UC Berkeley - HIST 186 - 2012 Spring - Sargent - International and Global History Since 1945 - Lecture 04 - The Division of East Asia - 01h 21m 41s

Introduction and Welcome

[0:00]

Okay, it's about time to begin. It's 9:40 so we should get going. I should start by thanking the person who pointed out on Tuesday that it was my cell phone that was causing interference with the audio, and we'll do much better without that. The cell phone today is at home where is can't do any damage.

Lecture Overview

[0:18]

Today we're going to talk about the division of East Asia but we'll start off just by sort of finishing the discussion of Europe's division in the late 1940s.

[0:28]

And when we add the two pieces of sort of this week's curriculum together, Tuesday's lecture and today's lecture, we should have a fairly comprehensive, if sweeping, overview of the Cold War's origins, of the processes by which the world was divided into two Cold War camps in the second half of the 1940s.

[0:50]

The Division of Europe

So first of all Europe.

The Devastation of Europe

[0:53]

Let's just remind ourselves of the situation in which Europe finds itself at the end of the Second World War. It's not a terribly happy situation. Europe is devastated by six years of fighting. Europeans are hungry. Their economies have substantially broken down. The British are doing a little bit better but they weren't so directly afflicted by the fighting as the continental Europeans were.

The Devastation of Germany

[1:22]

The epicenter of Europe's crisis is Germany -- in a way this is fitting. It was the Germans who started the war and at the war's end it is the Germans who find themselves devastated by the war -- economically devastated, physically displaced, millions of Germans are rendered homeless by the Allied bombardment of German cities.

[1:44]

Millions more people end up as displaced persons in Germany -- refugees often from Eastern Europe.

[1:51]

Germany's GDP collapses with the war's end. It's an absolutely catastrophic situation. Germans find themselves sort of immiserated and hungry.

[2:06]

In the slide here you can see a photograph which is taken in Germany in 1946 and the graffiti sort of painted on this wall says:

German: We have been hungry enough. We have been hungry long enough.

We have been hungry enough. We have been hungry long enough.

American Policymakers Fear that European Tumult will Spur the Growth of Communism

[2:22]

This material situation, a situation in which Europeans and Germans in particular, are experiencing dislocation, disarray and misery is a strategic concern for the United States. It's a strategic concern for American Cold War planners. American policymakers fear that Europe's disarray may provide a fertile breeding ground for Communism.

[2:49]

And this fear is not altogether farfetched. In the first elections that are held after the end of the Second World War it is the parties of the left who do the best.

[3:01]

The Communists and the socialists together command a majority for example in the French elections that are held in October 1945.

[3:09]

So the specter of a rising left in Europe is of concern to American policymakers who fear that a left wing Europe may sort of incline toward the Soviet Union.

[3:21]

What to do about this alarming situation? Alarming as American policy planners see it -- The response that George Kennan↗ proposes and which the State Department adopts in the winter of 1946-1947 is to find some way to help Europeans help themselves. How can the United States act as a facilitator? Perhaps also as a benefactor of a European recovery in which European will be in the driving seat.

American Strategy for Reconstruction in Europe

[3:50]

As American policy planners sort of ponder this question something akin to a strategy for European reconstruction begins to emerge. American policymakers decide that they will have to play a role in sort of catalyzing European recovery but that Europe will need with American assistance to reconstruct itself.

The Reconstruction of Germany and German Industry

[4:10]

And one of the really essential aspects of this strategic concept is that Germany will have a central place in it. American policymakers sort of debate the question of what should be done with Germany and they come to the sort of irresistible conclusion that Europe cannot recover without Germany.

[4:28]

It might be appealing after all the damage that the Germans have done to simply take Germany and divide it up and sort of try to destroy German industry -- reduce Germany to a sort of agrarian existence.

[4:41]

That's one of the sort of ideas as to what should be done with Germany that American planners sort of contemplate in the very early postwar period.

[4:49]

But the idea of demolishing German industry and reducing Germany to a sort of agrarian existence is not a practical one because if Europe is to recover Germany will have to recover too.

[5:02]

So the rebuilding of Europe around a sort of revitalized German economic core is essential objective for American policy in Europe by the beginning of 1947.

The Marshall Plan

[5:14]

And the primary initiative that the United States deploys to pursue this end will be the Marshall Plan↗. Most of you have probably heard of the Marshall Plan, right?

[5:25]

The Marshall Plan, as you know, is a major injection of funds, about 13 billion dollars of funds in total in 1947 dollars. Which are dispersed at the suggestion of the United States. George Marshall↗ in June 1947 gives a famous commencement address at Harvard University in which he commits the United States to provide resources to help Europe redevelop itself.

[5:52]

The Committee on European Economic Cooperation↗, a committee of European governments, is formed in July in 1947, and it concocts a plan for the utilization of American resources to promote European redevelopment.

[6:09]

It sets a very sort of ambitious goal for funding. Ultimately the Truman administration is willing to request some 30 billion dollars in financial commitments from the Congress and Congress approves about 13 billion of that.

[6:24]

But it's still a substantial amount of money. Marshall Aid will play a role in Europe's reconstruction and we'll talk about that in just a moment.

Marshall Aid in the Context of the Cold War

[6:34]

But first of all let's think a little bit about the strategic aspects of Marshall Aid. What is the relationship of Marshall Aid to the Cold War division of Europe?

[6:42]

I would argue, and I would think many historians would concur, that the relationship between the two, between Marshall Aid and the Cold War division of Europe is really crucial and essential, and American policy makers understand this at the moment.

[6:58]

George Marshall does invite the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to participate in Marshall Aid. The East Bloc↗ countries, as they are sort of becoming, are invited to submit proposals to participate in the Marshall Aid concept.

[7:15]

But Marshall does not expect that the Soviet Union will actually you know take up the offer. Does anybody have any ideas as to why that might be? Why can Marshall be confident?

[7:25]

(Student response)

Um-hum. Yeah.

[7:44]

Exactly. That's perfect. The situation is that the United States has a sort of coherent vision of an open postwar economy. It's a liberal vision, a vision in which markets will be essentially free, in which property will be essentially private.

[8:01]

And the terms of participation in Marshall Aid require beneficiary countries to participate in this open world order that American policy planners envisage.

[8:12]

So the Soviet Union could in theory participate in it but to do so would commit the Soviet Union to a ..., you know, process of economic reform and restructuring that Stalin is quite unwilling to contemplate.

[8:25]

To put it really succinctly it's hard to see how the Soviet Union could have remained the Soviet Union and to have participated in Marshall Aid at the same time.

[8:34]

So the USSR does not participate. Nor do its satellite countries, as they are becoming, in Eastern Europe. And this is really important. This is key to sort of understanding the strategic consequences of Marshall Aid.

Soviet and International Communist Opposition to Marshall Aid

[8:48]

And it's not only the East European countries that are sort of affected by the Soviet Union's disdain for the Marshall concept. It's also the case that Communist parties in Western Europe oppose Marshall Aid. And this is really important too. The opposition of the left, of the hard left, to Marshall Aid, helps to discredit the hard left in Europe in the latter 1940s. And we'll talk about that a little bit more in just a moment.

Economic Consequences of Marshall Aid

[9:14]

But first we should think about the economic consequences of Marshall Aid. What does Marshall Aid accomplish? Is Marshall Aid singularly responsible for the postwar economic reconstruction of Europe? This is a question that economic historians have debated and the answer is probably not.

[9:31]

Europe's economic recovery, you know, historians like Alan Milward↗ have shown, was already in process before the injection of Marshall Aid funds began. But Marshall Aid does serve one really, really important function. And that is to bridge Europe's balance of payments deficits with the United States.

