified within a singular political framework.

==== Henri de Saint-Simon ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:17]]
<nowiki>[41:17]</nowiki>

The history of visions of European integration goes back a long way. One of the thinkers to sort of articulate the clearest vision of a pan-European confederation, at least in the modern era, is the man pictured in the slide here: {{WPExtract|Henri de Saint-Simon}}.

[[File:Claude Henri de Saint-Simon.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Claude Henri de Saint-Simon]]

Saint-Simon in 1814 published a blueprint for European integration. It was very much a product of the {{WPExtract|Age of Enlightenment|the Enlightenment}} context in which it was drafted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:42]]
<nowiki>[41:42]</nowiki>

It envisaged a rational, secular, European state, with a single European parliament and a single European monarch too. Of course a constitutional monarch not an authoritarian one.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:55]]
<nowiki>[41:55]</nowiki>

What Saint-Simon offered was a sort of utopian vision of a Europe unified. Utopian because a Europe unified along Saint-Simonian lines would of course be a Europe in which war was implausible.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:09]]
<nowiki>[42:09]</nowiki>

War would be a thing of the past in a Europe unified within a singular political framework.

==== Winston Churchill's Zurich Speech of 1946 ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:14]]
<nowiki>[42:14]</nowiki>

This notion that unification offers an alternative to war, an alternative to organized violence, was also very much on the mind on Winston Churchill in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:28]]
<nowiki>[42:28]</nowiki>

If Europe was to be peaceful, Churchill proclaimed in 1946 in an important speech on European unification, we must build a kind of United States of Europe.<ref>One can obtain a [http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html transcript of the speech from The Churchill Society's website].</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:39]]
<nowiki>[42:39]</nowiki>

What Churchill is arguing at that moment is that Europe is doomed to repeat the experience of the Second World War unless it can establish some confederal institutional framework that will suppress its innate disposition towards conflict and violence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:57]]
<nowiki>[42:57]</nowiki>

It should be said just as a footnote to the Churchill point that Churchill did not expect that Great Britain would itself participate in this United States of Europe. It was to be a United States of Europe for the continental Europeans -- not one in which the British Isles would join.

==== European Integration as an Antidote to War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:14]]
<nowiki>[43:14]</nowiki>

But the overriding rationale was of course political, and this political rationale has been a common theme in the long sort of history of ideas about European integration: integration as a means to surmount conflict, integration as a means to surmount belligerent tendencies that are sort of inherent in the international relations of states, and you know pervasively present in Europe's bloody history.

==== The Economic Advantages of Integration ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:45]]
<nowiki>[43:45]</nowiki>

But there are also economic advantages which the would-be integrators of Europe in the 1940s identified and emphasized. Insofar as Europe's nation-state's are relatively small in scale, Europe as a patchwork of nation-states would never be able to develop the kinds of continental economies of scale from which the economy of the United States has benefited, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:13]]
<nowiki>[44:13]</nowiki>

The rise of American economic power in the first half the twentieth century was a model that struck a great deal of, you know fear, and trepidation into sort of Europeans who witnessed and watched it. Because the United States seemed to benefit from the fact of its being a vast integrated economic unit. There are of course no trade barriers between the states of the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:42]]
<nowiki>[44:42]</nowiki>

You know California and New York and all of the states in between them are part of a single integrated economic arena. And Europeans who looked at the United States attributed the economic prosperity of the United States to that basic fact.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:58]]
<nowiki>[44:58]</nowiki>

The fact of the United States being an integrated economy on a continental scale. So an alternative kind of rationale for European integration develops during the course of the 20th century in particular.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:09]]
<nowiki>[45:09]</nowiki>

And this is a rationale of economic integration. One which proposes self-consciously to emulate the historical experience of the United States of America. Integration of the European economies will in this framework create economies of scale that will be productive, so the theory goes, of kind of growth and prosperity that could not be accomplished in a Europe of independent nations.

=== The Paramount Rationale for European Integration: Political or Economic ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:37]]
<nowiki>[45:37]</nowiki>

So these are two possible rationales for constructing Europe: political and economic. There are also two explanations that historians have offered. There's no really consensus amongst the historians of European integration as to whether political or economic motives were paramount.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:54]]
<nowiki>[45:54]</nowiki>

Why was Europe built? Was it because European statesmen wanted to preserve the peace or was it because they wanted to create an integrated economy that would be productive of you know prosperity that a Europe of nations could not sustain.

==== The Materialistic Explanation ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:12]]
<nowiki>[46:12]</nowiki>

You know my own sympathies are with the more materialistic explanation -- that the integrationist project had to do with economics and not so much with international relations. But you know other historians will see things differently and I don't want to suggest to you that either interpretation is correct, but I will be honest as to what my biases are.

=== The Course of European Integration ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:33]]
<nowiki>[46:33]</nowiki>

Okay, so let's tell this history and try to figure out it happens in practice. Who favors European integration after the Second World War? Who are the major you know theorists, and thinkers and political leaders who bring about the integration, the economic integration of Europe's nation-states?

==== Paul Hoffman and the Economic Cooperation Administration ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:54]]
<nowiki>[46:54]</nowiki>

One of the first people, you know, we should mention when we think about the founding fathers of Europe is ironically an American: {{WPExtract|Paul G. Hoffman|Paul Hoffman}}.

[[File:Paul Hoffman (1950).jpg|thumb|250px|center|Paul Hoffman in 1950]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:02]]
<nowiki>[47:02]</nowiki>

Paul Hoffman before the Second World War had been head of the Studebaker Motor Corporation. He goes to work in Washington like a lot of businessmen do during the war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:11]]
<nowiki>[47:11]</nowiki>

And after the war becomes the head of the {{WPExtract|Economic Cooperation Administration|European Cooperation Administration}}.<ref>Likely actually meaning the {{WPExtract|Economic Cooperation Administration}}.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:16]]
<nowiki>[47:16]</nowiki>

A US government agency that is set up to promote the economic rehabilitation of Europe after the war has been won. In this capacity Hoffman is responsible for the disbursement of Marshall Aid funds.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:28]]
<nowiki>[47:28]</nowiki>

He is in effect the principle administrator of the Marshall Plan in Europe. This is a position of considerable influence and responsibility, and Hoffman from this position becomes a very strong advocate of European integration.

===== US Support for European Integration in the Postwar Era =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:44]]
<nowiki>[47:44]</nowiki>

This is not a [[wikt:quixotic|quixotic]] move on his part. On the contrary the State Department is wholly committed to the promotion of an integrationist agenda in postwar Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:55]]
<nowiki>[47:55]</nowiki>

The reason for this, you know, has to do in part with the Cold War. Europe, so the State Department line goes, will be more secure and more resilient if it can integrate the European nation-states, and more vulnerable as they are than as they would be if they sort of reconstituted themselves into a federation under some super national authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:17]]
<nowiki>[48:17]</nowiki>

So the US is a powerful cheerleader for European integration. In part that has do with a set of presumptions about American history, right. Insofar as the prosperity of the United States seems to have been built upon the integration of a large continental market so American planners argue will Europe be more prosperous if it can emulate the historical experience of the United States.

==== European Supporters for Integration ====

===== Jean Monnet =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:42]]
<nowiki>[48:42]</nowiki>

So the United States is both a model for European integration and a powerful supporter of the integrative process. But there are plenty Europeans who are also enthusiastic even zealous integrators -- none more important than {{WPExtract|Jean Monnet}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:56]]
<nowiki>[48:56]</nowiki>

And Monnet, you know, I would argue has a stronger claim than anybody else to be the sort of most important of Europe's founding fathers. That is the most important founding father of Europe as an integrative project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:11]]
<nowiki>[49:11]</nowiki>

This is all the more curious when we think about the fact that Monnet never held elected office. Monnet with a technocrat, an economist, a civil servant, but not a political leader. He was a French economist who served the prewar French government and reentered government service after the Second World War following the end of the {{WPExtract|Vichy France|Vichy regime}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:36]]
<nowiki>[49:36]</nowiki>

Monnet very much favored integration as an economic quest. He wanted to create a single integrated European market that would, as he saw it, be more prosperous and more productive than Europe could be in the absence of integration. Monnet did not however conceive that an integrated Europe would be a rival to the United States. Rather he saw a commitment to {{WPExtract|Atlanticism}}, to close relations between Europe and the United States, and European integration as complementary projects.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:09]]
<nowiki>[50:09]</nowiki>

He wanted both to integrate Europe as an entity unto itself and to build close and even integrated relationships between North America and Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:21]]
<nowiki>[50:21]</nowiki>

Monnet's vision is one that enjoys considerable support amongst the political leaders of postwar Europe.

===== Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Alcide De Gasperi =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:31]]
<nowiki>[50:31]</nowiki>

Who are the key leaders? They include {{WPExtract|Robert Schuman}} the Prime Minister of France, {{WPExtract|Konrad Adenauer}} the Christian Democratic Chancellor of Germany, {{WPExtract|Alcide De Gasperi}}, the Italian Prime Minister.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:43]]
<nowiki>[50:43]</nowiki>

The fact that these three men, three men who are very pivotal in the construction of Europe, rule at the same time is consequential. There are affinities between them as a group of leaders that help to explain their shared enthusiasm for the European project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:59]]
<nowiki>[50:59]</nowiki>

Each of these men comes from a border region. Schuman was born, I think in Luxembourg,<ref>According to Wikipedia Schuman was indeed born in {{WPExtract|Luxembourg City}}, {{WPExtract|Luxembourg}}.</ref>, Adenauer in the {{WPExtract|Rhineland|Rhine}}, sorry, not, maybe Adenauer might even have been born in {{WPExtract|Alsace-Lorraine}}. I'm not entirely sure you'd have to check that on Wikipedia.<ref>According to Wikipedia Adenauer was born in {{WPExtract|Cologne}}, {{WPExtract|Rhine Province}}, {{WPExtract|Kingdom of Prussia}}, {{WPExtract|German Empire}}.</ref> But he was born from the western portion, in the western portion of Germany, which has you know frequently been contested between Germany and France.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:24]]
<nowiki>[51:24]</nowiki>

De Gasperi was actually born in the {{WPExtract|Austria-Hungary|Austro-Hungarian Empire}} before you know it became part of the Italian nation-state.<ref>According to Wikipedia De Gasperi was born in {{WPExtract|Pieve Tesino}}, {{WPExtract|County of Tyrol}}, {{WPExtract|Austria-Hungary}}.</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:32]]
<nowiki>[51:32]</nowiki>

So they all have experience of living in contested border regions. These are not people who come from the centers of their own national projects, but they're people with, you know, a sensitivity to, you know, cosmopolitanism, to the fragility of life upon a contested international border.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:56]]
<nowiki>[51:56]</nowiki>

They're also all devout Catholics, and this is important too, right. Insofar as the Catholic Church is an institutional framework which encompassed much of Europe for most of its history, at least until the {{WPExtract|Reformation}}, and which continues even after to maintain sort of aspirations of being a universal church for all Europeans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:19]]
<nowiki>[52:19]</nowiki>

The fact that Schuman Adenauer, and De Gasperi are Catholics may be of some consequence. Probably more important as a practical matter is the fact that they all speak German.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:31]]
<nowiki>[52:31]</nowiki>

So they're able to converse with each other: the leaders of France, Germany and Italy without having to make recourse to translators. These affinities will in intangible but nonetheless important respects help to facilitate and sort of lubricate the process of institutional integration.

=== The European Coal and Steel Community ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:49]]
<nowiki>[52:49]</nowiki>

How does this process of institutional integration come about? What are the first kind of, you know, major steps? The first really significant step has to do with the construction of the {{WPExtract|European Coal and Steel Community}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:03]]
<nowiki>[53:03]</nowiki>

It's not a terribly evocative or you know romantic name but it is nonetheless the most important of the early institutional steps that are taken to build a united Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:15]]
<nowiki>[53:15]</nowiki>

The ECSC, The European Coal and Steel Community, is in its inception a French proposal. Schuman puts forward a plan, the {{WPExtract|Schuman Declaration|Schuman Plan}} in 1950 that proposes to create a single high authority to regulate the coal and steel production of northwestern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:37]]
<nowiki>[53:37]</nowiki>

The design, though it bore Schuman's name, had been drafted by Jean Monnet the leading sort of technocratic proponent of European integration in the French government.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:49]]
<nowiki>[53:49]</nowiki>

Coal and steel are important economically. There's also a political or symbolic importance to the proposition for a European Coal and Steel authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:00]]
<nowiki>[54:00]</nowiki>

After all coal and steel are both you know basic implements of war. Factories that produce munitions depend upon coal for energy. Steel of course is so vital to...you know, it's importance as a resource for war production can hardly be overemphasized.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:20]]
<nowiki>[54:20]</nowiki>

So there is a you know sort of political symbolism to the construction of the European Coal and Steel Community too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:27]]
<nowiki>[54:27]</nowiki>

The Coal and Steel Community will involve Germany, Italy and the {{WPExtract|Benelux}} countries as well as France. So it brings together the nation-states that will constitute sort of the core from which European integration proceeds.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:44]]
<nowiki>[54:44]</nowiki>

It's inaugurated in 1951 and Monnet becomes its first president.

==== The European Coal and Steel Community in Practice ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:49]]
<nowiki>[54:49]</nowiki>

What is the Coal and Steel community in practice? What does it do? It's not a supernational government. It doesn't sort of directly control steel resources which continue in many cases to be nationally owned.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:04]]
<nowiki>[55:04]</nowiki>

France for example had nationalized steel after the Second World War. What the Coal and Steel Community does is simply to sort of reconcile competing national priorities: to set production targets, to mediate amongst diverse national interests.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:21]]
<nowiki>[55:21]</nowiki>

So rather than an exercise in supernationalism the ECSC represents a framework for institutionalized cooperation amongst nation-states. It tries to balance national priorities. It's, you know, fairly successful in doing so.

=== European Military Integration ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:39]]
<nowiki>[55:39]</nowiki>

It doesn't take long for Europeans to pursue other kinds of integration. Here the story of military integration is particularly important. The question of what to do with Germany, particularly the question of what to do with German military power, was of course one of the really burning questions that Europeans confronted after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:00]]
<nowiki>[56:00]</nowiki>

By the late 1940s the United States is advocating strongly in favor of German rearmament. Germany is of course a very powerful, or at least potentially powerful country, to the extent that Germany can be integrated to the West than the West will be you know strengthened as a counter balance to the strength of the Soviet led East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:20]]
<nowiki>[56:20]</nowiki>

But the countries of Western Europe, France in particular, are very leery of German rearmament with good reason. Germany had invaded France twice, within the past forty years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:34]]
<nowiki>[56:34]</nowiki>

So French political leaders are sort of unwilling to countenance German rearmament.

==== The European Defense Community ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:40]]
<nowiki>[56:40]</nowiki>

In 1950 a concept for reintegrating Germany within a sort of Pan-European framework emerges. This becomes known as the {{WPExtract|Treaty establishing the European Defence Community|European Defense Community}} or EDC.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:54]]
<nowiki>[56:54]</nowiki>

It's a framework which enjoys strong support in Germany, in Italy, and in the Benelux countries, and it would be create a single sort of authority for sharing military resources and integrated military command that would you know represent a substantial step towards the military, if not the political integration of Europe.

===== French Rejection of the European Defense Community =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:17]]
<nowiki>[57:17]</nowiki>

France ultimately will not go along with the EDC, the European Defense Community proposal, decides in 19545 to veto it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:26]]
<nowiki>[57:26]</nowiki>

The rationale for the veto, the French Prime Minister {{WPExtract|Pierre Mendès France}} explains, is that the EDC contains too much integration and too little England. That's the phrase he used.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:39]]
<nowiki>[57:39]</nowiki>

What does that mean? Well, it suggests that France does not want to subordinate its military and thus its political autonomy within a Pan-European framework.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:50]]
<nowiki>[57:50]</nowiki>

France wants a degree of economic integration via the ECSC but it is not so enthusiastic about military integration. Moreover France does not want to participate in a military organization that would implicitly marginalize Great Britain as a factor in Europe's political military relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:12]]
<nowiki>[58:12]</nowiki>

This is really interesting. It tells us you know something about France's complex relationship with the European Project. France will be a powerful driver of economic integration but when it comes to political and security affairs the French in 1954 prefer to ... You know they prioritize their relationship or alliance with Great Britain over the possibility of an integrated European Defense Community.

=== The Integration of Germany into NATO ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:44]]
<nowiki>[58:44]</nowiki>

With the failure of the EDC the alternative solution ends up being the integration of Germany to NATO. And this is an important accomplishment so far as the NATO alliance is concerned. It represents a sort of escalatory move in the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:01]]
<nowiki>[59:01]</nowiki>

But it's also a setback so far as the project of European integration is concerned for a couple of reasons. And the first is that NATO is not a particularly tightly integrated, you know, military system. It's an alliance of nation-states but not a, you know, sort of defense community as the EDC would have been.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:20]]
<nowiki>[59:20]</nowiki>

Moreover NATO is a transatlantic community in which the United States plays the predominant role. So it would be hard to construe NATO as a framework for European integration. It's something much bigger than that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:32]]
<nowiki>[59:32]</nowiki>

It's a framework that integrates the military resources of the entire West.

=== Economic Integration of Europe in the Mid 1950s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:36]]
<nowiki>[59:36]</nowiki>

By 1955 the European project is at a sort of impasse. The ECSC has been very successful. The EDC has been much less successful. You know what should be done next?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:52]]
<nowiki>[59:52]</nowiki>

What do European integrationists want to do as they look towards the future? The lessons of the early 1950s are fairly obvious. Economic integration has been a success. Military political integration has been much harder to accomplish. The integrationists decide to press forward with economic integration.

==== The Messina Conference ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:10]]
<nowiki>[60:10]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Messina Conference|Negotiations undertaken at Messina in Italy in 1955}} which agree upon the goal of creating a European wide free trade area. This is really, really important.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:25]]
<nowiki>[60:25]</nowiki>

Removing tariffs barriers between the nation-states of Europe will create what amounts to a single integrated continental market. At least it will create sort of the opportunity for business to create an integrated continental market.

==== The Treaty of Rome ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:38]]
<nowiki>[60:38]</nowiki>

Messina inaugurates two years of very complicated negotiations which lead in 1957 to the {{WPExtract|Treaty of Rome}} -- the treaty that creates the {{WPExtract|European Economic Community}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:52]]
<nowiki>[60:52]</nowiki>

This is in many senses the big bang moment for European integration. The Treaty of Rome commits its signatories: France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries to create a single sort of integrated harmonized tariff bloc within a fairly limited time span.

===== The Absence of Great Britain =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:14]]
<nowiki>[61:14]</nowiki>

One of the sort of interesting features of the Rome treaty is the absence of Great Britain. Where is Britain at Rome? The answer is that Britain is not there. Though Britain was invited to participate in the discussions the British demure.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:31]]
<nowiki>[61:31]</nowiki>

They're excessively preoccupied with the {{WPExtract|Commonwealth of Nations|Commonwealth}} which is the sort of post-imperial alliance between Great Britain and its former colonies. They don't want to participate in the European Economic Community at least not at this time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:46]]
<nowiki>[61:46]</nowiki>

So the British abstain from participation in the project of European integration at the moment when it really takes off and begins to accelerate.

==== Rationale for European Integration ====

===== The Benelux Countries =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:57]]
<nowiki>[61:57]</nowiki>

Why do those countries that do participate in it decide to do so? The Benelux countries are probably the most ardent supporters of European integration. The reasons for this are fairly obvious, right.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:09]]
<nowiki>[62:09]</nowiki>

These are very small countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, tiny, tiny, little countries. Their economic prospects as autonomous nation-states are not very good. Only by being integrated into a larger European framework will these countries be able to participate in a larger market which will you know provide them with expanded economic opportunities.

===== Germany =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:32]]
<nowiki>[62:32]</nowiki>

Germany is a strong supporter of European integration. That in part has to do with the legacies of the Nazi era -- what you might call war guilt. Participating in the construction of a democratically and peacefully unified Europe offers at least some salvation for the crimes of the very recent past.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:52]]
<nowiki>[62:52]</nowiki>

Of course the European project also offers opportunity for German industry in the form of export markets which German industry can export to without having to surmount tariff barriers. So for Germany there are both political and economic incentives inherent in the integrationist project.

===== France =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:12]]
<nowiki>[63:12]</nowiki>

France's relationship to the integrationist project is probably the most complicated. France certainly seeks an expanded political role in the world via Europe. It is the expectation of French statesmen that they will dominate Europe politically and that by dominating Europe they will be able to exercise a world role if not commensurate to that of the United States then at least a lot closer to that of the United States than which France would be able to you know exercise on its own.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:43]]
<nowiki>[63:43]</nowiki>

So far as economic integration goes the French are less enthusiastic about it than the Germans and the Benelux countries are. France is particularly committed to agricultural protection -- to the establishment of specific provisions to protect the interests of French farmers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:59]]
<nowiki>[63:59]</nowiki>

Once these provisions have been accomplished, which they are, when the other countries agree to establish a common agricultural tariff policy and a system of subsidies to provide for direct payments to French farmers, than France will be an enthusiastic support in the European project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:16]]
<nowiki>[64:16]</nowiki>

But for France of establishment of special provision and protection for French agriculture is a precondition of participation virtually from the outset.

=== European Integration Post-1957 and the Treaty of Rome ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:26]]
<nowiki>[64:26]</nowiki>

1957 you know sort of sets up the basic project. The subsequent history of this project is one of ongoing incremental development and integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:39]]
<nowiki>[64:39]</nowiki>

There's really not a grand plan for European integration. At least there's not a sort of grand plan that produces the {{WPExtract|European Union}} as it exists today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:47]]
<nowiki>[64:47]</nowiki>

What we see instead is rather a process of sort of evolutionary integration. There are multiple institutions. These overlap and overlock.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:56]]
<nowiki>[64:56]</nowiki>

The ECSC, and the EEC, the {{WPExtract|European Economic Community}} which is created in 1957, are wholly different institutions. Another institution, for example, {{WPExtract|European Atomic Energy Community|Euratom}}, which is a Europe wide atomic regulatory agency is also created.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:11]]
<nowiki>[65:11]</nowiki>

And it's a separate institution too. Let me just show you a quick diagram which sort of illustrates the complexity of the European project as it evolves after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:23]]
<nowiki>[65:23]</nowiki>

The European project involves a number of different institutional frameworks and bodies. Euratom, the ECSC, the EEC, the {{WPExtract|Western European Union|West European Union}},<ref>Wikipedia is redirecting from West European Union to Western European Union which appears to be the more typical English name for the organization.</ref> {{WPExtract|European Political Cooperation}} entity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:36]]
<nowiki>[65:36]</nowiki>

There's a lot going on here, and it's not necessarily, it's not necessary to unpick or unravel all of these. Most Europeans couldn't tell you what different purposes these institutions serve, so we're not going to expect you to do that.

=== The Trajectory of European Integration ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:51]]
<nowiki>[65:51]</nowiki>

What you should have a sense of is of the basic vectors of development. Where does the European project go? Well, it basically moves in two directions. Integration becomes tighter and more intense. And the project expands spatially or geographically.

==== Spatial Expansion ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:07]]
<nowiki>[66:07]</nowiki>

The first 15 years after 1957 can be understood as a period of spatial expansion. Most importantly Great Britain becomes a member of the European Economic Community at long last in 1973. Sort of a critical moment in the spatial expansion of the European community, a process that today has taken the borders of integrated Europe all the way up to the Ukraine and Belarus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:35]]
<nowiki>[66:35]</nowiki>

Of course that little bit of the map we might be shading a different color soon.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:44]]
<nowiki>[66:44]</nowiki>

So, Europe expands, eastwards, Europe expands northwards to encompass Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.

==== Increase in the Intensity of Integration ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:53]]
<nowiki>[66:53]</nowiki>

During the 1970s, and this is a history that we'll come to in due course, the intensity of integration also deepens. The first steps to harmonize monetary policy take place in 1973. Negotiations to produce a single currency begin in the 1980s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:13]]
<nowiki>[67:13]</nowiki>

So the economic integration of the bloc will accelerate in due course. The euro of course will be introduced around the turn of the twentieth century. These are issues that we're going to deal with later so we're not going to belabor them now.

=== Conclusion: European Integration ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:26]]
<nowiki>[67:26]</nowiki>

The point is that Europe evolves. It becomes wider, and it also becomes you know sort of deeper. What does this transformation signify in the larger scheme of things? What has happened to Europe since the Second World War? And what does this imply not only about sort of European politics but also about larger transformations in the international relations of nation-states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:52]]
<nowiki>[67:52]</nowiki>

The transformation of Europe is really, really interesting because it conjures at least the possibility, if not the fact, of a different kind of international order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:03]]
<nowiki>[68:03]</nowiki>

An international order comprised not of wholly sovereign nation-states each defensive of their own self-interests but rather the possibility of an international order regulated and governed by shared institutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:16]]
<nowiki>[68:16]</nowiki>

It's particularly interesting that this new order of things has developed in Europe. Because Europe after all is the region of the world where the classical sort of international system of nation-states first developed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:29]]
<nowiki>[68:29]</nowiki>

It was the {{WPExtract|Peace of Westphalia|Treaty of Westphalia}} in 1648 that gave symbolic birth to the international system of nations. That is to say sort of an idea of international relations in which nation-states are the elemental units.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:46]]
<nowiki>[68:46]</nowiki>

Europe of course fought a great many wars between 1648 and 1945. Wars were fought for national aggrandizement. Wars were fought to preserve the European balance of power. Whatever the reason a great deal of them were waged and the consequences were very, very bloody.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:05]]
<nowiki>[69:05]</nowiki>

After the Second World War Europe in effect transforms its international relations. It integrates. And as a consequence perhaps no European war has been waged since 1945.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:18]]
<nowiki>[69:18]</nowiki>

The creation of Pan-European institutions, you know, thus sort of facilitates, enables would be too strong a word, but it facilitates the transformation in the inner character of European states. Insofar as European states after 1945 privilege welfare, which is to say the construction of sort of social democracy, they put less and less emphasis on warfare.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:43]]
<nowiki>[69:43]</nowiki>

Raising and maintaining armies was from the 17th century through to the mid-20th century the primary enterprise to which European states committed themselves. After the Second World War it's been very different. Promoting the welfare of their citizens has become the primary commitment to which European states are wed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:05]]
<nowiki>[70:05]</nowiki>

The transformation from the warfare state to the welfare state has you know larger global echoes but it is in Europe that it has been most pronounced.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:15]]
<nowiki>[70:15]</nowiki>

European institutions haven't produced this transformation, at least not on their own, indeed the history of Europe's social democratic moment antedates the history of European construction. But the creation of an integrated European community has at least facilitated the rise of a quite different kind of European nation-state from the European nation-state of the modern era more broadly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:42]]
<nowiki>[70:42]</nowiki>

To what extent has this European project been exceptional? Should we see Europe in the world today as something wholly different from other regions of the world or are their similarities in the institutions that Europeans have constructed to regulate their continental affairs and institutions like the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund that exist at the global scale? These are questions that we should think about.

=== The United States and the European Social Democratic Moment ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:09]]
<nowiki>[71:09]</nowiki>

Let me just talk for a few minutes -- last five minutes -- of the lecture -- about the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:14]]
<nowiki>[71:14]</nowiki>

The United States has an essential but at the same time ambivalent relationship with the history of the social democratic moment in Europe. To an extent that is hardly paralleled elsewhere in the West socialism remains a dirty word in the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:32]]
<nowiki>[71:32]</nowiki>

We might infer if we think about the toxic nature of the world socialist in American politics today that the United States has sort of always historically been opposed to social democratic socialist construction.

=== US Support for the Social Democratic Moment in Europe ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:47]]
<nowiki>[71:47]</nowiki>

In fact the history of the early postwar years is quite different from that. Far from opposing European socialism or social democracy the United States supported it after 1947 through the disbursement of Marshall Aid funds, through the provision of technical assistance, through the promulgation of a sort of doctrine that one historian {{WPExtract|Charles S. Maier|Charles Maier}} has called the politics of productivity -- the idea that becoming more productive can mitigate social conflict.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:17]]
<nowiki>[72:17]</nowiki>

The United States supported the project of European rehabilitation and of European integration. The {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods institutions}} in which the United States was preeminent also accommodated the global expansion of the public sector. This is an issue that we've already talked about. We'll come back to in due course. But let's remind ourselves that the Bretton Woods institutions accommodate the rise of postwar welfare states.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:42]]
<nowiki>[72:42]</nowiki>

The United States also provides free security. Mostly free security. American military forces are stationed in Europe after the Second World War -- provide European countries with security which enables those European countries to focus their fiscal resources on the provision of welfare to their citizens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:01]]
<nowiki>[73:01]</nowiki>

So the United States in a sense underwrites the emergence of Europe's sort of postwar social democratic consensus.

