Difference between revisions of "UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s"
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| + | <!-- UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 01 - History of the Present - 01h 11m 39s | ||
| + | |||
| + | {{Information | ||
| + | |university = UC Berkeley | ||
| + | |course-code = HIST 186 | ||
| + | |course-name = International and Global History Since 1945 | ||
| + | |lecture = 01 History of the Present | ||
| + | |instructor = Daniel Sargent | ||
| + | |semester = Spring 2012 | ||
| + | |license = {{cc-by-nc-nd-3.0}} | ||
| + | }} | ||
| + | |||
== Preliminaries == | == Preliminaries == | ||
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We might see what happened in Brussels last month as an episode in the larger history of globalization. | We might see what happened in Brussels last month as an episode in the larger history of globalization. | ||
| − | {{WPExtract|Globalization}} after all is a force which has been corrosive of fiscal and monetary sovereignty that is the fiscal and monetary sovereignty of nation states since at least the | + | {{WPExtract|Globalization}} after all is a force which has been corrosive of fiscal and monetary sovereignty that is the fiscal and monetary sovereignty of nation states since at least the 1970s. |
| − | A globalization in the form of, particularly the integration of financial markets, has imposed constraints on the deficits that governments can run, on public spending. The advent of globalization has been a somewhat progressive process. The integration of {{WPExtract|capital markets}}, though it's a story that could be traced back centuries, really begins to accelerate in recent times during the | + | A globalization in the form of, particularly the integration of financial markets, has imposed constraints on the deficits that governments can run, on public spending. The advent of globalization has been a somewhat progressive process. The integration of {{WPExtract|capital markets}}, though it's a story that could be traced back centuries, really begins to accelerate in recent times during the 1970s. |
| − | During the | + | During the 1990s globalization becomes a widely discussed and widely theorized phenomenon. We begin to see the development of what you might characterize as a sort of global public policy prescriptions for a globalizing world in the 1990s. And these dictate that countries that want to participate in globalization need to balance their budgets and cut back public spending. |
| − | It's familiar enough. This is a policy prescription which is sometimes characterized usually by its critics as the {{WPExtract|Washington Consensus}}. And it's applied in | + | It's familiar enough. This is a policy prescription which is sometimes characterized usually by its critics as the {{WPExtract|Washington Consensus}}. And it's applied in 1980s and 1990s primarily to the {{WPExtract| Developing country|developing world}}. This is really important. |
| − | North Americans and West Europeans don't really feel the constraining impact of globalization in the | + | North Americans and West Europeans don't really feel the constraining impact of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s. They might in fact have been its beneficiaries. You could certainly make that case so far as the United States is concerned. |
Since the {{WPExtract| Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2008}} however this ceased to be so clear that the West gets to enjoy the benefits of globalization without subjecting itself to the discipline inherent within the globalization of financial markets. | Since the {{WPExtract| Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2008}} however this ceased to be so clear that the West gets to enjoy the benefits of globalization without subjecting itself to the discipline inherent within the globalization of financial markets. | ||
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Thus far I've sort of focused on the economic aspects of the summit and their larger significance, but we must alternatively see the Brussel's summit as a sort of {{WPExtract|geopolitics|geopolitical}} episode. As an episode whose larger consequences lie ultimately not in the economic relations of nations but in {{WPExtract|power politics}}. | Thus far I've sort of focused on the economic aspects of the summit and their larger significance, but we must alternatively see the Brussel's summit as a sort of {{WPExtract|geopolitics|geopolitical}} episode. As an episode whose larger consequences lie ultimately not in the economic relations of nations but in {{WPExtract|power politics}}. | ||
| − | From a geopolitical perspective, which is say a perspective concerned with power ultimately, with military and political power in world affairs, the German problem has been European's fundamental problem since the | + | From a geopolitical perspective, which is say a perspective concerned with power ultimately, with military and political power in world affairs, the German problem has been European's fundamental problem since the 1870s. |
| − | Germany of course was unified at the beginning of the | + | Germany of course was unified at the beginning of the 1870s under the guidance of {{WPExtract|Otto von Bismarck}}. The creation of the German state in the 1870s created a big problem for Europe because, as most of you know, Germany is too big and too powerful for the European system to be able to contain it. |