The Marshall Plan and the International Balance of Payments

[9:50]

We'll talk much more about the international balance of payments↗ next week but the key point that we could stress today is that Europe after the Second World War runs major trade deficits with the United States, and this is because devastated European economies want to import machinery, consumer goods and food from North America and the larger non-European world.

[10:14]

They don't have a whole lot to export in return so they run trade deficits. How are these trade deficits to be financed? How to pay for the gap between what Europeans export and what they import? The answer is pretty simple. Marshall Aid helps to bridge the gap in Europe's international payments deficits.

[10:34]

This is really important insofar as it helps to enable the sort of multilateral liberal world economy that the United States wants to build to function.

[10:47]

Without Marshall Aid the Europeans would have struggled to have participated in the multilateral open postwar economic order. They would have to have you know implemented austerity policies to try to sort of balance their international payments without resorting to external financing -- which is what Marshall Aid essentially provides without any debt.

[11:13]

So it's a good deal for the Europeans -- they benefit from this. But so too does the world economy writ large benefit from Marshall Aid.

Political Effects from the Marshall Plan

[11:20]

Besides these economic consequences which will go into in more detail next week Marshall Aid produces political dividends for centrists political leaders in Europe.

[11:32]

The political right in Europe is of course discredited by the Second World War. So when we talk about European politics after the Second World War we're really talking about the center and the left. The right is not part of the picture any more.

[11:47]

The Second World War ends with a left buoyed by its heroic involvement in anti-fascist resistance during the war. The war ends with a left that performs very strongly in early postwar elections.

[12:05]

But the opposition of the Communist left to Marshall Aid is one of the factors that helps to discredit left wing parties, Communist parties, in Europe subsequent to the bitter winter of 1946-1947.

[12:19]

From a political perspective we could see the beneficiaries of Marshall Aid as having been the political centrists. The Christian Democrats like Alcide De Gasperi↗ in Italy, and Konrad Adenauer↗ in Europe who help to ... or who play a crucial role in the solidification of a liberal center in European politics.

[12:42]

Marshall Aid doesn't necessarily produce this but it helps to catalyze a sort of Christian Democratic resolution of Europe's prewar and wartime political polarization. And that's important too.

Marshall Aid and Politics in Eastern Europe

[13:00]

What about Eastern Europe? What are the consequences of Marshall Aid for the East that does not partake in the Marshall Aid scheme?

[13:09]

Let's talk a little bit about some of the you know sort of parallel processes of division and bloc integration as they appear from the other side of what Churchill called the Iron Curtain.

[13:21]

The first really important fact about postwar Eastern Europe is that the Red Army predominates. Eastern Europe falls quite literally under the sway of Soviet power.

[13:32]

You know that is to say that Soviet military forces, the forces of the Red Army, predominate in Eastern Europe. This gives the Soviet Union a powerful, powerful lever of political influence in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Eastern Germany, and so on.

[13:50]

The fact that the Red Army predominates at the end of the Second World War, in the summer of 1945, does not necessarily mean however that the countries of Eastern Europe have already been turned into Soviet satellites, into little facsimiles of the Soviet Union itself.

[14:08]

Stalin certainly had plans for Eastern Europe. He wanted to ensure that Eastern Europe would become a sort of security buffer zone -- that Eastern Europe would never represent a military threat to the Soviet Union again. That's really clear.

[14:23]

But it's not clear that Stalin wanted to create satellite states that closely resembled the Soviet Union in their internal politics as early as 1945. His objectives are somewhat cloudy. Different historians have made quite different arguments as to what Stalin wanted to do.

[14:41]

So let's not speculate on that question let's instead ask about what actually happens in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War.

Diverse Experiences in Eastern Europe

[14:50]

The experiences of 1945 and 1946 are fairly diverse which is to say that different countries experience you know have quite different kinds of experience. Poland comes under strict Soviet control and rigid Soviet influence fairly early. Can anybody hazard a guess as to why that might be?

[15:12]

Why is the Soviet Union determined to stamp its authority on Poland very early on?

[15:19]

(Student response)

[15:29]

That's right. There's a ...

[15:30]

(Student response)

[15:42]

Absolutely. You both make really important points. That Poland represents the sort of route through or the path through which Germany has previously attacked the Soviet Union -- Russia, as it was in the First World War -- and Poland itself looks to Stalin like a potential threat.

[16:01]

The Poles go to war against the Soviet Union during the Russian Civil War. In 1920 and 1921 Poland tries to grab a big chunk of Soviet territory while the Russians are you know sort of preoccupied with their civil war.

[16:14]

By consequence Stalin treats Poland fairly harshly immediately upon the conclusion of the Second World War. But other countries experience you know different kinds of relationships with the Soviet Union in the early postwar months and years.

[16:30]

Czechoslovakia for example is subject to a much looser Soviet control.

[16:36]

But from 1947 onwards Stalin begins to tighten political discipline throughout Eastern Europe. Communists seize control where they have not already done so of key government ministries particularly the ministries that are responsible for internal security.

[16:54]

Other left wing parties, non-Communist parties, which means sort of socialist parties, are forcibly integrated into coalitions with the Communist parties which Communist parties predominate.

[17:07]

Besides the sort of ratcheting down of Communist authority within East European countries, the Soviet Union tries during 1947 to promote sort of closer integration of the East European countries into a Soviet led bloc.

[17:26]

This is in large part a reaction to Marshall Aid.

[17:30]

Just as George Marshall proposes a sort of framework of cooperation among the West European countries so too will the Soviets try to promote their own economic framework for the integration of the East Bloc. And this is known initially as the Molotov Plan↗.

[17:47]

More important than the efforts to promote economic integration are the efforts that the Soviet Union offers to promote sort of political coordination among the countries of the East Bloc.

[18:01]

And the crucial sort of apparatus here is the Cominform↗ --The Communist Information Bureau which Stalin creates in September 1947.

[18:11]

The purpose of this new institution, the Cominform, is to integrate and coordinate national Communist parties. The effect of it is to sort of limit the autonomy of national political leaders, even of national Communist political leaders in Eastern Europe, and to subject Communist parties to the coordinated discipline of Moscow.

The Case of Czechoslovakia

[18:38]

In one case, in particular, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the sort of tightening of political discipline involves an outright seizure of power.

[18:52]

In February 1948 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia overthrows the coalition government of that country. Non-Communist political leaders are removed and a new pro-Communist constitution is promulgated in May of 1948.

[19:11]

Elections are soon held, elections, in which the only candidates are Communists.

[19:17]

This is probably the most gratuitous example of sort of Communist seizure of power in Eastern Europe after the Second World War.

[19:27]

In Czechoslovakia, what the Czech Communist Party does, under Soviet guidance, is you know in effect to seize control of the state in a coup that is so fundamentally different from the Bolshevik↗ coup of 1917 in Russia.

[19:43]

It lacks democratic support or legitimacy. And this is really important because it has you know consequences for relations between the West and the East. Westerners look at the situation of Czechoslovakia. They look at the coup and they ask, you know, what is going here? This is not democratic self-determination, that is not what we fought the Second World War to accomplish.

[20:05] What happens in Czechoslovakia looks really nasty from a Western perspective. And it helps to confirm the basic estrangement between East and West in Europe.

The Case of Yugoslavia

[20:17]

It's not only Western observers who are alienated and outraged by the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia. The view from Yugoslavia does not look so appealing either. Yugoslavia is a really interesting case and it's worth just talking about for a minute or so.

[20:37]

Yugoslavia, ends the Second World War, having experienced a very traumatic Nazi occupation -- an occupation that was fiercely opposed by a resistance coalition led by a Communist party under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito↗ a sort of military and political leader of the Yugoslavian Communist Movement.