=== US Demurral of Welfarist Policies Within Its Own Borders ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:09]]
<nowiki>[73:09]</nowiki>

But what of the United States itself? Does it participate in this social democratic moment? Of course the {{WPExtract|New Deal}} left legacies you know that amounted to a skeletal welfare state. Social Security in the United States was introduced in 1935, the minimum wage was also a legacy of the New Deal.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:30]]
<nowiki>[73:30]</nowiki>

So there are developments in the American experience that parallel those that occurred in Europe after the Second World War. The American welfare state is more limited however.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:41]]
<nowiki>[73:41]</nowiki>

When Harry Truman after the Second World War proposes to expand upon Roosevelt's New Deal with the creation of what he calls a {{WPExtract|Fair Deal}}, a new package of welfare provisions that will include a national health service, Congress pushes back. Says we're not going to do this -- that would be too much socialism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:58]]
<nowiki>[73:58]</nowiki>

So the project of welfarist construction in the United States encounters obstacles that it does not encounter in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:06]]
<nowiki>[74:06]</nowiki>

But nonetheless there are important gains for sort of social democracy, to use the term very broadly, in the United States. Nobody is more important in the history of European social democratic construction than, sorry, in the history of American social democratic construction, than Lyndon Baines Johnson.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:25]]
<nowiki>[74:25]</nowiki>

President from 1963 to January 1969, LBJ, was a, you know, sort of devotee of Roosevelt's New Deal. He sought in the 1960s to emulate and expand upon Roosevelt's accomplishments.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:42]]
<nowiki>[74:42]</nowiki>

In 1964 he declared a war on poverty. It involved the provision of sort of new assistance to ameliorate poverty particularly in inner city and rural America.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:51]]
<nowiki>[74:51]</nowiki>

Johnson presided over the establishment of new programs to provide welfare to American citizens. AFDC -- {{WPExtract|Aid to Families with Dependent Children|Aid for Families with Dependent Children}}, and most important of all in terms of their scale and consequence, Medicare and Medicaid.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 75:08]]
<nowiki>[75:08]</nowiki>

Thanks to increased social spending under the Johnson administration overall public spending commitments in the United States increased fairly dramatically in the years after the Second World War.

== The Social Democratic Moment Internationally ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:22]]
<nowiki>[75:22]</nowiki>

Now this chart with which we, you know, will conclude the lecture shows the transformation of the public sector in the United States in a sort of narrow international context.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:36]]
<nowiki>[75:36]</nowiki>

If we look at public spending in France, Germany, Japan, Britain and the United States, the five biggest countries of the West, which is what this chart illustrates, then we see an essentially similar pattern, right? During the course of the twentieth century public sector commitments increase markedly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:52]]
<nowiki>[75:52]</nowiki>

This increase is more pronounced in some contexts particularly France, Germany, and Britain than it is in Japan and the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:01 ]]
<nowiki>[76:01]</nowiki>

But the basic trend line is universal. So though there will be sort of differences of accent, differences of intensity between the American experience and the West European experience, the basic pattern is more or less parallel. The postwar decades bring about the consolidation of welfare's commitments and a commensurate increase in the scale of the public sector.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:27 ]]
<nowiki>[76:27]</nowiki>

Now there will be consequences to this story. There will be backlashes against it and to those we will turn in about a week when we sort of come back to the political economic story.

== Lecture Overview for the Next Session ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:38 ]]
<nowiki>[76:38]</nowiki>

On Thursday we're going to be dealing with a very different set of issues -- a set of issues having to do not with the West and with the capitalist world but with the East and the Soviet Union and its socialist model.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 06 - Decolonization and Development - 01h 21m 08s

2019-05-21T21:02:01Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

== Introduction and Nomenclature ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, good morning. I should start just with a word of acknowledgement about the title. It's a little bit of a misnomer. This lecture, though, it's titled "Decolonization and Development," it's really about development. The story of decolonization we'll deal with next week. So, a better title for the lecture would be "Development in the Decolonizing and Postcolonial World." Besides the fact that would be too long to fit in a single line, this is the title that happens to be in the syllabus. So, blame the person who wrote the syllabus.

== Lecture Overview ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:33]]
<nowiki>[0:33]</nowiki>

Okay, what we're going to deal with today is the very difficult history of development and under development in the sort of vast region of the world outside of the sort of industrial North. We might describe the region that we're dealing with as the {{WPExtract|Global South}}, the Developing World, perhaps, the Third World. There are sort of different ways of describing this part of the globe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:03]]
<nowiki>[1:03]</nowiki>

Each of the terms has slightly different implications. Third World implies a sort of Cold War schema in which the world is divided into a capitalist first world, a communist second world, and a developing third world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22]]
<nowiki>[1:22]</nowiki>

So, there are sort of implications to the terminology that we might choose to use. I, personally, like Global South, because I think it's sort of less loaded than some of the other terms of phrase. But really, it's not important. You can come to your own conclusions as what the right terminology is to describe the sort of vast region of the world with which we are dealing today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:43]]
<nowiki>[1:43]</nowiki>

The question that we're sort of going to address principally has to do with development. How did the developing world try to sort of improve its economic situation in the decades immediately subsequent to the Second World War?

== The Shift in Wealth and Its Reversal ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:59]]
<nowiki>[1:59]</nowiki>

I'd like to start off by contextualizing this history within a sort of larger historical panorama. So, I'm going to show you some slides that we've already seen, and we'll try to think about sort of the implications of the sort of larger historical framing for the particular history with which we're going to be dealing today. Let's think about, first of all, the changing global distribution of wealth over the past three centuries.

Where does the wealth go in the era of the Industrial Revolution, late 19th century globalization, and, of course, the 20th century? Well, there's a really clear path in which this chart illustrates and that is that the West gets rich and the rest of the world doesn't, at least through 1950.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:50]]
<nowiki>[2:50]</nowiki>

A distribution of global wealth between sort of the West, China, and India is relatively even around 1700, at the beginning of the 18th century. In fact, India is the sort of wealthiest of those three regions. This is kind of striking. By 1950, the realities could not be more different. The West has far eclipsed China and India, the three major centers of global sort of wealth and productivity, around the turn of the 18th century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:24]]
<nowiki>[3:24]</nowiki>

So, this is a big, big shift in the global distribution of wealth. We're not going to try to explain that shift today. That would be the subject for an entirely different lecture class. What we're dealing with are the consequences of this sort of shift in global wealth. Our story begins about there, in 1950. But it's still important to have a sense of the prehistory, right, because that powerfully animates the ways in which historical actors in the second half of the 20th century understand their own position, their own situation, and the challenges that lie ahead of them. I could show you a couple of maps which are scaled so as to reflect the global distribution of wealth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:03]]
<nowiki>[4:03]</nowiki>

These maps tell, essentially, the same story as the charts, which I just showed you. Three major centers of global wealth in 1500; Europe, South Asia, and China. The story has changed quite dramatically by the time we get to 1960. By the time we get to 1960, Europe, and its North American offshoot, the United States, are, of course, predominant. The share of wealth accruing to India and China has shrunk really dramatically by comparison.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:42]]
<nowiki>[4:42]</nowiki>

Of course, one of the sort of interesting phenomena of the period that we're going to be dealing with, the second half of the 20th century, is that this shift in wealth towards the West begins to be reversed. Think about the distribution of wealth today. In a sense the circle is turning, if not full circle, it's at least moving in that direction. Today, you see a slightly more – a rather more balanced distribution of global wealth. China has, self-evidently, resurged. India is very much in the process of doing so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:20]]
<nowiki>[5:20]</nowiki>

So, when we sort of try to explain the history of the second half of the 20th century, we have to be aware, both of what has happened over the preceding two or three centuries as well as aware of what is going to happen over the next half-century. To a substantial extent, the inequalities in wealth, which emerge during the 18th and 19th and first half of the 20th centuries will be reversed in the second half of the 20th century. Western Europe's share of global output declines fairly precipitously after the Second World War. This is really important. This is the big picture.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:00]]
<nowiki>[6:00]</nowiki>

At the same time, it's very important to remember that historical actors in the second half of the 20th century – development economists working in the 1950s – did not know what was going to happen next. We have a privileged perspective on the economic history of the 20th century. We have a sense of what happened. That could not be known in 1950. So, we should remember that when we deal with theorists of development, economists who propose solutions for dealing with the underdevelopment of China and India and Africa, Latin America, the developing world writ large, they didn't necessarily know that catchup was attainable. So, the privilege of hindsight is both sort of a privilege and a liability because it can get in the way of our historical understanding and that's important to remember.

=== Hans Rosling's 200 Countries, 200 Years, 4 Minutes Video ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:54]]
<nowiki>[6:54]</nowiki>

So, before we sort of transition from talking about the very big picture which is really more of a preamble to today's lecture than the substance of today's lecture, I wanted to show you a video clip which I think does about as good a job of telling the history of development in four minutes as any video clip can do. So, I'm just going to turn over the display for a moment to the Swedish statistician, {{WPExtract|Hans Rosling}}. Have any of you heard of him?

Okay, one or two of you.

Well, for the rest of you, I think you'll enjoy this. It's both a really interesting sort of snapshot of 200 years of historical change, and a very impressive demonstration of the visualization of statistics. So, here goes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:41]]
<nowiki>[7:41]</nowiki>

{{#ev:youtube| https://youtu.be/jbkSRLYSojo||center|||start=29&end=266}}

''Hans Rosling: So, here we go. First an axis for health, life expectancy from 25 years to 75 years. Down here, an axis for wealth, income per person; $400.00, $4,000.00, and $40,000.00. So, down here is poor and sick and up here is rich and healthy. Now, I'm going to show you the world 200 years ago in 1810. Here come all the countries. Europe, brown. Asia, red. Middle East, green. Africa, South of Sahara, blue and the Americas is yellow. The size of the country bubble shows the size of the population.''

''In 1810, it was pretty crowded down there, wasn't it? All countries were sick and poor. Life expectancy were below 40 in all countries. Only the U.K. and the Netherlands was likely better off, but not much. And now I start the world.''

''The Industrial Revolution makes countries in Europe and elsewhere move away from the rest. The colonized countries in Asia and Africa, they are stuck down there. And eventually the Western countries get healthier and healthier. And now, we slow down to show the impact of the First World War and the Spanish Flu epidemic. What a catastrophe!''

''Now I speed up through the 1920s and the 1930s. In spite of the Great Depression Western countries forge on towards greater wealth and health. Japan and some others try to follow, but most countries stay down here. Now, after the tragedies of the Second World War, we stop a bit to look at the world in 1948. 1948 was a great year. The war was over. Sweden topped the medal table at the Winter Olympics and I was born.''

''But the difference between the countries of the world was wider than ever. The United States was in the front. Japan was catching up. Brazil was way behind. Iran was getting a little richer from oil, but still had short lives. And the Asian giants: China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, they were still poor and sick down here. But look what is about to happen.''

''Here we go again. In my lifetime, former colonies gained independence and then, finally, they started to get healthier and healthier and healthier. And in the 1970s, then countries in Asia and Latin America started to catch up with the Western countries. They became the emerging economies. Some in Africa follows. Some Africans were stuck in civil war and others hit by HIV. Now, we can see the world today in the most up to date statistics.''

''Most people, today, live in the middle. But there are huge difference, at the same time, between the best of countries and the worst of countries. And there are also huge inequalities within countries. These bubbles show country averages. But I can split them.''

''Take China. I can split it into provinces. There goes Shanghai. It has the same wealth and health as Italy today. There is the poor, inland province Guizhou. It is like Pakistan. If I split it further, the rural parts are like Ghana in Africa. And yet, despite the enormous disparities today, we have seen 200 years of remarkable progress. That huge historical gap between the West and the rest is now closing. We have become an entirely new converging world. And I see a clear trend into the future with age, trade, green technology, and peace. It's fully possible that everyone can make it to the healthy, wealthy corner.''

== Measures of Poverty and Development ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:38]]
<nowiki>[11:38]</nowiki>

So, look; this is obviously a very optimistic positive (laughter) perspective on global economic change, but it's not wholly inaccurate, right? I mean the statistics do speak for themselves.

Yet, it's important for us to remember that we have a different vantage, depending upon whether we approach the history of global economic change from this very macroscopic vantage point than from if we approach it from the perspective of a particular developing economy, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:15]]
<nowiki>[12:15]</nowiki>

Poverty is self-evidently still with us in the world of the early 21st century. It exists. It has to be explained. When we talk about poverty, it's very important to remind ourselves that it is not distributed equally in the world.

=== Infant Mortality ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:31]]
<nowiki>[12:31]</nowiki>

Let's take infant mortality as a statistical proxy for absolute poverty. It's a pretty good indication of it. Where does infant mortality exist, for the most part? In South Asia and Africa. These are still among the poorest, most desperate, and destitute regions of the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:56]]
<nowiki>[12:56]</nowiki>

The case of South Asia is particularly striking, right, because we've already identified South Asia as a region that is booming in terms of its global share of wealth. At the same time, South Asia remains one of the world's major centers for infant mortality. So, this is a paradox with which we're going to have to grapple.

=== Deaths from Wars and Civil Conflict ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:16]]
<nowiki>[13:16]</nowiki>

Let's take another indicator of underdevelopment. This is not an economic indicator but rather a sort of metric which we can use to gauge political instability and look at deaths in war and civil conflict. This data is from 2002. Where in the world are people most likely to suffer untimely death due to political instability or inner state violence? The answer is pretty clear. Africa is, without a shadow of a doubt, the least politically stable part of the world. You're much more likely to die a violent death if you're an African than if you're a Latin American or a European or a North American and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:06]]
<nowiki>[14:06]</nowiki>

This is a very stark illustration of the very different material conditions in which human being find themselves at the turn of the 20th century. Inequality persists in the world of today, even as inequalities between nations, between continents have tended to narrow in the second half of the 20th century as basic indicators of material well-being, GDP per capita and life expectancy have tended to converge.

== What are the Causes of Poverty? ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:43]]
<nowiki>[14:43]</nowiki>

The endurance of poverty demands an explanation. Why are poor country's poor? Is it because we exploit them? Or is it because they have failed to develop? These are two profoundly sort of different interpretations for the persistence of poverty. Does poverty have something to do with the prosperity of the West? We might now add the prosperity of China and the prosperity of other economic centers of dynamism in the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:14]]
<nowiki>[15:14]</nowiki>

Or should poverty be explained really in terms of the circumstances of poor countries? Are poor countries poor because of their own failure to develop, their own failure to develop institutions capable of encouraging and sustaining growth, or are they poor because they are the victims of economic exploitation by the rich world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:36]]
<nowiki>[15:36]</nowiki>

This is a really, really big question and it's a question that development economists have offered quite different kinds of answer to. We're not going to go into sort of development economics in any great detail. There are classes on campus that will do that for you if you want to do it, but it's worth just pointing out a couple of quite different schools of thought when it comes to the issue of development and underdevelopment. I'm going to sort of try to sketch out for you, too, sort of different conceptual frameworks for thinking about the history of development and underdevelopment. The first I'll call a core-periphery model and the second, a model which emphasizes the autonomous development of nation-states.

=== Core-Periphery Model ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:21]]
<nowiki>[16:21]</nowiki>

The core-periphery model of the global economy begins with a basic distinction between sort of the industrial affluent core, the West, and the developing world. {{WPExtract|Immanuel Wallerstein}}, one of the sort of economic historians who was most associated with the core-periphery model, also identifies a sort of intermediary zone which he calls the semi-periphery. These zones each serve a distinct economic function.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:56]]
<nowiki>[16:56]</nowiki>

The industrial West, the core, is where high-value production occurs. The developing world, the periphery, is a center of low-value, sort of agricultural, and commodity production. The semi-periphery, you might think the industrial regions of Mexico, for example, may be defined by the presence of sort of low-value, industrial manufacturing. Dirty production of the kind that the core does not want to take place on its own territory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:31]]
<nowiki>[17:31]</nowiki>

But what's really important about this model isn't so much the sort of precise designation of regions – core, periphery, and semi-periphery – as the postulation about the links that exist between them. For Wallerstein and other proponents of sort of a core-periphery model, the prosperity of the core is fundamentally linked to and dependent upon the poverty of the periphery. The two things are interdependent. You couldn't have the prosperity of the core without the periphery existing in a state of semi-economic servitude. Inversely, the fact that the periphery is so poor reflects the fact of it being exploited by the rich, industrial core. So, the two things are linked, and the linkages are sort of absolutely crucial.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:26]]
<nowiki>[18:26]</nowiki>

The core-periphery model fundamentally challenges some of the most basic assumptions of liberal trade theory. Can anybody remind us what {{WPExtract|David Ricardo}} told us about trade?

Absolutely. Ricardo offers a theory of trade specialization. Countries should specialize in what they are best suited to produce. Who benefits if countries do that, if everybody specializes? That's right, we all benefit. This is sort of a basic assumption of Ricardian Trade Theory.

==== Raúl Prebisch and Import Substitution Industrialization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:08]]
<nowiki>[19:08]</nowiki>

It's an assumption that the proponents of dependency theory challenge very directly. Here, probably the single most important economic theorist is {{WPExtract|Raúl Prebisch}}, an Argentinian economist who develops, early in the postwar period, his first major paper is published in 1949, a powerful critique of Ricardian Trade Theory.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:33]]
<nowiki>[19:33]</nowiki>

Prebisch argues that in contra to the claims of liberal trade theory, free trade does not make everybody better off. Rather, he argues, liberal free trade produces structural inequalities in the global economy. It sustains and perpetuates a distinction between a rich industrial core and a developing primarily agrarian periphery. Trade, he argues, does not benefit the poor. It does not afford them opportunities to move up the food chain, to become richer, more materially prosperous. Furthermore, Prebisch suggests that the rich have a vested interest in the poor remaining poor. It will be unlikely, he suggests, that poor countries can sort of develop and improve their situation within a global economic framework defined and dominated by the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:29]]
<nowiki>[20:29]</nowiki>

There are obvious policy implications to the dependency or dependencia framework that Prebisch articulates sort of early in the postwar period. One of the first really important implications is that developing countries will not prosper within the framework of an integrated globalizing world system. For Prebisch, integration and globalization merely sustain and perpetuate inequality. Thus, in order to develop and prosper, developing countries will need to sort of break away from the global economic system. They'll need to establish barriers to globalization in order to protect their own economies against foreign competition. So, dependencia implies sort of a circumscription of the reach of global economic interaction.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 21:20]]
<nowiki>[21:20]</nowiki>

A second implication is that the developing countries will need to emulate the rich industrial core. If they want to be rich, affluent, and prosperous like the core, they will need to become like the core in terms of their own sort of economic profiles. The way to do this, Prebisch argues, is to promote industry. Insofar as developing countries like Argentina import, say, automobiles, from the United States, they should try to develop domestic industry capable of making those goods for themselves. They should substitute domestic products, domestic automobiles, for imported goods; hence, {{WPExtract| Import substitution industrialization|import substituting industrialization}} or ISI.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 22:07]]
<nowiki>[22:07]</nowiki>

The assumption that ISI is good for growth, is good for the periphery, is really, really pervasive in the first decades after the Second World War. Through the '50s and into the '60s, economists and policy makers throughout the developing world are, for the most part, committed to an ISI paradigm. They believe that developing domestic industries is the way to make their countries more affluent, more modern, ultimately.

=== Western Economists and Autonomous Development ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 22:38]]
<nowiki>[22:38]</nowiki>

What about Western perspectives on development? To what extent do Western economists concur with Prebisch's analysis of the underlying causes for underdevelopment? In general, and this is a generalization because there is a great deal of sympathy in the West for Prebisch's core-periphery model, but in general, Western economists, at least those who are sort of closest to policymaking circles, take a somewhat different perspective. They're much less inclined than Prebisch was to see direct connections between the prosperity of the core and the relative underdevelopment of the periphery.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 23:27]]
<nowiki>[23:27]</nowiki>

For more classically liberal economists, the underdevelopment of the periphery is to be explained primarily in terms of the conditions that exist in peripheral countries. If Argentina is less developed than the United States, it's simply because Argentina hasn't developed so far as the United States has done. But, Argentina's underdevelopment has very little to do with the prosperity of the United States. The things are, essentially, sort of disconnected and autonomous.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:00]]
<nowiki>[24:00]</nowiki>

So, this is a key sort of distinction. Proponents of a core-periphery model see the exploitation of the periphery as a necessary explanation for the wealth of the core. More classically sort of liberal theorists of development see the natural condition of humankind as being miserable and poor. What is to be explained, if you're a liberal economist, is not poverty. Poverty is easy to explain. It's a natural state. The thing which is hard to explain is affluence. So, if you're a liberal economist, you might sort of look at the historical lessons that, or the historical experiences, that produce a greater affluence in the West and ask why the developing world has not yet developed along kind of a similar trajectory.

==== Walt Rostow and Stages of Economic Growth ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:50]]
<nowiki>[24:50]</nowiki>

This is what {{WPExtract| Walt Whitman Rostow|Walt Rostow}}, one of the most influential, sort of liberal theorists of development in the 1950s, does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 24:58]]
<nowiki>[24:58]</nowiki>

Rostow proceeds from the assumption that poverty does not require explanation, prosperity does. In the hope of sort of devising a model that can explain the lessons of prosperity with the hope that they can be taught to the underdeveloped or developing world, Rostow undertakes a very careful study of Britain's historical industrialization.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 25:28]]
<nowiki>[25:28]</nowiki>

He argues that economic growth and modernization can be sort of broken down into a series of stages, each dependent upon the one that precedes it. Rostow posits a sort of grand, historical transformation from traditional society in which life is sort of nasty, brutish, and short – to use {{WPExtract|Thomas Hobbes|Hobbes'}} turn of phrase, to an advanced, industrial, mass consumer society such as that which exists in the United States and Great Britain by the middle of the 20th century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:04]]
<nowiki>[26:04]</nowiki>

Rostow posits a series of kind of stages through which development passes, from traditional society to sort of protoindustrialization to industrial takeoff to the maturation of industrial production, and finally, to the accomplishment of a mass consumption society, a society in which sort of every automobile worker can aspire to buy an automobile as emerges in the United States in the first half of the 20th century.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:33]]
<nowiki>[26:33]</nowiki>

The sort of postulation of distinct stages of development is a not too subtle jab at {{WPExtract|Karl Marx|Marx}} or sort of Marxist theorists who suppose that economic development can be broken down into a small number of distinct phases. Rostow subtitles his book, ''A Non-Communist Manifesto''. So, it's ''The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto'', is the title of Rostow's book.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:08]]
<nowiki>[27:08]</nowiki>

There is an irony there, right, because Rostow's framework is, in key respects no less deterministic than Marx's framework of historical development had been. What Rostow offers is sort of, in a sense, a series of hypotheses about liberal economic development that parallel Karl Marx's theories of sort of class-based economic growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:37]]
<nowiki>[27:37]</nowiki>

Although there are sort of key differences between the core-periphery economists and the liberal economists, there are important similarities which should also be emphasized when it comes to the policy implications of their models. Can anybody hazard a guess as to what those might be? If Prebisch and other dependency theorists argue that the periphery needs to become more like the core in order to prosper and if Rostow postulates a sort of [[wikt:teleological| teleological]] history of industrialization based upon the British example but universally emulable, what might be sort of the shared policy implications of the different models?

(Student response)

Exactly. So, they're coming from different positions. But the conclusions are essentially interchangeable. Whether you're a liberal or whether you're a dependency theorist, you will probably conclude that what the developing world needs to do in order to get rich and happy is to emulate the historical experience of the West. The developing world needs to develop. It needs to acquire modern industries. It needs to increase productivity. It needs to undertake exactly the same historical transformation that the West undertook in the 19th century.

== Modernization Theory ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 29:14]]
<nowiki>[29:14]</nowiki>

This insight animates a sort of school of theory which is highly influential in the United States and particularly on US Cold War foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s -- the school of theory, which we might describe as {{WPExtract|Modernization theory|modernization theory}}. What is modernization theory? Modernization theory is a theory which, essentially, propounds that the experience of Western development, Western industrial growth can be emulated by developing countries. They might need a little bit of assistance from the West. They certainly need to make the right policy choices. But the modernization theorists argue there is no earthly reason why developing countries should not develop into much the same kinds of productive economies that exist in the West.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 30:10]]
<nowiki>[30:10]</nowiki>

Why is modernization theory such a hot topic, an urgent theme in the early 1950s, or late 1940s, early 1950s, and on through the '60s? The rise of modernization theory has, in part, with the conditions that actually exist in the world. Insofar as poverty is still endemic in much of the world, the quest for solutions is necessarily an urgent one. We could see modernization theory simply as a response to the endurance of wide-scale misery in the world of the mid-20th century. But it's also a response to specific political conditions, specifically the advent of the Cold War and the challenge that the Soviet Union poses.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 30:10]]
<nowiki>[30:10]</nowiki>

When we think about the history of development, we should remember that circa 1950, the most impressive model of industrial development that's sort of available on view, may not be that of Great Britain and the Industrial Revolution. How long did Britain's Industrial Revolution take? About a century, I heard. How long did it take the Soviet Union to industrialize under Stalin?

''Student response: Seven years.''

Yeah, not nearly so long. So, if you're developing a country, if you're a leader of a newly postcolonial state like India, where are you going to look for a historical model to emulate?

''Student response: The Soviet Union''

The Soviet Union, perhaps. You may have reservations about adopting the Soviet model. You may not want to starve 10 million peasants to death and throw all of your political enemies into the gulag, but the accomplishments of the Soviet model are, nonetheless, impressive.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:04]]
<nowiki>[32:04]</nowiki>

So, the modernization theorists are sort of responding to the specter of Soviet accomplishment -- trying to distill the lessons of the West's economic history into a package that can be sort of neatly applied to the circumstances of the non-industrial world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:23]]
<nowiki>[32:23]</nowiki>

Of course, modernization theory seeks to fulfill the needs of newly postcolonial states for economic policy prescriptions. One of the reasons that modernization theory rises in the 1950s is that prior to the 1950s, much of the developing world had been colonized and the colonial powers had been, for the most part, much less interested in promoting development in the colonies than the postcolonial regimes that take over from them will be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 32:56]]
<nowiki>[32:56]</nowiki>

One key assumption that pervades modernization theory – this is also true of communist approaches to development, which we'll talk about more in due course – one of the key assumptions has to do with the universal applicability of Western experience. Modernization theorists don't spend a lot of time worrying about the possibility that the Industrial Revolution might have been dependent upon sort of factors that were historically or culturally specific to the British Isles. Rostow sees the Industrial Revolution as a process that could have easily have unfolded anywhere in the world and that can be easily emulated by other countries. He doesn't see industrialization as having a particular attachment to sort of culture or history even.

=== Daniel Lerner and Transitioning from Traditional Society to Modernity ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 33:49]]
<nowiki>[33:49]</nowiki>

Prominent amongst the ranks of development theorists are, of course, economists like Rostow. The role of sociologists is probably also worth pointing out. Sociologists are less concerned with industrialization per se; rather, their concern is with the condition of modernity, itself. Here, {{WPExtract|Daniel Lerner}} is a good example. During the 1950s, Lerner researches a book which sort of posits a grand historical transformation from what he terms traditional society to a condition of modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 34:27]]
<nowiki>[34:27]</nowiki>

Lerner argues in the late 1950s that the Middle East is sort of engaged in the process of making this transition, but the conclusions are really much more sort of sweeping than that. All of human history, Lerner proposes, can sort of be divided into two phases, tradition and modernity. The task that awaits the developing world is to make that transition. And Lerner argues along with other proponents of modernization that the United States government can help the developing world to make that shift. The US can help to make traditional societies modern.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:01]]
<nowiki>[35:01]</nowiki>

How should it do this? Well, it can provide direct material assistance. It can also provide technical and policy guidance. Why should Americans believe that they are sort of in a position to help modernize and develop the Global South? This seems, from a certain vantage point, to be an extraordinary kind of hubris. How can the United States sort of realistically hope to promote the modernization of the Global South? Can any of you sort of suggest why American policy makers in the 1950s might have been so optimistic about the power of their government to enact these sort of vast, far-reaching, social and economic transformations?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:53]]
<nowiki>[35:53]</nowiki>

(Student response)

Absolutely. They're looking at the lessons of recent history, the recent history of economic development and transformation in Europe, and also in the United States. From that perspective, the assumption is easy to reach that similar transformations can be orchestrated and implemented on a global scale.