Germany twice tried to dominate Europe by military means in the 20th century. In 1914 {{WPExtract| Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser Wilheml II}} launched Germany's first bid for European mastery. It was defeated but only really through the intervention of the United States, and Great Britain. In 1939 under {{WPExtract|Adolf Hitler}} Germany launched a second bid for European mastery. Once again it was defeated, but only because of the intervention of the United States and Great Britain. | Germany twice tried to dominate Europe by military means in the 20th century. In 1914 {{WPExtract| Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser Wilheml II}} launched Germany's first bid for European mastery. It was defeated but only really through the intervention of the United States, and Great Britain. In 1939 under {{WPExtract|Adolf Hitler}} Germany launched a second bid for European mastery. Once again it was defeated, but only because of the intervention of the United States and Great Britain. | ||
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If we have much longer memories we might incline to see the conflict between Iran and the West over the Straits of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear ambitions as an episode in a long {{WPExtract|Clash of Civilizations|clash of civilizations}}. | If we have much longer memories we might incline to see the conflict between Iran and the West over the Straits of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear ambitions as an episode in a long {{WPExtract|Clash of Civilizations|clash of civilizations}}. | ||
| − | Here the most influential theorist was {{WPExtract|Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington}}, a Harvard political scientist who offered a journal article which became a book called [https://books.google.com/books?id=1CM3GUNLzOAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''The Clash of Civilizations''] that famously argued, and this was in the mid | + | Here the most influential theorist was {{WPExtract|Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington}}, a Harvard political scientist who offered a journal article which became a book called [https://books.google.com/books?id=1CM3GUNLzOAC&source=gbs_navlinks_s ''The Clash of Civilizations''] that famously argued, and this was in the mid 1990s, that the most important fault lines in world affairs are not ideological, are not geopolitical even but are civilizational. |
The world as Huntington saw it was divided into a number of discrete civilizations. The Western civilization, Orthodox Christian civilization, which is Russia and the post Soviet successor states, Indian civilization, African civilization, and Islamic civilization. | The world as Huntington saw it was divided into a number of discrete civilizations. The Western civilization, Orthodox Christian civilization, which is Russia and the post Soviet successor states, Indian civilization, African civilization, and Islamic civilization. | ||
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Probably not, but some might be inclined to do so. | Probably not, but some might be inclined to do so. | ||
| − | We could after all see sort of recent international crisis, the rise of {{WPExtract|Islamic extremism|radical Islamism}} in the Middle East since the | + | We could after all see sort of recent international crisis, the rise of {{WPExtract|Islamic extremism|radical Islamism}} in the Middle East since the 1950s, {{WPExtract|Iranian Revolution|the Iranian revolution of 1979}}, the rise of {{WPExtract|Al-Qaeda}} in the 1990s, the {{WPExtract|September 11 attacks|9/11 attack}} in 2001, as sort of flash points in a long running clash of civilizations. |
My own view is that this would be far too simplistic a framework in which to understand the complex politics of the Middle East. | My own view is that this would be far too simplistic a framework in which to understand the complex politics of the Middle East. | ||
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One of the great values of historical training I would suggest is that it helps to equip us with the skills necessary to locate particular events and crises within larger frameworks. And doing this, being able to segue between the particular and the profound, helps us to gain some vantage point on the larger stakes -- on the larger significance of events. | One of the great values of historical training I would suggest is that it helps to equip us with the skills necessary to locate particular events and crises within larger frameworks. And doing this, being able to segue between the particular and the profound, helps us to gain some vantage point on the larger stakes -- on the larger significance of events. | ||
| − | And that is in a sense what this class aspires to teach you to do. It's not a class in contemporary ... you know, it's not a class in the history of the present moment as such. We're going to be delving fairly deep into the past, into the | + | And that is in a sense what this class aspires to teach you to do. It's not a class in contemporary ... you know, it's not a class in the history of the present moment as such. We're going to be delving fairly deep into the past, into the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s. We're not going to be talking about current affairs. But by talking about the history of the world in the second half of the twentieth century I hope that we'll be able to gain the ability to link events in ways that suggest the larger stakes and the larger consequences of particular episodes and crises. I think the ability to do this is one of the most valuable things that historical training can offer. |
And if you come out of this class feeling that you are better able to link the particular to the cosmic then I will feel that I have done my job. | And if you come out of this class feeling that you are better able to link the particular to the cosmic then I will feel that I have done my job. | ||
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<nowiki>[50:18]</nowiki> | <nowiki>[50:18]</nowiki> | ||
| − | One of the most obvious ones is the {{WPExtract|Cold War}}. The Cold War is the central geopolitical conflict of the postwar world (at least of the postwar world until the | + | One of the most obvious ones is the {{WPExtract|Cold War}}. The Cold War is the central geopolitical conflict of the postwar world (at least of the postwar world until the 1990s). |