[21:09]

In the early postwar years, 1945-1946, Yugoslavia looks like one of the most solid and loyal members of the Eastern Bloc. Tito is initially very close to Stalin, is very close to the Soviet Union. But Tito is profoundly alienated by the centralization of sort of East Bloc discipline from the summer of 1947 onwards.

[21:35]

Tito looks at what Stalin's trying to do, at Stalin efforts to subject national communist parties to Soviet control, and he decides that he does not want to be part of this. He does not want Yugoslavia to be part a rigidly integrated Soviet bloc.

[21:50]

Stalin is in turn dismayed by what he sees as Tito's unwillingness to follow Soviet leadership and direction. And in early 1948, sort of around the time of the Czech coup, Stalin publicly attacks Tito.

[22:07]

He denounces him as a deviationist↗, as a, you know, leader who is not loyal to the Soviet Union and not loyal to the Communist project. This is really important.

[22:20]

It's the first major split to emerge between a national Communist leader, Tito, and the Soviet Union. In some ways the Soviet-Yugoslavian split in 1948 prefigures the Sino-Soviet split↗ which occurs in the 1960s. So this is anticipatory of fractures that will emerge much later within the global communist movement.

[22:44]

But in 1948 the Soviet-Yugoslavian split is really important for European politics -- particularly for the internal politics of the East Bloc.

[22:56]

Stalin is dismayed by Tito's defection. While Tito remains a communist he begins sort of informally to open relations to the West and even receives some material assistance from the West in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

[22:56]

Yugoslavia is sort of an anomaly as a communist country that is tacitly aligned with the United States in Europe.

[23:21]

And Stalin is absolutely horrified by this. This is not what Stalin wanted to achieve at all. To preempt and preclude sort of future Titos Stalin tightens the discipline even further in the rest of Eastern Europe.

[23:40]

So Stalin after Tito's deviation becomes even less willing to countenance sort of independence and autonomy on the part of national Communist leaders elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

[23:53]

So the Soviet-Yugoslavian split has the effect of sort of further propelling the tightening and integration of the Eastern Bloc.

[24:03]

Germany after the Second World War

[24:04]

Let's turn finally to Germany. Germany's really, really important -- the cause of the Second World War. Germany is also the epicenter of Europe's post Second World War division.

[24:19]

The German case is in some ways unique. Whereas Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, were wholly occupied by the Red Army, Germany at the end of the Second World War is divided into occupation zones. We talked a little bit about these in Tuesday's lecture.

[24:39]

As the United States and Great Britain worked to promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of Europe they have to think also about the rehabilitation and reintegration of Germany.

[24:59]

Insofar as they want Germany to be the, sort of, to revive Germany as essential aspect of Europe's integrated economy, the Western powers have to think seriously about how to reintegrate Germany itself.

Integration of the American, British and French Zones

[25:16]

Germany in 1945 is divided into four occupation zones. As early as 1946 the British propose unifying the British and the American occupation zones into a single administrative entity. The reasons for this are fairly obvious. An integrated Western Germany will be economically more vibrant and more self-sustaining than separate occupation zones can be.

[25:45]

The British occupation zone in the north is the industrial heart of Germany. It consumes far more food stuff than it produces. The American occupation zone in the north is much more agrarian. There's a natural sort of marriage to be made between these two occupation zones.

[26:03]

But under the administrative separation of the zones there can be no economic integration. And the British argue that this ought to be promoted. The Americans are initially sort of hesitant. They don't want to go along with the British concept. Can anybody hazard a guess as to why not?

[26:22]

Why might the Truman administration in 1946 be sort of unwilling to countenance the unification of the British and American zones?

[26:30]

Who's likely to be sort of threatened or offended?

[26:36]

(Student response)

Absolutely. To unify the Anglo-American zones would look like a provocative move. Like the, you know, the British and the Americans were trying to rebuild and rehabilitate Germany which Stalin is very afraid of.

[26:54]

So the Americans in '46 don't go along with the British unification concept. They say, well, you know, that might be a good idea, but it would be far too provocative to the Soviet Union. We don't want to estrange Stalin like that. We want to, you know, try to preserve four power cooperation so far as we can.

[27:12]

With Marshall Aid, however, or even before Marshall Aid, as relations between East and West deteriorate, the Americans come around to an acknowledgment of the necessity, even the inevitably, of zone integration.

[27:28]

In early 1947, right at the beginning of 1947, in fact, the two occupation zones, the British and the American are merged. The new administrative entity is sort of nicknamed Bizonia↗. In 1948, the French occupation zone in the southwest, also becomes part of this new administrative entity, and it's called Trizonia, at least for a few months. Fairly soon of course it will be known as the Federal Republic of Germany.

[27:59]

But we won't come to that just yet.

Establishment of the Deutsche Mark

[28:03]

In order to sort of provide a stable monetary basis for economic recovery and reconstruction the British and the Americans in early 1948 introduce a new currency in Germany -- the Deutsche Mark↗. The old, you know, Nazi currency, the Reichsmark↗, is sort of no longer a viable unit of value. Germans in the aftermath of the Second World War are sort of reduced to exchanging goods by barter.

[28:36]

Can anybody tell me what the sort of most useful unit of currency is in postwar Germany in 1945 and 1946?

[28:44]

If you wanted to engage in a transaction? Small transaction? What would you use?

[28:49]

(Student response)

Exactly. Cigarettes. Particularly American cigarettes are the most reliable store of value in postwar Germany.

[28:56]

As clearly as, well, maybe it's not clearly, not a stable basis for you know long term growth and prosperity, you know, cigarettes have disadvantages as currency. They're not particularly durable, you can smoke them and then they cease to be a store of value. (laughter)

[29:13]

So fearing this the British and the Americans promote a new sort of paper and coin currency, the Deutsche Mark -- it's introduced in 1948.

Stalin's Negative Reaction to the Establishment of the Deutsche Mark

[29:27]

Stalin is not happy at all. This looks like a really provocative move. Introducing a new currency prefigures the creation of a new state.

[29:33]

Stalin worries that Germany is being rehabilitated and that a rehabilitated western Germany, which let's remember, represents the greater part of Germany, and the most affluent parts of Germany, in the industrial north -- he fears that this new German state, as it looks to be becoming, will be integrated to the West. And that it will provide a sort of powerful asset for the West in its sort of struggle with the East Bloc.

Stalin's Blockade of Berlin

[30:00]

By retaliation, or in retaliation, to what he sees as a provocative move, Stalin in mid-1948 decides to blockade Berlin. At this point Berlin merits a sort of moment's clarification.

[30:19]

Germany in '45 was divided into four occupation zones. The city of Berlin which lies sort of deep within the Soviet zone was itself divided into four occupation zones. There are three sectors of Berlin which are sort of subject to you know kind of much the same administrative separation as are the four occupation zones of Germany.

[30:43]

And this creates a sort of anomaly. The British and the Americans have a small occupation zone in the capital of Hitler's Reich which lies deep within the Soviet Bloc.

[30:55]

This is a source of vulnerability for the West insofar as the Western powers have responsibility for West Berlin. They're dependent upon the Soviet Union allowing sort of free passage between West Berlin and the Western occupation zones. This free passage is essential to the movement of foodstuffs -- Berlin, a very urban enclave, can hardly feed itself.

[31:21]

So if the West Berliners are to be fed then the British and the Americans are going to have to transport foodstuffs in by truck in order to feed them.