=== The Tennessee Valley Authority as a Model for Modernization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:17]]
<nowiki>[36:17]</nowiki>

So, the development project or the modernization project draws heavily on the experience of recent history. Here, probably no experience is more formative than that of the TVA, the {{WPExtract|Tennessee Valley Authority|Tennessee Valley Administration}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:35]]
<nowiki>[36:35]</nowiki>

What is the TVA? The TVA, as most of you probably know, is a sort of public works project that establishes a series of kind of major hydroelectric installations in the Tennessee Valley with the purpose of generating power, distributing that power to sort of residents of an impoverished region of the upper South, and of providing employment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:08]]
<nowiki>[37:08]</nowiki>

So, the Tennessee Valley Authority is a sort of grand experiment in public works, something without precedent in the American Experience. But it's an experiment that will sort of powerfully inform concepts of modernization and development in the postwar world. Insofar as the TVA transforms the landscape and the economic prospects of the Tennessee Valley, policy planners in the postwar era imagine that similar feats of accomplishment might be attempted elsewhere.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:39]]
<nowiki>[37:39]</nowiki>

Early in the postwar era, there's a great deal of talk in Washington about the construction of a TVA for the {{WPExtract|Danube}}. Can Central Europe be transformed and modernized much as the Tennessee Valley was? Later on, in the 1960s, there'll be talk of a TVA for the {{WPExtract|Mekong Delta}}. Why not accomplish a similar transformation in Vietnam or, for that matter, in Egypt where the United States could help to create a TVA for the Nile?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:07]]
<nowiki>[38:07]</nowiki>

Why is the TVA such an irresistible model? Well, in part, it's because {{WPExtract|David E. Lilienthal|David Lilienthal}}, who was the head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, is a very enthusiastic and effective promoter of the sort of TVA model. Lilienthal publishes a bestselling book, ''Democracy on the March'' in 1944 which sort of hails the TVA as a sort of new model for democratic governance in which democracy will take on sort of unprecedented responsibility for the promotion of economic growth and wellbeing.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:49]]
<nowiki>[38:49]</nowiki>

So, Lilienthal is an unabashed [[wikt:statist|statist]] and he sees the sort of fusion of political power and economic responsibility in the TVA as a model for the future of sort of democracy as a system of government. This is a lesson that he sorts of propounds to a wide readership in ''Democracy on the March''.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:17]]
<nowiki>[39:17]</nowiki>

There's substantial sort of enthusiasm for modernization at the very highest levels of US government policy. President Truman embraces commitment to modernization as early as 1949. Having orchestrated the Marshall Plan, which you might see as a sort of development project for Western Europe after 1947, Truman will in 1949, in his sort of second –- no, it's his first inaugural address, because he didn't give an inaugural address after Roosevelt died. In his first inaugural address, Truman articulates a commitment to –- here I'm going to quote directly –- "embark on a bold, new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."<ref>[https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-20-1949-inaugural-address Truman's January 20, 1949 Inaugural Address from the Miller Center at the University of Virginia]</ref> This is the fourth point in Truman's 1949 inaugural and it becomes known as {{WPExtract|Point Four Program|The Point Four Program}}, a program for making sort of our economic and technical advances available to the underdeveloped world. This is the first sort of major, sort of presidential commitment to embark upon modernization as a grand ambition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:38]]
<nowiki>[40:38]</nowiki>

''Student Question: Would the US want to do that just because of the Cold War or was there some kind of moral obligation?''

Yeah. That's a really good question. There's a great deal of debate as to what the ultimate purposes of US led modernization might have been. Did it reflect a sort of moral commitment? Was it purely a matter of sort of Cold War strategic interest? You might also raise the possibility that the development of the developing world might have fulfilled an economic interest for the United States by creating sort of expanded markets for the sale of American goods.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:20]]
<nowiki>[41:20]</nowiki>

So, there are a range of possible explanations, some self-interested, some more altruistic. I think the best answer that I can give is that it depends. I think the strategic purpose is very clear. It's no coincidence that Truman articulates Point Four in 1949, a year in which the Cold War intensifies sharply. Subsequent proponents of development in the US government, here President Kennedy is fairly exemplary, are quite unambiguous and unapologetic in tethering the modernization project to the accomplishment of Cold War strategic purposes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:59]]
<nowiki>[41:59]</nowiki>

So, I think of, you know of all of the explanations that you might offer. The one that stresses strategic self-interest is the most persuasive. Other historians may see it differently. I think a more cynical explanation would be that development served an economic self-interest. The least cynical and most generous interpretation would be that it was undertaken for reasons of altruism.

=== American Action to Facilitate Development ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:24]]
<nowiki>[42:24]</nowiki>

How is development to be orchestrated and implemented? Initially, Truman imagines that the agencies of the United Nations will play a leading role. But soon, the United States begins to construct a development apparatus of its own. The {{WPExtract|Mutual Security Act}} creates the {{WPExtract|Mutual Security Agency}} in 1951, and it will provide sort of military assistance to the developing world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:55]]
<nowiki>[42:55]</nowiki>

In 1961, Kennedy creates the new agency committed not to sort of providing military and security assistance but to providing economic and developmental assistance. {{WPExtract| United States Agency for International Development|USAID}} is created in 1961 and it marks a sort of zenith in the modernizing project as the United States worked to promote it.

== Modernization in the Developing World ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:16]]
<nowiki>[43:16]</nowiki>

But for all the efforts that American economists and sociologists and policymakers made to promote and propound modernization as an agenda for the developing world, it is really, really important to remember that modernization was not imposed on the developing world by the West. It was not cooked up in Washington and then exported to the Global South. On the contrary, leaders of the Global South are, themselves, modernizers. They have, for the most part, a very clear sense of the kinds of change that they want to accomplish. Probably the best way to illustrate this is to turn to some specific case studies which is what we'll do next.

=== Development in India after Decolonization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:01]]
<nowiki>[44:01]</nowiki>

Let's talk, first of all, about India. I'll talk about India because I know a little bit more about it than I do about some of the other cases, but more importantly, because one of your readings for this week, {{WPExtract|Sunil Khilnani}}'s extract on the "Temples of the Future" deals directly with the experience of India. Here, you see in the slide, a photograph of {{WPExtract|Jawaharlal Nehru}}, in the early 1960s. He's now India's fairly elderly prime minister sitting at the dedication of the {{WPExtract|Bhakra Dam}}, a vast hydroelectric project that was one of those "Temples of the Future" that Khilnani addresses in this week's reading.

==== Gandhi's and Nehru's Different Visions for Indian Prosperity ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:45]]
<nowiki>[44:45]</nowiki>

Let's talk a little about Nehru and his vision of the future. Nehru is an appropriate sort of point of departure for considering the Indian developmental experience. Who was Nehru and what did he want to accomplish? Nehru was the first prime minister of Independent India. He became prime minister in 1947, at the moment of Indian independence. He had not been the primary leader of the Indian National Congress, which was the sort of main political party in India which struggled for, and then in 1947 accomplished national independence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:27]]
<nowiki>[45:27]</nowiki>

It was, of course, {{WPExtract|Mahatma Gandhi|Mohandas Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi}}, who was usually given the greatest credit for the accomplishment of Indian independence. Gandhi was not only the symbolic but also the real political leader of the Indian independence movement. Nehru was Gandhi's protégé. It was Gandhi who sort of anointed Nehru as the man who would become India's first independent prime minister. But Gandhi was the leader of the nationalist movement that won India early independence following the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:07]]
<nowiki>[46:07]</nowiki>

We'll talk much more about sort of the process of decolonization itself next week. This week, we're really focused on development, itself. And here it's important to note that Gandhi's vision of India's future, specifically Gandhi's vision of India's economic future, was in key respects very different from Nehru's. It was very different from the future that India would end up living. Gandhi believed that European modernity was inappropriate to Indian circumstances. He did not want India to develop into a facsimile of Great Britain. He argued that sort of the ecological consequences of doing so would be catastrophic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:50]]
<nowiki>[46:50]</nowiki>

India, Gandhi argued, could not possibly aspire to enjoy the same kinds of standards of material wellbeing that Britain enjoyed. India was such a big country, contained so many people that if Indians were to be as well-off as Britains, the consequences would be catastrophic. Gandhi argued that development, insofar as it were to occur, would have to be sustainable. This is one of the reasons why Gandhi, though he's not taken very seriously as a development theorist in his own time, will be taken much more seriously as a proponent of sustainable development from the 1970s onwards. But we'll come to that in due course.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:30]]
<nowiki>[47:30]</nowiki>

Gandhi, besides arguing that development should be sustainable, argues that it should be primarily agrarian. His vision of India's future is not a vision of factories and cities and railroads. It is a vision of largely self-sufficient agricultural villages in which industry is local, small-scale, and primarily done by hand. Handwork and craftwork were absolute priorities for Gandhi. It's no coincidence that the symbol of the Indian National Congress is a spinning wheel, a hand-driven spinning wheel which sort of represents the Gandhian commitment to traditional, handcrafted industries.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:14]]
<nowiki>[48:14]</nowiki>

Nehru's vision of the future was really, really different from this. Nehru had spent a great deal of time in the West. He was a graduate of Cambridge University. He'd also visited the Soviet Union in the 1930s where he had been really impressed by Stalin's accomplishments in the promotion of forced industrialization. Nehru adhered to a dependency view of colonialism. He believed that India's great poverty in 1947 was directly attributable to British colonial exploitation. To be free, Nehru believed, India needed to industrialize and it needed to industrialize quickly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:52]]
<nowiki>[48:52]</nowiki>

Nehru's modernization vision, as it was, had three basic elements. It would pursue industrialization and the government would lead in the promotion of industrialization. It would not be private markets or private capitalist entrepreneurs but the state itself that would be the dynamo propelling Indian industrialization forwards into the future. Even as Nehru saw a substantial role for the state in the organization and promotion of development he believed that India ought to remain a constitutional democracy. He was impressed by aspects of the Soviet experience, just not the political ones.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:32]]
<nowiki>[49:32]</nowiki>

And finally Nehru wanted to create a state in which there would be sort of expanded support for the poor, and in India, the poor is a very large category. Nehru wanted the state to tax and redistribute wealth so as to sort of begin to offset the gratuitous inequalities in income that existed in 1947 within India.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:00]]
<nowiki>[50:00]</nowiki>

How was this to be accomplished? Nehru's vision for industrialization, modernization would depend upon the establishment of a centralized planning apparatus within the Indian state.

==== Prasanta Mahalanobis and Nehruvian Economic Planning in India ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:15]]
<nowiki>[50:15]</nowiki>

Here, a figure like {{WPExtract|Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis| Prasanta Mahalanobis}} provides us some insight as to how Indian development was to work in practice. Mahalanobis was an Indian mathematician and economist and become one of the most influential and important Indian planners of the postwar era. He had, like Nehru, degrees from British universities and became, in the early 1950s, an influential member of India's planning commission, a commission that Nehru established to plan the economy. Mahalanobis emphasized the sort of production of aggregate statistics, statistics that could be used to quantify and then plan India's economic production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:07]]
<nowiki>[51:07]</nowiki>

The role of numbers in the orchestration of planning cannot be overemphasized. Insofar as planning depends upon central government allocating resources, capital in particular, but also labor and land, it's necessary for a state that would plan to know a lot about the economy that it seeks to orchestrate and organize. So, the establishment of vast statistical collection bureaus for accumulating data about the economy is an essential part of the sort of industrial planning process.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:44]]
<nowiki>[51:44]</nowiki>

In India, the history of economic planning in the era of early independence passes through a number of sort of distinct phases, each demarcated by a five year plan. The five year plan was the sort of master plan that the Indian government established. It both sort of set the targets for development and described how those targets were to be accomplished. The institutional body responsible for the production of the five year plans was the planning commission which Nehru established in 1950, just three years after India accomplished its independence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:23]]
<nowiki>[52:23]</nowiki>

The first five year plan was, in some respects, a fairly modest economic plan. It targeted a unit total capital investment of about 35 billion rupees and it emphasized the expansion of heavy industry, of coal and steel and the production of sort of hydroelectric plants. So, it was really concerned with sort of those sectors of the economy that Lenin characterized as the commanding heights: big, heavy industry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:56]]
<nowiki>[52:56]</nowiki>

The plan was fairly successful. It succeeded over five years in increasing national income by about 18 percent, which is a fairly good rate of return.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:09]]
<nowiki>[53:09]</nowiki>

A second five year plan was introduced in 1956. This was a much more ambitious plan. Total expenditure was almost double what it had been in the first five year plan. Whereas, the first five-year plan emphasized primarily industry, the second five year plan aspired to sort of direct and lead a broader range of economic sectors. It also envisaged transforming agriculture to make agriculture more productive and efficient and expanding the production of consumer goods. So, from fairly early, from the mid-1950s onwards, Nehruvian planning in India will come to emphasize a broad range of economic objectives.

==== Inferences from Economic Planning in India ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:51]]
<nowiki>[53:51]</nowiki>

What general sort of inferences can we draw from the history of economic planning in India in the 1950s?

===== The Primacy of Investment =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:01 ]]
<nowiki>[54:01 ]</nowiki>

One really key point to take away has to do with the primacy of investment. For Nehru and for planners elsewhere, planners in countries other than India, sort of the key thing that you have to do in order to develop your economy was to increase the savings rate. You had to put more capital to work. You had to save in order to industrialize. There's a key role for the state in a planned economy in directing savings towards productive investment. By consequence, the planned economy will often involve very high rates of taxation, because in order to sort of acquire the capital which can then be used for the purposes of development, you have to tax your citizens, or you can borrow that capital. But then, of course, you have to pay it back.

===== Grand Prestige Projects =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:59]]
<nowiki>[54:59]</nowiki>

Besides the emphasis on investment as the sort of crucial vehicle of modernization, planning in the sort of Indian context manifested a commitment to grand, prestige projects. So, there was even a sort of aesthetic aspect to planning that's worth thinking about. I think that Khilnani's phrase, "Temples of the Future" -– actually it's not Khilnani's phrase; it's Nehru's phrase, but Khilnani uses it as the title of his chapter -– is really quite apt for describing the kinds of project that India sought to orchestrate in the era of Nehruvian planning. We're talking about big public works projects; dams, steelworks like the Tata Works outside of Calcutta. Projects that don't overly serve an economic purpose, but which represent a sort of tangible instantiation of the state's commitment to make a society and an economy modern.

=== Development in Indonesia after Decolonization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:59]]
<nowiki>[55:59]</nowiki>

The Indian experience is, by no means, unique. Let's briefly consider the case of Indonesia. In Indonesia, the trajectory of economic development was broadly similar to India's. It just did not end so well. Indonesia becomes independent just a couple of years later than India, in the late 1940s. Its politics are dominated by a single figurehead, {{WPExtract|Sukarno}}, a man who had been a sort of Japanese collaborator during the Second World War, but nonetheless emerges as the leader of independent Indonesia. He's every bit as influential and powerful as Nehru is in India.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:40]]
<nowiki>[56:40]</nowiki>

During the 1950s, Sukarno pursued an ambitious agenda of state-led economic development. The agenda became more aggressive as the decade progressed. In the early 1950s, crudely in the first half of the decade, Sukarno's government sought to direct economic development through the allocation of capital. Independent Indonesia quickly established a state-owned bank and the state bank was able to sort of channel funds to enterprises that the state was especially interested in promoting, usually, you know, heavy industry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:21]]
<nowiki>[57:21]</nowiki>

Despite the utilization of state-owned finance as a sort of instrument to direct development, development in the first half of the 1950s is more cautious than ambitious. Sukarno does not undertake sort of intense state-led industrialization, at least not yet. Things begin to change in the second half of the 1950s. The nationalization of Dutch owned businesses in 1957 is an important turning point. Two years later, Sukarno unveils what he characterizes as the guided economy. The name is sort of the giveaway. It is to be a tightly planned and controlled program of economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:08]]
<nowiki>[58:08]</nowiki>

In pursuit of state-led modernization, Indonesia unveils an eight year plan, not a five year plan, but an eight year plan, in 1960. It sets very ambitious targets for the industrialization of Indonesia. The plan itself is quite a spectacle besides what it proposes to accomplish. The plan comprises eight bound volumes. So, it takes up a lot of space on a bookshelf, and the volume of the plan is sort of illustrative of the ambition of its office.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:41]]
<nowiki>[58:41]</nowiki>

Things in Indonesia do not go terribly well, however. The eight year plan prioritizes expensive industrial development -- the creation of sort of large state-owned and state-operated enterprises. To put the explanation very succinctly, the problem for Indonesia is that the government tries to spend money that it doesn't have. It tries to sort of channel investment in excess of its tax revenues.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:12]]
<nowiki>[59:12]</nowiki>

By consequence, the government ends up borrowing and it ends up printing money. One of the things that a government can do when it spends more than it earns is to print money. Indonesia debases the currency to spectacular effect. By the mid-1960s, inflation rates, annual inflation rates are running at about 1,500 percent per year. So, this is hyperinflation or something very close to it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:41]]
<nowiki>[59:41]</nowiki>

This is an economic catastrophe and it quickly deteriorates into a political crisis, too. Sukarno is overthrown, and he is replaced by a dictatorial regime under {{WPExtract|Suharto}}. Indonesia's descent into political authoritarianism is, fortunately, sort of exceptional when you compare Indonesia's experience to India's. It looks less exceptional if you look at the developing world writ large. But this is a theme that we'll come to in due course.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:15]]
<nowiki>[60:15]</nowiki>

One of the things that's sort of interesting about the experience of the authoritarian regime that takes over Indonesia in the mid-1960s is that it quickly ratchets back the ambition of economic planning as it had sort of developed under Sukarno. The authoritarian regime will emphasize the pursuit of balanced budgets. In sum, it tries to sort of implement a [[wikt:retrenchment|retrenchment]] agenda, which in key respects sort of prefigures to turn away state-led planning and towards sort of balanced budgets and responsible fiscal policies that will sort of repeat itself throughout the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s. But this is a story for a future lecture.

=== Development in Ghana after Decolonization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:01]]
<nowiki>[61:01]</nowiki>

Let's sort of move out of Asia and into Africa to consider the developmental experience of a different country. Ghana is a sort of appropriate point to begin to tell the history of African development. Ghana is the first African country or the first Sub-Saharan African country to win independence, which it does in 1957. Just a quick aside, under the British Empire, the colony that became Ghana was not known as Ghana. It was known as the Gold Coast, but it becomes independent in 1957 as Ghana.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:36]]
<nowiki>[61:36]</nowiki>

The leader of the new state is the man pictured here in the slide, {{WPExtract|Kwame Nkrumah}}, educated, gifted politician in whom there is a great deal of hope not only in Ghana but also in the West. Nkrumah features on the cover of ''Time Magazine'', for example, as the man on whose shoulders sort of Africa's hopes depend.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:01]]
<nowiki>[62:01]</nowiki>

Nkrumah has a development concept that is not so different from Nehru's. Like Nehru, he has been heavily influenced by his own experiences in the West. He is, by no means, a Ghandian. He wants to create a Ghanaian state that will be industrial and modern, a Ghanaian state fashioned after Western models.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:21]]
<nowiki>[62:21]</nowiki>

Like Nehru, Nkrumah believes in dependency theory. He sees a connection between Ghana's relative poverty in 1957 and the affluence of the West. He argues that colonialism represents a long history of exploitation, and in order for Ghana to develop, it will be necessary to sort of break away from the free trade, liberal world economy in order to develop as sort of more {{WPExtract|autarky|autarkic}}, self-directed economic zone.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:49]]
<nowiki>[62:49]</nowiki>

Nkrumah is never sort of a crude nationalist; however, he's a strong believer in {{WPExtract|Pan-Africanism}}. Besides sort of wanting to establish sort of greater political coordination among the states of independent Africa Nkrumah also hopes to accomplish some economic integration. It was to Nkurmah's and Ghana's disadvantage, as well, arguably, to Africa's disadvantage that this economic integration proved in practice to be impossible to accomplish, at least in Nkrumah's lifetime.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:24]]
<nowiki>[63:24]</nowiki>

Within Ghana, however, Nkrumah undertakes an ambitious modernization program. As elsewhere, capital is forcibly mobilized. The state assumes responsibility for the construction and operation of large sort of public sector projects: dams, factories, and so on. As elsewhere, there is a focus on projects that sort of serve as literal embodiments of the state's developmental ambitions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:54]]
<nowiki>[63:54]</nowiki>

There are also kind of political aspects to Ghana's history of economic modernization that are worth pointing out. In some respects, Ghana's experience parallels that of Indonesia. It's not quite as bleak as Indonesia's but it's not particularly good either.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:14]]
<nowiki>[64:14]</nowiki>

Nkrumah, who becomes prime minister as a sort of prime minister of a democratic country descends fairly quickly into sort of authoritarianism. Nkrumah invokes the imperatives and challenges of development in order to justify the consolidation of his own personal power. In 1960, he becomes self-appointed president for life. He doesn't quite transform Ghana into a dictatorship. I think that would be too strong a word. But Ghana becomes increasingly authoritarian during the 1960s. The imperatives of modernization are probably the most frequently invoked rationalization for political centralization and, ultimately, authoritarianism, too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:01]]
<nowiki>[65:01]</nowiki>

But there are important accomplishments: in education, in the creation of a transportation infrastructure through the building of roads, in the provision of public health and so on. Nkrumah's government attempts to do a lot.

==== The Akosombo Dam ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:17]]
<nowiki>[65:17]</nowiki>

But probably the single sort of most powerful symbol of Ghana's modernization ambition in the Nkrumah era is the dam at Akosombo. The {{WPExtract|Akosombo Dam}} project, which is constructed in the early 1960s, marks the climax of Nkrumah's development agenda. This dam becomes an exemplar of modernization not only in Ghana but also on sort of the global scale. It is an absolutely gigantic project. It provides enough electricity to be able to supply Ghana, at least in the early 1960s, as well as neighboring countries. The dam, which is sort of down river on the Volta River, creates Lake Volta, shown here in a satellite image. Lake Volta is the largest manmade reservoir in the entire world. So, this is a serious public engineering project, and it attests to the reach of Nkrumah's ambition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:19]]
<nowiki>[66:19]</nowiki>

The accomplishment, of course, entails substantial human and environmental costs. Creating the world's largest reservoir displaces a large number of people. About 80,000 people sort of lose their homes to the dam because it floods sort of the valleys that lie behind it. And the dam's also created a host of environmental problems as large hydro engineering projects are prone to do. But it, nonetheless, represents sort of an exemplary instance of state-led economic development.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:58]]
<nowiki>[66:58]</nowiki>

Who pays for the dam? Financing comes, in large part, from the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank. So, the history of development is never sort of exclusively a national history. It's also a history in which international actors are intimately involved. In other context, the Soviet Union will provide sort of financing for hydroelectric projects in the developing world, in Egypt, for example.

==== The Divergence Between Ghanaian Economic Development and Chinese Economic Development ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:27]]
<nowiki>[67:27]</nowiki>
Why does this sort of intense promotion of development in Ghana not reap better dividends over the long-term? It's a really interesting question. I don't have a good answer to it. I can simply point out the divergence in Ghana's and China's economic trajectories over the second half of the 20th century. This is a provocative comparison. Let's remember that in 1957, the moment when Ghana becomes independent, the average Ghanaian is worth twice as much as the average Chinese person. Ghana's GDP per capita is about $1,000.00. China's is about $500.00. In relative terms, Ghana is not so badly off at the moment of independence. The problem for Ghana is that Ghana doesn't really develop much over the next 50 years. We do see sort of in very recent times some indications that Ghana's economic prosperity is beginning to take off, but it's nothing compared to what China has experienced since the 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:38]]
<nowiki>[68:38]</nowiki>

Explaining sort of the divergence between developing economies that do take off and those that don't is one of the really big, really difficult challenges that we encounter as we think about the history of development in the second half of the 20th century. I'm not going to try to explain this because I don't know that I have a good answer myself. What I can do instead is talk a little bit about the history of Chinese development, at least as a way of providing a counterpoint.

=== Development in China after the Communist Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:08]]
<nowiki>[69:08]</nowiki>

China, in 1949, at the beginning of the communist era, is a very poor country. In global standards, China is just about as poor as anywhere. Average GDP per capita is about $500.00 per head. This is sort of essentially what GDP per capita would be in the absence of modernity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:35]]
<nowiki>[69:35]</nowiki>

So, the challenges that the communist regime that comes to power under the leadership of {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong}} in October 1949 faces are really, really substantial. How to make China prosperous and modern? Mao, as a committed communist, seeks to accomplish a sort of transformation to socialism. Mao has no inhibitions about using the power of the state that he now commands to direct, plan, and to transform China's economy and society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:13]]
<nowiki>[70:13]</nowiki>

Yet, the history of Communist Party planning and direction in China goes through a number of different distinctive stages, some of which we should try to consider today.

==== Land Reform in China in the Communist Era ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:22]]
<nowiki>[70:22]</nowiki>

At the very outset Mao is committed to land reform. China, like most traditional societies has patterns of land ownership in which most land is owned by a very small number of people. Absentee land holding is common. Peasants, for the most part, labor on land that is not their own, but which belongs to other people. The patterns of land ownership are sort of grotesquely unequal at the beginning of the Communist Era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 70:50]]
<nowiki>[70:50]</nowiki>

One of the first things that Mao tries to do is to reform patterns of land holding in China. About 40 percent of all of China's land –-and this is a lot of land because China is a big country –- is redistributed in a single 1950 land reform.

==== Attacking the Interests of the Landlord Class and the Bourgeoisie ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:05]]
<nowiki>[71:05]</nowiki>

Besides redistributing land, the Chinese Communist Party utilizes the power of the state to assault and break up the old landlord class. Even as Mao attacks sort of rural land owners, he uses the power of the state to attack and sort of breakup the urban {{WPExtract|bourgeoisie}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 71:29]]
<nowiki>[71:29]</nowiki>

There are a series of campaigns fairly early on that become sort of vehicles for attacking the vested economic interests of the middle classes. The {{WPExtract| Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns|Three-antis}} campaign focused against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy. The {{WPExtract|Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns|Five-antis}} campaign focuses on bribery, theft of state property, tax evasion, cheating on government contracts and stealing state information. In theory, these sound like fairly innocuous objectives for the state to pursue. They have to do with sort of efficiency and honesty. But the campaigns become sort of proxy vehicles for attacking the interests of the bourgeoisie.

==== China and the Soviet Union ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:11]]
<nowiki>[72:11]</nowiki>

Meanwhile, China is pulling towards Moscow in its international relationships. The {{WPExtract| Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance|Sino-Soviet Alliance}} which is concluded in the winter of 1950 provides some Soviet commitment to facilitate and aid China's economic development. So, Mao, in the early years of the revolution, leans fairly heavily on the Soviet Union for advice, encouragement, and even material assistance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:40]]
<nowiki>[72:40]</nowiki>

The Korean War, which breaks out in the summer of 1950, has the effect of drawing Moscow and Beijing even closer together. Thereafter, the Soviet Union will provide a variety of different but very important forms of assistance to China's socialist project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:57]]
<nowiki>[72:57]</nowiki>

Besides sending large quantities of material aid, China will dispatch sort of legions of technical advisors and scientists to facilitate the developmental project in China.<ref>Likely meaning to say: " Besides sending large quantities of material aid, the Soviet Union will dispatch sort of legions of technical advisors and scientists to facilitate the developmental project in China."</ref> One historian, {{WPExtract|Odd Arne Westad}}, has sort of characterized the expanse of Soviet assistance to China after 1950 by describing Soviet assistance to China as the Soviet Union's Marshall Plan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 73:26]]
<nowiki>[73:26]</nowiki>

And it's actually a pretty good analogy if you want to gauge the scale of what the Soviet Union does for China in the early 1950s. Of course, one of the most notorious examples of Soviet assistance to China will be the assistance that the Soviet Union provides to the development of a Chinese atomic bomb project during the 1950s. But we'll talk about that a little bit more in due course.

==== The First Five Year Plan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 73:52]]
<nowiki>[73:52]</nowiki>

In 1953, China launches its first five year plan. The objectives of the first five year plan are rapid industrialization and capital accumulation. As elsewhere, Mao believes that increasing the savings rate, investing in the future, is the key to development over the long-term.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 74:16]]
<nowiki>[74:16]</nowiki>

Of course, because China is a very authoritarian communist community, capital accumulation can be done more forcibly than elsewhere. It's not just high rates of taxation but also the direct expropriation of property that will sort of contribute to capital accumulation in the Chinese case. Implementation of the plan draws heavily on Soviet models. China seeks in the first five year plan to accomplish an industrializing transformation that is substantially modeled after the examples that Soviet history has set. The economy will be centrally planned. Vast, industrial, agglomerations will be constructed, all owned and operated by the state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 75:02]]
<nowiki>[75:02]</nowiki>

What does the first five year plan accomplish? As you can see, the early 1950s produces an impressive increase in China's overall GDP. The plan certainly does succeed to a substantial extent in promoting growth, much as industrialization led by the state had done in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 75:31]]
<nowiki>[75:31]</nowiki>

China developed sort of a large-scale industry for the first time in its history. But by 1956 Mao is himself concerned that Soviet style industrialization does not represent socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is not the socialism that Mao wants for China. Mao is beginning to sort of conceive of something far more ambitious than a mere emulation of the Soviet Union's developmental successes.

==== The Hundred Flowers Campaign ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:01]]
<nowiki>[76:01]</nowiki>

In 1956, '57, Mao sort of, for a period of time, relaxes the discipline of the revolution. He speaks of allowing a hundred flowers to bloom, encourages free thought, dissent, and even criticism of the communist project in China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:22]]
<nowiki>[76:22]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Hundred Flowers Campaign}} gives rise to a memorable phrase, "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom," but it is mere prologue. It's prologue to the second five year plan which begins in 1958.