So we'll be paying careful attention to the history of the Cold War in this lecture class. | So we'll be paying careful attention to the history of the Cold War in this lecture class. | ||
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Remind yourselves that in 1945 many human beings in many parts of the world still inhabit colonial empires. That is to say they're the subjects of distant European colonial powers. | Remind yourselves that in 1945 many human beings in many parts of the world still inhabit colonial empires. That is to say they're the subjects of distant European colonial powers. | ||
| − | By the mid | + | By the mid 1970s nobody really lives in a colony anymore. There are a few cases in which you might argue colonialism survives but they're the exception and not the rule. Comprehending how decolonization comes about is one of the really really big you know sort of historical challenges for anybody who wants to understand the postwar world. And it's a theme to which I'll draw substantial attention in the semester ahead. |
==== Economic Development ==== | ==== Economic Development ==== | ||
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The syllabus will just give you a basic overview of the sort of narrative progression of this lecture course. | The syllabus will just give you a basic overview of the sort of narrative progression of this lecture course. | ||
| − | * We're going to start off the substance on Thursday talking about the world crisis of the | + | * We're going to start off the substance on Thursday talking about the world crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. How did the Second World War and its resolution foreground the history of the postwar world? |
* Next we'll talk about the Cold War in the second week or the origins of the Cold War. | * Next we'll talk about the Cold War in the second week or the origins of the Cold War. | ||
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* Week three we're going to talk about the creation of new nation states in the {{WPExtract|Global South}} and the consolidation of welfare states in the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}. | * Week three we're going to talk about the creation of new nation states in the {{WPExtract|Global South}} and the consolidation of welfare states in the {{WPExtract|North-South divide|Global North}}. | ||
| − | * Week four we'll make comparisons between the political economy of the {{WPExtract|socialism|socialist}} world and the managed {{WPExtract|capitalism}} of the West in the | + | * Week four we'll make comparisons between the political economy of the {{WPExtract|socialism|socialist}} world and the managed {{WPExtract|capitalism}} of the West in the 1950s and 1960s. |
* We'll deal with decolonization as a sort of political rather than economic theme. In the fifth week of the course we'll look at the struggles that the European colonial powers waged to retain control of their empires and we'll think about the relationship between the Cold War as one big conflict and decolonization as another sort of historical macro narrative. | * We'll deal with decolonization as a sort of political rather than economic theme. In the fifth week of the course we'll look at the struggles that the European colonial powers waged to retain control of their empires and we'll think about the relationship between the Cold War as one big conflict and decolonization as another sort of historical macro narrative. | ||
| − | * In the sixth week we'll sort of think about why the Cold War was so stable as it was. We'll look at the efforts that political leaders made to stabilize the Cold War, and we will inquire as to who pushed against the sort of stability of the Cold War system as it came to be in the | + | * In the sixth week we'll sort of think about why the Cold War was so stable as it was. We'll look at the efforts that political leaders made to stabilize the Cold War, and we will inquire as to who pushed against the sort of stability of the Cold War system as it came to be in the 1960s and 1970s and with what consequences. |
| − | * The seventh week looks at what I characterize as sort of a crisis of the Cold War international order in the | + | * The seventh week looks at what I characterize as sort of a crisis of the Cold War international order in the 1970s. |
| − | * Week eight takes us through the oil crisis, a really important turning point in the relations between the Global North and Global South and the resurgence of the Cold War towards the end of the | + | * Week eight takes us through the oil crisis, a really important turning point in the relations between the Global North and Global South and the resurgence of the Cold War towards the end of the 70s. |
| − | * Week nine focuses on what I would characterize as the resurgence of globalization from the | + | * Week nine focuses on what I would characterize as the resurgence of globalization from the 70s. We look at the rise of free market economics in the West particularly in the United States and Great Britain and then the global dissemination of free market solutions in the 1980s and thereafter. |
* Week ten will focus on the end of the Cold War. | * Week ten will focus on the end of the Cold War. | ||
| − | * Week eleven on sort of the international relations of the | + | * Week eleven on sort of the international relations of the 1990s. |
* Week twelve we'll explore some of the tensions within the globalizing world of what we might by this point define loosely as the present -- including one lecture which will focus more carefully on the experiences of China -- arguably the world's rising {{WPExtract|superpower}}. | * Week twelve we'll explore some of the tensions within the globalizing world of what we might by this point define loosely as the present -- including one lecture which will focus more carefully on the experiences of China -- arguably the world's rising {{WPExtract|superpower}}. | ||