[31:29]

Stalin recognizes that Berlin is a source of Western vulnerability. With Nikita Khrushchev↗ in the 1950s will describe Berlin as the testicles of the West. He says, if I want to make the West squeal, I just squeeze Berlin. (laughter)

[31:48]

And this is already a, you know, source of vulnerability in the late 1940s, and Stalin like Khrushchev, recognizes the, you know, opportunity to inflict pain. So Stalin to retaliate against the currency reform imposes a blockade.

[32:05]

And this is a really big deal. This is sort of the first moment in the Cold War, which the Soviet Union has used military force, or at least the threat of military force, to interrupt sort of Western, a major Western interest, access to the city of Berlin.

Possible Western Responses to the Blockade of Berlin

Appeasement

[32:21]

How to respond to this? Western military and political leaders debate a range of responses. But the sort of obvious options are to surrender Berlin, just to give up the Western interest in the city, and to allow the incorporation of the entire city of Berlin within the Soviet occupation zone. That would be one option. Appeasement.

Confrontation

[32:45]

Another option would be outright confrontation. Why not send a convoy of tanks up the autobahn↗ from the British occupation zone to the city of Berlin. This is an option that is seriously discussed. Let's try to open an access path to Berlin by military force and see what the Soviets do.

[33:06]

But that seems to be too provocative. Is it worth starting a war, perhaps with the Soviets, over the city of Berlin? Western political leaders decide that it's not.

Airlift

[33:16]

And they settle on a sort of intermediary solution -- which is to airlift supplies to Berlin.

The Berlin Airlift

[33:22]

Some Western leaders doubt that this can be accomplished. How can we possibly supply enough food and enough coal to keep the city of Berlin alive, you know, can we really do this via the air? And the answer is: yes they can. Or yes they could.

[33:40]

The Berlin Airlift↗ in the winter through the summer of 1948 and into the spring of 1949 is extremely successful. It succeeds in keeping the city of Berlin alive. It's a sort of heroic logistical undertaking. And the spectacle of the Berlin Airlift helps to sort of solidify German affection for the Western occupying powers.

[34:05]

The Western powers go to sort of considerable lengths and considerable costs to keep Berliners fed through the winter of 1948-49. So the Berlin airlift you know represents something like a sort of political triumph for the West -- even through Berlin is a strategic vulnerability.

[34:23]

The Berlin Airlift is really consequential insofar as it confirms Europe's Cold War division. But the real consequences of this crisis are that it demonstrates the inability of the Soviet Union and the Western powers to cooperate over Germany. The implication is that division rather than sort of four power cooperation will be the viable solution for dealing with Germany.

[34:50]

(Student question)

The Possible Shooting Down of Aircraft

[35:04]

That's a terrific question because there was some concern about this in, you know, Western military planning circles. Airplanes of course are really, really vulnerable to being shot down.

[35:15]

And what Western leaders calculated was that the Soviet Union might have blocked the autobahn but that it would not go so far as to shoot down a British or an American plane.

[35:25]

And in the end that assumption was proven correct. Stalin did not want to escalate the confrontation by assaulting Allied aircraft. Had he done so there would have had to have been some sort of retaliation. So the flights proceed without fighter escort and unmolested by sort of Soviet planes or ground based anti-aircraft guns.

[35:49]

(Student question)

Posture and Internal Thinking Within the Two Sides

[36:10]

I don't think that the rational for the airlift was primarily to provide a pretext for escalation. I think what's more interesting about the crisis, right, and you see this dynamic on both sides, is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union really wants to engage in military escalation.

[36:28]

(Student comment)

[36:32]

Yeah, exactly.

The political pressures to do something are very great. Neither side wants to back down. Nobody wants to look weak. But at the same time nobody wants to be responsible for starting another major war. And that dynamic is absolutely central not only to the Berlin crisis but also to the entire Cold War.

[36:51]

You know nobody wants to turn this into a shooting war.

[36:53]

(Student question)

[37:16]

You're absolutely right. That's a very important point. The Soviets don't say we're doing this in order to squeeze the testicles of the West. The Soviets say that they're doing this in order to you know maintain the roadways.

Other Actions Stalin Could Have Taken and the Avoidance of Escalation

[37:27]

And there are other things that Stalin could have done which he doesn't do -- besides you know attacking Western airplanes. He could have turned off the power grid, and deprived Berlin of electricity and water. He doesn't do that.

[37:42]

So there are, you know, there is on both sides a careful avoidance of escalatory measures that might result in outright confrontation. And that's really important because that dynamic will you know sort of persist throughout the entire Cold War.

[38:01]

At least in the Cold War's sort of central theaters. In the developing world Cold War tensions spill over more easily into outright confrontation, but that's an issue for another day.

Cold War Division into Military Blocs

[38:14]

Okay, finally, the Berlin crisis, sort of, precipitates the final division of Europe into armed military blocs.

[38:24]

Great Britain, first proposes a military alliance with France and the Benelux↗ countries, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and the United States. The British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin↗ calls it a Western Union.

[38:41]

This is proposed as early as 1947. Once again, this is just a sort of interesting point, it's the British who are really pushing the integration of the West hardest and fastest. The United States is a little bit more reluctant.

[38:56]

Part of that reluctance has to do, with a, you know, desire not to provoke the Soviet Union. It also has to do with a very longstanding aversion to permanent peacetime alliances. The United States has not historically engaged in sort of binding foreign attachments and American leaders in 1947 don't want to get involved in the first sort of major peacetime military alliance in American history.

[39:22]

But the Berlin crisis transforms American attitudes.

[39:27]

In March 1948, just before the Berlin crisis, the Treaty of Brussels↗, establishes a military pact between France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries.

The Formation of NATO

[39:40]

And this provides the sort of kernel for what becomes after the Berlin crisis the North Atlantic Treaty↗. Which international organization does the North Atlantic Treaty create?

[39:51]

(Student response)

NATO. Exactly.

[39:54]

And NATO is really, really important. It marks the advent of a binding American military commitment to Western Europe.

[40:02]

And it also marks the sort of integration of the West as a unified military bloc. Attack one Western country and you attack them all.

[40:11]

In a sense NATO, sort of merges, the military political sovereignties of Europe's non-Communist nation-states into a single bloc. For strategic purposes the countries shaded blue in the map become a single, you know, sort of bloc of territoriality.

[40:33]

So NATO transforms the West into an integrated and hierarchical alliance structure. The United States is on the top and the Europeans are clearly subordinate and dependent.

[40:45]

They don't mind the subordination and dependence though. And that's really important to remember. They invite American dominance of Western Europe's political and military affairs.

Empire by Invitation

[40:55]

One historian Geir Lundestad↗ coined a very nice phrase when he described the American presence in Europe as an empire by invitation. An empire in which the imperial power is really quite reluctant to get involved and gets involved only because its subordinate allies and clients demand it.

Consoldation of the East Bloc

[41:13]

Sort of simultaneous and in some ways a little bit subsequent to the creation of NATO comes the consolidation of the East Bloc. In 1949 the Soviet Union creates the Comecon↗ -- The Council on Mutual Economic Cooperation.

[41:28]

The purpose of this is to provide for a tightening of the economic integration of the Eastern Bloc. The basic dynamic of East Bloc economic integration is very different from the dynamic of West Bloc economic integration.

[41:43]

In the West the United States provides financing via Marshall Aid to help rehabilitate its own economy. In the East the Soviet Union takes things from the relatively advanced economies of Czechoslovakia and Poland and particularly East Germany in order to facilitate Soviet reconstructions.

[41:43]

So the two blocs and not exactly symmetrical in terms of their implications for the European countries that participate in them.

Conclusion: Cold War Division into Military Blocs

[42:11]

The Soviet Union also begins to tighten military coordination between the bloc countries.