==== The Great Leap Forward ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 76:40]]
<nowiki>[76:40]</nowiki>

Better known as the {{WPExtract|Great Leap Forward}}, the second five year plan represents an attempt to break with the Soviet model and to construct an indigenous Chinese version of socialism. Its developmental objectives are even more ambitious than those of the first five year plan or, indeed, those of Soviet modernization in the 1930s had been. Mao speaks of rivaling the West within 15 years, a very short span of time. Mao believes that China can become a modern industrial country within it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 77:15]]
<nowiki>[77:15]</nowiki>

How is this to be accomplished? Modernization is to be waged as a military campaign. Labor is to be forcibly mobilized if necessary at the barrel of a gun. The countryside is to be transformed. This is one of the key sort of distinguishing characteristics of the second five year plan, by the way.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 77:36]]
<nowiki>[77:36]</nowiki>

Whereas the first five year plan works to promote urban industry, the second five year plan will try to industrialize the countryside. Private property will all be sort of nationalized. Even traditional family structures will be assaulted. Peasants will be forced to live in sort of collective communal housing on collective farms in which they will turn their labors not only to the growing of crops but also to the production of steel. The introduction of small-scale so-called backyard steel furnaces on collective farms is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Great Leap Forward.

===== The Failure of the Great Leap Forward =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 78:13]]
<nowiki>[78:13]</nowiki>

What are the consequences of this? Well, if peasants are smelting steel, what are they not doing? Growing crops. That's right. The Great Leap Forward produces a crisis in agricultural production. There is a famine that kills about 30 million people. Grisly as the history of communism in the 20th century was, this is probably its single most atrocious episode. There's an absolute catastrophe in the countryside in China that claims up to 30 million human lives.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 78:46]]
<nowiki>[78:46]</nowiki>

What about the political consequences? What does the catastrophic failure of the Great Leap Forward mean for China? What does it mean for the communist world? Helps to precipitate the Sino-Soviet split. After all, China has gone off and pursued its own version of socialism repudiating the example and the leadership of the Soviet Union. We'll talk much more about the {{WPExtract|Sino-Soviet split}} in due course.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 79:11]]
<nowiki>[79:11]</nowiki>

Within China, the excesses and the failure of the Great Leap Forward help, at least temporarily, to discredit Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong, the singular, symbolic figurehead leader of the revolution retreats, for at least for a period of time, from public view. In his sort of temporary absence, new leaders emerge who try to sort of begin to undo some of the damage that the Great Leap Forward has done. Preeminent among these is {{WPExtract|Deng Xiaoping }}, a man who sort of comes to the fore of Chinese politics in the early 1960s, then goes away for almost two decades and comes back in the late 1970s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 79:55]]
<nowiki>[79:55]</nowiki>

But the experience of the early 1960s is really importive to Deng's political and intellectual development. Deng sees the failures of the Great Leap Forward and he comes to sort of question the capacity of tightly centralized state-led planning to produce sustainable economic growth.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 80:15]]
<nowiki>[80:15]</nowiki>

At the Party Congress in 1961, Deng sort of famously declares that results are ultimately more important than methods. What Deng is arguing for when he makes the statement is for the sort of restoration of a limited market in agricultural products. Deng argues that farmers need to have market incentives in order to raise output to grow more crops.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 80:39]]
<nowiki>[80:39]</nowiki>

He famously says, "I don't care if it's a white cat or a black cat. It's a good cat as long as it catches mice." This is sort of an appropriate point to conclude a discussion of development in the 1960s. In a realization that marks that crisis of China's developmental project under Mao and which prefigures the subsequent history of Chinese development in the last decades of the 20th century.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s

2019-05-21T21:01:22Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

== Introduction and Welcome ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Okay, it's about time to begin. It's 9:40 so we should get going. I should start by thanking the person who pointed out on Tuesday that it was my cell phone that was causing interference with the audio, and we'll do much better without that. The cell phone today is at home where is can't do any damage.

== Lecture Overview ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:18]]
<nowiki>[0:18]</nowiki>

Today we're going to talk about the division of East Asia but we'll start off just by sort of finishing the discussion of Europe's division in the late 1940s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:28]]
<nowiki>[0:28]</nowiki>

And when we add the two pieces of sort of this week's curriculum together, Tuesday's lecture and today's lecture, we should have a fairly comprehensive, if sweeping, overview of the Cold War's origins, of the processes by which the world was divided into two Cold War camps in the second half of the 1940s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:50]]
<nowiki>[0:50]</nowiki>

== The Division of Europe ==

So first of all Europe.

=== The Devastation of Europe ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:53]]
<nowiki>[0:53]</nowiki>

Let's just remind ourselves of the situation in which Europe finds itself at the end of the Second World War. It's not a terribly happy situation. Europe is devastated by six years of fighting. Europeans are hungry. Their economies have substantially broken down. The British are doing a little bit better but they weren't so directly afflicted by the fighting as the continental Europeans were.

=== The Devastation of Germany ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:22]]
<nowiki>[1:22]</nowiki>

The epicenter of Europe's crisis is Germany -- in a way this is fitting. It was the Germans who started the war and at the war's end it is the Germans who find themselves devastated by the war -- economically devastated, physically displaced, millions of Germans are rendered homeless by the Allied bombardment of German cities.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:44]]
<nowiki>[1:44]</nowiki>

Millions more people end up as displaced persons in Germany -- refugees often from Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:51]]
<nowiki>[1:51]</nowiki>

Germany's GDP collapses with the war's end. It's an absolutely catastrophic situation. Germans find themselves sort of immiserated and hungry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:06]]
<nowiki>[2:06]</nowiki>

In the slide here you can see a photograph which is taken in Germany in 1946 and the graffiti sort of painted on this wall says:

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|thumb|center|start=2:15|end=2:18|German: We have been hungry enough. We have been hungry long enough.]]

We have been hungry enough. We have been hungry long enough.

=== American Policymakers Fear that European Tumult will Spur the Growth of Communism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:22]]
<nowiki>[2:22]</nowiki>

This material situation, a situation in which Europeans and Germans in particular, are experiencing dislocation, disarray and misery is a strategic concern for the United States. It's a strategic concern for American Cold War planners. American policymakers fear that Europe's disarray may provide a fertile breeding ground for Communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:49]]
<nowiki>[2:49]</nowiki>

And this fear is not altogether farfetched. In the first elections that are held after the end of the Second World War it is the parties of the left who do the best.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:01]]
<nowiki>[3:01]</nowiki>

The Communists and the socialists together command a majority for example in the French elections that are held in October 1945.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:09]]
<nowiki>[3:09]</nowiki>

So the specter of a rising left in Europe is of concern to American policymakers who fear that a left wing Europe may sort of incline toward the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:21]]
<nowiki>[3:21]</nowiki>

What to do about this alarming situation? Alarming as American policy planners see it -- The response that {{WPExtract|George F. Kennan|George Kennan}} proposes and which the State Department adopts in the winter of 1946-1947 is to find some way to help Europeans help themselves. How can the United States act as a facilitator? Perhaps also as a benefactor of a European recovery in which European will be in the driving seat.

=== American Strategy for Reconstruction in Europe ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:50]]
<nowiki>[3:50]</nowiki>

As American policy planners sort of ponder this question something akin to a strategy for European reconstruction begins to emerge. American policymakers decide that they will have to play a role in sort of catalyzing European recovery but that Europe will need with American assistance to reconstruct itself.

==== The Reconstruction of Germany and German Industry ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:10]]
<nowiki>[4:10]</nowiki>

And one of the really essential aspects of this strategic concept is that Germany will have a central place in it. American policymakers sort of debate the question of what should be done with Germany and they come to the sort of irresistible conclusion that Europe cannot recover without Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:28]]
<nowiki>[4:28]</nowiki>

It might be appealing after all the damage that the Germans have done to simply take Germany and divide it up and sort of try to destroy German industry -- reduce Germany to a sort of agrarian existence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:41]]
<nowiki>[4:41]</nowiki>

That's one of the sort of ideas as to what should be done with Germany that American planners sort of contemplate in the very early postwar period.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:49]]
<nowiki>[4:49]</nowiki>

But the idea of demolishing German industry and reducing Germany to a sort of agrarian existence is not a practical one because if Europe is to recover Germany will have to recover too.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:02]]
<nowiki>[5:02]</nowiki>

So the rebuilding of Europe around a sort of revitalized German economic core is essential objective for American policy in Europe by the beginning of 1947.

=== The Marshall Plan ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:14]]
<nowiki>[5:14]</nowiki>

And the primary initiative that the United States deploys to pursue this end will be the {{WPExtract|Marshall Plan}}. Most of you have probably heard of the Marshall Plan, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:25]]
<nowiki>[5:25]</nowiki>

The Marshall Plan, as you know, is a major injection of funds, about 13 billion dollars of funds in total in 1947 dollars. Which are dispersed at the suggestion of the United States. {{WPExtract|George Marshall}} in June 1947 gives a famous commencement address at Harvard University in which he commits the United States to provide resources to help Europe redevelop itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:52]]
<nowiki>[5:52]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Committee of European Economic Co-operation|Committee on European Economic Cooperation}}, a committee of European governments, is formed in July in 1947, and it concocts a plan for the utilization of American resources to promote European redevelopment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:09]]
<nowiki>[6:09]</nowiki>

It sets a very sort of ambitious goal for funding. Ultimately the Truman administration is willing to request some 30 billion dollars in financial commitments from the Congress and Congress approves about 13 billion of that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:24]]
<nowiki>[6:24]</nowiki>

But it's still a substantial amount of money. Marshall Aid will play a role in Europe's reconstruction and we'll talk about that in just a moment.

==== Marshall Aid in the Context of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:34]]
<nowiki>[6:34]</nowiki>

But first of all let's think a little bit about the strategic aspects of Marshall Aid. What is the relationship of Marshall Aid to the Cold War division of Europe?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:42]]
<nowiki>[6:42]</nowiki>

I would argue, and I would think many historians would concur, that the relationship between the two, between Marshall Aid and the Cold War division of Europe is really crucial and essential, and American policy makers understand this at the moment.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=6:58]]
<nowiki>[6:58]</nowiki>

George Marshall does invite the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to participate in Marshall Aid. The {{WPExtract|Eastern Bloc|East Bloc}} countries, as they are sort of becoming, are invited to submit proposals to participate in the Marshall Aid concept.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:15]]
<nowiki>[7:15]</nowiki>

But Marshall does not expect that the Soviet Union will actually you know take up the offer. Does anybody have any ideas as to why that might be? Why can Marshall be confident?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:25]]
<nowiki>[7:25]</nowiki>

(Student response)

Um-hum. Yeah.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:44]]
<nowiki>[7:44]</nowiki>

Exactly. That's perfect. The situation is that the United States has a sort of coherent vision of an open postwar economy. It's a liberal vision, a vision in which markets will be essentially free, in which property will be essentially private.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:01]]
<nowiki>[8:01]</nowiki>

And the terms of participation in Marshall Aid require beneficiary countries to participate in this open world order that American policy planners envisage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:12]]
<nowiki>[8:12]</nowiki>

So the Soviet Union could in theory participate in it but to do so would commit the Soviet Union to a ..., you know, process of economic reform and restructuring that Stalin is quite unwilling to contemplate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:25]]
<nowiki>[8:25]</nowiki>

To put it really succinctly it's hard to see how the Soviet Union could have remained the Soviet Union and to have participated in Marshall Aid at the same time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:34]]
<nowiki>[8:34]</nowiki>

So the USSR does not participate. Nor do its satellite countries, as they are becoming, in Eastern Europe. And this is really important. This is key to sort of understanding the strategic consequences of Marshall Aid.

==== Soviet and International Communist Opposition to Marshall Aid ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:48]]
<nowiki>[8:48]</nowiki>

And it's not only the East European countries that are sort of affected by the Soviet Union's disdain for the Marshall concept. It's also the case that Communist parties in Western Europe oppose Marshall Aid. And this is really important too. The opposition of the left, of the hard left, to Marshall Aid, helps to discredit the hard left in Europe in the latter 1940s. And we'll talk about that a little bit more in just a moment.

==== Economic Consequences of Marshall Aid ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:14]]
<nowiki>[9:14]</nowiki>

But first we should think about the economic consequences of Marshall Aid. What does Marshall Aid accomplish? Is Marshall Aid singularly responsible for the postwar economic reconstruction of Europe? This is a question that economic historians have debated and the answer is probably not.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:31]]
<nowiki>[9:31]</nowiki>

Europe's economic recovery, you know, historians like {{WPExtract|Alan Milward}} have shown, was already in process before the injection of Marshall Aid funds began. But Marshall Aid does serve one really, really important function. And that is to bridge Europe's balance of payments deficits with the United States.

==== The Marshall Plan and the International Balance of Payments ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:50]]
<nowiki>[9:50]</nowiki>

We'll talk much more about the {{WPExtract|Balance of payments| international balance of payments}} next week but the key point that we could stress today is that Europe after the Second World War runs major trade deficits with the United States, and this is because devastated European economies want to import machinery, consumer goods and food from North America and the larger non-European world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:14]]
<nowiki>[10:14]</nowiki>

They don't have a whole lot to export in return so they run trade deficits. How are these trade deficits to be financed? How to pay for the gap between what Europeans export and what they import? The answer is pretty simple. Marshall Aid helps to bridge the gap in Europe's international payments deficits.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:34]]
<nowiki>[10:34]</nowiki>

This is really important insofar as it helps to enable the sort of multilateral liberal world economy that the United States wants to build to function.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:47]]
<nowiki>[10:47]</nowiki>

Without Marshall Aid the Europeans would have struggled to have participated in the multilateral open postwar economic order. They would have to have you know implemented austerity policies to try to sort of balance their international payments without resorting to external financing -- which is what Marshall Aid essentially provides without any debt.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:13]]
<nowiki>[11:13]</nowiki>

So it's a good deal for the Europeans -- they benefit from this. But so too does the world economy writ large benefit from Marshall Aid.

==== Political Effects from the Marshall Plan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:20]]
<nowiki>[11:20]</nowiki>

Besides these economic consequences which will go into in more detail next week Marshall Aid produces political dividends for centrists political leaders in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:32]]
<nowiki>[11:32]</nowiki>

The political right in Europe is of course discredited by the Second World War. So when we talk about European politics after the Second World War we're really talking about the center and the left. The right is not part of the picture any more.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:47]]
<nowiki>[11:47]</nowiki>

The Second World War ends with a left buoyed by its heroic involvement in anti-fascist resistance during the war. The war ends with a left that performs very strongly in early postwar elections.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:05]]
<nowiki>[12:05]</nowiki>

But the opposition of the Communist left to Marshall Aid is one of the factors that helps to discredit left wing parties, Communist parties, in Europe subsequent to the bitter winter of 1946-1947.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:19]]
<nowiki>[12:19]</nowiki>

From a political perspective we could see the beneficiaries of Marshall Aid as having been the political centrists. The Christian Democrats like {{WPExtract|Alcide De Gasperi}} in Italy, and {{WPExtract|Konrad Adenauer}} in Europe who help to ... or who play a crucial role in the solidification of a liberal center in European politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:42]]
<nowiki>[12:42]</nowiki>

Marshall Aid doesn't necessarily produce this but it helps to catalyze a sort of Christian Democratic resolution of Europe's prewar and wartime political polarization. And that's important too.

==== Marshall Aid and Politics in Eastern Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:00]]
<nowiki>[13:00]</nowiki>

What about Eastern Europe? What are the consequences of Marshall Aid for the East that does not partake in the Marshall Aid scheme?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:09]]
<nowiki>[13:09]</nowiki>

Let's talk a little bit about some of the you know sort of parallel processes of division and bloc integration as they appear from the other side of what Churchill called the Iron Curtain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:21]]
<nowiki>[13:21]</nowiki>

The first really important fact about postwar Eastern Europe is that the Red Army predominates. Eastern Europe falls quite literally under the sway of Soviet power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:32]]
<nowiki>[13:32]</nowiki>

You know that is to say that Soviet military forces, the forces of the Red Army, predominate in Eastern Europe. This gives the Soviet Union a powerful, powerful lever of political influence in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Eastern Germany, and so on.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:50]]
<nowiki>[13:50]</nowiki>

The fact that the Red Army predominates at the end of the Second World War, in the summer of 1945, does not necessarily mean however that the countries of Eastern Europe have already been turned into Soviet satellites, into little facsimiles of the Soviet Union itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:08]]
<nowiki>[14:08]</nowiki>

Stalin certainly had plans for Eastern Europe. He wanted to ensure that Eastern Europe would become a sort of security buffer zone -- that Eastern Europe would never represent a military threat to the Soviet Union again. That's really clear.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:23]]
<nowiki>[14:23]</nowiki>

But it's not clear that Stalin wanted to create satellite states that closely resembled the Soviet Union in their internal politics as early as 1945. His objectives are somewhat cloudy. Different historians have made quite different arguments as to what Stalin wanted to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:41]]
<nowiki>[14:41]</nowiki>

So let's not speculate on that question let's instead ask about what actually happens in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War.

===== Diverse Experiences in Eastern Europe =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=14:50]]
<nowiki>[14:50]</nowiki>

The experiences of 1945 and 1946 are fairly diverse which is to say that different countries experience you know have quite different kinds of experience. Poland comes under strict Soviet control and rigid Soviet influence fairly early. Can anybody hazard a guess as to why that might be?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:12]]
<nowiki>[15:12]</nowiki>

Why is the Soviet Union determined to stamp its authority on Poland very early on?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:19]]
<nowiki>[15:19]</nowiki>

(Student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:29]]
<nowiki>[15:29]</nowiki>

That's right. There's a ...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:30]]
<nowiki>[15:30]</nowiki>

(Student response)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:42]]
<nowiki>[15:42]</nowiki>

Absolutely. You both make really important points. That Poland represents the sort of route through or the path through which Germany has previously attacked the Soviet Union -- Russia, as it was in the First World War -- and Poland itself looks to Stalin like a potential threat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:01]]
<nowiki>[16:01]</nowiki>

The Poles go to war against the Soviet Union during the Russian Civil War. In 1920 and 1921 Poland tries to grab a big chunk of Soviet territory while the Russians are you know sort of preoccupied with their civil war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:14]]
<nowiki>[16:14]</nowiki>

By consequence Stalin treats Poland fairly harshly immediately upon the conclusion of the Second World War. But other countries experience you know different kinds of relationships with the Soviet Union in the early postwar months and years.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:30]]
<nowiki>[16:30]</nowiki>

Czechoslovakia for example is subject to a much looser Soviet control.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:36]]
<nowiki>[16:36]</nowiki>

But from 1947 onwards Stalin begins to tighten political discipline throughout Eastern Europe. Communists seize control where they have not already done so of key government ministries particularly the ministries that are responsible for internal security.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:54]]
<nowiki>[16:54]</nowiki>

Other left wing parties, non-Communist parties, which means sort of socialist parties, are forcibly integrated into coalitions with the Communist parties which Communist parties predominate.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:07]]
<nowiki>[17:07]</nowiki>

Besides the sort of ratcheting down of Communist authority within East European countries, the Soviet Union tries during 1947 to promote sort of closer integration of the East European countries into a Soviet led bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:26]]
<nowiki>[17:26]</nowiki>

This is in large part a reaction to Marshall Aid.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:30]]
<nowiki>[17:30]</nowiki>

Just as George Marshall proposes a sort of framework of cooperation among the West European countries so too will the Soviets try to promote their own economic framework for the integration of the East Bloc. And this is known initially as the {{WPExtract|Molotov Plan}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:47]]
<nowiki>[17:47]</nowiki>

More important than the efforts to promote economic integration are the efforts that the Soviet Union offers to promote sort of political coordination among the countries of the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:01]]
<nowiki>[18:01]</nowiki>

And the crucial sort of apparatus here is the {{WPExtract|Cominform}} --The Communist Information Bureau which Stalin creates in September 1947.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:11]]
<nowiki>[18:11]</nowiki>

The purpose of this new institution, the Cominform, is to integrate and coordinate national Communist parties. The effect of it is to sort of limit the autonomy of national political leaders, even of national Communist political leaders in Eastern Europe, and to subject Communist parties to the coordinated discipline of Moscow.

===== The Case of Czechoslovakia =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:38]]
<nowiki>[18:38]</nowiki>

In one case, in particular, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the sort of tightening of political discipline involves an outright seizure of power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:52]]
<nowiki>[18:52]</nowiki>

In February 1948 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia overthrows the coalition government of that country. Non-Communist political leaders are removed and a new pro-Communist constitution is promulgated in May of 1948.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:11]]
<nowiki>[19:11]</nowiki>

Elections are soon held, elections, in which the only candidates are Communists.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 19:17]]
<nowiki>[19:17]</nowiki>

This is probably the most gratuitous example of sort of Communist seizure of power in Eastern Europe after the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:27]]
<nowiki>[19:27]</nowiki>

In Czechoslovakia, what the Czech Communist Party does, under Soviet guidance, is you know in effect to seize control of the state in a coup that is so fundamentally different from the {{WPExtract|Bolshevik}} coup of 1917 in Russia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:43]]
<nowiki>[19:43]</nowiki>

It lacks democratic support or legitimacy. And this is really important because it has you know consequences for relations between the West and the East. Westerners look at the situation of Czechoslovakia. They look at the coup and they ask, you know, what is going here? This is not democratic self-determination, that is not what we fought the Second World War to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:05]]
<nowiki>[20:05]</nowiki>
What happens in Czechoslovakia looks really nasty from a Western perspective. And it helps to confirm the basic estrangement between East and West in Europe.

===== The Case of Yugoslavia =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:17]]
<nowiki>[20:17]</nowiki>

It's not only Western observers who are alienated and outraged by the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia. The view from Yugoslavia does not look so appealing either. Yugoslavia is a really interesting case and it's worth just talking about for a minute or so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:37]]
<nowiki>[20:37]</nowiki>

Yugoslavia, ends the Second World War, having experienced a very traumatic Nazi occupation -- an occupation that was fiercely opposed by a resistance coalition led by a Communist party under the leadership of {{WPExtract|Josip Broz Tito}} a sort of military and political leader of the Yugoslavian Communist Movement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:09]]
<nowiki>[21:09]</nowiki>

In the early postwar years, 1945-1946, Yugoslavia looks like one of the most solid and loyal members of the Eastern Bloc. Tito is initially very close to Stalin, is very close to the Soviet Union. But Tito is profoundly alienated by the centralization of sort of East Bloc discipline from the summer of 1947 onwards.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:35]]
<nowiki>[21:35]</nowiki>

Tito looks at what Stalin's trying to do, at Stalin efforts to subject national communist parties to Soviet control, and he decides that he does not want to be part of this. He does not want Yugoslavia to be part a rigidly integrated Soviet bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:50]]
<nowiki>[21:50]</nowiki>

Stalin is in turn dismayed by what he sees as Tito's unwillingness to follow Soviet leadership and direction. And in early 1948, sort of around the time of the Czech coup, Stalin publicly attacks Tito.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:07]]
<nowiki>[22:07]</nowiki>

He denounces him as a {{WPExtract|Deviationism|deviationist}}, as a, you know, leader who is not loyal to the Soviet Union and not loyal to the Communist project. This is really important.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:20]]
<nowiki>[22:20]</nowiki>

It's the first major split to emerge between a national Communist leader, Tito, and the Soviet Union. In some ways the Soviet-Yugoslavian split in 1948 prefigures the {{WPExtract|Sino-Soviet split}} which occurs in the 1960s. So this is anticipatory of fractures that will emerge much later within the global communist movement.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:44]]
<nowiki>[22:44]</nowiki>

But in 1948 the Soviet-Yugoslavian split is really important for European politics -- particularly for the internal politics of the East Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:56]]
<nowiki>[22:56]</nowiki>

Stalin is dismayed by Tito's defection. While Tito remains a communist he begins sort of informally to open relations to the West and even receives some material assistance from the West in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:56]]
<nowiki>[22:56]</nowiki>

Yugoslavia is sort of an anomaly as a communist country that is tacitly aligned with the United States in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:21]]
<nowiki>[23:21]</nowiki>

And Stalin is absolutely horrified by this. This is not what Stalin wanted to achieve at all. To preempt and preclude sort of future Titos Stalin tightens the discipline even further in the rest of Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:40]]
<nowiki>[23:40]</nowiki>

So Stalin after Tito's deviation becomes even less willing to countenance sort of independence and autonomy on the part of national Communist leaders elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:53]]
<nowiki>[23:53]</nowiki>

So the Soviet-Yugoslavian split has the effect of sort of further propelling the tightening and integration of the Eastern Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:03]]
<nowiki>[24:03]</nowiki>

== Germany after the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:04]]
<nowiki>[24:04]</nowiki>

Let's turn finally to Germany. Germany's really, really important -- the cause of the Second World War. Germany is also the epicenter of Europe's post Second World War division.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:19]]
<nowiki>[24:19]</nowiki>

The German case is in some ways unique. Whereas Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, were wholly occupied by the Red Army, Germany at the end of the Second World War is divided into occupation zones. We talked a little bit about these in Tuesday's lecture.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:39]]
<nowiki>[24:39]</nowiki>

As the United States and Great Britain worked to promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of Europe they have to think also about the rehabilitation and reintegration of Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:59]]
<nowiki>[24:59]</nowiki>

Insofar as they want Germany to be the, sort of, to revive Germany as essential aspect of Europe's integrated economy, the Western powers have to think seriously about how to reintegrate Germany itself.

=== Integration of the American, British and French Zones ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:16]]
<nowiki>[25:16]</nowiki>

Germany in 1945 is divided into four occupation zones. As early as 1946 the British propose unifying the British and the American occupation zones into a single administrative entity. The reasons for this are fairly obvious. An integrated Western Germany will be economically more vibrant and more self-sustaining than separate occupation zones can be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:45]]
<nowiki>[25:45]</nowiki>

The British occupation zone in the north is the industrial heart of Germany. It consumes far more food stuff than it produces. The American occupation zone in the north is much more agrarian. There's a natural sort of marriage to be made between these two occupation zones.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:03]]
<nowiki>[26:03]</nowiki>

But under the administrative separation of the zones there can be no economic integration. And the British argue that this ought to be promoted. The Americans are initially sort of hesitant. They don't want to go along with the British concept. Can anybody hazard a guess as to why not?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:22]]
<nowiki>[26:22]</nowiki>

Why might the Truman administration in 1946 be sort of unwilling to countenance the unification of the British and American zones?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:30]]
<nowiki>[26:30]</nowiki>

Who's likely to be sort of threatened or offended?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:36]]
<nowiki>[26:36]</nowiki>

(Student response)

Absolutely. To unify the Anglo-American zones would look like a provocative move. Like the, you know, the British and the Americans were trying to rebuild and rehabilitate Germany which Stalin is very afraid of.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:54]]
<nowiki>[26:54]</nowiki>

So the Americans in '46 don't go along with the British unification concept. They say, well, you know, that might be a good idea, but it would be far too provocative to the Soviet Union. We don't want to estrange Stalin like that. We want to, you know, try to preserve four power cooperation so far as we can.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:12]]
<nowiki>[27:12]</nowiki>

With Marshall Aid, however, or even before Marshall Aid, as relations between East and West deteriorate, the Americans come around to an acknowledgment of the necessity, even the inevitably, of zone integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:28]]
<nowiki>[27:28]</nowiki>

In early 1947, right at the beginning of 1947, in fact, the two occupation zones, the British and the American are merged. The new administrative entity is sort of nicknamed {{WPExtract|Bizone|Bizonia}}. In 1948, the French occupation zone in the southwest, also becomes part of this new administrative entity, and it's called Trizonia, at least for a few months. Fairly soon of course it will be known as the Federal Republic of Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:59]]
<nowiki>[27:59]</nowiki>

But we won't come to that just yet.

=== Establishment of the Deutsche Mark ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

In order to sort of provide a stable monetary basis for economic recovery and reconstruction the British and the Americans in early 1948 introduce a new currency in Germany -- the {{WPExtract|Deutsche Mark}}. The old, you know, Nazi currency, the {{WPExtract|Reichsmark}}, is sort of no longer a viable unit of value. Germans in the aftermath of the Second World War are sort of reduced to exchanging goods by barter.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:36]]
<nowiki>[28:36]</nowiki>

Can anybody tell me what the sort of most useful unit of currency is in postwar Germany in 1945 and 1946?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:44]]
<nowiki>[28:44]</nowiki>

If you wanted to engage in a transaction? Small transaction? What would you use?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:49]]
<nowiki>[28:49]</nowiki>

(Student response)

Exactly. Cigarettes. Particularly American cigarettes are the most reliable store of value in postwar Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:56]]
<nowiki>[28:56]</nowiki>

As clearly as, well, maybe it's not clearly, not a stable basis for you know long term growth and prosperity, you know, cigarettes have disadvantages as currency. They're not particularly durable, you can smoke them and then they cease to be a store of value. (laughter)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:13]]
<nowiki>[29:13]</nowiki>

So fearing this the British and the Americans promote a new sort of paper and coin currency, the Deutsche Mark -- it's introduced in 1948.