[42:17]

In 1949 it does not create the Warsaw Pact↗ organization, which is the sort of mirror to NATO, until 1955, and the reason for that has less to do with sort of strategic restraint on the Soviet Union's part than with the fact of the Warsaw Pact being a reaction not to NATO's creation in 1949 but to Germany's, to West Germany's, joining NATO in 1954.

[42:44]

Though, sort of NATO, doesn't really become sort of complete, as a Cold War security organization, until West Germany joins NATO, which as I mentioned happens in '54, by the end of 1949 the Cold War division of Europe is already substantially completed.

[43:08]

Europe, you know, has been divided into two tightly integrated alliance systems.

Cold War Division in East Asia

[43:14]

Now let's turn to East Asia. Try to get through this fairly briskly.

[43:19]

Where does the story of East Asia's Cold War division begin? That's a good question. We could perhaps try to take the story all the way back to the establishment of European colonial empires in East Asia -- go to the Dutch in Indonesia in the 16th century -- to do that might make sense, but it is probably unnecessary for the purposes of our collective understanding.

Japan's Imperial Conquests of the 1930s

[43:49]

So let's instead take the story of East Asia's Cold War division back to the early 1930s and back to Japan, to Japan's creation of an East European, sorry of an East Asian Empire, out of the wreckage of which, East Asia's Cold War division will sort of be built.

The Context of Japan's Imperial Projects

[44:10]

What do we need to know about Japan in order to understand Japan's imperial projects in East and Southeast Asia? First thing: Japan is a late developer by the standards of the industrial Western countries.

Industrialization in Japan

[44:25]

Japan is unified under the Meiji Dynasty↗ in the 1860s. It only really begins to industrialize thereafter. Japanese leaders are acutely aware that they are by Western standards late developers. They see themselves as being involved in a game of catch up.

[44:42]

This will help to sort of legitimate for Japanese leaders Japan's bid to create an empire. Japan argues, you know, the other major powers already have their empires we were just late in having the opportunity to build ours. Now it's our turn.

The Great Depression in Japan

[44:59]

Japan is in the early 20th century a fairly sort of globalized and integrated economy. By consequence it suffers very badly in the Great Depression.

[45:13]

There is widespread misery in Japan particularly in the countryside. You know one of the sort of important aspects of the Great Depression for Japan is the worldwide decline in agricultural prices which actually begins even before the Wall Street crash.

[45:29]

In Japan agricultural prices fall by about two-thirds between the late 1920s and the early 1930s and this causes widespread immiseration in the countryside.

Political Upheaval Caused by the Great Depression

[45:40]

The economic dislocation of the Great Depression produces political upheaval in Japan, as elsewhere, as in Germany, as in much of Latin America, the Great Depression brokers a crisis of liberal politics.

[45:55]

It brings to power, sort of, authoritarian and nationalist political leaders. These leaders will continue and expand a Japanese imperial project which is much older than the crisis of the 1930s. Japan's quest for empire could be taken all the way back to the beginning of the 20th century.

The Russo-Japanese War and Conquest of Korea

[46:20]

The Russo-Japanese War↗ which Japan fights in order to sort of challenge Russian primacy in Northeast Asia results in the conquest of Korea which is brought under Japanese imperial control in 1905.

[46:36]

The Korean occupation is not formalized until 1911 but it dates back to the very early years of the 20th century.

The Logic of Japanese Imperialism

[46:43]

What happens in the 1930s will be that Japanese leaders attempt to sort of expand this empire far beyond Korea. Why do they do it? What is the logic of Japanese imperialism?

[46:56]

There are multiple logics as with most imperial projects. But I would emphasize both the geopolitical and the economic aspects. Japanese leaders seek to make Japan the dominant, even the hegemonic power, in East Asia.

[47:14]

Insofar as Japan is the first East Asian power to industrialize they have a historic opportunity to do that. And Japanese leaders attempt to capitalize on the opportunity that history presents them.

[47:27]

There's also an economic logic. Japan's leaders seek to consolidate Japan's position as the predominant economic power in East Asia. They seek to harness the rest of East Asia to be a source of fuel for the Japanese economic engine. And this is something that we'll talk about a little bit more when we think about the impact of the Great Depression.

The Rise of Militarist Leadership in Japan

[47:54]

The depression brings to power, militarist, a new militarist leadership in Japan -- a leadership that is more aggressively committed to the consolidation and expansion of an imperial zone than the liberal political leaders of the 1920s had been.

[48:14]

The liberal prime minister, Hamaguchi Yūkō↗, is murdered in 1930, and his death sort of marks the end of a long phase of liberal ascendancy in Japanese politics.

[48:27]

As liberalism crumbles into crisis nationalist organizations seek to exert you know their influence.

[48:34]

There's not a single sort of nationalist party, as there is in Germany, rather Japanese politics becomes permeated and dominated by an array of nationalist organizations. Probably the most famous of these is the Cherry Blossom Society↗, an organization of militarist military officers.

The Conquest of Manchuria

[48:53]

The major sort of event in the early 1930s that marks sort of Japan's emergence as a more aggressive imperial is the conquest of Manchuria in 1931↗. Manchuria is an industrial and materially rich region of northeast China. It had been a zone of Russian influence prior to the Russo-Japanese War↗.

[49:20]

One of the dividends that Japan wins with the peace treaty that concludes the Russo-Japanese War is control over railroad concessions in Manchuria.

[49:28]

In 1931 the Japanese Army in Manchuria stages a terrorist attack, the so-called Mukden Incident↗ in which they accuse Chinese nationalists of attacking the railroads that Japan is responsible for in Manchuria. This provides a pretext for the occupation of the entire province of Manchuria during 1931.

[49:49]

This is a very contentious move on the part of the Japanese Army of occupation in Manchuria. It's contentious in the larger international community. It results in Japan's departure from the League of Nations↗ after the League condemns Japan's conquest of Manchuria.

Contentiousness in Japan about the Invasion of Manchuria

[50:04]

But the move is also contentious within Japan. And this is really important.

[50:08]

The government in Tokyo does not approve of the conquest of Manchuria. The Japanese army is in effect operating on its own. And the conquest will result in the collapse of a civilian Japanese government at the end of 1931.

[50:22]

But the overall effect of the Manchuria crisis is to consolidate both Japanese territorial power in Northeast Asia and the ascendancy of the militarists within Japanese politics.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan's Further Conquests in the Late 1930s

[50:38]

In 1937 Japanese imperialists push much, much further -- much more aggressively. They invade the rest of China and try to bring sort of coastal eastern China under Japanese influence.

[50:58]

The logic for this is both strategic and economic, right. Insofar as China represents a large market for Japanese manufactured goods, and a large, you know, important source of raw materials potentially for Japanese industry. Japan's military leaders proceed according to a certain economic logic.

[51:17]

They hope that by subjugating China, by reducing China to a sort of subordinate colonized position, in relationship to Japan, that Japan will preside over a large integrated economic arena which will be organized so as to serve the interests of Japan and of Japanese industry.

[51:38]

This is very clear kind of logic of core periphery distinction↗ going on here. The Sino-Japanese War↗ is also really important insofar as it marks the beginning of Japan's estrangement from the United States.

[51:51]

The United States, a major Pacific power, does not want to see China come under the sway of Japanese colonial influence. The United States wants China to remain independent and the United States wants China to remain open for trade with all comers. Not, you know, cordoned off as an exclusive zone of Japanese economic opportunity.

[52:12]

The United States after 1937 begins to provide aid, falteringly at first, to the Chinese nationalists who seek to resist and dispel the Japanese invasion.

Japanese Conquest in Southeast Asia

[52:25]

Japan's war in China is fairly successful for about three years. In 1940 the Japanese advance begins to stall. At this point Japanese militarists begin to think seriously about alternative paths of expansion. Southeast Asia begins to loom large as a potential asset for the Japanese empire.