=== Stalin's Negative Reaction to the Establishment of the Deutsche Mark ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 29:27 ]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

Stalin is not happy at all. This looks like a really provocative move. Introducing a new currency prefigures the creation of a new state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:33]]
<nowiki>[29:33]</nowiki>

Stalin worries that Germany is being rehabilitated and that a rehabilitated western Germany, which let's remember, represents the greater part of Germany, and the most affluent parts of Germany, in the industrial north -- he fears that this new German state, as it looks to be becoming, will be integrated to the West. And that it will provide a sort of powerful asset for the West in its sort of struggle with the East Bloc.

=== Stalin's Blockade of Berlin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:00]]
<nowiki>[30:00]</nowiki>

By retaliation, or in retaliation, to what he sees as a provocative move, Stalin in mid-1948 decides to blockade Berlin. At this point Berlin merits a sort of moment's clarification.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:19]]
<nowiki>[30:19]</nowiki>

Germany in '45 was divided into four occupation zones. The city of Berlin which lies sort of deep within the Soviet zone was itself divided into four occupation zones. There are three sectors of Berlin which are sort of subject to you know kind of much the same administrative separation as are the four occupation zones of Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:43]]
<nowiki>[30:43]</nowiki>

And this creates a sort of anomaly. The British and the Americans have a small occupation zone in the capital of Hitler's Reich which lies deep within the Soviet Bloc.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:55]]
<nowiki>[30:55]</nowiki>

This is a source of vulnerability for the West insofar as the Western powers have responsibility for West Berlin. They're dependent upon the Soviet Union allowing sort of free passage between West Berlin and the Western occupation zones. This free passage is essential to the movement of foodstuffs -- Berlin, a very urban enclave, can hardly feed itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:21]]
<nowiki>[31:21]</nowiki>

So if the West Berliners are to be fed then the British and the Americans are going to have to transport foodstuffs in by truck in order to feed them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:29]]
<nowiki>[31:29]</nowiki>

Stalin recognizes that Berlin is a source of Western vulnerability. With {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} in the 1950s will describe Berlin as the testicles of the West. He says, if I want to make the West squeal, I just squeeze Berlin. (laughter)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:48]]
<nowiki>[31:48]</nowiki>

And this is already a, you know, source of vulnerability in the late 1940s, and Stalin like Khrushchev, recognizes the, you know, opportunity to inflict pain. So Stalin to retaliate against the currency reform imposes a blockade.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:05]]
<nowiki>[32:05]</nowiki>

And this is a really big deal. This is sort of the first moment in the Cold War, which the Soviet Union has used military force, or at least the threat of military force, to interrupt sort of Western, a major Western interest, access to the city of Berlin.

=== Possible Western Responses to the Blockade of Berlin ===

==== Appeasement ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:21]]
<nowiki>[32:21]</nowiki>

How to respond to this? Western military and political leaders debate a range of responses. But the sort of obvious options are to surrender Berlin, just to give up the Western interest in the city, and to allow the incorporation of the entire city of Berlin within the Soviet occupation zone. That would be one option. Appeasement.

==== Confrontation ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:45]]
<nowiki>[32:45]</nowiki>

Another option would be outright confrontation. Why not send a convoy of tanks up the {{WPExtract|autobahn}} from the British occupation zone to the city of Berlin. This is an option that is seriously discussed. Let's try to open an access path to Berlin by military force and see what the Soviets do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:06]]
<nowiki>[33:06]</nowiki>

But that seems to be too provocative. Is it worth starting a war, perhaps with the Soviets, over the city of Berlin? Western political leaders decide that it's not.

==== Airlift ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:16]]
<nowiki>[33:16]</nowiki>

And they settle on a sort of intermediary solution -- which is to airlift supplies to Berlin.

=== The Berlin Airlift ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:22]]
<nowiki>[33:22]</nowiki>

Some Western leaders doubt that this can be accomplished. How can we possibly supply enough food and enough coal to keep the city of Berlin alive, you know, can we really do this via the air? And the answer is: yes they can. Or yes they could.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:40]]
<nowiki>[33:40]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Berlin Blockade|Berlin Airlift}} in the winter through the summer of 1948 and into the spring of 1949 is extremely successful. It succeeds in keeping the city of Berlin alive. It's a sort of heroic logistical undertaking. And the spectacle of the Berlin Airlift helps to sort of solidify German affection for the Western occupying powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:05]]
<nowiki>[34:05]</nowiki>

The Western powers go to sort of considerable lengths and considerable costs to keep Berliners fed through the winter of 1948-49. So the Berlin airlift you know represents something like a sort of political triumph for the West -- even through Berlin is a strategic vulnerability.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:23]]
<nowiki>[34:23]</nowiki>

The Berlin Airlift is really consequential insofar as it confirms Europe's Cold War division. But the real consequences of this crisis are that it demonstrates the inability of the Soviet Union and the Western powers to cooperate over Germany. The implication is that division rather than sort of four power cooperation will be the viable solution for dealing with Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:50]]
<nowiki>[34:50]</nowiki>

(Student question)

==== The Possible Shooting Down of Aircraft ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:04]]
<nowiki>[35:04]</nowiki>

That's a terrific question because there was some concern about this in, you know, Western military planning circles. Airplanes of course are really, really vulnerable to being shot down.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:15]]
<nowiki>[35:15]</nowiki>

And what Western leaders calculated was that the Soviet Union might have blocked the autobahn but that it would not go so far as to shoot down a British or an American plane.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:25]]
<nowiki>[35:25]</nowiki>

And in the end that assumption was proven correct. Stalin did not want to escalate the confrontation by assaulting Allied aircraft. Had he done so there would have had to have been some sort of retaliation. So the flights proceed without fighter escort and unmolested by sort of Soviet planes or ground based anti-aircraft guns.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:49]]
<nowiki>[35:49]</nowiki>

(Student question)

==== Posture and Internal Thinking Within the Two Sides ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:10]]
<nowiki>[36:10]</nowiki>

I don't think that the rational for the airlift was primarily to provide a pretext for escalation. I think what's more interesting about the crisis, right, and you see this dynamic on both sides, is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union really wants to engage in military escalation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:28]]
<nowiki>[36:28]</nowiki>

(Student comment)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:32]]
<nowiki>[36:32]</nowiki>

Yeah, exactly.

The political pressures to do something are very great. Neither side wants to back down. Nobody wants to look weak. But at the same time nobody wants to be responsible for starting another major war. And that dynamic is absolutely central not only to the Berlin crisis but also to the entire Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:51]]
<nowiki>[36:51]</nowiki>

You know nobody wants to turn this into a shooting war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=36:53]]
<nowiki>[36:53]</nowiki>

(Student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:16]]
<nowiki>[37:16]</nowiki>

You're absolutely right. That's a very important point. The Soviets don't say we're doing this in order to squeeze the testicles of the West. The Soviets say that they're doing this in order to you know maintain the roadways.

==== Other Actions Stalin Could Have Taken and the Avoidance of Escalation ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:27]]
<nowiki>[37:27]</nowiki>

And there are other things that Stalin could have done which he doesn't do -- besides you know attacking Western airplanes. He could have turned off the power grid, and deprived Berlin of electricity and water. He doesn't do that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=37:42]]
<nowiki>[37:42]</nowiki>

So there are, you know, there is on both sides a careful avoidance of escalatory measures that might result in outright confrontation. And that's really important because that dynamic will you know sort of persist throughout the entire Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:01]]
<nowiki>[38:01]</nowiki>

At least in the Cold War's sort of central theaters. In the developing world Cold War tensions spill over more easily into outright confrontation, but that's an issue for another day.

== Cold War Division into Military Blocs ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:14]]
<nowiki>[38:14]</nowiki>

Okay, finally, the Berlin crisis, sort of, precipitates the final division of Europe into armed military blocs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:24]]
<nowiki>[38:24]</nowiki>

Great Britain, first proposes a military alliance with France and the {{WPExtract|Benelux}} countries, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and the United States. The British foreign secretary {{WPExtract|Ernest Bevin}} calls it a Western Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:41]]
<nowiki>[38:41]</nowiki>

This is proposed as early as 1947. Once again, this is just a sort of interesting point, it's the British who are really pushing the integration of the West hardest and fastest. The United States is a little bit more reluctant.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=38:56]]
<nowiki>[38:56]</nowiki>

Part of that reluctance has to do, with a, you know, desire not to provoke the Soviet Union. It also has to do with a very longstanding aversion to permanent peacetime alliances. The United States has not historically engaged in sort of binding foreign attachments and American leaders in 1947 don't want to get involved in the first sort of major peacetime military alliance in American history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:22]]
<nowiki>[39:22]</nowiki>

But the Berlin crisis transforms American attitudes.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:27]]
<nowiki>[39:27]</nowiki>

In March 1948, just before the Berlin crisis, the {{WPExtract|Treaty of Brussels}}, establishes a military pact between France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries.

=== The Formation of NATO ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:40]]
<nowiki>[39:40]</nowiki>

And this provides the sort of kernel for what becomes after the Berlin crisis the {{WPExtract|North Atlantic Treaty}}. Which international organization does the North Atlantic Treaty create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:51]]
<nowiki>[39:51]</nowiki>

(Student response)

NATO. Exactly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=39:54]]
<nowiki>[39:54]</nowiki>

And NATO is really, really important. It marks the advent of a binding American military commitment to Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:02]]
<nowiki>[40:02]</nowiki>

And it also marks the sort of integration of the West as a unified military bloc. Attack one Western country and you attack them all.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:11]]
<nowiki>[40:11]</nowiki>

In a sense NATO, sort of merges, the military political sovereignties of Europe's non-Communist nation-states into a single bloc. For strategic purposes the countries shaded blue in the map become a single, you know, sort of bloc of territoriality.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:33]]
<nowiki>[40:33]</nowiki>

So NATO transforms the West into an integrated and hierarchical alliance structure. The United States is on the top and the Europeans are clearly subordinate and dependent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:45]]
<nowiki>[40:45]</nowiki>

They don't mind the subordination and dependence though. And that's really important to remember. They invite American dominance of Western Europe's political and military affairs.

==== Empire by Invitation ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=40:55]]
<nowiki>[40:55]</nowiki>

One historian {{WPExtract|Geir Lundestad}} coined a very nice phrase when he described the American presence in Europe as an empire by invitation. An empire in which the imperial power is really quite reluctant to get involved and gets involved only because its subordinate allies and clients demand it.

=== Consoldation of the East Bloc ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:13]]
<nowiki>[41:13]</nowiki>

Sort of simultaneous and in some ways a little bit subsequent to the creation of NATO comes the consolidation of the East Bloc. In 1949 the Soviet Union creates the {{WPExtract|Comecon}} -- The Council on Mutual Economic Cooperation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:28]]
<nowiki>[41:28]</nowiki>

The purpose of this is to provide for a tightening of the economic integration of the Eastern Bloc. The basic dynamic of East Bloc economic integration is very different from the dynamic of West Bloc economic integration.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:43]]
<nowiki>[41:43]</nowiki>

In the West the United States provides financing via Marshall Aid to help rehabilitate its own economy. In the East the Soviet Union takes things from the relatively advanced economies of Czechoslovakia and Poland and particularly East Germany in order to facilitate Soviet reconstructions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=41:43]]
<nowiki>[41:43]</nowiki>

So the two blocs and not exactly symmetrical in terms of their implications for the European countries that participate in them.

=== Conclusion: Cold War Division into Military Blocs ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:11]]
<nowiki>[42:11]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union also begins to tighten military coordination between the bloc countries.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:17]]
<nowiki>[42:17]</nowiki>

In 1949 it does not create the {{WPExtract|Warsaw Pact}} organization, which is the sort of mirror to NATO, until 1955, and the reason for that has less to do with sort of strategic restraint on the Soviet Union's part than with the fact of the Warsaw Pact being a reaction not to NATO's creation in 1949 but to Germany's, to West Germany's, joining NATO in 1954.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=42:44]]
<nowiki>[42:44]</nowiki>

Though, sort of NATO, doesn't really become sort of complete, as a Cold War security organization, until West Germany joins NATO, which as I mentioned happens in '54, by the end of 1949 the Cold War division of Europe is already substantially completed.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:08]]
<nowiki>[43:08]</nowiki>

Europe, you know, has been divided into two tightly integrated alliance systems.

== Cold War Division in East Asia ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:14]]
<nowiki>[43:14]</nowiki>

Now let's turn to East Asia. Try to get through this fairly briskly.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:19]]
<nowiki>[43:19]</nowiki>

Where does the story of East Asia's Cold War division begin? That's a good question. We could perhaps try to take the story all the way back to the establishment of European colonial empires in East Asia -- go to the Dutch in Indonesia in the 16th century -- to do that might make sense, but it is probably unnecessary for the purposes of our collective understanding.

=== Japan's Imperial Conquests of the 1930s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=43:49]]
<nowiki>[43:49]</nowiki>

So let's instead take the story of East Asia's Cold War division back to the early 1930s and back to Japan, to Japan's creation of an East European, sorry of an East Asian Empire, out of the wreckage of which, East Asia's Cold War division will sort of be built.

==== The Context of Japan's Imperial Projects ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:10]]
<nowiki>[44:10]</nowiki>

What do we need to know about Japan in order to understand Japan's imperial projects in East and Southeast Asia? First thing: Japan is a late developer by the standards of the industrial Western countries.

===== Industrialization in Japan =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:25]]
<nowiki>[44:25]</nowiki>

Japan is unified under the {{WPExtract|Meiji period|Meiji Dynasty}} in the 1860s. It only really begins to industrialize thereafter. Japanese leaders are acutely aware that they are by Western standards late developers. They see themselves as being involved in a game of catch up.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:42]]
<nowiki>[44:42]</nowiki>

This will help to sort of legitimate for Japanese leaders Japan's bid to create an empire. Japan argues, you know, the other major powers already have their empires we were just late in having the opportunity to build ours. Now it's our turn.

===== The Great Depression in Japan =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:59]]
<nowiki>[44:59]</nowiki>

Japan is in the early 20th century a fairly sort of globalized and integrated economy. By consequence it suffers very badly in the Great Depression.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:13]]
<nowiki>[45:13]</nowiki>

There is widespread misery in Japan particularly in the countryside. You know one of the sort of important aspects of the Great Depression for Japan is the worldwide decline in agricultural prices which actually begins even before the Wall Street crash.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:29]]
<nowiki>[45:29]</nowiki>

In Japan agricultural prices fall by about two-thirds between the late 1920s and the early 1930s and this causes widespread immiseration in the countryside.

===== Political Upheaval Caused by the Great Depression =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:40]]
<nowiki>[45:40]</nowiki>

The economic dislocation of the Great Depression produces political upheaval in Japan, as elsewhere, as in Germany, as in much of Latin America, the Great Depression brokers a crisis of liberal politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=45:55]]
<nowiki>[45:55]</nowiki>

It brings to power, sort of, authoritarian and nationalist political leaders. These leaders will continue and expand a Japanese imperial project which is much older than the crisis of the 1930s. Japan's quest for empire could be taken all the way back to the beginning of the 20th century.

===== The Russo-Japanese War and Conquest of Korea =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:20]]
<nowiki>[46:20]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Russo-Japanese War}} which Japan fights in order to sort of challenge Russian primacy in Northeast Asia results in the conquest of Korea which is brought under Japanese imperial control in 1905.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:36]]
<nowiki>[46:36]</nowiki>

The Korean occupation is not formalized until 1911 but it dates back to the very early years of the 20th century.

=== The Logic of Japanese Imperialism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:43]]
<nowiki>[46:43]</nowiki>

What happens in the 1930s will be that Japanese leaders attempt to sort of expand this empire far beyond Korea. Why do they do it? What is the logic of Japanese imperialism?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=46:56]]
<nowiki>[46:56]</nowiki>

There are multiple logics as with most imperial projects. But I would emphasize both the geopolitical and the economic aspects. Japanese leaders seek to make Japan the dominant, even the hegemonic power, in East Asia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:14]]
<nowiki>[47:14]</nowiki>

Insofar as Japan is the first East Asian power to industrialize they have a historic opportunity to do that. And Japanese leaders attempt to capitalize on the opportunity that history presents them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:27]]
<nowiki>[47:27]</nowiki>

There's also an economic logic. Japan's leaders seek to consolidate Japan's position as the predominant economic power in East Asia. They seek to harness the rest of East Asia to be a source of fuel for the Japanese economic engine. And this is something that we'll talk about a little bit more when we think about the impact of the Great Depression.

=== The Rise of Militarist Leadership in Japan ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=47:54]]
<nowiki>[47:54]</nowiki>

The depression brings to power, militarist, a new militarist leadership in Japan -- a leadership that is more aggressively committed to the consolidation and expansion of an imperial zone than the liberal political leaders of the 1920s had been.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:14]]
<nowiki>[48:14]</nowiki>

The liberal prime minister, {{WPExtract|Osachi Hamaguchi|Hamaguchi Yūkō}}, is murdered in 1930,<ref>{{WPExtract|Osachi Hamaguchi|According to Wikipedia although he was shot on November 14, 1930 he died about eight months later on August 26, 1931}}. One could also visit the {{WPExtract|February 26 Incident|Wikipedia article on the February 26 Incident}} which covers other assassinations that took place in Japan during the 1930s</ref> and his death sort of marks the end of a long phase of liberal ascendancy in Japanese politics.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:27]]
<nowiki>[48:27]</nowiki>

As liberalism crumbles into crisis nationalist organizations seek to exert you know their influence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:34]]
<nowiki>[48:34]</nowiki>

There's not a single sort of nationalist party, as there is in Germany, rather Japanese politics becomes permeated and dominated by an array of nationalist organizations. Probably the most famous of these is the {{WPExtract|Sakurakai|Cherry Blossom Society}}, an organization of militarist military officers.

=== The Conquest of Manchuria ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=48:53]]
<nowiki>[48:53]</nowiki>

The major sort of event in the early 1930s that marks sort of Japan's emergence as a more aggressive imperial is the {{WPExtract|Japanese invasion of Manchuria|conquest of Manchuria in 1931}}. Manchuria is an industrial and materially rich region of northeast China. It had been a zone of Russian influence prior to the {{WPExtract|Russo-Japanese War}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:20]]
<nowiki>[49:20]</nowiki>

One of the dividends that Japan wins with the peace treaty that concludes the Russo-Japanese War is control over railroad concessions in Manchuria.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:28]]
<nowiki>[49:28]</nowiki>

In 1931 the Japanese Army in Manchuria stages a terrorist attack, the so-called {{WPExtract|Mukden Incident}} in which they accuse Chinese nationalists of attacking the railroads that Japan is responsible for in Manchuria. This provides a pretext for the occupation of the entire province of Manchuria during 1931.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=49:49]]
<nowiki>[49:49]</nowiki>

This is a very contentious move on the part of the Japanese Army of occupation in Manchuria. It's contentious in the larger international community. It results in Japan's departure from the {{WPExtract|League of Nations}} after the League condemns Japan's conquest of Manchuria.

==== Contentiousness in Japan about the Invasion of Manchuria ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:04]]
<nowiki>[50:04]</nowiki>

But the move is also contentious within Japan. And this is really important.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:08]]
<nowiki>[50:08]</nowiki>

The government in Tokyo does not approve of the conquest of Manchuria. The Japanese army is in effect operating on its own. And the conquest will result in the collapse of a civilian Japanese government at the end of 1931.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:22]]
<nowiki>[50:22]</nowiki>

But the overall effect of the Manchuria crisis is to consolidate both Japanese territorial power in Northeast Asia and the ascendancy of the militarists within Japanese politics.

=== The Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan's Further Conquests in the Late 1930s ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:38]]
<nowiki>[50:38]</nowiki>

In 1937 Japanese imperialists push much, much further -- much more aggressively. They invade the rest of China and try to bring sort of coastal eastern China under Japanese influence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=50:58]]
<nowiki>[50:58]</nowiki>

The logic for this is both strategic and economic, right. Insofar as China represents a large market for Japanese manufactured goods, and a large, you know, important source of raw materials potentially for Japanese industry. Japan's military leaders proceed according to a certain economic logic.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:17]]
<nowiki>[51:17]</nowiki>

They hope that by subjugating China, by reducing China to a sort of subordinate colonized position, in relationship to Japan, that Japan will preside over a large integrated economic arena which will be organized so as to serve the interests of Japan and of Japanese industry.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:38]]
<nowiki>[51:38]</nowiki>

This is very clear kind of logic of {{WPExtract|Core–periphery structure|core periphery distinction}} going on here.<ref>One could visit also the Wikipedia articles on {{WPExtract|Core countries}}, {{WPExtract|Semi-periphery countries}}, and {{WPExtract|Periphery countries}}</ref> The {{WPExtract|Second Sino-Japanese War|Sino-Japanese War}} is also really important insofar as it marks the beginning of Japan's estrangement from the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=51:51]]
<nowiki>[51:51]</nowiki>

The United States, a major Pacific power, does not want to see China come under the sway of Japanese colonial influence. The United States wants China to remain independent and the United States wants China to remain open for trade with all comers. Not, you know, cordoned off as an exclusive zone of Japanese economic opportunity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:12]]
<nowiki>[52:12]</nowiki>

The United States after 1937 begins to provide aid, falteringly at first, to the Chinese nationalists who seek to resist and dispel the Japanese invasion.

=== Japanese Conquest in Southeast Asia ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:25]]
<nowiki>[52:25]</nowiki>

Japan's war in China is fairly successful for about three years. In 1940 the Japanese advance begins to stall. At this point Japanese militarists begin to think seriously about alternative paths of expansion. Southeast Asia begins to loom large as a potential asset for the Japanese empire.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=52:46]]
<nowiki>[52:46]</nowiki>

Early in 1941 Japan's military leaders decide to sort of pause the war in China, just to hold steady and consolidate the existing gains, and to shift their focus instead to Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Indochina in particular.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:03]]
<nowiki>[53:03]</nowiki>

There are clear economic prizes to be won. Indonesia is the richest source of what in East Asia? What does Indonesia have that Japan doesn't?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:14]]
<nowiki>[53:14]</nowiki>

(Student response)

Rubber is important.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:16]]
<nowiki>[53:16]</nowiki>

And what else? What's really important for fueling? I'm sorry?

(Student response)

Oil. Oil is absolutely crucial. Insofar as Indonesia represents a potential source of oil it provides a source of strategic materials. But there are other strategic materials in Indonesia and Southeast Asia too. Rubber is also really important. You need gasoline to fuel your trucks but you need rubber to hit the road.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=53:43]]
<nowiki>[53:43]</nowiki>

So Japan prepares for war in Southeast Asia. Japan's leaders recognize by the late summer of 1941 that any attempt to grab Southeast Asia and to incorporate it within a Japanese imperial zone will entail conflict with the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:02]]
<nowiki>[54:02]</nowiki>

Besides being committed to, you know, free trade principles in East Asia the United States is also a major colonial power in Southeast Asia. It still rules the Philippines. So a Southeast Asian thrust on Japan's part will necessarily lead to conflict with the United States. What do you do if you're a small rising power like Japan envisaging conflict with a big established power like the United States?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:33]]
<nowiki>[54:33]</nowiki>

What would be a, you know, sensible precaution to take?

=== The Nazi-Japanese Alliance ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:42]]
<nowiki>[54:42]</nowiki>

Let's try it. You could align yourself with another big power -- which is what Japan does. The Nazi-Japanese alliance serves a Japanese strategic interest insofar as it sort of bolsters Japan with an international alliance.<ref>One could visit the Wikipedia article on {{WPExtract|Germany-Japan relations}} which speaks about cultural and intellectual interaction between the two nations before the Second World War</ref>

=== The Attack on Pearl Habor ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=54:58]]
<nowiki>[54:58]</nowiki>

You might also think about what your adversaries' major military and strategic assets are and consider whether there is any sort of way that you can preemptively neutralize them. And this is what Japan does when it makes the decision to attack {{WPExtract|Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:14]]
<nowiki>[55:14]</nowiki>

What is the major asset for American military power in the Pacific? It is the Pacific Fleet -- based at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. By striking Pearl Harbor prior to a declaration of war Japan hopes to knock out the Pacific Fleet as an effective fighting force -- perhaps to cripple Pearl Harbor as an offensive base from which American military actions can be launched and thereby to establish Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=55:45]]
<nowiki>[55:45]</nowiki>

The attack on Pearl Harbor is sort of partially successful. It does, you know, catastrophic damage to the American battle fleet. Ships, famously the {{WPExtract|USS Arizona (BB-39)|USS ''Arizona''}} sunk, but the three US aircraft carriers in the Pacific are unscathed by the assault. And this is the real stroke of good fortune for the United States in Pearl Harbor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:10]]
<nowiki>[56:10]</nowiki>

The aircraft carriers are not damaged. And they will sort of eventually provide a platform from which the Pacific War can be waged.

=== Japan's Colonial Expansion after the Attack on Pearl Harbor ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:19]]
<nowiki>[56:19]</nowiki>

But having struck Pearl Harbor, in a preemptive move, Japan in early 1942 brings much of Southeast Asia under its control -- goes about conquering Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=56:33]]
<nowiki>[56:33]</nowiki>

And here you see a bit of a map of Japan's colonial expansion from the late 19th century through to the mid 1940s. And you can see it's a very, very impressive rapid increase in the extent of territory that comes under Tokyo's control. I'm afraid this map doesn't show Southeast Asia but you can sort of try to visualize Southeast Asia. Maybe next time I do the slide I'll try not to crop it so dramatically.

=== Japan's Colonial Vision and Proposition ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:05]]
<nowiki>[57:05]</nowiki>

So Japan bids for empire and is at least initially very successful in bringing the territories of Southeast Asia under its control. But what to do with this vast new empire? How to administer it? How perhaps even harder to legitimate it?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:25]]
<nowiki>[57:25]</nowiki>

For legitimacy Japan promotes an ideology of {{WPExtract|Pan-Asianism}} -- insofar as Japan's military forces have displaced European colonial empires in the Philippines, in Indonesia, and in Indochina -- Japan argues that its empire is not a colonial project but a liberatory project.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=57:44]]
<nowiki>[57:44]</nowiki>

Asia, for the Asians is Japan's colonial slogan. And this creates dilemmas for political leaders in the countries that come under Japan's sway. Asia for the Asians sounds like a pretty good slogan. Should they cooperate with it? Some nationalist political leaders argue no.

==== Responses to Japanese Colonialism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:04]]
<nowiki>[58:04]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Ho Chi Minh}} says that colonial domination is colonial domination no matter who is perpetrating it. And he commits to resist the Japanese occupation by the force of arms. {{WPExtract|Sukarno}} in Indonesia takes a very different perspective. Sukarno says, well, you know this is an opportunity to rid ourselves of the Dutch -- we might as well seize it.

=== Japan's Colonialism in Practice as Exploitation ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:23]]
<nowiki>[58:23]</nowiki>

Ultimately Ho ends up being proven more correct than Sukarno about the nature of Japanese colonial rule. Japan promises, most famously at a Great East Asian conference in the fall of 1943, to make its new colonies independent really, really soon. That promise is never redeemed. The economic relationship looks less like mutual co-prosperity and more like exploitative, you know, core-periphery dependence.

=== Japan's Ideology of Racial Superiority ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=58:56]]
<nowiki>[58:56]</nowiki>

Japan also embraces a sort of ideology of racial superiority. Japanese colonialists insist on the biological superiority of the {{WPExtract|Yamato people|Yamato peoples}}. It's not as sort of virulent an ideology of racial supremacy as that which Hitler formulates in Europe. There is some resemblance, and Japanese racism will sort of inhabit the forging of effective collaborative relationships between the Japanese and their new colonial subjects.

=== Violence by Japanese Forces During the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:30]]
<nowiki>[59:30]</nowiki>

And of course there is the brutal violence. The Western colonial troops who are sort of displaced by the Japanese experience some of this.

==== The Bataan Death March ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=59:41]]
<nowiki>[59:41]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Bataan Death March}}, for example, involves the forced march of prisoners of war from the Southern Philippines to the north of the island -- and its accompanied by brutal violence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:57]]
<nowiki>[59:57]</nowiki>

Prisoners of war are sort of starved to death -- bayoneted, cruelly tortured, or maimed during the Bataan Death March is which is perhaps just the most notorious episode of Japanese colonial violence.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:09]]
<nowiki>[60:09]</nowiki>

It's important to remember that the victims of the Bataan Death March are for the most part Philippinos not Americans. The overwhelming majority of the people who die are Asians not Americans. Spectacles of violence such as this hardly serve to legitimate Japanese colonial rule in the eyes of its East Asian subjects.

=== End of the Japanese Empire ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:31]]
<nowiki>[60:31]</nowiki>

So that's the Japanese Empire. How does it end? Well, the answer is really simple. It ends because American military power, American material resources for waging war, ultimately prove superior to Japan's. Japan surrenders in 1945 following the atomic bombing of {{WPExtract|Hiroshima}} and then {{WPExtract|Nagasaki}}.

=== Japan under MacArthur in the Postwar Period ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=60:54]]
<nowiki>[60:54]</nowiki>

With Japan's surrender the United States becomes the sole occupying power in Japan.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:01]]
<nowiki>[61:01]</nowiki>

This is really Japan's good fortune if you compare Japan's postwar fate to that of East Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:09]]
<nowiki>[61:09]</nowiki>

The American occupation sets about to transform Japanese society: to modernize Japan, to liberalize Japanese, to ensure that Japan can never wage offensive war again.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:21]]
<nowiki>[61:21]</nowiki>

The personification of American power and authority in Japan is the man pictured in the slide here with the {{WPExtract|Hirohito|Emperor Hirohito}} -- {{WPExtract|Douglas MacArthur}}.