[52:46]

Early in 1941 Japan's military leaders decide to sort of pause the war in China, just to hold steady and consolidate the existing gains, and to shift their focus instead to Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Indochina in particular.

[53:03]

There are clear economic prizes to be won. Indonesia is the richest source of what in East Asia? What does Indonesia have that Japan doesn't?

[53:14]

(Student response)

Rubber is important.

[53:16]

And what else? What's really important for fueling? I'm sorry?

(Student response)

Oil. Oil is absolutely crucial. Insofar as Indonesia represents a potential source of oil it provides a source of strategic materials. But there are other strategic materials in Indonesia and Southeast Asia too. Rubber is also really important. You need gasoline to fuel your trucks but you need rubber to hit the road.

[53:43]

So Japan prepares for war in Southeast Asia. Japan's leaders recognize by the late summer of 1941 that any attempt to grab Southeast Asia and to incorporate it within a Japanese imperial zone will entail conflict with the United States.

[54:02]

Besides being committed to, you know, free trade principles in East Asia the United States is also a major colonial power in Southeast Asia. It still rules the Philippines. So a Southeast Asian thrust on Japan's part will necessarily lead to conflict with the United States. What do you do if you're a small rising power like Japan envisaging conflict with a big established power like the United States?

[54:33]

What would be a, you know, sensible precaution to take?

The Nazi-Japanese Alliance

[54:42]

Let's try it. You could align yourself with another big power -- which is what Japan does. The Nazi-Japanese alliance serves a Japanese strategic interest insofar as it sort of bolsters Japan with an international alliance.

The Attack on Pearl Habor

[54:58]

You might also think about what your adversaries' major military and strategic assets are and consider whether there is any sort of way that you can preemptively neutralize them. And this is what Japan does when it makes the decision to attack Pearl Harbor↗.

[55:14]

What is the major asset for American military power in the Pacific? It is the Pacific Fleet -- based at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. By striking Pearl Harbor prior to a declaration of war Japan hopes to knock out the Pacific Fleet as an effective fighting force -- perhaps to cripple Pearl Harbor as an offensive base from which American military actions can be launched and thereby to establish Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific.

[55:45]

The attack on Pearl Harbor is sort of partially successful. It does, you know, catastrophic damage to the American battle fleet. Ships, famously the USS Arizona↗ sunk, but the three US aircraft carriers in the Pacific are unscathed by the assault. And this is the real stroke of good fortune for the United States in Pearl Harbor.

[56:10]

The aircraft carriers are not damaged. And they will sort of eventually provide a platform from which the Pacific War can be waged.

Japan's Colonial Expansion after the Attack on Pearl Harbor

[56:19]

But having struck Pearl Harbor, in a preemptive move, Japan in early 1942 brings much of Southeast Asia under its control -- goes about conquering Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore.

[56:33]

And here you see a bit of a map of Japan's colonial expansion from the late 19th century through to the mid 1940s. And you can see it's a very, very impressive rapid increase in the extent of territory that comes under Tokyo's control. I'm afraid this map doesn't show Southeast Asia but you can sort of try to visualize Southeast Asia. Maybe next time I do the slide I'll try not to crop it so dramatically.

Japan's Colonial Vision and Proposition

[57:05]

So Japan bids for empire and is at least initially very successful in bringing the territories of Southeast Asia under its control. But what to do with this vast new empire? How to administer it? How perhaps even harder to legitimate it?

[57:25]

For legitimacy Japan promotes an ideology of Pan-Asianism↗ -- insofar as Japan's military forces have displaced European colonial empires in the Philippines, in Indonesia, and in Indochina -- Japan argues that its empire is not a colonial project but a liberatory project.

[57:44]

Asia, for the Asians is Japan's colonial slogan. And this creates dilemmas for political leaders in the countries that come under Japan's sway. Asia for the Asians sounds like a pretty good slogan. Should they cooperate with it? Some nationalist political leaders argue no.

Responses to Japanese Colonialism

[58:04]

Ho Chi Minh↗ says that colonial domination is colonial domination no matter who is perpetrating it. And he commits to resist the Japanese occupation by the force of arms. Sukarno↗ in Indonesia takes a very different perspective. Sukarno says, well, you know this is an opportunity to rid ourselves of the Dutch -- we might as well seize it.

Japan's Colonialism in Practice as Exploitation

[58:23]

Ultimately Ho ends up being proven more correct than Sukarno about the nature of Japanese colonial rule. Japan promises, most famously at a Great East Asian conference in the fall of 1943, to make its new colonies independent really, really soon. That promise is never redeemed. The economic relationship looks less like mutual co-prosperity and more like exploitative, you know, core-periphery dependence.

Japan's Ideology of Racial Superiority

[58:56]

Japan also embraces a sort of ideology of racial superiority. Japanese colonialists insist on the biological superiority of the Yamato peoples↗. It's not as sort of virulent an ideology of racial supremacy as that which Hitler formulates in Europe. There is some resemblance, and Japanese racism will sort of inhabit the forging of effective collaborative relationships between the Japanese and their new colonial subjects.

Violence by Japanese Forces During the Second World War

[59:30]

And of course there is the brutal violence. The Western colonial troops who are sort of displaced by the Japanese experience some of this.

The Bataan Death March

[59:41]

The Bataan Death March↗, for example, involves the forced march of prisoners of war from the Southern Philippines to the north of the island -- and its accompanied by brutal violence.

[59:57]

Prisoners of war are sort of starved to death -- bayoneted, cruelly tortured, or maimed during the Bataan Death March is which is perhaps just the most notorious episode of Japanese colonial violence.

[60:09]

It's important to remember that the victims of the Bataan Death March are for the most part Philippinos not Americans. The overwhelming majority of the people who die are Asians not Americans. Spectacles of violence such as this hardly serve to legitimate Japanese colonial rule in the eyes of its East Asian subjects.

End of the Japanese Empire

[60:31]

So that's the Japanese Empire. How does it end? Well, the answer is really simple. It ends because American military power, American material resources for waging war, ultimately prove superior to Japan's. Japan surrenders in 1945 following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima↗ and then Nagasaki↗.

Japan under MacArthur in the Postwar Period

[60:54]

With Japan's surrender the United States becomes the sole occupying power in Japan.

[61:01]

This is really Japan's good fortune if you compare Japan's postwar fate to that of East Germany.

[61:09]

The American occupation sets about to transform Japanese society: to modernize Japan, to liberalize Japanese, to ensure that Japan can never wage offensive war again.

[61:21]

The personification of American power and authority in Japan is the man pictured in the slide here with the Emperor Hirohito↗ -- Douglas MacArthur↗.

Gen. Douglas Macarthur with Japanese Emperor Hirohito

[61:32]

MacArthur in effect becomes the American proconsul↗ in Japan -- the ultimate source of power and authority -- the embodiment for the time being of sovereignty.

[61:43]

For a country that has never been invaded by a foreign power, which Japan had not prior to the American occupation, this represents you know a sort of ... This is a novel experience being dominated and colonized. Yet we should not allow the novelty of it all, as it might appear from Japan's perspective to obscure the underlying continuities.

[62:07]

MacArthur becomes sort of the dominant figure in Japan's politics, but the regime over which he presides is a regime which is in many respects a, you know, sort of continuation of the prewar government.

Institutional Continuity in Postwar Japan

[62:19]

Sensibly, the Americans in 1945, don't try to dismantle Japanese governing institutions. The Americans will prosecute the worst of the war criminals. But the Americans don't try to dismantle the Japanese state, and then hope to rebuild it.

[62:37]

Rather there is institutional continuity which facilitates the effective reconstruction of Japan.