[[File:Macarthur hirohito.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Gen. Douglas Macarthur with Japanese Emperor Hirohito]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:32]]
<nowiki>[61:32]</nowiki>

MacArthur in effect becomes the American {{WPExtract|proconsul}} in Japan -- the ultimate source of power and authority -- the embodiment for the time being of sovereignty.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=61:43]]
<nowiki>[61:43]</nowiki>

For a country that has never been invaded by a foreign power, which Japan had not prior to the American occupation, this represents you know a sort of ... This is a novel experience being dominated and colonized. Yet we should not allow the novelty of it all, as it might appear from Japan's perspective to obscure the underlying continuities.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:07]]
<nowiki>[62:07]</nowiki>

MacArthur becomes sort of the dominant figure in Japan's politics, but the regime over which he presides is a regime which is in many respects a, you know, sort of continuation of the prewar government.

==== Institutional Continuity in Postwar Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:19]]
<nowiki>[62:19]</nowiki>

Sensibly, the Americans in 1945, don't try to dismantle Japanese governing institutions. The Americans will prosecute the worst of the war criminals. But the Americans don't try to dismantle the Japanese state, and then hope to rebuild it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:37]]
<nowiki>[62:37]</nowiki>

Rather there is institutional continuity which facilitates the effective reconstruction of Japan.

==== American Objectives in Postwar Japan ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:43]]
<nowiki>[62:43]</nowiki>

What the Americans try to do and how do they seek to accomplish it?

===== Demilitarization =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=62:48]]
<nowiki>[62:48]</nowiki>

Demilitarization is the first objective. Japan will be, you know, sort of, removed from the ranks of the world's major military powers -- prohibited under the terms of its new constitution from maintaining offensive military forces.

===== Land Reform =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:03]]
<nowiki>[63:03]</nowiki>

The United States also undertakes a program of land reform in Japan. Large feudal land holdings will be dismantled, parceled up, and, you know sort of, sold off. The logic of land reform is to take apart the power of the conservative aristocracy in Japanese society.

===== Decartelization =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:25]]
<nowiki>[63:25]</nowiki>

In industry, a similar process of decartelization occurs. The United States under MacArthur will try to sort of break up and dismantle the large industrial conglomerations which were during the 1930s such important cheerleaders for Japanese colonialism in East Asia.

===== The Contrast Between MacArthur's Political Conservatism and the Progressive Agenda in Postwar Japan =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=63:44]]
<nowiki>[63:44]</nowiki>

There is sort of historical irony to this. MacArthur in his own politics is a fairly conservative Republican, as proconsul of Japan he ends up implementing a very progressive reform agenda. Make of that what you will.

==== Japan's Economic Prosperity Following the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:02 ]]
<nowiki>[64:02]</nowiki>

Ultimately the occupation ends with sort of Japan's rehabilitation. Japan's economic rehabilitation is particularly stunning.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:13 ]]
<nowiki>[64:13]</nowiki>

You know sort of the grand irony of Japanese history in the 20th century is this. That in the first half the 20th century Japan wages war for economic empire in East Asia -- insisting that Japan can never be secure and prosperous in a world dominated by the United States and organized according to sort of liberal precepts and principles.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:34]]
<nowiki>[64:34]</nowiki>

This effort to create an economic empire, a colonial empire, ends in catastrophe. It end with Japan being atomic bombed by the United States.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=64:44]]
<nowiki>[64:44]</nowiki>

In the second half the 20th century Japan does something total different. Japan seeks prosperity and affluence within a world order framework dominated by the United States and organized according to liberal principles. And Japan does much better under American power than it does in opposition to it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:01]]
<nowiki>[65:01]</nowiki>

So that's the irony of Japanese history in the 20th century.

==== Conclusion: Japan under MacArthur in the Postwar Period ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:05]]
<nowiki>[65:05]</nowiki>

But rehabilitation is not certain in 1945. It's not clear exactly what's going to become of Japan. MacArthur doesn't quite know what his final destination is going to be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=65:18]]
<nowiki>[65:18]</nowiki>

Answering that question, what will become of Japan, will be sort of a contingent process, and it's a process that depends very fundamentally on the escalation of larger Cold War rivalries and tensions in East Asia and to those that we should turn.

=== China and Cold War Division ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:39 ]]
<nowiki>[65:39]</nowiki>

I'm actually going to skip over Vietnam and I'll come back to that when I talk about the process of decolonization, and we'll try to conserve a little bit of time.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:48]]
<nowiki>[65:48]</nowiki>

So let's turn straight to China and think about what happens there because China is really, really important. It's the epicenter, arguably of, East Asia's Cold War division. How does it come about?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:04]]
<nowiki>[66:04]</nowiki>

You know, once again, we could take the story back quite a long way. Probably the most logical point of departure is the collapse of the {{WPExtract|Qing Dynasty}} in 1911.<ref>{{WPExtract|Qing Dynasty|The Wikipedia article on the Qing Dynasty}} has, "The Wuchang Uprising on October 11, 1911, led to the Xinhai Revolution. General Yuan Shikai negotiated the abdication of Puyi, the last emperor, on February 12, 1912."</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:15]]
<nowiki>[66:15]</nowiki>

A political rupture of the grandest proportions that ushers in a long phase of political disaggregation -- a period in which warlordism prevails throughout much of the country in which there is no effective central authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:35]]
<nowiki>[66:35]</nowiki>

During this period the two primary sort of nationalist political forces, the {{WPExtract|Kuomintang}} headed by {{WPExtract|Chiang Kai-shek}} pictured in the slide and the {{WPExtract|Communist Party of China|Chinese Communist Party}}.

[[File:Chiang Kai-shek.jpg|thumb|500px|center|Chiang Kai-shek in 1945]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:48]]
<nowiki>[66:48]</nowiki>

These two forces while briefly allied split profoundly and sort of decisively in 1927.

==== The Kuomintang ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=66:57]]
<nowiki>[66:57]</nowiki>

It is in the late 1920s the Kuomintang -- not the Communist Party -- that succeeds in unifying China. What kind of organization is the Kuomintang? What kind of party is it?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:11]]
<nowiki>[67:11]</nowiki>

It's in many respects a progressive political party at least in the context of its times. It stands for centralization of political authority, for the administrative consolidation of the state, and for political and even some social reform.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:26]]
<nowiki>[67:26]</nowiki>

It's not a left wing party, far left wing party, like the Communist Party, but it is a party that aspires to be modernizing and progressive. When it comes to power it establishes a sort of political center at {{WPExtract|Nanjing}} under Chiang in the late 1920s.

==== The Chinese Civil War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=67:42]]
<nowiki>[67:42]</nowiki>

Insofar as the Communists are not reconciled to Kuomintang dominance the achievement of a Kuomintang dominated state also produces a long civil war -- the so called {{WPExtract|Chinese Civil War|Ten Years Civil War}} which begins in 1927 with the estrangement of the two parties and ends only in 1937. Can anybody hazard a guess as to why the Ten Years Civil War ends in 1937?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:11]]
<nowiki>[68:11]</nowiki>

(Student response)

That's right. Japan attacks in 1937 which forces the Kuomintang and the Communist Party into an uneasy alliance of cooperation. They sort of come together to fight the Japanese invader but they never really cooperate very effectively or very substantially. Even as they are sort of ostensibly working towards a common purpose they're still jockeying for advantage against each other.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:36]]
<nowiki>[68:36]</nowiki>

I'm not going to talk too much about China's experience in the Second World War here. Not because it's not an interesting story but because it's such an interesting story that it would take us too long to do it justice.

==== China in the Postwar Period ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:48]]
<nowiki>[68:48]</nowiki>

So let's think about how the Second World War ends from a Chinese perspective.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=68:54]]
<nowiki>[68:54]</nowiki>

In August 1945 Japan surrenders but Japanese occupation forces shaded in the chart in sort of pink still remain throughout much of coastal and southern China.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:08]]
<nowiki>[69:08]</nowiki>

Japan of course still occupies Manchuria in the north where it has been for 15 years now.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:15]]
<nowiki>[69:15]</nowiki>

China is not only divided between Japanese areas of occupation and areas that are not occupied by the Japanese it's also divided between areas that are dominated by the power of the Communist Party in vast swathes of the countryside, particularly in the north, and areas especially in the south, that are dominated by the Kuomintang.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:39]]
<nowiki>[69:39]</nowiki>

The Kuomintang had its sort of wartime capital in {{WPExtract|Chongqing }} in the Chinese interior and that represents sort of the heart of Kuomintang power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:51]]
<nowiki>[69:51]</nowiki>

The contending Chinese forces are not the only players who matter in China at the end of the Second World War. As you know had sort of previously been the case in Chinese history in the 20th century. Foreign powers have a major role to play -- none more than important that the United States of America.

==== US Objectives in China for the Postwar Period ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:12]]
<nowiki>[70:12]</nowiki>

What does the United States do in Japan? What does it want to accomplish? Oh sorry, in China, what does it want to accomplish?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:18]]
<nowiki>[70:18]</nowiki>

During the Second World War, the United States, supports the Kuomintang as a useful ally against the Japanese. Containing and fighting Japan is really the primarily objective of American policy in China during the Second World War.

===== US Support for the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:34]]
<nowiki>[70:34]</nowiki>

And to this end the United States tries to promote cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. But the United States is never evenhanded. It leans to one side. It leans to, towards, Chiang Kai-Shek. And this is part because Chiang Kai-Shek looks like the more natural political leader of China. He has after all been leading China through the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:58]]
<nowiki>[70:58]</nowiki>

But it's also because Chiang Kai-Shek is not a communist. And there is strong support for Chiang in the domestic politics of the United States -- particularly on the West Coast, the so called China lobby is influential.

===== US Support for Truce Between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:10]]
<nowiki>[71:10]</nowiki>

Despite these, you know, sort of structural biases toward the Kuomintang the United States works to produce, or tries to produce, a truce between the two Chinese parties. It does so out of the conviction that China will be a more useful military ally if it can get its act together, and if it's two major political factions can cooperate.

==== The Soviet Union and China in the Postwar Period ====

===== Soviet Support of the Chinese Communist Party =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:32]]
<nowiki>[71:32]</nowiki>

What about the Soviet Union? Like the United States the Soviet Union tilts to one side. It supports the Chinese Communist Party as a sort of fraternal Communist power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:47]]
<nowiki>[71:47]</nowiki>

But the Soviet Union really doesn't ever go so far, at least not until much later, to overtly align itself with the Chinese Communist Party.

===== Soviet Acceptance of the Kuomintang =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:58]]
<nowiki>[71:58]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union through the Second World War, and well into the postwar period, continues to recognize the Kuomintang as China's legitimate government. And there's certainly an argument which historians have made with some plausibility that Stalin in fact favored a Kuomintang dominated China rather than a China ruled by {{WPExtract|Mao Zedong}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:17]]
<nowiki>[72:17]</nowiki>

So the Soviet relationship with the Chinese Civil War is very tricky. And it merits you know sort of more discussion than we can really afford to give it in the context of this lecture class.

===== Soviet Desire to Avoid Confrontation with the United States =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:28]]
<nowiki>[72:28]</nowiki>

Besides sort of maintaining a posture of neutrality in the conflict between the Kuomintang and the CCP Stalin also wants to avoid confrontation with the United States in and over China. This may have been Stalin's most urgent objective of all -- to avoid turning China into a Cold War battlefield.

==== CCP Victory in the Chinese Civil War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:49]]
<nowiki>[72:49]</nowiki>

That the Chinese Civil War ends with a Chinese Communist victory owes much more to the Chinese Communists themselves ultimately than to the external powers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:01]]
<nowiki>[73:01]</nowiki>

After the Second World War the CCP consolidates control, particularly in the countryside, the Kuomintang by comparison struggles to establish political legitimacy and to sustain its own political authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:14]]
<nowiki>[73:14]</nowiki>

As the political balance in China begins to shift toward the CCP so too does the military balance shift. Mao Zedong declares open warfare on the Kuomintang in mid-1948. Manchuria falls to the Communists later that summer.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:30]]
<nowiki>[73:30]</nowiki>

In 1949 the Communists embark upon a major southern offensive that ultimately succeeds in reunifying all of the country except Taiwan under Mao Zedong's rule in the fall of 1949.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:43]]
<nowiki>[73:43]</nowiki>

In September Mao declares a new government, a coalition government, so called, really dominated by the Communist Party, on October 1st 1949 he declares the People's Republic of China.

==== Mao's Commitment to Lean to the Soviet Union in the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:56]]
<nowiki>[73:56]</nowiki>

In the Cold War Mao professes his commitment to lean to one side. Said he's not going to be neutral. He's going lean to one side. And there's little ambiguity as to which that side is going to be.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:09]]
<nowiki>[74:09]</nowiki>

In 1949 at the very end of the year Mao travels to Moscow for a conference with Stalin that will produce and consecrate the {{WPExtract|Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance|Sino-Soviet Alliance}}. In early 1950 China and the Soviet Union sign a treaty: the Sino-Soviet Alliance. It provides a kind of mutual security pact, much like NATO, or sort of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:33]]
<nowiki>[74:33]</nowiki>

There are real benefits in this treaty for China. The Soviet Union renounces Russia's historic interests in Manchuria. The Qing Empire had signed concessions that gave Russia permanent interests in Manchuria. Stalin unilaterally renounces these which is to very much to China's advantage.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:54]]
<nowiki>[74:54]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union also agrees to provide Mao with serious material assistance to rebuild and to develop China's economy. Having treated Mao somewhat indifferently through the long period of civil war that followed the Second World War Stalin almost seems in early 1950 to be trying to make amends for his earlier aloofness.

==== Chinese Communist Ascendancy and the Transformation of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:17]]
<nowiki>[75:17]</nowiki>

Now that Mao dominates China the Soviets are very eager to create a close alliance. This alliance transforms the Cold War, right. Eurasia's two great powers, the Soviet Union and China, are now by 1950, both Communist and are locked in a very tight strategic alliance.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:38]]
<nowiki>[75:38]</nowiki>

This looks like a very different world from the world of 1945 in which China's future was still very open.

=== Cold War Division in Korea After the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:43]]
<nowiki>[75:43]</nowiki>

The consolidation of a Communist Chinese state has consequences elsewhere in East Asia nowhere more important than in Korea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:54]]
<nowiki>[75:54]</nowiki>

The Korean Peninsula, as I've already mentioned, was occupied by Japan really from the beginning of the 20th century. With Japan's defeat in 1945 Korea's future becomes open. The country is temporarily occupied by US forces in the south and by Soviet forces in the north.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:12]]
<nowiki>[76:12]</nowiki>

This doesn't mean that the United States and the Soviet Union want to transform Korea into a small version of Europe -- into a peninsula divided by the superpowers. On the contrary, both Moscow and Washington really want to neutralize Korea. They don't want to fight over Korea. They hope that Korea can be you know sort of turned into a sort of neutral arena in the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:32]]
<nowiki>[76:32]</nowiki>

To that end both the United States and the Soviet Union withdraw their military forces in 1948 and 1949.

==== Tension in the Korean Peninsula After the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:39]]
<nowiki>[76:39]</nowiki>

But the question of Korea's postwar independent future remains uncertain. In the north the Soviets promote {{WPExtract|Kim Il-sung}}, a Russian trained Communist as their preferred successor, as the man whom they hope will rule over the entire nation of Korea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:57]]
<nowiki>[76:57]</nowiki>

In the South the United States promotes {{WPExtract|Syngman Rhee}} a corrupt non-Communist as their preferred successor.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:05]]
<nowiki>[77:05]</nowiki>

Rhee and Kim are fierce rivals from the very beginning. As Soviet and American occupation forces withdraw border skirmishes between South Korean and North Korean forces begin.

==== The Outbreak of the Korean War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:18]]
<nowiki>[77:18]</nowiki>

It's not until July 1950; however, that outright war begins. It begins when North Korea under Kim Il-sung invades the South. Why does it do this?

===== Kim's Effort to Gain Support from Stalin and Mao =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:30]]
<nowiki>[77:30]</nowiki>

Well, the person to whom we have to turn for an explanation is really Kim Il-Sung. Kim is desperate to go to war to reunify Korea under his own auspices. The hard part is securing the support of Stalin for such a aggressive, potentially dangerous move.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:46]]
<nowiki>[77:46]</nowiki>

But Kim goes to Stalin and says, this is really a great idea, will you support me in my effort to reunify Korea via military means? And Stalin says, well, I suppose so.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:56]]
<nowiki>[77:56]</nowiki>

In part Stalin does that because he doesn't think that the United States will go to war over Korea. The United States has not publicly described Korea as a country to whose independence it is absolutely committed. So Stalin thinks that this can be gotten away with it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:14]]
<nowiki>[78:14]</nowiki>

And it's also the case that Korea dominated by Kim Il-Sung could be a useful sort of ally or resource for the Soviet Union in northeast Asia. By renouncing Manchuria in the Sino-Soviet Treaty Stalin has surrendered Russia's major sort of historic interest in northeast China establishing a new sphere of influence in Korea might be sort of substitute.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:40]]
<nowiki>[78:40]</nowiki>

Mao has very little role in the origins of the Korean War he simply goes along with Kim's plan. Kim travels to Beijing after he's traveled to Moscow and says this is what I'm going to do.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:53]]
<nowiki>[78:53]</nowiki>

And Mao says, well, I guess you're gonna do it then. This is not an action which China necessarily encourages. Mao simply accepts Stalin's guidance and leadership on the Korea issue. In part that's because Mao is much more concerned with Taiwan.

==== The Course of the Korean War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:09]]
<nowiki>[79:09]</nowiki>

How does the war go? North Korea attacks in July. The West responds. It does so under the auspices of the United Nations. {{WPExtract|United Nations Security Council Resolution 84|Security Council Resolution 84}} authorizes the war but it's the United States that leads the war effort.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:23]]
<nowiki>[79:23]</nowiki>

The course of the war is really not important. This is a class in military history.<ref>Likely meaning to say, "this isn't a class in military history".</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:26]]
<nowiki>[79:26]</nowiki>

But for the record North Korea initially thrusts deep into the South, United Nations forces respond with an {{WPExtract|Battle of Inchon|ambitious daring military landing at Inchon in September 1950}}. Thereafter UN forces push north towards the Chinese border. At this point Mao decides to intervene directly with Chinese military forces in Korea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:48]]
<nowiki>[79:48]</nowiki>

Galvanized by sort of Chinese assistance the Communists push south then the United Nations pushes back and the whole thing settles with a return to the [[wikt:status quo ante|status quo ante]]. That is to say with Korea divided at the 38th parallel. The situation by the end of 1950 is a stalemate. This is more or less where it remains.

==== Consequences of the Korean War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:08]]
<nowiki>[80:08]</nowiki>

[01:20:09.3]
What are the consequences? Lot of dead Koreans. About 1.5 million military deaths. 2.5 million civilian deaths. And a semi-permanent division of Korea.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:19]]
<nowiki>[80:19]</nowiki>

It's important to remember that the real costs of the Korean War are borne by the Koreans.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:24]]
<nowiki>[80:24]</nowiki>

Who wins the Korean War? The answer is really simple: Japan. Japan experiences an export led economic boom, signs a security treaty with the United States that returns its sovereignty and independence, and is fully incorporated to the West. Japan as a consequence of the Korean War becomes sort of a major US strategic ally in East Asia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:44]]
<nowiki>[80:44]</nowiki>

There are major consequences for the Cold War too. The Korean War marks the militarization of the Cold War, and most importantly, and here we conclude the lecture, it makes the consolidation of the Cold War's division.
== Conclusion: Cold War Division by 1950 ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:55]]
<nowiki>[80:55]</nowiki>

By the end of 1950 the world has in effect been divided into two blocs of military territoriality. Each organized under the leadership of a dominant superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=81:08]]
<nowiki>[81:08]</nowiki>

Getting there however took five years. It wasn't necessarily obvious in 1945 that this was going to be how things ended up. It wasn't preordained by ideology nor was it preordained by the condition of bipolarity. To understand how the world gets divided I would suggest it's really important to pay attention to the consequences of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=81:29]]
<nowiki>[81:29]</nowiki>

What is the legacy of the Second World War? What vacuums of power and authority does it create? And how do the superpowers end up filling it. Those are the questions on which you should reflect.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 03 - The Division of Europe - 01h 20m 27s

2019-05-21T21:00:07Z

UploadBot: put_page.py interactively: Changing U.S. to US. Wikipedia Manual of Style permits both styles, but US is stated as preferred when other countries such as UK, USSR are also in the article.

== Introduction: The Importance of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:00]]
<nowiki>[0:00]</nowiki>

Today we're going to be talking about the origins of the Cold War.

The Cold War is a definitive theme of the postwar era. Sometimes when historians of international relations talk about the postwar era they describe it simply as the era of the Cold War, i.e. the Cold War is such a big, such a crucial theme, that it can be a synonym almost for postwar international history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:31]]
<nowiki>[0:31]</nowiki>

Personally I wouldn't want to go that far. I think that there are dangers in seeing the Cold War as sort of the singular overarching framework within which the history of the postwar world needs to be understood. I think that we get a better historical understanding of the postwar world if we see the Cold War as one of a number of defining themes or struggles which we might use to comprehend the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=0:59]]
<nowiki>[0:59]</nowiki>

But even if we try to situate the Cold War in context, if we try to take the Cold War as one of a range of important historical themes that we need to understand its significance is still very substantial. The Cold War was a defining geopolitical confrontation of the postwar era and it will be one of the central issues that we have to try to comprehend as we move forward this semester.

== Aspects of the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:28]]
<nowiki>[1:28]</nowiki>

What then was the Cold War? How should we understand it? And the Cold War had a number of different faces or aspects.

=== Geopolitical and Ideological Struggle ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:39]]
<nowiki>[1:39]</nowiki>

At one level the Cold War was simply a great power rivalry between two superpowers. A geopolitical confrontation between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=1:51]]
<nowiki>[1:51]</nowiki>

But at the same time the Cold War also had a central ideological aspect. It's difficult to understand the Cold War without paying central attention to the struggle between communism as an ideological system and capitalism as an ideological system. After all during the Cold War both Communists and capitalists claimed to be able to offer a superior way of organizing societies and economies. Both Communists and capitalist claimed that history was on their side.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:31]]
<nowiki>[2:31]</nowiki>

So when we think about the history of the Cold War we ought to think not only about the confrontation between two great powers: the United States and the Soviet Union, but also about the confrontation between two rival ideological systems: Communism and capitalism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=2:46]]
<nowiki>[2:46]</nowiki>

The slide shows you a photograph of {{WPExtract|Richard Nixon}} and {{WPExtract|Nikita Khrushchev}} arguing in the late 1950s about which of their social systems: Communism or capitalism was superior. It's significant that the debate took place inside a model kitchen because the kitchen was part of the American exhibition at the Moscow World's Fair and it modeled what Nixon saw as the superior merits and virtues of the capitalist system.

[[File:Kitchen debate.jpg|thumb|500px|center|[[wikipedia:Kitchen Debate|Kitchen Debate]] between Nixon and Khrushchev]]

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:15]]
<nowiki>[3:15]</nowiki>

So the Cold War was both an ideological struggle and a geopolitical confrontation. But there were more aspects to the Cold War than these.

=== The Nuclear Arms Race ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:26]]
<nowiki>[3:26]</nowiki>

The history of nuclear weapons has a central role in the history of the Cold War. And at some level we ought to see the nuclear arms race, the struggle for strategic superiority, and then from the early 1970s the struggle to control the nuclear arms and to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a history that is to some extent autonomous from the history of the geopolitical rivalry and the ideological struggle.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=3:56]]
<nowiki>[3:56]</nowiki>

Nuclear weapons were an invention of the postwar era. It might not be an exaggeration to say that nuclear weapons invented the postwar era in international relations and their history is from a certain point of view distinct from the history of the Cold War of which they were such a central part.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:14]]
<nowiki>[4:14]</nowiki>

After all dilemmas over nuclear proliferation have continued beyond the end of the Cold War. This is a history that is both part of the Cold War and which transcends the Cold War itself.

=== Struggle Over the Developing World ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:26]]
<nowiki>[4:26]</nowiki>

Besides the history of nuclear weapons as a central theme of Cold War history we ought to think too about the struggle to influence the postcolonial or decolonizing world that was such a central aspect of the Cold War's history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=4:45]]
<nowiki>[4:45]</nowiki>

The Cold War was not just a struggle between social systems. Not just a struggle between great powers, superpowers, it was also a struggle for the soul of the developing world. And this was a struggle in which developing world actors like {{WPExtract|Ho Chi Minh }} played central roles themselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:04]]
<nowiki>[5:04]</nowiki>

It was not just a history in which the superpowers did things to the developing world. It was also a history in which developing world leaders and actors were themselves central players.

=== Conclusion: Aspects of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=5:16]]
<nowiki>[5:16]</nowiki>

The Cold War had many different facets and during the course of the semester we will be visiting as many of them as we have time to.

== Understanding the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:27]]
<nowiki>[5:27]</nowiki>

How then do we explain the Cold War? How did it come to pass? Was the Cold War inevitable or was the Cold War a product of specific choices, specific actions, for which we might hold individual historical actors accountable?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 5:44]]
<nowiki>[5:44]</nowiki>

Historians of the Cold War have tended to fixate on the question of origins. In part this is a reflection of sort of when the history of the Cold War was written. After all a great deal of Cold War {{WPExtract|historiography}} was written before the Cold War ended.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:02]]
<nowiki>[6:02]</nowiki>

Historians writing in the 1970s and 1980s could not very well be concerned with the question of endings. They sort of had to as a function of their own perspectives be concerned with the question of origins because that was really all that there was to write about the '70s and '80s.

=== Cold War Historiography and the Question of Accountability ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:18]]
<nowiki>[6:18]</nowiki>

One of the sort of central preoccupations for historians who have dealt with the origins of the Cold War has been the question of accountability. Who ultimately was to blame for the Cold War's arrival?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:33]]
<nowiki>[6:33]</nowiki>

I don't want to belabor the historiographical discussion. It would be more appropriate in a class on the history of US foreign relations than it is this semester's lecture series.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:45]]
<nowiki>[6:45]</nowiki>

But it's still worth thinking a little bit about the sort of ways in which scholars have tried to ascribe responsibility for the coming of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 6:56]]
<nowiki>[6:56]</nowiki>

And let me just give you a very simple run down of how this history works.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:02]]
<nowiki>[7:02]</nowiki>

(static like noise)

I don't know what that noise is.

Does anybody have any idea?

I'm sorry.

Okay, let's ...

I could do without the microphone in a room of this size but it's essential for the podcast so ...

==== Orthodox View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:25]]
<nowiki>[7:25]</nowiki>

Okay, so sort of the first generation of Cold War scholarship in the United States. Genre of scholarship which we commonly refer to as sort of orthodox history of the Cold War laid the blame for the Cold War's origins on the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 7:42]]
<nowiki>[7:42]</nowiki>

They said, well really the Cold War emerged out of Stalin's efforts to create a empire in Eastern Europe and the history of the early Cold War can be understood as a series of sort of Western reactions to Soviet provocations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=7:58]]
<nowiki>[7:58]</nowiki>

That's in a nutshell the first generation of Cold War historiography.

==== Revisionist View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:05]]
<nowiki>[8:05]</nowiki>

During the 1960s this sort of one dimensional interpretation of Cold War history is counted by an alternative one dimensional interpretation of Cold War history which sort of inverts responsibility for the coming of the Cold War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:21]]
<nowiki>[8:21]</nowiki>

It says, well, you know really the Cold War was about American efforts to create an empire of sort of economic exploitation and influence in Western Europe and the origins of the Cold War can be understood in terms of a series of rational Soviet responses to American expansionism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:37]]
<nowiki>[8:37]</nowiki>

This emphasis on sort of American expansion as the root cause of the Cold War, an interpretation that flourishes in the 1960s, has something to do with the Vietnam War and the influence that the Vietnam War has on historians who are working at the time of it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=8:56]]
<nowiki>[8:56]</nowiki>

This genre of scholarship that tries to lay the blame for the Cold War on the United States is usually referred to as revisionist historiography.

==== Post-Revisionist View of the Cold War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:05]]
<nowiki>[9:05]</nowiki>

Out of this conflict between revisionists and orthodox historians of the Cold War something akin to a synthesis begins to emerge in the 1970s. The synthesis is usually labeled a sort of post-revisionist synthesis. And its great virtue I would suggest is that it seeks to transcend the question of accountability entirely. Rather than sort of looking to blame either side for the origins of the Cold War the post-revisionists are more concerned with understanding how the Cold War came to pass.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=9:41]]
<nowiki>[9:41]</nowiki>

They tend to emphasize sort of the conflicting visions that American and Soviet leaders had for the postwar order and the essential incompatibility between the expectations of the two sides. Post-revisionists tend to see two, the two sides, as sometimes unintentionally creating the sensation of insecurity on the part of the other superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:11]]
<nowiki>[10:11]</nowiki>

So the post-revisionists understand the Cold War less as a case of provocation and reaction but rather as a series of escalations sometimes unintentional that have the effect of reinforcing the mutual insecurities that both sides feel as they sort of look at the map of Europe and look at the actions of the other superpower.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:36]]
<nowiki>[10:36]</nowiki>

So that's a very quick overview of Cold War historiography.

=== Questions about the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:40]]
<nowiki>[10:40]</nowiki>

What do we need to know about the Cold War in this class? In History 186? This is not a class on sort of the historiography of international relations.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=10:51]]
<nowiki>[10:51]</nowiki>

What it is important for you to think about as the semester moves forwards: I would say that the first question that you want to think about is how the Cold War came to pass. How did the world transition from a condition of world war between sort of 1939 and 1945 and a condition of Cold War from the late 1940s? How was this transition accomplished? Was it inevitable or was it the achievement of specific choices and actions?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:27]]
<nowiki>[11:27]</nowiki>

So the question of origins is a question that it is important to reflect upon just as generations of Cold War historians have concerned themselves with origins so too should you be concerned with the question of origins because it's really important.

==== The Cold War International System ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=11:42]]
<nowiki>[11:42]</nowiki>

Beyond the question of origins you should think about how the Cold War functioned as an international system. How did the Cold War world work? Did the Cold War transform the world into a bipolar world in which two superpowers predominates it and everybody else was subject to them?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:03]]
<nowiki>[12:03]</nowiki>

Or did smaller powers, did second tier powers, retain a certain historical autonomy? Did they retain a capacity to influence events despite the overarching condition of Cold War bipolarity? How did the Cold War system work?

==== Internal Politics and International Relations ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:20]]
<nowiki>[12:20]</nowiki>

You might also think about the relationship between internal politics, the domestic politics of nation-states, and the larger condition of global Cold War division. This relationship between sort of interior politics and international politics is one of the defining characteristics of the Cold War era. And it's something which you should reflect upon when you think about how the Cold War system worked.

==== The Cold War and Other Historical Themes Such as Decolonization ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:45]]
<nowiki>[12:45]</nowiki>

It's also very important, sort of in a third theme, to consider how the Cold War related to other major historical themes of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=12:56]]
<nowiki>[12:56]</nowiki>

How do we relate the history of the Cold War, for example, to the history of decolonization? Decolonization as a historical theme was in some ways autonomous from the history of the Cold War. After all decolonization antedated the Cold War by decades if not by centuries. But the last phase of decolonization, the phase of decolonization that follows the Second World War, will be profoundly affected by the simultaneous outplaying of Cold War rivalries in the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:29]]
<nowiki>[13:29]</nowiki>

How did the two themes intersect? How did they interact? That's something which you should sort of think about as you try to sort of locate the Cold War in relation to other major historical developments of the postwar era.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:44]]
<nowiki>[13:44]</nowiki>

=== The End of the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:44]]
<nowiki>[13:44]</nowiki>

And finally the question of endings. Why did the Cold War end as it did and when it did? This we will come to in due course.

=== Conclusion: Understanding the Cold War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=13:54]]
<nowiki>[13:54]</nowiki>

But as we reflect upon these various aspects of Cold War history I hope that we will come to some deeper understanding not only of the Cold War, what was it, how did it work, and why did it end but also of the Cold War's significance for understanding our own times.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:13]]
<nowiki>[14:13]</nowiki>

We are very much the products of the Cold War world. Our era is fundamentally a Cold War era, so we should try to think out the ways in which the realities of our own times have been shaped and defined by the experiences of the Cold War era.

== Organization and Schedule as Relates to the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:31 ]]
<nowiki>[14:31]</nowiki>

So how are we going to do this? We will be returning to the Cold War at various points during the course of the semester. This week we're really concerned with the question of origins. The other is sort of aspects of Cold War history which I've just outlined we'll be reserved for subsequent weeks. This week we're going to deal with the question of origins.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 14:54 ]]
<nowiki>[14:54]</nowiki>

Today we will focus on Europe, Thursday we'll focus on Asia. When we think about the Cold War in Europe, which is our task for today, we're going to think first of all about the Soviet Union, and Communism, what was the Soviet Union, what was Communism, what were the Soviet Union's aspirations for the postwar world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:14]]
<nowiki>[15:14]</nowiki>

We'll think next about the United States. What kind of postwar order did the United States want to create? And we'll think about the condition of Europe at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:24]]
<nowiki>[15:24]</nowiki>

In what situation did Europeans find themselves subsequent to the end of the Second World War? How did the vacuum of European politics following the defeat of Nazi Germany help to precipitate confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:45]]
<nowiki>[15:45]</nowiki>

And finally how did the division of Europe between the two superpowers play itself out in the late 1940s. That's what we're going to deal with today.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=15:54]]
<nowiki>[15:54]</nowiki>

And then on Thursday we'll deal with the parallel history of East Asia in the period between the end of the Second World War, the defeat of Japan's new order in the Asia Pacific region, through to the sort of formal military division of East Asia at the end of the Korean war. So Asia we'll wait for Thursday today we're going to deal with Europe.

== Communism ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:24]]
<nowiki>[16:24]</nowiki>

A fundamental question that we have to address when we think about the history of the Cold War is the question of communism. What is communism? Perhaps it would be more historically accurate to ask what was communism. Why did it have such a sort of disruptive impact on the international politics of the twentieth century?

=== Karl Marx ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=16:49]]
<nowiki>[16:49]</nowiki>

Of course to understand the history of communism it's not sufficient to deal with the history of the twentieth century. We have to go back to the history of the 19th century and to the political philosophy and economic sociology of {{WPExtract|Karl Marx}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:09]]
<nowiki>[17:09]</nowiki>

How many of you have had a chance to read Marx in your undergraduate studies so far? Okay, about half of you which is sort of a testament to Marx's enduring significance as a sociologist of capitalism which is really what he was.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:28]]
<nowiki>[17:28]</nowiki>

Let me push that question a little further though. Of those of you who have read Marx how many of you have read {{WPExtract|The Communist Manifesto|''The Communist Manifesto''}}? Okay. How many of you have read something other than ''The Communist Manifesto''?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:43]]
<nowiki>[17:43]</nowiki>

Okay, what have you read?

(Student response)

{{WPExtract|Das Kapital|''Das Kapital''}}. All of it? Okay, that's hardcore (laughter). So...

==== Marx's Views on Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=17:54]]
<nowiki>[17:54]</nowiki>

Okay, those of you who have read ''Das Kapital'' will know that what Marx is really concerned about is capitalism not communism. This the grand irony of Karl Marx.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:05]]
<nowiki>[18:05]</nowiki>

For a thinker who is so singularly associated with the political and economic project of communism. He actually had a lot more to say about capitalism than he did about communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:16]]
<nowiki>[18:16]</nowiki>

Besides an expansive analysis of capitalism as a productive system, which is really what constitutes the greater part of Karl Marx's work and writings, Marx offers a sort of political doctrine of revolutionary communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:35]]
<nowiki>[18:35]</nowiki>

This is doctrine that is stated most succinctly, most quotably, in ''The Communist Manifesto'', sort of political pamphlet, published in 1848.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=18:46]]
<nowiki>[18:46]</nowiki>

To understand Marx's vision of communism, of the communist future (static like sound) ... alright.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:00]]
<nowiki>[19:00]</nowiki>

It's important to think about what Marx says about capitalism too. We should remember that Marx is writing in the middle of the 19th century in Great Britain at a moment when the Industrial Revolution is utterly transforming British society, but also a moment in which memory of the preindustrial world is still sort of tangible.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:31]]
<nowiki>[19:31]</nowiki>

For Marx the accumulation of wealth, the accumulation of capital, in a capitalist system depends fundamentally upon the expropriation of labor. This a really sort of crucial insight for Marxist economic sociology.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=19:52]]
<nowiki>[19:52]</nowiki>

The accumulation of wealth depends upon the expropriation of labor -- since it's your labor that pays for somebody else's prosperity. Marx argues that the capitalist system depending as it does upon the expropriation of labor and upon the accumulation of capital via labor expropriation is inherently unstable because it has a built in tendency towards the concentration of wealth, the concentration of resources in the hands of a few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:29]]
<nowiki>[20:29]</nowiki>

In the hands of a very wealthy, a very affluent minority. Ultimately, Marx argues, the history of capitalism veers unavoidable towards conflict. In a world in which resources are finite, which Marx profoundly believed, the concentration of more and more resources in fewer and fewer hands will produce conflict amongst those in whose hands wealth is vested.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=20:56]]
<nowiki>[20:56]</nowiki>

That sort of makes sense as abstract theory, right. The concentration of resources in the hands of the few will produce a situation of conflict between those in whose hands wealth is concentrated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:11]]
<nowiki>[21:11]</nowiki>

Because as a smaller and smaller number of sort of powerful, of empowered capitalists, fight over finite resources, their confrontation will become increasingly bitter, increasingly, sort of ferocious.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:29]]
<nowiki>[21:29]</nowiki>

So Marx offers a theory of capitalism in which all wealth derives from exploitation, from the exploitation of labor, and in which the accumulation of wealth tends over time to produce a concentration of resources in the hands of a few. That's really exactly to understanding sort of Marx's theory of capitalism.

==== Marx's Meta-Historical Framework ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=21:50]]
<nowiki>[21:50]</nowiki>

Besides sort of offering a sociological analysis of capitalism that emphasized labor expropriation as the ultimate source or engine of wealth and accumulation and concentration of wealth as sort of capitalism's inner dynamic Marx also offered a historical framework, a framework, a sort meta-historical framework, that tried to situate capitalism in relation to earlier phases of history defined by the relationship of labor to production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:28]]
<nowiki>[22:28]</nowiki>

For Marx history in the very largest sense had an internal logic. History Marx argued could be divided into a series of stages or phases each of which could be defined by the relationship between labor and production. For Marx this with really the crucial relationship in human history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=22:52]]
<nowiki>[22:52]</nowiki>

Marx argued that we could understand the entire course of human history as a sort of progression from one historical phase defined by the relationship of labor to production to another.

===== Marx's Stages of History =====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=23:04]]
<nowiki>[23:04]</nowiki>

To understand this it might help to sketch out the stages of history as Marx construed them.

For Marx the first stage of history is what Marx called a stage of sort of primitive communism and this is what we sort of more commonly identify as a hunter-gatherer stage of human existence. A sort of sociology in which human beings lived in small bands of a dozen, two dozen, individuals no larger than that. Subsisted on hunting and the gathering of plant stuffs, and in which, this is really fundamental, all food was shared more or less equally amongst members of the hunter-gatherer band. Marx characterized this kind of very small-scale subsistence lifestyle as a condition of primitive communism.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:01]]
<nowiki>[24:01]</nowiki>

How do we get from a world of hunter-gatherer tribes to a world of vast empires capable of orchestrating large construction projects like the pyramids of Egypt or the Roman Coliseum? For Marx the answer is slavery.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:19]]
<nowiki>[24:19]</nowiki>

Only the legal enslavement of labor and the exploitation thereof will permit the creation of sort of vast complex societies on the model of Greco-Roman antiquity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:33]]
<nowiki>[24:33]</nowiki>

So for Marx slavery as a social institution is absolutely crucial to understanding how we get from sort of a world of primitive hunter-gatherer tribes to a world of sophisticated urban imperial structures like Rome.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=24:50]]
<nowiki>[24:50]</nowiki>

The slave societies of the ancient world, Marx argues, eventually deteriorate into a feudal order. The transition to the feudal order is characterized by the tethering of slaves to particular plots of land. Individuals in effect become sort of the wards of the land rather than of powerful owners. This is for Marx what defines the transition from a slave society to a feudal society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:27]]
<nowiki>[25:27]</nowiki>

None of this is going to be on the exam by the way, so...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:30]]
<nowiki>[25:30]</nowiki>

Then following the sort of creation of a feudal economic sociology Marx identifies in the late 18th century the advent of a capitalist system. And this is really what Marx is concerned with explaining. How does the capitalist world come to be?

==== Marx on the Advent of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=25:51]]
<nowiki>[25:51]</nowiki>

What defines the advent of capitalism? And for Marx capitalism has to do fundamentally with the transition or with the transfer of power from the feudal aristocracy, from landowners, to an urban {{WPExtract|bourgeoisie}} whose wealth is defined not in terms of ownership of land but in terms of the ownership of industrial production.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:20]]
<nowiki>[26:20]</nowiki>

So with industrialization, the mill owner, the railroad baron, will replace the feudal lord as the sort of dominant economic figures of their times.

==== Marx on the Fate of Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:34]]
<nowiki>[26:34]</nowiki>

For Marx though, capitalism as we've already discussed, is inherently unstable. Moreover it depends upon exploitation, upon the appropriation of labor, the labor of the many, by the sort of vested power of the few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=26:52]]
<nowiki>[26:52]</nowiki>

And for Marx capitalism is destined to collapse. This is really, really, important. It's a sort of historical inevitably as Marx puts it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:01]]
<nowiki>[27:01]</nowiki>

That capitalism will eventually collapse because of its own internal contradictions. Perhaps capitalists will fight amongst themselves in the internal struggle for finite resources. Or perhaps workers, who grow tired of being exploited, will raise up and overthrow the capitalist {{WPExtract|plutocracy}} in a revolution.

==== Marx on Socialism Replacing Capitalism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:22]]
<nowiki>[27:22]</nowiki>

And what will follow capitalism, Marx argues, is a new stage of history, a stage that Marx defines as the socialist stage of history, an era in which a revolution will create a new socialist order, an order in which a sort of powerful state will seize control of factories, of the means of production, and will utilize those resources to benefit the many and not the few.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=27:52]]
<nowiki>[27:52]</nowiki>

And this transition from capitalism to socialism is what Marx is really concerned with in his writings. How will it come about? How can it be achieved?

==== Marx on Communism after Socialism ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:03]]
<nowiki>[28:03]</nowiki>

Finally the socialist order as Marx prophesies it will be followed by a communist era of history. Sorry the slide says capitalism but it should read communism. A communist era of history in which the revolutionary state withers away and in which sort of workers administer their own affairs.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:25]]
<nowiki>[28:25]</nowiki>

For Marx the existence of a revolutionary state is a sort of necessary aspect of the socialist transition between capitalism and communism.

=== Karl Marx, ''The Communist Manifesto'', and the Russian Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:37]]
<nowiki>[28:37]</nowiki>

So that in a nutshell is Karl Marx's sociology of capitalism and his conception of the course of world history. Capitalism is unstable and it's destined to collapse.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=28:50]]
<nowiki>[28:50]</nowiki>

And what Marx offers in his sort of political pamphlet, ''The Communist Manifesto'', which famously begins with the declaration, "Workers of the world, unite!", is a program, a very skeletal program, but a program nonetheless, for achieving the transition from a capitalist world to a socialist world. Marx calls for a revolution, a revolution of workers, to rise up and overthrow the capitalist order, and to create in its wake a new socialist world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:27]]
<nowiki>[29:27]</nowiki>

Marx might have been surprised that the sociologist revolution that he prophesied and called for occurred ultimately when it did occur, not in Germany, not in Great Britain, but in Russia.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=29:46]]
<nowiki>[29:46]</nowiki>

Insofar as Marx believed that revolution would emerge out of a sort of crisis of capitalism it was plausible to imagine that the revolution would come first of all to Europe's most developed capitalist economies, namely...

(static like noise)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:07]]
<nowiki>[30:07]</nowiki>

I don't know what the problem with this is.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:13]]
<nowiki>[30:13]</nowiki>

Not to Russia, or ... But to Germany, or ... I'm sorry ...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:24]]
<nowiki>[30:24]</nowiki>

(silence)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:34]]
<nowiki>[30:34]</nowiki>

Apparently my cell phone is responsible for the interruption with the microphone and this actually works much, much better so thank you very much.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:41]]
<nowiki>[30:41]</nowiki>

Okay, now, I can concentrate on this and not on that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:45]]
<nowiki>[30:45]</nowiki>

So Marx predicts that the revolution will occur in the most advanced, most developed, capitalist economies of Europe, which is to say Germany, Great Britain.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=30:57]]
<nowiki>[30:57]</nowiki>

Of course that's not where the revolution ends up happening. The revolution ends up in happening in Russia -- a vast overwhelmingly agrarian society on the periphery of the European economy.

== The Russian Revolution ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:09]]
<nowiki>[31:09]</nowiki>

Why does the revolution happen in Russia? Why does it not happen in Germany or in Great Britain? A simple answer to that question is that Russia is devastated, exhausted, and impoverished by the First World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:26]]
<nowiki>[31:26]</nowiki>

The First World War exhausts Russia. It exhausts Russia's limited industrial resources. Russia is also you know very badly afflicted by the fighting on the Eastern Front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:42]]
<nowiki>[31:42]</nowiki>

The czarist regime, an autocratic monarchy which ruled Russia, had already been weakened even before the First World War by the pressure of political reform within the Russian state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=31:58]]
<nowiki>[31:58]</nowiki>

There were a handful of liberal reformers who envisaged that Russia would sort of reform itself in a state resembling Britain or France or the United States. The opponents, among the opponents, of the czar, sort of radical revolutionary socialists, were more numerous and more capable often than were the sort of liberal reformers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:22]]
<nowiki>[32:22]</nowiki>

The disruption that the First World War produces in Russia creates avenues of opportunity for the czar's opponents as the sort of men of the Russian imperial armed forces experience the sort of upheaval and convulsions of war. They become radicalized. The Russian army becomes a sort of potential source of political instability for the state.

=== The Kerensky Regime ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=32:55]]
<nowiki>[32:55]</nowiki>

And for reasons that are far too complicated to get into today Russia ends up experiencing a revolution early in 1917. The czar abdicates and a liberal regime comes to power under the leadership of {{WPExtract|Alexander Kerensky}}, a progressive, sort of non-Communist politician.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:18]]
<nowiki>[33:18]</nowiki>

This is never a terribly strong regime. But it is a regime that seeks to sort of remake Russia, an authoritarian monarchical society, in a sort of liberal democratic mold.

=== The October Revolution and the Rise of the Bolsheviks ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:31]]
<nowiki>[33:31]</nowiki>

The Kerensky regime does not last a year. It comes to power in February of 1917. In October 1917 it is overthrown in a coup. And the person who overthrows it is {{WPExtract|Vladimir Lenin}} -- the leader of Russia's {{WPExtract|Bolsheviks|Bolshevik}} Party.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=33:50]]
<nowiki>[33:50]</nowiki>

The Bolsheviks are a minority faction of the Revolutionary Socialist Left in Russia. This is really important to remember. Lenin does not represent the socialist left in Russia. The socialist left is divided into multiple parties. And Lenin's party represents a small but unusually radical faction of the Russian revolutionary left.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:20]]
<nowiki>[34:20]</nowiki>

It's Lenin's conviction that a determined Communist Party can orchestrate a revolution on its own accord. Most other Russian leftists say: look, this is ridiculous, Russia is a big poor country, we need to wait for Russia to develop, for Russia to industrialize, before trying to create something like a socialist society.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=34:43]]
<nowiki>[34:43]</nowiki>

How do you create a socialist society in a predominantly agrarian context? That's what Lenin's critics say. Lenin has no time for this. Lenin says, well, all we have to do is seize control of the state -- is to seize the control of the levers of the power, and we can use the state as an instrument for orchestrating social and economic transformation of the profoundest kind.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:05]]
<nowiki>[35:05]</nowiki>

This is Lenin's revolutionary theory. It's a theory that tells us that a determined vanguard party can seize control of the state and use the state as an instrument of social and historical transformation.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=35:20]]
<nowiki>[35:20]</nowiki>

This is what Lenin tries to do in October 1917 -- when his Bolsheviks come to power in a coup d'etat.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:26 ]]
<nowiki>[35:26]</nowiki>

Lenin in October 1917 seizes control of the state, or at least he seizes control of the state's capital, St. Petersburg, but he does not seize control of the country writ large.

=== The Russian Civil War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 35:40 ]]
<nowiki>[35:40]</nowiki>

The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 will be followed by a long period of civil war in which anti-Communist White Russians who predominate in the countryside struggle to sort of regain control against the Bolsheviks, the revolutionary Communists, who predominate in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:04 ]]
<nowiki>[36:04]</nowiki>

This war ultimately ends in 1921 with the triumph of the Bolsheviks but there is great deal of consequence that happens between 1917 and 1921.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:18 ]]
<nowiki>[36:18]</nowiki>

Great Britain and the United States send limited military forces and economic aid to help the White Russians. This is really important because the Bolsheviks remember that.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:31 ]]
<nowiki>[36:31]</nowiki>

The {{WPExtract|Russian Civil War}}, as it is known, also involves an international war. Poland goes to war against Russia in 1919. Essentially what Poland tries to do is to achieve a land grab at Russia's expense while Russia is preoccupied with its internal civil war.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 36:52 ]]
<nowiki>[36:52]</nowiki>

And both of these sort of aspects of the civil war, the war with Poland and the allied intervention are really, really important for sort of shaping the Bolshevik concept of the external world.

=== Conclusion: The Russian Revolution ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:09]]
<nowiki>[37:09]</nowiki>

So that's the Russian Revolution in about two minutes. And next let's deal with the transition from Lenin to Stalin in a similarly cursory manner.

== From Lenin to Stalin ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:21 ]]
<nowiki>[37:21]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Vladimir Lenin|Lenin}} is the singular charismatic leader of the Russian Revolution. It's hard to conceive of the Russian Revolution without Lenin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:31]]
<nowiki>[37:31]</nowiki>

His death in 1924 is a catastrophe for the Revolution that he led and for the party that he created, the Bolshevik party. The question of what comes next and what comes after Lenin is a profoundly divisive one amongst Lenin's potential heirs.

=== Leon Trotsky ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 37:50 ]]
<nowiki>[37:50]</nowiki>

Perhaps Lenin's most sort of brilliant and charismatic would be successor -- {{WPExtract|Leon Trotsky|Trotsky}} -- argues that a continuation of Lenin's work would involve an export of the Russian Revolutionary model to the larger world. Trotsky, who is the one of the figures vying to succeed Lenin, argues that Russia should now take it upon itself to create a sort of global revolutionary front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:17]]
<nowiki>[38:17]</nowiki>

The Bolsheviks, Trotsky argues, should build alliances with Communists in other countries, specifically in Western Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:25 ]]
<nowiki>[38:25]</nowiki>

Trotsky is sort of concerned that the Russian Revolution having occurred as it did in a poor agrarian country may not survive unless the larger revolution which Marx prophesied -- the revolution in Germany -- also sort of takes place. Consolidating and broadening the gains of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

=== Joseph Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 38:49 ]]
<nowiki>[38:49]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Joseph Stalin}}, another putative successor to Lenin, takes a very different view of the revolution's future. Whereas Trotsky favors a globalization of the revolution Stalin instead argues that the Bolsheviks should focus upon the construction of an effective socialist system within Russia. His slogan will be socialism in one country.

=== Trotsky and Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:15 ]]
<nowiki>[39:15]</nowiki>

To see the struggle for succession as a struggle between Trotsky and Stalin is an oversimplification, but we don't have time for much else. Ultimately it is Stalin who wins. Stalin wins in large part because he controls the party apparatus.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:32 ]]
<nowiki>[39:32]</nowiki>

Trotsky controls the Red Army but Stalin controls the internal sort of bureaucratic apparatus of the party and this proves to be a very useful asset in seizing control of the state.

== Stalin's Rule ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 39:47 ]]
<nowiki>[39:47]</nowiki>

Having seized control of the party in the mid 1920s, Stalin in the second half of the 1920s, consolidates his personal power. And he does this by first of all purging the Bolshevik left, and by then at the end of the 1920s, turning against the moderates within the Bolshevik Party.

=== The Great Turn ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:05 ]]
<nowiki>[40:05]</nowiki>

As he turns against the moderates, you know those who favor a more gradual transition to socialism, Stalin in 1928 embarks what is known as the {{WPExtract|Great Break (USSR)|Great Turn}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:16 ]]
<nowiki>[40:16]</nowiki>

He launches a five year plan for the rapid industrialization of the country. What Stalin initiates in the late 1920s is an effort to transform the Russian economy, to transform Russian society, through the orchestration of a sort of gargantuan process of top down change.

=== The Transformation of Agriculture and Turning Peasants into Industrial Workers ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:41 ]]
<nowiki>[40:41]</nowiki>

Besides creating new factories, state owned enterprises, Stalin will try to sort of transform Russian agriculture. And this is really important because most Russians in the late 1920s are still peasants.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 40:56]]
<nowiki>[40:56]</nowiki>

Stalin's purpose is to take these peasants, remove them from the land and transform them into factory workers. After all this is what a Marxist theory of history dictates will happen. Having committed himself to accelerating the transition to communism Stalin will try to transform peasants into industrial workers.

=== The Repression of Joseph Stalin ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:21 ]]
<nowiki>[41:21]</nowiki>

Doing this will entail the construction of a vast apparatus of political repression. Having [[wikt:alloy|alloyed]] the party to the power of the state Stalin will turn the instrument of the party-state into a machinery of repression. Who is repressed? Anybody who stands between Stalin and the accomplishment of his sort of radical transformative agenda. Anybody who represents a threat to the personal authority of Joseph Stalin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 41:59 ]]
<nowiki>[41:59]</nowiki>

The death toll in the 1930s will be catastrophic. The imposition of a forced top down campaign of agricultural collectivization claims millions and millions of victims.

=== The Ukrainian Famine ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:20 ]]
<nowiki>[42:20]</nowiki>

In the Ukraine, which is the most agriculturally productive part of the Soviet Union, Stalin introduces a program of collectivization which forcibly removes peasants from their small plots of land and concentrates them in collective farms. This is done with the purposes of making agricultural production more efficient.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:45]]
<nowiki>[42:45]</nowiki>

In practice, of course, what it enables the state to achieve, is to requisition grain from the peasantry, to take grain from the countryside, and to use it to feed urban workers.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 42:57 ]]
<nowiki>[42:57]</nowiki>

As a consequence of the {{WPExtract|Holodomor|famine}} that collectivization causes in the Ukraine about 3 million people die. And those who die are often amongst the youngest and the oldest and the otherwise most vulnerable members of Ukrainian society.

=== Stalin's Campaign of Political Terror ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:17 ]]
<nowiki>[43:17]</nowiki>

Besides the millions of peasants who succumb to the collectivization campaign Stalin launches a campaign of political terror against his political opponents. During the 1930s a series of purges remove and then liquidate individuals and factions whom Stalin considers to be sort of a threat to his own personal authority.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 43:45 ]]
<nowiki>[43:45]</nowiki>

The death toll of the purges of the 1930s amounts to the hundreds of thousands. So we're not talking about as many human victims as the campaign of agricultural collectivization produces but we are talking about a campaign of intentional state murder.

=== The Death Toll of Stalinization ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 44:03 ]]
<nowiki>[44:03]</nowiki>

The consequences of Stalinization will be sort of catastrophic in terms of the overall death toll. It's really hard to estimate the total number of human fatalities that we can ascribe to the Stalin regime. One estimate which was sort of put together by a group of admittedly sort of anti-Communist historians about fifteen years ago puts the death toll at somewhere around 20 million human deaths that can be ascribed to the project of Stalinization in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:44]]
<nowiki>[44:44]</nowiki>

It's a death toll that sort of pales by comparison with the death toll that could be ascribed to the Maoist regime in China but that's a topic that we will come to in due course.<ref>One could visit the [[wikipedia:Great_Leap_Forward#Famine_deaths|famine deaths section of the Wikipedia article on the Great Leap Forward]] and also [[wikipedia:Great_Leap_Forward#Deaths_by_violence|the section on deaths by violence]]. Within the article there is also [[wikipedia:Great_Leap_Forward#Treatment_of_villagers|a section reporting on the cruel and violent treatment of the villagers during the Great Leap Forward]].</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=44:55]]
<nowiki>[44:55]</nowiki>

Whatever way you look at it the human costs of Stalinization in the 1930s are very, very high.

== Western Response to the Human Toll of Stalinization ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:02 ]]
<nowiki>[45:02]</nowiki>

How does the West react to this? How do Western intellectuals, Western public leaders, respond to the vast human upheaval and human misery that the Stalinist experiment produces in the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:20 ]]
<nowiki>[45:20]</nowiki>

Western intellectuals for the most part are not particularly bothered by the crimes of Stalinism. We should remember that the West itself is in the 1930s enmired in a Great Depression. The Soviet system seems for some sympathetic Western intellectuals to represent the wave of the future.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:40]]
<nowiki>[45:40]</nowiki>

Some sympathetic Western observers are willing to overlook and disregard the crimes of Stalinism as simply being sort of the necessary [[wikt:detritus|detritus]] of the revolution.