American Objectives in Postwar Japan

[62:43]

What the Americans try to do and how do they seek to accomplish it?

Demilitarization

[62:48]

Demilitarization is the first objective. Japan will be, you know, sort of, removed from the ranks of the world's major military powers -- prohibited under the terms of its new constitution from maintaining offensive military forces.

Land Reform

[63:03]

The United States also undertakes a program of land reform in Japan. Large feudal land holdings will be dismantled, parceled up, and, you know sort of, sold off. The logic of land reform is to take apart the power of the conservative aristocracy in Japanese society.

Decartelization

[63:25]

In industry, a similar process of decartelization occurs. The United States under MacArthur will try to sort of break up and dismantle the large industrial conglomerations which were during the 1930s such important cheerleaders for Japanese colonialism in East Asia.

The Contrast Between MacArthur's Political Conservatism and the Progressive Agenda in Postwar Japan

[63:44]

There is sort of historical irony to this. MacArthur in his own politics is a fairly conservative Republican, as proconsul of Japan he ends up implementing a very progressive reform agenda. Make of that what you will.

Japan's Economic Prosperity Following the Second World War

[64:02]

Ultimately the occupation ends with sort of Japan's rehabilitation. Japan's economic rehabilitation is particularly stunning.

[64:13]

You know sort of the grand irony of Japanese history in the 20th century is this. That in the first half the 20th century Japan wages war for economic empire in East Asia -- insisting that Japan can never be secure and prosperous in a world dominated by the United States and organized according to sort of liberal precepts and principles.

[64:34]

This effort to create an economic empire, a colonial empire, ends in catastrophe. It end with Japan being atomic bombed by the United States.

[64:44]

In the second half the 20th century Japan does something total different. Japan seeks prosperity and affluence within a world order framework dominated by the United States and organized according to liberal principles. And Japan does much better under American power than it does in opposition to it.

[65:01]

So that's the irony of Japanese history in the 20th century.

Conclusion: Japan under MacArthur in the Postwar Period

[65:05]

But rehabilitation is not certain in 1945. It's not clear exactly what's going to become of Japan. MacArthur doesn't quite know what his final destination is going to be.

[65:18]

Answering that question, what will become of Japan, will be sort of a contingent process, and it's a process that depends very fundamentally on the escalation of larger Cold War rivalries and tensions in East Asia and to those that we should turn.

China and Cold War Division

[65:39]

I'm actually going to skip over Vietnam and I'll come back to that when I talk about the process of decolonization, and we'll try to conserve a little bit of time.

[65:48]

So let's turn straight to China and think about what happens there because China is really, really important. It's the epicenter, arguably of, East Asia's Cold War division. How does it come about?

[66:04]

You know, once again, we could take the story back quite a long way. Probably the most logical point of departure is the collapse of the Qing Dynasty↗ in 1911.

[66:15]

A political rupture of the grandest proportions that ushers in a long phase of political disaggregation -- a period in which warlordism prevails throughout much of the country in which there is no effective central authority.

[66:35]

During this period the two primary sort of nationalist political forces, the Kuomintang↗ headed by Chiang Kai-shek↗ pictured in the slide and the Chinese Communist Party↗.

Chiang Kai-shek in 1945

[66:48]

These two forces while briefly allied split profoundly and sort of decisively in 1927.

The Kuomintang

[66:57]

It is in the late 1920s the Kuomintang -- not the Communist Party -- that succeeds in unifying China. What kind of organization is the Kuomintang? What kind of party is it?

[67:11]

It's in many respects a progressive political party at least in the context of its times. It stands for centralization of political authority, for the administrative consolidation of the state, and for political and even some social reform.

[67:26]

It's not a left wing party, far left wing party, like the Communist Party, but it is a party that aspires to be modernizing and progressive. When it comes to power it establishes a sort of political center at Nanjing↗ under Chiang in the late 1920s.

The Chinese Civil War

[67:42]

Insofar as the Communists are not reconciled to Kuomintang dominance the achievement of a Kuomintang dominated state also produces a long civil war -- the so called Ten Years Civil War↗ which begins in 1927 with the estrangement of the two parties and ends only in 1937. Can anybody hazard a guess as to why the Ten Years Civil War ends in 1937?

[68:11]

(Student response)

That's right. Japan attacks in 1937 which forces the Kuomintang and the Communist Party into an uneasy alliance of cooperation. They sort of come together to fight the Japanese invader but they never really cooperate very effectively or very substantially. Even as they are sort of ostensibly working towards a common purpose they're still jockeying for advantage against each other.

[68:36]

I'm not going to talk too much about China's experience in the Second World War here. Not because it's not an interesting story but because it's such an interesting story that it would take us too long to do it justice.

China in the Postwar Period

[68:48]

So let's think about how the Second World War ends from a Chinese perspective.

[68:54]

In August 1945 Japan surrenders but Japanese occupation forces shaded in the chart in sort of pink still remain throughout much of coastal and southern China.

[69:08]

Japan of course still occupies Manchuria in the north where it has been for 15 years now.

[69:15]

China is not only divided between Japanese areas of occupation and areas that are not occupied by the Japanese it's also divided between areas that are dominated by the power of the Communist Party in vast swathes of the countryside, particularly in the north, and areas especially in the south, that are dominated by the Kuomintang.

[69:39]

The Kuomintang had its sort of wartime capital in Chongqing ↗ in the Chinese interior and that represents sort of the heart of Kuomintang power.

[69:51]

The contending Chinese forces are not the only players who matter in China at the end of the Second World War. As you know had sort of previously been the case in Chinese history in the 20th century. Foreign powers have a major role to play -- none more than important that the United States of America.

US Objectives in China for the Postwar Period

[70:12]

What does the United States do in Japan? What does it want to accomplish? Oh sorry, in China, what does it want to accomplish?

[70:18]

During the Second World War, the United States, supports the Kuomintang as a useful ally against the Japanese. Containing and fighting Japan is really the primarily objective of American policy in China during the Second World War.

US Support for the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek

[70:34]

And to this end the United States tries to promote cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. But the United States is never evenhanded. It leans to one side. It leans to, towards, Chiang Kai-Shek. And this is part because Chiang Kai-Shek looks like the more natural political leader of China. He has after all been leading China through the 1930s.

[70:58]

But it's also because Chiang Kai-Shek is not a communist. And there is strong support for Chiang in the domestic politics of the United States -- particularly on the West Coast, the so called China lobby is influential.

US Support for Truce Between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party

[71:10]

Despite these, you know, sort of structural biases toward the Kuomintang the United States works to produce, or tries to produce, a truce between the two Chinese parties. It does so out of the conviction that China will be a more useful military ally if it can get its act together, and if it's two major political factions can cooperate.

The Soviet Union and China in the Postwar Period

Soviet Support of the Chinese Communist Party

[71:32]

What about the Soviet Union? Like the United States the Soviet Union tilts to one side. It supports the Chinese Communist Party as a sort of fraternal Communist power.

[71:47]

But the Soviet Union really doesn't ever go so far, at least not until much later, to overtly align itself with the Chinese Communist Party.

Soviet Acceptance of the Kuomintang

[71:58]

The Soviet Union through the Second World War, and well into the postwar period, continues to recognize the Kuomintang as China's legitimate government. And there's certainly an argument which historians have made with some plausibility that Stalin in fact favored a Kuomintang dominated China rather than a China ruled by Mao Zedong↗.

[72:17]

So the Soviet relationship with the Chinese Civil War is very tricky. And it merits you know sort of more discussion than we can really afford to give it in the context of this lecture class.

Soviet Desire to Avoid Confrontation with the United States

[72:28]

Besides sort of maintaining a posture of neutrality in the conflict between the Kuomintang and the CCP Stalin also wants to avoid confrontation with the United States in and over China. This may have been Stalin's most urgent objective of all -- to avoid turning China into a Cold War battlefield.

CCP Victory in the Chinese Civil War

[72:49]

That the Chinese Civil War ends with a Chinese Communist victory owes much more to the Chinese Communists themselves ultimately than to the external powers.

[73:01]

After the Second World War the CCP consolidates control, particularly in the countryside, the Kuomintang by comparison struggles to establish political legitimacy and to sustain its own political authority.

[73:14]

As the political balance in China begins to shift toward the CCP so too does the military balance shift. Mao Zedong declares open warfare on the Kuomintang in mid-1948. Manchuria falls to the Communists later that summer.

[73:30]

In 1949 the Communists embark upon a major southern offensive that ultimately succeeds in reunifying all of the country except Taiwan under Mao Zedong's rule in the fall of 1949.

[73:43]

In September Mao declares a new government, a coalition government, so called, really dominated by the Communist Party, on October 1st 1949 he declares the People's Republic of China.

Mao's Commitment to Lean to the Soviet Union in the Cold War

[73:56]

In the Cold War Mao professes his commitment to lean to one side. Said he's not going to be neutral. He's going lean to one side. And there's little ambiguity as to which that side is going to be.

[74:09]

In 1949 at the very end of the year Mao travels to Moscow for a conference with Stalin that will produce and consecrate the Sino-Soviet Alliance↗. In early 1950 China and the Soviet Union sign a treaty: the Sino-Soviet Alliance. It provides a kind of mutual security pact, much like NATO, or sort of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe.

[74:33]

There are real benefits in this treaty for China. The Soviet Union renounces Russia's historic interests in Manchuria. The Qing Empire had signed concessions that gave Russia permanent interests in Manchuria. Stalin unilaterally renounces these which is to very much to China's advantage.

[74:54]

The Soviet Union also agrees to provide Mao with serious material assistance to rebuild and to develop China's economy. Having treated Mao somewhat indifferently through the long period of civil war that followed the Second World War Stalin almost seems in early 1950 to be trying to make amends for his earlier aloofness.

Chinese Communist Ascendancy and the Transformation of the Cold War

[75:17]

Now that Mao dominates China the Soviets are very eager to create a close alliance. This alliance transforms the Cold War, right. Eurasia's two great powers, the Soviet Union and China, are now by 1950, both Communist and are locked in a very tight strategic alliance.

[75:38]

This looks like a very different world from the world of 1945 in which China's future was still very open.

Cold War Division in Korea After the Second World War

[75:43]

The consolidation of a Communist Chinese state has consequences elsewhere in East Asia nowhere more important than in Korea.

[75:54]

The Korean Peninsula, as I've already mentioned, was occupied by Japan really from the beginning of the 20th century. With Japan's defeat in 1945 Korea's future becomes open. The country is temporarily occupied by US forces in the south and by Soviet forces in the north.

[76:12]

This doesn't mean that the United States and the Soviet Union want to transform Korea into a small version of Europe -- into a peninsula divided by the superpowers. On the contrary, both Moscow and Washington really want to neutralize Korea. They don't want to fight over Korea. They hope that Korea can be you know sort of turned into a sort of neutral arena in the Cold War.

[76:32]

To that end both the United States and the Soviet Union withdraw their military forces in 1948 and 1949.

Tension in the Korean Peninsula After the Second World War

[76:39]

But the question of Korea's postwar independent future remains uncertain. In the north the Soviets promote Kim Il-sung↗, a Russian trained Communist as their preferred successor, as the man whom they hope will rule over the entire nation of Korea.

[76:57]

In the South the United States promotes Syngman Rhee↗ a corrupt non-Communist as their preferred successor.

[77:05]

Rhee and Kim are fierce rivals from the very beginning. As Soviet and American occupation forces withdraw border skirmishes between South Korean and North Korean forces begin.

The Outbreak of the Korean War

[77:18]

It's not until July 1950; however, that outright war begins. It begins when North Korea under Kim Il-sung invades the South. Why does it do this?

Kim's Effort to Gain Support from Stalin and Mao

[77:30]

Well, the person to whom we have to turn for an explanation is really Kim Il-Sung. Kim is desperate to go to war to reunify Korea under his own auspices. The hard part is securing the support of Stalin for such a aggressive, potentially dangerous move.

[77:46]

But Kim goes to Stalin and says, this is really a great idea, will you support me in my effort to reunify Korea via military means? And Stalin says, well, I suppose so.

[77:56]

In part Stalin does that because he doesn't think that the United States will go to war over Korea. The United States has not publicly described Korea as a country to whose independence it is absolutely committed. So Stalin thinks that this can be gotten away with it.

[78:14]

And it's also the case that Korea dominated by Kim Il-Sung could be a useful sort of ally or resource for the Soviet Union in northeast Asia. By renouncing Manchuria in the Sino-Soviet Treaty Stalin has surrendered Russia's major sort of historic interest in northeast China establishing a new sphere of influence in Korea might be sort of substitute.

[78:40]

Mao has very little role in the origins of the Korean War he simply goes along with Kim's plan. Kim travels to Beijing after he's traveled to Moscow and says this is what I'm going to do.

[78:53]

And Mao says, well, I guess you're gonna do it then. This is not an action which China necessarily encourages. Mao simply accepts Stalin's guidance and leadership on the Korea issue. In part that's because Mao is much more concerned with Taiwan.

The Course of the Korean War

[79:09]

How does the war go? North Korea attacks in July. The West responds. It does so under the auspices of the United Nations. Security Council Resolution 84↗ authorizes the war but it's the United States that leads the war effort.

[79:23]

The course of the war is really not important. This is a class in military history.

[79:26]

But for the record North Korea initially thrusts deep into the South, United Nations forces respond with an ambitious daring military landing at Inchon in September 1950↗. Thereafter UN forces push north towards the Chinese border. At this point Mao decides to intervene directly with Chinese military forces in Korea.

[79:48]

Galvanized by sort of Chinese assistance the Communists push south then the United Nations pushes back and the whole thing settles with a return to the status quo ante. That is to say with Korea divided at the 38th parallel. The situation by the end of 1950 is a stalemate. This is more or less where it remains.

Consequences of the Korean War

[80:08]

[01:20:09.3] What are the consequences? Lot of dead Koreans. About 1.5 million military deaths. 2.5 million civilian deaths. And a semi-permanent division of Korea.

[80:19]

It's important to remember that the real costs of the Korean War are borne by the Koreans.

[80:24]

Who wins the Korean War? The answer is really simple: Japan. Japan experiences an export led economic boom, signs a security treaty with the United States that returns its sovereignty and independence, and is fully incorporated to the West. Japan as a consequence of the Korean War becomes sort of a major US strategic ally in East Asia.

[80:44]

There are major consequences for the Cold War too. The Korean War marks the militarization of the Cold War, and most importantly, and here we conclude the lecture, it makes the consolidation of the Cold War's division.

Conclusion: Cold War Division by 1950

[80:55]

By the end of 1950 the world has in effect been divided into two blocs of military territoriality. Each organized under the leadership of a dominant superpower.

[81:08]

Getting there however took five years. It wasn't necessarily obvious in 1945 that this was going to be how things ended up. It wasn't preordained by ideology nor was it preordained by the condition of bipolarity. To understand how the world gets divided I would suggest it's really important to pay attention to the consequences of the Second World War.

[81:29]

What is the legacy of the Second World War? What vacuums of power and authority does it create? And how do the superpowers end up filling it. Those are the questions on which you should reflect.