=== Beatrice and Sidney Webb's Laudatory Reports on the Soviet Union ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 45:57 ]]
<nowiki>[45:57]</nowiki>

Two prominent British socialists, {{WPExtract|Beatrice Webb|Beatrice}} and {{WPExtract|Sidney Webb, 1st Baron Passfield|Sidney Webb}} travel to Russia in the early 1930s and they, on their return to London, publish a very kind of laudatory book titled ''Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?'' which lauds the accomplishments of the Stalinist state and praises Stalin for sort of leading humanity forward into a new era of history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:22 ]]
<nowiki>[46:22]</nowiki>

That represents one reaction to the Soviet project.

=== Western Governments' Hostility to Stalinism ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:27 ]]
<nowiki>[46:27]</nowiki>

Western governments on the other hand are much more hostile to Stalinism. We should remember that Great Britain and the United States tried to intervene in the Soviet Union in order to aid the opponents of the revolution after 1917, and the governments of Britain and the United States remain hostile to Bolshevism, to the Soviet Union, through the 1920s and into the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 46:53]]
<nowiki>[46:53]</nowiki>

The United States does not even recognize the Bolshevik regime as the legitimate government of the Soviet Union until 1933 when {{WPExtract|Franklin D. Roosevelt|Franklin Roosevelt}}, Roosevelt, becomes President of the United States.

== Stalin's Popular Front Strategy ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:06 ]]
<nowiki>[47:06]</nowiki>

Stalin in the 1930s is focused much more upon the accomplishment of rapid domestic transformation than he is upon foreign policy. But he is concerned by the rise of {{WPExtract|fascism}} in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:22]]
<nowiki>[47:22]</nowiki>

In order to sort of create an international coalition to contain the fascist threat Stalin in the mid 1930s promotes what becomes known as a popular front strategy -- a strategy that tries to rally progressives and leftists of all kinds: liberals, socialists, revolutionary as well as non-revolutionary, anarchists, everybody except the Trotskyites, into a broad coalition known as a sort of popular front.<ref>One could visit the [[wikipedia:Popular_front#The_Comintern's_Popular_Front_policy_1934–39|section on the Comintern's Popular Front policy 1934–39 in the Wikipedia article on popular front]]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 47:55 ]]
<nowiki>[47:55]</nowiki>

It's ironic in some ways that Stalin promotes an ecumenical international strategy at the same time as he is purging his ideological opponents at home, but that is what he does.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:07]]
<nowiki>[48:07]</nowiki>

He tries to promote a sort of popular front approach in the 1930s that will rally anti-fascists of all kind into a grand coalition.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:19 ]]
<nowiki>[48:19]</nowiki>

The West, or at least the governments of the Western Powers, the French, actually, the French are somewhat more sympathetic to this for a period in 1936, but the British and the Americans have very little interest in joining with the Soviet Union in an anti-fascist popular front. Instead they sort of continue to spurn the USSR.

== The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its Termination ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 48:41 ]]
<nowiki>[48:41]</nowiki>

Having failed to create a coalition with the West, Stalin will in 1939, sign a pact with Hitler, the {{WPExtract|Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact|Nazi-Soviet Pact}}. This represents a very different kind of response to the fascist threat. Stalin continues to believe that Nazi Germany represents a mortal threat to the Soviet Union but he decides in 1939 to sign a pact with Hitler in the hope of buying time that will enable the Soviet Union to better prepare itself for confrontation with Nazi Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:12]]
<nowiki>[49:12]</nowiki>

This strategy endures until 1941, until June 1941, when Hitler of course invades the Soviet Union -- an invasion that really took Stalin by surprise.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:26]]
<nowiki>[49:26]</nowiki>

Stalin had not expected that Hitler would turn on the Soviet Union as quickly as he did. Having been sort of surprised by the Nazi attack Stalin will forge in the early 1940s a grand alliance with Great Britain and the United States for the purposes of waging war against Nazi Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 49:49]]
<nowiki>[49:49]</nowiki>

But it's really important to remember that the grand alliance emerges in the very unusual circumstance of 1941. Only after Hitler has attacked the Soviet Union will a coalition between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union emerge.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:08]]
<nowiki>[50:08]</nowiki>

The democracies in the 1930s had not allied with the Soviet Union for the purposes of containing fascism. That happened only in the context of the Second World War.

== Grand Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies during the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 50:21]]
<nowiki>[50:21]</nowiki>

The wartime {{WPExtract|Grand Alliance (World War II)|grand alliance}} is highly effective. It ultimately accomplishes the defeat of Nazi Germany but that is not to say that the alliance is without internal friction. There are profound disagreements between the Allies particularly over the issue of the second front. The question of how soon the British and the Americans will attack Nazi Germany and the West is a really contentious issue amongst the wartime allies. Insofar as the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944 is the only power that is waging a land war against Nazi Germany Stalin can't wait for the British and the Americans to join the Second World War to open a second front in France.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:09]]
<nowiki>[51:09]</nowiki>

Because you know Stalin expects that will ease the pressure on Soviet forces in the east -- because Germany's resources will be divided by the opening of the second front.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:19]]
<nowiki>[51:19]</nowiki>

The fact that it takes the British and the Americans so long to open a second front is an irritant to Stalin during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:30]]
<nowiki>[51:30]</nowiki>

It should be said, just to give you a little more background on that issue, that the United States under Franklin Roosevelt is eager to open a second front. It's Britain which is really the major obstacle to the opening of a second front earlier than 1944.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 51:48]]
<nowiki>[51:48]</nowiki>

It's not until 1944 with {{WPExtract|Normandy landings|D-Day}} that the Anglo-Americans finally attack continental Europe, but they do so later than FDR and the United States would have wanted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:01]]
<nowiki>[52:01]</nowiki>

So that is the grand alliance, an alliance that finally brings the Soviet Union together with the Western Democracies, in a coalition intended to defeat Hitlerism.

== From the Grand Alliance to the Cold War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:16]]
<nowiki>[52:16]</nowiki>

But this hardly explains why American forces will by the 1950s be permanently stationed in Europe, their mission being the containment of the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 52:31]]
<nowiki>[52:31]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|Elvis Presley}} in the late 1950s has to do military service, and this is a unprecedented thing in the American experience. Never before in the United States had there been a peacetime military draft -- a peacetime military draft which capable of taking a sort of popular entertainment figure like Elvis across the seas to Germany where he would be tasked with sort of serving in the American army of occupation in Germany, in that country.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:09]]
<nowiki>[53:09]</nowiki>

The question of explaining sort of how the United States transitions from the grand alliance, an alliance of convenience with the Soviet Union, to a state of Cold War in which American forces will be permanently located in Europe in order to contain Soviet power is sort of the question of the Cold War's origins.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:32]]
<nowiki>[53:32]</nowiki>

How did we get from the alliance of the early 1940s to the estrangement of the late 1940s? Was that transition inevitable or was it a consequence of specific circumstance and specific choices that might have been made differently that could have produced different kinds of outcomes.

== Origins of the Cold War ==

=== US Aspirations and Goals for the Postwar Era ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 53:53]]
<nowiki>[53:53]</nowiki>

Let's start by asking what American wanted from the postwar settlement? What kind of world did American leaders want to create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:04]]
<nowiki>[54:04]</nowiki>

It's important to remember that the United States in 1945 is very much the world's dominant power. American military forces are victorious in Europe and Asia. The United States is by far and away the world's predominant economic power as well.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:23]]
<nowiki>[54:23]</nowiki>

What do Americans want to accomplish from this position of paramount power and influence what kind of world does the United States want to create?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 54:35]]
<nowiki>[54:35]</nowiki>

There is a prehistory and it weighs powerfully on the minds of American decision-makers. The experiences of the 1930s, the experiences of a decade in which an integrated global economy broke apart, the experiences of a decade in which America experienced unprecedented economic misery weighs powerfully on the minds of American policy planners as they look at the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:03]]
<nowiki>[55:03]</nowiki>

Americans to put it succinctly want to put the world economy back together. They want to reintegrate a world that came apart in the 1930s and they want to create new international institutions that will superintend an integrated global system.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:22]]
<nowiki>[55:22]</nowiki>

There are political aspects to this as well and economic aspects. The primary economic institutional framework which we're going to talk about in more detail next week will be the {{WPExtract|Bretton Woods system}}, the political institution that Americans promote to sort of put the world back together is the {{WPExtract|United Nations}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 55:44]]
<nowiki>[55:44]</nowiki>

And there is strong, strong public support for the United Nations in the United States during the Second World War. And this may surprise those of you know anything about American attitudes towards the UN today. But during the Second World War leaders of both major parties support active American involvement in the United Nations and public support for the United Nations is overwhelming.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:08]]
<nowiki>[56:08]</nowiki>

You know 85% of Americans are strongly in favor of active American involvement in the UN during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:18]]
<nowiki>[56:18]</nowiki>

Americans want to lead the world and they want to make a world safe for globalization. They want a world in which free trade will prevail as a worldwide norm. And this is what the Bretton Woods institutions will try to accomplish.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 56:36]]
<nowiki>[56:36]</nowiki>

This commitment to the reintegration of the world is powerfully informed, as I've tried to emphasize, by the experience of the 1930s. Convinced as they are that the American economy requires an open world economy in order to be prosperous American leaders in the 1940s will try to sort of put the world back together, to put the world economy back together, in order to avoid a return to the depression conditions of the 1930s.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:12]]
<nowiki>[57:12]</nowiki>

What should we call this American vision of the postwar world? It's easy enough to pin a label on Stalin's ideological agenda. We simply call it Communism. But what do we call the American ideological project for the postwar world?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:29]]
<nowiki>[57:29]</nowiki>

Do we call it sort of a democratic project? There would be good reason to do so. Democracy, self-government, and human rights, are central aspects of the American vision for the postwar world. FDR, after all, talks about four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom of fear, which he argues everybody in the entire world should enjoy at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 57:56]]
<nowiki>[57:56]</nowiki>

So there's a strong sort of democratic aspect to the American vision of the postwar world.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:02]]
<nowiki>[58:02]</nowiki>

It's also a liberal vision, liberal in the sense that it promotes free trade, free economic exchange as a universal standard. It's a capitalist vision too. The United States is an economy in which the means of production reside in private hands. Americans presume capitalism to be sort of the natural condition of a market society and the condition best configured to produce widespread growth and prosperity.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:35]]
<nowiki>[58:35]</nowiki>

So this is a world order that will be democratic, liberal, and capitalist.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 58:40]]
<nowiki>[58:40]</nowiki>

But it's also a world order that defines itself in opposition to its antagonist. It is anti-Communist. It is opposed in the world vision that Stalin projects. So whether we call this an anti-Communist liberalism, or capitalist democracy, what the United States tries to create is a sort of liberal democratic world order in which the private sort of market economy will prevail.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:12]]
<nowiki>[59:12]</nowiki>

I would suggest that sort of Cold War liberalism is as succinct a label as any other for this ideological synthesis, but you can call it whatever you like. The key elements will be sort of individual rights, democratic self-government, capitalist economics and, and this is sort of interesting -- a modicum of welfare protection for ordinary people.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 59:37]]
<nowiki>[59:37]</nowiki>

It's really important to remember that the experience of the 1930s tempers American capitalism in important ways. Roosevelt creates an array of new social protections for workers in the United States. Social Security for example is introduced in 1935. Extensive new regulations are introduced, to provide say, a minimum price for farm production, and the international synthesis that the United States offers in the mid 1940s is very much a product of the New Deal era transformation of American capitalism. In a sense what American leaders in the 1940s propose to do is to make the lessons of the New Deal globally applicable.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:26]]
<nowiki>[60:26]</nowiki>

So this Cold War liberal synthesis, this capitalist anti-Communist synthesis, is a synthesis which includes a sort of range of social protections as well as protections for property and political rights.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 60:43]]
<nowiki>[60:43]</nowiki>

And it's a synthesis that American leaders hold to be universally applicable. It's a synthesis that manifests itself in particular institutions: Bretton Woods and the United Nations. These are institutions that are conceived respectively in New Hampshire and San Francisco.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:02]]
<nowiki>[61:02]</nowiki>

The sites of conception tell you something about the influence of the United States upon the postwar design. None of this is to say that Americans act in isolation when they create a new order for the postwar world. Non-Americans play really important roles in the construction of the postwar institutions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:23]]
<nowiki>[61:23]</nowiki>

{{WPExtract|John Maynard Keynes}}, about whom we're going to talk a great deal more, is instrumental to the creation of the Bretton Woods settlement. {{WPExtract|Jan Smuts}} a South African political leader is one of the central figures involved in the creation of the United Nations, so non-Americans are crucial to this postwar project too.

=== The Soviet Union and American Goals and Aspirations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 61:41 ]]
<nowiki>[61:41]</nowiki>

But if South African politicians and British economists can assimilate themselves relatively easily to an American led world order the role of the Soviet Union in this Americanized postwar world is much less clear.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:01]]
<nowiki>[62:01]</nowiki>

Will the Soviet Union be able to participate in the open and integrated world that American leaders project and hope to create? Franklin Roosevelt hopes that cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:17 ]]
<nowiki>[62:17]</nowiki>

Whether Roosevelt was guilty of sort of wishful thinking in imagining that it might is something that we'll have to answer for ourselves.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:29]]
<nowiki>[62:29]</nowiki>

But there are key questions to be answered. At the end of the Second World War, in August 1945, there are sort of key questions that will ultimately determine the extent to which the Soviet Union participates in the Americanized postwar order.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 62:43 ]]
<nowiki>[62:43]</nowiki>

Will the Soviet Union, for example, join the {{WPExtract|International Monetary Fund}}? To do so would be to commit the Soviet Union to participating in a liberal world economy. Will the United States provide material assistance to the Soviet Union? Aid to facilitate the USSR's recovery from the Second World War and to sort of facilitate the accommodation of the Soviet Union to a liberal US led international order?

=== Context at the End of the Second World War ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:12 ]]
<nowiki>[63:12]</nowiki>

These are important questions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:14 ]]
<nowiki>[63:14]</nowiki>

The world in which these questions will be answered is a world transformed by the outcome of the Second World War. Europe in August 1945 is dominated by external powers. In the east, it's dominated by the Red Army, which pushes through Eastern Europe all the way to Central Germany.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:42]]
<nowiki>[63:42]</nowiki>

In the west, the forces of the US Army, and the British Army hold sway over the other half of the continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 63:52]]
<nowiki>[63:52]</nowiki>

The future of the continent and the future of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States will hinge upon, sort of, choices.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:06]]
<nowiki>[64:06]</nowiki>

We've talked about the ways in which the expectations and visions of the two sides for the postwar world might vary, but the outcomes of this conflicting set of expectations will ultimately depend upon the choices that historical actors, leaders for the most part, end up making.

=== Deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Relations ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:29 ]]
<nowiki>[64:29]</nowiki>

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States begin to deteriorate fairly quickly -- even before the end of 1945. The reasons for this are complicated.

==== Soviet Occupation of Eastern Europe ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 64:46]]
<nowiki>[64:46]</nowiki>

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe is offensive to American public opinion. As Americans who have fought for the freedom of Europe see the Red Army sort of ride roughshod over democratic freedoms in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, American public opinion always somewhat suspicious of the Soviet Union, turns fairly hard against Stalin.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:09]]
<nowiki>[65:09]</nowiki>

The occupation of Eastern Europe, as it proceeds, sort of conjures the specter of an Eastern Europe dominated by Soviet imperial power. And Americans ask themselves, with some reason, whether this is what they fought the Second World War to accomplish? Of course they're not in much of a position to do anything about it.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:33 ]]
<nowiki>[65:33]</nowiki>

What can the United States do? Could continue to provide aid to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it could attach political conditions to that assistance, but it does not.

==== Termination of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:44]]
<nowiki>[65:44]</nowiki>

In August 1945, immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities, the United States cancels the lend-lease assistance program under which material aid had been sent to the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 65:58 ]]
<nowiki>[65:58]</nowiki>

The reasons that it does that are fairly straightforward and they have to do with domestic policy. The Congress doesn't want to continue to fund an assistance program to the Soviet Union after the war has been won. But the cancellation of lend-lease sort of comes as an affront to Stalin and to the Soviet leadership.

==== The Soviet Union's Absence from Bretton Woods ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:18 ]]
<nowiki>[66:18]</nowiki>

In December 1945 the Soviet Union decides that it not will participate in the Bretton Woods institutions. The Soviet decision not to participate in Bretton Woods is understandable enough. What Stalin has tried to construct in the 1930s is a very centralized planned economy in which all production is owned by the state. The Soviet economy, as it developed in the 1930s, was almost entirely separated from the larger world economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 66:52]]
<nowiki>[66:52]</nowiki>

Insofar as the Bretton Woods institutions envisage the reintegration of the world economy it's not likely that the Soviet planned and closed economy could be easily assimilated to them.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:05]]
<nowiki>[67:05]</nowiki>

But Stalin's announcement of Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods nonetheless marks an important turning point. It sort of marks a clear declaration on the Soviet Union's part that the Soviet Union will not participate in the open integrated postwar world order that the United States starts to build.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:27 ]]
<nowiki>[67:27]</nowiki>

Subsequent to this declaration in 1945, in December 1945, of Soviet non-participation in Bretton Woods, there begins to be, sort of more powerful discursive acknowledgment, on both sides of the inevitably of postwar estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Stalin in February 1946...

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:50]]
<nowiki>[67:50]</nowiki>

(Student question)

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 67:58]]
<nowiki>[67:58]</nowiki>

No, it really was that key in the postwar world. You're absolutely right to caution against reading history from a particular national standpoint. But the power, importance, and influence of the United States in 1945 I don't think can be overstated.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:16 ]]
<nowiki>[68:16]</nowiki>

This is not like 1919. At the end of the First World War the United States is one of several victorious powers. In 1945 the United States really is the victorious power. The West Europeans are absolutely devastated by the war. They look to the United States to restore prosperity, to provide security.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:35]]
<nowiki>[68:35]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union is the only power that begins to compare with the United States in terms of its wealth and military capabilities in 1945. But it's a poor second.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 68:45 ]]
<nowiki>[68:45]</nowiki>

So I would not in this case want you to sort of avoid focusing on the United States as a central aspect of the international settlement because of a sort of wariness of reading history through an American lens.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:04]]
<nowiki>[69:04]</nowiki>

When we sort of come to talk a little bit more about the West Europeans will see just how dependent they believed themselves to be on the United States.

==== Soviet Hostility to Capitalism and the United States ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:12 ]]
<nowiki>[69:12]</nowiki>

So Stalin in February 1946 gives a speech called The Election Speech, even through there was no real election, in which he denounced capitalism and denounced the United States, accusing the capitalists of seeking to encircle and destroy the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 69:31 ]]
<nowiki>[69:31]</nowiki>

This was not unprecedented. He had offered similar speeches in the 1930s but coming after the Second World War it represented a reversion to a sort of hostile rhetoric which had been dormant for the duration of the war itself.

==== George Kennan and the Long Telegram ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=69:47]]
<nowiki>[69:47]</nowiki>

The next month, in March 1946, {{WPExtract|George F. Kennan|George Kennan}}, the attaché at the US embassy in Moscow sends to the State Department a document which has become known as the {{WPExtract|X Article|"Long Telegram"}}.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:00]]
<nowiki>[70:00]</nowiki>

It's still the longest telegram that the State Department has ever received from one of its officers overseas. And in it Kennan offered a very lengthy analysis of Soviet behavior. His central point is that the Soviet Union is intractably opposed to the liberal integrated postwar order that the United States wants to build.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:22]]
<nowiki>[70:22]</nowiki>

Kennan argues that it's foolish to even try to integrate the Soviet Union to the US led postwar design. Instead he argues the Soviet Union should be carefully contained.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:32]]
<nowiki>[70:32]</nowiki>

Note that Kennan does not say that the Soviet Union should be confronted through military means. Kennan simply says that the United States ought to focus on building up the strength of its allies, on building a Europe which that will be sort of resilient in the face of Soviet power.

==== Winston Churchill and the Iron Curtain Speech ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=70:50]]
<nowiki>[70:50]</nowiki>

Later that month, later in March 1946, Winston Churchill, who's no longer the Prime Minister of Great Britain, he lost an election at the end of the Second World War, but he's still a public figure of great consequence, gives a public speech in Fulton, Missouri.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:06]]
<nowiki>[71:06]</nowiki>

Sitting next to him on the podium is Harry Truman -- the President of the United States of America. In this speech Churchill offers an analysis of the European situation. He proclaims that an iron curtain has divided the European continent.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:20]]
<nowiki>[71:20]</nowiki>

And this is the first sort of very public acknowledgment by a leading Western politician that Europe has been sort of irrevocably divided between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:34]]
<nowiki>[71:34]</nowiki>

So there is a sort of growing rhetorical acknowledgment of a situation of Cold War on both sides in the early months of 1946.

==== Conflict Between the Soviet Union and the US in Iran and Turkey ====

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:45]]
<nowiki>[71:45]</nowiki>

Later that year the two sides, East and West, begin to encounter, serious substantive crises.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=71:52]]
<nowiki>[71:52]</nowiki>

The Soviet Union in September refuses to withdraw occupation troops from Northern Turkey. The United States sides powerfully with the Turkish government and eventually helps to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed forces from Turkey.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:06]]
<nowiki>[72:06]</nowiki>

I'm sorry I got that a little bit mixed up. That happens in Iran at the end of the year.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=72:12]]
<nowiki>[72:12]</nowiki>

What happens in Turkey is that there is a, is that the Soviet Union demands passage for Soviet naval vessels through the {{WPExtract|Dardanelles|Dardanelles Straits}}.<ref>See also [[wikipedia:Dardanelles#Turkish_republican_and_modern_eras_(1923–present)|the Wikipedia article on the Dardanelles in the section on Turkish republican and modern eras (1923–present)]]</ref>

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:21]]
<nowiki>[72:21]</nowiki>

The Turkish government is unwilling to grant this and the United States stands with the Turkish government and US support bolsters Turkish resolve and ultimately that concession is not granted.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:35]]
<nowiki>[72:35]</nowiki>

But in both circumstances the dynamic is basically the same. The Soviet government makes demands against its neighbors, Turkey and Iran, and the United States stands by the affected countries and sort of helps to persuade local leaders to stand firm and to reject Soviet demands for territorial and military concessions.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start= 72:58]]
<nowiki>[72:58]</nowiki>

<span id="iron_curtain_speech">I'm not going to play that because we're running out of time but I have a video clip of Churchill speaking at Fulton and I can put it online for you.</span>

{{#ev:youtube| https://youtu.be/5QuSXZTo3Uo||center}}

== Tumult in Europe After the Second World War ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:07]]
<nowiki>[73:07]</nowiki>

Okay, so as relations between the two sides become more fractious during 1945 and into 1946 the attention of American policy planners comes to fixate more and more upon Europe. Europe was devastated by the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:25]]
<nowiki>[73:25]</nowiki>

Capital plant was destroyed, the economy is in chaos, there is widespread price instability, a lack of convertible currency. Europe is in a state of great tumult.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:36]]
<nowiki>[73:36]</nowiki>

It's not only Europe's economy that is in crisis. European societies have been torn apart by the Second World War. They've been torn apart and they are being put back together in altered configurations.

=== Ethnic Cleansing in the Postwar Period ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=73:49]]
<nowiki>[73:49]</nowiki>

Europe during and after the Second World War experiences a prolonged bout of what we might euphemistically describe as ethnic cleansing. The most notorious effort to ethnically cleanse Europe is of course Adolf Hitler's. But ethnic cleansing in Europe does not end with Hitler's suicide in a Berlin bunker.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:08]]
<nowiki>[74:08]</nowiki>

With the end of the Second World War, the Germans who inhabit the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, the Germans whose presence in Poland had provided Hitler with a sort of justification, specious as it was, for the invasion of Poland will be ejected from the countries which they have long inhabited.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:30]]
<nowiki>[74:30]</nowiki>

The ejection of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe is one of the major aspects to the postwar European sort of ethnic sorting that is a powerful legacy of the war itself.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:46]]
<nowiki>[74:46]</nowiki>

It's not only Germans who are ejected from Eastern Europe. Poland ejects the few surviving Jews who have survived Hitler's Holocaust. It says that they have no place in the postwar Polish state.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=74:59]]
<nowiki>[74:59]</nowiki>

The logic of ethnic cleansing in postwar Europe produces a continent that is sort of by 1947-48, more ethnically homogeneous that at any other point in its history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:12]]
<nowiki>[75:12]</nowiki>

It's ironic in a way that postwar Central and East European governments ultimately accomplish and realize what Hitler set out to do.

=== Europe in the Winter of 1946-47 ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:21]]
<nowiki>[75:21]</nowiki>

This forced movement of populations exacerbates the economic and social instability of Europe. It doesn't help that the winter of 1946-47 is one of the coldest winters in European history.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=75:35]]
<nowiki>[75:35]</nowiki>

Transportation links, canals, and railroads freeze and become inoperable. It becomes very difficult to move food from ports and storage depots to markets. By consequence Europe experiences widespread starvation. Millions of people subsist in refugee camps. Displaced persons camps operated by the United Nations and funded almost entirely the United States.

=== American Fears that European Tumult Will Lead to Gains for Socialists and Communists ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:00]]
<nowiki>[76:00]</nowiki>

This is a very volatile situation. Europe in the winter of 1946-47 does not appear to be recovering from the Second World War. On the contrary, Europe's economic situation, its political tumult, appear to be getting worse.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:16]]
<nowiki>[76:16]</nowiki>

American policy planners fear that this upheaval and uncertainty in Europe's affairs will ultimately produce gains for Communist parties in Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:31]]
<nowiki>[76:31]</nowiki>

You know disenchanted, disillusioned hopeless people, so the logic goes, may ultimately end up voting for radical political alternatives, for socialists and Communists, who promise a radical new order of things.

== Allied Postwar Policy Concerning Germany ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:44]]
<nowiki>[76:44]</nowiki>

There are also major geostrategic issues to be confronted -- none greater than the question of Germany. What ultimately is to be done with Germany?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=76:55]]
<nowiki>[76:55]</nowiki>

Germany as we've already acknowledged, you know, in the first meeting of this class, is a problem for Europe's international relations. Germany is too big, too powerful, to be easily contained by a European balance of power. Germany twice in the space of a generation in 1914 and in 1939 tried to conquer Europe.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:18]]
<nowiki>[77:18]</nowiki>

Can Germany continue to exist as a unified state or should Germany be dismantled? Be transformed into a number of successor states which would presumably be less threatening to the overall European balance of power.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:33]]
<nowiki>[77:33]</nowiki>

This is one of the really big questions that American and British and French and Russian policy makers face at the end of the Second World War.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:41]]
<nowiki>[77:41]</nowiki>

How to keep Germany down? How to stop Germany from ever again threatening the peace of Europe?

=== Allied Occupation of Germany ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=77:48]]
<nowiki>[77:48]</nowiki>

The initial interim answer to that question is a joint occupation. At the end of the Second World War Germany is divided into four occupation zones: a Soviet occupation zone in the east, an American occupation zone in the south, a French occupation zone in the west, and a British occupation zone in the north.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:07]]
<nowiki>[78:07]</nowiki>

But this is only an interim solution. It's clearly not the case that the four victorious powers can continue to occupy Germany indefinitely.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:18]]
<nowiki>[78:18]</nowiki>

But there's no clear political solution in 1945. A long term political future for Germany remains to be determined.

=== Germany's Political Future and Europe's Economic Future ===

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:27]]
<nowiki>[78:27]</nowiki>

But the question of Germany's political future is intimately linked to the question of Europe's economic future, right?

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:35]]
<nowiki>[78:35]</nowiki>

Europe is devastated, it's economically distraught at the end of the Second World War, and the catastrophe that is Germany doesn't help matters. Because Germany is not only Europe's dominant sort of political force. It's also the heart of the European economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=78:51]]
<nowiki>[78:51]</nowiki>

Can Europe recover economically without German recovery? After all Germany is the center of Europe's industrial production. The factories of the Ruhr in Western Germany are the center of the European industrial economy.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:08]]
<nowiki>[79:08]</nowiki>

French and Belgian and Dutch industry is intimately linked to German industry. Whether Western Europe can recover without some rehabilitation of Germany is you know a good question and the obvious answer is no it cannot.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:27]]
<nowiki>[79:27]</nowiki>

So the dilemma that the victorious allies face at the end of the Second World War, is the dilemma of how to rehabilitate Germany without restoring German political power. Can you make Germany a vibrant sort of economic center of Europe again without sort of unleashing the potential political and military power of a would be European hegemon.

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=79:54]]
<nowiki>[79:54]</nowiki>

(Student question)

That comes much later. It comes subsequent to a process of Cold War division. But you're absolutely right that the creation of European wide institutions will be the ultimate answer to that question.

== Cold War Division of Europe and Division of East Asia for Next Lecture ==

[[File:{{PAGENAME}}.ogg|500px|start=80:09]]
<nowiki>[80:09]</nowiki>

To understand how we get to that question we have to think about how the Cold War divides Europe, which we should have done at the end of this lecture, but we'll do it on Thursday at the beginning of that lecture. And then we'll go and talk about sort of the parallel division of East Asia.

== References and Notes ==

<references/>

WikipediaExtracts:Fox News

2019-04-17T19:45:35Z